History of the California National Guard during the 1894 Railroad Strike

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CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD
AND
THE RAILROAD STRIKE OF 1894
The effects of the strike were felt more keenly in this State than in the Eastern states probably because of its isolation, its entire dependence on the railroads for transportation, and the fact that the strike took place at a time when the fruit crop was ready for shipment and depended on rapid transportation to Eastern markets. The first railroad to be affected was the Santa Fe system extending south to the Gulf and west to the Pacific Ocean, and on the twenty-eighth of June, Eugene V. Debs, President of the American Railway Union, telegraphed...
from Chicago to the Pacific coast representatives of the Union to tie up the entire Southern Pacific system, thus paralyzing practically the transportation facilities of the State from the Oregon line to San Diego and from the Pacific Ocean as far East as Nevada and Arizona. Fruit was ready for shipping to the markets of the East; merchants and manufacturers needed goods and supplies which could be procured only in the eastern cities; in fact a time could hardly be chosen when a tie up of transportation facilities would have a more disastrous affect on the State as a whole. It was the hope of the promoters of the strike to so completely paralyze all facilities for quick transportation both local and transcontinental, that the railroads would speedily meet the demands of the strikers and that in a very few days, business would resume its normal condition; but this was where the plans went awry. The railroad officials were obstinate and instead of acceding to the demands of their employees they seemed determined to fight the matter to a finish, and as a consequence the strike lasted about three weeks.

The localities in California principally affected by the strike were Los Angeles, Bakersfield, San Jose, Stockton, San Francisco, Oakland, Sacramento, Truckee, Port Costa, and Dunsmuir. Oakland was more seriously affected than San Francisco, and Los Angeles felt the effects of the strike to a greater extent than either of the two cities. However, in none of these cities did the strike reach the importance or receive the attention it did in Sacramento; that, appearing to be the point toward which the attention of the people was directed.

Delayed United States mail was piling up on every hand, and it was that fact which caused the strikers to come into conflict with "Uncle Sam".* On July first, the United States took a definite stand in the matter when the United States Attorney General sent instructions to United States Marshals whose territory was affected by the strike, to execute the processes

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*The Strike In California By Company B, First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, Page 15, State Library.
of the courts and prevent any hindrance to the free circulation
of the mails. Barry Baldwin, United States Marshal for the
northern district of California, was at Sacramento with a large
number of deputies sworn in for the occasion, as the group of
 strikers at Sacramento was larger, more determined and better
organized than at any other place in the State. On the third
of July, Baldwin attempted to open up the blockade. Strikers
calmly watched the making up of trains and then at a given
signal rushed forward, and in a few minutes demolished the
result of several hours' labor. The Marshal was thrown to the
ground several times, as he rushed among the strikers in a vain
effort to proceed with his plans to get the mail trains under
way. Finally realizing the hopelessness of the situation he
withdrew, leaving the depot in possession of the strikers and
that same afternoon he made formal request upon Governor Mark-
ham for military assistance in forcing and maintaining a free
passage for the United States Mail.

A plan had been arranged between the United States Marshal
for the southern district of California and Marshal Baldwin
of the northern district, to break almost simultaneously the
blockade at Los Angeles and Sacramento. Marshal Baldwin with
his deputies was to act in conjunction with the troops of the
National Guard at Sacramento, while the United States Marshal
for the southern district co-operated with the troops of the
Regular United States Army at Los Angeles.

The United States Marshal for the southern district had made
a request upon General T. H. Ruger, commanding the Western Division
of the United States Army for assistance at Los Angeles, and six
companies of Regulars (320 men) under command of Colonel Shafter
were dispatched from San Francisco to the southern city at 10:30
P.M., July second.* The Regular troops experienced little diffi-
culty in the south and without meeting any serious resistance
took possession of all railroad property in Los Angeles.

At Sacramento, however, the strikers, evidently encouraged by
their success in resisting the efforts of Marshal Baldwin to
open up a passage for the mails, were not so easily persuaded
to vacate the railroad depot and yards.** In compliance with
the request of the Marshal for military assistance, Governor

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*The Strike in California By Company B, First Infantry Regiment,
Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, page 15,
State Library.

**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, page 211.
Markham, on the third of July ordered Major General Dimond of the National Guard of California, to send troops to Sacramento to aid in quelling the disturbance there.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, General Dimond had as early as June thirtieth begun preparations for the movement of troops, and subsequent developments proved the value of his foresight. The experiences of Eastern Militia in strike troubles showed that the display of a large force had a salutary effect, and for that reason it was deemed advisable to call out a large force on this occasion.

Such a situation as that above described cannot be other than closely related to the activities of the National Guard, and as early as June twenty-ninth there were rumors of calling out the State Troops. In the Eastern States, as soon as a strike was inaugurated the people looked for the calling out of State troops, and as this mode of thinking had gravitated westward to California, people looked for the appearance of the Guard on this occasion. The members of the National Guard of California were especially interested in the situation, for when they enlisted they thought that a sham battle at camp was about as near as they would get to an actual engagement; therefore the experience of being called out was to the men a novel one. The men felt that this was their opportunity, and every member of the Guard was determined on this occasion to establish a reputation that would overshadow the previous charges of being "sidewalk soldiers."

On receipt of the order from the Governor requesting that troops be sent to Sacramento, Major General Dimond hastened to complete the arrangements already begun and immediately issued orders for the movement of troops to Sacramento.*

Following is a chart indicating the companies called into active service during the strike:

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*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Pages 212 and 213.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Relieved from strike duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 17 Truckee July 18-July 25</td>
<td>Irving B. Cook Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Homer H. Woodruff Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Arthur W. Baker Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>James F. Margo Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Edgar C. Sutliffe Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Edward G. Eisen Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1st Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>James W. Duffy Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3rd Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Edward H. Kennedy Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3rd Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Samuel J. Ruddell Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3rd Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Wm. M. Sullivan Captain</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3rd Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 25</td>
<td>Thomas F. Barry Colonel</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co.</td>
<td>Reg.</td>
<td>Called for strike duty</td>
<td>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</td>
<td>Commanding Officers</td>
<td>Brigade Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; G</td>
<td>3rd Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4–July 25</td>
<td>Daniel J. Driscoll Captain</td>
<td>Thomas F. Barry Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 men from Signal Corps</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4–July 25</td>
<td>Abbot A. Hanks Captain</td>
<td>John N. Dickinson Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. C</td>
<td>5th Inf.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oakland and Alameda July 4–July 22</td>
<td>Thomas Maclay Captain</td>
<td>D. B. Fairbanks Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; E</td>
<td>5th Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Oakland and Alameda July–July 22</td>
<td>John Dunbar Captain</td>
<td>D. B. Fairbanks Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; B</td>
<td>5th Inf.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>San Jose July 6–July 20</td>
<td>H. L. Partridge Captain</td>
<td>Albert K. Whitton Lt. Col.</td>
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## TROOPS OF THE SECOND BRIGADE (Continued)

<table>
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<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Re-lieved from strike duty</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; F</td>
<td>5th Inf.</td>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Oakland and Alameda July 4-July 5</td>
<td>Geo. H. Wetheren, Captain</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>&quot; 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; G</td>
<td>5th Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; 4</td>
<td>Oakland and Alameda July 12-July 23</td>
<td>Wm. F. Chipman, Captain</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>&quot; 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; D</td>
<td>2nd Artl. Reg.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Oakland July 12-July 30</td>
<td>C. F. Seitz, Captain</td>
<td>July 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; E</td>
<td>2nd Artl. Reg.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Oakland July 12-July 30</td>
<td>T. J. Cunningham, Captain</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TROOPS OF THE SECOND BRIGADE**

**Commanding Officers**

- Charles J. Poulter, Captain
- Geo. H. Wetheren, Captain
- Wm. F. Chipman, Captain
- Frank G. Easterby, Captain
- Charles Boxton, Captain
- C. F. Seitz, Captain
- T. J. Cunningham, Captain

**Re-lieved from strike duty**

- July 23
- " "
- " 21
- " 25
- Aug. 8
- July 30
- " "
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Brigade Commander</th>
<th>Relieved from strike duty</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detachment of Light Btry. A</td>
<td>Unattached</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Oakland, July 12-July 30</td>
<td>Hugh T. Sime Captain</td>
<td>Dennis Geary Lt. Col.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detachment of Signal Corps</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Oakland, July 12-July 24</td>
<td>Geo. C. Boardman First Lieut.</td>
<td>Dennis Geary Lt. Col.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop A Cavalry</td>
<td>Unattached</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Oakland, July 15-Aug. 8</td>
<td>S. P. Blumenberg Captain</td>
<td>Wm MacDonald Colonel</td>
<td>Aug. 8</td>
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</table>
# TROOPS OF THE THIRD BRIGADE

Commanded by Brigadier General M. W. Muller

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Re-leased from strike duty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>6th Inf.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 15, Dunsmuir July 15-July 25</td>
<td>Wm. E. Simpson Captain, John J. Nunan Colonel, Chas. H. Bulson Major</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>6th Inf.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sumner July 12-July 30</td>
<td>M. J. Byrnes Captain, S. S. Wright Lt. Col.</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**TROOPS OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE**

Commanded by Brigadier General Timothy W. Sheehan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Brigade Commander</th>
<th>Relieved from strike duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 24, Dunsmuir July 25-July 30</td>
<td>Alverst J. Lloyd Captain</td>
<td>John W. Guthrie Colonel Wm. H. Curson Major</td>
<td>July 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 18</td>
<td>Port Costa July 18-July 27</td>
<td>George Nyhill Captain</td>
<td>Arthur M. Seymour Major</td>
<td>n 27</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 25</td>
<td>Truckee July 25-Aug. 7</td>
<td>F. P. Tuttle Captain</td>
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<td>Aug. 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 4</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 24</td>
<td>Henry I. Seymour Captain</td>
<td>John W. Guthrie Colonel</td>
<td>July 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 4</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 16, Red Bluff July 16-July 23</td>
<td>Thomas B. Hall Captain</td>
<td>John W. Guthrie Colonel</td>
<td>July 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 25</td>
<td>Truckee July 25-Aug. 7</td>
<td>Peter J. Riley Captain</td>
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<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
<td>n 4</td>
<td>Sacramento July 4-July 24</td>
<td>Fred L. Martin First Lieut.</td>
<td>John W. Guthrie Colonel</td>
<td>July 24</td>
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<td>Light Btry.</td>
<td>2nd Inf.</td>
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<td>Sacramento July 4-July 24</td>
<td>John Cooke Captain</td>
<td>John W. Guthrie Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co.</td>
<td>Reg.</td>
<td>Called for strike duty</td>
<td>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</td>
<td>Commanding Officers</td>
<td>Relieved from strike duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Chico: July 4, Sacramento: July 24–July 30</td>
<td>Henry D. Burroughs, Captain</td>
<td>July 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
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<td>Colusa: July 4, Sacramento: July 24–July 30</td>
<td>Howard Ford, Captain</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Sacramento: July 24–July 30</td>
<td>Richard Belcher, First Lieut.</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sacramento: July 25–July 30</td>
<td>Milton G. Gill, First Lieut.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Red Bluff: July 23–July 29</td>
<td>Thomas B. Dozier, Captain</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chico: July 4, Sacramento: July 24–July 30</td>
<td>Warren Sexton, Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>8th Inf.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Willows: July 4, Sacramento: July 24–July 30</td>
<td>Marion W. Pirkey, Captain</td>
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</table>

**TROOPS OF THE FIFTH BRIGADE**

(James Montgomery Commander of the Fifth Brigade)
**DETACHMENT OF THE NAVAL BATTALION**

(Commaned by Lieutenant Commander Frederick H. Stahle)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Called for strike duty</th>
<th>Headquarters while on strike duty and duration of active service</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Company Commander</td>
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<td>Brigade Commander</td>
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<td>Relieved from strike duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co. B</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>Oakland July 15-July 30</td>
<td>Cecil G. Tennis</td>
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<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Wm. MacDonald</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>July 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; C</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; 10</td>
<td>San Jose July 15-July 15</td>
<td>Colin R. Douglas</td>
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<td>Albert K. Whitton</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
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<td>August 8</td>
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<td>Wm. MacDonald</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>&quot; D</td>
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<td>&quot; 15</td>
<td>Oakland July 15-Aug. 3</td>
<td>Lewis H. Turner</td>
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<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>July 30</td>
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</table>
About 5:45 P. M. on the third of July, Colonel Sullivan of the First Infantry Regiment and Colonel Barry of the Third Infantry Regiment, received orders to assemble the troops of their regiments, and both officers immediately proceeded to carry out their instructions.* Company rolls were divided into squads and a non-commissioned officer assigned to each squad, whose duty it was to notify each member to report at his armory immediately in service uniform and to bring blankets, an extra suit of underclothing, and rations for two days. If the members of the Guard had obeyed the order strictly, much of the discomfort they experienced afterward would have been avoided, but as it was, many of the men neglected to provide themselves with extra clothing and the two days' rations. A number of the Guardsmen did not receive notice of the movement until late in the evening and responded immediately without any preparation for nearly a month's absence from home, and a number of others neglected or more likely in the excitement of the occasion forgot, not only the two days' rations which they were ordered to take on the trip, but their evening meal before leaving home.

The zeal and alacrity with which the men responded to the call and obeyed orders after reaching their armory, were worthy of commendation. Intense activity and excitement prevailed inside the armory, while in front of the building a large crowd gathered. A curious, speculative group of people, some cheering the troops, others criticizing or condemning them, and a great many remaining silent as the members of the Guard were bustling about making preparations for their departure. The last act in the preparations was the distribution of ammunition, then the order was given to march.

Crowds had gathered along the street and at the San Francisco pier, to watch the troops leave the city. A large number of these were men whose views regarding the situation were such that they looked upon the calling out of the National Guard as an act on the part of the Government to abet the railroad company in opposing its employees, and not as a necessary act to maintain the laws of the land. These men jeered and cast slurs at the troops as they marched along. This was one extreme. The other extreme was made up of men who seemed to think that workmen had no rights whatever, and above all things no right to strike. This group called upon the soldiers to "blow the scoundrels to pieces". There was a third element

made up of men who had a true insight into the condition of affairs; men who fully recognized the position strikes held in the development of the human race, and from this stamp of men the Militia received its real encouragement. For they saw that the aims of the workingman could not be attained through disregard of the laws, but it was only by his developing with them and through them that he could ever reach his true plane.

The San Francisco Troops, (the First and Third Regiments of Infantry, half of the Signal Corps and part of Light Battery A of the Second Brigade) were ordered to be ready to leave for Sacramento that evening, July third.* It was decided to travel by way of Stockton instead of the direct route and the Stockton Troops, (Companies A and B of the Sixth Infantry Regiment, Third Brigade) were ordered to be ready to join the San Francisco contingent when the latter passed through Stockton the following morning, July fourth. The Sacramento troops, (Companies A, E, and G of the Second Infantry Regiment, the Signal Corps, and Light Battery B of the Fourth Brigade) were to join the main body upon the arrival of the latter at the capital city.

When the San Francisco Troops arrived at the Oakland Mole there was a delay of an hour, as the trains had to be made up since whoever was in charge of arranging for transportation of the troops, had "slipped" and trains were not ready. Finally the train in two sections was reported ready and the troops climbed aboard. The First Regiment occupied the first section of the train, and the Third Regiment together with the section of Light Battery occupied the second section, leaving the Mole ten minutes behind the first. Major General Dimond and Staff took passage on the second section and Brigadier General Dickinson and Staff on the first section. Men to guard the train were stationed on the front and rear platforms of each car and were relieved every hour. The guards were to prevent any person leaving the car and were to alight whenever the train stopped, to see that no one interfered or tampered with it. At Sixteenth Street Station, Oakland, there was another short delay when it was found that the pipes containing the wires of the block signal system had been cut, rendering the entire system useless.

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Many of the men had paid little if any attention to the order telling them to bring rations, and as the morning wore on, they were ready to eat, but what? The hungry mortals looked forward longingly to their arrival in Sacramento.

At Stockton, the San Francisco Troops were joined by Companies A and B of the Sixth Regiment who were taken on the second section of the train and all arrived in Sacramento, July fourth, at twenty-first and R Streets, about 8:30 A. M. There was considerable delay and confusion on entering Sacramento, but everything seemed quiet in that part of town. The men had little if any sleep and all were hungry, many of them having had no dinner the previous evening. Sacramento was hot and there was a three mile march to the armory ahead of them. Warm, weary, and hungry, the troops arrived at the armory about 9:30 and found the Sacramento Troops, (Companies E and G of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade) under arms there. The ample breakfast which the men had been told awaited them consisted of strong coffee as long as the coffee lasted and bread; then it was water and bread--hardly ample for men who had been awake and traveling all night, many without dinner the evening before and had executed such a trying march that morning.* Hardly ample either when considered that it was intended to serve both as breakfast and lunch, and it might be dinner. Surely a lesson in economy given by the military heads of the State to the civil heads who might wish to profit thereby.

At about 11:45 A. M., the movement from the armory toward the Southern Pacific depot commenced. To those in the ranks it seemed, as they marched up the street, that the large crowds of gaily dressed sightseers looked upon the march as part of a Fourth of July Celebration. It seemed more like a Saturday afternoon crowd than a mob, resisting the authority of the United States Marshal, but a closer inspection revealed the fact that a large majority were strikers. Upon the arrival of the troops at the depot there was enacted a scene of confusion almost indescribable and unbelievable. The space in front of the depot was thronged with men, women, and children in holiday attire. Many of the men were strikers and practically all were in sympathy with the strike movement. Inside the depot near the front entrance were about two hundred strikers armed with weapons of various kinds and apparently ready for battle. For the soldiers to attack the mob in front of the depot was of course out of the question.

as there were many women and children, also innocent sightseers among the strikers. These sightseers did not comprehend the situation, apparently, or if they did it was not their intention to aid the military authorities in gaining entrance to the depot. The mob simply ignored the requests of the officers commanding the troops to move aside.

The strain on the San Francisco troops now became intense. Lack of sleep and lack of food combined with the intense heat of that Fourth of July day began to have its effect, and many of the soldiers tottered and fell, overcome by the heat. It would have taken only a handful of men to clear the depot if thrown in from the rear, but this was not done. Why it was not was determined at a later date by a Court of Inquiry. Finally the Sacramento troops marched off the railroad grounds followed by part of the mob, then the Stockton companies followed, and Company G of the Third Infantry left their positions without orders to do so, and declined to return to their regiment when directed to by Major J. F. Smith who was then in command of the First Battalion of the Third Regiment, Second Brigade of which Company G was a part. The members of this company were tried by Court Martial on the charge of disobedience of orders and neglect of duty on July eighth, and found guilty of the charge and specification. The attention of the Court was called to the fact that these men had nothing to eat since the evening of July third; that they had traveled all night from San Francisco to Sacramento; that at the time when the disobedience of orders occurred it was about three o'clock in the afternoon of July Fourth at which time they had been standing for nearly three hours exposed to the intense heat of the sun, by reason of which they had become almost physically prostrated; that the commissioned officers of the company were some distance away from the men at the time, and that the accused being in this condition, retired as a body to a shady place not far distant taking their arms and accoutrements with them; that they retired without command to do so, but neither was any command given not to, and after retiring they remained together and retained their arms, accoutrements and ammunition; that many of the men claimed not to have heard the order of their battalion commander to return to their places, and that there was hesitation and delay until their Captain returned and gave the proper orders which they obeyed immediately and thereafter continued with their command. The accused were placed under arrest on July fifth, and continued in arrest performing police duty, until the evening of July tenth when they were released from arrest and ordered to duty which they performed in a most willing and efficient manner.*

Regarding Company A, Second Infantry Regiment, Fourth Brigade, this company, while not refusing to turn out on July Fourth, made it plain that they did not wish to be placed in a position where they would have to fire upon the strikers or the crowds of people surrounding the depot at Sacramento July Fourth, most of whom were their friends, neighbors, and fellow workers. Under the circumstances, General Sheehan who commanded the Fourth Brigade, decided to dismiss the company until further notice. The company was not immediately assigned to any other duty and their arms were removed from the armory to the State Capitol where they were stored. It was felt that this was sufficient punishment for the men, and several days later, July twenty-fifth, their arms were returned and they were assigned to guard duty guarding railroad property at Dunsmuir.*

The hesitation and confusion at the depot finally resulted in turning the command of all the State Troops over to United States Marshal Baldwin. General Dickinson, overcome by the heat had been taken off the field and Colonel Sullivan was temporarily in command of the Second Brigade troops, but all the commanding officers were to take orders from Marshal Baldwin only, and the Marshal's first order was to send details of troops to guard the Yolo and American River bridges. General Dimond protested against this order on the ground that such a movement would be considered by the strikers as a retreat and would be disastrous upon the morale of the troops. The Marshal insisted, however, upon the command being obeyed and the order was communicated to General Sheehan who immediately detailed Company E, Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade, to guard the Yolo bridge across the Sacramento River and Company G, Second Infantry and a squad from Light Battery B, Fourth Brigade, were detailed to guard the American River Bridge; but in compliance with orders from Marshal Baldwin on July fifth both of these details were withdrawn.**

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After dispatching General Sheehan to guard the railroad bridges, the United States Marshal and Colonel Sullivan mounted a cab near the depot and pleaded with the strikers to disperse, surrender the depot to the troops and return to their homes. This they refused to do and the Marshal then asked for a truce until three o'clock that day to which the strikers again objected, claiming that the time was too short. An agreement was finally reached and a truce until six o'clock was agreed upon.*

All through that hot afternoon of July Fourth no effort was made to enter the depot from the rear, although a few days later a corporals Guard of Regulars cleared the place in a few moments. During that hot afternoon about one hundred and fifty National Guard men were placed under the care of the hospital corps, but no fatalities resulted. At about 6:30 P.M. the order was given to fall in for supper and, needless to say, that was the most welcome sound the troops had heard that day. Thus ended the Fourth of July 1894, the first day of the bloodless battle of the Sacramento depot.**

Reports circulated and printed in the papers that the depot was not occupied on July Fourth because the men were demoralized and could not be trusted, were at a later date proved utterly false. The failure of the National Guard to accomplish its purpose could not be attributed to a lack of loyalty on the part of the troops. The Rank and File with the exception of two companies were at all times under good discipline and behaved with courage and loyalty. The two companies whose attitude was questionable were Company A of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade and Company G of the Third Infantry, Second Brigade. The first mentioned was a Sacramento Company whose members were mostly railroad employees and therefore in sympathy with the strikers; in fact some of them were strikers. This company remained at the armory after the arrival of the San Francisco and Stockton troops on July Fourth and took no part in the proceedings at the depot. There was talk of Court Martial proceedings but nothing developed in that line.

The other was Company G of the Third Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade and concerning it there were extenuating circumstances. The commissioned officers of the company were some distance away from the unit endeavoring to keep members of their own company and also of the Regiment to which they belonged from partaking of water which the surgeons had forbidden the men to drink, and had these officers remained with the company there is no doubt that it would have been as reliable as any other.

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**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Appendix.
†Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 249.
However, there were plenty of men in the ranks willing to retrieve the day when at three o'clock, after standing patiently in the sun for three hours they received their first orders which were to move off and abandon the attempt to occupy the depot. That night the First Infantry Troops were quartered at the new pavilion on Fifteenth Street, and the Third Infantry and the Stockton Troops were at the Armory at Sixth and L Streets, Sacramento. On the following day, July fifth, all the troops of the Second and Third Brigades moved to Capitol Park where they went into camp and remained there until July eleventh.*

In Oakland the strikers began aggressive operations, July third, when two trains were seized at Sixteenth Street, the air brakes cut and the regular running of trains stopped. Only spasmodic service was attempted throughout that day on July Fourth the strikers determined to prevent the moving of any trains on the local system. They invaded the railroad yards and took possession of the shops and offices. Engineers and firemen were taken from their posts with no gentle hands. No further attempt was made to operate the local railway system in Oakland until July thirteenth.** On July Fourth a company of Regular Soldiers stationed at Benicia was ordered to Oakland while Colonel Fairbanks commanding the Fifth Infantry Regiment, National Guard of California, was ordered to assemble his troops at the same place. Upon the arrival of the troops in Oakland, the evening of the Fourth, the situation had quieted somewhat and on July fifth Colonel Fairbanks was ordered to dismiss Companies A, F, and G of the Fifth Infantry until further orders.†

As soon as it became known to the strikers that the National Guard had been ordered to Sacramento a body of the strikers, variously estimated at from 125 to 200, all fully armed, captured a train at Dunsmuir on July Fourth, and left there about noon of that day for Sacramento to cooperate with the strikers at that point, and another train with about 100 strikers equally well armed left Truckee for the same destination. A

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*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 244.

**The Strike in California By Company B, First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, Page 89, State Library.

large crowd of strikers and sympathizers greeted the arrival of the Dunsmuir train at Redding. At Red Bluff, Company G of the Eighth Infantry Regiment, Fifth Brigade, under Captain Hall was ordered to stop the train from Dunsmuir and capture the strikers. About half of the company responded and the action so incensed the citizens there, that about two hundred of them gathered at the railroad station and prepared to oppose the militia and see that the strikers' train went through. A conflict seemed imminent when orders were given for Company G to retire to their armory.*

At about one o'clock P. M. the same day Colonel Henshaw commanding the Eighth Infantry Regiment of the Fifth Brigade stationed at Chico, was ordered to collect the troops of his command and intercept the strikers enroute to Sacramento from Dunsmuir. Colonel Henshaw responded with Companies A, B, and F of the Eighth Infantry and just as the troops were in a position to achieve a victory, Marshal Baldwin at Sacramento, fearful that such a movement would precipitate things to such an extent that the strikers would retaliate by destroying bridges and buildings, asked General Dimond to rescind the order. This was done and the troops were ordered back to their armories. The strikers from Dunsmuir and Truckee arrived in Sacramento, July fifth.**

On July sixth, the Sheriff of Santa Clara County, being unable to disperse the mob stationed at the depot and about the yards of the Southern Pacific Company at San Jose, made a call for military assistance and Company D of the Fifth Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, then at Oakland, was ordered to join Company B of the same Regiment at San Jose. Both of these companies were placed under the command of Colonel Whitton; but owing to the hesitancy of the Sheriff of the County to give an order calling for aggressive action against the strikers, the troops remained inactive until July tenth.†

At San Francisco there was rioting at the Southern Pacific machine shops, but it did not reach dangerous proportions. Precautions were taken to prevent the strikers from committing depredations, and to prevent the possibility of the strikers securing arms by raiding the armories of the National Guard. These arms were either removed to a safe place or the armory was guarded by a strong force day and night.‡‡

*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 263.


†Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 266.

The strike at that time involved about three-fourths of the United States and had developed into an armed rebellion against the laws of the land. On Monday, July eighth, President Cleveland's proclamation was issued regarding the employment of part of the military force of the United States in preventing further unlawful acts interfering with the functions of Government, or destroying or attempting to destroy property belonging to the United States or under its protection. The turning point of the strike had apparently been reached, and from this time on the impetus of the movement seemed to be downward. The arrest and imprisonment of Eugene V. Debs, President of the American Railway Union, in Chicago on the tenth of July on charges of conspiracy, added another force to the downward trend of the strike movement, and though rioting did not cease and the strike was not settled until some time later, the seriousness of the situation lessened by degrees. The ranks of the strikers became thinned and the men showed a strong inclination to return to work. Harmonious relations did not prevail among them and their temporary victory of July Fourth was slowly turning into defeat. Many of the strikers, counting on a swift victory were enthusiastic at first, but they were ill prepared to stand a long siege and many secretly prepared to desert the cause of the strikers at the first opportunity. There was talk of a compromise at the time, but nothing ever came of it.*

With the troops in Sacramento there had been no movement from July fifth to July tenth except the ordinary routine of camp life, and of course, guard duty and drills. Owing to the shortage of camp equipment, the men went out to meals at different downtowm hotels, always in squads of fifty or more, under charge of officers who marched them to and from the eating place selected. Only two meals a day were taken outside, lunch having been served on the grounds. Too much time to rest and sleep became monotonous and the soldiers were ready to welcome any change. A break in the routine came on the morning of the eleventh when the order was given to "fall in". The Regulars were coming and the Guardsmen were ordered to meet them on the river front. The troops of the National Guard marched to Front and L Streets, and from that point to the Southern Pacific depot, companies were stationed at all street crossings.

Just when the Regulars were landing, the troops under Colonel Barry who were stationed two blocks above L Street, were fired upon from the Yolo side of the Sacramento River and part of a company of the Third Regiment was immediately ordered out on the skirmish line to return the fire.** The line was reinforced by skirmishers from the First Regiment and about sixty shots were fired resulting in the wounding of one Japanese, an

*The Strike in California By Company, First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, Page 87, State Library.23
**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 236.
onlooker.* Hostilities soon ceased and the Regular Troops under Colonel Graham proceeded toward the Southern Pacific depot while the troops of the National Guard were ordered back to their camp on the Capitol grounds.

Upon their arrival at the depot, the Regulars found it almost deserted and entered without opposition. With the troops in possession of the premises, the railroad officials proceeded almost immediately to open the blockade. A train was made up and placed under guard of a detail of Regular Troops and at 12:06 P. M., July eleventh, the first train since July third, pulled out of the Sacramento depot for Oakland. At a small trestle about two and one-half miles west of Sacramento, the bolts had been withdrawn from the rails and when the train attempted to cross, it was ditched and the engineer and three United States soldiers were killed. By this outrageous crime the strikers lost more than they ever could hope to regain. Public opinion and the press turned against them. Colonel Graham was much affected by the disaster and resolved to show no mercy to those responsible for the crime.**

A systematic search for the guilty ones was immediately instituted with the result that Worden, Hatch, Knox, and a number of other leaders in the strike movement, who were implicated in the train wreck, were arrested and thrown into jail to await trial at Woodland, Yolo County on the charge of murder. Conclusive evidence was found that while professing to act peaceably, the strikers had made all possible preparations for even a revolution against the authority of the Government.

There were now stationed in the strike area in California United States Regular Troops as follows: At Los Angeles, six companies of Infantry; at Oakland, one company of Infantry, two hundred sailors and fifty marines; and at Sacramento there were four companies of Artillery, two companies of Cavalry and one company of Infantry.

Upon the arrival of the Regular Troops in Sacramento, Colonel Graham proceeded immediately with the execution of his plans for breaking the strike. The State Troops were now under his command and the Colonel's methods were too well known for the men to imagine that they would have cause to complain of too little activity in the future. The first order from Colonel

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*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 236.

**The Strike in California By Company B, First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, Page 111, State Library.
Graham was to break camp at Capitol Park and the Troops of the National Guard were assigned as follows:*

The First Regiment of Infantry, Second Brigade at Ninth and D Streets, Sacramento, and maintained a guard from the Roundhouse at the railroad yards East as far as Twelfth Street, and North to the bridge across the American River, requiring a detail of about one hundred and forty men per day.

The Third Regiment of Infantry, Second Brigade camped opposite the depot and they maintained the guard from the Roundhouse westerly to and beyond the Yolo Bridge, which guard required a detail of upward of one hundred and twenty men per day. This Regiment also maintained a guard consisting of one company in the Roundhouse. There was also a detail from the Third Regiment on duty at the powder house which was owned by the railroad company.

The Signal Corps detachment was encamped within the depot and was used for guarding trains as well as for signaling. The Gatling gun with its detachment was also encamped in the depot acting in conjunction with those of the United States Army.*

On July eleventh and twelfth in compliance with orders issued by United States Marshal Baldwin, Companies A and B of the Sixth Infantry, Third Brigade and Company B of the First Infantry, and Company D of the Third Infantry, Second Brigade all under command of Colonel Numan of the Sixth Infantry, Third Brigade, were detailed to raid certain premises in the vicinity of the City Hall and to secure such weapons and ammunition belonging to the strikers as might be found there. This search was a complete success from every point of view, and proved beyond a doubt that the strikers were prepared and really intended to engage in actual conflict with the troops. The command returned from the search with a conveyance loaded with about forty guns, more than a dozen pistols, a large quantity of cartridges, slugs and bolt heads, more than three dozen sabers, a quantity of lint and

bandages, and seven written documents containing memoranda of arms and ammunition, delivered to various parties from the strikers' headquarters. Many prisoners were rounded up during the raid, a number of whom were implicated in the train wreck of the eleventh.*

During the interval from July twelfth to the sixteenth, guard duty and little else occupied the attention of the troops stationed at Sacramento. There was a gradual but quite noticeable change in the attitude of the strikers as they became more and more discouraged as to the final outcome of the strike. July sixteenth saw more activity in and about the railroad yards than any day since the coming of the National Guard. That day saw definitely the breaking of the strike at that point. Many of the fireman and brakemen who had been forced out against their will were glad to return to work and the yards presented a busy appearance with men hustling about, clearing the railroad tracks and making up trains. On July seventeenth, circulars were issued by the management of the railroad offering work to all who had not taken an aggressive part in the strike, and a battalion of the First Infantry Regiment was ordered to Sixth and H Streets, Sacramento, to prevent any violence while the men were returning to work; but no trouble of that nature occurred and the troops returned to their former positions without interference.**

On July fourteenth, the first train in two weeks had arrived in Sacramento from Oakland by way of Benicia. Four trains including an overland train left Sacramento on that day, the overland being the first train to pull out with a Pullman car attached.

On the fifteenth and on the seventeenth of July, detachments from Companies A and B of the Sixth Infantry Regiment, Third Brigade under Colonel Nunan were ordered to Dunsmuir where it was reported several miles of railroad track had been greased and about half a mile of track torn up. On their way to Dunsmuir the troops made several stops to inspect the tracks and it was found that the report of the greasing of the tracks was correct, but none of the tracks had been torn up as reported. Companies A and B of the Sixth Infantry under Colonel Nunan remained at Dunsmuir until July twenty-sixth when they returned to Stockton, having been relieved by Company A of Sacramento and Company F of Woodland of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade.***

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*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 236.
**The Strike in California By Company B, First Infantry, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, Page 164, State Library.
On July eighteenth, Companies A and B of the First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade were ordered to Truckee under command of Major Burdick, to report to Colonel Guenther, United States Army, under whose instructions they were to perform the duties of guarding trestles, bridges, and other railroad property. These two companies remained at Truckee until July twenty-fifth when they returned to Sacramento having been relieved at Truckee by Company D of Auburn, and Company H of Grass Valley, both of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade.*

Conditions at Sacramento had steadily improved and on July twenty-second had become so nearly normal that it was considered unnecessary to hold all the troops of the National Guard longer, and General Dimond ordered the troops of the Fourth Brigade in active service in Sacramento dismissed. On the twenty-fifth of July the troops of the Second Brigade consisting of the First and Third Regiments of Infantry, part of the Signal Corps and a section of Light Battery A on duty in Sacramento, were ordered home. On the twenty-fourth, Colonel Henshaw had been ordered to report for duty at Sacramento where he arrived that same evening with Companies A, B, C, F and G of the Eighth Infantry Regiment, Fifth Brigade.** Company D of the same regiment was ordered from Red Bluff and reported in Sacramento the following day, July twenty-fifth, as did also Company B of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade, this company having been on duty at Woodland. Company C, Eighth Infantry, was posted at the Roundhouse, but was withdrawn the following day, and no guard was afterwards placed over that property. Company A, Eighth Infantry Regiment, was sent to guard the trestle and bridge across the American River. The troops of the Eighth Infantry were reinforced on the twenty-ninth by Company E from Red Bluff, and this force with Company B of the Second Infantry, continued to guard the tracks and property of the railroad company from Sutter Lake on the East to the point west of the city where the wreck had occurred, July eleventh, and North to the American River Bridge. No serious disturbance occurred, although a few loiterers and persons attempting to run the lines were arrested and turned over to the United States Marshal. On July thirtieth, all the troops of the National Guard on duty in Sacramento were dismissed.†

During the interval from July Fourth to July twelfth, the strikers remained masters of the situation in Oakland, and not until July twelfth was there any evidence of a movement to contest their position. On that date about two hundred sailors and fifty marines from the United States Navy arrived at the Oakland pier and on the following day, the Second Artillery Regiment, and a

**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 257.
†Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 228.
detachment from Light Battery A of the Second Brigade, National Guard of California and Company B of the Naval Battalion, National Guard of California, under command of Colonel Geary and Companies A, C, E, F and G of the Fifth Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, commanded by Colonel Fairbanks arrived in Oakland. These troops were reinforced on the morning of the fifteenth by Cavalry Troop A, Second Brigade, under command of Captain Blumenberg and Companies B and D of the Naval Battalion under command of Lieutenant Commander Stahle, all of the National Guard of California. These troops remained on duty in Oakland and Alameda guarding trains, ferry boats, yards and shops of the railroad company until the twenty-second when the companies of the Fifth Infantry, Second Brigade, were dismissed and returned to their armories. The troops met with little resistance by the strikers in Oakland and Alameda. In fact there was no organized resistance, the only trouble that occurred was of a minor nature caused by individuals. Several arrests were made in Oakland and the Sheriff finally protested on the grounds that the jails were filled and that he would be unable to accommodate any more prisoners. On July twenty-fourth, the Signal Corps and Light Battery A were dismissed, and on the twenty-fifth Light Battery B was ordered to return to their armory. On July thirtieth all the remaining troops at Oakland were dismissed except detachments of Cavalry, Naval Battalion, and one company of the Second Artillery Regiment who remained on guard and picket duty there until August eighth when they were ordered to return to their armories.*

In his report to the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard of California, concerning the operations of the forces under his command during the strike, Major General Dimond made favorable mention of Troop A, Cavalry, commanded by Captain Samuel P. Blumenberg, also of the three companies (B, C and D) of the Naval Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Commander Frederick H. Stahle, whose services in Oakland were of great value in restoring and keeping order during the strike disturbance.**

The National Guard forces on duty in San Francisco were placed under command of Colonel W. R. Smedberg during the strike. These forces were constantly changing under orders to proceed to different points throughout the central part of the State, but principally to Oakland, Alameda, San Jose and Port Costa. The need of troops in San Francisco was slight, the principal duties there being to guard the armories: the city police forces having been sufficient to quell the disturbance caused by the activities of the strikers at the Southern Pacific shops. During the two weeks he was in command at San Francisco, Colonel Smedberg's

*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Pages 228, 237, 279, and 291.
**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 231.
command consisted of detachments from several different companies of the Second and Fifth Regiments of Infantry and part of the Second Artillery. On January twenty-sixth, the last of the troops on duty in San Francisco were dismissed and Colonel Smedberg was relieved from duty.

On July sixteenth, Company A, Fifth Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade was detailed for guard duty at Port Costa, Contra Costa County, under command of Captain Poulter and on the eighteenth they were joined there by Company C of the Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade and Major A. Seymour who assumed command of the two companies at that point. Company G of the Fifth Infantry, Second Brigade, was also detailed to go to Port Costa on the eighteenth making three companies in all at that point. Although nothing alarming occurred there, the troops were not dismissed until July twenty-seventh.

At San Jose, Companies B and D of the Fifth Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, were quartered at the Armory until July ninth when upon recommendation of the Surgeon, Major Simpson, they made camp at the Fair Grounds near the city. Up to this time there had been no call made to use the troops, the Sheriff of the County hoping to be able to disperse the mob assembled at the Southern Pacific depot and railroad yards. On July tenth, the Sheriff called upon Colonel Whitton for assistance and Companies B and D reinforced by Company C of the Naval Reserve under command of Lieutenant Douglas, took possession of the Roundhouse, railroad yards and depot. A constant guard was kept on duty and while there was no rioting or disturbance, the presence of the troops gave the people a sense of security and although Colonel Whitton urged that the troops be excused, the fear of a new outbreak impelled the authorities to hold the troops there. Company C of the Naval Reserve under Lieutenant Douglas was dismissed July fifteenth and on the following day the Sheriff of Santa Clara County issued an order relieving Company D from further active service at that point. Camp was broken that day and Company D returned to San Francisco, while Company B, a San Jose company, remained at their armory subject to the Sheriff's orders until July twentieth when they were relieved from further duty.*

In Los Angeles the six companies of United States Regulars under command of Colonel Shafter were guarding the railroad property at that point, and had met with no resistance on the part of the strikers. The first train from Los Angeles to San Francisco since the strike was inaugurated, arrived in the latter city, July fifteenth.

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On the twelfth of July, Brigadier General Mueller was ordered to proceed with Companies E, F and G of the Sixth Regiment of Infantry, Third Brigade, to Bakersfield and from there to guard the disputed points on the Southern Pacific Railroad south to Tehachapi, and to furnish guards for trains running north from Bakersfield through the San Joaquin Valley. Although severely handicapped on account of the scarcity of proper equipment and the unserviceable condition of that which was available, General Mueller promptly complied with orders and on July thirteenth was in peaceable possession of the railroad property from Summer to Tehachapi. The work of his troops was done quietly and thoroughly and trains were in operation in that section on July seventeenth. Two companies of this detachment were dismissed on the twenty-fifth of July and the other company was sent home July thirtieth.*

At Truckee, Companies A and B of the First Infantry, Second Brigade, had been replaced by Company D of Auburn and Company H of Grass Valley, both companies of the Second Infantry Regiment, Fourth Brigade. These two companies, under command of Major Burdick, continued to guard the railroad tracks and other railroad property in and about Truckee, and east to the Nevada line; and to guard trains running between Colfax and the State line until August seventh when they were dismissed.

At Dunsmuir the detachment from Colonel Nunan's Companies A and B of the Sixth Infantry, Third Brigade, under Major Bulson established headquarters in a Pullman Sleeper near the Roundhouse. The crowd of strikers about the place hooted and jeered at the troops but no violence was attempted. On July seventeenth Colonel Nunan arrived at Dunsmuir with forty more men and on July eighteenth he established a military post there, and designated it as Camp Shasta making his headquarters in the Pullman car mentioned above, the troops using the depot for sleeping quarters. Everything passed off peaceably there, the principal duty of the troops being to keep on a strong guard and supply details for the various trains. This kept the men fully occupied. As a stronghold for strikers, on account of the great number of railroad employees stationed there, Dunsmuir was considered in strength and importance next to Sacramento and Oakland. Colonel Nunan performed his task there efficiently and well. There were no Regulars at Dunsmuir during the strike and all credit for a duty well performed belongs to the National Guard. Colonel Nunan's troops were relieved at Dunsmuir by Companies A and F of the Second Regiment, Fourth Brigade, under command of Major Curson, and the Third Brigade troops returned to Stockton on the twenty-fifth of July, Companies A and F of the Second Infantry remained at Dunsmuir until August seventh, when they were ordered to return to their armories; the former at Sacramento and the latter at Woodland.**

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**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Page 262.
Since July sixteenth it had been evident that the cause of the strikers was definitely lost. The continued entreaties of Eugene V. Debs, President of the American Railway Union, to his followers to stand firm, were in vain. From one end of the land to the other men were deserting the cause and Debs' announcement that business in Chicago was paralyzed was unheeded. Debs and his followers realized that the strike was lost, and knew that the loss could be ascribed to no other cause than violence by the strikers.*

Toward the end of July the strike slowly resolved itself into a legal battle in the courts. Every leader of prominence was arrested and a thousand criminal suits throughout the land ended the greatest railway strike in the history of our country. An end that few persons if any would have predicted on that memorable Fourth of July.

The damage to property by the strikers was not great when the magnitude of the movement was considered and the railroads were in full operation throughout California before the last of the troops were withdrawn. There was no loss of life due to actual strike conflict within the State; a few deaths caused by accidental discharge of firearms and the killing of three United States soldiers and the engineer in the train wreck near Sacramento, July eleventh, cover the fatalities due to the strike.

Los Angeles was the first place of importance to resume normal activities, then in order came San Francisco, Bakersfield, Oakland and Sacramento. The latter city feeling the effects of the strike in a greater degree than any of the other cities, because of the enormous amount of railroad traffic through there, especially during the fruit season.

The troops of the National Guard had performed the duties assigned to them with a willingness and alacrity that brought well deserved praise not only from the commanding officers of the State Troops; but also from Colonel Graham of the United States Army who had charge of all operations in the northern part of the State after his arrival in Sacramento, July eleventh. The Colonel showed a lively interest in the welfare of the militia, putting himself to much inconvenience to advise and instruct them in a plain and kindly way. Mistakes were made, plenty of them, but these men taken from their work in offices, factories, shops, in fact from every walk of life, could hardly be expected to be the equal in military tact and knowledge of the trained and hardened soldier.

From the time they left their armories, the State Troops were the objects of ridicule and derision, by fully one half of the civilian population.

*The Strike in California, By Company B, First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, National Guard of California, 1895, page 170, State Library.
population wherever they were stationed. These civilians, many of whom were strikers and a far greater number who were in sympathy with the strike movement, missed no opportunity to insult and abuse the members of the National Guard because of the prevailing mistaken idea that the Guardsmen were the representatives of "big business" and were, therefore, the natural enemies of the laboring class. Added to this was the experience of the San Francisco Troops in Sacramento on July Fourth where for hours they marched or stood exposed to the burning sun on one of the hottest days Sacramento had ever known. The men from the Bay District were not accustomed to such heat; most of them had received but little food, many of them none at all since the day previous, and they were forbidden to drink the water which was available. Therefore, it was not surprising that some of the soldiers collapsed. All weary and impatient as they stood there near the Sacramento depot in the broiling sun while their commanding officers hesitated, unable it appeared to agree on any plan of procedure.

During the temporary absence of Captain D. J. Driscoll of Company G, Third Infantry Regiment, most of the members of that company moved out of line to a shady spot a few feet away, and when ordered by Major Smith who commanded the Battalion to return to their former positions, refused to do so. Upon the return of Captain Driscoll a few minutes later, however, and at his command, the men moved back to their line. For their refusal to obey the command of Major Smith, these men were afterward placed under arrest, tried by Court Martial and punished, which from a military standpoint was necessary; nevertheless, it must be admitted that these were extenuating circumstances and that the men were sorely tried. Company A, Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade had openly declared that they would perform any duty and obey any command, except they would refuse to enter into actual conflict with the strikers. This company was disarmed and held at their armory until July twenty-fifth when they were detailed for guard and police duty at Dunsmuir.

From July Fourth on, the hardships endured by the troops of the National Guard were not as severe, but still were numerous. The men were supplied with food, but there was a noticeable lack of camp equipment, cooking utensils and the like. The arms supplied were insufficient and fully one half of those supplied were unserviceable; many were actually worthless. The men on duty in the higher altitudes and in the Bay District were without blankets or overcoats. Many were without shoes and all were placed upon their own resourcefulness in securing proper wearing apparel. No doubt much of this discomfort was caused by a lack of finances as the appropriations for the National Guard were insufficient to cover the heavy expenditures necessary in a campaign of this magnitude. However, a great deal of the hardship was also due to lack of foresight on the part of the commanding officers of the Guard, whose duties were to see first, that the men were properly equipped, and secondly that their comfort and well being
provided for as well as might be expected under the circumstances.*

Notwithstanding the criticism, the hooting and jeering of the crowds, the privations and hardships to which they were subjected, the Rank and File of the National Guard emerged from the ordeal with flying colors. The men had profited greatly by the experiences of the campaign and never again would they venture forth on a mission, the extent of which was unknown to them, in the state of unpreparedness which had caused them so much embarrassment and discomfort during July 1894. The commanding officers were also taught a lesson which they would remember. They were severely criticized by a Court of Inquiry (whose findings are hereinafter set forth) not alone for their negligence in ordering out their commands without knowing that the men were properly equipped for the service they were expected to render, but also for the hesitancy, uncertainty and lack of soldierly qualities, which was so much in evidence at Sacramento on July Fourth. Real leadership which the men would have respected and obeyed was lacking, and the troops could not help recognizing the fact. Then when failure of the movement to gain possession of the depot and railroad yards at Sacramento was evident, some of these officers attempted to place the responsibility for the failure upon the men under their command, by making the claim that the troops were demoralized and unreliable. These statements, untruthful as they were, were eagerly seized upon by the press and the unfriendly element of the citizens and were made much of, adding materially to the discomfort of the men of the National Guard who had given everything they had in the effort to make the movement a success.

Although the strike was ended as far as the National Guard of California was concerned, the matter of placing the responsibility for the failure of the State Troops to occupy the railroad premises in Sacramento on July Fourth, had to be attended to and on the eighth of September 1894, upon request of Brigadier General John H. Dickinson, commanding the Second Brigade, Special Order No. 12 was issued. General Dickinson's request was for the appointment of a Court of Inquiry as to the conduct of the troops of the Second Brigade including General Dickinson's own conduct; but it appearing to the Commander-in-Chief that in justice to the entire Guard of the State, a thorough inquiry should be made as to the conduct of all the troops including the Naval Battalion, participating in the late strike and the order was so drawn.**

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*Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Pages 242, 255, 256, 264 and 266.
The Court was appointed to meet in San Francisco on the seventeenth of September 1894, at the armory of Company C of the First Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, and inquire into the operations of the National Guard of California called into active service during the strike; and particularly as to the conduct of officers and men called into active service from July third until the date of the arrival of the United States Troops in Sacramento, July 11, 1894. The Court was also to inquire into the conduct of all troops participating in any manner, from the commencement of said strike to its close. The work of the Court was to be performed without regard to rank, prejudices or preconceived ideas, with its opinions freely expressed and its suggestions clearly enunciated. The work was to be done thoroughly and the labors of the Court to be performed with that fact in view. The detail of the Court was as follows:

Colonel Park Henshaw, Eighth Infantry, Fifth Brigade, President.
Colonel Frank W. Sumner, Staff, Commander-in-Chief.
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart S. Wright, Sixth Infantry, Third Brigade.
Captain Charles L. Tilden, retired, Recorder.

The Court was in session twenty days and performed its duties as directed with a view of eliciting the true facts. A large number of witnesses including citizens as well as members of the National Guard were examined and the testimony covered a thousand pages of legal cap.

The findings of the Court were as follows:

1. That the orders from the Commander-in-Chief to Major General Dimond to send troops to Sacramento were received in San Francisco at about 5:30 P. M., July third.

2. That the orders were immediately communicated to Brigadier General Dickinson and by him in turn communicated to Colonels Sullivan and Barry, commanding the First and Third Regiments of Infantry, Second Brigade, respectively.

3. That the troops showed remarkable promptness and zeal in reporting for duty and it was to the credit of the men that they reported for active service at a distant point in such large numbers; as the returns showed a larger per cent of men present for duty than was ever known at any camp.

4. That an attempt was made to supply the troops with breakfast upon their arrival at the armory at Sixth and L Streets, Sacramento; the breakfast consisted of bread and coffee and was so limited in quantity that the troops did not have sufficiently enough to satisfy their hunger.

5. That at about 11:40 A. M. after an inexcusable delay at the armory the command started its march for the depot with two companies and a Gatling gun detachment from the Second Infantry Regiment, Fourth Brigade, (Sacramento Troops) commanded by Colonel Guthrie, next were two companies from the Sixth Infantry, Third Brigade (Stockton Troops) commanded by Colonel Nunan and a part of the Signal Corps of the Fourth Brigade, forming the leading Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Sheehan. Next the First Infantry, Second Brigade (seven companies) under Colonel Sullivan, then the Third Infantry, Second Brigade, (seven companies) under Colonel Barry, then the Gatling gun and detachment from the Second Artillery, Second Brigade, followed by a part of the Signal Corps of the Second Brigade commanded by General Dickinson. The entire force numbered 947 men and officers. The order to provide one day's rations seemed to have been understood by General Dickinson and Colonels Sullivan and Barry, but with the exception of two or three companies of the First Regiment, Second Brigade, no attempt had been made to comply with it. So far as the court could ascertain the commissary officers had received no orders or instructions to provide rations, nor did the commanding officers themselves make any effort to obtain subsistence of any kind, although it was in evidence that as early as June thirtieth these officers had considered the probability of their commands being ordered out for service, and that on that date a consultation was held at which Generals Dimond and Dickinson and Colonels Sullivan and Barry were present, but from June thirtieth to July third nothing was done by any of these officers to prepare their commands for service. No funds were available for such an emergency, but the Court was convinced that a little exertion on the part of the officers would have procured the necessary supplies. This view was emphasized by the fact...
that provisions were afterwards readily obtained in Sacramento in much greater quantity and under more difficult circumstances.

6. That there apparently was no question that General Dickinson had received orders to cooperate with and support General Sheehan at the depot. The depot could be approached by three or four different streets, but there seems to have been no organized plan and no consideration of the advisability of marching to the depot in columns so that a strong line might have been formed and a force of skirmishers thrown forward. During the three hours that the troops remained at the armory on the morning of the Fourth no effort was made by any one to ascertain the actual situation of affairs at the depot; it appears that Generals Dimond and Dickinson accepted the assurance of General Sheehan that there would be no resistance and so the column of nearly one thousand men moved to the depot without taking the trouble or precaution to send a force or even a single skirmisher in advance. Upon arrival at the depot the Major General and his staff went inside the building and established headquarters from which point the troops were not under his personal observation.

7. That the crowd assembled at the depot that day was composed largely of curious onlookers who had no connection with the strikers; that the number of armed men who might have offered resistance at the depot was greatly exaggerated. People were drawn to the spot apparently, simply to observe the military display. The strikers at the depot were not desperate or threatening, nor openly armed and it was well known that a large majority of the railroad employees who quit work did so out of sympathy and were not rioters and would not have taken part in any violence. No real effort, from a military standpoint was made July Fourth to take possession of the railroad premises. The proof was overwhelming that the four companies and Gatling gun detachment comprising General Sheehan's command were entirely surrounded by the crowd and that the people were permitted to pass between the companies and to gather around the Gatling gun. This was proven by photographs taken at the time. For about an hour General Sheehan's command remained in this position and if the crowd had
been so disposed they could have overwhelmed his troops, taken the Gatling gun and turned it upon the Second Brigade. The fact that this was not done was the best possible proof of the absence of any large number of dangerous or desperate strikers. For nearly three hours while the troops were kept standing in column, the crowd was about the west end of the depot only; the remainder of the depot was open and no reason appears why it should not have been occupied.

That General Sheehan refused to obey orders directly communicated to him by General Dimond to effect an entrance into the depot by force if necessary. A spirit of hesitancy and doubt seemed to have taken possession of General Dimond and General Sheehan. There was great straining of technical points of law and questions of legal and constitutional rights were discussed at length. Notwithstanding orders to take the depot had been given to the brigade commanders by General Dimond and positive orders had been given to General Sheehan by General Dimond to clear the depot, he delayed their execution and when these orders were again repeated to him by General Dimond he demanded written orders from the United States Marshal and General Dimond, at the moment when strong and positive action should have been taken by him, turned the command over to the United States Marshal.

8. General Dickinson understood the object of the movement of the troops and his instructions to cooperate with and support General Sheehan must have been understood by him, yet, during all the time the troops remained at the depot no movement of his command was made or undertaken. Upon request of railroad officials and by direction of the United States Marshal two companies were detailed to guard the railroad bridges across the American and Sacramento Rivers and the two leading companies, those in direct contact with the crowd were by General Dimond's orders withdrawn for that duty. Colonel Numan, commanding the two remaining companies in General Sheehan's brigade then withdrew his command without orders. After the withdrawal of these four companies constituting the leading brigade, Colonel Sullivan upon whom the command of the Second Brigade had then devolved received positive orders from General Dimond to clear the depot by force if necessary. Colonel Sullivan questioned the advisability of this order, hesitated and instead of complying with the order he left his
command, without permission, went into the depot
to confer with General Dimond, urged the com-
manding General not to compel him to comply with
the order and represented to General Dimond
that the troops were demoralized and could not
be relied upon to execute that order and upon
such representations made by Colonel Sullivan
and at his request an armistice was entered into
between the United States Marshal and the strikers
and thereupon all military operations were
brought to an end. At a consultation held at
the depot a little before three o'clock between
Marshal Baldwin and General Dimond at which
Colonel Sullivan was present, it was represented
to Marshal Baldwin that owing to the dissatis-
faction of the troops it would be unsuitable
to go on with any offensive operations that day.
At a subsequent consultation between Marshal
Baldwin, General Dimond and General Dickinson,
the latter reported that as to the First and
Third Regiments he did not believe that at that
time they could be depended upon and General
Dimond confirmed the report as to the condition
of the troops.

9. That from July Fourth until July twelfth after
the arrival of the Federal Troops, the National
Guard forces remained inactive. No effort was
made during the seven days, and no reason
appeared why the depot could not have been taken
on any one of those days. The Court confessed
its inability to discover any reason for the
inactivity of the troops from July Fourth to
July eleventh. No service of any kind was per-
formed while in camp at Capitol Park except
the guarding of the camp, and there was nothing
tending to show that there was any danger of an
attack upon the camp. The discipline main-
tained in camp was rigid and severe and the men
cheerfully and at all times complied with all
orders and at no time evinced any inclination to
complain except at their lack of activity.

10. That in a measure the State was responsible
for the condition of the troops during the operations
of the National Guard in July 1894. It was generally
supposed that the troops were equipped to take
the field on short notice, but all organizations
of the National Guard suffered from want of proper
equipment. The troops were destitute of many items
of necessary equipment such as canteens, haversacks,
blankets and overcoats.

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11. That the rank and file, with the exception of Company A, Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade, and Company G, Third Infantry, Second Brigade, were at all times under good discipline and behaved with courage and loyalty.

12. That great injustice had been done the men by the reports made and the widespread publication that they were disloyal and unreliable and it was a source of pleasure to the Court to report that not only on the Fourth of July, but during the whole time they remained in Sacramento the men obeyed all orders with cheerfulness and alacrity and that with the exception of the two companies above mentioned the men could have been implicitly relied upon any duty. Some few were prostrated by the heat but the number was very limited and in many companies not a single man succumbed. There were men in the ranks plenty and willing to retrieve the day when after patiently standing in the sun for three hours they received their first orders which were to move off and abandon the attempt to occupy the depot.

13. That on July Fourth Company A, Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade, openly stated to their commanding officer and to General Sheehan that they would not obey all orders that might be issued. This company was later dismissed and its arms taken and stored, but some time later the arms were restored to the company and they were sent on duty at another point, but there was no evidence that the company had changed its convictions. Therefore, the Court found Company A, Second Infantry, Fourth Brigade, guilty of mutiny in declaring, immediately prior to the movement upon the depot that they would not obey orders. That the organization had disgraced the National Guard and recommended that the company be mustered out of the service.

14. That on July Fourth, Company G, Third Regiment Infantry, Second Brigade, commanded by Captain D. J. Driscoll, deserted the ranks, refused to return when ordered by Major Smith, commanding the Battalion and stated that they would not perform duty. They were placed under arrest and court martialed for refusing to obey orders but in the opinion of this Court of Inquiry the sentence of the Court Martial was not in proportion to the offense. The Court of Inquiry
determined that the organization had disgraced the National Guard and recommended that Company G, Third Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, be mustered out of the service.

15. That the Rank and File of the National Guard (with the exception of the two companies mentioned above) on duty at Sacramento and elsewhere, performed good and efficient service and in all cases behaved in a manner to reflect credit on any military organization.

16. That while it was known as early as June thirtieth that in all probability, the troops would be ordered to Sacramento, no preparation was made for that movement and it was not until the evening of July third that the orders reached the captains and in many cases did not reach the men at all. That the ranks were so well filled speaks volumes in praise of the enlisted men. The Court found that after due consideration of the facts, that a certain amount of blame should be attached to the officers in command.

Major General Dimond was held personally responsible for a number of mistakes as follows.*

1. It was ill advised to make any attempt against the depot at Sacramento on a national holiday.

2. When the trains were halted at Twenty-first Street, Sacramento, Major Dimond should have issued orders to proceed to the depot and if necessary he should have taken charge of the trains himself.

3. The Major General should have verified the statements of General Sheehan that the strikers would allow them to enter the depot without resistance and taken precautions so that there could have been no question of success in case of resistance.

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4. The Court held that the command should have moved in two or more parallel columns, in order that on arrival at the open ground near the depot the troops could have deployed, and a force of skirmishers be thrown forwards.

5. The Court found the Major General, equally with the Brigade commanders responsible for the faulty formation of the troops at the depot.

6. That, instead of establishing headquarters in the depot building, the Major General should have remained with the column so that he could have personally issued his orders and verified their execution.

7. That it was undoubtedly one of the grave errors of the day to place the Sacramento troops at the head of the column and in the opinion of the Court, if the San Francisco troops had been placed at the front, an entry into the depot could have been effected without trouble or loss of life.

Brigadier General Sheehan was held responsible by the Court for the following errors in judgment.*

1. His insistence on the right of line by reason of his seniority in the march from the armory to the depot. In a campaign a senior officer has no rights which his commanding officer is bound to respect.

2. In addressing the mob at the depot and pleading with the strikers, the General forgot his duty as an officer and violated the Regulations which prohibits making speeches to a mob.

3. The Court expressed the opinion that a greater portion of the responsibility for the failure to take the depot at Sacramento on July Fourth was due to the suggestions made and the advice given by General Sheehan and to the faulty handling of his command especially when in the immediate presence of the mob. The facts led to the conclusion that the acts of General Sheehan in stopping to plead and argue with the mob instead of taking the depot by force if necessary, when ordered to do so, made him liable to severe censure.

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Brigadier General Dickinson was found to be responsible for the following.*

1. As General Dickinson was on June thirtieth aware, that in all probability a portion of his Brigade would be ordered on active duty he should have directed his Colonels to place their regiments in condition for active service and he should have verified the work of his subordinates and seen that his orders were executed.

2. In the opinion of the Court, the attempt to take the Sacramento depot on July Fourth would have been a success had the San Francisco troops marched directly to that point instead of marching to Sixth and L Streets for breakfast. The General had neglected the most important duty of a commander, that of supplying his command with subsistence.

3. Upon arrival near the depot the General should have placed his command in formation to make or resist an attack. This was not done, hence General Dickinson's formation was faulty. The fact that his was not the leading brigade was no excuse.

4. In view of all the facts the Court found that General Dickinson was to be criticised for his neglect to make any movement toward taking the depot.

5. That the statements made by General Dickinson with regard to the demoralization of his command were not well founded and he should be criticised for not being better informed in that respect.

Colonel Sullivan was held responsible for the following.**

1. The lack of preparation of his Regiment.

2. Criticised by the Court for his actions while in command of the Second Brigade on July Fourth before the depot in Sacramento after General Dickinson had been overcome by the heat. On assuming that command the Colonel received positive orders to clear the depot and if necessary to use force in so doing. His orders required implicit obedience, but instead of obeying, he immediately left his command, went to the Major General's headquarters and urged that the

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**Adjutant General Report 1893-1894, Pages 308-309.
order be rescinded, and stated that his troops were not in a condition to take up the offensive.

3. The Court found Colonel Sullivan to be at fault in three things: Omitting to carry out the order of his commanding officer, leaving his command after receiving the order and violating military law by speaking to a mob.

4. Colonel Sullivan's statement to Major General Dimond and the United States Marshal in regard to the demoralization of his troops was not well founded and must be severely criticized as the representations so made by him at that time undoubtedly resulted in the declaring of the armistice by the Marshal and in the cessation of active operations.

As to Colonel Barry, the Court found that he was responsible for the lack of preparation for the campaign in his Regiment. He was present at the consultation held June thirtieth and it would have been an easy matter for him to have directed his Commissary to procure food supplies for his command sufficient for one or two days. Colonel Barry was also held responsible for the lack of discipline in portions of the Third Regiment and the lack of control of some of the field and company officers over their men.*

The Court found that Colonel Nunan committed a grave error in moving his command without orders when stationed in front of the depot in Sacramento, July Fourth.**

With reference to United States Marshal Baldwin, the Court was of the opinion that in view of the fact that the command of the troops had been turned over to him, he had full authority and would have greatly improved his position and that of the entire body of troops in Sacramento, July Fourth, had he simply notified the crowd to disperse, and on their refusal to do so given the Major General written authority to use force and take possession of the depot. In any event no armistice with a mob should have been considered. But the Marshal was advised that the troops were not in a condition for offensive operations and therefore consented to an armistice.

until 6 o'clock P. M. This gave the mob the prestige and put the troops in a false position.*

The proceedings, opinions and recommendations of the Court were commented on by Adjutant General C. C. Allen as follows:**

1. The censures of Brigadier General Sheehan were excessive in comparison with those imposed on other officers.

2. The censures of Colonel Sullivan were excessive as compared with those imposed on the three general officers then in the field.

3. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Court, orders were to be issued to muster out of the service of the State, Company A, Second Infantry Regiment, Fourth Brigade, and Company G, Third Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade.

In conclusion it would be well to summarize briefly the results of the great strike of 1894 insofar as it affected the National Guard of California. The experiences of officers and men from July Fourth to the date the last of the State troops were dismissed, could hardly be other than beneficial and for reaching in their effect. To the commanding officers was demonstrated the need of providing beforehand for the well being of the troops while on active duty and to that end a reasonable supply of rations, camp equipment, clothing and arms should be provided. That the good of the service and the general welfare should be considered before the seniority of any commissioned officer while on active duty; that one of the outstanding qualifications of a commanding officer should be his ability to employ strong and positive action in a time of stress similar to the situation encountered in Sacramento July Fourth; and that in every military movement there should be a carefully considered rearranged plan of action.

To the men, was brought a realization of the duties and responsibilities of their position, and the knowledge that they must lay aside all personal prejudices and direct their energies for the good of the service, thereby developing and strengthening a self reliant personality.


The experiences of the National Guard during the strike situation exposed the need of a careful revision of the Militia Laws and Regulations so as to make clear and positive the relative duties and rights of the civil and military authorities, in event that the question would again arise as to the authority and responsibility of each. It was recommended by the Court of Inquiry that,*

"A civil officer should have no actual command over the military and the law should be so amended as to clearly prescribe that the duties of civil officers are limited to the issuance of a notice or proclamation directing a disorderly assemblage to disperse and if such notice is ignored, the military should thereafter, under the sole command of its own officers, use sufficient force to accomplish the desired result; and the military officer should be compelled to use his own judgment as to the method of quelling the disturbance."

Without doubt, much of the uncertainty and delay at the depot in Sacramento on July Fourth, and the failure to intercept the strikers who had stolen the train at Dunsmuir on the same date, resulted from the fact that the Laws and Regulations did not clearly define the respective duties of the civil and military officers.** The knowledge acquired by these experiences impelled the Court of Inquiry which convened in San Francisco, September 17, 1894, to submit as part of its report, a recommendation that the National Guard be reorganized by raising the standard of the companies comprising State forces and at the same time reducing the number of Brigades and Regiments thereof so as to conform more nearly with the organization of the Regular Army. The recommendation of the Court met with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant General's department and were placed before the legislative bodies of the State. Accordingly, March 1895, a law was enacted reducing the number of companies of Infantry and Artillery in the National Guard from 70 to 60, reducing the number of Regiments from 9 to 5, and the number of Brigades was reduced from 6 to 3, thereby dispensing with about 150 commissioned officers.***

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At the same session of the Legislature, a law was enacted authorizing the commanding officer of any portion of the National Guard called into active service to disperse a mob or to enforce the execution of the laws of the State or of the United States, to use his own discretion with respect to the propriety of attacking or firing upon any mob or unlawful assembly, and that such commanding officer's honest and reasonable judgment in the exercise of his duty shall be full protection, civilly and criminally for any act performed or directed by him while on duty; thus vesting the National Guard with full authority and making the Guard responsible in situations similar to those encountered during the strike disturbance.*

These laws, undoubtedly a result of the strike, were also designed to conform as nearly as practicable with the laws and regulations governing the United States Army, and with the ultimate object of perfecting the National Guard of California into a more compact and more efficient organization.