

The 40th Infantry Division in the Korean War

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History
of the
40th
Division
(Korean War Chapter)

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CHAPTER TWELVE

KOREA, THE FRONT LINES

The first echelon shipped to Korea was the 160th Regimental Combat Team (including their 143rd Field Artillery Battalion) accompanied by the Headquarters of the Division Artillery, the 625th Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery A of the 140th AAA AW Battalion. They departed from Yokohama January 7, 1952 aboard Navy transports.

When the troops were transported to Korea, they were told how cold it would be. Many of them went down into the hot troop holds, and struggled into long johns, olive drab (wool) shirt, two pairs of fatigue pants, field jackets, and gloves with liners. They then put on their field packs and waited. When they got outside, the temperature hovered around 5 degrees below zero. They could see that there was little left of Inchon. They loaded their gear into railroad boxcars, and climbed into little Korean rickety and battered third class coach cars. They crossed the Han River to Chunchon. There they were put into 2½ ton trucks, sometimes without tops, for the rest of the move. It was incredibly cold, with icy wind cutting through flimsy field jackets. Those that could quickly broke out their extra blankets or used their sleeping bags to keep warm. Later on they were given fur-lined parkas and "sno pak" overshoes plus fur lined gloves with trigger fingers. By that time they were already half frozen.

As advertised, the troops found the sub-zero weather bitterly cold. Many soldiers would recall this period in Korea as the coldest time of their lives. Artillerymen had to be careful. When they swabbed the bore of their howitzers, water would drip and freeze, forming a miniature ice rink below the breech. That made it extremely slippery and dangerous when servicing the weapon. The artillerymen always had to have their gloves on. If they accidentally put a bare hand against the frozen metal, they could lose a layer of skin. Troops without hot water or open fires found they could defrost their C-rations enough to eat by putting them under their armpits.

When the troops arrived in Korea, they were immediately put into the front line. As troops passed the war-weary veterans returning from the front lines, anxiety and apprehension were heightened. The veterans of the Twenty-Fourth Division looked physically tired and emotionally beat. As they pulled off the line into reserve, many of them whispered to 40th soldiers as they passed, wishing them luck and a safe trip home next year.

The relief plan called for the Fortieth to leave its equipment in Japan, and take over the Twenty-Fourth Division's equipment in Korea. The Twenty-Fourth would fall back on the Fortieth Division's equipment left in Japan. This was a complicated move, but the most frustrating aspect was the condition of the equipment the division took over in Korea. Battle-weary and worn, much of the equipment was in extremely poor shape. The advance detachment of the division was shocked at the condition of the equipment. For example, the S4 of the 160th found that the 19th Infantry Regiment had thrown weapons and equipment in tents with no accountability of any kind. It was apparent that maintenance had been just about nonexistent on all weapons and vehicles. This was not something that had been allowed to happen only after the 24th Division found they were to leave Korea, as it was apparent that the condition had

existed for many months. The morale and esprit de corps of the troops being relieved was about as low as the condition of their equipment, so some of the 40th Division troops had to wonder what they were getting into.

Eventually, some equipment rebuilt by depots in Japan arrived to help the situation. However, the great majority of the equipment had to be laboriously repaired by organic ordnance and maintenance elements of the division.

Many of the division's soldiers were returning to Korea. A poor country when they left in 1946, they found the countryside much worse due to the ravages of war. The foreign smells were unforgettable. The smell of human excrement was mixed with the pungent odors of kimchi, the spicy dish made from pickled cabbage, peppers and garlic that is unique to Korea. Huge kimchi jugs were everywhere, sometimes on balconies, sometimes buried in the ground. Trees had been stripped by artillery, or by villagers for fuel. There was very little scrub brush left for concealment. The war had hit before Koreans had an opportunity to recover from decades of occupation by the Japanese, and most of the peasants were extremely poor. The many widows and orphans made a lousy situation worse, a situation that troops tried to help, each in his own way. But first they had a war to fight.

The division officially launched its first action on January 13, 1952, when Sergeant First Class Gary Ducat of Santa Monica pulled the lanyard on a 105mm howitzer of Battery B, 143rd Field Artillery Battalion. The battery was chosen by lot from the 143rd, the first field artillery battalion in position. The lanyard was yanked at about 10:00 a.m., with a great many officials and reporters observing.

The 160th started relieving units of the 19th Infantry of the 24th US Infantry Division on January 13th, and assumed responsibility for the zone on January 19th. Patrols were immediately sent out. Company A, 160th Infantry sent out

the first patrol, ten men led by Sergeant First Class Loren Knepp. A designated sniper in the patrol, Private First Class Pete Romus, developed a leg cramp when they were about 800 yards into enemy territory. He sat down to massage the cramp as the rest of the patrol went on. He then noted that an enemy patrol of about fifteen men was circling around to ambush their patrol in the rear. Romus yelled at his comrades, but they were too far away to hear him. He carefully aimed and fired at the first man in the enemy patrol when the Chinese soldier reached the crest of the hill. The enemy soldier was hit, and then fell down the hill. Private Romus continued to fire, as his comrades, warned by the firing, quickly returned to assist him. When the short, intense fight ended, at least two Chinese had been killed and several wounded. Sergeant Knepp was wounded in the leg by a burst from a "burp" gun, for which he was treated by the patrol's aidman, Corporal David M. Olvera of Hayward, California. Knepp then ordered Olvera to withdraw. Olvera refused, carrying the 200-pound sergeant about 125 yards to friendly lines. The assistant patrol leader, Sergeant Robert O'Connor, covered them by fire as they withdrew through heavy enemy small arms fire. Olvera was later awarded the division's first Bronze Star by the Eighth Army Commander, General James A. Van Fleet.

The division suffered its first combat death on January 20th. On that day, Sergeant First Class Kenneth Kaiser, Jr. of Los Angeles was killed by a mortar shell that fell into the 160th's positions near Kumsong. It was one of the first mortar shells that landed after 1-160th Infantry took over the area. The shell hit just as Kaiser, his platoon's section leader (assistant platoon sergeant), was going into the command post bunker. Sergeant Kaiser was only 18-years-old when he was killed, having joined the National Guard when he was sixteen. It was very common before and after World War II for men to lie about their age and join the National Guard when they were underage.

The division's second echelon left Yokohama on January 18th, and consisted of the Division Headquarters, the 223rd Infantry Regiment, and the 980th and 981st Field Artillery Battalions. When this echelon with the Division Headquarters landed at Inchon on January 22nd, the division was attached to IX Corps of Eighth U.S. Army. The division commander and his staff flew across from Haneda Air Base near Tokyo on January 19th. The 223rd completed relief of the 24th US Division's 21st Infantry on January 28th. On that day, the Commanding General of the 40th Division assumed sector responsibility (Kumsong-Chwapae-Ri in the central front) from the 24th US Division, effective at 7:55 a.m. on January 28, 1952. When the 40th assumed responsibility for the sector, the 24th's 6th Tank Battalion and 5th Regimental Combat Team were attached to the 40th Division. The division was now deployed with the 223rd Infantry on the left, the 5th RCT in the center, and the 160th Infantry on the right. The 224th Infantry and the division's 140th Tank battalion were en route from Japan as the month ended, having departed Yokohama on January 30th,

A tank-led, two platoon raid by the 5th US RCT resulted in the destruction of eight enemy bunkers, highlighting the combat activity for the period. Small scale patrol clashes characterized the combat activity, with numerous combat and reconnaissance patrols being dispatched by division units.

The Army publicly revealed the presence of the Fortieth in Korea on February 3rd. On that date, the 224th Infantry Regiment with the 140th Tank Battalion landed at Inchon and began their movement to the division sector. The 140th quickly began its relief of the 6th Tank Battalion, which was immediately released from attachment to the division. The 224th relieved the 5th US RCT in the center sector on February 10th, with the 5th then relieved from attachment.

The division's command post was initially located at Korisil, approximately seven miles southeast of Kumsong. The division rear was initially located at Ascom City near Seoul, but shortly moved to the vicinity of Chunchon.

The division's sector was on the east central front and occupied 9,300 meters of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). The 160th was on the east, the 224th in the center, and the 223rd in the west. The sector was a bulging salient that reached well into Chinese and North Korean positions. The 3rd ROK Division was on the division's east, and the 2nd ROK division was to the west.

Patrols were sent out every night. One patrol that headed out in the freezing weather consisted of a reinforced platoon from Company K, 223rd Infantry Regiment. They were spotted by the Chinese as dawn broke, and started taking heavy fire from four Chinese bunkers. The platoon retaliated with their 57mm recoilless rifle, followed by grenades. They killed several of the Chinese, with no losses to themselves. There were close calls, including helmets dented by burp gun bullets.

The "face" of the division had changed by this time. Earlier levies on the division had siphoned off many trained National Guardsmen. They were primarily replaced with draftees, plus a few Regular Army enlistees, and a few transfers from other National Guard divisions. These troops were quickly becoming combat veterans. Many found that they could smell the Chinese, who evidently consumed lots of garlic.

An aggravation to commanders throughout the division was the exceptional interest shown by Corps and higher staffs about minor details of routine daily operations. It was not uncommon to get a call from Corps wanting to know why a recon patrol the previous day had a BAR assigned to it, or why there were a certain number of men assigned to a combat patrol. The impression was that

some staff officers in higher headquarters didn't have enough of their own work to do.

The division pursued an aggressive program of company-size raids, and tank and artillery attacks on prepared positions. The control of the artillery was centralized, with all four battalions responsive to the division artillery fire direction center. The division artillery was commanded by West Pointer Brigadier General Horace Harding, with his tall executive officer, Colonel Charles O. Ott, Jr. serving as ramrod of the outfit.

The division was directed to participate in Operation "CLAM-UP" from February 10th to 15th. This was an operation across the front, ordered by Eighth Army Headquarters. It was also called Operation "SNARE" by some of the allied units. It was designed to lure Chinese patrols into ambush through cessation of friendly fire and patrolling, together with a simulation of withdrawal. It was hoped that a great many previously-hard-to-get prisoners would be snared by the ruse. The operation required a great deal of ammunition and other supplies to be stockpiled in advance, which was difficult due to the great number of unserviceable vehicles received from the 24th Infantry Division.

Operation CLAM-UP started at 6:00 p.m. on February 10th. All unnecessary daytime movements and activities were suspended. Friendly troops remained in concealed positions on the MLR and in strong points. Necessary activity was postponed until after dark. Initially, the desired reaction was forthcoming. Freedom from division artillery and infantry weapons fire brought numbers of enemy troops out into the open and patrols were sent out by the enemy to find out what the situation might be. In spite of the new boldness of the enemy, friendly troops were unable to capture any POW's without danger of compromising the plan. Soon it was apparent that enemy higher headquarters had become aware of the United Nations strategy because the enemy became

more cautious and used the time to improve their defensive positions and to move closer to UN lines, encroaching on what was previously considered no man's land.

Operation CLAM-UP was brought to a crashing close at 2:00 p.m. on the 15th by a coordinated display of firepower designed to inflict maximum shock and casualties upon the enemy. The operation was declared a success, with many valuable lessons learned. The truth was that the most valuable lesson learned was that such an operation could and did work more to the enemy's advantage than ours.

After Operation CLAM-UP, it was necessary to take steps to clear the enemy from the new positions which they occupied during that period. The plan included aggressive patrolling and company sized raiding attacks by elements of each regiment. However, only one of the planned raids was carried out.

The United Nations enjoyed air superiority, so weapons of the 140th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion were primarily used in a ground support role. The quad 50's mounted in half tracks put out a deadly amount of firepower, and could quickly have a decisive effect in a fire fight. They played a key role in the one "raid" conducted by the 224th Infantry on February 18th.

The 224th's commander was Colonel Jim ("Walking Jim") Richardson. Colonel Richardson was a very personable, highly competent commander who was well regarded by all of his troops. He had emphasized to all of his units the importance of never leaving a comrade in need.

He had an opportunity to personally demonstrate this when the 224th was chosen to make a limited predawn attack or raid, on February 18th. He met with Lieutenant Colonel Emmett A. ("The Red Fox") Rink, commander of 3rd Battalion of the 224th. Captain John Wilt's Company L from Orange County was given the lead in attacking the well-entrenched Chinese positions on a ridge line that

pointed right into the 224th's lines. Company L was supported by other elements of the 3-224th, including Captain Norman H. Young's Company M, the Heavy Weapons Company. Others in support included the 224th Tank Company, division artillery, and the division's quad-50's of the 140th AAA Battalion. Colonel Richardson knew the mission was extremely hazardous, and decided to accompany Company L in the assault. He actually placed himself at the lead with one of the platoons, accompanied by his radio operator.

The company attacked with the support of twenty-two tanks and three quad 50's, just as dawn broke. The troops moved out with two platoons abreast, and a third in reserve, as the armor in support poured 90mm shells and .50 calibre bullets into the bunkers and suspected enemy positions in front of the troops. The Communists responded initially with mortar and artillery fires, and then with grenades as the troops closed for close-in fighting.

The Chinese Communists on adjacent ridges tried to support their comrades with automatic weapons fire. Much of it was suppressed by heavy fires from the Fortieth Division artillery. Almost immediately, a radio reported that First Lieutenant James Ingelsby of Santa Ana had been killed. He wasn't supposed to be involved in the attack, and was due to take command of the company shortly after the attack. He chose to be with his soldiers during the attack. When he was hit by mortar fragments and fell, Master Sergeant William Cathcart, Company L's First Sergeant, rushed over to help rally the survivors of Ingelsby's platoon.

Soldiers from both sides fell in the violent clash. Several soldiers from the Fortieth died on that ridge line. One was Colonel Richardson's radio operator, who was mortally wounded during the assault. Colonel Richardson, who had a minor wound himself, carried his radio operator down the hill while under enemy fire, placing him on a tank deck for evacuation to the rear. Colonel Richardson

was covered with blood, some his own, but mostly that of his radio operator, as he went up and down the hill to help pull the casualties off.

When Colonel Richardson decided to disengage, the mortars laid down a curtain of fire to cover the withdrawal. The enemy took heavy casualties during the total of about four hours they were under fire. Losses included 27 KIA, 46 estimated KIA, and 65 estimated WIA. The 224th lost 4 KIA, 2 MIA, and 30 WIA.

The 3rd Battalion, 223rd Infantry conducted a company-sized raid to clear enemy bunkers and entrenchments along "The Boot" from map coordinates CT790508 to CT800520. The operation was going well until the unit tried to disengage. They called for assistance from the regiment's supporting 625th Field Artillery Battalion, which fired white phosphorus into the objective area to protect and screen the withdrawal.

The operations during February surfaced definite information about the enemy and provided some valuable experience. It also pointed out some of the training deficiencies in the division, such as insufficient combined arms training, a result of training area limitations in Japan and the wide dispersion of units necessitated by the dual role of training and defense of Northern Honshu.

Another significant combat action involved a two-phased operation in the Kumsong area on February 29th, employing armor supported by artillery. The first phase was carried out by two companies of the 140th Tank Battalion near Kumsong, and resulted in the destruction of six bunkers, and damaging of thirty-two more. There were an estimated 24 enemy KIA and 47 WIA. One of the 140th's tanks was damaged by a mine, but all tanks returned safely without any friendly casualties.

The second phase was conducted by the Tank Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, kicking off at noon on the same day. The unit attacked bunkers on the reverse slopes of Hill 378 and vicinity until recalled at 2:30 p.m. That action

resulted in ten enemy bunkers destroyed, with 8 enemy counted KIA, 12 estimated KIA, and 10 estimated WIA. Three of the 224th's tanks were so badly damaged by mines that they had to be stripped and destroyed in place because it would be too costly to recover them. Friendly casualties were three slightly wounded.

A lengthy episode that sullied the reputation of the division started in January, and really started bubbling up during February. Some Guardsmen and their families believed that the division would not be sent outside of the United States. Centered in San Bernardino, wives of Guardsmen were writing to protest the fact that the 40th and 45th Divisions were being sent into combat while so many other divisions were not. One former recruiter from San Bernardino, even said he had been told to tell prospective recruits they would not be sent overseas. The great majority of Guardsmen, however, told reporters they did not question their role in Korea. Nonetheless, the seeds of dissent had been sown.

The complaints began to surface shortly after it was revealed that the Fortieth was in combat, and grew after the division suffered its first casualties. Soldiers sent strong letters of protest to their families, pointing out that they were being called the "cry-baby division," because of complaints from their wives and mothers.

A dozen soldiers of the 224th wrote to the editor of the San Bernardino Sun-Telegram. They said "we view the (letter writing) campaign as emotional, unpatriotic, futile and unwise...We do not intend to return because of a successful protesting campaign on the home front. We intend to return because of a successful military campaign on the battle front."

After the letters from Korea, the great majority of those few family members who had been protesting shut up. However, the damage had been done, and

many brave soldiers died for a division that had difficulty shaking the "cry-baby" label.

When the snows began to melt, the troops had to be especially wary. Old mortar shells, both friendly and enemy, were uncovered everywhere. The remains of many bodies also began to be exposed. Some were enemy, but many were Koreans who had been killed by the Chinese the previous year. It was a humbling experience.

There was an unfortunate incident on March 2, 1952. Marine Corsairs strafed and bombed the division rear, killing several troops of the division's postal section. A Marine colonel later came to division headquarters to apologize, but was not well received.

An active defense was maintained during the month of March. Most of the contacts with the 12th CCF Army Corps were initiated by aggressive 40th Infantry Division patrols. The defensive line of the division, running generally from map coordinates CT775493 to CT910987 was improved. The program of aggressive patrolling was continued to maintain contact while inflicting maximum casualties and denying the enemy the opportunity of permanently entrenching himself south of Line BILL, a line parallel to and 1000-3000 yards in front of the MLR. Organic tanks were used effectively, in both day and night operations, conducting direct fire missions against enemy positions.

The enemy's lack of tanks and antitank weapons other than mines encouraged the division to make widespread use of tanks to destroy enemy bunkers. Tactics evolved wherein tanks were used at night in the same role so that the enemy had difficulty repairing bunkers during the hours of darkness as he had in the past. There was some equipment damage due to mines, but the results were considered excellent, and very few friendly casualties were sustained.

The enemy initiated eight engagements during March in a vain effort to capture United Nations prisoners. They were almost successful, however, during the early morning hours on March 18th. Three members of an enemy patrol infiltrated a friendly ambush position, and addressed a BAR man on the flank using English while attempting to take him prisoner. The soldier was able to free himself, and the two forces clashed later that morning in a brief fire fight.

During the period March 21st through 30th, the division was relieved by elements of the ROK Capital and 6th Divisions. Sector responsibility was assumed by the ROK forces on March 30th. The division immediately began a movement to relieve the 2nd ROK Division. The 160th Infantry Regiment completed the relief of the 32nd ROK Regiment, and the 223rd Infantry Regiment had relieved the 31st ROK Regiment as the month ended. Now the division found itself with the 7th U.S. Division on its left (west) flank, and the 6th ROK Division on its right. The three Regimental Combat Teams maintained the same relative positions as they had before, with the 223rd on the left, the 224th in the center, and the 160th on the right.

A rotation system had been established throughout Korea, and the 40th Replacement Company had structures constructed to house 750 incoming and 750 outgoing personnel simultaneously. The first large group to be rotated, 389 enlisted men, departed Chunchon en route to the port city of Inchon on March 23, 1952. The tempo of returning National Guard personnel was accelerated and the final major group left the division area on June 8, arriving in Seattle and San Francisco during the first week of July 1952.

On March 30, 1952, the division's command post was moved from Korisil to Chaegung-dong in the Kumwha Valley. The division rear was moved from Ascom City near Seoul to the Chunchon area.

On April 1st, the division completed the relief of the 2nd ROK Division and assumed control of the Kumhwa-Kumsong sector, with the MLR running from CT665409 to CT7766493. The division was deployed with the 223rd Infantry Regiment on the left, the 160th Infantry Regiment on the right, and the 224th Infantry Regiment and 140th Tank Battalion in division reserve.

The boundary between the Fortieth and the 2nd US Division changed on April 3rd, so the 224th Infantry Regiment was moved into the line on the left of the 223rd. Battle lines remained unchanged as the division constructed and improved positions in the new area, and conducted patrols and numerous tank operations against enemy positions. The experiments with tank operations the previous months were highly successful, so the division continued to send tanks forward of the MLR to engage enemy installations and positions with direct fire. The only damage to the tanks was mine damage to tracks which could be easily repaired. For the first time, the enemy was seen to use antitank weapons, including recoilless rifles and rocket launchers.

The division sustained several company-size probes by the enemy during April. It was decided to seize the ground west of a 223rd Infantry outpost between CT695434 and CT693436. Coordinated planning was conducted between the 223rd and 224th Infantry Regiments for a reinforced company-size operation on April 16th. On that day Company C, 224th attacked west through the 223rd outpost position and occupied the ground without enemy opposition.

Considerable effort during the month of April was devoted to a IX Corps exercise dubbed "Exercise MUSHROOM." This was a training exercise in defense against atomic attack.

One attack on Company M, 223rd Infantry at 3:30 a.m. on April 13th was particularly well planned and executed. An enemy force approached friendly positions from the rear, and with well-timed point blank burp gun fire killed the

sentries at both ends of the platoon position. The enemy quickly moved to individual personnel bunkers, simultaneously attacking six by hurling a grenade inside with immediate burp gun fire when the grenade exploded. The enemy rapidly withdrew and was well away before the surprised friendly units brought effective fire to bear. The Chinese had killed ten and wounded one, and probably suffered no casualties themselves.

There was a marked increase in enemy probes and enemy-initiated fire fights, all at night. This was especially true towards the end of the month. One particularly violent attack was made by an estimated company on Company A, 223rd Infantry Regiment on April 28th. After a brief fire fight the enemy withdrew, leaving eight enemy killed with an estimated 25 wounded. Company A suffered two killed and three wounded.

Since moving into the Kumhwa-Kumsong sector in April, troops felt a two or three-fold increase in incoming mortar and artillery fire. They were very conscious of the fact that the enemy looked right down their throats from Hill 1062 in the vicinity of CT648458. By May, an intensified program of bunker building and improvement was under way to increase the defensive capabilities of the division and to decrease friendly casualties. Commanders were also concerned about improving the siting and drainage of fortifications with the rainy season just around the corner.

Other than indirect fire from the enemy, there was very little enemy contact. It was decided to send out sizeable elements against enemy installations. There was concern that the enemy might be establishing installations south of Line BILL. The Division G2 coordinated tactical terrain studies of known and suspected enemy positions, and four were selected. Orders were given for large patrols to seize their objective, kill or capture enemy personnel encountered, and

then destroy the enemy fortifications. Four company-size night patrol actions were conducted in May, and all four were successful.

On May 19th, IX US Corps revised the division's left boundary to the rear of the MLR and relieved the division of responsibility for the vital Kumhwa Valley. The 7th US Division assumed responsibility for the valley.

The tactic of having tank units advance forward of the MLR and bust bunkers with direct fire was repeated in May. There were ten such attacks, but it was becoming apparent the enemy was reacting differently. They no longer were rebuilding the bunkers under cover of darkness. Unfortunately, one tank suffered a direct hit from an 82mm mortar, and was destroyed by fire. Luckily, there were no casualties among any of the tank crews.

A couple of T-6 "Mosquito" aircraft from the U.S.A.F. base at Chunchon appeared over the Fortieth Division's lines early in the afternoon of May 27th. Dispatched on a reconnaissance mission across the IX Corps front, a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) requested one of the aircraft make a low level reconnaissance of three possible gun and mortar positions. The aircraft turned south, and passed over the target at approximately 600 feet. Both the pilot and observer heard 20mm fire, followed quickly by flames in the cockpit.

The American pilot died in the crash of the aircraft. The observer, First Lieutenant W.P.R. ("Peter") Tolputt of Norfolk, England, had his moustache singed before he could bail out only 400 feet above the ground. Tolputt, on detached duty from the 14th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (1st British Commonwealth Division), hit the ground on the sloping side of a hill with considerable impact. His red and white parachute did not have time to fully deploy, so he ended up with a twisted knee. He looked around, trying to orient himself, and saw that he appeared to be surrounded on at least three sides by enemy-held hills. He used his URC-4 radio to contact the other T-6, piloted by

Captain John Payer (who retired as a Colonel in Tennessee). Payer told Peter not to move, Peter later finding out he was only about 75 yards from the Chinese, and 1000 yards from the Americans. About that time, continuous enemy small arms and automatic fire started hitting in the vicinity. Artillery fire shortly began to fall all around Peter, and when he asked the Mosquito pilot whether it was enemy or friendly, the pilot told him it was both.

Four F-51 Mustangs and two F80 jets arrived on the scene. The Mosquito fired marking rockets, and the fighter aircraft engaged enemy targets with their .50 calibre machine guns. The Mosquito brought the air and artillery strikes closer and closer to Lieutenant Tolputt to protect him from the Chinese.

The troops of Company E, 224th observed all this to their right front. First Lieutenant Arthur L. Belknap, the company commander, radioed to see if anyone was going to rescue the "pilot." When it was obvious no one else was going to, he called for volunteers. He quickly assembled a combat patrol with ten sergeants (four of whom were platoon sergeants), three corporals, and a private first class medic. His assistant patrol leader was Second Lieutenant Edward C. ("Shy") Meyer, Belknap's First Platoon Leader. Meyer had been assigned to Company E just five days before, along with Second Lieutenant Donald E. Rosenblum. Shy Meyer eventually rose to four star general and Chief of Staff of the Army, while Don Rosenblum ended up as a Lieutenant General and commander of First Army.

The Chinese, as determined from an intercepted radio transmission, were trying to capture Tolputt alive. The race was on to see who could get to Tolputt first. The patrol quickly moved out, threading their way through mine fields to reach Tolputt. One of Company E's mortars knocked out a Chinese machine gun while covering the patrol's advance. At least three enemy patrols were trying to reach Tolputt at the same time as Belknap's patrol, but with the air and

artillery fires delaying the enemy, the friendly patrol won the race. As they approached, Tolputt radioed the Mosquito, "Here comes a bloody lot of American sergeants!"

Tolputt the next day said "I later discovered that the abundance of high rank was due to the fact that this was an all-volunteer patrol. I was so delighted to see them that I shook hands with the nearest sergeant...Two members of the patrol shouted that they saw enemy troops and (started) firing their weapons. We departed in such haste that I neglected to bring my chute or URC-4 out with me...We reached friendlies after a walk of approximately one thousand meters, some of which I covered on the litter born by the medics and some assisted by members of the patrol helping me in pairs as I had twisted my knee on landing and suffered a head wound in the aircraft."

The patrol from Company E killed several Chinese as they covered their buddies who were assisting Tolputt back to friendly lines. As Tolputt wrote several years later, "The patrol lumbered with me, when returning to friendlies, in fact had a spirited fire fight nearly the whole way back, and in particular, Corporal Jack Appleby, who was in the unenviable position of 'Tail End Charlie,' himself accounted for at least 3 Chinese trying to catch up and surround us." Members of the patrol were awarded the Silver Star following the action. It had been an exciting end to a comparatively quiet period on the front lines.

Major General Hudelson turned command over to Brigadier General Joseph P. Cleland at 9:00 a.m. on June 2, 1952. On the same day, Colonel Gordon B. Rogers arrived to replace Brigadier General Homer O. Eaton, the Assistant Division Commander. Colonel Rogers had been wounded twice on Buna during World War II as General Eichelberger's G-2, and had extensive experience in the Pacific Theater.

General Hudelson departed via air the same day, arriving in Los Angeles on June 8th. By June 6th, all Guardsmen had been released except those who signed an extension. During the first phase of Korean combat for the division, while still under command of National Guard officers, the following statistics were recorded:

Killed in action	66
Wounded in action	327
Missing in action	<u>6</u>
Total casualties	399

Awards:

Silver Star	10
Soldier's Medal	1
Bronze Star	86
Air Medal	28
Commendation Ribbon w/Pendant	67
Purple Heart	277
Combat Infantry Badge	10,188
Combat Medical Badge	<u>661</u>
Total awards	11,318

General Cleland had an almost immediate impact on the division. He had considerable experience, primarily in airborne units. A comparatively small man, he was in exceptional physical shape for a man of his age. He could do a standing back flip, so he was given the nickname "Jumping Joe" Cleland by some of the troops. Almost his first order of the day was that everyone in the

division would run two miles in the morning before calisthenics and morning chow. He personally led the officers in the division headquarters, some of whom were advancing in age and not as fit as they should have been. They quickly shaped up.

General Cleland had a personal habit, whenever time allowed, of having his driver stop at the bottom of hills. Korea is a very hilly country, so this happened quite often. General Cleland would then jog up the mountain, where he would be picked up by his jeep driver. General Cleland was a very competent commander who quickly gained the respect of the division. The division perceptively improved when he assumed command.

Shortly after General Cleland assumed command of the division, a couple of significant and controversial changes were directed to be made in the division's patch and nickname. The division's patch was converted from a blue and gold square with one corner up, to a multi-colored diamond sewn on laterally. The patch was made in the far east and issued at no cost to all of the troops.

The division's nickname was changed from "Sunburst" to "Ball of Fire." The change served to immediately signal a shift in command style and philosophy. The patch design meant nothing to the replacements and draftees who joined the division. On the other hand, it was seen as an affront by many veterans of the division who had seen thousands of their comrades lost as casualties in two wars while wearing the traditional (and Department of the Army-approved) patch. Many derisively called the new patch the "Flaming Asshole."

Someone from Corps saw the unauthorized patch, and the issue went all the way up to Eighth Army. General Cleland was admonished, and the traditional patch returned.

Major General Hudelson criticized conduct of the war shortly after he returned to California, stating the war was becoming more political than military.

He wrote a series of articles for the Hearst newspapers, headlined "We Are Not Fighting to Win in Korea." He pointed out that the troops stopped at the truce line, not because they were stopped by the enemy, but because they had been ordered to. He felt that served no purpose except to give the enemy time to build up their forces opposite ours, and strongly said so. General Hudelson was *persona non grata* from that point on. He received a letter of reprimand from Lieutenant General Joseph M. Swing, Commanding General of Sixth Army, for his remarks about the fighting in Korea.

The division, under cover of darkness in early June, occupied the former OPLR in strength. There was no enemy contact, and the division remained deployed with the 224th on the left, the 223rd in the center, and the 160th on the right.

The division took some pride in patrolling more aggressively, and deeper, than other divisions. Patrol plans were rather elaborate, routinely involving dozens of patrols each night. Patrolling activity in June was no exception, and included several company-sized night raiding operations with the primary mission of seizing prisoners. Bunker busting operations continued, employing both tanks and towed 90mm guns along MLR positions. Two tank operations were conducted by units of the 140th Tank Battalion in support of company-sized attacks by 6th ROK Division units against enemy outposts. Three tanks were lost in the second of these two engagements.

The mission of June 14th to take prisoners was a particularly bloody effort. Patrol Number 21 called for Company F, 223rd Infantry to attack Hill 449 near Minari-gol to obtain a prisoner. The Battalion Intelligence Officer, who wanted a prisoner for interrogation, estimated that there were only about a dozen enemy on the hill.

The unit officers planned the attack, with the start time to occur just before dawn. Volunteers were called for, with a total of ninety officers and men responding. The men were briefed and coordination accomplished, when just four hours prior to the attack, a new plan was received from the battalion S-3. The revised plan was not as complete, and took the unit over another route that required them to traverse over a hill before assaulting the objective.

The unit moved to the line of departure to attack with three platoons abreast. The platoon on the left was lead by First Lieutenant Richard C. Wagner. As his platoon was guided to the line of departure through another company, the guides became disoriented, and dawn was breaking before the platoon moved out. They were slightly behind the platoons on their right as they moved up the hill with little or no cover.

Lieutenant Wagner's platoon no sooner got started when the word came that the company commander, Captain Curtis Weeks, was wounded (losing one eye, with another bullet through his shoulder and neck) and Wagner was to take command. In Wagner's words, "Studying the terrain, I decided to take my platoon up the two hills, keeping (close to the ridge line) to use as cover from enemy fire. Running forward we scrambled over one hill and up the second to (an enemy) bunker. The fifties passing overhead from our company perimeter were giving us excellent support. We advanced to within twenty feet of the bunker. The fifties could not have been more than four feet over our heads.

"The bunker was made of large logs and had no port for any large weapons. I saw a slit between the two lowest logs from which the North Koreans could observe the total area on either side of the ridge that ran from the base of the hill up to the bunker."

Lieutenant Wagner directed his radioman to fire the green smoke signal to lift the supporting fires so they could assault the bunker. When the green smoke

popped, three riflemen raced towards the left end of the bunker. Wagner's narrative continues, "just before they reached the bunker I fired three carbine rounds through the slit to pin down anyone inside. Immediately after that a stick grenade with a metal ball shaped top was thrown to the left of me, landing on a rocky ledge on level with my head, exploding a foot from my helmet." Wagner was badly wounded, but not knocked unconscious. He passed command to the platoon leader on his right, and then tumbled down the hill where the medics got him evacuated to a MASH unit.

The enemy opposition was much more intense than intelligence estimates had anticipated. Rather than about a dozen enemy, there were at least three times that. There were several automatic weapons on the hill, as well as supporting enemy small arms, artillery and mortars from adjacent hills. Corporal Clifton T. Speicher's squad was pinned down by heavy fires, and Speicher was wounded. He leapt up and charged the bunker directly in front of his squad, but was hit again as he approached the enemy position. Speicher was heavily wounded, with penetrating wounds to his stomach and hip. In spite of his wounds, he continued on, and killed the three North Koreans in the bunker, two with his rifle and one with his bayonet. The machine gun silenced, his men continued with the mission while Speicher worked his way to the foot of the hill where he died.

Sergeant David B. Bleak, from the medical company, had volunteered to accompany the attack. There were wounded everywhere, as seventy-five of the original ninety volunteers ended up wounded, in addition to those killed. He ministered to the wounded as he worked his way up the hill. As he neared the military crest of the hill, he was fired on from a trench as he tried to reach some wounded. He raced to the trench, killing two of the enemy with his bare hands, and another with his trench knife. Jumping out of the trench, he saw a grenade

fall near a fellow soldier. He quickly moved to place himself to shield the soldier from the blast. A few minutes later, he was struck by a bullet in the lower left leg, while treating the wounded. Though suffering a perforating wound himself, he picked up a casualty and started down the hill. On the way down he was attacked by two enemy soldiers with fixed bayonets. He put the casualty down, and grabbed the two North Koreans, smacking their heads together. He picked up his helpless companion, and carried him down the hill to safety.

The combat chronicle for the day reported fifteen of the enemy counted as KIA, and twenty estimated WIA. Company F got their prisoner of war, but at heavy cost. The company suffered two KIA's and two MIA's, in addition to the dozens of wounded soldiers.

Both Bleak and Speicher were later awarded the Medal of Honor, Speicher posthumously. Several factors contributed to this being an extraordinarily bloody affair, with comparatively few men escaping unscathed. Not only was the position heavily defended, with last minute changes contributing to misunderstandings and confusion, but the planned artillery barrage to keep the enemy pinned down never came. As Lieutenant Wagner noted, "The mortar companies fired a record number of shells. I wasn't there at the end, but I was told they saved all our butts."

The enemy prisoner of war was interrogated. He turned out to be a mortar squad leader from the 133rd Regiment, 45th Division, 15th CCF Army Corps. The prisoner provided the location of gun positions opposite the 223rd Infantry, and stated the Chinese were at full strength when they moved into the positions across from the 223rd.

The division artillery was kept busy, and well forward. The 105mm howitzer batteries would often move up right behind the mortars of infantry heavy weapons companies, and then lob shells over the hill by reducing the propellant

to only charge one or two. When the infantry regiments were pulled into reserve, the artillery would support ROK regiments, some of which had little or no artillery of their own.

The relief of the division by the 2nd ROK Division was accomplished from June 26th to 28th. On June 30th, the division (less the division artillery and tank battalion) moved into Field Training Center (FTC) #5 to begin a period of training and rehabilitation in conjunction with assuming the mission of IX US Corps reserve. The division artillery and tank battalion were placed under IX US Corps control to support the 2nd ROK Division.

Units that were not on the front line often had Korean "house boys" assigned on the basis of as many as one per staff section and one per squad tent. Korea hadn't even recovered from the Japanese occupation when the war broke out, so there were many Koreans without a means of support. In a mutually advantageous accommodation, house boys helped the troops with many housekeeping chores, for which they were provided food, shelter, and sometimes pay. This was considered such good "duty" by the Koreans, that units had to occasionally have a face-to-face identification check to control the number of bogus house boys.

The Korean police could be brutal to their own people, so when the division returned underage or bogus house boys to their communities, a sergeant would often be sent with them to ensure they got all the way home with whatever clothes, blankets, or other items the troops had given them. Otherwise they would be stopped, the Korean police would take the items for themselves, and send the former house boys on with only their underwear.

The summer of 1952 was unforgettable for many of the soldiers, especially when compared with the freezing winters. It was very hot, and the soldiers complained about rats which they claimed were as big as small dogs, and

poisonous snakes. However, the snakes did have one redeeming virtue, when the troops noted that they kept the rat population under control by eating the young ones.

Korean soldiers, or "KATUSA's," were assimilated into each of the regiments in great numbers. Americans got to quickly know the soldiers with names like Kim, Chung and Lee, and the language barriers were gradually stripped away.

On July 1st, 3-223rd Infantry Regiment was dispatched to the Sangdong Mine Area to perform a security mission. There they provided security for the mines, the US IX Corps Forward Command Post, and a radio station. Most of the 224th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 2nd Logistical Command on July 2nd, and left for Pusan to provide security for POW enclosures on Koje-do. The 3-224th, reinforced by two tank platoons, was given the same mission at Cheju-do.

A soldier from Company M, 224th described the duty on Cheju-do as "terrible." It was hot and humid, and the troops were not given any time off. They finished building the POW enclosures and stringing of barbed wire. The Special Orders for prisoner guards made it clear troops were not to permit abuse, beating, ridicule or maltreatment of prisoners. They spelled out the rules in great detail, including instructions on who was to handle discipline, how often work details were to get rest breaks, and other mundane details. Three of the twenty-two paragraphs also made it clear when deadly force was to be applied:

"16. If a Prisoner of War attempts to escape, the prisoner guard will call "Jon Ju." (This is the Chinese term for "Halt") If the Prisoner of War fails to halt the call will be repeated once. If the Prisoner of War still fails to halt the prisoner guard will shoot to kill the escaping Prisoner of War.

"17. Any incident where Prisoners of War are observed attacking or threatening to attack UN personnel by throwing any objects such as rocks, metal pieces, boards, etc., which could injure, maim or kill such UN personnel, the Prisoner(s) of War will be shot at that moment in order to protect the UN personnel concerned.

"18. In any incident where Prisoners of War are observed hitting, striking, kicking, biting or in any other way observed doing injury or maiming or threatening to maim UN personnel, such Prisoner(s) of War will be shot at that moment in order to protect UN personnel concerned."

Back on the mainland, General Cleland was promoted to Major General effective July 6th. A week later most of the division moved from FTC #5 to a new training area near Kapyong (sometimes spelled "Gapyong") after nearly six months of continuous combat. The division completed the move by July 20th, resuming training and security missions.

General Cleland temporarily was assigned command of the IX US Corps on July 31st, while Brigadier General Gordon B. Rogers assumed command of the Fortieth.

The division's move to Kapyong brought them to a formerly picturesque area just a few miles south of the 38th Parallel. For several months, residents of the city had suffered under the rule of the North Koreans. They were freed by the first United Nations push to the north, but had to escape south when friendly forces were again pushed back. Thousands of Kapyong residents died of starvation, disease, or the bitter cold as they trekked to the south. The city was repeatedly fought over, and was all but completely destroyed.

Soldiers of the division were struck by the plight of Kapyong's children, who hadn't had a school building for two years. Village elders were teaching the

children using old boxes for desks and otherwise making do as best they could. The soldiers were determined to do something about it.

Building a new school became a division project. Almost \$14,000 was collected within a week. During just one payday, soldiers contributed over \$17,000. The division's 578th Engineer Battalion quickly produced plans for a ten classroom high school, and the Koreans donated an eight acre site. A joint Korean-40th Division committee had agreed that the school would be built of native stone, and materials would be purchased in Korea to help the war-torn economy. Other men of the division came by to assist the engineers in the work, although most of the work was done by the Koreans, and the school was ready for use by October 18, 1952. The school was dedicated on that date to the "future leaders of the Republic of Korea by the officers and men of the 40th Infantry Division, United States Army."

The school was named for Sergeant First Class Kenneth Kaiser, the young Angeleno from Company B, 160th Infantry who was the first member of the division to be killed in action. Kaiser had joined Company B, 160th Infantry in Los Angeles when only sixteen. A good soldier, he had learned fast from the senior sergeants in the company, most of whom were veterans of World War II. He was second in command of his platoon, and only eighteen-years-old when he was killed by mortar fragments on January 20, 1952 just three days after his unit arrived in Korea.

A monument was constructed near the entrance to the school. It has a plaque with Major General Cleland's face on one side, and Sergeant Kaiser's on the other. There is also a plaque with the division crest at the top which tells the story of the school.

The school was the first coeducational school in Korea, with three hundred children as its first occupants (although it quickly grew to an enrollment of almost

2,000). There was one short-lived threat to the school. The Korean National Police were impressed with the school, the only large building in the region that was undamaged, and were determined to make it their local headquarters. The division commander immediately made it clear that his troops could tear it down even faster than they put it up, and it had been built for children, not police officers. The police quickly backed off.

While the division was located in and around Kapyong, there were military missions to be accomplished. Elements of the division remained detached in support of the 2nd ROK Division and the 2nd Logistical Command.

The 160th and 223rd Infantry Regiments kept training in the Kapyong area while most of the 40th Division had an additional mission as reserve for the IX U.S. Corps. Extensive plans and preparations were made to prepare the division for instant employment as a counterattacking or blocking force should that be required. The two regiments rehabilitated and improved reserve defensive positions on the division's portion of Line KANSAS, a defensive line selected by General Van Fleet. That defensive line followed the twisting curves of the Imjin River from the west coast, and then generally paralleled to the north of the 38th Parallel.

On August 9th, Major General Cleland returned to command of the division. The 160th and 223rd Infantry Regiments participated in battalion-size combat firing exercises. The 224th Infantry Regiment was relieved from its security mission at Cheju-do on September 23rd, and rejoined the division. The division continued to rehabilitate defensive positions on Line KANSAS while performing various training and security missions.

The First Battalion of the Turkish Brigade was assigned to the division in October, 1952. The division was ordered on October 16th to relieve the 25th US Division in the Paeam - Ihyon-Ni sector. On October 21st, the division artillery

and the 140th Tank Battalion were returned to division control. By the next day, the 224th Infantry Regiment had relieved the 25th Division's 27th Infantry Regiment, and the 160th Infantry Regiment had relieved the 14th Infantry Regiment. The Commanding General of the Fortieth Infantry Division assumed sector responsibility on October 22nd.

The division then passed to control of the X US Corps. The 5th Regimental Combat Team was attached, with the 160th Infantry deployed on the left, the 224th in the center, and the 5th on the right. The 223rd arrived a day later, and was placed in division reserve. On October 31st, the 5th RCT moved to division reserve positions after being relieved by the 223rd.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE FIGHT TO THE END

During most of the month of October 1952, the division continued in defensive positions, maintaining enemy contact by aggressive patrol activity. Combat was highlighted by a series of enemy attacks which ranged from reinforced platoon up to almost battalion size.

The heaviest combat during the month of October occurred early the morning of the 26th. On that date an estimated understrength battalion, supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire, attacked Companies F and G, 160th Infantry on Heartbreak Ridge. A one hour and twenty minute fire fight ensued, with the enemy advancing to within 35 yards of friendly positions. They were then forced to withdraw with an estimated twenty KIA and forty WIA. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy during the various attacks, and the MLR was firmly in friendly hands at the end of the month.

The division, with its command post firmly entrenched at Tokkol-li in the center of the X US Corps sector along Line MINNESOTA, continued to have the 160th Infantry on the left, the 224th in the center, the 223rd on the right, and the 5th RCT in reserve. There were numerous small unit actions and night patrols during the month. Tanks continued to play a key role through heavy direct-fire destruction of enemy installations.

The fighting on Heartbreak Ridge had evolved into trench warfare, with extensive fortifications and bunkers. The soldiers fought from the forward slope, which was always manned to some degree. They slept and had such positions as administrative bunkers on the reverse slope. Artillery and mortar fires had stripped the foliage from the few trees that remained. Each night patrols would be sent out by both sides to probe for weaknesses, gather information, or capture prisoners.

The tedium of front line duty was broken up by entertainment from "Peking Sally," who broadcast daily over loudspeakers from "Station WWW." The soldiers never knew what those initials meant, but enjoyed the broadcasts from a woman who spoke excellent English. She played music the soldiers enjoyed, gave out baseball scores, and talked about wives at home. She talked to "you GI's," often by name. The troops were convinced that much of her information came from the Korean Service Corps (KSC) workers, sometime called "chogies," who carried chow and supplies to the units each day. She would end her broadcasts saying such things as, "Good evening all you GI's, and all of you on ambush patrols."

As October changed to November, enemy activity grew. There seemed to be increased enemy patrol activity, and enemy artillery and mortar fire on Hill 851 grew in intensity each night. Intelligence information pointed to 2-160th Infantry's positions as the target for attack. On the afternoon of November 3rd, enemy artillery and mortar fire interdicted the entire battle position of the 160th Infantry.

The 2-160th Infantry's portion of the line included Hill 851, and had an unusual mix of companies. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Pell had deployed four companies on line, from west to east his Companies E and F, plus the attached

Companies C and A. In reinforcing positions to the south were his Company G and attached Company B.

As it grew dark on November 3rd, a patrol left Company C heading into "no-man's land." They ran into an enemy patrol, and killed a North Korean soldier. The body was hauled back to American lines and searched. A pair of wire cutters were found in his clothes, so the unit was immediately brought to 100% alert. Five minutes later, at 9:07 p.m., "all hell broke loose."

Many mortar rounds hit Hill 851, and some artillery, totalling approximately 4,500 before the night was through. As bugles blew all up and down the line, soldiers of a reinforced battalion of the North Korean People's Army 14th Regiment hit E, F and C Companies.

Company C, commanded by Captain Willard J. "Wild Bill" Hardy, was particularly hard hit. His third platoon, some troops of which had been transferred as replacements from Ohio's 37th Division, defended Castle Rock with a ridge finger in front of them that stretched for about 500 yards towards the enemy. Their first soldier to open fire was an automatic rifleman with a BAR. Friendly searchlights, about two miles behind the front lines, swept back and forth reflecting off the clouds to illuminate the battlefield. The North Koreans looked like ants as they covered the forward slope of hills in front of Company C. They threw sticks or their bodies over the barbed wire, so their comrades could quickly rush the 160th positions. The next few minutes were described by many as a "turkey shoot," as enemy soldiers came within rifle and machine gun range while well illuminated by the searchlights. The 143rd's forward observer in the platoon area called in artillery, some of which was purposely called into the platoon's area.

The fighting quickly was close and personal. A black machine gunner from Detroit yelled over and over at the North Koreans, "yi lhee wah (EE-lee-wah)"

meaning "come here." He was having trouble being heard over the din of combat, but finally they heard him and started in his direction. When they did, he opened fire. He killed a great many before they overran him. The two tanks in the platoon area were fully engaged, and soon had North Koreans crawling all over them. Some were shot off by infantrymen, but others were removed when the tankers brought machine gun fire to bear on each other.

The fighting slacked off in front of all companies except C and E, both of which had lost several bunkers to the enemy. At 10:49 p.m., Company C requested additional fires in front of their positions. A minute later the artillery forward observer with Company E reported the enemy had broken through into their positions. At 10:56 p.m., Company C reported that the enemy seemed to be withdrawing. This turned around a few minutes later when Companies C and E were again hit.

Captain Hardy, normally armed with a pistol, had picked up a carbine and was using that. He seemed to be everywhere, always followed by his company wireman, moving through intense enemy fire to direct the fire of his platoons. In spite of their efforts, the enemy deeply penetrated the unit's positions, including the command post, and the enemy gained the company's high ground. It was after midnight when Captain Hardy charged up the hill against the enemy, firing his carbine and throwing hand grenades, until an enemy grenade blew his helmet off and knocked him back down the hill.

Dazed and bleeding, he stumbled into a platoon position, obtaining another helmet and carbine. He quickly put together a small assault team, and charged back up the fire swept slope, the small group succeeding in driving the enemy back, as the company reestablished a defensive perimeter. He also retook the company command post, with a carbine in one hand and swinging an entrenching tool in the other.

Company C restored the MLR, and a little while later Company E reported the same. Litter jeeps were requested for the many casualties. It was clear that the enemy had given up after almost four hours of trying to get through.

The North Koreans were repulsed without committing any of the regiment's reserve companies. In the morning, the troops moved over the battlefield to survey the damage. They found the machine gunner from Detroit dead with a bullet through his head, but many enemy dead stacked in front of him. They found another machine gunner sitting with his machine gun in his lap, holding it with one hand on the pistol grip and another on the barrel. He was alive, but not moving or responding, sitting there with the classic "1000-yard stare." They pulled the machine gun out of his hands, but some of the skin from his left hand stayed on the barrel. The gun barrel had obviously been very hot when he was fighting.

The North Korean dead and wounded were everywhere. They were wearing quilted uniforms, similar to mover's blankets in the United States, and tan in color. They didn't wear underwear underneath, which surprised our troops. They were carrying rice, indicating they intended to stay when they captured Hill 851. Some had mortars strapped to their legs. Their attack had seemed fanatical, in fact, some were convinced the North Koreans were high on something when they attacked.

The enemy paid a high price, with 137 KIA's, 266 additional estimated KIA's, 3 WIA's, 523 estimated wounded, plus 7 captured. Enemy materiel captured included automatic rifles and machine guns, ammunition, documents and rations. The documents indicated the enemy had intended to seize, hold and reinforce Hill 851, and continue the attack to seize Hill 930. The 160th Regiment had suffered also, with 73 casualties, including 19 dead.

On November 4th, "Peking Sally" said the 160th had been hit with two battalions the previous night, and would be hit by two regiments that night. Nothing happened. In the aftermath, Company C dubbed themselves "Chop-em-up Charlie."

Captain Hardy, a native of Ringwood, New Jersey; was highly respected by his men. A veteran of the Normandy invasion, commissioned after reaching Staff Sergeant as an enlisted man, he had earned two Purple Hearts before he received his third in Korea, along with the Distinguished Service Cross for the action described above.

The division suffered 287 battle casualties during November. The winter was very cold, and some units had to remove their batteries each night and take them into the bunkers to keep them from freezing. Many of the troops had little oil stoves for heat, but it was so cold that they had to thin the cold oil with gasoline to make it liquid. They had to be careful, because too much gas could cause an explosion. One explosion killed three Koreans attached to an artillery battery.

The terrain was so steep that vehicles could not resupply troops on the MLR. As a consequence, the engineers designed and constructed spectacular lifelines for infantrymen perched on otherwise inaccessible Korean mountain peaks. These aerial tramways were used to haul water, rations, ammunition, clothing and weapons to the MLR. Just as important, those trams were used to quickly evacuate casualties. A tram operator's school was conducted in November 1952 to train one officer and ten enlisted men from each lettered company supported by a tram.

The division retained its defense mission along a static front and limited its operations to aggressive patrol activity, improvement of defensive positions, and the continued training of the reserve regiment. Patrolling changed, with a trend

toward fewer but larger and better organized patrols. Fire support for these patrol missions was earlier and closer. Ambush patrols, as well as combat and reconnaissance patrols, were fully utilized. Construction and repair of defensive positions progressed in spite of winter weather, with first priority on the MLR given to barbed wire, trenches, and bunkers.

An interesting order in the midst of all this was issued in Division Daily Bulletin Number 117, dated December 13, 1952. The third paragraph referred to guidance from X Corps regarding relief of drivers for inefficiency. Those who were caught speeding, driving recklessly, or under the influence of alcohol, were to be immediately reassigned to an infantry or heavy weapons company unless they already belonged to such an organization.

Christmas in the 160th Regiment's sector was memorable for many reasons. One was the few trees that were left had been festooned with Christmas decorations. The other involved two soldiers from Company A who had been captured by the North Koreans. On Christmas they turned one loose. He came across the line in red long johns with a cotton beard and carrying a sack full of cigarettes and Chinese candy. Battle casualties for December totalled 163.

As December turned to January of 1953, Corporal Eldon Wattles of Merced, California watched an enemy sniper come out of his hide hole each morning on the hill opposite his Company E, 224th positions. The sniper would do a few exercises before breakfast at the same time each morning, and then the sniper would disappear for the day. The mortar section was notified. The next morning the sniper came out of the hole, but didn't even have time to start before the mortars got him. "We had to get him," laughed Wattles, "We didn't want our first sergeant to get any ideas."

On January 8th the 5th RCT relieved the 223rd Infantry Regiment, which then moved to division reserve. There were an increasing number of patrol

engagements and enemy probes of the MLR during the month. The largest of these occurred the early morning of January 28th, when Company G, 5th RCT was hit by an estimated 100 enemy along the MLR in the Punch Bowl area. The enemy penetrated the MLR to a depth of 20 yards before being ejected.

One routine patrol ended with a not-so-routine rescue. A 223rd Infantry Regiment patrol was well out in front of friendly lines when the patrol leader was cut down by enemy machine gun fire only thirty or forty yards in front of them. PFC Charles Holloway of Niagara Falls, New York ran forward to assist while screaming for a medic. When he tried to stop the flow of blood, he saw the wounds were too numerous and the patrol leader would have to be immediately evacuated. Taking hold of his parka hood, he started dragging him down the hill.

The enemy opened fire, with bullets tracing the route of withdrawal down a snow-covered finger. In a draw at the bottom, he paused to see if he could do anything further about the wounds, but was concerned at the way blood was flowing. Holloway then started the grueling 800 yards across "no-man's-land," but was again fired on by the enemy when they spotted them. Holloway tried to carry his wounded leader on his back, but he was too heavy. They struggled across a frozen creek, and eventually fell into a hole where he tried to regain his breath. When he started again, his hands were frozen and raw, and his patrol leader was unconscious. He struggled, usually at a crawl, dragging his man to the barbed wire at the foot of a hill held by Company F, 223rd Infantry. He couldn't get up the hill as he kept sliding back. Half way to the crest he yelled for help. Immediately three soldiers raced down the slope and carried the wounded patrol leader the rest of the way.

Both he and Holloway were rushed to the aid station. When the doctor's finished with them, Holloway was assured his patrol leader would live. Holloway

was told, however, that he was going to have to lose four fingers from one hand, and two from the other. Exhausted, but thankful he had been successful in saving his leader, Holloway broke into tears.

The division suffered 191 casualties in the month of January. This was also the month that saw the division's last of the original contingent of National Guardsmen leave. That was Captain Donald B. George of the 140th AAA AW Battalion, who left on January 28, 1953.

The relief of the division by the 45th US Division began on January 28th when the 224th Infantry Regiment was relieved by the 180th Infantry Regiment. On January 30th, the 160th Infantry Regiment was relieved by the 279th Infantry Regiment, and the Commanding General of the 45th Division assumed sector responsibility. On January 31st, the relief was completed when the 223rd was relieved by the 179th Infantry Regiment. Division artillery remained in position, and along with the 140th Tank Battalion, passed to control of the 45th.

To economize on equipment, transportation and supplies while conserving manpower during the intense cold, all possible equipment and facilities of the 40th Division were left in place. The property records were adjusted with the 45th Division after the relief. The security and secrecy measures that were taken to prevent knowledge by the enemy were successful, evidenced by the lack of enemy patrol activity, mortar and artillery fire during the relief. The Army Commander commended the division after the relief had taken place, and stated the division had "established a precedent which undoubtedly will be followed in the future."

As the month ended, the division was in X Corps reserve, with its command post at Nambakchon. The 160th was located in the vicinity of Hwachon, the 223rd at Kowanton, and the 224th at Inje.

The only reorganization of organic elements while in Korea was effective the first of February. On that date, the 740th Ordnance Maintenance Company was reorganized and redesignated the 740th Ordnance Battalion.

The Fortieth Division artillery, under X US Corps control, relieved the 45th US Division artillery in direct support of the 12th ROK Division on February 3rd. The 140th Tank Battalion relieved the 245th Tank Battalion along the MLR in the same sector on February 11th, joining the division's artillery in direct support of the 12th ROK Division.

In the meantime, the first edition of the division's new four-page weekly, *The Fire Ball*," was distributed on February 6th after being printed in Seoul. During a short ceremony Colonel Thomas W. Dunn, the Division Artillery Commander, pulled the lanyard on a 981st Battalion howitzer. The 600,000th round fired by the division's artillery was sent on its way.

The division inaugurated a training program on February 9th, stressing weapons, small unit tactics, and physical fitness training. Plans were drawn up and construction started on a semi-permanent division training center. The 160th Infantry Regiment sent a task force to the Sangdong Mine area on February 17th to assume security duties there.

The 224th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 45th US Division on March 17th. The regiment displaced to Wondang-ni in the 45th's sector, where it moved into reserve positions for that division. Tactical units conducted training exercises at platoon and company level. The most extensive training operation conducted during the period was TRAINER ONE, the purpose of which was to test the ability of the 160th Infantry Regiment and part of the division headquarters to move from X US Corps to execute the IX US Corps Attack Plan, HOOKER ONE, in the Chorwon sector. The operations started on March 21st,

involving a move of about 135 miles. In the meantime, the division was designated Eighth US Army reserve from March 6th through the 28th, 1953.

The 224th, still under control of the 45th US Division, moved into the line on April 14th. On that day it relieved the 5th RCT. Major General Ridgley Gaither assumed command of the division from General Cleland on April 17th. At a banquet, officers welcomed General Gaither and said goodbye to General Cleland. They presented General Cleland an engraved Chinese burp gun while the division band played "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow." There was a colorful goodbye ceremony held at the airstrip the next day. Tanks from the 223rd Infantry Regiment fired a thirteen gun salute, General Cleland said goodbye to the officers and men, and he boarded his plane to the strains of "Auld Lang Syne."

General Gaither's record included a combat jump with the 17th Airborne Division in World War II. Following World War II he had several assignments including assistant division commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, and commander of the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

On April 19th, the 160th Infantry Regiment was placed under operational control of the 45th US Division. The 160th replaced the 279th Infantry Regiment in the 45th's reserve positions. The 223rd Infantry Regiment initiated the Fortieth's relief of the 20th ROK Division when it relieved the 61st ROK Regiment in line on April 26th. On April 27th, the 224th Infantry Regiment and the 40th Division Artillery with the 625th and 980th Field Artillery Battalions returned to division control, and the 40th Division Commander assumed sector responsibility. The 160th passed from 45th Division control to X Corps control at that time, and occupied reserve positions.

The 140th Tank Battalion continued its support of the 12th ROK Division with two tank companies during the entire month. As April ended, the division was

emplaced along the MLR (Line MINNESOTA) in the Punch Bowl, or Ihyon-ni-Kalbakkumi sector. The division was deployed with the 224th Infantry Regiment on the left, and the 223rd on the right. The 143rd and 981st Field Artillery Battalions continued to support the 12th ROK Division under X US Corps control, along with two companies of the 140th Tank Battalion. The 160th was in X US Corps reserve. The division had a total of 35 battle casualties in April.

The 981st Field Artillery Battalion returned to division control on May 7th. The 143rd remained in support of the 12th ROK Division, along with two companies of the 140th Tank Battalion. The division engaged in numerous small-scale patrol clashes with the enemy in actions typical of that period in the PUNCH BOWL area. The 160th Infantry Regiment on May 27th was relieved from X US Corps Reserve, and sent to Koje-do under Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) control to guard prisoners of war.

This last mission was not without incident. There is always some tension between the guards and those guarded. There was the infamous incident of May 7, 1952 when Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd had been seized and then held by the prisoners in POW Enclosure #1 for seventy-eight hours. He was released on May 10th, and later was reduced to the rank of colonel. When control had been restored, Operation BREAKUP resettled the prisoners in stockades that held between 500 and a 1000 prisoners. This resettlement was completed by June 19, 1952. However, this was a year later. The greatest problem for division troops was not expected. The greatest tension experienced by our troops involved their supposed allies, the South Korean ROKs.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee was strongly opposed to forced repatriation of any North Korean prisoners who claimed to be anti-Communist. The negotiators in Panmunjom finally reached an accord calling for such prisoners to be placed with a neutral Custodial Commission. President Rhee

ordered his troops to free any prisoners on Kojedo who claimed to be anti-Communist. About 25,000 were set free on June 18th when South Korean guards threw the gates open in a move some felt was an attempt to sabotage the peace talks. Less than 10,000 others refused to be repatriated.

The 160th found themselves in the middle of this tense situation. The experience of the Company C, 160th Infantry serves to illustrate the stress involved. They were quartered in Quonset huts on the island, with their quarters surrounded by barbed wire. Their mission was to guard POW Enclosure #13, which supposedly held high ranking officers. They wore no badge of rank, so the guards couldn't tell for sure.

The ROKs unceremoniously took over the mission when their President ordered the prisoners turned loose. Nerves were really on edge with all those prisoners running loose around the island. Many of the American troops did not know where all of this was going to lead, and suspected the worst. One of many incidents that followed is described by a squad leader in Charlie Company:

"We almost went to war with the ROKs! Lieutenant Stone (First Lieutenant John Stone, the Company Commander) called a squad leader's meeting at the rear edge of our barbed wire company area. We met as scheduled and crossed the barbed wire, then going outside of our area. We hadn't gone five yards before an entire ROK platoon commanded by a ROK captain popped up out of concealment. It was Lieutenant Stone's intention to dig in a defensive position and we were going out to determine where the positions would be. If we were going to die, we were going to die fighting, not just standing there and waiting."

The ROK Captain asked "Stoney" where he was going. When Lieutenant Stone told him the group was out for a leisurely walk, the ROK captain strongly suggested the Americans get back behind the wire. Lieutenant Stone responded that he would after they finished their walk. Every ROK soldier then

moved two paces towards the Americans, and the ROK captain said "I strongly suggest you go back now!" Lieutenant Stone said "We will--in a few minutes." Eventually Lieutenant Stone turned around and led his troops back to their area.

"We were under constant observation by the ROKs, and they held the high ground. The only place they couldn't see was inside the Quonset huts. We set up machine guns (two per hut) facing each door (one at each end). They were manned by crews twenty-four hours per day. Charlie (Company) was pissed. It turned into a stand off with no hostile action by either party."

Extensive small-scale patrol activity, both ambush and reconnaissance patrols, continued along the MLR through June. A total of ninety-four patrols were dispatched by the division during the month. The heaviest combat of the month occurred on June 2nd. On that night there was an exceptionally heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire. This was followed by about forty or fifty enemy that attacked elements of the 223rd Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of DT2341. After 30 minutes of hand-to-hand combat, the enemy was repulsed. Enemy casualties totalled 17 KIA, 5 estimated WIA, and one POW.

The 140th Tank Battalion had continued in support of the 12th ROK Division on the 40th Division's right since February. June found two companies of the tank battalion positioned on four vitally strategic hills in the vicinity of Nojonp-Yong. On the first of the month, there were heavy preparatory fires followed by a large attack on one of the hills.

The enemy pushed the ROK infantrymen off the hills, leaving the tank platoon surrounded by North Koreans. The tanks were quickly covered by North Korean infantrymen crawling all over the tanks looking for a weak spot, but the tanks used their coaxial (mounted in the turrets beside the main gun) machine guns to shoot them off of each other. The tanks held their ground in an action that made national news. That night, another platoon of tanks fought their way forward

under covering fires of two tank companies of the battalion to reinforce the beleaguered platoon. Another platoon joined those two the next morning.

The North Koreans tried to drive the tanks off the hill all day the 2nd, but the tankers refused to budge. On the morning of the 3rd, a tank-supported counterattack was launched which reestablished 12th ROK Division control of the crest and most of the hill. There were heavy attacks against the ROK's up and down the line, but the Koreans continued to hold with the aid of the tankers.

These same tankers of the 140th were to play a key role in July, when the North Koreans again attacked the 12th ROK Division the night of July 16th. Attacking in battalion strength, they were driven back with the help of strong flanking fires from the tankers. Two nights later the enemy tried it again in regimental strength, but were again driven back. In every case the determined and resolute defense of the tanks played a key role in stopping the enemy.

Like the artillery, the tankers were rarely given an opportunity for rest during the Korean War. During the war, in addition to supporting normal combat missions of the division when the division was on line, the tankers were in direct support of five different ROK Army Divisions at various times.

The division continued to occupy positions in the Punch Bowl sector until July 10th, when the division was relieved by the 20th ROK Division. On July 11th, the division relieved the 45th US Division in the Heartbreak Ridge-Sandbag Castle sector, which extended from Paem to a point west of Ihyon-ni. The 160th continued to guard prisoners on Koje-do until July 20th. On that date the 160th disembarked at Sokcho-ri and moved to the vicinity of Inje, where it passed to operational control of X US Corps as Corps reserve. The 143rd Field Artillery Battalion remained under X US Corps control in support of the 12th ROK Division, while the rest of the 40th Division Artillery continued in support of the 40th Infantry Division.

While in the Punch Bowl sector, the division was deployed with the 223rd Infantry Regiment on the right and the 224th on the left. When the division moved to the Heartbreak Ridge-Sandbag Castle area, the 223rd was emplaced on Heartbreak Ridge to the left, while the 224th was in the Sandbag Castle sector to the right.

In July of 1953, Company F, 223rd Infantry was directed to send a combat patrol out in front of the Punch Bowl to inflict casualties on the Chinese, and capture prisoners if possible. Second Lieutenant Richard S. Agnew was designated to lead the patrol, and the next day scheduled a daylight aerial reconnaissance.

A couple of things were obvious as Agnew and the pilot flew in the L-19 observation aircraft over Chinese lines. One was the ruggedness of the terrain. The valley north of the rim of the Punch Bowl was marked by precipitous ridges and valleys, with rocks and boulders everywhere. The terrain would be extremely difficult to traverse at night. The other was the presence and aggressiveness of the enemy. Lieutenant Agnew wanted the pilot to fly lower so he could get a good look at terrain the patrol would have to cross. As ground fire built up, the pilot refused to go any lower. When they landed after the foray, they counted over twenty bullet holes in the aircraft.

Lieutenant Agnew organized and briefed his patrol of a dozen or so infantrymen, with Corporal Gilbert G. Collier as his assistant patrol leader and point man. Observation post #322, just north of the Punch Bowl, overlooked a very steep slope leading down into the valley. The patrol left OP #322 on July 19th, after it was completely dark. Corporal Collier was leading, slowly picking his way through the tough terrain, immediately followed by Lieutenant Agnew. It was a couple of hours later when Corporal Collier suddenly lost his footing, and

started to fall off the cliff. Lieutenant Agnew reached out to grab Collier and pull him back, but instead fell down the steep 60-foot cliff after him.

Another member of the patrol climbed down to them. He found the lieutenant immobilized with a badly sprained ankle, and Collier with a painful back injury, though still mobile. Lieutenant Agnew told Collier to take the patrol back before dawn broke, but Collier refused to leave his lieutenant. The other soldiers left extra grenades, .45 calibre ammunition for Collier's sub-machine gun, and .30 calibre carbine ammunition for Agnew's weapon. The main body of the patrol then returned to friendly lines without further incident.

Lieutenant Agnew and Corporal Collier could hear Chinese patrols out looking for them. As quietly as possible, they laboriously crawled up and over the steep ridge into the next valley until they reached a small creek. The two concealed themselves in some brush and then took turns keeping watch as the Chinese continued searching for them.

The next day, Agnew took off his boot and soaked his injured ankle in the creek. That night they both felt better, and decided to make an effort to return to friendly lines. Agnew's ankle was so badly swollen that he couldn't lace his boot back on, but they started back as soon as it got dark.

They were suddenly ambushed around midnight by a Chinese patrol throwing hand grenades and firing small arms. Collier moved to the left flank, yelling and shooting, as Lieutenant Agnew threw four or five hand grenades to their right. Agnew was hit by a Chinese grenade that threw him in the air and wounded him in the head, arms and leg. He felt the blood on his face as he fought the loss of consciousness. Agnew had lost his trench knife in an earlier fight, so when he was then assaulted by a Chinese soldier, he killed the soldier with the soldier's own knife.

Lieutenant Agnew said, "As the cobwebs cleared, I didn't know where Collier was. I finally found him, surrounded by several Chinese he had killed, but badly wounded with the loss of a leg. I then heard Chinese voices, and was convinced we'd had it. I pulled the pins on two grenades, and lay on my stomach with the two grenades under me. That way I could take a few with me when they rolled me over. The Chinese came up and kicked me once or twice...I don't know, because I passed out."

A patrol from Company F, complete with litter bearers, was searching for their missing comrades after dark. They finally found them, turned Agnew over, and quickly threw the grenades out of harm's way. Both were immediately evacuated through medical channels. Corporal Collier died a couple of days later, though not without asking each day about Lieutenant Agnew's health. Lieutenant Agnew spent a few hours at the battalion aid station, followed by about a week being administered to by a MASH unit. He then returned to duty. Corporal Collier received the Medal of Honor posthumously, while Lieutenant Agnew was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Many months later, American forces named one of their key observation posts near Panmunjom in the DMZ after Collier. The post is still used, and named after Collier, as this book is written.

The last significant combat action occurred on July 27th, just prior to the armistice going into effect. The enemy shelled friendly positions for four hours with 4700 rounds of mortar and artillery. There were few casualties and only slight damage. Division artillery responded with approximately 11,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. The cease fire went into effect that day, and the division prepared to withdraw to the Post Armistice Main Battle Position.

The division continued to maintain its special relationship to Kapyong. After the Kenneth Kaiser High School was finished, the division sought other needed projects for "their" town. In 1953, the engineers provided a progress report on

construction projects in Kapyong. A church had been completed, using \$4500 contributed by men of the division at Protestant church services. The engineers also built a dispensary, and helped build a grade school. While most of the work on the grade school was accomplished by the Koreans, the engineers fabricated and put up the rafters.

On January 24, 1954 the division learned that its colors (flags) and eligible members would return to California. The 578th Engineer Battalion completed construction of what was named "Sunburst Village," in the farmlands of the Chorwon Valley. The division's engineers had performed many missions during their time in Korea, from the mundane to the extraordinary.

Routine engineer work included installing and removing mines, maintaining roads, bridges and culverts, and bunker building. The engineers operated four water purification units, each capable of supplying 40,000 gallons of water per day. The engineers furnished nails, lumber, barbed wire, sniper scopes, sandbags, paint, and thousands of other engineer items daily.

Not so routine, the engineers also worked to keep the troops warm during the freezing winters. They fabricated 46 charcoal kilns, and produced an average of 6000 pounds of charcoal daily to warm front line bunkers. The division engineers also operated a sawmill, furnishing lumber for the many construction projects, as well as building the spectacular tramways for resupply in steep terrain.

The Final Review of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea was conducted at the Division Review Field on May 8, 1954. The setting was unusual, as a series of seven tableaux had been created as a back drop. The tableaux represented:

The Punch Bowl, and was sponsored by the 578th Engineer Battalion
Heartbreak Ridge, sponsored by 223rd Infantry Regiment

Sandbag Castle, sponsored by the 224th Infantry Regiment

Kumwha (Papa-San), sponsored by the Division Artillery

Chorwon, sponsored by the 160th Infantry Regiment

Eighth Army Patch, sponsored by the 578th Engineer Battalion

The Rose Bowl (in California), sponsored by the 578th Engineer Battalion

In addition to the tableaux plus the normal line up of major commands, a group called "The California Contingent" was formed at the end of the parade field. The California Contingent, consisting of approximately 1200 officers and men, were those scheduled to return the colors, standards and records to California. The commander of the group was Colonel Louis V. Hightower.

There were many distinguished guests who participated in this final ceremony. While waiting for them to arrive at 2:00 p.m., there were two exhibitions. One was by a Scout Dog Platoon, and the other was an exhibition drill by a platoon of the Provisional Honor Guard Company. The distinguished guests arrived to Ruffles and Flourishes, and a 21 gun salute. Speakers included President Syngman Rhee, who awarded the division the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General of Eighth Army, also spoke to the troops, lauding their combat record.

After the reviewing party trooped the line, there was a color ceremony in which the United Nations and Republic of Korea Army colors were turned over to honor guards. The Division Colors were turned over to Colonel Hightower, and the division passed in review for the final time in Korea.

It was a fitting goodbye ceremony for the division. In Korea, the division had:

342 Days of combat

376 Men killed in combat

1457 Wounded in action (and actually hospitalized)

3 Medals of Honor awarded

9 Distinguished Service Crosses awarded

246 Silver Stars awarded

675 Bronze Stars for valor awarded

1783 Bronze Stars for merit awarded

3110 Commendation Ribbons awarded

The division received battle credits for the Second Korean Winter; Korea, Summer-Fall 1952; Third Korean Winter; and Korea Summer-Fall 1953, with battle campaign streamers in addition to being awarded the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

A silver punch bowl played a key role in many ceremonies during and following the war. Major General Ridgley Gaither had contracted with a Tokyo silversmith to craft a special punch bowl modeled on the "Punch Bowl," where the division had fought, and suffered, so many casualties. The natural bowl was formed several thousand yards in diameter, with a sandy floor, and a rim of sharp mountains with decomposed granite on all sides. The two main roads bisecting the floor of the bowl were named "Hollywood" and "Vine" by the division.

The artisan was given a relief map, and told what was desired. He then crafted a replica of the "Punch Bowl," which was delivered with a ladle to the division several months later in a handsome, leather-tooled box.

The first ceremony involving the punch bowl in the continental United States occurred in June of 1954. Camp Stoneman was hosting the returning soldiers for demobilization processing. A reception and buffet, honoring the officers of the 40th U.S. and 40th National Guard Divisions, was conducted in the Officers'

Club at Friday, June 18th. Brigadier General William J. Bradley presented, on behalf of his 40th U.S. Division officers, the silver punch bowl. Major General Homer O. Eaton Jr., commander of the 40th N.G. Division accepted the punch bowl. Dancing followed in the club which had been decorated for the occasion.

The division's battle flags were officially returned to the United States in impressive ceremonies the next day. Hosted in the City of San Francisco, 1,156 returning officers and men marched up Market Street behind their Commanding General, General Bradley. They followed behind the Sixth Army Band and honor guard in chrome plated helmets, and parade marshal Major General William F. Dean. General Dean was a former California Guardsman who earned the Medal of Honor in Korea as Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division before being captured by the North Koreans. Token elements representing the Navy, Marines, and Air Force followed.

In the grandstand were Governor Goodwin J. Knight; General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army; and several other dignitaries, as well as General Eaton. Actor Walter Pidgeon narrated events for the public. The troops marched up Market to the sound of applause from the crowds lining the street, but the crowd burst into cheers when the troops rounded the Civic Center Plaza.

The troops formed in the plaza for the ceremony, and then the dignitaries took their positions. General Bradley passed the colors to the Sixth U.S. Army Commander, Lieutenant General W. G. Wyman saying, "These are the colors of the Fortieth Infantry Division...hold them high and guard them well." General Wyman passed them to the Governor while saying "Preserve it...cherish it...guard it!" The Governor replied simply, "We shall." He in turn passed them to General Eaton, who then gave them to his aide-de-camp, Captain James F. Battin, II.

That solemn ceremony marked the end of the 40th "Sunburst" Division, and the short period when there were two 40th Divisions. The flag passed to the 40th "Grizzly" Division.

This ceremony not only marked the end of the 40th Division's combat campaign in Korea, but marked the end of an extraordinary period in which two 40th Divisions existed.

In the spring of 1952, the division had been told while in Korea, that it would be reorganized as a "cadre organization" in California with 50% officers and 25% enlisted men. The division had 421 National Guard of the United States officers due to be released by August 31, 1952, plus 2990 enlisted men with enlistments to complete in the California National Guard. They were to form the nucleus of the new 40th Infantry Division in California.

The division had 62 armories for 111 units when it was called to service in 1950. In March of 1952 there were still 24 state-owned and 12 leased armories for a total of 36. It was felt it would be comparatively easy to hire Unit Caretakers (Property Custodians) because their starting pay had just been raised to \$260 per month.

The new 40th National Guard division was organized and federally recognized with headquarters in Los Angeles on September 2, 1952. Brigadier General (later Major General) Homer O. Eaton, Jr. was named division commander. General Eaton had been executive officer of the 160th Infantry during most of its Pacific campaigning in World War II. He later was intelligence officer (G-2) of XIV Corps. He won the Silver Star for gallantry during the crossing of the Passig River at Manila, and the Bronze Star during the Luzon campaign.

While combat continued with the 40th U. S. Division in Korea, the reorganization of the 40th National Guard Division continued and strength grew

in California. A unique and unparalleled relationship developed between the two divisions.

National Guardsmen who had rotated back kept in touch with old comrades as well as new soldiers who had replaced them in Korea. They were very much interested in the Kapyong project, which many of them had helped start. Even those who weren't remembered vividly the plight of Korea's children.

In Kapyong, the division had only partially solved a larger problem. Korea had been so badly devastated that the citizens of Kapyong were barely surviving. The division had given the citizens a beautiful high school, but the nearby grammar school only had a makeshift building of four mud-walled rooms and thatched roof, supplemented by four damaged squad tents. Fifteen teachers were trying to teach 1,160 students with less than a dozen textbooks and only a handful of pencils.

The division had provided a modern facility for the older children, and had even equipped a first aid room in the school with medical supplies. They also provided the school with a school bus, actually a converted and overhauled enemy truck. Financial contributions continued to be solicited from the soldiers to assist. However, it was obvious to all that much more needed to be done. The 40th U. S. Division became busily engaged in assisting the Armed Forces Aid to Korea program which aimed at helping the South Koreans rebuild their war-torn country.

The 40th National Guard Division's Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel William B. Henderson, took a particular interest. He proposed that the stateside division adopt the Kapyong School project as one of its own, and the division commander quickly agreed. Major General Eaton told Major General Gaither in Korea that "your stateside counterpart would take the greatest pride in assisting your projects." General Eaton proposed that the stateside division collect

clothing, books, sports equipment and other items needed by the school.

General Gaither quickly accepted the offer, and the division mounted a huge collection effort.

The division's 43 armories became collecting points where people brought clothing, canned food, pencils, erasers, paper, school books and other supplies. Such personalities as popular Los Angeles disc jockey Johnny Grant, who had a long history of supporting the 40th, got behind the effort. He also helped arrange for the involvement of other entertainers, such as Penny Singleton and Roscoe Ates. Additional publicity was provided by two half-hour television shows on the popular series "Before Your Eyes" that were devoted exclusively to the project.

The drive came to an end in early April, 1954. This jointly-produced and record-breaking contribution assured that the 40th Division would long be remembered for its role in Korea. More than 200 tons of needed school materials and clothing had been turned in to the armories. Schoolbooks alone required over 1,500 large crates for the more than 70,000 texts. In addition to the schoolbooks and clothing, over 10,000 cans of food and a great deal of athletic gear was collected. The Pacific Far East Lines was a big help, and their freighter Indian Bear departed Long Beach Harbor on April 24th for Pusan, Korea. Arrangements had been made with officers of Armed Forces Assistance for Korea to deliver the goods from Pusan to city fathers in Kapyong for needed distribution. That coordination was needed because the 40th United States Division was preparing to leave Korea.

No estimate was ever made of the cash value of the shipment. Men of the 40th Division had contributed over \$200,000 to various charitable projects while they were in Korea. Support for the Kapyong School continued for many years after the war. General Cleland's widow made at least one trip after the war.

Various division commanders visited the school, as recently as 1988, and occasionally delivered additional cash contributions from soldiers of the division. The school is in a beautiful and prosperous resort area, and the school's athletic teams are renowned, especially for bicycle racing.

The division is proud of its combat record in Korea. Soldiers of the 40th are just as gratified by their contributions to the civilians of Korea, most especially the children.

24 Feb 51	40th ID receives alert orders for movement to Japan
28 Mar 51	40th ID Advance Party leaves for Japan
29 Mar 51	40th ID Main Body departs for Japan
10 Apr 51	40th ID advance elements arrive in Japan. Division given mission of defending No. Honshu while training
11 Apr 51	GEN MacArthur relieved of command
12 Apr 51	GEN Ridgway replaces GEN MacArthur. GEN James A. Van Fleet assumes command of forces in Korea
10 Jul 51	First meeting between UN and North Korean-Chinese delegations held at Kaesong
4 Aug 51	40th ID rear detachment arrives in Japan after training at Camp Cooke
15 Aug 51	Far East Air Forces start "Operation STRANGLE"
23 Aug 51	Communists suspend armistice negotiations
13 Sep 51	UN begins attack on Heartbreak Ridge
25 Oct 51	Armistice talks resumed as delegates meet for twenty-seventh plenary session
18 Dec 51	Both sides exchange prisoner lists. UN held 132,474 Red prisoners. Communist list had 11,559 names
22 Dec 51	40th ID alerted for move to Korea to relieve 24th ID
26 Dec 51	40th ID Advance Party departs for ROK
6 Jan 52	First ship departs Japan for Korea with first elements of the 40th ID Main Body (the bulk of the first echelon sailed 7 Jan)
11 Jan 52	40th ID first echelon landed at Inchon
13 Jan 52	143rd FA fired first round in anger when SFC Gary Ducat of 143rd pulled lanyard on 105mm howitzer
19 Jan 52	160th Inf completed relief of 19th Inf Regt (24th US ID)
20 Jan 52	40th ID's first loss was SFC Kenneth Kaiser Jr. of 160th killed by mortar fragments near Kumsong
22 Jan 52	40th ID asgd Eighth US Army when 2nd echelon landed Inchon this date
24 Jan 52	Korean truce negotiations stalemated
28 Jan 52	223rd Inf completed relief of 21st Inf (24th US ID)
10 Feb 52	224th Inf relieved 5th RCT (24th US ID)
Mar 52	The 40th ID: Had a daily average of 19,436 organic and 7,858 attached troops to support. Moved the Division CP from Ascom City (near Seoul) to the Chunchon area
22 Mar 52	160th Infantry relieved by 1st ROK Regiment
28 Mar 52	Relief of 224th Infantry by 7th ROK Regiment completed
29 Mar 52	Relief of 223rd Infantry by 2nd ROK Infantry completed
Apr 52	40th ID: Six B-29's dropped 210 500lb bombs in the division sector resulting in 34 secondary explosions and one large fire. Construction and occupation of all installations was completed by the end of the month. Enemy probes of the division's lines increased during the month, especially towards the end of the month. There were a total of 3636 enemy mortar and artillery rounds impacting in April.
1 Apr 52	40th ID completed relief of 2nd ROK Div in Kumwha-Kumsong sector. 223rd on left, and 160th on right. 224th & 140th TK in reserve.
3 Apr 52	Boundary change between 40th & 2nd ID on left, 224th inserted left of 223rd.
6 Apr 52	40th ID assumed responsibility for portion of 2nd ID sector from CT665409 to CT699425
May 52	40th ID: Total of 29 missions (112 sorties) CAS during May. High levels of personnel turnover during the month. Fewer contacts initiated by the enemy during May. A total of 2722 enemy mortar and artillery rounds impacted during May.

7 May 52	Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, Commander of UN Prisoner of War Camp Number One on Koje-do, is seized and held for seventy-eight hours by Communist prisoners
12 May 52	General Mark W. Clark takes over from General Ridgway as Supreme Commander
19 May 52	IX US Corps revised the 40th ID left boundary to the rear of the MLR and relieved the division of responsibility for the Kumwha Valley (then assumed by 7th US ID)
2 Jun 52	BG Cleland assumes command of 40th ID vice MG Daniel H. Hudelson at 0900 hours. COL Gordon B. Rogers arrives and assumes ADC duties vice BG Homer O. Eaton.
26-28 Jun	2nd ROK Div relieves 40th ID
30 Jun 52	40th ID (-) closed into Field Training Cmd #5 for training and rehabilitation while in IX Corps reserve. Divarty & 140th Tk remained in action under IX Corps control in spt 2nd ROK Div.
1 Jul 52	3-223rd Inf dispatched to Sangdong Mine Area to perform security mission
5 Jul 52	224th Inf attached to 2nd Log Command, left for Pusan to provide security for POW enclosures in that area
13 Jul 52	40th ID moved to new training area near Kapyong, resuming training and security missions
2 Sep 52	40th ID (NGUS) organized and federally recognized in Los Angeles
16 Oct 52	40th ID ordered to relieve the 25th US Div in the Paem-Ihyon-Ni sector
22 Oct 52	224th & 160th had relieved 27th and 14th Inf respectively, and CG, 40th ID assumed sector responsibility. 40th ID then passed to X Corps control, with 5th RCT attached. Deployed 160th on left, 224th center, and 5th RCT right. 223rd arrived a day later, placed in reserve. Div CP at Tokkol-Li.
31 Oct 52	5th RCT moved to 40th ID reserve after being relieved by 223rd
8 Jan 53	5th RCT relieved 223rd, which moved to division reserve
30 Jan 53	45th US Div assumed sector responsibility from 40th ID
31 Jan 53	40th ID in X US Corps reserve, with CP at Nambajchon
11 Feb 53	General Van Fleet turns over command of Eighth Army to Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor
6 Mar 53	40th ID designated Eighth US Army reserve
27 Apr 53	CG, 40th ID accepted sector responsibility from 20th ROK Div at that time. 40th deployed across Ihyon-Ni - Kalbakkumi (Punchbowl) sector.
10 Jul 53	20th ROK Div relieved 40th ID in Punchbowl area.
11 Jul 53	40th ID relieved 45th US Div in the Heartbreak Ridge-Sandbag Castle area, which extended from Paem to a point west of Ihyon-Ni. 223rd was deployed on Heartbreak Ridge to the left, while the 224th was in the Sandbag Castle sector to the right.
27 Jul 53	En shelled friendly positions four hours with 4700 rounds of mortar and artillery. Few casualties and only slight damage. 40th Divarty countered with about 11,000 arty and mortar rounds. Ceasefire declared as armistice signed at Panmunjom
8 May 54	Final Review of 40th ID in ROK
19 Jun 54	Ceremony in San Francisco to celebrate return of 40th ID battle flags
30 Jun 54	40th ID (US) released from active Federal service and reverted to state control
1 Jul 54	40th ID reorganized and redesignated as 40th Armored Div
22 Jan 56	40th Signal Co responds to train wreck in L.A.
25-27 Jan 56	40th ID elements assist during floods in L.A. area
1 Jul 59	40th AD organized under "D" series TO&E under "ROCAD."

OUT of SEA

14 Jun 42	184th Infantry detached and assigned to the Western Defense Command
8 Jul 42	40th ID starts move to Hawaii (completed early Oct 42)
1 Sep 42	108th Infantry from the 27th ID joins the 40th ID as the third regiment
20 Dec 43	40th ID leaves for Guadalcanal. (Mission completed by mid-Jan 44)
4 Jan 44	40th ID debarks at Guadalcanal
25 Mar 44	40th ID transferred to General MacArthur's command, then to XIV Corps
23 Apr 44	Elements of the 40th ID relieve 1st Marine Division on New Britain. Balance of the Division lands over the next several days
27 Nov 44	40th ID relieved from its mission on New Britain
9 Jan 45	40th ID invades Luzon, P.I.
21 Feb 45	40th ID transferred to XI Corps, commanded by MG Charles P. Hall
2 Mar 45	40th ID relieved by 43rd Division. Transferred to Eighth Army, commanded by LTG Robert L. Eichelberger
8 Mar 45	108th RCT sails from Luzon to Leyte, relieves 164th Infantry of Americal Division
18 Mar 45	185th RCT reinforced by 2-160th invades Panay
22 Mar 45	Company G 2-185th secures Inampulugan Island
	Amphibious patrol from 2-160th secures Guimaras Island
29 Mar 45	185th lands on Negros Island, Occidental Province.
7 Apr 46	2-108th (reinforced) lands on Masbate, starting three week campaign to secure island
10 May 45	108th RCT lands at Macajalar Bay on Mindanao as part of X Corps
15-18 Jun 45	40th ID elements return from Negros to Panay
14 Aug 45	Japan accepts unconditional surrender terms
16 Aug 45	Japanese Imperial Headquarters announces cessation of hostilities
2 Sep 45	Official signing of surrender document aboard USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.
15 Sep 45	40th ID Advance Party arrives at Inchon
1 Oct 45	185th Inf CP opened at Taegu
2 Oct 45	160th Inf closes at Pusan. CP established
7 Oct 45	108th Inf established CP, occupies Andong, Yongdok, and other cities
8 Oct 45	Division Artillery established CP at Chinhae
7 Apr 46	40th ID inactivated at Camp Stoneman, California

Post World War II

14 Oct 46	40th ID reorganized and federally recognized at Los Angeles
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Korean War Years

25 Jun 50	North Korea invades South Korea
27 Jun 50	President Truman orders US air and naval forces to help repel North Koreans
30 Jun 50	President Truman authorizes General MacArthur to send ground forces to Korea
5 Jul 50	US troops fight their first engagement in Korea
7 Jul 50	UN Security Council authorizes use of UN flag in Korea
1 Aug 50	40th ID receives telephonic alert for induction
1 Sep 50	40th ID activated for Korea. Advance party departs for Camp Cooke
15 Sep 50	All 40th ID troops are at Camp Cooke. Prepare to receive fillers
6 Nov 50	40th ID recruit training commences
26 Dec 50	LTG Matthew B. Ridgway arrives to take command of all UN ground forces in Korea

1 Jul 63	40th AD reorganized under "ROAD," changing combat commands to brigades
17-30 May 64	2-40th AD (+) participates in Exercise DESERT STRIKE at Fort Irwin
13-24 Aug 65	40th AD employed to control Watts Riots in L.A.
29 Jan 68	40th AD reorganized and redesignated as 40th Armored Brigade
13 Jan 74	40th ID (Mechanized) organized and federally recognized with Hqs in Long Beach
Apr 81	40th ID Hqs moved to Los Alamitos Armed Forces Reserve Center
Mar-Apr 82	40th ID (-) participates in Exercise GALLANT EAGLE '82 at Fort Irwin
Apr 86	1-184th Inf (+) participates in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT in the Republic of Korea
Apr 87	2-160th Inf (+) participates in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT in the Republic of Korea
Apr 88	40th ID provides controllers for 2 ID during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT (and over the next two years to a lesser degree)
23 Oct 88	Exercise BORDER RANGER I. Counter Drug efforts in conjunction with law enforcement end with disastrous crash of helicopter. Efforts are reorganized and continue for many years
Jun 90	40th ID participates in first BCTP Warfighter exercise at Camp Roberts.
Apr-May 92	40th ID employed to control L. A. Riots
17 Jan 94	Northridge Earthquake. 40th ID elements (primarily DISCOM) establish tent cities and provide security

APPENDIX 3

DIVISION COMMANDERS

MG Frederick S. Strong	5 Aug 1917 - 2 Jun 1919
MG David P. Barrows (1)	18 Jun 26 - 27 Jun 37
MG Walter P. Story	28 Jun 37 - 22 Jun 41
MG Ernest J. Dawley	23 Jun 41 - 15 Apr 42
MG Rapp Brush	16 Apr 42 - 21 Jul 45
BG Donald J. Myers	22 Jul 45 - 7 Apr 46
MG Harcourt Hervey (2)	15 Aug 46 - 1 Dec 47
MG Daniel H. Hudleson	2 Dec 47 - 1 Jun 52
MG Joseph P. Cleland	2 Jun 52 - 16 Apr 53
MG Ridgley Gaither	17 Apr 53 - 17 Jan 54
BG J. F. R. Seitz	18 Jan 54 - 4 Feb 54
BG William Bradley	5 Feb 54 - 30 Jun 54
MG Homer O. Eaton, Jr (3)	2 Sep 52 - 2 Jul 60
MG Charles O. Ott, Jr.	3 Jul 60 - 29 Jan 68
MG Charles O. Ott, Jr.	13 Jan 74 - 12 Aug 74
MG Thomas K. Turnage	12 Aug 74 - 28 Aug 75
MG Robert E. Johnson, Jr.	28 Aug 75 - 3 Oct 76
MG James T. Keltner	4 Oct 76 - 7 Nov 77
MG Thomas K. Turnage	7 Nov 77 - 9 Jun 79
BG Robert L Meyer (Acting) (4)	10 Jun 79 - 7 Nov 79
MG Robert L. Meyer	8 Nov 79 - 9 Nov 81
MG Anthony L. Palumbo	9 Nov 81 - 17 Jul 83
MG William J. Jefferds	17 Jul 83 - 1 Aug 86
MG James D. Delk	1 Aug 86 - 1 Oct 89

MG Averill E. Hawkins	1 Oct 89 - 1 May 91
MG Daniel J. Hernandez	1 May 91 - 8 Aug 93
MG William Stewart	8 Aug 93 - 5 May 96
MG Edmund C. Zysk	5 May 96 -

- (1) MG Barrows took a nine month leave of absence, departing for Germany immediately after annual training in 1933, returning on 10 April 1934. BG Story temporarily assumed command in his absence.
- (2) Not federally recognized as a Major General
- (3) There were two 40th Infantry Divisions for a time during the Korean War. The Fortieth Infantry Division (NGUS) was reconstituted in California effective 2 Sep 1952 composed primarily of troops rotated back from Korea. The 40th U.S. Infantry Division was relieved from active Federal service effective 30 Jun 54, although the colors were passed during a ceremony 19 June 1954 in San Francisco.
- (4) For administrative reasons (shortage of Major General slots), BG Anthony L. Palumbo was on state orders as division commander, even though BG Meyer was on division orders as acting commander and actually functioned in that role.

APPENDIX 5

**DECORATIONS AND CAMPAIGN CREDITS AWARDED
TO THE
40TH DIVISION**

Campaign Participation Credit**World War I**

Streamer without inscription

World War II

Bismarck Archipelago

Luzon (with arrowhead)

Southern Philippines

Korean War

Second Korean Winter

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952

Third Korean Winter

Korea, Summer 1953

Decorations:**World War II:**

Division: The Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17
October 1944 to 4 July 1945 (DA GO 47, 1950)

Units: Distinguished Unit Citation, 40th Reconnaissance Troop for
January 9 to April 25, 1945, action in Southern Philippine Islands

Distinguished Unit Citation, Company I, 160th Infantry Regiment,
for February 15, 1945 action on Luzon.

Korean War:

Division: Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer
embroidered Korea 1952-1954 (DA GO 50, 1954)

Units: Distinguished Unit Citation, 140th Tank Battalion, for June 1-8 and
July 16-18, 1953 action vicinity Nojonp-Yong.

Meritorious Unit Commendation, 40th QM Company, for service
August 15, 1953 to January 31, 1954.

WORLD WAR II

Distinguished Unit Citation: GO #66, War Department 10 August 1945

16. *The 40th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)* is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy. On 9 January 1945 the troop landed with the leading elements at Lingayen and before night fell, by using amphibious tractors, crossed the Calmay and Agno Rivers and probed enemy positions in Salasa and Labrador. Given the special mission of reconnoitering to Dasol Bay on the China Sea Coast, the troop slashed through enemy resistance at Alaminos and patrolled the Dasol Bay shore from Egia to Santa Cruz. Turning south, the troop continued reconnaissance to Camiling and Tarlac. Thrusting beyond Bamban the *40th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)*, making a number of enemy contacts, on 24 January reconnoitered Mabalacat, Dau, the barriers to the east, and dashed into Clark Field. A week later a platoon was dispatched to Guagua and preceding infantry troops entered Dinalupihan, northeast anchor of Bataan Peninsula. On landing at Tigbauan, Panay, 18 March 1945, elements of the troop were dispatched north and northeast to Alimodian and Santa Barbara Airfields, which were reached before nightfall. In a sharp engagement at Pavia, the enemy force was disorganized and broken into small groups which withdrew up the Tigon River. More than ninety enemy dead were left in this encounter. The troop sought enemy contacts to the extremities of the island, to Unidos on the northwest and Estancia to the northeast. On reaching the shore of Negros at Pulupandan, elements of the troop searched La Carlota and Pontevedra to the south. On 30 March, at the end of the encounter with the enemy in the vicinity of Atipuluan, the troop captured five Japanese and counted 114 killed, while losing only one of its own killed and three wounded. On 2 April, Silay, Alicante, and Malago air strips were reconnoitered, and on the next day Victorias and Manaplas on the north coast were reached. By 7 April, a permanent bivouac was established at Fabrica, and the troop was reaching east to Escalante and later south to San Carlos. On 25 April reconnaissance was extended to Dumuguete on the southeast coast where, next day, contact was established with an infantry combat team which had just landed. In all, the troop killed 292 of the enemy and captured twenty. The volume of intelligence obtained of the enemy situation, terrain, avenues of approach, and conditions of roads, bridges and trails was of inestimable value to the division commander, and the speed, dash, boldness and combat effectiveness displayed by the *40th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)* were inspiring to the officers and men of the division.

Distinguished Unit Citation: GO #68, War Department 14 August 1945

18. *Company I, 160th Infantry Regiment*, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy. On 15 February 1945, in the Zambales Mountain Range, Luzon, P. I., *Company I* was given the mission to attack and secure a commanding hill approximately 1,800 yards to the front, referred to as Objective Hill. The company advanced approximately 1,000 yards encountering heavy enemy small-arms fire and knee-mortar fire, then pushed forward until they reached a ridge paralleling their front, approximately 300 yards short of and below their objective. Here they were subjected to fire from their front, both flanks and rear. The remaining distance was open country and the terrain necessitated a steep climb of over 400 feet, the last 50 feet being almost straight up with only one approach for men in single file. With the enemy in a commanding position, with excellent fields of fire and superior observation, the decision was to make a night assault. At 0400 hours, 16 February 1945, the company under cover of darkness succeeded in getting one platoon of men on the hill and inside the enemy's positions. At that time the enemy detected their presence and, after a short but severe close-in fight, retreated off the hill to positions some 30 yards down the reverse slope in a bamboo draw. The balance of the company, in single file, scaled the cliff and joined the platoon already there. At dawn they were subjected to heavy enemy fire from the front and flanks and broke up a counterattack from the left front. Running short of ammunition, without water or rations, suffering considerable

casualties, the aid men killed, and without plasma or morphine for the wounded, the company held its position. Every attempt by carrying parties to resupply them all that day and the following night failed to get through to the company because of enemy action. The next day attempts to supply by air-drops were unsuccessful because of the hard rocky hilltop, the steep cliffs on three sides, and the nearness of the enemy on the fourth side. As a result, only one box was recovered and it consisted of machine gun ammunition and four canteens of water. Although completely exhausted and without food and water for over 36 hours, the company maintained control of the hill until 0130 hours, 18 February 1945, when another company was able to relieve them. Upon the relief, the largest part of the litter bearers was made up of *Company I* men, and to transport the wounded it was necessary to tie them to the litter and lower them by rope. The terrain was so difficult that from 8 to 10 men were required per litter. In the accomplishment of the assigned mission, overcoming the extreme hardships and suffering 39 casualties out of 96 men, *Company I, 160th Infantry Regiment*, displayed courage, determination, and a unit spirit by teamwork and the will to win despite all obstacles, and maintained their high morale and esprit de corps to the end of their mission.

KOREAN WAR

ROK Presidential Unit Citation: GO #50 DA, Wash DC 30 Jun 54-

REPUBLIC OF KOREA PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION awarded by citation dated 27 July 1953, by Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, for exceptionally meritorious service to the Republic of Korea during the period 22 January 1952 to 15 January 1954, inclusive, with citation as follows:

The 40th United States Infantry Division arrived in Korea in January 1952 and assumed control of the Kumwha sector on the central front. Consolidating their positions along the entire line assigned to them, the troops of this Division maintained the security of a broad segment of the battle area and successfully contained the enemy. On 30 June 1952, the Division was relieved on position by the 2d Republic of Korea Army Division with artillery elements of the division remaining on position in support of the Korean troops. Intermittently assigned to reserve and to front line positions, the Division continually rendered active support to various Republic of Korea units and made evident its superior combat and training proficiency.

On 27 April 1953, the Division received the responsibility of defending part of the main line of resistance along the northern rim of the Punch Bowl and later was assigned to protect the Heartbreak Ridge sector. Division units such as 143rd and 981st Field Artillery Battalion, and many others continued with their mission of supporting the 12th Republic of Korea Army Division. During the entire campaign, the Division displayed superb solidarity and combat effectiveness in performing the many vital duties assigned to it and exhibited outstanding resoluteness in its training and supporting of Republic of Korea forces. The individual concern of all members of the Division in aiding their Korean comrades-in-arms and the consistent efficiency prominent throughout the Division's service in Korea reflect great credit on the Division, the United States Army, and the entire United Nations forces.

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION TO 140th Tank Battalion:

GO #56 DA, Washington, DC dated 20 July 1954:

The 140th Tank Battalion, 40th Infantry Division, is cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy in the vicinity of Nojonp-Yong, Korea during the period 1 to 8 June and 16 to 18 July 1953. Committed to direct support of the 12th Republic of Korea Army Division, the battalion had been manning tank positions in four vitally

strategic hills. On the night of 1 June the enemy began preparatory fires followed by a large scale attack on one of the hills and succeeded in displacing infantry elements. However, the tank platoon located in that sector refused to leave its positions and continued valiant efforts in denying the enemy its objective. That night another platoon moved up under the supporting fires of Company B and Company C to aid the beleaguered unit, and the following morning they were reinforced by an additional platoon.

Fierce action continued throughout the remainder of 2 June with the tankers resolutely refusing to withdraw. With tanks spearheading the infantry, a counterattack was launched on the morning of 3 June and although it did not clear the hill it permitted the besieged tanks to be replaced with others which, supported by the balance of the battalion tanks, denied the enemy access to the crest.

On 5 June, Company A, which was in reserve 56 miles to the rear, was alerted and moved in an excellently coordinated forced march and arrived in an exceedingly short time to relieve Company B. That evening the hostile force began concentrated attacks on two adjacent hills and gained a few friendly outposts, however, the infantry, inspired by the tankers' valiant stand, counterattacked and hurled the enemy from these positions. In the remaining days, from 6 to 8 June the battalion continued devastating fire against hostile positions, sealing off approach routes and permitting friendly lines to be reconsolidated. Fierce as these actions were, it was realized that they were but a prelude to a more massive attack to seize the entire hill complex and clear the way to the south.

On the night of 16 July the foe commenced battalion-size attacks against two of the hill positions. The combined tank, artillery, and infantry fires, particularly flanking fire from the tanks which the aggressor had not anticipated, destroyed one battalion and so decimated the others that it only made minor gains. The following night small diversionary actions were attempted and on the morning of 18 July they began a regimental size attack against another sector. Here the aggressiveness, esprit de corps, and prowess of the defenders succeeded in wreaking havoc among the hostile force. The superb gallantry of the tankers displayed in both phases of this action paved the way for a stiffened defense and better coordination and as a result the attacking enemy division was completely demoralized and ceased to be an effective striking force.

The heroism and courage exhibited by the members of this unit in denying the enemy a vitally strategic area reflect great credit on themselves, their organization and the military service of the United States. (GO 285, HQs, Eighth U.S. Army, 10 May 1954)

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION TO 40th QM Co, 40th Inf Div (Same GO as 140th Tank Bn):

The 40th Quartermaster Company, 40th Infantry Division, is cited for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services in support of combat operations in Korea during the period 1 August 1953 to 31 January 1954. Serving all units of the 40th Infantry Division, this company continued its normal functions without interruption or decrease in efficiency during three complete moves made by the division.

In addition to handling a prodigious amount of Class II and IV items, receipt, storage, and distribution of over 560 tons of winter clothing and equipment was effected and 5,000 quartermaster items were expeditiously repaired and returned to service, thereby saving the United States Government thousands of dollars in replacement stock. Over 22,000 tons of rations were provided and handled with superior protection and accountability and 35,000 tons of petroleum, oil and lubricants were expeditiously delivered to motor pools and supply points, assuring an adequate supply for transportation and heating unit consumption.

The three Quartermaster Truck Platoons provided excellent transportation facilities during Division moves and daily operations, traveling thousands of miles every month over hazardous

terrain and under adverse weather conditions. The provision of laundry and shower facilities and the production of more than three servings of ice cream each week for assigned and attached personnel were high among the many contributing factors in the maintenance of morale throughout the division.

The 40th Quartermaster Company displayed such outstanding devotion to duty in the performance of exceptionally difficult tasks as to set it above and apart from other units with similar missions. The initiative, ability, and esprit de corps exhibited by the members of this unit throughout the entire period reflect great credit on themselves and the military service of the United States. (GO #333, HQS, Eighth U.S. Army, 28 May 1954).

APPENDIX 6

MEDAL OF HONOR CITATIONS

WORLD WAR II:

STAFF SERGEANT JOHN C. SJOGREN

Company I, 160th Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division. Vicinity of San Jose Hacienda, Negros, Philippine Islands, 23 May 1945. GO. Nr. 97, 1 November 1945.

Staff Sergeant Sjogren led an attack against a high precipitous ridge defended by a company of enemy riflemen, who were entrenched in spider holes and supported by well-concealed pillboxes housing automatic weapons with interlocking bands of fire. The terrain was such that only one squad could advance at a time; and from a knoll atop a ridge a pillbox covered the only approach with automatic fire. Against this enemy stronghold, Staff Sergeant Sjogren led the first squad to open the assault. Deploying his men, he moved forward and hurling grenades when he saw his next in command, at the opposite flank, was gravely wounded. Without hesitation he crossed twenty yards of exposed terrain in the face of enemy fire and exploding dynamite charges, moved the man to cover and administered first aid. He then worked his way forward and, advancing directly into the enemy fire, killed eight Japanese in spider holes guarding the approach to the pillbox. Crawling to within a few feet of the pillbox while his men concentrated their bullets on the fire port, he began dropping grenades through the narrow firing slit. The enemy immediately threw two or three of these unexploded grenades out, and fragments from one wounded him in the hand and back. However, by hurling grenades through the embrasure faster than the enemy could return them, he succeeded in destroying the occupants. Despite his wounds, he directed his squad to follow him in a systematic attack on the remaining positions, which he eliminated in like manner, taking tremendous risks, overcoming bitter resistance, and never hesitating in his relentless advance. To silence one of the pillboxes, he wrenched a light machine gun out through the embrasure as it was firing before blowing up the occupants with hand grenades. During this action, Staff Sergeant Sjogren, by his heroic bravery, aggressiveness, and skill as a soldier, singlehandedly killed forty-three enemy soldiers and destroyed nine pillboxes, thereby paving the way for his company's successful advance.

THE KOREAN WAR

SERGEANT DAVID B. BLEAK

Medical Company, 223rd Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division. Vicinity of Minari-gol, Korea, 14 June 1952. GO. Nr. 83, 2 November 1953.

Sergeant Bleak, a member of the medical company, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and indomitable courage above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy. As a medical aidman, he volunteered to accompany a reconnaissance patrol committed to engage the enemy and capture a prisoner for interrogation. Forging up the rugged slope of the key terrain, the group was subjected to intense automatic weapons and small arms fire and suffered several casualties. After administering to the wounded, he continued to advance with the patrol. Nearing the military crest of the hill, while attempting to cross the fire-swept area to attend the wounded, he came under hostile fire from a small group of the enemy concealed in a trench. Entering the trench he closed with the enemy, killed two with bare hands and a third with his trench knife. Moving from the emplacement, he saw a concussion grenade fall in front of a companion and, quickly shifting his position, shielded the man from the impact of the blast. Later, while ministering to the wounded, he was struck by a hostile bullet but, despite the wound, he undertook to evacuate a wounded comrade. As he moved down the hill with his heavy burden, he was attacked by two enemy soldiers with fixed bayonets. Closing with the aggressors, he grabbed them and smacked their heads together, then carried his helpless comrade down the hill to safety. Sergeant Bleak's dauntless courage and intrepid actions reflect utmost credit upon himself and are in keeping with the honored traditions of the military service.

CORPORAL GILBERT G. COLLIER (Died of Wounds)

(Later Sergeant) Company F, 223rd Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division. Vicinity of Tutayon, Korea, 19-20 July 1953. GO. Nr. 3, 12 January 1955.

Corporal Collier, a member of Company F, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and indomitable courage above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy. Corporal Collier was point man and assistant leader of a combat patrol committed to make contact with the enemy. As the patrol moved forward through the darkness, he and his commanding officer slipped and fell from a steep 60-foot cliff and were injured. Incapacitated by a badly sprained ankle which prevented immediate movement, the officer ordered the patrol to return to the safety of friendly lines. Although suffering from a painful back injury, Corporal Collier elected to remain with his leader, and before

daylight they managed to crawl back up and over the mountainous terrain to the opposite valley where they concealed themselves in the brush until nightfall, then edged toward their company positions. Shortly after leaving the daylight retreat they were ambushed and, in the ensuing fire fight, Corporal Collier killed two hostile soldiers, received painful wounds, and was separated from his companion. Then, ammunition expended, he closed in hand-to-hand combat with four attacking hostile infantrymen, killing, wounding, and routing the foe with his bayonet. He was mortally wounded during this action, but made a valiant attempt to reach and assist his leader in a desperate effort to save his comrade's life without regard for his own personal safety. Corporal Collier's unflinching courage, consummate devotion to duty, and gallant self-sacrifice reflect lasting glory upon himself and uphold the noble traditions of the military service.

CORPORAL CLIFTON T. SPEICHER (KIA)

Company F, 223rd Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division. Vicinity Minari-gol, Korea, 14 June 1952. GO. Nr. 65, 19 August 1953.

Corporal Speicher distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and indomitable courage above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy. While participating in an assault to secure a key terrain feature, Corporal Speicher's squad was pinned down by withering small-arms, mortar, and machine gun fire. Although already wounded, he left the comparative safety of his position, and made a daring charge against the machine gun emplacement. Within ten yards of the goal, he was again wounded by small arms fire but continued on, entered the bunker, killed two hostile soldiers with his rifle, a third with his bayonet, and silenced the machine gun. Inspired by this incredible display of valor, the men quickly moved up and completed the mission. Dazed and shaken, he walked to the foot of the hill where he collapsed and died. Corporal Speicher's consummate sacrifice and unflinching devotion to duty reflect lasting glory upon himself and uphold the noble traditions of the military service.