


THE BOYS OF FIFTY



**625th Field Artillery Battalion
40th Infantry Division
California National Guard
1946 - 1954**

MSgt R. L. Hanson

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Revision 1: Dated 10 Sept 2006

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Acknowledgments: A hearty thanks to all who shared their pictures and stories as we recalled our time in Korea.. Any errors are entirely mine and will be acknowledged when brought to my attention. Although comprehensive, the Consolidated Roster is not complete and the author would welcome the names of additional battalion members. The Consolidated Roster and the Casualty List may be shared freely as long as there is no attempt to make commercial use of them.

Pictures: Author's and battalion member's own collections and from the World Wide Web. All photos from the World Wide Web are assumed to be in the public domain. If this is not the case, please let the author know.

Revision 1; Dated 10 Sept 2006.

This revision to The Boys of Fifty identifies and adds some additional 625th Field Artillery Battalion members to APPENDIX A: 625th FA Bn Roster. Some additional information regarding the battalion's last day in combat (page 124 and 125) has been provided by Stan Hanks. The reference to the patrol action in which the Medal of Honor was awarded to Cpl Gilbert Collier has been deleted as the action did not take place in the Punchbowl area but at Heartbreak Ridge. This historically incorrect misconception has crept into recent articles and also the initial publication of The Boys of Fifty. The following communication from Stan Hanks dated 28 Apr 2006 hopefully sets the record straight:

Military records (40th Div Order of Battle) indicate that on 10 July 1953, the 20th ROK Div relieved 223rd Regt, 40th Div on the north rim of the Punchbowl. The 223rd Regt then moved from the Punchbowl to relieve the 45th Div at Heartbreak on 11 July 1953. Therefore, the Collier/Agnew incident that occurred 19 July 1953 could not have taken place at the Punchbowl nor at No Name Ridge. I have spoken recently with one of the Fox Company officers that lead the rescue party, also an enlisted man in that party which brought Lt Agnew and Collier back from no mans land --- both of them stated that the action took place at Heartbreak. I also have talked to Lt. Agnew who, unfortunately, told General Delk author of "The Fighting Fortieth" that he recalls the action as occurring in, or at, the Punchbowl Area. General Delk quoted that location in his book. These locations are only two miles apart, but with Sandbag Castle and a deep valley (the Sat-ae-ri) separating them from Heartbreak Ridge. The 224th Regt occupied the Sandbag Castle position and the 223rd occupied Heartbreak Ridge during the period after 10 July 1953 until after the cease fire. I believe It is understandable that Agnew could be confused regarding the two locations. He had previously been a month or so at the Punchbowl then only about a week at Heartbreak before the horrific 19 July action, and then was immediately promoted to 1st Lt and transferred Div HQ.



625th Field Artillery Battalion Crest

Early in 1949, Sgt Brown of Headquarters Battery designed a battalion crest for the new 625th Field Artillery Battalion. A shield of scarlet, the artillery's color, is overlaid with crossed cannon barrels implying the strength and alluding to the units mission, over this a Greek warrior's Corinthian helmet represents the fighting spirit of the "King of Battles". The "Nulli Secundus" motto means "Second to None." Although, never officially approved by the Adjutant General of the Army, the crest was worn proudly by the redlegs of the 625th .

To those who remember...

**FOR ALL GAVE SOME
AND SOME GAVE ALL**

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FOREWARD

More than fifty years ago, the 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard went off to war. Labeled a “Police Action” by President Harry S. Truman¹ and forgotten by most, it was war. Thousands of miles from home, it had dust and heat, rain and mud, snow and bitter cold as well as over 100,000 casualties. Sandwiched between World War Two and Vietnam; it has been called “the Forgotten War.” But it is not forgotten by those who served in that far off frozen land. The 40th Division’s 625th Field Artillery Battalion’s story begins with National Guardsman from Southern California but soon included draftees, enlistees and recalled reservists from across the country. By the time the Korean Cease Fire was signed more than fifteen hundred young men and World War II veterans served in the 625th. This is their story: from San Fernando Valley armories, north to Camp Cooke, across the sea to Japan, and up the steep hills of Korea and back to California. May our children, now grown, and their children see that the Korean War was more than a footnote on the pages of history.

1

The President’s News Conference; June 29, 1950:

Q. Are we or are we not at war?

THE PRESIDENT. We are not at war.

Q. Would it be possible to call this a police action under the United Nations?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is exactly what it amounts to.

PROLOGUE

Artillery has been and remains the great killer of communists. It remains the great saver of soldiers, American and Allied. There is a direct correlation between piles of shells and piles of corpses. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter. - General Matthew B. Ridgway (Commander Eighth Army, 1951)

THE KING OF BATTLES

Once truce talks began at Panmunjom progressing at a snail's pace, it became clear that the United States and the United Nation forces were not going to try for a military victory in Korea at the cost of thousands of lives. U. S. Commanders in the last two years of the Korean War would depend upon artillery to do the lion's share of the ground fighting: interdicting enemy movements, responding to enemy artillery fire (which continued to increase until the cease fire), and countering enemy offensive actions with massive artillery barrages. This led to a change in tactical doctrine; replacing fire and maneuver with massed artillery fire. There were almost 500 artillery pieces in the UN command and the majority were contained in 105mm towed howitzer battalions, such as the 625th. When General James A. Van Fleet, who followed General Ridgway as commander of the Eighth Army, shifted to an active defense posture, he made artillery the

primary battlefield weapon, keeping the enemy vulnerable to massed artillery fire whenever he attacked.



The M101A1 105mm Light Howitzer. Source: National Archives
The basic light artillery weapon of World War II and Korea. Towed behind a 2 ½ ton 6x6 truck. It was used for both direct and indirect fire.

THE WEAPON

The field artillery’s primary crew-served weapon, was the 105mm howitzer (M101A1), the same weapon used with great success in WWII. It was light, dependable and with a high rate of fire, an ideal weapon for moving with light infantry forces and responding quickly with high volumes of close-in fire. Weighing 2,220-kg and with a maximum range of 11,220 meters (almost 7 miles), it could fire its shells at the rate of 8 per minute.

The basic Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)² for a 105mm towed howitzer field artillery battalion in the 1950's consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), three lettered firing batteries (A, B, and C) each with six guns, a Service Battery and a Medical Detachment. The nominal battalion strength was 34 officers, 2 warrant officers and 671 enlisted men.

2

For a detailed T/O & E, see Appendices D, E and F.

THE BEGINNINGS

BACK FROM THE WAR

In April 1946, the 40th Infantry Division, displaying World War II battle streamers for the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO, SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES and LUZON returned from occupation duty in Korea. The 40th was the last National Guard division to return to the United States from World War II service.

Almost immediately upon its release from Federal service, the 40th Division began to reorganize. The division had gone into Federal Service in March 1941 composed of units from California, Nevada and Utah. The National Guard Bureau now felt that with California's population growth during the war, the state could support two divisions. A new 49th Infantry Division based upon the 40th's 159th, 184th Infantry Regiments and the 1st Battalion of the 185th Infantry Regiment would cover northern California. Units of the 40th would be limited to the Southern California area, i.e., south of Santa Barbara to the Mexican border. The 160th Infantry Regiment and the 143rd Field Artillery Battalion remained in the 40th Division. Two new infantry regiments (the 223rd and 224th), were formed by expanding the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 185th Infantry Regiment. Three new artillery battalions (625th, 980th and 981st) were added along with supporting units.

A NEW BATTALION

The 625th Field Artillery Battalion, a 105mm towed-howitzer unit was constituted³ 5 August 1946 in the California National Guard and assigned to the 40th Infantry Division. It was organized and Federally recognized⁴ 18 June 1947. The battalion's armories were scattered throughout the greater Los Angeles area. Leased buildings housed Btry A in Highland Park and Btry B in the city of Van Nuys. Btry C was located in the basement of the Police Department in San Fernando. World War II Quonset Huts housed Headquarters and Headquarters Battery as well as Service Battery at the former Army Air Base at Burbank Airport. Not designed as armories, these buildings were cramped with limited storage space and parking. The units themselves, using volunteer labor modified these areas to fit their needs, e.g., constructing classrooms, secure storerooms, and even strongrooms for weapons.

In June 1950, both Headquarters and Service Batteries were deposed from their Burbank armory to make room for a California Air National Guard unit. These batteries crowded into the Btry B armory in Van Nuys while waiting for a new armory to be built in Burbank. June also saw Btry C moving from the San Fernando Valley northward to Santa Paula. Here it was brought up to strength by the transfer of about fifty men from Btry A, 981st FA Bn (located in Oxnard). Lt Maurice Ragner, who had recruited most of these men from the Santa Paula, Fillmore and Piru areas was assigned as Battery Commander. The Santa Paula armory was an example of the make-do spirit of the guardsmen. Headquarters was under the ramp to the Santa

3

To place the designation of a new unit on the official rolls of the United States Army.

4

To accept an Army National Guard unit into the force structure of the United States Army after the unit has been inspected by a federal representative and found to be properly stationed, organized, and equipped in accordance with Army requirements.

Paula High School gymnasium. Here a strongroom was made for weapons and supplies. The battery's vehicles and howitzers were kept inside a fenced yard at the local packing house.

RECRUITING

Initially, most of the new battalion's Guardsman were veterans of World War II. Maj John L. West became the 625th's first battalion commander. Officers like Lt Robert Madsen, Hqs Btry.; Capt Don Southwick, Sv Btry; Capt James Griffith, Btry A and Lt Jack Griffith, Btry B were soon putting their previous military experience to work in turning their units into trained artillery batteries. NCO's with prior service joined, retaining or advancing in rank. Soon an active recruiting campaign got under way to fill the ranks. Unit Caretakers (full-time Guardsman who maintained the armories) spent a sizeable portion of each day out recruiting. They hit the beaches, drive-ins, schools, any place young men gathered, Here they would extol the benefits of joining a home town unit. A Pvt in the Guard at this time was paid \$12 a quarter, if he did not miss any drill nights (usually one night a week). No one enlisted for the money. Some joined for excitement, others to be with their buddies and maybe have a little rank if they had to go to war. World War II had just ended. Love for your country and being willing to fight for it was considered to be everyone's duty. When one joined, he would usually talk his buddies into joining.

Robert B Kinkead, a former Coast Guard Petty Officer enlisted in Hqs Btry and brought two co-workers, John Coon and Bob Hanson into the ranks of the battalion. Kinkead was later commissioned and served as Forward Observer. The local high schools were fertile recruiting grounds. Gus Ghiselli, John Olah and Steve Terrel joined up from Burbank High School in June 1948. The local catholic school, Bellarmine-Jefferson, furnished Ronald Bergstrom, John Coleman, Herb Grim, Neil Mahoney, Herb Regoni, Dale Taufer and John Whittet. The then 17 year-old Whittet later became Hqs Btry Survey Section Chief. Glendale High School was represented by James E. Dovey, John Few and Arlin Rhia. Owen Marsh and Bill Plimpton came from North Hollywood High. April 1948 saw Johnny Vaiana enlisting in Btry C where he later became Chief of Section. Jack D.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

Flanagin and Don Marsh joined Service Battery in 1949.

A well-qualified addition to the battalion was 1st Lt Fred Baumeister, a World War II 11th Airborne Division veteran. Fred had been serving as Asst Div Arty, S-3, 24th Infantry Division on occupation duty in Japan. Separated from the service, in February 1950, since his family could not join him in Japan, Fred joined the 625th. This may have saved his life as four months later, the 24th was badly mauled and suffered heavy casualties in the first weeks of the Korean War. The heavy emphasis on recruiting paid off as by the spring of 1950, the 40th was National Guard's third largest division.

WEEKLY DRILLS

Usually drill nights were taken up with a single battery focusing on individual and/or crew training. Wire crews learned how to splice wire, man switchboards, and climb telephone poles. Radio crews learned how to operate and align radios, as well as use proper radio-telephone procedures. Fire direction personnel were working with maps, pins, pencils and slide-sticks plotting fire missions. Forward observers used sand table ranges to fire at targets. Gun crews went through their drills. Of course, ample close order drill and personnel inspections. And lots of administrative paper work for the clerks. Where batteries shared armories, they usually drilled on separate nights because of the limited drill space. Occasionally, the entire battalion would road march for a weekend drill at the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, south of Los Angeles for small arms instruction and qualification.

ANNUAL FIELD TRAINING

Each year the entire division would spend two weeks in the field. This allowed units to train together without time or space constraints. The first annual field training for the division since before World War II occurred the first two weeks of August 1948. The 625th spent the first week at Camp San Luis Obispo covering basic military subjects. The second week the battalion traveled north to the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation. Here they lived in the field and conducted live firing with their 105mm howitzers.

The artillery range's bush covered rolling hills were always bone dry in the summer heat. Live artillery rounds impacting on the range caused brush fires now and then. All firing stopped and Guardsman turned out to fight the fires. This first year, the 49th Infantry Division's artillery had proceeded us to the firing range. They had burnt up most of the range, so the 40th Div Arty training was not interrupted by firefighting duties.

Here on the range the Forward Observers directed live firing, the Fire Direction Center team plotted target positions, the gun crews aimed and fired their guns. The communication crews tied everybody together with wire and radio nets. To the rear, the cooks were preparing meals, the mechanics maintaining the vehicles and the Service Battery personnel providing supplies.

Sometimes the Forward Observer would call "Cease Firing" and when asked why, replied "D--- cattle have wandered onto the range." A hasty call to a local rancher, who more times than not would reply, "That's OK, if you hit 'em, eat 'em" and the shooting would resume.

The next year, 1949, found the division at summer camp the last two weeks of July. The routine was the same, a week at Camp San Luis Obispo and then a week at Hunter Liggett. This year the 40th Division artillery was the first unit to Hunter Liggett and they were on tap to fight any brush fires caused by impacting rounds.

MINUTEMEN AGAIN

As the 625th prepared for its 1950 summer field training, little did it know that it would soon be gone for "A Very Long Weekend."⁵ Early on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, the Land of the Morning Calm was awoken by the roar of artillery shells. Almost 90,000 North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea. Five days later, President Truman signed the

5

A Very Long Weekend by William Berebitsky tells the story of the Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652, Dec. 20, 1950, 500 W. 20
 R. R. of U.S. Pat. 2,111,980 1/15
 GPO: 1950-200-2-1000

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

24 JUNE 1950

FROM: THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D.C.
 TO : THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
 NR : WHITE 3
 DTG : 250515Z

THE SECRETARY OF STATE REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED
 TO THE PRESIDENT:

TO THE PRESIDENT
 FROM SEOUL
 TO SECRETARY OF STATE

NO NINE TWO FIVE CMA JUNE TWO FIVE CMA ONE ZERO ABLE MIKE
 NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT NINE TWO FIVE CMA REPEATED INFORMATION CINFOE,

ACCORDING KOREAN ARMY REPORTS WHICH PARTLY CONFIRMED BY KMAQ
 FIELD ADJUTANT REPORTS CMA NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADDED ROK TERRITORY
 AT SEVERAL POINTS THIS MORNING. ACTION WAS INITIATED ABOUT FOUR ABLE
 MIKE ONGJIN BLASTED BY NORTH KOREAN ARTILLERY FIRE. ABOUT SIX ABLE
 MIKE NORTH KOREAN INFANTRY CONGENCE CROSSING PARALLEL IN ONGJIN AREA
 CMA KANSONG AREA CMA CHUNCHON AREA AND AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WAS REPORT-
 EDLY MADE SOUTH OF KANGHUNG ON EAST COAST. KANSONG WAS REPORTEDLY
 MADE CAPTURED AT NINE ABLE MIKE WITH SOME ONE ZERO NORTH KOREAN TANKS
 PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION. NORTH KOREAN FORCES CMA SPEARHEADED BY
 TANKS, REPORTEDLY CLOSING IN ON CHUNCHON. DETAILS OF FIGHTING IN
 KANGHUNG AREA UNCLEAR, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS NORTH KOREAN FORCES HAVE CUT
 HIGHWAY. AM CONFERRING WITH KMAQ ADVISORS AND KOREAN OFFICIALS THIS
 MORNING RE SITUATION. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM NATURE OF ATTACK AND
 MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS LAUNCHED IT CONSTITUTES ALL OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST
 ROK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUCCIO
 RSP LQB

NOTE: MR. CONNERS FE CMA MR WHITE S.A. NOTIFIED ONE ZERO; ONE FIVE PETER
 MIKE SIX/24/50. Relayed to Army Dept. 10:30 PM 5/24/50 CWO/TED.

Selective Service Extension Act, extending the draft that had been in effect since 1948 and was due to expire 14 Aug 1950. The president authorized the call-up of Reserve Components for Federal service not to exceed twenty-one months. General MacArthur was authorized to use ground troops to stop the North Korean aggression. Thus less than five years after the 40th Division had returned from Korea, the United States was again involved in a war in that far off land. It seemed inevitable that the 40th Infantry Division, as in February 1941, would again be called upon to serve our country. None of the guardsman were surprised that within a month, the 40th Division received warning orders for mobilization.⁶

Unlike the 746th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (120mm) from San Diego, a non-divisional unit which was activated 15 July and had most of its guardsman sent as individual replacements to Korea, the 625th would be activated with and remain part of the 40th Infantry Division.

Alerted as they prepared for summer field training, the 625th went to three drills per week. As in March 1941 when the 40th was activated prior to World War II, enlistments increased as many draft-eligible men preferred to go with their hometown units. Processing these new enlistees, releasing underage Guardsman, inventorying and readying equipment for mobilization made for ten to twelve hour days. Many who had scheduled time off from school or work to attend summer field training, volunteered to work full time at the armories prior to their departure to Camp Cooke. Again, in response to their nation's needs, California Guardsmen were leaving their families, friends, and homes. 10 August 1950, found California's 40th Division called into federal service for the third time in less than fifty years.

6

Units activated early in 1950, were only given three weeks to accomplish the many tasks required between alert and entry into federal service. Units were later allowed thirty days by the AEF between alert and entry into federal service.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California

INDUCTION ORDER

10 August 1950

NUMBER 7

INDUCTION OF 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND
186TH OPERATIONS DETACHMENT
CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

INDUCTION OF 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND 186
OPERATIONS DETACHMENT, CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

1. By direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense under authority conferred by the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 (Public Law 599, 81st Congress), the following units and members thereof of the National Guard of the United States are ordered into the active military service of the United States to serve therein for a period of twenty-one (21) consecutive months, or such other period as may be authorized by law, unless sooner relieved.

UNIT	T/O&E	HOME STATION	EFFECTIVE DATE
625TH FABN(105 How TK-DR)	RT 6-25N-22 1 Oct 48		0001 Local Time 1 September 1950
Hq & Hq Btry	RT 6-26N-22 1 Oct 48	Van Nuys, California	“ ” “
SV Btry	RT 6-29N-22 1 Oct 48	Van Nuys, California	“ ” “
MED Btry	RT 6-10N-22 1 Oct 48	Van Nuys, California	“ ” “
A Btry	RT 6-27N-22 1 Oct 48	Los Angeles, California	“ ” “
B Btry	RT 6-27N-22 1 Oct 48	Los Angeles, California	“ ” “
C Btry	RT 6-29N-22 1 Oct 48	Van Nuys, California	“ ” “

2. All persons so ordered into the active military service of the United States are, from the effective dates indicated above, are relieved from duty in the National Guard of their respective states..

CAMP COOKE

ROAD TRIP

At 0001:00 01 Sept 1950, the battalion's advance party passed through the gates of the Van Nuys Armory and turned onto Ventura Boulevard. The week before, Captain Phillips Melzer, the Battalion S-2 scouted the entire route to Camp Cooke by air and had briefed all the drivers. The 1/4 ton trucks (jeeps), 3/4 ton weapons carriers, and 2 ½ ton trucks, some towing trailers or howitzers, were heavily loaded with all the battalion's Federal property. A few short blocks brought the convoy of twenty vehicles to Highway 101, the Coast Highway, where they headed north into the night. Service Battery's, big 5 ton wrecker brought up the rear in case of "car trouble." Charlie Battery's three vehicles joined the battalion near the Ventura County line.

The thirty-five mile an hour limit speed limit; designed to allow the convoy to stay together, separated by a nominal interval, was hard to maintain. That night the string of vehicles resembled a rubber band stretching and contracting as the drivers speed up or slowed down trying to keep the required distance. This continued mile after mile as the night wore on. As dawn broke, the advanced party neared its destination, while to the south the rest of the battalion reported to their mostly empty armories for their first day of active duty.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

The 40th Division's destination was Camp Cooke, north of Santa Barbara, a World War II Army Base empty since 1946. Not entirely empty, for a maximum security Army Disciplinary Barracks stood in one remote corner of the camp. Passing through the main gate, the advanced party drove to the battalion's assigned area. Getting out of our vehicles, We stretched cramped legs and looked around. Standing in the middle of the battery street, we saw those ubiquitous two-story wooden barracks that have dotted American military bases for what seems like hundreds of years.



Camp Cooke Barracks.

Source: Unknown

EARLY DAYS

Six days later, the battalion's main body boarded a train at the Los Angeles Union Station. A few hours later they arrived at Camp Cooke, bringing all 373 men of the battalion together. By mid-September, the battalion had settled into their barracks and had evicted most of former tenants (mice, rabbits, and fleas). The battalion's first

Friday night “G. I. Party” in preparation for Saturday morning’s inspection had some unusual results. The boys of Btry C found out that if you wet mop the second floor of a wooden barracks whose floorboards have shrunk through long hot summers of neglect, water will quickly flow down through cracks to the first floor. The resulting havoc of wet bunks, wet gear and a muddy floor caused many angry “shouts” from the first floor occupants. But after working late into the night to clean up the soggy mess, the barracks were ready for inspection by reveille

The 625th began the housekeeping tasks of preparing the long neglected barracks, messhalls and battery offices for use. To the daily administrative duties was added the burden of converting all National Guard forms to US Army forms,⁷ discharging remaining underage personnel, and updating all personnel records. A multitude of other necessary pre-cycle training tasks had also to be accomplished. An intensive 26 week training program was scheduled to begin in November. The army promised that the division would then be at full strength through the addition of fillers and recalled reservists. This promise was never kept and affected the training effort throughout the divisions stay at Camp Cooke.

General Order 133, Hqs 6th Army, dated 21 September 1950 directed the reorganization of the division in accordance with an amended T/EOE. A light field artillery battalion, such as the 625th was now allocated six guns per firing battery for a total of eighteen for the battalion. A corresponding increase in enlisted personnel was also allocated.

Later in the month, Lt Ragner and Lt Madsen brought six additional howitzers (giving the battalion a total of twelve) from the National Guard arsenal at Camp San Louis Obispo. While checking

7

This reconciliation was not completed until 30 November. The two different and incompatible administrative systems between the National Guard and U. S. Army forms continued to be a problem until the 1990's.

the gun books,⁸ Lt Madsen found that one of these guns was from the artillery battalion he served with in World War II.



Home Sweet Home: But no foot lockers or wall lockers. Cots head to foot was supposed to be healthier. Source: Unknown

Maj John L. West Jr, continued as Battalion Commander. His staff consisted of Maj Chandler, Executive Officer (XO); Capt Ralph O. Meister, Adjutant (S-1); Capt Phillips Melzer, Intelligence (S-2); Maj William E. Fisher Jr, Operations and Training (S-3); Capt Don M. Southwick, Supply, (S-4), 1st Lt. Maurice G. Ragner (Comm O). Battery Commanders were: Capt James R. Griffith, Btry A; 1st Lt Jack D. Farris, Btry B; 1st Lt Fred S. Baumeister, Btry C, Capt Don M. Southwick, Service Battery; 1st Lt Robert J. Madsen, Hqs Battery.

8

Each Gun Book contains that gun's history in great detail (repairs, tube changes, number and types of rounds fired, units, locations, etc.) starting from the time the gun was built.

FILLERS AND REPLACEMENTS

The first fillers arrived the 13th of October. By 22 November, the battalion was at full strength for enlisted men but that was not to last for long. With only a partial mobilization (the policy of butter and guns continued with no large scale mobilization during the Korean War), the Army's training system could not keep pace with the need for replacements. The Army began the practice of pulling individuals out of activated stateside units. The majority chosen were experienced guardsmen, usually NCO's. Filler personnel continued to arrive but never enough to maintain the battalion's wartime strength of 643 (T/O&E plus 10%). Early in 1951, Hqs Btry lost 34 enlisted men, including 10 sergeants and 5 corporals.⁹ The Saturday that alert orders for overseas movement were received, 34 fillers arrived and 38 more the following Monday. A week later, 40 more fillers arrived. That's 112 fillers received, less than a month before leaving for Japan. The Wednesday before overseas departure, eight replacement officers joined the battalion.

The newly arrived fillers as well as 22 other trainees were assigned to the 40th Div Rear Detachment¹⁰ to complete their training. They were scheduled to rejoin the battalion in Japan upon completion of their basic training. As might be expected, many did not rejoin the battalion but were sent directly as individual replacements to Korea.

While at Camp Cooke, the battalion had received over 150 fillers but the Army's individual replacement policy resulted in a net loss of 85 enlisted men for the battalion. This pulling of experienced guardsmen from activated units continued throughout the Korean War. For example, SFC Gordon Westerfield, a member of the 233rd FA Bn, 44th Infantry Division, Illinois National Guard was activated

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The 40th lost over 600 men as individual replacements to Korea in January 1951, the majority were experienced guardsmen and World War II veterans.

10

The 40th Div left 4000 men behind when they left for Japan. They were to join the division in August 1951 after they completed their basic training.

September 1951. The division was sent to Camp Cooke as training cadre. In August 1952, Gorden was pulled from his unit to join the 625th in Korea, where he served in the battalion Fire Direction Center.

The loss of NCO's as replacements to Korea had a major effect upon the battalion's non-commissioned ranks. The 6th Army's restrictive promotion policy resulted in only 77 enlisted promotions during the months at Camp Cooke. Upon overseas departure many qualified enlisted personnel were serving satisfactorily in jobs one or two pay grades above their rank.

Our fillers were a mixture of draftees, Regular Army enlistees and recalled reservists. They came from all over the country. Two of the earliest draftees, Harold Zuckerman and George Baumli arrived the last week of October. Harold, a New Yorker, ended up as Service Battery's 1st Sgt by the time he left Korea. George, from Carbondale, Colorado wound up a Chief of Detail in Btry C. November brought three draftees from Wisconsin who were all assigned to Service Battery; Paul Grangaard, Bob Herbst, and John Stanek. Dick (Bing) Bingham, from Taylorville, Illinois, enlisted in the Regular Army the first of November 1950 and within a week found himself in Hqs Battery. Bing remained in the Army and retired after 25 years service as a Chief Warrant Officer. The brothers Dupuis; Eugene and Merritt from Yakima, Washington enlisted 4 November 1950 and soon were assigned to Hqs Battery. Jim Wilson, a World War II veteran, was recalled to active duty the September 1st and assigned to Hqs Btry. Bob Peek, a Tennessee boy, enlisted in the Regular Army, December 1950 and joined the battalion in January. Bob, became a Chief of Section in Btry A. He was seriously wounded on April 5, 1952 by counter-battery fire.

The battalion even received a couple of boys from California; Winfield (Bud) Curry and Thomas (Tommy) Gunn. Bud wound up a SFC in Hqs Battery's Survey Section. Tommy, assigned to Hqs Battery did not go to Korea with the battalion. While the battalion was still in Japan, Tommy volunteered to go to Korea with a levy of troops for the 63rd FA Bn which had been badly chewed up. But by the time Tommy joined the 63rd, it had returned to Japan from Korea with the

rest of the 24th Div which had been relieved by the 40th Div.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAM (ITP)

By October, the guardsmen had completed all the necessary pre-cycle training tasks. The eleven week Individual Training Program began with the arrival of the first fillers. The purpose of ITP was the teaching of basic soldering skills to untrained personnel. In addition, individuals received basic instruction in their assigned job which was called a Military Occupation Speciality (MOS.)

A typical training day began well before the crack of dawn. The Charge of Quarters went through the dark barracks, stopping wherever a towel was draped over the end of a bunk. The towel identified those who had to get up for KP duty. After the KPs had dressed and headed for the mess hall, the barracks were quiet again. Soon however, the quiet was broken by a sergeant's loud, bull-like voice, "Hit the deck, everybody up!" It was five o'clock and reveille. Sleepy-eyed the troops headed toward the messhall for breakfast and hot coffee. A quick meal and back to the barracks to s---, shower and shave before falling out for Physical Training. Most mornings concentrated on general subjects (NBC, First Aid, Map Reading, Individual Weapon Training, etc.) with Close Order Drill squeezed in. A break for lunch and then the battalion scattered about the area for sectional training.

At the gun park, unwieldily canvas covers were removed from the howitzers and the gun crews gathered around. Words like bore sighting, direct laying, indirect laying, minimum elevation flew through the air. By the numbers, each crew went through the steps necessary to fire the piece. Again and again these steps were repeated, until they were second nature. The guns were cleaned and cared for as though they were a Southern California boy's custom hot rod.

The battalion and battery ammunition sections gathered in the Service Battery area. The battalion's primary weapon, the 105mm howitzer (M101A1) used several different types of semi-fixed ammunition. The ammo sections learned how to identify each type and it's unique safety requirements. Practical work consisted of correctly

handling, storing and transporting ammunition.

Advanced map reading, aerial photograph interpretation, target identification and acquisition, and the miscellaneous skill mix needed by the Forward Observation and Liaison Sections were practiced in and out of the classroom.

Fire Direction Center personnel learned the duties of the computer.¹¹ They used the M10 Plotting Board, Charge and Distance slide rules as they plotted ranges and azimuths on their firing charts. The results of these calculations were turned into firing commands for the firing batteries.

Battalion and battery survey sections mixed classroom instruction about fire control instruments, taping, and survey computations with practical work. Outside with their instruments, rods and chains they measured everything in sight.

Down at the Communication shack, the Radio Section was installing, maintaining and repairing SCR 608's or 610's. Operators practiced tuning BC 684 Transmitter's or BC 683 Receiver's. Proper Radio/Telephone procedures were practiced until the Phonetic Alphabet (Able, Baker, Charlie, etc)¹² was a piece of cake and communication the Army way was second nature. The Wire Section was all over the battalion area. Putting in phone lines, installing field phones and switchboards where needed provided on the job training. Field wiremen practiced wire splices over and over again, laid and picked up field wire, and learned pole climbing techniques.

At the Motor Pool, mechanics and drivers worked long hours maintaining and keeping the few available vehicles operational. The battalion was performing not only 1st and 2nd but also 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance. The division's overloaded 740th Ordnance Maintenance Company had authorized 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance at the battalion level. The heavy maintenance load was

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The computer was not a machine but a person who calculated firing solution information required for the aiming of the guns.

12

Today's alphabet has changed to an universal set of words for all allied nations.

due in large part to the age and general mechanical condition of these World War Two vintage vehicles. The shortage of vehicles hindered training down to the battalion level. All vehicles were dispatched under battalion, not battery control. Later vehicles were re-allocated within the battalion, and a return to battery control was possible. The end of 1950 found transportation still a major problem as only 19% of authorized vehicles were on hand. The seventeen additional vehicles that arrived before leaving for Japan brought the battalion to 34% of vehicle allocation. This merely kept pace with the augmented manning strength of the battalion.

NCO's traveled to Lompoc, the nearest town, buying expendable supplies (radio batteries, friction tape, pencils, paper, etc) with their own money. Expendables were always in short supply through official channels, especially those used up in training. The citizen soldiers used their various civilian skills to overcome many supply shortages. Activated 1 September 1950, the battalion received it's first signal expendables the 23rd of January 1951. This marked the beginning of an increase of supplies from all technical services. The number of "official" trips to town decreased to the dismay of some.

After the evening meal; cleaning personal equipment, washing clothes, shining brass, and polishing shoes filled the time before "Lights Out." Maybe a card game or a dash to the PX for a beer could be squeezed in. Clerks and others whose administrative duties precluded training during normal duties hours, received specialized classes two hours a night three times a week.

ITP along with the many other tasks of an military unit (KP, Guard Duty, and frequent inspections) continued on a daily basis. Weekends saw the inevitable Saturday morning inspection. At the command "Battalion Dismissed", those with weekend passes dashed for the barracks to change. The rest slowly walked toward the mess hall for the noon meal. Crowded cars headed toward the East Gate. Guardsman usually headed south toward the Los Angeles area and home. Rarely was the 50 mile limit on the weekend passes observed. Monday morning saw many wearied eyed drivers just making reveille.

Those without cars hitchhiked, caught a bus or took a taxi to the one of the neighboring towns of Lompoc, Santa Maria, Santa Inez and Santa Barbara. As the afternoon wore on, those remaining on base settled down to beer or two at the PX, shot the bull or caught up on



Battery Street on Weekend.

Source: Unknown

sleep. Sunday was much the same, some went to chapel services, maybe the movie, then back to the barracks and the never ending bull session.

SERVICE SCHOOLS

By the end of September, battalion personnel were attending service schools across the country. Army Service Schools provided technical and advanced training otherwise not available to unit personnel. The first school quota sent a Service Battery NCO across the country to Maryland. Here he attended the ten- week Electric and Acetylene Welding Course at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Soon motor pool personnel were at Unit Automotive Mechanics and Artillery Vehicle Maintenance courses. Administrative personnel were off to General and Supply Clerks schools. The massive quantities of food needed for hungry troops must be prepared the Army way, so cooks were off to various Food Service Schools. Newly promoted

NCO's attended the NCO Leadership School at Fort Sill.

The Artillery School at Fort Sill also saw battalion and battery Operations and Intelligence Section personnel attending Surveying, Intelligence and Operations classes. Nine enlisted volunteers attended the Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Artillery School at Fort Sill became a frequent destination for battalion officers. Five departed in October for a 13-week Associate Field Artillery Basic Officers Course. By December, all Field Grade Officers had attended a 15-day Field Artillery Refresher Course. Arriving officer replacements, usually newly commissioned 1st or 2nd Lieutenants, soon departed to attend either the Basic or Advanced Associate Field Artillery Course. The Army Aviation School saw two officers at the Aerial Observation Course. The Naval Amphibious Base, San Diego trained four officers in Amphibious Warfare Techniques while another officer attended a Special Air Transportability Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.

IN THE FIELD

As 1950 drew to a close, the distinction between guardsmen, draftees and enlistees blurred as individuals became "redlegs". Nineteen-year old sergeants, 25-26 year old draftees,¹³ and enlistees were learning and working together as gun crews, radio and wiremen, fire direction center personnel as well as in the messhall and motor pool. Individual sections began to interact to form a working field artillery battery. Batteries then must learn to function together to form a cohesive field artillery battalion in action.

To become proficient, a battalion must get into the field for actual service practice. Here is where the gun crews fire live rounds; fire direction centers compute and generate fire commands, communication crews operate and maintain wire and radio nets between all units, and Forward Observers graduate from sand table ranges to requesting and adjusting live fire.

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Many of the first draftees we received had just missed being drafted at the end of World War II and were not happy to be called up five years later.

Camp Cooke was not large enough to combine both live firing and maneuvering. The nearest available range was the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation (HLMR). This area, almost a hundred miles, north of Camp Cooke was familiar to the Guardsmen themselves from summer field training. Here training would take place through battalion or firing battery exercises, called Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP) exercises. RSOPs ranged from a day to a week or more in duration. The unit(s) involved loaded in a tactical manner and road marched the hundred or so miles to one of the impact areas that sprawled over the rolling hills of Hunter Liggett.. Tents were raised, howitzers setup, communication established and the firing began. At the exercise completion, a Change Station March Order (CSMO) was given and the unit(s) loaded up for the return trip to Camp Cooke. The battalion conducted its first RSOP on October 31st and completed six more by January.

On 1 December, Btry C with four howitzer sections supported the 223rd Infantry Regiment in a full scale fire power demonstration before 3000 civilian and military guests of the division Major William E Fisher Jr, Battalion S-3, conducted the artillery phase of this demonstration.


The beginning of January saw the entire battalion on the road for a scheduled two week RSOP and small arms qualifications. Saturday morning, 6 January at 0645 hours, nine officers and 154 enlisted men led by Major Maurice Chandler, the Battalion XO, departed for Hunter Liggett 133 miles away. Using the majority of the battalion's vehicles, the advance party brought all twelve¹⁴ of the battalion's howitzers with them. The remainder of the battalion, over 500 men and officers departed Camp Cooke Monday morning at 0716 and closed the Hunter Liggett bivouac area at 1400 hours. The move was made using the rest of the battalions vehicles plus an additional

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Authorized sixteen howitzers under the new T/O&E, the battalion received the remaining four howitzers dockside as the 625th prepared to board ship for Japan.

twenty-one vehicles borrowed from the 223rd Inf Regt

Service practice began on the 10th at the El Piojo impact area with 142 rounds fired and 248 rounds on the 11th, including a high burst registration and several time transfers at night. The 40th Div.



Hunter Liggett: Btry C Messhall.

Source: SFC R L Hanson

Muddy but sunny and the food is hot.

commander, Maj Gen Daniel H. Hudelson, inspected the battalion in the field that day. Later in the afternoon, the Bn CO led a reconnaissance party to the Stoney Valley Impact area.

The 12th saw the firing batteries displaced to Stoney Valley and using ground and air observation posts fired 398 rounds of various types including 24 rounds of VT fuses which were only 80% effective. Individual weapon (carbines, submachine guns, and pistols) familiarization and qualification took place at the HLMR small arms ranges from the 14 through the 16th of January, with most of the battalion qualifying on their primary weapon. The rest of the battalion qualified later in the month at Camp Cooke. On the 19th of January, the battalion departed Hunter Liggett at 0740 and closed Camp Cooke at 1435. Although the weather was generally cold and rainy, the two

week bivouac was an unqualified success.

The next week at Camp Cooke saw grenade practice, service practice with the 2.36 inch rocket launcher (which had proved ineffective against North Korean or Chinese tanks) and firing of non-primary weapons for familiarization. From 29th of January to the 2nd of February, the battalion organized and operated the Day and Night Infiltration course for the all thirty-two hundred 40th Div Arty redlegs

UNIT TRAINING PROGRAM (UTP)

With the individual training cycle completed by the middle of



Hunter Liggett: Small Arms Familiarization.

Source: R L Hanson

January, the battalion began a thirteen-week Unit Training Program.

The UTP cycle would train the separate parts of the batteries (wire and radio sections, gun crews, fire direction teams, etc.) to smoothly work together. These parts would then be melded into a fully functioning field artillery battalion. The 15th of February, saw the 625th twelve howitzers lined up hub to hub, at Camp Cooke's Surf Area. Firing towards the open sea at high elevation angles, comparative calibration of the weapons was performed. Each battery then took their four guns, displaced to normal firing positions and held a service practice including high burst registrations and time transfers. The morning of the 16th was spent in the classroom learning about chemical warfare. After lunch, it was off to the gas chamber. When your turn came you put on and adjusted your mask. Then entering the tear gas filled tent, you took a few deep breaths and if your mask fitted correctly, no tears. Then the order came to take of your masks. A whiff or two of the gas and your eyes were full of tears as you headed out the door and fresh air.

The next week, the 625th supported the 223rd Infantry Regiment in a battle indoctrination course that was given to all division personnel. This was a combined field exercise including an overhead artillery fire demonstration. The battalion's massed fire upon various targets was unusually effective. As one infantry observer stated; "the rounds appeared like lead shot being poured down a tin funnel." The battalion fired over five hundred rounds that day. The 23rd was spent to learning about mines and bobby traps in the classroom with practical work outside.

By Saturday, February 25th, the battalion was halfway through its Unit Training Program cycle. That afternoon around 1500 hours, the quiet in the battalion orderly room was broken when the Duty Officer received alert orders for overseas movement to Japan. The battalion would have to complete their UTP in Japan. Rumors about going overseas had been common since January. Most of us thought

the division, if it went anywhere, would be sent to Germany¹⁵ as part of NATO's buildup.

TIME TO GO

With the receipt of orders to Prepare for Overseas Movement (POM), all training was suspended. The division turned to completing POM qualification courses (Day and Night Infiltration Course, Overhead Artillery Fire, Combat in Cities, etc.). Many other activities also had to be completed before personnel could be sent overseas; pre-embarkation leave, records updated and of course, another round of medical shots.

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The National Guard 28th (Pennsylvania) and 43rd (Rhode Island-Connecticut-Vermont) Infantry Divisions, were activated a week after the 40th and 45th and later sent to Germany to shore up U.S. strategic defenses in Europe.

Pre-embarkation leave was initiated Friday, the 2nd of March, when 91 enlisted men left for eight days. Another 88 enlisted men left the 13th of March. This continued until all personnel had been given leave. Although necessary, pre-embarkation leave left the battalion shorthanded. Those that had completed or not yet taken their leave, worked many long hours preparing our equipment for transportation by sea. No one had ever processed weapons, vehicles and other major items for overseas movement. It

**THE 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION IS
GOING OVERSEAS—
AND
YOU MAY SAY THAT . . .**

1. The 40th Division presently at Camp Cooke, California will depart for Japan at the end of March 1951.
2. The 40th Division consists of certain organic troops (i.e. 160th Inf. Regt., 143rd FA Bn. etc.) and at present has about 18,000 officers and men.
3. The 40th Division will continue its training in Japan.
4. Personnel from the 40th Division are getting pre-embarkation leaves.

SILENCE MEANS SECURITY!

Security Reminder

**AND
YOU WILL NOT TELL . . .**

1. Actual date of departure from Camp Cooke of the Division or any portion thereof.
2. Number of personnel engaged in the move or any part thereof.
3. Quantity of equipment accompanying the Division.
4. Serviceability of the equipment accompanying the Division.
5. Route to be taken from Camp Cooke, to ships.
6. Any stops between Camp Cooke and POE.
7. Clothing and individual equipment being taken.
8. Date of arrival at Foreign Station.
9. Method of transportation to Port.
10. Port of departure.
11. Port of arrival.
12. Number of ships.
13. Names of ships.
14. Type of loading.
15. Order of departure.
16. Time of arrival.
17. Shipment numbers.
18. Condition of weapons.
19. Type of ships used.
20. Route ships will use.
21. Time of departure.
22. How equipment is packed.

Source: Sgt Wilton L Chase, L Co, 223rd Inf.

was a real “learn as you go” task. Estimating, obtaining and/or building the right number of containers, crates and boxes, and then packing them took the rest of the month. As packing and crating supplies arrived, cargo to accompany troops (TAT) was identified, sorted and packed. Ordnance processing of vehicles and crew-served weapons for movement by water began.

Flatcars and boxcars on the camp railhead sidings were loaded

starting the 17th of March. Post, Camp and Station (PC&S) equipment which could be spared was turned back in 22 March. The rest of the Category C PC&S equipment was turned over at 0045 30 March. And four hours later, the 625th FA Bn departed Camp Cooke for the ten hour train trip to the San Francisco, Port Of Embarkation.

Arriving at the Oakland Army Base, the battalion climbed down from the train, walked across the pier and after a short wait boarded the USNS General M. C. Meigs. Wearing full-field packs and steel helmets chalked with identifying numbers, carrying their individual weapons and over-stuffed duffel bags: the battalion waddled or staggered up the gangway. At the top, sailors guided us through a maze of hatchways and ladders into the depths of the ship. Here were the birthing compartments: a forest of steel pipes, which would be home for the next two weeks. A closer look revealed canvas bunks, two feet wide and six feet long, stretched tightly by ropes between the pipes. On each bunk rested a life jacket. With about two feet between one bunk and the one above it, it was a tight squeeze getting in or out. Stacked 4 or 5 high in the smelly hold of a troopship, the preferred bunk is at the top. Here you were out of the way and clear of the sloppy, slippery decks. There is also a little more room for your gear and sometimes an air vent nearby. The passageways between the bunks were narrow, crowded with duffel bags and assorted gear. Moving about always involved climbing over something. Light was provided by naked electric bulbs suspended from the deck above. These were turned off at 2200 hours, so your flashlight had better be working. You quickly learned your way to the mess, the head and back to your bunk. Otherwise you might wander forever among the hatchways and ladders till somebody showed you the way.

AT SEA

The last National Guard Division to return from overseas duty in World War II, the 40th was now the first to leave for this new conflict. At 1800 hours, 30 March 1951, the Meigs weighed anchor and passed under the Golden Gate Bridge at twenty knots, joining the ships carrying the rest of the division. The convoy headed west into the

setting sun, toward the Land of the Rising Sun.

The 40th's destination was Honshu, the largest Japanese home island. Did anyone wonder if we would stay in Japan longer than the 3rd Infantry Division did? The 3rd Div had also been sent to Japan at General MacArthur's request but spent less than two months there before going to Korea.

Every morning the berthing compartments were cleaned, mopped and inspected. All troops except the cleaning detail reported topside regardless of weather conditions. There you remained until the inspection was finished. Not much open space was available so troops just milled about. Some found a secluded corner out of the wind where they could read a battered paperback from the ship's library. Others just smoked, staring out at the ever moving surrounding sea. World War II veterans who had been on troopships before or those who were just lucky, got on special details (ship's library, px, etc.). Special details usually meant exemption from mess duty, cleanup details and allowed early chow. For the rest, chow usually meant long mess lines in which most of the troops spent an hour or so getting served.

After a few days, shipboard routine settled down (get up, clean up, eat, go topside, some physical training (mostly jumping jacks and running in place), go below, bs, play cards, read, sleep, hit the sack before lights out. Orientation and training films were shown topside, weather permitting. Officers and senior non-commission officers met daily, planning the 625th's future in Japan. Two days out of Yokohama, the convoy slowed down and circled for a day to avoid a typhoon that hit Japan ahead of us.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

Entering Tokyo Bay, the 40th Division had been lucky, spending only fourteen days at sea. The 45th Division (Oklahoma National Guard), left from the Port of New Orleans, passed through the Panama Canal, and spent forty-five days at sea before reaching Japan.



Another day at sea.

Source: Wilton Chase, L Co, 223rd Inf

JAPAN

LAND OF THE RISING SUN

When General MacArthur sent the 3rd Infantry Division from Japan to Korea in November 1950, it was without prior approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The movement of this division left the U. S. XVI Corps, charged with the defense of the Japanese home islands, without any ground combat troops.

The Russians began to increase their Far East military strength and commenced large scale maneuvers on Sakhalin Island, just twenty miles across the Soya Strait from Hokkaido, the northern most Japanese island. Early in December, MacArthur urgently requested that the four newly activated National Guard divisions (The 40th, 45th, 28th, and 43rd) be sent to Japan to complete their training. This would reassure Japanese that the United States was still committed to the defense of their islands.

On the other hand the JCS, concerned that Korea was just a prelude to other Russian maneuvers, remained chiefly focused on Europe. Their reply to MacArthur was that his chance of receiving the National Guard divisions was remote. MacArthur continued to insist that he could not “assume responsibility” for the security of Japan and keep the Eighth Army in Korea without additional divisions. Faced with the insistence of America’s most famous five-star general, the JCS agreed that two partially trained National Guard divisions “could be deployed to Japan.” By the end of January, MacArthur was informed that the National Guard 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions would be ordered to Japan. They would reach his command sometime

in April, the 40th Div to Northern Honshu and the 45th Div to Hokkaido. Upon completion of their unit training cycles, they would maintain maximum combat readiness for defense of the islands or deployment to Korea.

ARRIVAL

The USNS General M. C. Meigs traveled up Tokyo Bay to dock at Port of Yokohama at 1400 hours, 13 April 1951. The 625th FA Bn lined the rails to catch this first sight of Japan as the strains of “California, Here I Come” filled the air.¹⁶ After watching the dockside activities for a while, the troops went below to prepare for debarkation. Borrowed naval items had to be returned or accounted for, living quarters policed and inspected, personal gear stuffed back into packs and duffle bags. Night had fallen and the band long since departed, when at 2200 hours, the battalion began to file down the steep gangway onto the pier. Standing in formation, it was one head count after another, until everyone was satisfied that nobody was left aboard.

The weary troops were then ordered to board a waiting train. It was after midnight before the train pulled away from the RTO (the Japanese railway station), heading northward on the final leg of this trip to a foreign shore. The end of the long day saw everyone settling down all over the cars. Some tried to sleep sitting up in the undersized seats, others stretched out in the aisles. A short few hours later, as the sky began to lighten, bodies stirred, stretched and looked out the windows. Unable to smell the fragrance of the night soil because of the

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The band was from the 2nd TC, Major Port Command. During World War II, the 2nd Port served in the East Indies, Papua, and New Guinea and won the Distinguished Unit Streamer in that campaign, the 2nd Port arrived in Yokohama in June 1946, taking over the facilities from the 11th Port. It was redesignated the 2nd Transportation Major Port in July 1947, and in March 1948 became a Medium Port. After the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the 2nd Port again was designated a “Major Port” and held that designation until March 1954, when it became the 2nd Transportation Command. For its service during the Korean conflict, the 2nd Port received the Meritorious Unit Commendation. During the Vietnam conflict, the Military Port of Yokohama played a key role in supporting the U. S. Forces in the Western Pacific.

closed windows, the passing rice paddies looked green and lush in the early morning light. Later the night soil fragrance would become a familiar odor. However, after a short time, you were use to the smell (and smell it did) and paid it no attention. The rest of the morning was spent in dozing, staring at the passing scenery, a card game or two and smoking. After twelve hours on the train, the battalion detrained at the Jinmachi railhead. The 625th had arrived at Camp Younghans.

CAMP YOUNGHANS¹⁷

Camp Younghans, a former Japanese Army Camp, was located outside the small village of Jinmachi, southwest of Sendi, the largest city north of Tokyo. It was first occupied by the 674th Airborne Artillery Battalion, 11th Airborne Division in the fall of 1945. The camp was named after 1st Lt Raymond M Younghans who was killed 31 March 1945 in Luzon, Phillippines. Lt Younghans was awarded the Silver Star for this action.

The camp must have looked very familiar to 1st Lt Fred Baumeister, Btry C's commanding officer. He had been among the first of the 11th Airborne Division troops to take over this camp from the Japanese after their surrender. A nearby former Japanese Naval Airbase had been strafed several times and was littered with wrecked aircraft. Fred remembers being in charge of a detail to destroy all the remaining aircraft. The planes were stacked front to back, on their noses. They were then set on fire using fifty-five gallon drums of alcohol that had been used for aviation fuel.


The camp had housed the 48th and 49th Field Artillery Battalions, 7th Infantry Division until September 1950 when they left

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Today, Camp Younghans, now called Camp Jinmachi, is home to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's 60th Logistical Support Regiment. U. S. Troops are still occasionally seen on the streets of Jinmachi and at the camp. In 1998, soldiers from the 63rd Ordnance Company, Fort Lewis, Washington could be found working alongside JGSDF forces in a successful bilateral troop exchange allowing US Army and JGSDF soldiers to learn about each other's forces, training and tactics.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

for the Inchon invasion. Units of the 3rd Infantry Division had also been here, for a couple of months, before leaving for Korea.



Where We Were: April 1951; Camp Younghans

Entering the main gate, the battalion found itself not the only occupant of the camp. Other divisional units which had preceded the battalion off the ship were busily moving in. The 981st FA Bn (155mm), 40th Div Arty Hqs and 1st Bn, 223rd Infantry Regiment would share facilities with us. The battalion headed toward their side of the camp. Arriving in their battalion area, the 625th entered single-story barracks which had stood empty since last November. A sense of sadness struck us as we paused to look at the rows of empty wall

and footlockers bearing the names of those who left for Korea a few months before. Many had gone north to the Yalu and not returned.

Before hitting the sack that first night, we were informed that these wooden barracks were very susceptible to fire. They could and had been known to burn to the ground in sixty seconds. Therefore a fire watch would be maintained from taps to reveille. So in each barracks, every two hours a sleepy GI would wake up another sleepy GI and tell him to get up and keep his eyes open. The battalion had no fire incidents but other units did. In April, a kitchen and mess hall at Camp Schimmelpfennig were destroyed. At Camp Zama, seven barracks were burned to the ground in late December.



Camp Zuma barracks after December fire.

Source: Cpl Earl Bates, Sv Co, 160th Inf.

Soon we learned that the Japanese Guards (mostly Japanese Army veterans) patrolled the camp's ammunition dump with loaded shotguns. Of course, we pulled guard duty with unloaded weapons. It

was an eerie experience sharing guard duties with ex-Japanese soldiers who a few years earlier would have shot us on sight.

The next few days were occupied in that myriad of housekeeping details involved in moving onto a base (issuing bedding, setting up the kitchens, etc). The rest of April was spent unloading and unpacking equipment as it arrived at the railhead. Damage to equipment in shipping caused several vehicles to be dead lined upon arrival. Absence of any well defined system for acquiring necessary parts and maintenance materials caused the dead lined vehicles to remain out of action longer than usual. As busy as we were, time was found for 20 mile speed foot marches every week.

The only available small scale maps of the battalion training areas were inaccurate and out of date. This quickly sent the Reconnaissance and Survey Sections to the field. The necessary data collection to correct these maps provided valuable practical training.

The 26th of April marked the first visit to the camp by Major General Hudelson, the 40th Inf Div Commander. Btry C fired the required 13 gun salute and in the review that followed the battalion was highly commended. This was the first of many salutes fired by the battery which earned it the title of the "salutingest battery in the division." By the end of April, the Unit Training Program that had been interrupted in February by the overseas movement was back in full swing.

As at Camp Cooke, the continued shortage of vehicles hampered training in the field. Once again all transportation was consolidated under battalion control. The 625th Cmd Rpt for April reported:

	Motor Vehicle Status as of 30 April 1951			
	1/4 ton 4x4	3/4 ton 4x4	2 ½ ton 6x6	Total
Hq Btry	5	2	3	10
Btry A	1	0	7	8
Btry B	1	0	7	8
Btry C	1	0	7	8
Svc Btry	1	0	4	5
Total	9	2	28	39
Plus 1 - 4 ton wrecker				

With the six howitzers the battalion had received dockside in San Francisco, each firing battery now had its full complement of six howitzers. However, the lack of enough 2 ½ ton 6x6 trucks to move a battery as a unit hampered battery training. Even after vehicle consolidation, the critical shortage of light vehicles (1/4 ton and 3/4 ton) made a true battery exercise very difficult.

Little by little additional equipment, supplies and personnel arrived. As we settled into our training cycle, nights found the PX sounding with Hank Snow's classic honky-tonk song, "I'm Moving On" or the number one song of 1950, "Goodnight Irene" by the Weavers. We brought these songs with us from the PX's of Camp Cooke. Soon however, as we ventured into nearby Jinmachi or Yamagata, we learned the words to "Shina no Yoru" (China Night) or as it was sometimes called "She An't Got No Yo Yo.." That haunting melody followed us to Korea and lingers with us to this day. Some learned the hard way about the higher alcohol content of Japanese beer. Our favorites were Asahi and Kirin. Then there was the kick in Nakadama, a red wine made from potatoes.

Unless we were in the field, Saturday mornings saw battery inspections, with the Battalion Commander, Major John L. West and his Executive Officer, Capt Ralph R. Griffith, conducting spot checks of barracks, messhalls, the motor pool and the gun park. Personnel inspection ensured that our brass was polished and the non-regulation jumpboots spit-shined. Saturday afternoons and Sundays were usually free except for guard duty or KP. As the spring turned into summer, the training cycle continued, interspersed with weekend passes to Sendi and once in a while a week in Tokyo.

OUR MEDICS

At Camp Younghans, our medics came in two sizes, large and small. Our shots came two ways, hard and easy. The tall, over 6'6", huge medic gave the most gentle, easy shots. These shots you could hardly feel. The small medic, reported to be a champion bantam-weight boxer in civilian life, hit like a mule. You never felt the shot because your whole arm turned numb. Late in the fall of 1951, all

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units were given Encephalitis-B vaccine which really hurt, your arm was sore for a week. Later we found out that we were the last unit to get this vaccine. More troops were getting sick from the vaccine than were catching the disease itself.

ROAD RECONNAISSANCE

Washington remained concerned about possible Russian involvement in the Korean War, especially an invasion of the Japanese Islands. This concern when passed on to the XIV Corps in Japan, then to division, then to 40th DivArty resulted in the Battalion Intelligence and Liaison personnel making frequent reconnaissance



Road Reconnaissance.

Source: SFC R. L. Hanson

The quiet countryside was not disturbed by our frequent excursions into the back country.

trips into the back country. These road trips identified various areas where the battalion could be deployed, if it was necessary to fight on the Japanese homeland. Roads, bridges, tunnels and railroad lines were physically inspected for height, width, capacity and overhead clearances. Lt. Robert Gregory and Capt. James Griffith, with two drivers and two jeeps with trailers headed east through the Azuma Mountains to Fukushima. A similar team went west through the Japanese Alps southwest of Yamagata to Nigata, a coastal city on the Sea of Japan. The Japanese encountered in the scenic back country were very friendly. Some had never seen an American soldier even though we had occupied their country for the last five years.

These road reconnaissance trips continued throughout the battalion's stay in Japan. In December, 40th DivArty directed the battalion to reconnoiter the strategic roads to the northwest. The reconnaissance parties traveled as far north as Akita on coast and as far inland and east as Yokote. General road conditions were noted and particular attention was paid to road surfaces and bridge conditions after snow. Most important roads were passable for at least a 1/4 ton truck.

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

As summer began, the division's three Regimental Combat Teams (the 160th, 223rd, and 224th) were scheduled for amphibious training. The 223rd Inf and its organic artillery, the 625th FA, began training in June. Early that month, the battalion practiced on wooden mockups by climbing down big unwieldy cargo nets which hung over the sides of the mockups. That's how you get into bobbing landing craft. Carefully grabbing the vertical ropes, not the horizontal ones (hands on horizontal robes were likely to be smashed by someone's size 12 boot) and not looking down, you climbed to the bottom. After a few times, it was second nature as long as the ropes didn't swing in all directions and the ground below was not moving. Of course, aboard ship it would be different.

At the Motor Pool, drivers were hard at work waterproofing vehicles to be used in the landing. A waterproof dough like 'gunk' was

packed over and around the spark plugs and all electrical connections. Snorkel extensions were attached to the exhaust pipe and the carburetor's air intake. These pipes would stuck out well above the water, allowing the engine to run smoothly while under water. Soon funny looking trucks, called DUKW's, that could float in water appeared in the gun park area. The World War II DUKW was basically a 2 ½ ton, six-wheel amphibious truck. It had a hollow airtight body for buoyancy and used a single propeller for forward momentum in the water. Each DUKW could carry a 105mm howitzer, gun crew and 40 rounds of ammunition. The firing batteries practiced loading and unloading their howitzers using the DUKW's own A-frames. The gun crew drivers and their assistants drove these awkward vehicles out of the Motor Pool and around the camp, getting a feel for how they handled on the road.

By the morning of June 22nd, all vehicles were waterproofed and loaded, the dry runs completed, and the battalion began it's road march to the sea. Leaving the main camp gate, the convey slowly climbed up the winding road leading to Sendi. That narrow road with its hairpin turns required the loaded DUKW's to stop, back up, inch forward, back up, and inch forward again and again. Passing north through Sendi, the battalion joined the 223rd RCT at Chagoma Bay and boarded waiting LST's. Once loaded, the Task Force¹⁸ got under way for Chigasaki Beach, south of Tokyo Bay.

The landing went without any major incidents. Although the then Cpl Bob Hanson recalls:

The LCVP in which our Liaison jeep and trailer had been loaded pulled along side our LST. A cargo net dangled over the side of the LST into the landing craft. Capt Gregory and I climbed down the net as it swung back and forth, up and down. It was a lot more difficult to get down this net than the stationary

ones we had practiced on. Getting in the jeep, I remembered to set the handbrake so the jeep wouldn't roll about in the pitching landing craft. The hand throttle was then pulled all the way out. This would prevent the jeep from stalling if the shock of cold sea water caused my foot to come off the accelerator pedal. I started the engine just before we hit the beach. The ramp went down, we drove through the surf up onto the dry sand. Heading toward the assembly point, we roared along the beach. Shouts were heard above the noise of the engine. Looking around, I saw a Navy Chief running toward us. Catching up, he waved us to a stop. "Your jeep is on fire," he shouted, pointing under the chassis. Kneeling in the sand, the Chief smothered the fire with handfuls of sand. The friction caused by hand brake that I had forgotten to release when we had hit the beach had started the fire. With a sheepishly look, I thanked the Chief, and released the hand brake. As Capt Gregory looked at me and slowly shook his head, I carefully drove our jeep and loaded trailer back up the beach."

A few hours later we were back on board the ship and headed back to Chagoma Bay. Off-loading, the battalion passed through Sendi and on down the winding mountain road to Camp Younghans. After our short trip through the surf, it was a week or more of hard work to



Chigasi Beach: Here comes the artillery.

Source: 40th Sig Co.

get the “gunk” off and the vehicles cleaned up enough to pass inspection. In fact, more time was spent cleaning up after the landing exercise than in preparing for it.

AIR TRANSPORTABILITY TRAINING


Having learned to move by sea, could learning to move by air, be far behind. September saw the 625th along with the 1st Bn, 223rd Infantry Regiment begin Air Transportability Training. The Eighth Air Transportability Training Center at Matsushima Air Force Base near Sendai provided the instructors and planes.

The C-119 was the plane of choice. It had removable clam-shell rear doors and its floor was equipped with a roller system that eased the loading and unloading of equipment. However, a 105mm howitzer and the 2 ½ ton 6x6 truck which towed it around did not fit even with the rear doors removed. But by using a ¾ ton weapons carrier instead of a 2 ½ ton truck, everything would just fit in the plane’s cargo area.

Working with wooden mockups, the gun crews backed their vehicles and howitzers up the ramps until they could do it blindfolded. Just like in the Boy Scouts, knots were learned and ropes were tied to everything. After a few days of tying down guns and trucks with the double bowline and other assorted knots, all was ready.

On the big day, C-119s lined the runway, waiting for troops and vehicles. The large, bulged doors of the blunt-bodied planes opened wide and vehicles started backing up the narrow loading ramps. Inside, the double bowline was coming into its own. Lines were strung from axles, bumpers, springs and chassis to the floor rings, holding the vehicles and guns in the center of a web of ropes. The jumpmaster checked each man’s gear, including the strange-hanging parachute with the creeping straps. Then everyone climbed aboard and the engines were started. The planes taxied down the strip, swirling dust, and left the ground. A few men were sick and silent. Some tried to talk above the noise. All hoped that the air would stay calm and the landing would be soft and gentle. After about an hour, the planes headed back, smoothly touched down and taxied to a halt.

The gun crews unbuckled their seat straps and climbed out of the planes. Gladly shedding their chutes they began to untie their equipment. Vehicles and their attached howitzers were driven down the ramps, everyone climbed aboard their trucks and it was back to



Battery B loads up.

Source: 40th Sig Co.

camp after a day in the air.

SERVICE SCHOOLS

As in the states, Army Service Schools augmented division training facilities. Battalion personnel attended the Artillery Mechanics School, the Radio Operators School and the Clerk Typist School. Cooks attended the XVI Corps food service school in nearby Sendi. Newly promoted NCO's went to Leadership School at Camp Matsushma. Battalion personnel also attended the Chemical School at Gifu and the Ordnance Winter School.

And as at Camp Cooke, the Army continued to pull trained troops out of units as individual replacements for Korea. Between 1 January and 31 July 1951, Headquarters Battery alone lost twenty-four enlisted men. Thirteen of these were non-commissioned officers, nine in the top three paygrade. In return, the battery received eight privates, a corporal and a sergeant. This loss of individual replacements continued until the battalion itself was alerted for Korean duty.

FIELD TRAINING

As the year moved on, the battalion completed its Unit Training Program. Post cycle Field Training began, including correction of deficiencies found in previous training cycles. Physical Training and Motor Stables were not forgotten as well as the 20 miles of foot marches each week. Some of the rear detachment (those that had remained at Camp Cooke when the battalion left for Japan) joined us in August. George Barton was one of those that made it back to us. Upon his arrival, he was assigned to the Survey and Fire Direction Section of Battery C. Others had been pulled out by the Army and sent directly to Korea as individual replacements. This was especially true of those battalion NCO's that had been left behind as cadre.

By the fall of 1951, the 625th had become a well-trained, efficient Field Artillery Battalion. Frequent unannounced motor marches keep the battalion mobile. For example: On 19 December at 2035 hours, the Battalion Executive Officer, Capt James R. Griffith alerted the Battalion Duty Officer that the battalion was to move out at 0730 the next day. The battery commanders were notified and early the next morning, the motor pools were a hub of activity. Drivers prepared their vehicles, howitzers and trailers were hooked up and personnel climbed aboard. By 0700, all battalion personnel had

reported to the motor pool and were ready for the March Order. By 0730 Battery A pulled out of the motor pool. The rest of the batteries followed at five minute intervals; B, C, Hq and finally SV battery which brought up the rear with its 4 ton wrecker.

Convoy control was by radio and the 100 yard interval between vehicles was maintained most of the time. Morning passed as the eighty-two vehicles traveled over muddy, narrow winding dirt roads previously visited by our reconnaissance and survey teams. Arriving at the halfway point, the battalion halted for a lunch stop. After eating, the battalion was on the road again, returning to Camp Younghans by a different route.. Fine tuning our motor march skills, kept the battalion ready to respond quickly to movement orders. These motor marches also ensured that road marking and evacuation procedures were continuously clarified and upgraded.

WINTER TRAINING

As fall turned into winter, the 40th Division established a Winter Training facility near Camp McNair. Here on the slopes of famous Mt Fujiawa, troops would be given cold-weather training. The battalion provided two officers, a warrant officer and a master sergeant as instructors. These men had all previously received winter training. The first week of December, three officers and twenty enlisted men left for winter training. One of those students, SFC Arley Sievertson (who had spent a year in the Navy before he joined the National Guard in 1948) recalls; “There was a good three feet of snow on the ground when I left Camp Younghans. Upon arrival at the Winter Training Facility, I looked around for snow but there wasn’t any. The slopes of the mountain were bare. It didn’t bother the Army though, they taught me to ski on grass.”.

As snow became more and more frequent in the Yamagata area, the battalion Air Section moved to Matushima Air Base near Sendi on 2 December. Here along with the DivArty Air Section, they would be able to operate during the winter months.

COMBINED ARMS TRAINING

Combined arms training began in December. The 625th was

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combined with the 1st Battalion of the 223rd Inf Rgt to form the 223rd Battalion Combat Team (BCT). Battery A fired over three hundred rounds of High Explosive and Smoke, December 10-11, in support of the 1st Bn. This was a BCT infantry defense and attack exercise



Ojohara Maneuver Range, Dec 1951. Source: SFC R. L. Hanson
Battery C in action: Chief of Section, SFC Robert Nunn;
Gunner, Cpl Richard Echavarria.

conducted at the Camp Younghans Firing Range. Batteries B and C displaced to the Ojohara Maneuver Training Range,¹⁹ which had more room for joint artillery and infantry maneuvers. Here Battery B fired a hundred rounds of High Explosive and Smoke for a BCT attack exercise on December 10-12. Battery C fired a hundred and fifty rounds of High Explosive and Smoke for a BCT in defense exercise.

At the time it seemed like the batteries were firing a lot of rounds but soon they would be firing many more around the clock. And the cold rain came down. Engines were started every two hours to keep them from freezing up. It was cold, wet, and very, very muddy. Any extra clothing came out of our packs and onto our backs. These first two weeks of December was good practice for the Korean winter we would soon be facing.

An important function of an infantry division's artillery, is its ability to quickly and accurately combine and mass the fires of all four artillery battalions. Combined and massed fires require that each battalion's Fire Direction Center works under the control of DivArty's Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). The limited maneuver areas in Japan prevented the division's artillery units from fully deploying together. This lack of suitable training areas led to some creative work arounds. The first week of December found DivArty planning a combined FDC shoot to take place on the 5th and 6th of December. The 625th was tasked with establishing three battalion positions at the Yachi firing area, some 12 miles northeast of Camp Younghans. Each 625th firing battery would establish three two piece battery positions in one of the three battalion locations. Each light battalion (143rd, 625th, and 980th) would then establish their battalion location at one of the 625th battery positions locations. The division's medium battalion (981st) established a battalion position using two of

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The Ojohara Maneuver Training Range is still in use by both JGSDF and United States troops. 25th Infantry Division personnel were in joint training here in 1995 and Marine field artillery units now use this range instead of their previous range on Okinawa.

Battery A's 155mm howitzers for each of its three firing batteries.

With the guns in the field and FDC's and FSCC colocated at Camp Younghans, the 625th's communication section was critical to the success of the shoot. Wire was laid and maintain to all four units and their firing batteries as well as to the battalion FDC's and the 40th DivArty FSCC. In addition, a DivArty wide radio net was establish with all units using their own frequencies and callsigns.

The combined FDC's organized and practiced, using a terrain board DivArty CPX, on the 4th and 5th of December. The next day, massed and combined fires as well as numerous Time on Target (TOT) missions were fired under the control of the 40th DivArty FSCC. Over two-hundred rounds were fired per battalion. This was the first time that all of the division's artillery units worked together under DivArty control. Just in time too, as in a little over a month, all the battalions would be firing at real targets.

WE'RE NEXT

The middle of November found an abundance of rumors that the 45th Infantry Division, stationed north of us on Hokkaido island was headed for Korea. If was true, we would go next. After all, the 45th (Oklahoma National Guard) and the 40th had been activated at the same time, both had been sent to Japan last April, and had the same training. It made sense to us that we would soon be on our way to Korea also. It was true. The first unit of the 45th Infantry Division, the 180th Regimental Combat Team arrived in Korea the 5th of November, replacing the 1st Cav's 5th Calvary Regiment. By December 27th, all units of the 45th were in Korea and the 1st Calvary Division was now stationed in Hokkaido. The 45th exchanged their equipment for that of the 1st Cav Div and then relieved the 3rd Div online.

And we were next..On the 23rd of December, the 40th Infantry Division was directed to relieve the 24th Infantry Division. This was to be a "QUICK MOVEMENT" deployment, dictated by various political considerations. The division would fall-in on the 24th's material on the front lines in Korea, and the 24th would take over the 40th's material in Japan. This was not the first time these divisions had

met. During World War II, the 40th had relieved the 24th in Hawaii, and then again in the Solomon Islands.

On Christmas Day, movement orders were received and the battalion staff began the necessary planning. The 625th FA Bn was directed to leave all crew-served weapons, vehicles, equipment and supplies at Camp Younghans. The only exceptions would be the battery mess trucks. Except for these five mess trucks, the battalion would take only personal equipment and individual weapons to Korea. At 0730, the day after Christmas, the battalion stood in formation as the Battalion Commander, Major James L West announced that we were going to Korea. An advance party would leave within the week, and the battalion would follow early in January. The advance party roster was submitted to 40th DivArty on the 27th.

The battalion, short twenty-one officers, reassigned fourteen officers to strengthen and fill battalion staff positions. These reassignments filled every critical vacancy with the most competent available officer. Though the firing batteries would enter combat with new commanding officers, the battery's experienced senior NCO's remained in place. Packing of equipment to accompany troops (TAT) began the 28th. Showdown inspections of individual equipment were held and requisitions submitted for all missing items needed to complete POM requirements. Sunday, the 30th of December saw all personnel issued clothing needed to meet POM requirements (including field coats and shoe-pacs). Some irregular sizes in shoe-pacs were unavailable, resulting in some frozen feet on the trip to the front.

CHOSEN

The US 40th Div began its three echelon movement to KOREA as scheduled on 7 Jan 1952. On 11 Jan, the 1st Echelon: 160th Inf Regt; 143rd FA Bn; 625th FA Bn; Hqs Btry, 40th DivArty and Btry A, 140th AAA AW Bn arrived at the Port of Inchon. The 160th departed immediately for the front and by 19 Jan had relieved the 19th Inf Regt, US 24th Div. With the arrival on 22 Jan of the 2nd Echelon: Hqs 40th Div, 223rd Inf Regt, 980th FA Bn and 981st FA Bn; the Div was assigned to the 8th U. S. Army and attached to the IX U. S. Army Corps.

SECOND KOREAN WINTER 1951-1952

Second Korean Winter 1951 - 1952: 28 Nov 1951 - 30 Apr 1952

LAND OF THE MORNING CALM

On New Years Day 1952, the battalion's advance party of thirteen officers and forty-seven enlisted men, headed by the battalion S-3, Major William E. Fisher left for Matsushima AFB near Sendi.. The next day they boarded a C54 for their flight to Chunchon, Korea. Landing at the Far East Air Force Site K-47, they climbed aboard trucks for their trip north to the IX US CORPS sector. At the front, they were taken to the 52nd FA Bn, 24th Div. Here the advance party would stay while they prepared battalion positions to the rear of the those occupied by the 52nd. Once prepared, these positions would be

occupied by the 625th with howitzers, vehicles and other equipment acquired from the 13th FA Bn, 24th Div. The 625th would then relieve the 52nd online.

Back in Japan, the afternoon of Jan 1st found the battalion's five mess trucks, each accompanied by a driver and assistant driver moved to the Jinmachi railhead for shipment to Korea. These five mess trucks, equipped to operate in the field, were the only major T/O&E items that the battalion took to Korea. All of our clean, well-maintained and fully operable equipment was to be left in Japan for the men of the 52nd FA Bn, 24th Inf Div.

With the arrival of the 52nd's advance party on the 2nd of January, transfer of the battalion's T/O&E and PCS property began. The 2nd also saw nine enlisted medics from the 40th DivArty Medical Detachment attached to us as corpsmen. Their first action upon arrival was to give all of us cholera, tetanus and typhoid shots. Personal weapons were checked and zeroed in. Issuance of winter clothing, including field overcoats and pile caps was completed as fast as possible. Items to be worn, carried in barracks bags or shipped in duffle bags were identified and the packing began.

By the 6th, the battalion was packed and ready to go. That morning, all duffle bags and TAT property were loaded aboard trucks borrowed from the 981st FA Bn and taken to the railhead. After lunch, the men of the 625th, numbers chalked on helmets again, loaded down with field packs, barracks bags and carrying individual weapons moved out to the trains. At 1500, the battalion left Camp Youngans, our home for almost a year, and settled down for the fourteen hour train trip to Yokohama (POE). Only the Assistant Supply Officer and his clerk remained behind to complete the last of the turnover paperwork.

The next morning, the battalion arrived at the docks of the 2nd Transportation Major Port, Yokohama. Here ships of the Amphibious

Redeployment Group (TG 90.5)²⁰ waited for the 40th Division's 1st Echelon. The men of the 625th FA Bn immediately boarded the USS Henrico (APA 45). By 0930, all were aboard and began settling down for the trip to the "Land of the Morning Calm." Departing the harbor, the convoy headed southeast toward the southernmost Japanese island of Kyushu. After clearing Kyushu, it headed northwest through the Yellow Sea toward the Korean port of Inchon. At sea, the battalion staff, battery commanders and senior NCOs held daily planning sessions. For the rest of the battalion, it was four days of nothing to do but play cards, sack out and wonder about the future.



First View of Inchon Harbor
Source: Cpl Earl Bates, Sv Co, 160th Inf

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Amphibious Redeployment Group (TG 90.5) under COMTRANSDIV 11, composed of four APAs, two LSDs, eight LSTs and screening elements provided the interchange lift for the 40th and 24th Infantry Divisions between Yokohama, Japan and Inchon, Korea.

A little after midnight on 11 Jan 1952, APA 45 anchored in Inchon Harbor. After breakfast, troops wandered topside to catch their first glimpse of Korea. As the day wore on and the temperature dropped, they hustled below to search through their gear for more clothes to put on.

Among the last to disembark, the battalion moved down the gangways onto two shallow-draft LCU's that transferred us to land. Ashore at 1700, we were directed to a large tent where hot coffee and doughnuts welcomed us to Korea. The coffee was too hot to drink, especially if you had a rolled-lip canteen, but the minute you stepped outside it was too cold to drink and froze to your field overcoat if you spilled any. Leaving the comfort of the tent, we boarded a waiting train for the next step in our journey to the front. The unheated, war-weary train headed northward into the night. The battalion arrived at the Chunchon RTO after midnight. Sleepy, half-awake troops climbed down from the train and found trucks of the 107th Transportation Truck Company²¹ waiting for them. Climbing up onto the trucks and they huddled as much out of the wind as possible, enduring the cold thirty-five mile drive to Tent City.²²

Arriving at 0430 12 Jan, we were directed to large squad tents which had been erected on the frozen rice paddies. Stoves were lit and the troops put their sleeping bags on cots that were already set up and crawled in for a couple hours of sleep. We awoke to a sea of mud. For while we sleep, the heat of the stoves had melted the frozen rice paddies under our cots. Here we learned our first lesson about Korea, if its frozen don't melt it!

The mess trucks which had been sent ahead of us were set up,

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107th Transportation Truck Company (Alabama National Guard) had arrived in Korea 8 Jan 51. Thus one of the first National Guard units to arrive in Korea transported one of the last to arrive.

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Tent City was officially known as Area 10, Delta Rear, a camp in the 24th Div rear area.

battalion rations were drawn and the cooks went to work to feed us. All personnel began making improvements to living conditions in the tents. A direct exchange of field overcoats for parkas was made with

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the 24th Div QM Co. Duffle bags and TAT boxes arrived and were distributed to the batteries.

The main body of the battalion remained at Tent City almost a week. Daily work parties were sent forward to assist the advance party. Lt Ragner, the Battalion Communications Officer, a member of the advance party, remembers that wire crew he brought with him laid



Tent City

Source: Cpl Sam Marritt, H Co, 223rd Inf

at lot of battalion wire. Most of it was put up on poles to keep it out of trouble. A 10KW generator was found and using wire from a destroyed transmission line and coke bottle insulators set on poles, Hqs and Hqs Battery had electric lights.

The 14th of January was a busy day. The advanced party left their quarters with the 52nd FA Bn and occupied the battalion's newly

prepared positions. Additional personnel left Tent City to support the advanced party in completing these positions. The Air Section moved to the forward DivArty airstrip. The Battalion Commander and supply personnel moved to the 13th FA Bn area. Here they would inventory and start the transfer of the 13th's property to the 625th.

On the 16th, one of the first to arrive in Korea with the advance party, Sgt Gregory Calkins was the first to return to the states. Greg, who had enlisted in Hqs Battery. in 1949, left the battalion 16 Jan on emergency leave. His mother was seriously ill and not expected to live. The MATS aircraft taking Greg home crashed into Puget Sound on its second approach to the runway due to icing on the wings, He was one of the few survivors. Life magazine featured this story. Later Greg was on the old radio show "This is Your Life" that united all the survivors.

On the 17th, Service Battery moved from Tent City to the forward position, taking all barracks and duffle bags with them. Lt Gregory, the Battalion Liaison Officer, went forward to the 21st Inf Regt, 24th Div Command Post establishing liaison between the 21st and the battalion. At 0600, 19 Jan the battalion left Tent City for the 13th FA Bn area. Here they picked up the equipment, howitzers, tentage and vehicles which they moved forward to those positions prepared by the advance party. Soon the battalion would relieve the 52nd and take over the direct support of the 21st Inf Regt. That would complete the difficult task of taking over equipment of one field artillery battalion (the 13th) and the tactical role of another (the 52nd)

Operation Changey Changey²³

The 40th Division's "Quick-Movement" to Korea: exchanging

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OPERATION CHANGEY CHANGEY: An article by James L. Hilton appearing in the December, 1952 issue of the National Defense Transportation Journal regarding the exchange of equipment between the 40th and 24th Infantry Divisions

ordnance, vehicles and equipment in place with the 24th Division resulted in unforeseen problems. The 625th's Command Report for January 1953 read: *The operations of the battalion have been seriously effected by the critical shortage and unreliable condition of the equipment and material received from the 13th FA Bn in conjunction with the movement of this battalion into the combat zone. Equipment and material received is in extremely poor condition evidencing a complete lack of proper preventative maintenance. In almost every instance 10 to 75 percent of the component parts are missing.*²⁴

Again as in California and Japan, the battalion was short of vehicles. The 13th FA Bn had only one hundred and twenty-one vehicles out of a TO&E of one hundred and thirty-five. Eleven of the missing fourteen vehicles were the most needed, that "jack of all trades" the 1/4 ton jeep. The remaining three were 3/4 ton weapons carriers badly needed by the communication section. Eighteen of the vehicles on hand were dead lined for lack of replacement parts. All vehicles were in extremely poor condition. The Motor Pool's General Mechanics and 2nd Echelon Tool Sets were only thirty percent complete. Drivers found their vehicles inadequately equipped with anti-freeze, some had low batteries, and still others no brakes in working condition. The individual vehicle OVM and Tool Sets were more than fifty percent incomplete, rendering emergency repair and preventive maintenance away from the motor pool impossible in most cases. The four-ton wrecker was dead lined and nine M10 Ammo

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Cmd Rpt - 40th Div Mar 52: *When the 40th Division relieved the 24th Division in place, it exchanged most of the weapons and equipment in place. This had the disadvantage that equipment which was battle worn and in a very poor state of repair was turned over to this division. It was found necessary to devote major attention to repairing and replacing numerous items of equipment which were found to be entirely unserviceable. By the end of Feb much progress had been made as a result of concentrated efforts but even then a tremendous job still remained to be done to approach a satisfactory condition. Fortunately the stable defensive tactical situation allowed time for rehabilitation program. Had an enemy offensive been launched in January or February 1952 much equipment would have been inoperative and might have been lost to the enemy.*

trailers were missing. There were not enough vehicles in operating condition to move the battalion as a unit.

The signal equipment received indicated that no policy for care and maintenance had been in effect or enforced for months. Among the missing signal items were seven SCR-536's, four SCR-608's and one SCR-610 radio. A shortage of radio crystals restricted the number of channels that the battalion could communicate on. Headsets and microphones were either broken or missing. The extremely poor condition and numerous shortages required utmost creativity by the Battalion Communication Officer to establish and maintain the required battalion wire and radio nets.

All equipment showed an accumulation of dirt and corrosion caused by months of neglect. Quartermaster items were twenty-five to forty percent incomplete, tentage and heating equipment was either missing or in poor condition. Eighty-seven single bit, chopping axes were missing as well as one hundred and ninety-five 5 gallon gasoline drums. Before the month was out, the Medical Officer had condemned eighty-three 5 gallon water cans as well as the battalion's five 250 gallon water trailers. It was months before all the water cans and trailers were replaced.

The howitzers received were worn and battle weary. Aiming stakes were broken or missing, sights were out of alignment and again maintenance seemed to be lacking. Two tubes in Battery A were soon replaced.

For all concerned, the result of this QUICK MOVEMENT²⁵

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This QUICK MOVEMENT technique employed by the Far East Command employed a technique developed in the Pacific during World War II. Divisional units would leave their equipment and weapons in place and swap them with the units relieving them. By using the same shipping for both the relieving and relieved elements and swapping all heavy equipment and supplies, all the men would have to carry would be personal arms and equipment. It was an economical method that obviated on- and off-loading of divisional equipment and speeded up the whole
(continued...)

was that the battalion got the short end of the stick. Vehicles had been left and cannibalized where they had broken down. Field sanitation and security was non-existent. The gun batteries had been forced to leave their clean, calibrated and well functioning howitzers in Japan. The many weapons and vehicles that were red-lined, required long hours and many harsh words before they could be used operationally.

At least, all divisional units were in place and fighting before the Communist forces were sure that the divisions had been switched. It wasn't until 8 Feb that the Eighth Army Headquarters announced that the 40th Infantry Division was in Korea, even though personnel had been in country since late December 1951.


As the morning of 20 January dawned, the battalion settled into their battle line positions. Glad to have left Tent City behind, all personnel went to work with a will to improve their positions. Additionally, there was that large task of bringing the 13th FA Bn's equipment to operational condition. Wire crews spliced old wire together and laid alternate lines everywhere ensuring communication survivability. The radio section realigned radios with what radio crystals were available to provide at least a minimum capability radio net. The kitchen crews emptied their mess trucks, supply began to generate requisitions to replace missing and worn out equipment as the numerous shortages were identified.. At the motor pool, usable parts from dead lined vehicles were taken out and used to get other vehicles up and running. Almost every 1/4 ton vehicle (Jeep) transmission had old, extremely dirty oil mixed with a large amount of water. Due to the extremely cold weather, most transmissions were frozen making it impossible to move the vehicles. It was necessary in most cases to thaw the transmission with a blow torch in order to flush and change the lubricant before moving the vehicles.

The firing batteries unlimbered their howitzers stood ready to provide reinforcing fire to the 52nd FA Bn. Each gun crew set up their

aiming stakes, aligned their weapons and worked on improving firing positions. The Fire Direction Centers got out their plotting boards and began to make overlays of both friendly and enemy positions on the 1:50,000 (UTM) scale Map Sheets 6729III and 6728II of Korea.

Now under operational control of the 24th Inf Div, the Guardsmen, draftees, and Regular Army fillers all “Redlegs” now, were ready to fire. At 1235, the 52nd FA Bn Forward Observer with Co L, 21st Inf, 24th Div registered Battery B on CKPT 7950 using twelve rounds. Twenty minutes later, Battery A registered on the same checkpoint using ten rounds. Later that afternoon, all three firing batteries registered on 52nd FA Bn’s Base Point using an Air OP. At 1605, Battery B fired the first battalion mission in support of combat actions. As snow began to fall, the battalion’s first day of combat drew to a close. The battalion fired almost two hundred scheduled Harassing and Interdiction (H&I) missions received from the 52nd that first night.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY



1st Round Fired:

Source: Capt Maurice Ragner

Major William E Fisher (S-3) and Major James L West (Bn CO)

RECORD OF MISSIONS FIRED									
1500 19 JAN TO		1800 20 JAN							
CONC NO	TIME PROJ CO	NATURE TARGET	COORD	MTRY	NO RDS	ADJ COORD	OBVN	EFFECT	
CR. PT. REG.	1230-1250	REG. FOR CORR.	71856-50717 50717	B	12 HE	71856-50717 ALT. 206	GROUND	-	
CR. PT. REG.	1250-1300	REG. FOR CORR.	-	A	9 HE 1 WP	71856-50717 ALT. 206	GROUND	-	
BP. Reg.	1440-1500	DIG-IT B.P.	-	B	9 HE	81083-53610 ALT. 250	AIR	-	
S.P. Reg.	1500-1510	DIG-IT B.P.	-	A	12 HE	81083-53610 ALT. 250	AIR	-	
BP. Reg.	1510-1520	DIG-IT B.P.	-	C	7 HE 2 WP	81083-53610 ALT. 250	AIR	-	
600	1610-1635	BEN. SHELTER	799-547	B	4 WP 8 PP	7994 5486	AIR	4 CAS.	3 SHELTERS DAM.

Record of Missions Fired; 625th FA Bn, 20 Jan 52.
 Source: 625th FA Bn Cmd Rpt, Jan 1952

Intermittent snow continued falling the next day as work continued on improving battery positions. All tents were dug in four or five feet for more protection against counter-battery fire. Everyone was hard at work performing maintenance and repair on equipment acquired from the 13th FA Bn.

As soon as a vehicle was available, the Survey Crew was out in the field with their instruments checking the surveyed battery positions. For two days, they were all over the area with rods and chains. By the 23rd, all battery positions and checkpoint positional data

had been resurveyed and corrected as necessary.²⁶ Soon this job would have to be redone as the entire survey net was found to be in error.

The next day, Jan 24th, saw the arrival of fourteen officers and fifty-five enlisted men transferred from artillery units of the 24th Div. These “unhappy campers” from the 11th, 13th and 52nd artillery battalions did not have enough points to return to Japan with their former units. A typical case was Harold Justman. Harold arrived in Korea 20 November 1951 and was assigned to the 11th FA Bn (155mm), 24th Inf Div. Upon the 24th’s movement to Japan, Harold was transferred to the 625th where he was assigned to Battery C. He served as an ammo driver in the Supply Section until he rotated home in October 1952. A number of those transferred were in the top three pay grades, preventing promotion of trained and eligible personnel who had been with the battalion since Camp Cooke.

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The initial battle positions of the 625th FA Bn: AMS L751; 6729III, 6728II: Hqs Btry CT787454, Btry A CT785451, Btry B CT786450, Btry C CT777462, SVC Btry CT752353.

CENTRAL FRONT - KUMSONG

26 Jan 52 - Mar 52

26 Jan 1952 saw the 5th RCT and 6th Tank Bn attached to the 40th Div. That same day, the 223rd Inf relieved the 21st Inf, 24th Div. The 40th Div now assumed responsibility for the KUMSONG-CHWAPAE-RI sector of the Central Front. The 3rd and last echelon in the division's move to KOREA; the 224th Inf Regt and 140th Tank Bn arrived 3 Feb. The 140th Tank Bn immediately moving forward and relieving the 6th Tank Bn, 24th Div. 10 Feb saw the relief of the 5th RCT by the 224th Inf. All elements of the Div were now on-line in a combat status. The Div was bounded on the left by the ROK 2nd Div and on the right by the ROK 6th Div. The MLR (Line Missouri) found the 223rd on the left, the 224th in the center and the 224th on the right. The Div pursued an aggressive program of patrols, company size combat raids, tank and artillery attacks on prepared positions. The period 21-30 Mar saw the Div relieved by elements of the ROK 6th and ROK Capital divisions.


By the 26th of January, our Forward Observer crews and Liaison teams had relieved their 52nd FA Bn counterparts on the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). Two days later, on 28 January, the 223rd Inf completed the relief of the 21st Inf. As the Div assumed operational control of the Iron Triangle area, the 625th began direct support of the 223rd and remaining elements of the 21st Inf at 1200 hours. The battalion's general support role was turned over to the 980th FA Bn which took over the positions and equipment of the departing 52nd FA Bn.



MLR looking north near Kumsong
Source: Cpl Earl H Bates, SV Co., 160th Inf

With assumption of the direct support role, the battalion was in position to improve the accuracy of fires given supported units. A considerable change in the method of registration was made. Previously registration had only been made upon a distant Base Point, visible only by an Air OP. If weather conditions did not permit flying or an aircraft was unavailable, then there was no way to register the battalions guns. Even when registration was accomplished, the distance between the Base Point and the necessary close-in defensive fires points reduced positional accuracy. The difficulty of providing accurate close-in defensive fires was increased by the rugged terrain and the lower powder charges required. Not only do close-in fires need to be very accurate, but the supported units need to know they are accurate. No short rounds or friendly fire accidents are wanted.

Providing better registration to increase the accuracy of all fires was a two step process. First, the entire survey net was redone. The Survey Crew found and corrected errors of up to 200 yards in the existing survey net. Second, each of the three Liaison Officers selected a clearly identifiable Check Point in front of their supported infantry battalion. Daily registration was conducted on each of these Check Points in the late afternoon. Fire Direction Personnel corrected data between registrations using the most recent meteorological



625th FA Bn Overlay, 28 January 1952
 Source: 625th FA Bn, Cmd Rpt, Jan 1952

information. Frequent firing data correction by meteorological data was necessary due to the differences in weather encountered at various hours of the day. The pronounced cooling effect immediately upon

sunset was a good example of this: resulting in sudden changes in ballistic performance. Corrected data was passed to the firing batteries as it occurred. Upon completion of these registration changes, the battalion's ability to rapidly and accurately place fire where needed by the supported units increased dramatically and was commented upon by all concerned.


As January drew to a close, the shortage of operations personnel to man the battalion Fire Direction Center around the clock required some operational changes. Hqs Battery trained additional personnel and used firing battery FDC personnel to fully man the battalion Fire Direction Center twenty-four hours a day.

On 2 Feb, Battery B and Battery C, 980th moved west to provide direct support to the 224th Inf when they arrived at the front. Battery A, 980th FA Bn remained in position to continue reinforcing the fires of the 625th. The 3rd of February saw the 625th's Battery C fire over 122 rounds covering the withdrawal of a Fox Company patrol. Battery B displaced northward to a position (CT787169) providing a greater depth of fire. By the 9th, the 224th Inf relieved the 5th RCT bringing all infantry regiments of the division online. Battery A, 980th FA Bn rejoined its parent unit and Battery C, 555th FA Bn replaced it in general support of the 625th .

The First Beer Run

The 3rd of Feb saw a special PX cargo arrive for the battalion. A heavily guarded 2 ½ ton truck turned off the road near the MLR and traveled the few hundred yards to the battalion supply area. Here SFC Roger Hallenbeck, a draftee from New York, who was now the battalion supply sergeant anxiously awaited this truck. His Service Battery personnel broke into smiles as the covering tarpaulins were removed to reveal cases of "American beer." Cans of Pabst and Balentine (in its copper colored can) for the enlisted men and hard liquor for the officers. Stacked in Roger's supply tent, this precious cargo was carefully allocated to the batteries and trucked forward to them. Word "the Beer is here" quickly spread; first to Battalion Hqs, then Hqs Battery, the firing batteries and on up the line to the FO's.

That day marked the first “Beer Run” for the 625th and from then on, usually around the beginning of the month, a truck would arrive with its precious cargo. The usual allotment was a case of beer for each enlisted man and several bottles of hard liquor for the officers. Those who didn’t drink; sold or traded their allotment to those who did and a half case of beer could bring a bottle of whisky. In the winter the



Sgt Hallenbeck, pondering the distribution of the beer ration.
Source: Sgt Roger Hallenbeck, SV Co, 625th FA Bn

beer was frozen and in the summer it was warm, but that didn’t matter, it was a little taste of home.

These were not pull-tab aluminum cans of today but tin cans that needed an old fashion church key to open them up. Sgt John Whittet recalls, that when the beer was frozen “we wouldn’t wait it to thaw, but cut off the tops with our “C” ration can openers (P-38’s), and thawed out the beer on top of the “pot-belly” stoves in our tents and bunkers.” John, who enlisted Hqs Battery in 1948 at the age of 17 was among the many who were still underage for drinking or voting

but not for fighting. Of course, no one checked our ID's in the bunkers. And it's been recalled that from that February day on, the "Beer Run" was awaited more than "Pay Call." As time passed, batteries sometimes received their beer rations direct from the Quartermaster and Sgt Hallenbeck turned to other supply matters.

Operation Clamup

Early in February, enemy patrols had become increasingly aggressive attempting to learn the Eighth Army's operation plans for the coming spring. To use this aggressiveness to its advantage, the Eighth Army planned to cease daylight operations and nighttime raids. It was hoped that Operation Clamup (called Operation Snare along some portions of the front) would lure enemy troops into ambush so that prisoners could be taken. All artillery firing and daylight troop movement would cease across the entire Korean front at 1800 hours on 10 Feb and this would last for approximately ten days.

Prior to the beginning of Clamup: Operation Crescendo; a massive artillery bombardment using all available allied artillery (light, medium and heavy) took place. At 0930 10 Feb, the battalion began firing the first of over a thousand rounds ending with a final Time-On-Target²⁷ (TOT) on Hill 691. Around noon, Easy Company's Forward Observer was cleared to fire the 8inch towed howitzers of the IX Corps's 424th FA Bn. The targets were four bunkers across the valley from Easy Company. Incoming fire from these positions was causing Easy Company casualties. Soon the air was filled explosions and smoke as the heavy shells reduced the bunkers to rubble. In this action the battalion suffered its first casualty, PFC Francis M Coon Jr of Battery A was seriously wounded by enemy fire.

Operation Clamup brought silence to the front. The battalion stood down and concentrated on getting equipment in better operational shape. The efforts of all personnel were directed toward repair and maintenance of the worn and neglected equipment. In many

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Time-on-Target (TOT) artillery fire is designed so that all shells impact on the target at the same time.

cases, it was a matter of keeping things running with “bailing wire and chewing gum” until replacement parts could be obtained. Supplies were brought up to operational levels as much as possible, considering the shortage of items and lack of spare parts.

The absence of artillery response to their movements, induced the enemy to move about more freely, especially during daylight hours. As the days progressed, no attempt was made to conceal their movements as working parties engaged in the repair and construction of bunkers and gun positions. The enemy used this pause in activities to strengthen and repair their Main Line of Resistance. The open movement and visible repairing of enemy positions enabled us to compile and update target lists of enemy installations. With few prisoners being taken, the operation was brought to an early end. Operation Clamup, closed at 1400 15 Feb with a thunderous roar as



Operation Clamup ends

Source: Cpl Sam Marritt, H Co., 223rd Inf

all available artillery battalions delivered a ten-minute TOT barrage. This “shock and awe” was designed to inflict maximum damage and casualties upon targets taken from the updated target lists.

With the ending of Operation Clamup, the battalion returned

to providing direct support to the 223rd Inf. To increase the firing batteries effectiveness for round-the-clock operations; gun-crews were crossed-trained so that only four men were needed to serve the weapon. On 18 Feb, Batteries A and B supported the fires of the 980th FA Bn for a special bunker destruction mission. Units of the 224th Inf (Companies I and M (heavy weapons)), twenty-two tanks of the 224th Tank Co as well as four M-16's²⁸ of Battery A, 140th AAA AW Bn attacked a strong enemy bunker complex. The battalion fired almost 700 rounds for this action.

One of the battalion's earliest direct fire "Bunker Busting" missions occurred on the 20th of Feb. The 578th Engr Bn bulldozed a trail to ridge line occupied by Item Co, 223rd Inf. A self-propelled M40 155mm "Long Tom" carefully followed the narrow winding muddy road almost to the top. Here on the reverse slope, its muzzle poked through a parapeted front line position. Our forward observer, looked at the enemy bunkers a few hundred meters away and fired away. It was almost like "point and shoot." Every time a round was fired, telephone pole size logs flew through the air with flames and smoke everywhere. This show was real bunker busting. For another "Bunker Busting" story, see Capt James Griffith's account in William Berebitsky's "A Very Long Weekend."

But as darkness came, the sounds of picks and shovels could be heard as the enemy began to repair and rebuild. To discourage these kinds of nightly activities, random TOT fires were directed on targets destroyed during the day. Although casualties were not visible the next morning, nightly bunker rebuilding and repair was not pursued as aggressively.

Never was Artillery: "The King of Battle" more of a king, than

The M-16 Half-track mounted four 50 caliber machine guns in a turret. They were often called Quad 50's. During this action, Btry A of the 140th fired 11,000 rounds and burned out 11 barrels in 15 minutes. The M-16 MGMC was a variant of the M3 halftrack intended for air defense. While they were intended for air defense, in Korea they were deployed as a devastating anti-personnel weapon.

during the last two years of the Korean War. For example, the battalion in less than thirty days in a static situation fired over 5000 rounds. The 5000 round was fired by Battery. A, the 23rd of Feb at 1415 hours. General Harding, Commanding General (40th DivArty) pulled the lanyard to send that round on its way.

As February drew to a close, 40th DivArty began receiving newly commissioned 2nd lieutenants to fill the battalion's officer shortage. Many of these were without artillery training. DivArty started an observed fire school, where at least the fundamentals of observing and directing artillery fire could be acquired. The last week of February saw the battalion firing for the DivArty Observed Fire school. The new lieutenants, received on-the-job training from the battalion's forward observers as they fired 184 rounds on the 27th, 241 rounds on the 28 and 427 on the 29th of February.

The 29th also found the 223rd's 3rd Bn conducting a company-sized raid to clear enemy bunkers and entrenchments along "The Boot". Things went well until the raiders began to disengage when they came under heavy enemy fire. The 625th FO called for covering artillery fire: the white phosphorus (WP) shells fired onto "The Boot" effectively screened and protected the withdrawal. On 1 March, the 2nd Rocket Battery (105mm How) was attached to the battalion as a fourth firing battery.

The 2nd Platoon, 86th Engineer Searchlight Company²⁹ was attached to the 40th Div on the 15th of March and displaced to our rear. The availability of this platoon increased our ability to find and hit enemy targets at night. In action, their anti-aircraft artillery searchlights bounced beams off low-lying clouds and reflected that light onto enemy positions. It was truly amazing to see the hills light up as bright as day for us while the Chinese were forced to squint back into the glare of the lights. The illumination was not kept constant as

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Redesignated the 2nd Platoon, 86th Field Artillery Battery (Searchlight) on 25 Jan 53.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

the enemy soon learned to avoid a fixed beam. Also a continuous defused light on the rear slopes aided the enemy work parties and supply details. The searchlight units started using a varied, intermittent schedule of turning the beams off and on. There were also periods of searching the battlefield with battalion observers and guns following the beam, ready to fire immediately on any targets revealed.

The presence of the searchlight beam and the threat that it



Searchlights at work

Source: Unknown

might be accompanied by artillery fire had a distinct harassing value on nighttime enemy bunker construction and resupply. After the Cease Fire, the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (Searchlight) was deactivated in the fall of 1954 and the 60-inch searchlights and equipment were turned over to the ROK Army.


CENTRAL FRONT - KUMHWA

Apr 52 - Jun 52

Relieved by elements of the ROK 6th and ROK Capital divisions at the end of March, the 40th Div moved southwest relieving the ROK 2nd Div. The 160th Inf replaced the ROK 32nd Inf on the right and the 223rd Inf replaced the ROK 31st Inf on the left. The 224th Inf and the 140th Tank Bn were placed in reserve. On 1 Apr 52, the Div assumed control of the KUMHWA-KUMSONG sector. The Div was bounded on the left by the US 2nd Div and on the right by the ROK 6th Div. The US 2nd Div boundary moved westward on the 6 Apr, allowing the 224th Inf to come online to the left of the 223rd Inf. On 19 May, the US 7th Div relieved the US 2nd Div. With this move, the 40th Div's left boundary was moved eastward as 7th Div assumed responsibility for the entire KIMHWA Valley. The battle lines remained unchanged as the Div constructed and improved positions in their new area. Increased enemy mortar and artillery fire resulted in an intensified program of bunker building and improvements. This strengthened the defensive capabilities of the division as well reducing casualties from counter-battery fire. BG Joseph P. Cleland assumed command 40th Div, relieving MG Daniel H. Hudelson on 2 Jun. The last week of June saw the division relieved by the ROK 2nd Div. Upon relief, the 40th Div (-DivArty and the 140th Tank Bn) was assigned to US IX Corps reserve. DivArty and the 140th Tank Bn remained in place, under IX Corps operational control, to provide artillery and tank support for the ROK 2nd Div.

The 625th remained in the KUMSONG area until late March, when the battalion moved southwest to the KUMHWA Valley as the 40th Div relieved the ROK 2nd Div. The batteries completed the relief

of their ROK counterparts by 30 March. Gun position surveys were corrected and gun pits improved. Additional communication wire was laid, providing alternate communication paths. Bunkers were enlarged



Where We Were: 30 April 1952.

Kumwha Valley: It is the junction of five roads, a river and a railroad. Kumwha is the eastern anchor of the central Korean plain that is known as the Iron Triangle, a triangularly shaped area of relatively flat terrain about 30 miles north of the 38th Parallel in the mountains of east-central North Korea. **Source:** Truce Tent and Fighting Front

and deepened, making them more habitable for the larger sized Americans.

Most tents or bunkers were heated with fuel oil space heaters. The extreme cold would cause fuel oil to jell up and clog fuel lines. No fuel, no heat and a very cold bunker. The Army solution is to take apart the fuel line, clean it and then put everything back together. A messy time consuming job, usually occurring in the middle of a cold night. The approved G. I. solution, if you were not caught, was mix fuel oil with gasoline so it wouldn't jell. Now and then, if the mix was heavy on gasoline, a large boom would be heard in the area. And we

knew that another heater had exploded and a tent or bunker was probably on fire.

Back in the States - Politics

All National Guard Units were initially activated for twenty-one months of Federal service, this was later extended to twenty-four months. By 1952 over 300,000 National Guardsmen had been activated. Forty-three National Guard Units were in Korea, ranging in size from division (the 40th and 45th) to battalion or company size (i.e., 231st Engineer Combat Battalion, 252nd Transportation Truck Company.) Additionally, many individual guardsman had been pulled from their activated stateside units and sent to Korea as replacements. Guard units were also serving in Europe and as training cadres at home.

By early 1952 it was clear that the Army would need these units longer than the twenty-four months they had been called up for. However, Congress and all the State Governors were not willing to extend the twenty-four months term of service unless this “Police Action” was declared a war. And President Truman was unwilling to ask for a Declaration of War. But how could National Guard units be withdrawn from the battle lines without being replaced and there were no replacement units.

Congress came up with a plan that seemed to please everybody, somebody or nobody depending upon your point of view. First, legislation was passed requiring activated National Guardsman to be released before they served 24 months unless they volunteered to serve longer. Second, Congress fixed the maximum term of Federal service for activated National Guard units (ARNG) at five years. Third, states could form duplicate National Guard units at home while their own units remained in Federal service. These duplicate units would be called National Guard of the United States (NGUS). California was among those states that chose to form NGUS units. This would soon result in a duplicate 40th Inf Div back in California.



OP overlooking Kumhwa Valley. Largest hill is Papa-San (Hill 1062), a Chinese Observation Post that looked down on us.

Source: Unknown

Back at the Front - Kumhwa Valley

With the move to the KUMHWA Valley, the battalion just changed its location, not its mission. It continued direct support of the 223rd Inf. Fire missions ranged from ground and air observed fires during the day and nightly H&I fires. Preplanned defensive fires provided cover for nightly ambush and attack patrols. Counter-battery fire on 5 Apr resulted in six casualties among Battery A gun crews. The next day, a Battery B FO, 1st Lt George R. Quarles was wounded. The middle of April found the battalion supporting company sized night patrol actions designed to prevent the enemy from establishing positions south of Line Bill (1000-3000 yds in front of the

MLR).

By the end of April, the Eighth Army G-3 concluded that the present combat effectiveness of the two National Guard divisions (the 40th and 45th) was equal to that of the two divisions that they had replaced.

Flying Cheetah's³⁰

In the KUMHWA-KUMSONG sector, our artillery OP's overlooked the wide KUMHWA Valley that stretched northward to the next mountain range which was held by the enemy. At times we would hear piston-driven World War II P-51D (Mustang) aircraft roar through the valley. It was a sight to be looking down from above on these planes as made their strikes below us. These aircraft belonged to the 2nd Squadron of the South African Air Force. They had been placed at the disposal of the United Nations to serve in the Korean War by the South African Government in August of 1950. The



Flying Cheetah's, 2nd Sq, SAAF at K-46, 1952

Source: Don Eaton

squadron had an outstanding World War II record in the Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Sicily, Italy and the Middle East. These seasoned

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During World War II, the squadron's mascots were two pet cheetahs, hence the name.

**KOREA SUMMER-FALL 1952**

Korea Summer Fall 1952: 1 May 1952 - 30 Nov 1952

pilots and technicians were attached to the USAF's 18th Fighter Bomber Wing. The squadron converted to modern F-86F's fighter-bombers in November 1952.

The marked increase in the number of incoming mortar and artillery rounds received in the battalion area in May, intensified the battalion's bunker building and improvement. With the rainy season on its way, gun positions were improved, especially in regards to sitting and drainage. The battalion's intensive ditching and drainage program proved eminently successful, enabling the unit to withstand the severe rains suffered later in July.

The battalion S-2 (Intelligence Officer) and his Operations Sergeant made frequent visits to the artillery OP's for on-spot target information and critiques. These informal face-to-face on-the-spot talks with the Forward Observation and Liaison teams were extremely valuable. Small items of seemingly unessential information gathered during these informal conversations, when collected and evaluated, netted many returns in the verification of enemy weapons and installations.

The 16th of May, our fourth firing battery, the 2nd Rocket Battery (105mm How) left for duties elsewhere. The 2nd had been attached to the 625th since the 1st of March. We were now back to the normal compliment of three firing batteries.

The rugged nature of the Korean terrain, frequently required the emplacement of firing batteries in positions with high minimum elevations for the howitzers. This required the use of high-angle fire for both observed and unobserved missions. The procedures and techniques of high angle fire had long been "brushed over lightly" at

**105mm High Angle Fire****Source: Unknown**

the Army Artillery School at Fort Sill. As a result, most new officers had to learn the adjustment, fire direction procedures and the ramifications of high angle fire on the job. Pointing their tubes to the sky, gun crews reduced propellant charges from Charge Seven to Charge Two or even Charge One. This reduced charged lobbed the howitzer's thirty-three pound projectile up and over the hills like a 4.2 mortar round, plastering the enemy caught on the reverse slope. Of course, the cannoneers had to remember to dig a hole between the trails, so that the recoil of the elevated gun did not bury its breech in the mud.

Near the end of May, Major John L. West turned over the battalion to Major Wheller J. Morrison and rotated home. June saw continued improvement and strengthening of positions. A typical twenty-four hour period³¹ in June found the battalion firing forty-three missions for a total of 522 rounds. These consisted of Air OP, Ground

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625 POR 135, 11 June 1952

OP, Registration, Unobserved Fire and H & I missions. A new method of firing Harassing and Interdiction missions was implemented in an attempt to achieve greater results. Previously H&I missions had been randomly fired by one, two or all six guns of a battery during the night. Assigned targets were known or suspected artillery, mortar and assembly areas. Results were usually unknown. Now however, the battalion would fire all eighteen guns (battalion TOT) on areas considered active based upon updated intelligence information. These unexpected TOT's kept the enemy holed up much more at night as shown by the marked decrease in their early morning activities. Over four-hundred H&I missions were fired in June.

At Line KANSAS to the rear of the MLR (Line WYOMING), alternate defensive positions for Operation Hangfire "A" were reconnoitered and surveyed. The Survey Section did a great job in laying out battalion positions in a wide level area. However, as spring began and the weather warmed up, it was rice planting time. The South Korean farmers had been told to stay south of the "farm line" in order not to stray into the combat zone. But what farmer, struggling to raise food for his family could resist the lure of that level land they had used all their life. Soon all the alternate artillery positions were unusable. The farmers had moved north of the line and planted rice wherever they could. And those carefully surveyed positions were now nothing more than flooded rice paddies, impassible to vehicles.

Flack Suppression

The summer of 1952 saw each side trying to gain some tactical advantage as the truce talks dragged on. With little or no action at the peace table, increased volumes of allied artillery fire rained destruction on enemy bunkers and fortifications. The Chinese countered by building deeper and more sophisticated bunkers and fortifications for personnel and weapons. In fact, their construction techniques seemed to be taken from U. S. Army Field Manuals on entrenched positions. Four or more layers of eight to ten-inch diameter logs, topped with one to three feet of dirt. This reduced the effectiveness of our light, medium and even heavy artillery weapons. As artillery effectiveness on

these stronger and more numerous bunkers decreased, 500lb or 1000lb bombs from Allied fighter-bombers were increasingly used for “bunker destruction” whenever available. The enemy then increased the number of anti-aircraft weapons employed at the front. The stage was set for a new battalion mission; flack suppression by artillery fire.

Flack suppression fire missions were designed to reduce aircraft vulnerability during low-level strikes against bunkers and fortifications. Upon receipt of a frag order (strike plan), all known or suspected anti-aircraft positions within 4,000 meters of the target center were plotted. A Time-On-Target (TOT) schedule was created for all available artillery pieces, ensuring that all rounds would impact simultaneously on the anti-aircraft positions near the target. The air observer directing the strike, would mark the target with a smoke round and as soon as the fighter-bombers visually identified their target, they were orbited on the far side away from our artillery positions. The air observer then called the battalion for the flack suppression mission. Knowing the TOT, the Air OP, would vector the strike toward the target so that the aircraft arrived over the target after the flack-suppression rounds neutralized enemy antiaircraft fire. All rounds were fired with VT fuse and as a precaution against late rounds arriving after the fighters start in, an “All Clear” round was fired after all artillery units reported “rounds complete.” This final smoke round arrives within seconds after the artillery concentration impacts. The first pass by the fighters arrived less than two minutes later.

The battalion first used this flack suppression technique on 8 June with a 0730 strike on Hill 532 by four F-80's with eight 1000 pound bombs and again on 9 June by 4 F-84's. With minor refinements, this technique continued to be very successful in reducing enemy anti-aircraft fire during low-level strike missions for the rest of the Korean War.

Ammunition Shortage? Yes and No

Throughout the Korean War, senior commanders like Ridgway and Van Fleet sought to offset the huge Communist manpower advantage through the use of artillery firepower. They sought to overcome the enemy's 8:1 manpower advantage through a 100:1

firepower advantage. This resulted in enormous demands for artillery ammunition after the front had stabilized, producing a tremendous drain on available stocks. Only semi-mobilized for war and slow to get into ammunition production, the nation could not fully utilize its tremendous industrial strength. In fact, the ammunition requirements in Korea caused theater stocks in Europe to be depleted and at times reach critically low levels. The Van Fleet rate of fire per tube³² and distribution problems resulting from a poor transportation network, hilly terrain and adverse weather sometimes created local shortages, as experienced by the battalion. For example, while supporting a 223rd Inf patrol withdrawal in pre-dawn hours of June 13th which resulted in heavy firing, the battalion went over its daily allotment and all further firing was restricted. The Battalion Daily Journal for 14 June reads *“Unable to satisfy artillery needs do to shortage of ammunition allotment. Corps artillery was called in to fire several missions which were light artillery targets within our capabilities.”* And again on 16 June *“Few observed missions due to shortage of ammunition”* Technically, I guess there was no ammunition shortage but at the front we would have used more if we had it..

The Unknown GI?

A couple of hours after midnight on June 19th, a hand grenade went off near the 223rd Inf's King OP. Upon investigation, Forward Observer Lt William R. Smith and his Recon Sergeant, PFC Glen P. Holland saw a figure dressed in a GI uniform and wearing an American helmet. Lt Smith challenged the figure twice, receiving no answer Smith fired twice just as the figure threw a grenade which wounded Smith, Holland and two riflemen from King Company. The figure took off down the hill and disappeared toward enemy lines.

On 23 June, a Service Battery 3/4 ton truck was nine miles from Chunchon when it was forced off the road by an oncoming 2 ½ ton truck. The Service Battery driver, Anthony Alvis, was killed and

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Van Fleet Rate-Rounds per tube per day: 105mm howitzer, 300 rnds; 155mm howitzer, 250 rnds; 155mm gun, 200 rnds; 8" howitzer, 200rnds.

a Warrant Officer and enlisted passenger were seriously injured. The other truck did not stop to render assistance and was never identified.

Near the end of June, the word was passed that the 40th Div was to be relieved by the ROK 2nd Div and pass to IX Corps reserve. The battalion began taking down tents and preparing equipment for the movement to the rear. The 24th of June saw the battalion's advance party depart for reserve positions. The next morning, thirteen trucks loaded with battalion tentage and equipment also departed for the rear. But this move was not to be, for at noon that same day it was canceled. So the battalion quit packing up and began to unpack. The next afternoon, the trucks from the rear returned and were unloaded. It took the next couple of days to restore things to the way they were before the move (that wasn't made) started.

General Van Fleet wanted to keep an "active defense" posture as the truce talks dragged on.. This required keeping his "firepower advantage"; the artillery that would continue interdicting enemy movements, responding to enemy batteries, and countering enemy offense actions. These battlefield tactics, would require keeping all available guns in action. Thus when infantry divisions were pulled out of the line for rest and put in reserve, their organic artillery battalions would remain at the front.

The 27th of June saw Batteries A and B, displace to alternate positions to reinforce the fires of the 143rd FA Bn. Battery C moved to higher ground (CT711403) as their previous position would probably become flooded during the anticipated rainy season. By the 28th of June, the relief of the 40th Div by the ROK 2nd Div (7th, 31st and 32nd Inf) was completed. During the relief, the battalion fired suppression fires as the ROK 31st Inf relieved the 223rd Inf. The 18th FA Bn, ROK 2nd Div set up in the 625th's alternate positions to provide direct support to the ROK 31st Inf. The next day, 29 June, the battalion was tasked with general support of the ROK 18th FA Bn. All the battalions's Forward Observer crews and Liaison teams were relieved by their ROK counterparts and returned to the battalion area.

With June drawing to a close, most of the officers and men (guardsman, draftees, and regular army) that had been with the battalion since Camp Cooke had left or soon would rotate out. In fact, by the end of June, the battalion was short 68 enlisted men. As the number replacements and less experienced personnel increased in the battalion, the training program begun in May accelerated. Gun crews went back to learning the Duties of Cannoneers, ammo handling and direct firing. The communication sections went back to basics; wire splicing, fire commands, radio telephone procedures and field wire techniques. The FDC and Survey crews worked with aiming circles, BC Scopes, and learned Fire Direction operation techniques.

CENTRAL FRONT - KUMHWA

Jul 52 - 21 Oct 52

The Div (-DivArty and 140th Tnk Bn) moved to Field Training Command area #5 to begin a period of training and rehabilitation in conjunction with its mission as U. S. IX Corps reserve. 1 Jul 1952 found the 3rd Bn, 223rd Inf moving to the SANDONG Mines area to provide security for the IX Corps Forward Command Post and adjacent areas. On 5 Jul, the 224th Inf was attached to the 2nd Log Command and left for PUSAN to provide security forces for PW enclosures, returning to Div control on 23 Sep. The Div(-) moved to a new training center near KAPYONG on 13 Jul, continuing its training program, rehabilitating reserve defensive positions on Line KANSAS, and providing security for IX Corps Headquarters facilities. 40th Division Commander, Major General Cleland was temporarily assigned as IX Corps Commander on 31 Jul. Brig General Gordon B. Rogers assumed command of the division until 9 Aug when General Cleland returned. The Div continued training and security missions until 16 Oct when it was ordered to relieve the 25th Div in the PAEM- IHYN-NI SECTOR (Heartbreak Ridge). On 21 OCT, DivArty and the 140th Tnk Bn were released from IX Corps operational control and support of the ROK 2nd Div. Moving eastward, they rejoined the rest of the Div at Heartbreak Ridge.

ROK 2nd Div Support

July found the battalion assigned as general support for the 18th FA Bn, ROK 2nd Div. General support for ROK units, departed from normal artillery doctrine in that battalion activities were closer to providing direct support that just reinforcing fires. Three new

observation posts (OPs) were constructed by the battalion on the MLR. These were occupied by battalion forward observers and liaison personnel whose primary purpose was to provide information regarding friendly and enemy activity. The majority of missions fired were nightly H&I fires as requested by the ROK 18th FA and some targets of opportunity during the day (working parties or supply points). For most of the battalion, support of ROK troops presented few, if any, changes to normal day to day operations.

However, the Forward Observer and Liaison personnel faced some unique challenges. Most Korean line officers were very young with little service school training. They had learned on-the job, through trial and error. Junior officers would not speak out even when a senior officer was clearly in error, a culture condition which required great tact on our part to get a clear answer. Little English was spoken, although sometimes an interpreter was available. Both sides worked out ways to get along and identify targets, generate patrol and operational support defensive fires. The static situation helped and the end result was that artillery support was there as needed.

Taking advantage of the comparative inactivity while in this general support role, the battalion began improving their positions. A battalion wide reconstruction program was started with emphasis on modifying tactical fortifications to provide added protection against increasing enemy counter-battery fire as well as more adequate living spaces. Construction was started on building a larger (thirty-three feet by thirty-six feet) maintenance shop which would accommodate more vehicles and permit better second echelon work during bad weather.

There was also more opportunity for additional training to counter the effect of the Army's rotation policy upon operational effectiveness. The combat efficiency of artillery units was seriously lowered by the army's policy of individual rather than unit rotation.³³ Replacements, for the most part, were only partially trained, and in some cases not trained at all in the MOS they had been assigned. In

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This policy seems to have been corrected now (over fifty years later) with the rotation of National Guard and Reserve units, not individual personnel to Iraq.

addition, difficulty was experienced in getting replacements in critical MOS positions. Many replacements, officers and enlisted men alike were not even artillery trained. Cpl Jim Mehaffey, trained as a combat engineer, arrived at the Inchon replacement depot when there was no need for combat engineers. Jim was asked if he had ever spliced fieldwire. His classic answer was “no but I bet I can learn faster than anybody you ever sent up there.” Given a senior wireman MOS, he joined the 625th as wireman on a liaison team. Later Jim operated the battalion switchboard until rotating home in February 1953.

Thirty-six Points³⁴

The rotation system was an important factor in sustaining troop morale in this limited war or police action. However, the price paid was lowered unit efficiency. Units were in constant flux with seasoned veterans departing and inexperienced individuals arriving. These replacements had to undergo a period of indoctrination and training before they became battle-wise. By the time they were good at their jobs, it was almost time to rotate out of Korea. For the 625th FA, this indoctrination and training was always on-the-job training, since the battalion was continuously on line from January 1952 when it arrived in Korea to the Cease-Fire in July 1953.

General Van Fleet complained that by the fall of 1952 his artillery units had lost their ability to shoot quickly and accurately. He blamed this on the rotation system that had stripped artillery units of their veteran gunners.³⁵ During Van Fleet’s “active defense” portion of the Korean War, field artillery was increasingly used to reduce casualties. During the October-November time period, the UN Command fired eight outgoing artillery rounds for every one received. By December, this ratio had increased to 19 to 1, even though the volume of incoming fire had increased,.

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A total of thirty-six points was required for rotation stateside. Four points per month in a combat zone, three points for being located between regimental headquarters and firing batteries, and two points for rear echelon duty

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HQ Eighth Army Cmd Rpt, Oct 52, sec I, Narrative, pp 68-69.

Formal on-the-job training at battery and battalion levels covering basic artillery subjects brought replacements up to a skill level where they could be integrated into the battalion on an operational basis. Since most artillery officers would serve as Forward Observers sometime during their tour in Korea, all incoming junior officers regardless of job speciality spent at least a week at one of the battalion's observation posts. This was a rapid and effective means of instructing them in adjusting artillery fire. Familiarizing these new officers with the problem of adjusting artillery fire in this rugged terrain also reduced the number of rounds needed by them to adjust fire. Starting with 12-20 rounds fired for check point registration, by the end of a week they usually registered in 7 to 10 rounds with fewer rounds lost.

On the equipment side, the war-weary howitzers of the battalion were in need of spare parts and several tubes needed replacement. These worn tubes resulted in large dispersion patterns when all six of the battery's guns fired at the same target. To somewhat offset this problem, daylight center of impact registration was used. Data computed as a result of daylight, center of impact registration compared to regular ground observed registration, indicated a marked improvement in registration under existing conditions. This method reduced registration time by up to 200% and resulted in up to 2/3 less ammunition expended.

To ensure that firing batteries retained their ability to rapidly displace to another position, daily displacements to alternate positions were conducted. A daily displacement of one howitzer section from each firing battery was executed upon orders from the Bn S-3. The section to be displaced was designated by the battery Executive Officer and rotated among the six sections ensuring that each section became proficient at hasty displacements and familiar with their alternative positions.

Lt. Col Louis R Van De Velde assumed command of the 625th FA Bn on 4 Jul 1952 from Major Wheller J Morrison. On the 8th of July, Batteries A and C received incoming fire resulting in the

wounding of Pvt Octo Price who was on outpost duty.

With the division in reserve and having moved to KAPYONG, the division technical services (supply, ordnance, dental, etc) were slower to respond to the battalion's needs. Shortages in combat tend to be thought of as big things, lack of ammunition, fuel, and troops. But "for the want of a nail" was still true. The communication sections, at times, lacked friction tape needed to splice the continually torn up and cut field wire that was the backbone of the battalion's communication. Friction and insulating tape for splicing communication wire was issued in quantities based on the amount of wire drawn. In our existing static situation, not much new wire was drawn as wire lines remained in place and the tape was needed for repair of broken lines rather than installation of new lines. No new wire, no need for tape according to supply. So scrounging for tape was the order of the day. The Operation and Fire Direction personnel spent their own money on target grids, fans, plotting needles, rubber cement and scotch tape. These items, vital to successful FDC operation were purchased by officers and men returning from R&R in Japan or ordered directly from The Artillery School at Fort Sill. Oklahoma.

The Flood

The 26 of July saw the onset of the rainy season, with six days of heavy, torrential downpour turning the landscape into sea of mud. The heavy rains threatened routes 117A and 117B back of the MLR with washouts. By midnight of the 28th, all efforts by the battalion and the 74th Engineer Bn had become fruitless and extremely hazardous. The 29th saw all access routes to the rear washed out in several places as well as the MSR immediately to the rear of the battalion. Two bridges going up to OP2 were washed out.

All HE ammunition in the battalion ammunition dump was brought forward, an additional 100 rounds was delivered to each firing battery and the rest left in trucks parked on high ground near the battalion CP. Restrictions were placed on firing because of the resupply problem, although the ammunition level never fell below the basic load. Extra rations were positioned before the flood waters reached their peak. The force of the overflowing waters caused

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

extensive damage to the roads and washed out poles supporting overhead field wires, causing a break in thirty-five lines, severing all wire communication with adjacent, supported and subordinate units. This left only one direct line from the battalion FDC to the 18th FA



July 1952 Flood: No Roads.

Source: Unknown

Bn FDC. Satisfactory radio communication was established and all units of the battalion remained in contact with each other.

The battalion was alerted to take over direct support of the ROK 31st Inf, if the ROK 18th FA Bn, which was situated on low ground behind the battalion, was unable to carry out its mission. Liaison Officers were sent to the 18th and forward to the 1st and 2nd battalions, ROK 31st Inf. Our three battalion OPs were alerted and made “commo checks” to the FDC every half-hour.

Engineer support arrived the morning of the 30th. Plans were made to set up trolley systems using winch and cables across washed out portions of the roads between the batteries. This would make it possible to transport rations and supplies to the batteries which were

isolated from each other. When the five trolley's were completed they were manned 24 hours a day with two men on each side. A stock pile of ammunition was accumulated at Service Battery and readied for trolley line delivery. Company C, 74th Engineer Battalion lost a man who was swept away by the flood water during trolley building.

When the rain ceased on the last day of July, over eleven inches had fallen in five days. The road conditions remained serious, no vehicular traffic was possible except between washouts. Vehicular shuttle systems combined with the trolley systems made it possible to transport personnel and equipment between forward and rear installations. The battalion observation posts on the MLR received air



July 1952 : The Bridge is Out.

Source: Unknown

drops by L19 which delivered rations, batteries and communication wire. As soon as the skies cleared, all available personnel began to fix the damaged bunkers, trenches and roads.

Normally, infantry-occupied bunkers did not represent profitable artillery targets since their destruction requires the



Propaganda Leaflet: Over 300 rounds fired in July. Source: Unknown

expenditure of an excessive amount of ammunition, and they are quickly rebuilt. However, after the heavy rains of July, bunkers, communication trenches and trails were heavily damaged on both sides of the MLR. The battalion took advantage of these conditions to effectively target enemy positions opposite the ROK 31st Inf. The blast effect of even a near-miss would cause the collapse of the saturated bunkers and trenches. So with a relative light expenditure of ammunition, serious damage was done to enemy positions after the flood.

August saw the rainy season ending and both sides sought to improve their tactical positions before winter set in. The ROKs on the MLR were being subject to increasing hit-and-run mortar fire. The enemy would run their weapons out to a firing position, fire a few rounds, bring the weapons back into hiding or move to a new position and fire again. Our FO's were frustrated in their attempts to destroy weapons/crews in these know positions. However on the 8, 9, and 10

of August, all of the one hundred and seventy known and suspected hostile mortar positions facing the ROK 2nd Div sector were attacked by all available artillery fire. This countermeasure significantly decreased the number of incoming mortar rounds received.

Back in the States - 40th Div(NGUS)

September in California, found the 40th Infantry Division (NGUS) being organized. The 625th Field Artillery Battalion (NGUS) was federally recognized 2 September 1952 with Headquarters at Van Nuys. The majority of the battalion's initial members were returning veterans who had been with the battalion in Korea. Back to weekly drill nights and recruiting more guardsmen. The next year summer field training was at Hunter Liggett Military Reservation on Aug 16-30 1953. To the veterans it was a strange feeling to be firing for practice when just a few months before they fired for real with somebody firing back at them.

Back at the Front

September in Korea, found the 625th FA Bn (ARNG) continuing their support of the ROK 18th FA Bn. Counter-battery fire resulted in injuries to four Battery A personnel on the 28th of September. The 2nd of Oct saw the battalion receiving long johns and sweaters, as another winter was on its way. On 3 Oct, the majority of the battalion moved to a training area in the rear. The next day they registered their guns in preparation for providing live artillery fire for combined arms training. The 625th provided direct support to the 223rd Inf for a series of infantry battalion combat team exercises. Each day the batteries occupied firing positions, fired throughout the day and night until that exercise was complete. They then returned to their respective bivouac areas until the next exercise started. During this time, our three battalion OPs on the MLR were manned by personnel borrowed from the 981st FA. Training exercises for the 223rd Inf were completed the 11th of Oct, the battalion was given Close Station March Order and by midnight had returned to the KUMHWA positions supporting the ROK 18th FA.

The battalion was just in time to take part in one of the biggest artillery shoots of 1952. The UN truce negotiators had walked out on the armistice talks in frustration over the stalling tactics of the enemy regarding the prisoner exchange issue. General Van Fleet, felt that it was time to demonstrate UN resolve and force the enemy back to the truce table. A good candidate for such an operation was north of KUMHWA. Here the MLR held by the ROK 2nd Div and the US 7th Div on their right was at times only two hundred yards from the enemy, who held dominating positions on Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge. General Van Fleet felt that if these positions could be taken the Communists would be forced to fall back twelve hundred yards to the next defensible position.

Operation SHOWDOWN began on the 14th of October 1952 with a one hour pre-assault bombardment beginning at 0440 by sixteen artillery battalions totaling 280 guns. The 31st Inf, 7th Div attacked Triangle Hill while the 32nd Inf, ROK 2nd Div attacked Sniper Ridge. The day before on the 13th of Oct, Batteries A and B of the battalion were laid on the same azimuth as Battery C, so that all three batteries covered Sniper Ridge. This would provide reinforcing the fires to the 980th FA for attacks by the ROK 32nd Inf. This was also the day when supply received seventeen armored vests which they quickly brought forward the next day to the Forward Observers and Liaison teams. Throughout the 14th, the battalion answered calls for fires from the 980th on targets of opportunity. Enemy sightings were numerous and large compared to previous periods. Shortly after dark the enemy counter-attacked and the battalion fired heavy concentrations of pre-planned, defensive fires which stopped the enemy by morning. These pre-planned defensive concentrations were fired at the maximum rate of fire (battery one round every 30 seconds).

The 15th saw the battalion firing almost five thousand rounds for the 7th Div in support of their attack on Triangle Hill. OP3 received a direct hit on the 17th, partially destroying the bunker and completely destroying the BC Scope and mount but no personnel casualties. The next day Battery C came under heavy counter-battery fire resulting in three wounded and one killed. On the 19th, heavy counter-battery fire hit Battery B resulting in one killed and two



Unboxed 105mm rounds

Source: PFC Grumshaw, 213 th AFA Bn

wounded.

The entire period between the 14th and 20th was one of firing heavy defensive concentrations during hours of darkness and numerous targets of opportunity during daylight with increased enemy counter-battery-activity (over five hundred rounds fell in the battalion area). The battalion fired almost eighteen thousand rounds during the battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge.

Although the distance to the Army Class V Supply Point (ASP) was not great, the turn-around time was seven hours due to the difficult terrain. Thus during these periods of heavy sustained fire, Service Battery ammunition trains were augmented by ammunition vehicles from the firing batteries. Augmenting the ammo train with additional vehicles allowed the battalion's basic ammunition load to be maintained even at this high rate of sustained fire. At times, the numerous wooden ammo boxes around the guns, became both a safety and a fire hazzard. So the artillery rounds, two to a box, were unpacked at Service Battery and delivered to the firing batteries in their fiber containers.

EASTERN FRONT HEARTBREAK RIDGE 22 Oct 52 - Jan 53

By 22 Oct 1952, the 224th Inf completed its relief of the 27th Inf, 25th Div while the 160th Inf completed the relief of the 14th Inf, 25th Div. On that date, the 40th Div assumed responsibility for the Heartbreak Ridge sector. The 5th RCT was attached to the division. The Div was bounded on the left by the ROK 7th Div and on the right by the US 45th Div. The 223rd Inf arrived on 23 Oct and went into Div reserve until the 31st when it changed places with the 5th RCT. The Div continued active defense of Line Minnesota in the X Corps sector throughout the fall and into the New Year. On 8 Jan 1953, the 5th RCT relieved the 223rd Inf which then became Div reserve. On 22 Jan, the 45th Div (- DivArty and the 245th Tank Bn) was directed to relieve the 40th Div on Heartbreak Ridge. On 28 Jan, the 180th Inf, 45th Div relieved the 224th Inf. On 30 Jan, the 279th Inf, 45th Div relieved the 160th Inf. On 31 Jan, the 179th Inf, 45th Div relieved the 223rd Inf. The 40th Div (- DivArty and the 140th Tank Bn) then became X Corps reserve. The 160th Inf moved to HWACHON, the 223rd Inf moved to KOWANTONG, and the 224th Inf moved to IMJE. The 40th DivArty and 140th Tank Bn remained in position, attached to the 45th Div since 45th's artillery units and its tank battalion were still in support of the ROK 12th Div.

Late in October, the 40th Div left IX Corps reserve to relieve the 25th Div in the PAEM-IHYOU-NI Sector (Heartbreak Ridge). In conjunction with this move. The battalion left the ROK 2nd Div and traveled east to rejoin the 40th Div. The morning of the 19th, found the base piece of each firing battery withdrawn and replaced by a base piece of the ROK 52nd FA Bn. The 52nd began base piece registration



Heartbreak Ridge.

Source: Unknown


and by afternoon all of the 52nd's guns were registered.³⁶ While this was going on, a 625th advance party was on its way to the positions of the 8th FA Bn, 25th Div. The next morning, the battalion left the KUMHWA valley and began infiltrating their vehicles over route 117B(Mule Trail) to rendezvous in the Service Battery Area. Here a hot meal was served, before the entire battalion moved out in two serials

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The 52nd was one of the new ROK field artillery battalions resulting from the UN Command finally approving a full complement of three 105-mm battalions and one 155-mm battalion for each ROK division. Previously a ROK division's artillery was limited to a single 105-mm battalion. These new battalions were formed and trained at The Korean Artillery Training Center and then were given 60-90 days battle indoctrination and advanced training in the 5th US Artillery Group before attachment to a ROK Division. Most of these ROK Field Artillery Battalions were firing combat missions within five weeks of being formed.

toward the Heartbreak Ridge area.

The next day, 21 October, the 625th relieved the 8th FA without incident. The battalion provided direct support to the 27th Inf, 25th Div until the 27th was relieved by the 224th Inf.. Direct support of the 224th continued until 26th when the 980th FA arrived from the ROK 2nd Div area and took over direct support of the 224th. The 625th then switched to general support missions for the 555th FA. The "Triple Nickel" was providing direct support to 5th RCT which had



Where We Were: 31 October 1952; Heartbreak Ridge

A narrow, rocky, mountain mass running north and south dominating the MUNDUNG-NI and SATAE-RI valleys. The south and east slopes up which we had to move were extremely steep, while the west and north slopes by which the enemy moved supplies up to the ridges were moderate. Source: Truce Tent and Fighting Front

been attached to the 40th. At the end of the October, the 625th began direct support of the 223rd Inf when the regiment relieved the 5th RCT. The 555th FA Bn then became the general support battalion.

The Communists tried to exploit the relief of the 25th Div by the 40th with attacks along the division's front every night. As in the battles for Sniper Ridge, the batteries fired continuously. All available

trucks were pressed into service to bring up ammunition. Sometime in October, the battalion fired its's 100,000 round since being committed to combat. The 3rd and 4th of November saw the enemy launch a battalion size attack against Heartbreak Ridge (Hill 851) which resulted in one hundred and thirty-one enemy KIA, an estimated four hundred



Heartbreak Ridge Bunkers.

Source: Unknown

and fifty WIA and seven prisoners. The 7th saw 1st Lt William T. Reynolds wounded during action on Heartbreak Ridge.

The three displacements in October emphasized the necessity for continuous study of the battalion's basic loads. All units of the battalion tended to accumulate a considerable amount of "extra stuff" when sitting in a static situation for several months, reducing the battalion's ability to "shoot and scoot."

The rotation policy continued to result in low ranking enlisted men performing job assignments calling for higher pay grades. This problem was somewhat alleviated by the appointment of "deputy"

THIRD KOREAN WINTER 1952-1953

Third Korean Winter 1952 - 1953 : 1 Dec 1952 - 30 Apr 1953

NCOs, stripes but no pay. The front remained relatively static during November and December. The division continued active defense of

Line Minnesota in the X Corps sector with aggressive attack patrols. This required heavy defensive and counter-battery fires by the battalion. Construction and reinforcement of battalion positions continued, providing more protection against increased enemy country-battery fire.

On 8 January the 5th RCT relieved the 223rd Inf. The battalion switched support roles with the 555th, using three battalion observation posts to provide general support. As January came to a close, patrol engagements and enemy probes increased. The largest occurring on 28 January on Heartbreak Ridge during the relief of the 40th by the 45th Div.

Back to the States - Homeward Home

Time passed and one day your name showed up on some 'Special Orders'...

HEADQUARTERS 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 6

SPECIAL ORDERS

21 May 1952

NUMBER 23

EXTRACT

10. Fol EM rel asg 625th FA Bn reasg in gr WP o/n 26 May 52 to Inchon Repl Depot, 369 Repl Co, 110 Repl Bn, APO 971 for rtn to ZI for subsequent reasg. Phys insp prior to departure will be accomplished as dir in Cir 12, Hq Eighth Army, 1952. DD Form 415 will beutil by indiv to inform corr and pub of a non-mil address, a perm mil address, or to discontinue mail and pub until further advised as to new address. EDCSA 21 May 1952. AUTH: Cir 12, Hq Eighth Army. Asterisk indicates NCO in charge of record.

EDD							
NAME	GRADE	SN	MOS	TOE	ETS	FEC	UNIT
ADERHOLD, DALE N	PVT	US53040040	4844	2YRS	Sep53	May52	C Btry
CALDWELL, DAVIS I	PFC	RA19341053	4812	3YRS	Apr54	May52	Hq Btry
*HANSON, ROBERT L	SFC	NG28098034	4641	2YRS	Sep52	May52	Hq Btry

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

NAYLOR, WILFORD L SGT	NG28097989 3844 2YRS	Sep52	May52	B Btry
ZIELINSKI, THEODORE PVT	US51057183 4844 2YRS		Aug53	M a y 5 2
C Btry				

...and there you were, headed home.

Down from the hill or out of your bunker, you checked out with the Supply Sergeant. Slinging your duffle bag over your shoulder, pausing to say goodbye to some, getting an address or two, you climbed aboard a truck headed for the rear. Arriving at the replacement depot near Inchon, you took off your dirty worn fatigues and tossed them into an ever growing pile of dirty worn fatigues. After a shower with plenty of hot water and soap, you were issued a set of worn clean fatigues, which might or might not fit. Now it was time to play the old Army game of "hurry up and wait." A few flew home, but for most of us, after a day or two we boarded an LST or an APA for the trip across the Sea of Japan.

Coming ashore at Sasebo,³⁷ you entered a large building and processing began again, this time more thoroughly. Duffle bags were emptied onto a long counter and their contents were checked very closely. Drugs were not the problem then but illegal souvenirs and guns were. I saw a couple of hand grenades fall out of one duffle bag. Records were brought up to date, sometimes resulting in shots we didn't want. New uniforms were issued. The ubiquitous tailor shop did a land office business tailoring your uniform and sewing insignia and patches on. When processing was completed, you still had to wait until a MTS transport was ready to sail.

Two very long weeks at sea and you arrived at a Pacific Coast port (San Francisco or Seattle). For me, it was under the Golden Gate Bridge to the San Francisco POE, Fort Mason. Disembarking we passed through a large door into a huge terminal building. Waiting in formation, an Army band welcomed us home. At the other end of the

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Sasebo, with a port area larger than either Kobe or Yokohama served as the focal point for transshipment of tons of ammunition, fuel vehicles and supplies between the United States and Korea. In addition, the replacement depot processed 20,000 to 30,000 troops per month once the rotation program was in full swing.

terminal, another large door led to the ferryboats of the Army Transport Service: the Catalina, Cabrillo, and the Ernie Pyle. Boarding one of the ferryboats , hopefully the Ernie Pyle, as it was the



Going Home, May 1952:

Source; SFC Bob Hanson, 625FA

Back Row: John Few, Bernard Shapen, Bob Hanson

Front Row: Jim Dovey, Ron Bergstrom

largest and most comfortable of the fleet, you settled down for a three hour ride. Heading north, you passed under the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge and then up the San Joaquin River to Pittsburgh, California and Camp Stoneman. Forty-eight to seventy-two hours after your arrival at Camp Stoneman, your processing was finished and you were discharged or headed home with a thirty-day leave.

And off you go, having served in that “Police Action” or the “Forgotten War.” Unlike the Victory Parades of World War Two or the taunts and jeers of Vietnam, we were pretty much ignored when we got home. In fact, you were often asked; “Where you been the last couple of years? I haven’t seen you around.” Most of us just picked up where we had left off a couple of years earlier.

EASTERN FRONT - PUNCHBOWL

Feb 53 - 24 April 53

On 3 Feb 1953, the 40th's Div artillery units changed places with those artillery units of the 45th Div which were supporting the 12th ROK Div. The 45th DivArty units returned to operational control of their parent unit while the 40th DivArty units were placed under operational control of the X Corps. On 11 Feb, the 140th Tank Bn, 40th Div replaced the 245th Tank Bn, 45th Div on the MLR in support of the ROK 12th Div. The 245th Tank Bn returned to operational control of its parent unit. On 17 Feb, the 160th Inf moved to the SANDONG mines area providing security forces. On 17 Mar, the 224th Inf, 40th Div was placed under operational control of 45th Div as 45th Div reserve. The 140th Tank Bn manned MLR positions in support of both the ROK 7th and ROK 12th divisions. On 14 Apr, the 224th relieved the 5th RCT on the MLR. 17 April saw Maj Gen Ridgely Gaither assume command of the 40th Div from Maj Gen Joseph P. Cleland. On 19 Apr, the 160th Inf, 40th Div came under 45th Div operational control as it relieved the 279th Inf, 45th Div.

ROK 12th Div Support

As January ended, the 45th Div (- DivArty and 245th Tank Bn) relieved the 40th Div on Heartbreak Ridge. The 40th Div (- DivArty and the 140th Tank Bn) passed to X Corps Reserve. The DivArty and 140th Tank Bn remained in position; attached to the 45th Div. On 1 Feb, nine Forward Observer parties and four Liaison teams of the 625th moved east from Heartbreak Ridge to the Punchbowl's north

rim relieving their opposite numbers of the 158th FA Bn, 45th Div. The 158th had been in direct support of the 37th Inf, ROK 12 Div. As usual, the enemy tried to disrupt troop changes. The 2nd of Feb saw a reinforced enemy battalion (seven hundred men) penetrating the 37th MLR after a forty minute firefight. The 625th forward observers called for on-position³⁸ fire from the 158th at the request of the ROK



Punchbowl, Northern Rim.

Source: Rex Galentine, K Co. 223rd Inf

infantry. The fire caught the enemy in the open, inflicting many casualties. The ROKs counterattacked, restoring the MLR.

The next day, the 625th relieved the 158th. Since the two battalions were just changing positions, the majority of like equipment

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Artillery air bursts using VT fuses on top of one's own position.

items including howitzers,³⁹ were just transferred on paper between the units rather than moved. The 625th FA assumed direct support of the 37th Inf, ROK 12th Div in the vicinity of Su-Gong-ni (DT301289)..

The Heavy Mortar Company of the 224th Inf (Galahad Black) was attached to the battalion on 4 Feb. The company's 4.2mm mortars became our fourth firing battery. Colonel Josiah B. Miller assumed command of the battalion on 10 Feb. Frequent Communist loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts directed toward the 37th Inf soldiers presented the battalion with a new target of opportunity: loudspeakers.

The 625th Battalion Daily Journal for 17 Feb 53 reads: "*OP 125 reports: Korean music coming from loudspeaker (275476) during the hours 2015-2040. From 2100 hours to 2110 hours loudspeaker issued again in a male Korean voice saying: 'Come North and we'll give you the great things of life you do not have there. We have a nice warm tent waiting for you, you will receive number one treatment, number one medical air. Let us show you how well we treat PW's.' Message came from same coordinates as music broadcast. Our unit fired 18 rounds and silenced speaker at 2100 hours.*" Whenever these broadcasts were heard in the sector, the loudspeakers were located by sound ranging and silenced individually by our fire.

The 27th of Feb was a busy day for the battalion. Early in the morning (0220), the 3rd Company, ROK 37th Inf was probed by two platoons supported by mortar and artillery fire. A friendly ambush patrol first engaged the enemy with small arms and automatic weapons. The ambush patrol withdrew, the fire fight continued from the MLR battle positions for over an hour. During this engagement the battalion fired four hundred and sixty-six rounds in direct support. POW reports stated that the effective artillery fire was responsible for the majority of enemy casualties.

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Later in February, three of those pieces had to be replaced, two from Battery B and one from Battery C.

That afternoon brought some unexpected visitors from the sky. Two U. S F-84 fighter bombers crashed and exploded in the area, one in the center of Battery B's motor pool area and the other in Battery C of the nearby 66th FA Bn. Both pilots bailed out and were unhurt. Several fires were started but property damage was surprisingly light and no casualties on the ground were reported. Allyn Pearsall, Battery B's Motor Sergeant said "That was too much" as he looked at airplane parts scattered all over his motor pool.



OP 124, Note wire to prevent grenades from entering.

Source: Lt Stan Hanks, Btry B, 625th FA


The battalion trained both ROK artillery and infantry officers in the adjustment of artillery fire. The training included theory and techniques of observed fire, sequence of fire commands and other related subjects. Each officer fired three live missions; a defensive concentration, an area mission and a precision registration. Our experienced forward observers conducted the training from the Forward Observation Posts. The targets were actual enemy installations and troop movements

When Lt General Maxwell Taylor took over General Van Fleet's post as Eighth Army commander in February, he felt that the artillery battalions needed to move their positions frequently in order to maintain their basic mobility capabilities. To retain their ability to move fast and fire quickly, the 625th continued to conduct weekly firing RSOPs. Each battery moved at least one piece to an alternate position, registered it, fired several rounds and then returned to their primary position. Staff officers viewed the action and made corrections on the spot.

By the end of February, the battalion manned seven forward observation posts on the MLR in direct support of the 1st and 3rd

battalions, ROK 37th Inf. Three other complete forward observation parties were attached to the three 2nd battalion rifle companies that constituted the 37th's regimental reserve. The 625th continued ROK 37th Inf support on the northern rim of the Punchbowl during March.

Heavy rains the 18th and 19th of March caused the SOYANG-GANG to flood, washing out both bridges to Hqs Battery, isolating it



Where We Were: 3 Mar 53 **Source: Truce Tent and Fighting Front Punchbowl; Northern Rim: A deep circular valley (an ancient volcanic crater) surrounded by hills twenty miles northeast of the Hwachon Reservoir.**

from the rest of the battalion. Engineers strung cables across the river. Rations and water were transported across the river until the bridge was repaired two days later.

The enemy continued its aggressive patrols and probes. Observation posts were high priority targets in an attempt to reduce the accuracy of our artillery fire.⁴⁰ At 0330, 19th Mar, an estimated enemy platoon (engineer troops) penetrated friendly MLR positions, surrounded OP126 and called for surrender. A concussion grenade was thrown into the OP seriously wounding the reconnaissance sergeant, PFC Richard L Brown. Lt. Miles S Grant, the FO, was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor in saving Brown's life during this action. PFC Norman L Cole was wounded by mortar fire Automatic weapons, grenades, 60 mm mortars and heavy artillery fire drove the enemy off.

The battalion's Daily Journal for 20 March reveals that higher headquarters (X Corps) was also taking care of business; *"40th DivArty S-2 reports - X Corps definitions of damaged and destroyed bunkers: Damaged Bunker-One which is collapsed or altered to limit its usefulness and serviceability, but can be repaired to restore it to original condition. Destroyed bunker-One which is rendered unserviceable, no longer providing adequate protection or usefulness and must be rebuilt."* Now the battalion's Periodic Operations Report would be definitive when it read *"1 m/g bunker 25% damaged, 2 m/g bunkers 60% damaged."*

The last week of March, enemy snipers focused their attacks on battalion's observation posts. This was especially true of OP125 in "Luke The Gook's Castle" area. Luke's was famous for the nearness of the front lines to each other, less than a hundred feet apart in places. March 23rd saw the OP125 BC Scope damaged by sniper fire. The same sniper struck again on the 25th. Battery C Forward Observer,

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POW's repeatedly reported that they feared our accurate artillery fire and that it was responsible for most casualties.

2nd Lt. George Alexander was wounded by a round that came through the bunker aperture, hit the replacement BC Scope and ricocheted off. Taken down the hill and hospitalized, Alexander returned to duty a few weeks later. Upon his return, he learned that on 10 Apr, OP125 was hit and destroyed by approximately fourteen 122mm rounds. A 140th AAA FO was seriously wounded and Alexander's former ROK Interpreter, 16-year old Sgt Kim, was killed. Shortly thereafter, George transferred to the battalion's Aviation Section as an Aerial Observer. On May 14, now 1st Lt. Alexander picked up his second Purple Heart when he was hit by shrapnel while flying over enemy lines in an L-19. So Alexander has the 'distinction' of being wounded as a Forward Observer both on the ground and in the air.

The early morning hours of 26 March, saw a large enemy force engage a 37th Inf outpost. The battalion fired approximately fifteen hundred rounds in close support. The 143rd FA (Gremlin) and 980th FA (Glacier) added their weight to the fires of the battalion. The 155mm howitzer's of the 981st FA (Golden) and the Quad 50's of the 140th AAA (Glider) also supported the engagement with fires on enemy supporting elements and avenues of withdrawal. This increased firepower was in line with the new X Corps policy of maximum artillery fire on any enemy contact. This policy had a definite effect upon enemy activity. Deserters and PW's taken during this engagement stated that the heavy artillery fire limited their movement, lowered their morale and moved them from bunkers to caves.

Latter that day, OP125 directed 8 inch howitzer rounds toward "Luke the Gook's Castle". The battalion Daily Journal reads: *From 1000 to 1400 hrs today friendly 8 in arty⁴¹ expended 72rnds on and in vic of "Luke's Castle." The results were one 76mm arty piece bunker destroyed, a fire started in another bunker, and a bunker 20% damaged. Several sniper positions were filled up or blown apart. One large fire was started behind "Luke's Castle" and debris was observed flying through the air. OP 125 observed these missions."*

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Battery C, 780th FA Bn. The 780th was an Army Reserve unit from Roanoke, Virginia that had arrived in Korea, February 1951.

March 27th saw Lt Alfred Dawson's Battery C fire the battalion's 200,000 round since arriving in Korea. Sgt William J Jones's howitzer section did the honors. PFC John E. Wyatt pulled the lanyard.



200,000 round crew.

Source: Bill Jones

Rear, Left to Right: Chief Of Section, MSgt William J Jones; Unknown; Ronald J McCarthy. Front, Left to Right: Gunner, PFC John E Wyatt, Unknown, Unknown, KATUSA's Kidso and Nunge.

The liberal promotion policy, increased R& R quota and battalion area and living condition improvements helped to keep morale high. The Heavy Mortar Company from the 224th Inf cleared the battalion area 0900 31 March to return to its parent unit. As a fourth firing battery, they had fired over 6000 4.2 rounds in the two months they were attached to the 625th.

April's spring thaw turned the ground to gumbo. Movement by men or vehicles was extremely difficult and time consuming. The front was relatively quiet although the enemy continued aggressive patrol action. As the grass, underbrush and trees dried out, the battalion fired

increasing amounts of white phosphorous. The resulting forest and brush fires cleared enemy areas of cover and concealment. The battalion continued the practice of weekly firing RSOPs by each battery. The 2nd of April saw the battalion turning its battered World War II SCR-536 (hand-talkie) radios in for new reduced interference, longer ranged FM AN/PRC-6s. The battalion continued X Corps' policy of heavy fire on any contacts. For example, at 0300 5 Apr, a fifteen minute firefight resulted in a hundred and eighty-eight 105mm rounds fired and later at 0530, in a twenty minute firefight, the battalion fired two hundred and twenty-three rounds.

As 1953 progressed, enemy bunkers and emplacements became more numerous, deeper, and harder to destroy. This increased the need for heavier artillery pieces than the 105's organic to the battalion. As often as possible we directed the fire of the big guns again. Op123 and OP 125 directed fires of 8th inch howitzers or 155mm "Long Toms" assigned to the X Corps. The 7th, 8th and 10th of April saw the 780th FA Bn, Battery C's 8inch howitzers delivering over a hundred and fifty rounds.

The 145th FA Bn,⁴² Battery B's 155mm "Long Tom's" fired on the 9th and 10th. The battalion followed daylight bunker destructive fires with nighttime TOT fires on the same positions. This caused many casualties during enemy attempts to repair or rebuild their positions. Bunker busters were used as often as possible. However, with a basic daily allotment varying from fifteen to forty rounds (a far cry from the Van Fleet rate), the heavier weapons had a limited availability.

A TO&E ⁴³change for light artillery battalions resulted in the 625th receiving M-1 rifles in exchange for M-2 carbines. Not that

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The 145th FA Bn, Utah National Guard, arrived in Korea, 5 December 1951.

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Both the M-1 and M-2 Carbines proved to be generally unreliable under the combat conditions of Korea. TO&E changes attempted to replace carbines with M-1 Rifles where ever possible, even among artillery units.

Redlegs were to be grunts but experience had shown that the rifle was a better weapon under the harsh Korean conditions. Increasing enemy counter-battery fire resulted in the issuing of armored vests to the firing batteries. Our FOZ and Liaison teams had received their vests in the fall of 1952, when increased enemy attention to artillery OP's, had brought FO's under heavier fire whenever they attempted to adjust artillery fire.

The enemy's concern with the increased volume of artillery fire they were receiving led to the dispatch of specially trained units to infiltrate our lines and report on artillery positions. One such team of nine men and one officer had radio equipment and rations for ten days. Its objective was to locate those artillery units supporting the ROK 12th Div and report their positions by radio. Friendly elements spotted and engaged this special enemy team on the 14th of April and engaged them with small arms fire resulting in four captured and three enemy killed, including their officer. The remaining three enlisted men escaped but two were captured the next day trying to return to their lines.

The 625th Daily Journal for 14 April contains this entry; *“Regt repts: The 4 POW capt yestdy beh friendly lines gave fol info: Mission was to loc & determine cal & amt of fr arty supp the ROK 12th Div. They were to take notes on mass troop mvmts, tech of supply & radio this info back to the enemy. Enemy is expecting an all-out U N offensive push. Enemy patrol has radioed back info as to loc & cal of friendly arty. Contact was made by the POW by radio w/enemy just before they were capt.”*

April 16th saw the ROK 66th FA Bn (another new ROK field artillery battalion) take over direct support of the ROK 37th Inf. The previous week, our battalion FDC personnel had trained the ROK 66th FDC personnel in direct support duties and functions. With this relief, the 625th's Liaison and Forward Observer parties moved over to assist the 980th FA Bn and the battalion took over general support for the ROK 12th Inf Div. With the battalion's mission changed to general support, Battery A moved to a new position and was attached to the

980th until 18 April when it returned to the 625th. That same day, the battalion began direct support of the 51st Inf, ROK 12th Div. Our Liaison and Forward Observer parties left the 980th and manned six Observation Posts on the ROK 51st Inf MLR. The 625th continued direct support of the ROK 51st throughout April but as April drew to a close, the battalion prepared to move again.

EASTERN FRONT - PUNCHBOWL

25 April 53 - June 53

On 25 April 1953, the 223rd Inf relieved the ROK 61st Inf, on the northern rim of the Punchbowl. Two days later, the 224th Inf, the 625th and the 980th FA Bns returned to 40th Div operational control. The 40th Div then accepted sector control of the northern rim of the PUNCHBOWL from the ROK 20th Div. The 160th Inf reverted from 45th Div operational control to X Corps control as Corps reserve. The 143rd FA and 981st FA battalions continued their support of the ROK 12th Div. The 140th Tnk Bn continued supporting the ROK 12th Div with two tank companies. The 40th Div was bounded by the 45th Div on the left and the ROK 12th Div on the right. The 224th Inf was deployed on the left and the 223rd Inf on the right. On 7 May, the 981st FA returned to Div control. On 27 May the 160th Inf was released from X Corps control, placed under KCMOZ control and sent to KOJE-DO to guard PWs. The Div improved and strengthened the MLR, with emphasis placed on improving the trench system. Extensive patrol activity, employing both reconnaissance and ambush patrols was characteristic of normal combat activity during this period.

Early on the morning of April 26, the enemy engaged a ROK 51st Inf outpost with an estimated two platoons, one in assault and one in reserve as a support element, both sides used small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. The enemy fired approximately two hundred and seventy-one mortar rounds and a one hundred and twenty-five artillery rounds. The battalion responded with over seventeen

hundred rounds in close support of this engagement. The enemy, disorganized as a result of this heavy close support fire disengaged after a thirty-five minute fire fight. Reports from deserters and POW's stated that the preponderance of artillery fire employed was "murderous and demoralizing". At OP124, Lt Kochli was wounded in this action.

The morning of the 28th, found the base pieces of each firing battery displaced west to the Su-Dong area, where the 40th Div was relieving the ROK 20th Div. Each base piece was replaced by the base piece of the relieving ROK FA battalion from the ROK 12th Div. Here the 40th Div relieved the ROK 20th Div. By the 29th, the 625th had completed its move: Battery A (DT262366), Battery B (DT258367), Battery C (DT248369) and Hqs Battery (DT258365). The battalion was now in direct support of the 223th Inf and assumed tactical control of seven OP's on the MLR for the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 223rd Inf. Two additional Forward Observation crews were assigned to the 3rd battalion which was in a reserve blocking position.

The next day, 30 Apr, the 625th was back destroying bunkers with the fires of the 780th's 8inch howitzers. The 625th Daily Journal contains the following entries:

301130: OP 123 reports the 8" howtzn fired 26 rounds on susp enemy OP vic DT22854385 resulting in OP posn 40% damgd, 1 bunker destroyed & 40 yds commo trench destroyed.

301615: OP122 reports the 8" howtzn fired 55 rds on a 76 arty piece bunker vic DT21004715 res in 76 arty piece bunker destroyed, 20 yds commo trench damgd, 1 bunker 50% damgd & a tunnel closed. Bunker destruction during the day was followed by battalion TOT's at night when the enemy attempted to repair and rebuild their destroyed and damaged bunkers.

To extend the 625th firing capabilities beyond the northern rim of the PUNCHBOWL, Battery B displaced forward to northwest (DT25483803) on May 7th. Meanwhile construction of new firing

positions for Batteries A and C began with the intent of moving before the start of the rainy season. PFC Roger Thorson was wounded 9 May.

The Battalion Command reports again emphasized the need for additional M65 BC Scopes. The relative static positions, a well-entrenched and fortified enemy required the need of as much accuracy



Punchbowl

Source: Unknown

as possible in the initial and subsequent adjustment of artillery fires. This was only possible by the use of BC Scopes instead of just Field Glasses.

With the rotation policy in full swing, officer and enlisted men continued to arrive direct from basic training with little or no knowledge of artillery subjects. The lack of qualified enlisted replacements by MOS and top-three pay grades was especially critical. Under these conditions T/O vacancies were filled with the best available personnel without regard to over-all qualifications. Therefore,

training in basic artillery skills had to be contentiously emphasized through training programs and OJT. All officers and NCO's were given instruction in how to call for and adjust artillery fire. Live firing was included in this training whenever possible. The X Corps conducted battery proficiency tests throughout the battalion on the 24th of May. The results were satisfactory but showed the need for progressive, continuous training of all basic artillery subjects.

June saw enemy patrol activity increasing along the 223rd's regimental front in the Punchbowl area. The 1st of June the battalion fire over a hundred propaganda rounds and the next day saw the heaviest combat action of the month. Company C, 223rd was hard hit by an enemy force estimated at one hundred and supported by over two thousand heavy mortar and artillery rounds. The 625th replied with heavy volumes of close-in fires and the attack was repulsed. This was in accord with the policy of replying to any enemy contact with heavy volumes of artillery fire. The battalion continued its bunker busting activities adjusting the fires of the 780th FA's 8inch howitzers. And on the 6th of June we directed the fire of the largest artillery piece in Korea, a 240mm howitzer of the 213th FA Bn,⁴⁴ which fired a three hundred and sixty pound shell.

As the peace talks headed toward a seeming conclusion, enemy artillery fire increased. The 223rd regimental front received over sixty-five hundred rounds in June as against eighteen hundred in May. With the completion of the new firing positions. Battery A and Battery C displaced forward northwest (DT252383 and DT253391) for better fields of fire. The battalion enlisted strength was down by fifty men, with replacements not keeping up with those rotating out. Top enlisted

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Charlie Battery of the 213th FA Bn had been attached to the X Corps Artillery 6 June 1953. The 213th FA Bn was an Utah National Guard unit that arrived in Korea February 1951. Originally, a 105mm Armored Field Artillery Battalion, it was converted to 155mm towed howitzers in October 1951. The 213th received its first 240mm howitzer in April 1953 and was completely converted by June 1953, having six of the twelve 240mm howitzers in Korea..

pay-grades generally rotated out first as they had been here longer. Lower pay-grades then took their places, were promoted and by the time they had somewhat learned their jobs, it was time to rotate home. Eight battalion observation posts were manned along the MLR. Most H&I fires were again suspended by DivArty direction. The battalion turned in their World War II SCR-610 radios for newer longer ranged AN/PRC-9 radios. Although not yet the rainy season the end of June saw enough rain to cause some flooding problems.

HEARTBREAK RIDGE

Jul 53

The 40th Div continued to occupy defensive positions on the northern rim of the PUNCHBOWL until 10 Jul 1953 when it was relieved by the ROK 20th Div. On 11 Jul, the Div moved to the left and under heavy enemy pressure relieved the 45th Div in the HEARTBREAK RIDGE-SANDBAG CASTLE sector while the 45th moved further left. The 40th Div which was bounded on the left by the 45th Div and the ROK 20th Div on the right had a two regiment front. The 223rd Inf on the left and the 224th Inf on the right. During this relief, the CCF shined the 40th Division patch skyward using a searchlight and their loudspeakers blared out in English; "Welcome 40th Infantry Division to Heartbreak Ridge." On 20 Jul, the 160th Inf was released from PW duty at KOJE-DO and returned to X Corps reserve. The Div remained in Heartbreak Ridge area, after the Cease Fire on 27 Jul, until the beginning of August.

As July started, the battalion continued direct support of the 223rd Inf positions on the northern rim of the PUNCHBOWL. The second week of July, our FOZ familiarized the Forward Observer crews of the ROK 69th and 70th FA Bns, ROK 20th Div with the area. The ROK 20th would relieve the 40th Div when the 40th moved left, to the HEARTBREAK RIDGE-SANDBAG CASTLE area as the 45th Div moved further left to the Christmas Hill area.. The 9th of July saw the battalion go from direct support, as 223rd Inf pulled off the line to general support for the ROK 70th FA Bn. The morning of the 10th, the 625th moved southwest: Hqs Battery (DT11043396), Battery A (DT110834564), Battery B (DT1125035012), and Battery

C (DT1103134163). The next day, the battalion assumed direct support of the 223rd Inf as they relieved the 179th Inf, 45th Div under heavy enemy pressure.

Enemy artillery was extremely active during July as the peace process seem to be coming together, over nine thousand rounds were received along the regimental front and rear areas. The battalion area itself, received over one hundred and fifty rounds of 122mm artillery shells. The DivArty continued the suspension of most H & I fires. 1st Lt Stan Hicks, a Battery B FO operated OP322 at Hill 930 on the rim



OP322.

Source: Lt Stan Hanks, Btry B


of the Punchbowl opposite No Name Ridge.

On July 24-26, the Communists unsuccessfully attacked the Berlin Complex (“Boulder City”), Hills 111 and 119 with reinforced Brigade-sized units. During this action, the battalion suffered its last casualty. Cpl Henry L. Taylor was seriously wounded on the 26th and

later died of his wounds.

Cease Fire

At 1000 hours, 27 July 1953, Lieutenant General Harrison and Lieutenant General Nam Il Jr, signed the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom with hostilities to end at 2200 hours. The rest of the day



Where We Were: 27 July 1953: Heartbreak Ridge-Sandbag Castle
Source: Truce Tent and Fighting Front

saw heavy mortar and artillery fire by both sides along the entire front. The 40th Div received 4700 incoming rounds in four hours. Division Artillery fired 11,000 rounds in return.

1st Lt. Stan Hanks was in the 625th B Battery area that morning to receive the orders containing provisions of the cease fire to be read to all the troops. "As I recall about 1000 hours, we received enemy fire

near the battery area which hit a Korean work group nearby inflicting a number of casualties. Shortly after that B Btry fired its last four rounds of counter battery fire. Later that day I proceeded to OP28 to carry out the provisions of the truce.”

The Battalion Duty Officer that night, Lt. James P. Clay, had originally enlisted in the United States Marine Corps. Discharged after six months to allow him to enlist in the Regular Army and attend Officer Candidate School at Fort Sill. Commissioned a 2nd Lt in the Field Artillery, Jim joined Hqs Battery in the Punchbowl area in May 1953 as Motor Pool Officer. To Jim it seemed that this must have



been what the armistice of World War I was like as silence filled the air. The next day was filled with all troops on the line, removing all equipment and moving back at least 2000 meters to comply with the cease fire instructions within 72 hours of the signing.



B Btry firing last round on 27 July 1953. Note the three empty shell casings on the right and that the howitzer is in full recoil of the last round. Source: 1st Lt. Stan Hanks

AFTERWARD

Aug 53 - May 54

The first week of Aug found the 40th Div moving westward, back to the KUMHWA sector to relieve the 3rd Div. There the 40th prepared post-armistice defense positions immediately south of the demilitarized zone. The division also started nation-building and humanitarian deeds as well as training the Korean Army. Several times during this period they Div went to the DMZ in response to Communist threats. On 8 May 1954, the 40th Infantry Division conducted its final Korea Pass-in-Review and left for the states.

The rest of July and into the first week of August, the battalion continued its direct support mission for the 223rd Inf in the HEARTBREAK RIDGE sector. On the 4th of August, the battalion was relieved and withdrew from Heartbreak Ridge moving to a bivouac area (DT74343550) southeast of the MLR. The morning of 9 August, the battalion displaced thirty miles west to the KUMHWA Valley (CT74343550). The battalion was back where it began in January 1952. That afternoon, the 625th relieved the 10th FA Bn, 3rd Div. As the 40th relieved the 3rd Div, the battalion resumed direct support of the 223rd Inf with nine observation posts on the MLR. On August 18th, the battalion was relieved of its direct support mission and assigned as 40th Div general support. This required moving northwest to new positions: Hqs Battery (CT764320), Battery A (CT764320), Battery B (CT767315) and Battery C (CT76663138).

Six battalion observation posts were established. August and September saw the battalion receiving the new M-type vehicles(2 ½ ton, 3/4 ton and 1/4 ton trucks) to replace those war-weary World War II ones which had served so long. With the cease-fire, the battalion's daily operations began to change. For example, Lt. Stan Hicks, a Battery B Forward Observer was reassigned to the 40th Div Aviation Company as an Aerial Observer as the number of aerial observation flights increased over the DMZ.



The Hills of Korea.

Source: Kenneth McDonald, Co H, 224th Inf

Daily training plans appeared with emphasis on learning the “army way” of doing things. The “army way” had often been overlooked in the daily business of fighting a war. Training in basic artillery subjects was again emphasized as experienced men were lost through rotation. With the exception of qualified non-commissioned officers in the highest three pay grades replacements were adequate to offset losses through rotation. The September Command Report for the

battalion stated that of the 149 enlisted replacements received, less than 10% were artillery trained.

Services practices were held for the firing batteries. Prior to live firing, non-firing RSOPs were conducted following the provisions of ATT 6-1. The conduct of observed fire was patterned after the formal artillery school methods. In conjunction with range firing, a miniature gunnery range was used to maintain officer proficiency in observer techniques and to provide fire direction and communication practice.

September saw the battalion's mission change on the 4th from general support to direct support of the 223rd Inf. Five Observation Posts were manned on the MLR. Then on the 16th, the 625th provided direct support to the ROK Capital Div as they relieved the 40th Div on-line. The Observation Posts were manned jointly with ROK 61st FA until the 18th when the battalion was relieved by the ROK 61st FA. The battalion moved southwest: Hqs Battery (CT432304), Battery A (CT425299), Battery B (CT434308), and Battery C (CT407314). Here they relieved the ROK 62nd FA and assumed 40th DivArty general support. The 28th of September saw the 625th occupy three Forward Observation Posts in direct support of the 223rd which was back on-line. The battalion was reinforced by the 58th FA Bn, 3rd Div. As winter approached the division started nation-building and training the Korean Army. Several times during this year and into 1954, the 40th Div went to the DMZ in response to Communist threats.

Two who served during this "quiet time" were Harvey Fowler and Henry Fallot. Harvey enlisted in the Regular Army, January 1953 and by July had joined the battalion in the Heartbreak Ridge sector. A Sergeant in Battery C's Communication Section, he remained with the battalion until it stood down prior to its return to the states. Harvey remained in the Army, did a second Korean tour in 1963, and retired from the army in 1973. Henry enlisted in the Regular Army and also joined the battalion in July 1953. He was the Battery C's last Motor Pool Sergeant before the colors were returned to the states

On 8 May 1954, the 40th Infantry Division conducted its final Korea Pass-in-Review and the division then returned to Camp Stoneman, California.

The Demilitarized Zone

The Demilitarized Zone that was set up following the cease-fire, stretches 2 ½ miles wide and 151 miles long across the entire Korean peninsula. The DMZ is known as the world's most heavily fortified border. The edges of which are dotted with land mines, bunkers and crisscrossed with barbed wire. This area has been virtually undisturbed since the Korean War Cease Fire. It has become a major tourist attraction and the rugged landscape has become a natural haven for several endangered species of cranes and the nearly extinct Korean subspecies of tiger and leopard. Yet numbers of U.S. and Korean troops have been killed in clashes with the North and the troops on both sides stand ready to finish "The Forgotten War" if it starts again.



DMZ Then.

Source: Unknown

THE REST OF THE STORY

By 1 June 1954, the 40th Infantry Division (ARNG) had been reduced to an “on-paper” organization at Camp Stoneman, California. On 30 June 1954, the California 40th Infantry Division (ARNG) was released from active Federal service and reverted to state control. Concurrently Federal recognition was withdrawn from the 40th Infantry Division (NGUS). Now there was only one 40th Infantry Division (ARNG) and a single 625th Field Artillery Battalion. But that’s not the end of the story...

The next day, 1 July 1954, the 40th Infantry Division (ARNG) combined with the 111th Armored Cavalry Regiment converted⁴⁵ to the 40th Armored Division, (ARNG). The 625th Field Artillery Battalion was reorganized and redesignated the 214th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, an element of the 40th Armored Division. Since then California National Guard units have undergone many organizational changes as the Army has gone back and forth from divisions to brigades, to elements. Today the honors and lineage of the 625th Field Artillery Battalion are held by the 144 Field Artillery Battalion, headquartered at Burbank, California. And so the story ends...

Many of us are gone now and those remaining will soon will be:
but **“WE WERE THE BOYS OF FIFTY.”**

45

To transfer a unit from one branch to another, i.e., from infantry to armor, however there is no break in the historical continuity of the unit.

APPENDIX A

625th FA Bn Roster

1 Sep 1950 - 30 Jun 1954

NOTE: Ranks shown may not be represent highest rank obtained. Although comprehensive this roster is not complete, additional names would be welcome by the author.

A

ABBOTT, Charles K; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section

ADERHOLD, Dale; Btry C

ADAMS, Harold W; Btry A

ADAMS, Joseph Jr; Svc Btry

ADKINS, Donald R; Btry C

AGNEW, George A; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn

AGUILAR, Augstine; Cpl, Btry B

AHERNS, Albert C; Btry C

AHLBERG, Frank R; Cpl, Btry B

ANGLIN, Franklin D; Btry B

AKERS, Donald E; Hqs Btry

AKIYAMA, Harry S; Hqs Btry

ALAMILO, Lorenzo B; Btry C

ALBERTIE, Edward J; Major, Hqs Btry
 Executive Officer, Bn Co

ALLEN, Clarence J; Btry B

ALEXANDER, George; 1st Lt, Btry C
WIA 03/25/53, WIA 05/14/53, Forward Observer

ALICATA, S J (Joe); Hqs Btry
Wire Section

ALLDREDGE, Eugene R; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry
Assistant Communication Officer

ALLMENDINGER, Harold; Hqs Btry

ALTIERI, Angelo; Btry A

ALVEREZ, Alfred; Btry A

ALVEREZ, Antonio U; Hqs Btry/Btry C

ALVEREZ, Pedro P; Hqs Btry/Btry C

ALVIS, Anthony; Svc Btry
Txfr 52nd FA Bn

ALVORD, James B; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
Motor Transport Officer

AMMONS, Emmet L; CWO, Btry C

ANDERSON, Oliver M; Btry A
Txfr 11th FA Bn

ANDERSON, Port A, Jr; PFC, Btry C
WIA 10/18/52, later died of his wounds

ANDREW, James W; 1st Lt, Btry B/Btry C

ANDREWS, Reed H; Hqs Btry

ANGUISH, Don; Hqs Btry

ANTHONY, David H; 1st Lt, Btry B/Btry C

AOKI, Roy K; Svc Btry

APPLETON, Herbert A; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn

ARCHER, Jerry; Hqs Btry

ARCHER, Donald D; Btry A

ARAGON, Perfecto E; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn

ARMSTRONG, Robert D; Hqs Btry

ARMSTRONG, Lawrence; Cpl, Hqs Btry

ASHBEY, Cameron F; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A
Forward Observer

ASHLEN, James E; Btry A

ASP, Ernest G; Btry B
ATHANAS, James P; Btry C
ATHANS, Tommy H; Capt, Hqs Btry
ATTEBERRY, Harlen; Sgt, Hqs Btry
AVERY, Robert A; Cpl; Btry A/Btry C
AYALA, Antonio A; Btry C
AYLER, William; Hqs Btry
AYLWARD, Arthur W; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
AYMAR, Ira R; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section

B

BABJACK, Charles F; Svc Btry
BAKER, Ned; MSgt, Hqs Btry
BALDWIN, Melvin L; Btry C
BALDWIN, Ralph; Btry B
BALL, James H; Btry C
BALLENGER, Robert C; 2nd Lt, Btry A
 Recon & Survey Officer
BAMBULAS, John P; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
BANDEN, Charles R; Cpl, Btry C
BANZ, Werner A; Btry A
BARDSLEY, Peter J; Sgt, Hqs Btry
BARESH, Alphonse H; Cpl, Hqs Btry
BARR, Robert E; 1st Sgt, Hqs Btry/Btry C
BARTON, Edward A; Btry C
BARTON, George J; Btry C
 Survey & Fire Direction Section
BASKETT, Ted F; Btry C
BASOLO, John A; Svc Btry
BASSETT, Robert A; Btry C
BATES, Charles I; Btry C
BAUMEISTER, Fred; Capt, Hqs Btry/Btry C

BAUMLI, George; SFC, Btry C
Chief of Detail

BAWDEN, Richard (Rick); Sgt, Btry C
Wire Section

BAXTER, George R; Hqs Btry

BEAL, Marshall W; MSgt, Svc Btry

BEALS, Sherman J; Sgt, Btry B

BEATMAN, Howard C; Btry C

BEAU, Eugene D; Btry C

BECK, unk; Sv Btry

BECKER, William A; Btry A

BEENE, Joe; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn

BELFORD, Robert E; 2nd Lt, Btry C
Forward Observer

BELL, Richard V; Cpl, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry

BELL, Thomas J; Btry B

BENNETT, Essek; Btry C

BENNETT, Gus; Btry C

BENNETT, Phillip G; Btry A

BENSON, Louis E; Btry B

BERG, Alfred; Btry C

BERGER, Edward J; Cpl, Btry B

BERGSTROM, Ronald F; MSgt, Hqs Btry

BERKE, Bernard (Bill); MSgt, Hqs Btry
Communication Sgt

BERNE, Bernard; SFC, Hqs Btry

BERTSCHINGER, William D; Sgt, Hqs Btry

BESTLE, Harold L; Btry A

BETTS, George E; Btry A

BI?E, Robert L; Sgt, Btry B

BIGGERS, Luther; Btry C

BINGAHAM, James R; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Txfr 52nd FA Bn

BINGHAM, Richard W; SSgt, Hqs Btry
Wire Section

BISHOP, unk; Sgt, Hqs Btry

BITTER, Norman A; Btry C

BLACKBURN, Phillip; Hqs Btry

BLANGIN, Alfred; Hqs Btry

BLANK, Ronald M; Btry C

BLATT, Jerald W; Cpl, Btry B

BLISS, Paul E; Hqs Btry

BLISS, William L; 2nd Lt, Btry B
Forward Observer

BLOUNT, Jacob A Jr; Btry A

BLUE, Curtis L; Btry C

BODENSTAB, Leonard H; Cpl, Btry B

BOE, James; Hqs Btry

BOGGS, Keith K; Sgt, Hqs Btry
Motor Pool

BOLDEN, Orlo J; Btry C

BOLDT, Carrol A; Svc Btry

BOLLER, John J; Btry B

BOLSTER, Gerald P; Btry C

BONGLE, Milton L; Btry A

BORDEN, James E; Btry A

BOWDEN, Edmund R Jr; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
Radar Officer, Executive Officer(XO),
Intelligence Officer (S-2)

BOWER, Theron L; Svc Btry

BREBAUGH, Jack; Btry A

BREECH, Dale; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Motor Pool

BREKKE, Arvid B; 1st Sgt, Btry A

BRENDEMUEHL, Fred A; Btry B

BRENNAN, Walter J; MSgt, Hqs Btry
Battalion Sergeant Major

BRICEN, Joe M; Cpl, Svc Btry

BRIEGEL, Bennie L; Btry

BRESLIN, Charles F; Btry A
BRISBO, William; Hqs Btry
Txfr 52nd FA Bn
BRITT, Everett H; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
BRITT, James E; Hqs Btry
BROCKMEYER, Gerald P; Btry C
BROCKMEYER, Neal C; Btry C
BROWN, Clifford H; Sgt, Hqs Btry
BROWN, Harold E; Btry C
BROWN, Olin M; Sgt, Btry C
Communication Section, Wire Sgt
BROWN, Ray; Btry C
BROWN, Richard A; SFC, Btry B
BROWN, Richard C; Btry A
Chief of Section
BROWN, Richard L; PFC, Btry C
WIA 3/19/53, Forward Observer section
BROWN, Robert B; 1st Lt, Btry B
Btry Commander, Forward Observer
BROWN, Willie J; Btry C
BRUCE, Morris R; SFC, Btry C
BRUNSON, Robert O; Btry A
BUCHANAN, Lewis E; Btry C
BUCHOLZ, Lester; Cpl, Btry C
BUCHOLZ, Duane R; Cpl, Btry C
BUNDY, Robert N; Btry C
BUNN, William J; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A
Battalion Communication Officer
BURKE, James; Svc Btry
BURNCHETT, Lyle D; Sgt, Btry A
BURNS, Harold C; Btry B
Forward Observer Section
BURRIS, William V; Btry B
BURSON, Ralph F; Cpl, Btry C
BURTON, Irvin D; Btry C

BURTON, Marvin: Btry C
BUSBY, Bill E; Btry A
BUSSEWITZ, Harley A; Btry A/Btry B
BUTLER, Albert S; Svc Btry
BUTRICK, Robert L; 1st Lt, Btry A/Btry C
Executive Officer (XO)

C

CAIN, William H Jr: MSgt, Btry A
CALDWELL, Davis L; Btry C
CALKINS, Gregory R; Sgt, Hqs Btry
FDC Computer Operator
CALLAHAN, Edward; Btry C
CALVI, Dee F; Sgt, Btry A
CAMPBELL, Robert; Btry C
CAMPBELL, Robert W; Btry A
CAMPEAU, Harold J; Btry B
CANALES, Frank R; Btry C
CAPPS, Kenneth; Btry B
CARASSO, Pierce A; Btry B
CARAWAY, Raymond V; Sgt, Btry B
WIA 10/19/52, later died of his wounds
CARDINAL, Donald L; Cpl, Btry B
Forward Observer Section
CAREW, Joseph L; Btry C
Mess Steward
CAREY, Harold W; Btry C
CARHART, Charles; Hqs Btry
CARLSON, George E; Btry B
Txfr 11th FA Bn
CARLTON, Alvin P; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A/Btry B/Btry C
Motor transport Officer, Executive Officer

CARON, Charles J; Hqs Btry/Btry B
Txfr 11th FA Bn

CARPENTER, Donald M; Btry C
CARRIER, Wilfred P; Btry A
CARRILLO, Agapito C (Pete); Btry C
CARRILLO, Alfred B; Cpl, Svc Btry
CARTER, Ernest L; Btry C
CARTER, unk; Btry A
CARTWRIGHT, Cecil D; SFC, Btry A
CASON, Leroy O; Cpl, Btry C
CASON, William E; Btry C
CASTELOWE, George C; Btry A
CATLIN, William P; Btry B
CELSKE, George H; Btry A
CHANDLER, Maurice; Major, Hqs Btry
 Executive Officer (XO)
CHANEY, Keith A; Sgt, Hqs Btry
CHAPEK, John R Jr; MSgt, Btry C
CHAVEZ, David R; Btry C
CHEEK, Ralph J; Hqs Btry
CHESBRO, Norman L; Sgt, Hqs Btry
CHESTNUT, Jackie; Btry B
CHIN, Buck K; Btry C
CHMIELEWSKI, Benedict; Btry B
CHRISTIAN, Billy D; Btry B
CHRISTIAN, Trueman; Btry B
CHRISTIANSON, Vernon M; SFC, Btry A
CHRISTENSEN, James; Hqs Btry
CIACCIO, Anthony J; Btry C
CIFALDI, Anthony Jr; Btry B
CIOMEI, Marshall W; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
CLAPP, Lonnie T; Btry C
CLARK, Charles C; Btry C
CLARK, Donald L; Btry C
CLARK, Edwin P Jr; Btry B
CLARK, Lawrence F; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry C
 Liaison Officer, Btry Commander

CLARK, Leo S; Hqs Btry
CLARK, Norman D; Btry C
CLAY, James P Jr; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry
 Motor Pool Officer, Counter-mortar Radar Officer
CLAYTON, Cecil C Jr; Btry B
CLOSE, Kenneth H; Cpl, Svc Btry
COBB, Damon; Btry C
COHEN, Elton H; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
 Forward Observer
COLE, Norman L; PFC, Btry C
 WIA 3/19/53
COLE, Roy V; Btry C
COLEMAN, John J; Hqs Btry
COLESCENT, Joseph W; Hqs Btry
COLLINS, James E; Btry B
COLLINS, William J; Btry B
COMMANDER, John C; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
 Survey Officer
CONANS, Curtis D; Btry C
CONAWAY, Gerald D; Cpl, Hqs Btry
CONNERS, Paul R; Hqs Btry/Btry C
CONRAD, William J; Btry B
CONRIQUE, Bernard; Btry B
COOK, Dan N; SFC, Svc Btry
COOK, Denton C; Cpl, Btry A
 WIA 4/5/52
COOK, Lynn N; Svc Btry
COON, Francis M Jr; PFC, Btry A
 WIA 2/10/52
COON, John M; Sgt, Hqs Btry
CORBETT, Maurice D; Btry A
COULSON, Ralph E; Btry A
COUPE, Raymond J; SFC, Btry B
COURTIER, Gordon L; Svc Btry
COURTEMANCHE, Leo J; Btry C
COWANS, Curtis D; Sgt, Btry C

COX, John B; Hqs Btry
CRADDOCK, Joe D; SFC, Btry A/Btry C
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
CRAWFORD, Cleveland; Btry C
CRISPIN, John M; Btry C
CRITTENDEN, Norman; Btry A
CROSSWHITE, L C; Cpl, Btry C
CROVITZ, Gerauld H; Hqs Btry
CROWDER, Joseph; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
CUMMINS, Grover G; Sgt, Svc Btry
CURRY, Winfield S (Bud) Jr; SFC, Hqs Btry
 Survey Section
CUSIC, Rolla R; Btry C

D

DeBOCK, Albert F; Btry C
De LA ROSA, Victor; Sgt, Btry A
De JOHN, Vincent; Cpl, Btry B
De PENCIER, Ronald; Btry B
De YOUNG, Wesley J; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Des SAINT, William L; Cpl, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
Di MEO, Raymond R; 2nd Lt, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
Di VIA, Richard G; Btry C
DABKOWSKI, Nicholas J; Btry B
DANANFELZER, unk; Btry A
DAILEY, Joseph A; Hqs Btry
DANIELSON, Harold A; Cpl, Hqs Btry
DARLING, Max L; Btry B
DARRAGH, William M; 1st Lt, unk Btry
DAWSON, Alfred W; 1st Lt, Btry C

DEITZ, Edward F; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
 DEMBOWSKI, Alfred S; Hqs Btry
 DENNISH, Edward F; Btry C
 DERING, Charles R; Btry A
 DERHOLD, Dale; Btry C
 DERR, Doyle D; SFC, Svc Btry
 DETTER, Calvin D; Btry C
 DIAMOND, Jack K; SFC, Svc Btry
 DIDRICK, Robert M; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
 DIECK, Arne R; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A/Btry B
 Executive Officer
 DIECKMAN, Leroy E; Hqs Btry
 DILLON, Clair R; Btry C
 DISKIN, Don J; Cpl, Svc Btry
 DISS, William T Jr; Hqs Btry
 DODD, Billie E; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 DONVAN, Roy V; Btry B
 DOSTER, Darrell; Svc Btry
 DOSTER, Virlin E; Cpl, Svc Btry
 DOUGLAS, Richard J; Btry A
 DOVEY, James E; Hqs Btry
 DRACHENBERG, Jerome P; Sgt, Btry C
 DRAGSETH, Merton D; Btry A
 DREILING, Anthony F; Sgt, Btry A
 WIA 9/28/52
 DURAN, Pedro; Btry C
 DUPUIS, Eugene L; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Wire Section
 DUPUIS, Merritt; Sgt, Hqs Btry

E

ECHIVERIA, Richard Reyes; Cpl, Btry C

EDGARTH, Bill F; Hqs Btry
 EDWARDS, Archie T; Cpl, Btry A
 EDWARDS, Orville Jr; Pvt, Hqs Btry
 WIA, 04/05/52
 EDWARDS, Royal W; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 EHLEN, George A; Btry B
 EKINS, Ronald H; Cpl, Svc Btry
 ELDER, William R (Bill); Cpl, Hqs Btry
 EMHOFF, James J; Btry C
 ENCALADE, Louis J; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 ENDERLIN, August (Gus) E; Cpl, Btry A
 WIA 9/28/52, Cannoneer
 ENGLEHARDT, Donald W; Hqs Btry
 ENGEL, Carl H; Btry A
 ENGEL, William L; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 ERICKSON, Donald F; Btry A
 ERICKSON, Doral O; Svc Btry
 ERICKSON, Henry C; Btry B
 ERWIN, Robert; SFC, Btry A
 ESTRADA, Manuel; Btry C
 ETTINGER, Morton N; Btry A
 EVARD, Patrick; Btry B

F

FABRIZIUS, Herbert H (Harry); Hqs Btry
 FALLOT, Henry; Staff Sgt, Btry C
 Motor Pool
 FARRIS, Jack D; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 FARRIS, Vernon E; Btry C
 FAUST, Jerome J; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry /Svc Btry/Btry C
 Btry Commander, Executive Officer (XO)
 FEASEL, Clarence L; Btry B
 FENTON, James A; Btry A
 FERGENSON, Marion J; Svc Btry

FERNANDEZ, Gilbert V; Btry C
FERREIRA, Salvatore; Btry A
FERRING, unk; 1st Lt, Btry A
FERRY, Wilbur V; 1st Lt, Svc Btry
FEW, John B (Barkley); Hqs Btry
FIGLIOLI, Salvatore; Btry B
FINN, Thomas; Btry A
FISCHER, Robert M; Btry C
FISSETTE, Arthur U; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry
 Adjutant (S-1), Motor Officer
FISHER, William E; Major, Hqs Btry
FISHER, William H; Btry A
FITZGERALD, William; Btry A
FLANAGIN, Jack D; Cpl, Svc Btry
 Light Truck Driver
FLANDERS, Gerald D; Btry C
FLEMING, Corbit L; Svc Btry
FLYNN, Charles W; Btry C
FORSTER, Donald N; Cpl, Btry C
FOSTER, Bud O; Btry C
FOWLER, Harvey; Sgt, Btry C
 Communication Section
FOX, Billy M; Btry C
FOX, Lawrence S; Hqs Btry
FRANCIS, Warren C; Sgt, Btry C
FRANKLIN, Ben G; SFC, Hqs Btry
FRANKLYN, James A; Btry A
FRA*SER, Michael J; Hqs Btry
FREESE, Paul J; Hqs Btry
FRENCH, Thomas O; Sgt, Btry A
FRIGON, Donald F; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry
 Light Aviation Officer
FROST, John L; SFC, Btry C
FRUTOS, Robert Q; Btry C
FRYE, William H; Btry B
FULLER, Bobby G; Svc Btry

FULLER, Gary R; Hqs Btry
 FULLER, George A; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
 FYLLING, Anker C (Chris); Sgt, Hqs Btry

G

GAISFORD, Merlin J; Cpl, Btry C
 Truck Driver, Ammo Section
 GALLAGER, Joseph; Hqs Btry
 GALVAN, Julio P; Btry B
 GANT, Frazier Jr; Btry A
 GARCIA, Joe; Btry C
 GARDER, unk; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 GARTMAN, Leonard W; Btry B
 GAUGER, Orville; Hqs Btry
 GAXIOLA, Jess M; Sgt, Btry C
 GAXIOLA, Mike C; Btry C
 GAYLOR, Frank E; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 GEER, Raymond I; Btry B
 GEFFEN, Herbert; Hqs Btry
 GEORGE, Richard M; Sgt, Btry B
 GHISELLI, Evans E (Gus); Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Wire Section
 GIAMBALVO, Frank P; Btry B
 GIAMBALVO, Salvatore; Btry B
 GIANETTO, Samuel S; Hqs Btry
 GIBBS, William C; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
 GIBSON, Charles T; Hqs Btry
 Aviation Section
 GIL, Joseph M; Btry B
 GILLISPIE, Allen B; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
 GILLO, unk; Capt, Hqs Btry
 GIRARD, Andrew; Pvt, Btry A

KIA 9/28/52

GLASS, Floyd L; MSgt, Btry A

GLENN, Joseph G; Cpl, Btry A

GLENN, Robert A; Capt, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry

Operations and Training Officer (S-3), Btry Commander

GLENN, Samuel A; Hqs Btry/Btry C

GOCKING, Bill D; Btry B

GOFFNER, Albert; Hqs Btry

GOLD, James; Cpl, Hqs Btry

GOMEZ, RAY; Hqs Btry/Btry C

GONZALES, Fernando-Orama; Btry C

GONZALES, Robert D; Btry C

GOOCHNOUR, Frank L; Hqs Btry

GRAFF, Merlynn A (Dutch); Cpl, Hqs Btry

GRAHAM, Harold E; Cpl, Hqs Btry

GRAHAM, Melvin G; Btry B

GRANESE, Louis; Cpl, Btry C

Ammunition Driver

GRANGAARD, Paul M; Sgt, Svc Btry

Ammunition Section Chief

GRANT, Miles S; 1st Lt, Btry C

Forward Observer

GRANT, William S Jr; Svc Btry

GREEN, Carl H; Hqs Btry

Txfr 13th FA Bn

GREEN, Ciellan H; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry

Adjutant (S-1)

GREGORY, Robert J; Capt, Hqs Btry/Btry A

Liaison Officer, Btry Commander

GRENZER, Kenneth J; Btry C

GRIFFIN, Charles E; Hqs Btry

Txfr 13th FA Bn

GRIFFITH, James R; Capt, Hqs Btry/Btry A

Liaison Officer, Hqs Btry Commander

GRIFFITH, Ralph D; Sgt, Hqs Btry

GRIGGS, Gerald E; Btry C

GRIMM, Herbert A; SFC, Hqs Btry
GROSSMAN, Gilbert G; SFC, Btry A
GRUBBS, Clyde J; Hqs Btry
GRUDNIEWSKI, Norbert M; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
GUELLD, John E; Btry A/Btry B
GUERRERO, Leon Vice; PFC, Btry A
WIA 5/12/52, WIA 10/18/52
GUERRERO, Robert P; Btry A
GUILL, Harold; Btry B
GUITERREZ, Dan F (Frank) Jr; Hqs Btry/Btry C
GUNN, Thomas (Tommy); Hqs Btry
Counter-mortar Radar Operator

H

HAGOOD, Alvus L; Btry A
HAINES, Edgar H Jr; Btry C
HALL, Randy; Hqs Btry
HALL, Rick; Svc Btry
HALLENBECK, Roger E; SFC, Hqs Btry
Supply Sgt
HAMILTON, John N; Sgt, Hqs Btry
HAMILTON, Joseph; Btry B
HAMPTON, Homer F; Svc Btry
HANKS, Harold S (Stan) Jr; 1st Lt, Btry B
Forward Observer
HANLON, Harry (Russ); Sgt, Hqs Btry
Communications Section
HANLON, James J; Btry C
HANSEN, Gordon D; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
HANSON, Jerry; Sgt, Hqs Btry

HANSON, Robert L; SFC, Hqs Btry/Btry C
Wire Sgt, Liaison Sgt

HARE, Leroy B; 1st Lt; Hqs Btry
Light Aviation Officer

HARGROVE, Paul G; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn

HARKNESS, Robert S; MSgt, Hqs Btry

HARPER, Henry; Cpl, Btry B
#1 Man on howitzer

HARRIS, Arthur B; 2nd Lt, Btry C
Forward Observer

HARRIS, Billy A; Btry C

HARRIS, Cleo; Btry A

HART, Donald H; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
Forward Observer

HARTMAN, unk; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry

HARWICK, John ; Hqs Btry

HEALION, John E; Svc Btry

HEALY, Paul E; Btry C

HEATH, Harland D; Cpl, Hqs Btry

HEFLER, Frank J; Btry C

HEINEN, Roland W; Btry A

HELLER, James D; Sgt, Btry B
Supply Sgt

HELMEID, Gladwin B; Btry B

HELMER, John A; Btry C

HENDERSON, Thomas E; Btry C

HENDRIX, Lavern; Btry C

HERBST, Robert W; Cpl, Svc Btry
CO's driver

HERMOSILLO, Flore; Btry B

HERNANDEZ, John; Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn

HERNDON, Garnett W; Hqs Btry

HERRERA, Fred F; SFC, Btry B

HERRON, unk; 1st Lt, Btry C

HILLARY, Richard K; Btry A

HILZENDEGER, Joseph; Hqs Btry
HINES, Howard V; Sgt, Btry A
HINKLE, Glyn J; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
HITZ, George R; Btry C
HJERTA, Louis C; Btry C
HOBBS, Raymond H; Btry B
HOBSON, James W; SFC, Btry C
HOBSON, Harold O; Btry C
HOCKENBERRY, William L; 2nd Lt, B Btry
Forward Observer
HOEFLING, Lawrence; PFC, Btry A
WIA, 4/5/52
HOGELAND, Richard A; MSgt, Hqs Btry
HOKE, Frank A Jr; Cpl, Hqs Btry
HOLLAND, Glenn P; PFC, Btry C
WIA 06/19/52
HOLLINGSWORTH, Edward T Jr; Btry C
HOMAN, Raymond E; Sgt, Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
HOOK, Harry C Jr; Btry B
HOPKINS, Robert S; Btry A
HOUSTON, Robert W; Btry A
HOWARD, Dean; Cpl, Hqs Btry
HOWE, Charles; Cpl, Hqs Btry
HUERTA, Louie C; Btry C
HUFFMAN, Samuel A; Sgt, Btry C
HULLINGER, Billy E; Hqs Btry
Txfr Hqs Btry, 24th Inf Div Arty
HUMBER, Willard L; SFC, Svc Btry
HUMBLE, Robert; Btry C
HUNTING, Peter; Hqs Btry
HUNT, James L.; Cpl, Hqs Btry
HUTCHINSON, unk; Hqs Btry

I

IBARRA, Leocadio Jr; Btry C
IMSECK, Richard F; Btry C
IRIZARRY, Edison-Amely; Btry C
IRIZARRY, Caraballo-Carlos; Btry C
IRIZARRY, Hernandez-Antonio; Btry C

J

JACOBS, Frederick B; Btry C
JAMES, Oscar; Btry C
JANASIAK, Eugene A; Btry C
JEFFERSON, John R; Svc Btry
JENNINGS, Jesse J; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
JENSEN, Harry E; Btry C
JEWKES, Lorus D; 2nd Lt, Btry A
 Forward Observer
JOHNSON, David; Hqs Btry
JOHNSON, John E; Btry C
JOHNSON, Howard M; Svc Btry
JOHNSON, John W; Btry B
JOHNSON, Rex; Cpl, Hqs Btry
JOHNSON, Robert F; Btry B
JOHNSON, Vernon L; Cpl, Btry A
JOHNSON, William A; Btry A
JONES, William J; MSgt, Btry C
 Chief of Firing Battery
JORDON, Benny; Hqs Btry
JUAREZ, Felix C; Btry C
JUDKINS, James W; Btry C
JUSTMAN, Harold A; Btry C
 Txfr 11th FA, Bn Driver, Supply Section

K

KAESER, Gerald T; Cpl, Btry A
KAISER, David; Hqs Btry
KAISER, Oliver D; Hqs Btry
KALK, Glenn R; Sgt, Svc Btry
KAMINSKI, Clifford S; Btry C
KARIN, David; JW1, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry
 Unit Administrator
KARLEIGH, Jerome S; Cpl, unk Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
KECK, Robert; Hqs Btry
KEEFE, George A; Cpl, Btry C
KEHOE, Lawrence F; Hqs Btry
KEELER, Harry B; Btry B
KELLER, Warren G; Btry C
KELLERHOUSE, Ron; Hqs Btry
KELLY, Joseph P; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
KELSE, Fred H; Btry A
KENNEDY, Joseph M; Btry A
KERN, Ralph E; Svc Btry
KIGHTLINGER, James; Btry B
KINDLE, Floyd A; SFC, Btry C
KINGSBORO, Clifford E; Btry C
KINKEAD, Robert B; Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A/Btry C
 Asst Executive Officer, Forward Observer
KINVILLE, Leonard A; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
KIPLINGER, Robert E (Kip); Cpl, Hqs Btry
KIRKMAN, William T Jr; Hqs Btry
KLIMAS, Frank W; Hqs Btry
KLINE, Grant B; Btry C
KLOSS, John M; Cpl, Btry B
KNIGHT, Edward; SFC, Btry B
KNIGHTLINGER, James E; Btry B

KNOOP, Frederick A; JW1, Svc Btry
Supply Officer
KOCHER, Maynard E; Btry C
KOCHLI, Philip J; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
WIA 4/26/53, Forward Observer
KOHOUT, Joseph L; Btry C
KONDRO, John M; Hqs Btry
KOPP, Theordore J; Btry C
KOSCHKE, Billy E; Btry A
KOTZ, Norbert F; Btry B
KOVACH, Emil J; Btry B
KRUCKENBERG, Melvin; Sgt, A Btry
Communication Section
KULICK, Johnny; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
KURTIS, Francis; Btry B

L

LAMADRID, Marvin W; Hqs Btry
LEBRETON, J; Btry B
LEFLOHIC, Harry J; Cpl, Hqs Btry
LE MONIER, Donald J; Major, Hqs Btry
Operations and Training Officer (S-3)
LAND, Jerry; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
Forward Observer
LANDIS, Warren W; Btry C
LEBER, Donald W; Hqs Btry
LEE, Donald H; Sgt, Hqs Btry
LEE, George A; Cpl, Btry A
LEE, Robert G; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
LEHMAN, Richard F; Cpl, Hqs Btry
LEIGH, Earl; Btry A
LEMONIER, Donald J; Major, Hqs Btry
Executive Officer (XO), Operations and Training Officer (S-3)

LENNERTS, unk (Dad); Hqs Btry
LENTZ, Edwin S; Hqs Btry
Txfr 52nd FA Bn
LEONARD, Robert D; 1st Sgt, Hqs Btry
LEON, Guerrero Vice; unk Btry
Cannoneer
LESTINSKY, Al; Btry C
LETIZA, Thomas; Hqs Btry
LEVASSEUR, Robert F; Btry C
LEWIS, Donald F; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
LEWIS, Richard; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
LIBERTY, Douglas T; Sgt, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
LIGGETT, Thomas P; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Txfr 13th FA Bn
LIGHT, Sheldon K; SFC, Hqs Btry
LILLEGARD, Conrad; MSgt, Btry B
Chief of Detail
LINDBLOM, LeRoy H; Btry C
LINDENSMITH, Lawrence; Svc Btry
LINDH, Arthur Jr; Cpl, Hqs Btry
Liasion Section, Radio Operator; Acting Motor Pool Sgt
LISTI, Sam D; Btry C
LOCKE, Norval M; Lt Col, Hqs Btry
Battalion Commander
LOCKWOOD, Harold C Jr; SFC, Hqs Btry
LOFTON, Willie; Btry C
LOGAN, E J; Btry C
LOHREY, Charles; SFC, Btry B
LOOMIS, John; Sgt, Btry C
LONG, Robert J; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
Forward Observer
LONGMORE, Myron J; Capt, Btry C
Executive Officer
LORENZ, Andrew T; Btry B
LORENZO, Gonzalez-W; Btry C

LOUD, Arthur F; Svc Btry
LOUDON, Thomas A; Btry C
LOURANCE, John W; Cpl, Btry C
LOVE, Thomas, A; SFC, Btry C
LOWE, Donald K; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
LOWE, Solomon; Sgt, Btry B
LOWERY, Billie; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
LUCKERMAN, Harold; Sgt, Svc Btry
LUCKHARDT, Lawrence L (Curley); Hqs Btry
LUGO, Florencio T; Btry A
LUJAN, Lupe A; Svc Btry
LUKASZEWSKI, Arhur J; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
LUZZI, Sam J; Btry B
LYNN, Charles E; SFC, Btry A
 WIA, 4/5/52

M

McADAMS, Henry E; Cpl, Btry A
McCABE, Curtis C; Hqs Btry
McCANTER, Llyod S; Sgt, Hqs Btry
McCARTHY, Ronald J; Btry C
McDONALD, Richard R; Btry C
McGEE, Hubert (Jim); Svc Btry
 Btry Commander
McGREGOR, Fred O; SFC, Hqs Btry
 Battalion Wire Chief
McKINLEY, Jack E Jr; Hqs Btry
McKINLEY, Robert J; Hqs Btry
McMAHEN, Samuel M; Cpl, Btry C
McMILLAN, Howard G; Hqs Btry
McMULLEN, Richard E; Hqs Btry
McMULLEN, Robert E; Sgt, Hqs Btry

Txfr Hqs Btry, 24th Inf Div Arty
McNEAL, Edward E; Btry C
McWADE, Harold A; Cpl, Btry B
#5 Man on Gun
MACOMBER, Ronald; Btry B
MADDALENE, David; Cpl, Hqs Btry
MADSEN, Robert J; Capt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
Btry Commander, Liaison Officer
MAGILL, William M; Cpl, Btry C
MAGRUDER, Alfred L; Capt, B Btry
Btry Commander
MAHONY, Neil A; SFC, Hqs Btry
MALEK, Edward R; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
MANNION, Thomas F; Btry A
MANOK, Ralph T; Btry B
MARBLE, Norman L; Btry A
MARCELL, Richard J; CWO, Hqs Btry
Adjutant (S-1)
MARCHESE, Vincent; Btry C
MARQUART, Dennis; Btry A
MARSH, Ben; Btry C
MARSH, Donald E; Svc Btry
Communication Section
MARSH, Owen T; SFC, Hqs Btry
Computer Chief, Battalion FDC
MARSZALEK, Stanley J; Sgt, Btry B

MARTIN, Glen; Sgt, Btry C
Wire Sergeant
MARTIN, Jack L; Btry C
MARTIN, William J; Svc Btry
MARTINEZ, Fernando V; Hqs Btry/Btry C
MARTINEZ, Joe D; Btry B
MARTINEZ, Robert Y; Btry C
MARTIRANO, Guido E; Svc Btry
MASCOLO, Carlo A; SFC, Btry B

MASCOLO, Michael N; Btry B
MASON, Hobert L; Btry C
MATAVA, John M; Hqs Btry
MATHIS, Cleo D; Cpl, Btry B
MATHIS, Robert; Btry A
MATTHEWS, Walter G; Sgt, Btry B
MAUER, Elroy A; Btry A
MAY, John A; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Liaison Sgt
MEADOW, Sam; Major, Hqs Btry
 Executive Officer
MEARS, Perley B C Sr; Hqs Btry
 Messagener
MEDES, Clifford (Cliff) M; Cpl, Btry C
MEDRANO, Robert E; Svc Btry
MEDVED, Morris M; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Battery Clerk
MEHAFFEY, James; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 Wire Section
MEI, Emile N; Btry C
MEISTER, Ralph O; Capt, Hqs Btry
 Operations and Training Officer (S-3)
MEJIA, Joel M; Btry B
MELZER, Phillips; Capt, Hqs Btry
 Intelligence Staff Officer (S-2)
MENGE, William; Btry C
MERLO, James A; Sgt, Btry B
MESSENGER, Leo F; Btry C
METZLER, Edward C Jr; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 Motor Transport Officer, Forward Observer
MEYERS, Fred; Hqs Btry
MILLER, Charles B; 1st Lt, Btry B
 Forward Observer
MILLER, John; SFC, Btry A
MILLER, Josiah B; Lt. Col, Hqs Btry
 Battalion Commander

MILLER, Paul F; Btry B
 MILLS, Charles E; Btry A
 MILLS, Lescie M; Cpl, Btry A
 MINARA, Mitsuru; Cpl, Svc Btry
 MINTON, Robert C; 2nd Lt, Btry B
 Forward Observer
 MOBLEY, James; Btry C
 MOE, Harvey L; Sgt, Btry C
 MOEN, Roy E; Btry B
 MOLLISH, Frank E; 1stLt, Hqs Btry
 Adjutant
 MONAHAN, James W; Sgt, Svc Btry
 MONROE, William F; Sgt, Btry A
 MOORE, Josph A; SFC, Hqs Btry/Btry A/Btry C
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
 MOORE, Samuel; Btry B
 MOON, Roy E; 2nd Lt, Btry B
 MORA, Raul; Cpl ,Btry C
 MORALLS, Donald L; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry/Btry B
 Battalion Motor Officer, Executive Officer,
 Liaison Officer
 MORRIS, Paul P; Btry C
 MORRISON, Wheeler J; Major, Hqs Btry
 Executive Officer (XO)
 MORSEY, Carl T; Btry A
 MORSS, Robert D; Svc Btry
 MORYL, Louis M; Sgt, Btry A
 MOSSO, Michael P; Cpl, Btry A
 MOTT, Wilbur R; Btry C
 MOTYCKA, Stanely; Btry B
 MOULTRIE, Ezekiel Jr; Btry C
 MUNOZ, Empidio; Btry C
 MUNSON, Glen V; Svc Btry
 MUNSON, James L; Svc Btry
 MUNZ, Leo F; Btry A
 MURPHY, Robert D; Btry C

MYERS, Fred; Hqs Btry

N

NAGLE, Brooke T; Btry C
NARDINI, Louis; Cpl, Svc Btry
NAVARRO, Louis L; Btry A
NAYLOR, Wilford L; Sgt, Svc Btry/Btry C
NELSON, Laurence A; Btry C
NEMETH, Frank A; Btry C
NEUGESSER, Richard; Btry C
NEVILLE, Bernard L; Sgt, Hqs Btry
NICHOLS, Harold E; Sgt, Hqs Btry
NICHOLS, Hobert G; SFC, Btry A
NICHOLSON, George T; Sgt, Btry A
Wire Section
NICO, Willard I Jr; Sgt, Svc Btry
NIPPERT, Clyde E (Ed); Sgt, Hqs Btry
NOLAN, Kenneth; Sgt, Btry A
NORDSTROM, Elmer; Hqs Btry
NORGAARD, Mike; Hqs Btry
NORMAN, Lonnie R; Btry C
NORTHERN, Leonard; Hqs Btry
NUNN, Robert E; SFC, Btry C
NUNN, William A; Btry C

O

O'CONNELL, Leo J; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
O'DAINEL, Philip; Capt, Btry B
O'MULLEN, James J; Cpl, Btry B
O'NEAL, Patrick Jr; Svc Btry
OLAH, John F (Omar); Cpl, Hqs Btry
Motor Pool Mechanic
OLERICH, Kenneth; Btry B

OLERICH, Howard; Btry B
 ONEILL, William P; Capt, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry
 Liaison Officer, Btry Commander, Battalion Commander
 ONEILL, Richard M; Btry B
 OSLOOND, Raymond E; Svc Btry
 ORSON, Rufus H Jr; SFC, Hqs Btry
 ORTEGA, Cipriano M; Hqs Btry
 OTT, Robert V; Hqs Btry
 OTTERO, Louis C; Btry C
 OUYE, Milton T; Btry C
 OWENS, William H; Btry C

P

PAEZ, Augustine; unk Btry
 PAGE, John; Btry C
 PAGE, Robert H; Btry C
 PAJARI, Robert A; Btry A
 PALM, Clarence; WOJG, Btry C
 PALMER, Fred W; SFC, Btry B
 PALMER, Gerald K; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 PALMER, Rodney H; Btry A
 PAPPADEMOS, Christos M; Btry A
 PARKER, Deryl W; Hqs Btry
 PARKER, Donald G; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 PARSONS, Jack; 1st Lt, Btry B
 Forward Observer
 PARSONS, Paul W; Btry A
 PAULL, Glen D; Btry C
 PEARSALL, Allyn; Sgt, Btry B
 Motor Pool
 PEARSON, John H; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
 PEEK, Robert A; SFC, Btry A
 SWA 4/5/52, Chief of Section

PENN, William H; Hqs Btry
PENN, Willis; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
PENNINGTON, Floyd E; Cpl, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
PEREZ, Alfred E; Btry B
PERRY, Charles; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
PETERS, Donald D; Hqs Btry
PETERS, Daniel L; Btry A
PETROSKE, Walter F; MSgt, Btry A
PETRIGALA, Peter; 2nd Lt, Hqs Btry
PETTIT, Medford; Cpl, Btry C
PFUHL, Fred R; Btry B
PICKETT, Bernard J; Btry B
PIERCE, Casimir S; 2nd Lt, Svc Btry
 Motor Transport Officer
PIES, Stanley Dean; Btry C
PINA, James C; Btry B
PLYLEY, George H; Btry A
PLYMPTON, William H; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Fire Direction Center
POORE, Raymond S; Btry A
POORE, Robert W; Btry A
POSTEMA, Herman G; Svc Btry
POSTEMSKI, Frank W Jr; Btry C
POSTON, Vernon W; Svc Btry
PRAY, Frankie D; Btry C
PRECIADO, L H; Sgt, Btry C
PRICE, Edgar; Btry C
PRICE, Octo; PFC, Btry A
 WIA 7/8/52
PRIMISING, Harold J; Btry A
PRIMISING, Kenneth; Btry A
PRINTZ, Robert C; Btry B

PROBASCO, Cyril E; 2nd Lt, Btry A/Btry C
 Executive Officer
 PURTELL, Charles T (Charley); Hqs Btry
 PYMM, Robert; SFC, Btry C

Q

QUARLES, Charles; 1st Lt, Btry A/Btry B
 WIA 04/07/53, Forward Observer
 QUINN, John K; Btry C

R

RADTKE, Ed; Btry C
 RAGNER, Maurice G; Capt, Hqs Btry/Btry C
 Communication Officer, Operations and Training Officer (S-3)
 RAGNONE, Fulvio E; Btry C
 RAINES, Frank C; Btry C
 RAINES, John L Sr; Staff Sgt, Btry C
 Mess Steward
 RAKOCZY, Theodore W; Btry B
 RALYEA, Ellwyn; Sgt, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 RAMSEY, unk; 1st Lt, unk Btry
 Forward Observer
 RANSLEM, Wayne L; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 RASMUESSEN, Milton D; Sgt, Svc Btry
 RAY, Kenneth L; Btry C
 Forward Observer Section
 RAYBURN, John N; Btry A
 REAL, Joe R; SFC, Btry C
 REAVES, Osborne E; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 Forward Observer
 REAVIS, Ivey L; Btry C
 REED, Levi; Btry C

REINHARDT, Robert; Hqs Btry
RENWICK, Myrwyn; Btry C
REYNOLDS, William T; 1st Lt, unk Btry
 WIA 11/7/52, Forward Observer
REZENDES, John C; Btry A
RHODES, Roy (Dusty); Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Motor Pool
RHODY, Howard A; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
RICE, Frank A; Btry C/Btry B
RICE, Philip; Btry B
RICH, Donald N; Hqs Btry
RICHMOND, William H; Btry C
RIDDLE, Don K; Btry C
RIESGO, James W; Btry C
RIGGS, Lloyd E; Btry A
RIGONI, Herbert C; SFC, Hqs Btry
RIHA, Arlin K; Hqs Btry
RIOS, Andrew I; Btry C
RIVERA, Joe; Btry C
RIZLEY, Levert R; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 Forward Observer Section
ROADY, William E; Btry A
ROBERTS, Thomas D; Btry C
ROBBINS, Homer O; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 Liaison Officer
ROBIDEAUX, George E; Cpl, Hqs Btry/Btry C
 Motor Pool
ROBINSON, Irving S; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
ROBINSON, James P; Cpl Btry A
ROBINSON, Kenneth F; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
ROBLES, Reuben; Btry B
ROCK, Edward C; Sgt, Btry A
ROGERS, Douglas B; PFC, Hqs Btry
 WIA 10/18/52

ROGERS, Earl H; SFC, Btry C
 ROHRER, unk; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
 ROLAND, unk; 1st Lt, Btry C
 ROLLINS, Norman N; Btry A
 ROPS, John; Hqs Btry
 ROSITTO, James P; Hqs Btry
 ROSS, Lester O Jr; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 ROSSOTTO, Domingo; Hqs Btry/Btry C
 ROY, Gabriel R; Sgt, Btry B
 ROZLEY, Levert R; Sgt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 RUBINO, Angelo C; Btry C
 RUCHTI, Alfred E; Btry C
 RUEGE, Walter A; Sgt, Svc Btry
 RUIZ, Lawrence; Btry B
 RUNNION, James P; Hqs Btry
 RUSSELL, William T; Btry C
 RUSSING, Marvin C; Btry B
 RUSSO, Anthony J (Tony); Hqs Btry
 RUTKOVSKY, Paul; Capt, Hqs Btry

S

SABIN, Carl A; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
 SACCOMANDO, Jack V; Svc Btry
 SAENZ, Jess R; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 SAGUNSKY, Eugene D; Btry B
 SALDAMA, Robert; Btry B
 SALGADO, Jose B; Btry C
 SALGADO, Vazquez Tomas; Btry C
 SANDBERG, Donald E; SFC, Btry A
 SANDERS, Enar H; Btry C
 Assistant Executive Officer
 SARBER, Wayne R; Sgt, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section

SATHRUM, John M; 2nd Lt, Btry A
 SAVINO, Francis V; Btry A
 SAYLORS, Orville F Jr; Btry C
 SCARFF, Ross W; Hqs Btry
 SCHAKO, Sanford L; Btry C
 SCHALF, Troy A; Btry C
 SCHALF, Don L; Btry C
 SCHENFISCH, Wilmar; Btry A
 SCHEU, Maurice R; Staff Sgt, Btry A
 SCHIELD, Thomas R; Btry C
 SCHIAVO, Mero; Svc Btry
 SCHINDEL, Elliot; Hqs Btry
 SCHLABIG, Franklin R; SFC, Hqs Btry
 SCHLOUGH, Richard J; Btry C
 Driver, No. 6 Gun Section
 SCHMIDT, Robert; Btry C
 SCHOCK, George R; Btry A
 SCHOEPP, Lee A; Btry A
 SCHOFIELD, Richard T; Sgt, Btry B/Btry C
 SCHULTZ, John; Btry A
 SCHUMACHER, Walter B; Btry B
 SCOTT, Robert E; Btry C
 SEELEY, William A; Svc Btry
 SEIWALD, Paul B; Hqs Btry/Svc Btry
 SELCHERT, B G; Btry B
 SELLMAN, Richard L; Sgt, Btry A
 SEMBIANTE, Willaim F (Bill); Cpl, Hqs Btry
 SEMEL, Bernard; Btry B
 SEWELL, Wesley E; 1st Sgt, Btry C
 SGAMMATO, Nichlos; Btry C
 SHATTUCK, Dean J; Svc Btry
 SHAPEN, Bernard (Bernie); Cpl, Hqs Btry
 Truck Driver
 SHARP, Albert W; Svc Btry
 SHARP, Thomas C Jr; 2nd Lt, Btry A/Btry B
 Forward Observer

SHENE, Harley N; Cpl, Svc Btry
SHETLAR, Clark A; Cpl, Hqs Btry
SHELTON, James E; SFC, Btry B
 Communication Chief
SHENKIR, John H; Cpl, Hqs Btry
 Txfr 52nd FA Bn
SHEOLDAN, Charles L; Btry C
SHINGLER, Albert; Svc Btry
SHIPLEY, Ellsworth; Btry A
SHORES, Gerald M; Svc Btry/Btry B
SIEBOLD, Joe J; Btry A
SIEVIERTSON, Arley V; SFC, Btry B
 Gun Sergeant
SILVER, Fredrick E; 1st Lt, unk Btry
SIMARD, Wilfred J; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
SIMMONS, Louie E; MSgt, Hqs Btry
SIMPSON, Arthur E; Hqs Btry
 Driver, Wire Section
SINGLETON, Raymond; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn
SKAGGS, James M; Svc Btry
SKINNER, Edward A; Cpl, Hqs Btry/Btry C
SLAVEN, Harold M (Mickey); Hqs Btry
SLATER, John T; Btry C
SLIGH, Albert; SFC, Btry C
 WIA 10/18/52
SLOCUM, James R; Btry C
SMALLEY, Jay; Hqs Btry
SMITH, Billy G; Hqs Btry
SMITH, Donald H; Btry C
SMITH, Fred; Sgt, Btry B
 Took colors home, Crew Chief #4 Howitzer.
SMITH, Glenn H Jr; Svc Btry
SMITH, Harold; Btry C

SMITH, Harold C; Sgt, Btry B
Forward Observer Section

SMITH, Paul; Hqs Btry

SMITH, William E; Sgt, Hqs Btry/Btry B

SMITH, William R; 2nd Lt, Btry B
WIA 6/19/52, Forward Observer

SMITH, unk; Capt, Hqs Btry
Btry Commander

SMULL, Charles N Jr; Btry C

SMYTH, Donald E; Btry A

SMYTHE, Howard O; Btry A

SOBECKI, Eugene J; Sgt, Btry B

SODDY, Charles; Btry C

SOLOMON, Lawrence T; Cpl, Hqs Btry

SOMMERS, Richard N; Hqs Btry

SORENG, Clifford B; Hqs Btry

SOUNIA, Donald L; Svc Btry

SOUTHWICK, Don M; Capt, Hq Btry/Svc Btry
Btry Commander

SPENCER, Lee J; Btry B

SPRINGER, Norman H; Sgt, Btry A
Forward Observer Section

STAFFA, Vincent G; SFC, Btry A

STAFFEL, Carroll E; Btry C
Switchboard Operator

STANARD, Robert H; Sgt, Btry C

STANEK, John F; Svc Btry

STANFLEY, Raymond W; Sgt, Hqs Btry

STARNS, Dveal W; Svc Btry

STEIN, Ronald R; Btry C

STEINHOEFEL, Robert A; Btry C

STEINMCHER, Edward; Btry A

STENZEL, Arthur J; Pvt, Btry A
WIA 9/28/52

STEVENS, Charles W; Hqs Btry/Btry B

STODDARD, Marion R; Btry A

STOKER, Richard L; Btry C
 STORY, Robert S; Btry C
 STOUGHTON, David E; Btry C
 STREMEL, Richard L; Cpl, Hqs Btry/Btry C
 STRICKLIN, William; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
 SULLIVAN, Bobby G; Sgt, Btry C
 SULLIVAN, John J; Hqs Btry
 SUSIDKO, unk; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 SVOBODA, George J; Btry B
 SWAIDNER, Robert G; Btry A
 SWAIN, William M; Hqs Btry
 SWANK, Doyle H.; Sgt, Hqs Btry/Btry B
 SWANSON, Orville C; Btry B
 SYLVIO, Theodore F; Svc Btry

T

TANNER, Glenn; Btry C
 TAPLIN, Lloyd M; Btry A
 TARANTO, John G; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 TATUM, Richard C; Btry B
 TAUBER, John; Btry C
 TAUFER, William D; Sgt, Hqs Btry
 TAYLOR, Gene A; Cpl, Svc Btry
 TAYLOR, Harry L; Cpl, unk Btry
 WIA 7/26/53, later died of his wounds
 TAYLOR, Robert F; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 11th FA Bn
 TENISON, Carroll; Hqs Btry
 Aviation Section
 TERREL, Steve; Hqs Btry
 TERSIGNI, Peter P; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section
 THOMAS, Earnest; Btry C
 THOMAS, William L; Hqs Btry

THOMPSON, Edward D; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry B/Btry C
Intelligence Officer (S-2), Forward Observer
THOMPSON, Richard E; Hqs Btry
THORSON, Roger A; PFC, unk Btry
WIA 5/9/53, Operations Clerk
TODD, Ted L; WOJG, Hqs Btry
TORRES, Arturo; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
TORMA, Joseph S; Sgt, Hqs Btry
Aviation Section
TORNQUIST, Fred W; Hqs Btry
TORPY, Richard J; Svc Btry
TOWLES, unk: 1st Lt, Btry B
TROMBLEY, Melvin F; Btry A
TRUMP, William; Btry C
TRUKENBROD, John P; Hqs Btry
TRYER, Kenneth M; Hqs Btry/Btry C
TUERFIELD, Richard G; Sgt, Svc Btry
TUKESBERY, James; Sgt, Hqs Btry
TUCKFIELD, Richard G; Sgt, Svc Btry
TURNER, Edward; Hqs Btry
Txfr 11th FA Bn
TURNER, Young Jr; Btry C
TYNUS, Raymond; Svc Btry

U

UDELHOFEN, Francis J; Cpl, Btry B
ULSHAFER, Von; Btry C
UMLAUF, Louis B; Major, Hqs Btry
URBAN, unk; Hqs Btry
Battalion Commander
USHER, James G; Major, Hqs Btry
Battalion Executive Officer
UYBER, Herbert F; Btry B

V

VAIANA, Johnny; SFC, Btry C
 Chief of Section

VALENCIA, Joe; Btry C

VALENTINE, Charles E; Btry B
 Forward Observer Section

VAN DE VELDE, Louis R; Lt Col, Hqs Btry
 Battalion Commander

VANMATRE, Francis; Hqs Btry

VAN HARN, Stephen; Btry C

VAN PELT, Laurel L; Btry C

VASQUEZ, Richard; Btry B

VEATCH, William J; Sgt, Btry A

VERDUGO, Robert; Btry C

VIDAL, Adolph; Sgt, Hqs Btry

VIENNA, Gerhard G; Cpl, Btry A
 WIA 8/7/52, Forward Observer Section,

W

WABACKECK, Clifford; Btry A

WADDLETON, Bernard D; Btry C

WHALEY, Donald L; Hqs Btry
 Txfr 13th FA Bn

WALKER, Billy G; Cpl, Hqs Btry

WALKER, Curtis W; SFC, Btry C
 Supply Sergeant

WALKER, LeRoy M; Btry C

WALKER, Raymond D; Cpl, Btry B
 Forward Observer Section

WALKER, Robert G; Svc Btry

WALL, Bernard F; Btry A

WALLAN, unk; Hqs Btry
 Operations and Training Officer (S-3)

WALLANDER, Arthur R; Btry C

WALLS, unk; Btry A
WAMPLER, Tex M; Btry C
WARDEN, Vernon E; Btry C
WARNER, unk; Capt, Hqs Btry
WARSCHAW, Bernard; SFC, Svc Btry
WATERMAN, Richard G; Hqs Btry
WATKINS, Billy B; Btry C
WATKINS, unk; Hqs Btry
WATSON, Wayne W; Btry B
WEAVER, Wilson H; Sgt, Btry A
WEIAND, Howard A; Btry C
WEIR, Carlton R; Hqs Btry
WEITZEL, George L; MSgt, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry
WELCH, Eugene; Hqs Btry
WELLS, James B; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry
 Btry Commander
WELKENER, Clarence; 1st Lt, unk Btry
 Forward Observer
WERNER, John A; Capt, Btry C
 Btry Commander
WEST, James L; Major, Hqs Btry
 Battalion Commander
WESTERFIELD, Gordon; SFC, Hqs Btry
 Fire Direction Center
WESTRUP, Donald A; Hqs Btry
WETJIN, Harlan (Salty); Btry A
 Battery Cook
WHALEN, unk; Hqs Btry
WHALLS, Thomas L; Btry B
WHITE, Clarence B Jr; Hqs Btry
WHITE, William A; Cpl, Btry A
 WIA 4/5/52
WHITE, William H Jr; Cpl, Hqs Btry.
WHITE, Raymond L; Cpl, Hqs Btry/Svc Btry

WHITTET, John H; SFC, Hqs Btry
Survey Section Chief
WILCOX, Lester R; Btry B
WILCOX, Roger W; SFC, Hqs Btry
WILCSEK, Arnold; Hqs Btry
WILEY, Maurice M. (Mike); MSgt, Hqs Btry
WILEY, Walter J (Jerry); Sgt, Hqs Btry
WILCOX, Lester R; Btry B
WILCOX, Rodger W; SFC, Hqs Btry
WILKE, Richard T; Sgt, Hqs Btry
WILLIAMS, Milton L; Btry C
WILSON, James R; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A
Battalion Communication Officer
WINESAP, unk; Btry A
WISSUSIK, Ronald K; Cpl, Svc Btry
WITAR, Leonard; Btry B
WOLLANDER, Art; Btry C
WONG, Chester; Btry B
WOODRUFF, Delbert R; Btry A
WOODS, James T; SFC, Hqs Btry
WOODWARD, Robert M; Btry B
WOODWORTH, Thurman L; Cpl, Btry A
WOOLLEY, Peter W; SFC, Btry B/Btry C
WORMAN, Fred; Btry C
Prime Mover Driver
WREN, Willie B; Btry C
WRIGHT, Earle S; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A
Battalion Commander
WUNKER, Swift E; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry/Btry A
WYATT, John E; Btry C
Gunner, fired the 200,000 round
WYNKOOP, Chester L; SFC, Btry A

XYZ

YBARRA, Raul S; Hqs Btry

YOUNGER, Estus A; Btry A/Svc Btry

ZANG, Richard; Hqs Btry

ZEHR, Norman; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry

Aviation Section

ZIELINSKI, Theodore S; Cpl, Btry C

ZIMMERMAN, Donald E; Btry A

ZUCKERMAN, Harold; 1st Sgt, Svc Btry

ZYLA, Edmund M; Btry A

APPENDIX B

625th FA Bn Casualties



Purple Heart Medal

The Purple Heart was established by General George Washington at Newburgh, New York, on 7 August 1782, during the Revolutionary War. It was reestablished by the President of the United States per War Department General Orders 3, 1932. The Purple Heart is awarded in the name of the President of the United States to any member of an Armed Force or any civilian national of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the U.S. Armed Services after 5 April 1917, has been wounded or killed, or who has died or may hereafter die after

being wounded.

ALEXANDER, George R; 2nd Lt, Btry C

LWA 3/25/53: Punchbowl, hospitalized and returned to duty

LWA 5/14/53: Punchbowl, hospitalized and returned to duty

ANDERSON, Port A Jr; PFC, Btry C

SWA 10/18/52: Kumwha, later died of wounds

BROWN, Richard L; PFC, Btry C

SWA 3/19/53: Punchbowl, evacuated and separated for disability

CARAWAY, Raymond V; Sgt, Btry B

SWA 10/19/52: Kumwha, later died of wounds

COLE, Norman L; PFC, Btry C

LWA 3/19/53: Punchbowl, hospitalized and returned to duty

COOK, Denton C; Cpl, Btry A

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

COON, Francis M Jr; PFC, Btry A

SWA 2/10/52: Kumsong, returned to duty

DREILING, Anthony F; SGT, Btry A

LWA 9/28/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

EDWARDS, Orville Jr; Pvt, Hqs Btry

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

ENDERLIN, August E; Cpl, Btry A

LWA 9/28/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

GIRARD, Andrew; Pvt, Btry A

KIA 9/28/52K Kumwha

GUERRERO, Leon Vice; PFC, Btry A

LWA 5/12/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

LWA 10/18/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

HOEFLING, Lawrence; PFC, Btry A

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

HOLLAND, Glenn P; PFC, Btry C

LWA 6/19/52: Kumwha: hospitalized and returned to duty

KOCHLI, Philip J; 1st Lt, Hqs Btry

LWA 4/26/53: hospitalized and returned to duty

LYNN, Charles E; SFC, Btry A

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

PEEK, Robert A; Sgt, Btry A

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

PRICE, Octo; PFC, Btry A

LWA 7/8/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

QUARLES George R; 1st Lt, Btry B

LWA 4/7/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

REYNOLDS, William T; 1st Lt, unk Btry

LWA 11/7/52: Heartbreak Ridge, hospitalized and returned to duty

ROGERS, Douglas B; PFC, Hqs Btry

LWA 10/18/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and separated for other than disability

SLIGH, Albert; SFC, Btry C

LWA 10/18/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

SMITH, William R ;2nd Lt, Btry B

LWA 6/19/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

STENZEL, Arthur J; Pvt, Btry A

LWA 9/28/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

TAYLOR, Harry L; CPL, unk Btry

SWA 7/26/53: Heartbreak Ridge, later died of wounds

THORSON, Roger A; PFC, unk Btry

LWA 5/9/53: Punchbowl, evacuated and separated for other than disability

VIENNA, Gerhard G; Cpl, Btry A

LWA 7/8/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

LWA 9/9/52: Kumwha, hospitalized and returned to duty

WHITE, William A; Cpl, Btry A

SWA 4/5/52: Kumwha, returned to duty

APPENDIX C

625TH FA Bn Lineage

Constituted⁴⁶ 5 August 1946 in the California National Guard(ARNG) as the 625th Field Artillery Battalion and assigned to the 40th Infantry Division. Organized⁴⁷ and Federally recognized⁴⁸ 18 June 1947 with Headquarters at Burbank, California. (Location of Headquarters changed 1 June 1950 to Van Nuys, California). Ordered⁴⁹ into Federal Service 1 September 1950 at home stations.

625th Field Artillery Battalion (NGUS) organized and Federally recognized 2 September 1952 with Headquarters at Van Nuys.

46

To place the designation of a new unit on the official rolls of the United States Army.

47

To assign personnel and equipment to a unit and make it operative - capable of performing its mission.

48

To accept an Army National Guard unit into the force structure of the United States Army after the unit has been inspected by a federal representative and found to be properly stationed, organized, and equipped in accordance with Army requirements.

49

To place an Army National Guard unit on full-time active duty under the control of the United States government.

625th Field Artillery Battalion (ARNG) released⁵⁰ 30 June 1954 from active Federal service and reverted to state control; federal recognition concurrently withdrawn from the 625th Field Artillery Battalion (NGUS).

625th Field Artillery Battalion reorganized and redesignated 1 July 1954 as the 214th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, an element of the 40th Armored Division.

214th Armored Field Artillery Battalion consolidated 1 July 1959 with the 143rd, 215th, 225th Armored Field Artillery Battalions and the consolidated unit reorganized and redesignated as the 144th Artillery Regiment, to consist of the 1st Rocket Howitzer Battalion, and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Howitzer Battalions, elements of the 40th Armored Division.

144th Artillery Regiment reorganized 1 March 1963 to consist of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Battalions, elements of the 40th Armored Division.

144th Artillery Regiment reorganized 29 January 1968 to consist of the 1st Battalion, an element of the 40th Armored Brigade; 2nd Battalion; and 3rd Battalion, an element of the 40th Infantry Brigade. Redesignated 1 May 1972 as the 144th Field Artillery.

144th Field Artillery reorganized 13 January 1974 to consist of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, elements of the 40th Infantry Division.

144th Field Artillery reorganized 1 December 1976 to consist of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions and Btry F, elements of the 40th Infantry Division.

144th Field Artillery withdrawn 19 January 1988 from the Combat Arms Regimental Systems and reorganized under the United States Army Regimental System.

144th Field Artillery reorganized 1 December 1993 to consist of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and Batteries D and F, elements of the 40th Infantry Division.

50

To release an Army National Guard unit to the control of its home state or states.

APPENDIX D

HQS & HQS Battery

(TO&E: RT 6-26N-22, 1 Oct 46)

HHB was the tactical and administrative headquarters of the battalion. The battery consisted of Battalion Headquarters, Battery Headquarters, Operations Platoon, Communication Platoon, Personnel Section, Maintenance Section, three Liaison Sections and an attached Medical Unit. The nominal battery strength was 14 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 111 enlisted men. The attached Medical Unit served as a battalion aid station (BAS) which sorted, treated, evacuated or returned casualties to duty. The medical detachment had a nominal strength of 1 officer and 11 enlisted men.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS (7 O)

Battalion Headquarters combined with Battery Headquarters formed the Command Post (CP) of the battalion, providing command and control of the entire battalion.

BATTALION COMMANDER (Bn CO): Lt. Colonel; responsible for the performance and operational status of the battalion.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER (XO): Major; second in command of the battalion, the senior staff officer of the unit.

ADJUTANT (S-1): Captain; served as primary logistician; the battalion XO, sometimes served as S-1.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (S-2): Captain; performed a wide variety of tasks concerning intelligence, targeting and operational security.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER (S-3): Major; served as principal planner, staff responsibility for effective control of the Operations Platoon.

ASSISTANT S-3 OFFICER: Captain; assisted the S-3 in supervision of the Operations Platoon.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEY OFFICER (RSO): 1st Lt; battalion commander's principal advisor on survey operations, Assistant S-2.

BATTERY HEADQUARTERS (1 O, 9 EM)

Battery Headquarters provided command and control of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery itself.

BATTERY COMMANDER: Captain; also served as the Battalion Communications Officer.

1st SERGEANT: senior enlisted advisor to the battery commander.

BATTERY CLERK: Corporal

Additional Personnel: assorted clerks and orderlies

OPERATIONS PLATOON (2 O, 27 EM)

The Operations Platoon performed those duties associated with surveying, current subordinate unit status, tactical fire control, targeting and planning. The platoon consisted of a Operations and Fire Direction Section; and a Instrument and Survey Section.

Operations & Fire Direction Section (S-3 was OIC) The Operations and Fire Direction Section provided timely, effective tactical and technical fire control by the prompt conversion of fire requests into battery firing commands through the use of firing charts, grid sheets and maps. The Fire Direction Center (FDC) served as the "brains" of the gunnery team. Upon receiving calls for fire, the FDC processed that information, determined the appropriate method of fire, ammunition

expenditure, units(s) to fire and time of firing. The weapon and ammunition characteristics (muzzle velocity, propellant temperature, and projectile weight), weapon and target locations, and meteorological information were converted into firing data transmitted to the firing batteries.

LIAISON PILOT (2): 1st Lt; flew the battalion's two liaison aircraft⁵¹ which furnished the battalion with "eyes in the sky". These aircraft were sometimes combined with other artillery unit's organic aircraft to form a provisional Division Artillery Aviation Battery.

SERGEANT MAJOR: Master Sergeant; the senior enlisted advisor to the battalion commander.

OPERATIONS CHIEF: Sergeant First Class; responsible for the overall functioning of the Operational Platoon.

FDC COMPUTER:⁵² Staff Sergeant; served as the FDC's technical expert, the actual supervisor and/or trainer of battalion FDC personnel.

FDC COMPUTER: Corporal; assisted the FDC Computer as necessary and monitored Height Control (HCO) and Vertical Control (VCO) operators.

HORIZONTAL CONTROL AND VERTICAL OPERATORS: plotted known data as directed, plotted initial target location, determined chart data and maintained equipment and associated generators.

Additional Personnel: radio/telephone operators and drivers.

Vehicles: Two 2½-ton cargo trucks with 1 ton trailer, three 1/4-ton trucks, three 3/4-ton weapons carriers.

Instrument & Survey Section (RSO is OIC): The Instrument and Survey Section maintained, evaluated and disseminated survey information to subordinate, adjacent and higher units. This information provided the firing batteries and the target-locating assets (Forward Observers and

51

Various types of Piper Cub type aircraft were used during the Korean War for aerial observation by field artillery units.

52

FDC Computer was not a computer at all, but just the title of the operator who used charts, maps, protractors and special slide-rule instruments to compute the gunnery calculations. Computers, as we know them now, were science fiction in the 1950's.

Liaison Teams) with a common grid, which enabled the battalion commander to employ his firing batteries with a guarantee of accurate and timely fire support.

SURVEY/INSTRUMENT SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Additional Personnel: Four survey/instrument men and two survey/instrument men/ drivers

Vehicles: One 1/4-ton truck, one 3/4-ton weapons carrier.

COMMUNICATION PLATOON (1 O, 42 EM)

The Communication Platoon provided the battalion with communication links between batteries, Forward Observer/Liaison teams and adjacent units as required. Generally this was by telephone lines (W-110 and W-130 double strand light weight electrical wire) as the radios were WWII vintage and the mountainous terrain and Korean weather made radio transmission/reception unpredictable. Wire crews were out day and night, repairing breaks in the line (what with tanks and vehicles chewing up the wire, Chinese cutting it, non-combatants taking lengths of it for tying things, and GI's being careless where they dragged their size twelve boots) and laying new wire every time positions were changed. The platoon consisted of a Headquarters Section, Wire Section, and Radio Section.

Headquarters Section: Provided command and control for the communication operations of the battalion, including unit level maintenance for communication equipment and maintained a switchboard capability. Hqs Btry CO was Battalion Communication Officer.

ASSISTANT COMMUNICATION OFFICER: 2nd Lt

COMMUNICATION CHIEF: Sergeant First Class; supervised all operations of the Platoon.

MESSAGE CENTER CHIEF: Sergeant; operated a central point for all incoming and outgoing messages

MESSAGE CENTER CORPORAL: assisted message center manning.

Wire Section: The Wire Section was responsible for installation, maintenance and repair of all battalion wire communication between batteries, the forward observer and liaison teams, except for that which

was internal to the firing batteries themselves.

WIRE SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant; supervised all Wire Section operations.

WIRE CORPORALS (4): each Wire Corporal supervised a team of 4 Field Wireman.

SWITCHBOARD OPERATORS (2): operated the battalion switchboard. Additional Personnel: 13 Field Wiremen, one field wireman/driver for the assistant communication officer, three wireman/drivers, truck driver for the wire truck.

Vehicles: One 1/4-ton truck, three 3/4-ton weapons carriers, one 2 1/2-ton, short wheelbase (SWB) wire truck.

Radio Section: The Radio Section established and maintained all radio nets required for battalion operations.

RADIO SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant; supervised all Radio Section operations.

Additional Personnel: radio operators, radio repairman, radio repairman/driver

Vehicles: Two 3/4-ton weapons carriers for radio trucks.

PERSONNEL SECTION (1 WO, 4 EM)

The Personnel Section was responsible for all battalion personnel services, i.e., maintaining the paperwork the army runs on.

PERSONNEL OFFICER: Warrant Officer; personnel and administration center supervisor.

PERSONNEL SERGEANT: Sergeant First Class; assisted Personnel Officer.

Additional Personnel: personnel clerks/typists

MAINTENANCE SECTION (1 O, 11 EM)

The Maintenance Section provided combat service support (fix, feed, and supply) for HHB

Maintenance: Performed scheduled maintenance and repair of all HHB vehicle and power generation equipment.

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

MOTOR OFFICER: 2nd Lt

MOTOR SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant;

Additional Personnel: Assorted mechanics and drivers

Vehicles: One 2 ½-ton cargo truck with a 1-ton trailer, two 3/4-ton weapons carriers, two 1/4-ton trucks with 1/4-ton trailers.

Supply: Handled HHB supply items.

SUPPLY SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Food Service: Provided food services and rations for Hqs Btry. When conditions permitted, battery messes were consolidated into a battalion mess.

MESS SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

COOKS (3)

COOK'S HELPER/DRIVER

Vehicles: 2½-ton mess truck with 1-ton trailer

LIAISON SECTION(1 O, 5 EM per section)

The three liaison sections provided liaison support to each of the three infantry battalions generally supported by an artillery battalion.

LIAISON OFFICER (LO): Captain; interface between battalion and supported units

LIAISON SERGEANT: Sergeant First Class; assisted the LO with his duties.

LIAISON CORPORAL: Responsible for the day to day duties of the rest of the section.

RADIO OPERATOR

LIAISON DRIVER

WIREMAN/TELEPHONE OPERATOR/DRIVER

Vehicles per Liaison Section: 1/4-ton truck with 1/4-ton trailer.

MEDICAL DETACHMENT (1 O, 11 EM)

Served as the battalion aid station (BAS) which sorted, treated, evacuated or returned casualties to duty.

MEDICAL OFFICER: Captain; field surgeon or a physician's assistant, coordinated the operations, administration, and logistics of the medical detachment.

SURGICAL TECHNICAL: Staff Sergeant

MEDICAL SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

MEDICAL CORPORAL: Corporal

Additional Personnel: Assorted medics, aid-men and drivers. Each firing battery and Service Battery were assigned an aid-man.

Vehicles: 1/4-ton truck, 3/4-ton truck with 1/4-ton trailer.

APPENDIX E

Firing Battery

(TO&E; RT 6-27N-22, 1Oct 48)

The firing batteries are the heart of the field artillery battalion and the reason for its existence. The batteries provided the deadly punch that earned the artillery the right to be called “The King of Battle.” Each firing battery had nominal strength of five officers and 114 enlisted men divided between Battery Headquarters, Battery Detail, Firing Battery, Maintenance Section and Forward Observer Section. Each of the three named firing batteries (Able, Baker, Charlie) was composed as follows:

BATTERY HEADQUARTERS (1 O, 7 EM)

Provided the command, control, and supervision of all battery operations.

CAPTAIN: Battery Commander; responsible for all aspects of battery operations.

1ST SERGEANT: Senior enlisted advisor to the battery commander.

BATTERY CLERK: Corporal

Additional Personnel: 5 privates

BATTERY DETAIL (1 O, 25 EM)

The Battery Detail handled all communication and instrument/survey functions for the battery. This included the installation, operation, and maintenance intra-battery wire communication and switchboard operations.

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER(RO): 1st or 2nd Lt

CHIEF OF DETAIL: Staff Sergeant

INSTRUMENT OPERATOR: Corporal/Driver RO's Truck

WIRE CORPORAL

RADIO SERGEANT

Additional Personnel: wiremen/telephone operators, radio operators, a switchboard operator, a radio repairman and drivers

Vehicles: 1/4-ton truck, 1/4-truck with 1/4-ton trailer, three 3/4-ton weapons carriers

FIRING BATTERY(1 O, 72 EM)

The Firing Battery consisted of the Firing Battery Headquarters, six Howitzer Sections (one section per gun) and an Ammunition Section.

Firing Battery Headquarters: Responsible for reconnaissance, positioning and conduct of the firing battery.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER(XO): 1st Lt; responsible for everything the firing battery did.

ARTILLERY MECHANIC: Corporal; driver executive officer's truck

INSTRUMENT OPERATOR: Private

AUTHORIZED VEHICLES: 1/4-ton truck

Howitzer Section(6): Engaged the enemy by translating battery firing commands into the technical firing data necessary to aim, load and fire the howitzer.

CHIEF OF SECTION: Staff Sergeant/Sergeant; responsible for the training and proficiency of his gun section, the operational readiness of his equipment, and the safe firing of his weapon.

GUNNER: Corporal

Additional Personnel: 7 cannoneers and a driver

Vehicles: 2 ½-ton SWB cargo truck; prime mover for the section's 105mm towed howitzer.

Ammunition Section: Handled the ammunition supply for the battery's guns.

CHIEF OF SECTION: Sergeant

Additional Personnel: 9 ammunition handlers and drivers

Vehicles: Two 2/12-ton SWB cargo trucks with M10 Ammunition trailers

MAINTENANCE SECTION (1 O, 8 EM)

The Maintenance Section provided the combat service support (fix, feed, and supply) for the Firing Battery.

Maintenance: Performed scheduled maintenance and repair of all firing battery vehicle and power generation equipment.

MOTOR OFFICER(MO): 2nd Lt; also the Assistant XO

MOTOR SERGEANT: Sergeant

AUTOMOTIVE MECHANIC: Sergeant; driver motor maintenance truck

Vehicles: 3/4-ton weapons carrier with 1/4-ton trailer

Supply: Handled the firing battery supply items

SUPPLY SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Food Service: Provided food services and rations for the firing battery. When conditions permitted, battery messes were consolidated into a battalion mess.

MESS SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Additional Personnel: 3 cooks, cook's helper and a driver

Vehicles: 2½-ton mess truck with 1-ton trailer

FORWARD OBSERVER SECTION (1 O, 2 EM)

This section of the firing battery served as one set of the battalion's "eyes." The section's mission was to detect and locate suitable targets and bring fires upon them.

FORWARD OBSERVER: 1st or 2nd Lt

RECONNAISSANCE SERGEANT: Sergeant

200

THE BOYS OF FIFTY

RADIO OPERATOR: Corporal; driver forward observer's truck

Vehicles: 1/4-ton truck with 1/4-ton trailer

APPENDIX F

Service Battery

(TO&E: RT 6-29N-22, 1 Oct 48)

Service Battery was tasked with supplying the battalion with food, ammunition, clothing, gasoline and other supplies. In addition, Service Battery provided a higher echelon of equipment and vehicle repair. The nominal battery strength was four officers, one warrant officer and sixty-nine enlisted men. The battery consisted of Battery Headquarters, Service Platoon, Ammunition Train and Battery Maintenance Section.

BATTERY HEADQUARTERS (1 O, 8 EM)

Provided the command, control and supervision of all battery operations.

BATTERY COMMANDER(CO): Captain; also served as Munitions Officer and the Battalion Supply Officer (S-4)

1ST SERGEANT: Master Sergeant; senior enlisted advisor to the battery commander

BATTERY CLERK: Corporal

DRIVER: Corporal; driver battery commander's truck

Additional Personnel: radio operator and orderlies

Vehicles: 3/4-ton weapons carrier

SERVICE PLATOON (1 O, 1 WO, 14 EM)

The Service Platoon consisted of a Battalion Supply Section and a Battalion Motor Maintenance Section.

Battalion Supply Section: Handled all the battalion supply and resupply needs; such as food, ammunition, clothing, gasoline as well as those parts needed to maintain and repair the battalion's equipment

BATTALION SUPPLY OFFICER(BSO): Warrant Officer

SUPPLY SERGEANT: Sergeant First Class

SUPPLY ASSISTANT: Staff Sergeant

Additional Personnel: supply clerks and driver

Vehicles: 2 1/2-ton cargo truck with 1-ton trailer

Battalion Motor Maintenance Section: Provided a higher echelon of maintenance and repair to the battalion's vehicles than the individual battery's maintenance sections were equipped or trained to do.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER(XO): 1st Lt; also Battalion Motor Officer (BMO)

MOTOR SERGEANT: Master Sergeant

AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY: Corporal

WELDER: Corporal

Additional Personnel: automotive mechanics, drivers and a welder

Vehicles: 1/4-ton truck, 2 1/2-ton SWB cargo, 2 1/2-ton SWB with 1-ton trailer, and 4-ton wrecker

AMMUNITION TRAIN(1 O, 37 EM)

The Ammunition Train was responsible for ensuring that the firing batteries had ample ammunition supplies. The train was composed of a Train Headquarters and three Sections, one section for each firing battery.

Train Headquarters: Controlled the operation of the trains (truck convoys) which brought ammunition from rear area supply dumps to the firing batteries.

TRAIN COMMANDER: 2nd Lt

AMMUNITION SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Additional Personnel (6): assorted radio operators, drivers and clerks
Vehicles: 1/4-ton truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier

Train Sections (3): The three Train Sections acquired and delivered ammunition to the firing batteries.

CHIEF OF SECTION: Sergeant

Additional Personnel(9): ammunition handlers and drivers

Vehicles per Section: 2 ½-ton SWB cargo truck, 2 ½-ton cargo truck

MAINTENANCE SECTION (1 O, 10 EM)

The Maintenance Section provided combat service support (fix, feed, and supply) for Service Battery.

Maintenance: Performed unit and scheduled maintenance and repair of all Service Battery vehicle and power generation equipment.

MOTOR OFFICER(MO): 2nd Lt; also the Assistant XO

MOTOR SERGEANT: Sergeant

Additional Personnel: vehicle mechanic, repairman and driver

Vehicles: 3/4-ton weapons carrier with 1/4-ton trailer

Supply: Handled Service Battery supply items

SUPPLY SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Food Service: Provided food services and rations for Service Battery. When conditions permitted, battery messes were consolidated into a battalion mess.

MESS SERGEANT: Staff Sergeant

Additional Personnel: 3 cooks, cook's helper/driver

Vehicles: 2½-ton mess truck with 1-ton trailer

APPENDIX G

Odds & Ends

Camp Cooke

In March 1941, the U. S. Army acquired approximately 90,00 acres of rolling brush-covered coast land near the small town of Lompoc, some 50 miles north of Santa Barbara, California. Here the Army would establish an improved training center for armored and infantry forces. Construction of Camp Cooke, named for Major General Philip St. George Cooke, a cavalry officer who had fought in the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Indian Wars. Construction began in October and continued well into 1942. Troop training did not wait for all facilities to be completed. The 5th Armored Division arrived in February and March of 1942. The 6th, 11th, 13th and 20th Armored Divisions as well as the 86th and 97th Infantry Divisions were trained at Camp Cooke. By the end of World War II, more than 400 separate and distinct units had called Camp Cooke home at one time or other. In 1944, the Army established a Prisoner of War Camp, which eventually housed almost 9,000 German and Italian prisoners of war (later organized as Service Units). Both groups were kept separate from each other and worked on the post at various jobs. The Germans also worked in the local communities, mainly harvesting crops.. Additionally, a maximum security Army Disciplinary Barracks (now the U. S. Penitentiary, Lompoc) was constructed on the post. When the main camp was inactivated in June 1946, the disciplinary barracks

remained active with personnel also serving as installation caretakers. Practically all of the camp was then leased for agriculture and grazing. The abandoned Camp Cooke was reactivated in August 1950, in time for the September arrival of the 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard, after its activation into Federal Service. After the 40th left for Japan in March 1951, the 44th, 86th, 91st Infantry Divisions as well as the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions trained here. Camp Cooke remained open until February 1953 when it was again deactivated and turned over to “housekeepers” from the Disciplinary Barracks. In November 1957, the largest portion of the 90,000 acres was transferred to the U. S. Air Force to become Vandenberg Air



Korean War Memorial, 40th Infantry Division

Source: Ed Marshal

Force Base.

On 1 September 2000, veterans of the 40th Infantry Division gathered at Vandenberg Air Force Base to dedicate the privately-funded Korean War Memorial, honoring California’s National Guard 40th Infantry Division. This date was exactly fifty years to the day

when the division was activated for Korean War service and the first troops arrived at Camp Cooke.

The Korean War memorial is constructed of reddish South Dakota granite weighing 25,000 pounds. The block in front depicting the unit's 12-pointed star represents the division's time at Camp Cooke. The bridge symbolizes combat training in Japan and joins the oriental lantern representing Korea. Through the opening in the unit's star, oriented toward Korea, some 5,792 miles away, is seen the Tori Lantern.


In June 2001, the final remnants of Camp Cooke, including some of those two-story barracks used by the 40th Infantry Division were torn down.

General M. C. Meigs

A General John Pope Class Transport, launched in March 1944 and manned by a Coast Guard crew; the USS General M. C. Meigs, served as a troop transport until it was decommissioned in March 1946. Struck from the Naval Register and custody, it was assigned to the American President Lines, where it sailed as the SS General M. C. Meigs.

After the outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea, the Meigs was reacquired by the Navy on 21 July 1950 and assigned to the newly organized Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). As the USNS General M. C. Meigs (T-AP-116), she was manned by a civilian crew, made 19 cruises to the Far East during the fighting in Korea and carried thousands of American troops from the West Coast to ports in Japan and South Korea. Following the uncertain armistice, she continued to support American readiness in the Far East with troop-rotation cruises during the remainder of 1953 and through 1954. The General M. C. Meigs received six battle stars for Korean War Service.

Placed in Reduced Operational Status in 1955, she was transferred to the Maritime Administration 1 October 1958 and entered the National Defense Reserve Fleet at Olympia, Washington



USNS General M. C. Meigs

Source: unknown

where she remained until 1972. Sold for salvage, the Murphy Pacific

Marine Salvage Company was contracted to tow Meigs to San Francisco. With Meigs under tow, the USNS Gear (T-ARS-34) reached the Pacific Ocean, just west of Cape Flattery, at 0300, 1 September 1972. Wind and high seas caused the tow to sever, setting Meigs adrift. Despite efforts of the crew of Gear and the Coast Guard, Meigs continued to drift, stranding on a rocky ledge and breaking in two around a large rock pinnacle at Cape Flattery, WA. at 48°16N 124°40W.

Band of Brothers

It is true, that those who train and fight together form a “Band of Brothers.” Here one is among friends; ones who can be depended upon, and who can depend on each other. This kinship is broken when one is wounded and taken to the rear. For an unmentioned fear among those separated from their unit, is that they will be sent to a Replacement Depot, where he is just a another unknown GI. More often than not, troops in Replacement Depots are thought of as interchangeable clogs in a giant machine. Little, if any thought or effort was given to returning veterans to their old units. Some, however, made sure they got back to their brothers. This is one such story:

While manning one of the battalion observation posts on the MLR in support of the ROK 18th FA, Cpl Gerhard Vienna, Battery A was wounded in the leg on 7 August 1952. Carried down the hill to the battalion aid station, he was temporarily patched up and then moved to 1st Clearing Platoon, 115th Medical Bn. Gerhard was x-rayed and later that afternoon, evacuated by helicopter to the 5076 AU (MASH) where he was operated upon. After about a week, he was transferred to the Swedish Red Cross Hospital in Pusan. After several weeks of watching his wound heal and gazing at the blonde Swedish nurses, Gerhard figured it was time to get back to his buddies before he was shipped elsewhere. Some seventy-five percent recovered, he caught his attending doctor in a good mood, and talked him into releasing him on the promise that he would see a doctor when he got back to the battalion. Throwing his gear together, Gerhard was on a troop train heading north at noon the next day, spending the night sleeping on the floor was no joy but he was headed back to his unit. At the last station he got off and climbed aboard a waiting 2 ½ ton trucks\ which later dropped him at the gate of a Replacement Depot. “Damm, I didn’t want to be

there,” recalls Gerhard. Asking around, he found a truck heading toward the Kumwha Valley area. Gerhard asked for a ride. “Sure, we’ll be leaving shortly”, was the answer. Tossing his bag over the tailgate, he climbed aboard. A few hours later, the truck pulled into company sized unit located at the base of a large mountain. The NCO in charge said that no travel was allowed over the mountain pass at night. A spare sleeping bag and cot was found and Gerhard settled in for the night. Asking around the messhall the next morning he found a courier who was going through the KUMWHA Valley area. Thanking the sergeant for his help, Gerhard climbed into the waiting jeep and off they went up the pass and into the KUMHWA valley. Turning off the MLR onto the access road to battalion area, they found no tents, no troops, and no battalion headquarters. The ROK 18th FA was still there but the 625th was nowhere in sight. Now what? “No problem” said the courier, who using his secure radio, found out where GAMMA (the 625th’s call sign) had moved. While Cpl Vienna was in the hospital, the battalion had left the KUMHWA Valley and support of the ROK 2nd Div. In late October, they had rejoined the 40th Div when it relieved the 25th Div in the Heartbreak Ridge area. Once the battalion was located, the friendly courier drove Gerhard some 30 miles east to battalion headquarters. The sign may have read “ Gamma HQ’ but to Gerhard it said “Welcome Home.”



625th FA Bn Hqs

The Bench

Major West, the 625th's first battalion commander, had a bench. When the battalion was first organized, in common with most newly formed National Guard units, ordinary things were in short supply. Chairs were not high on the needed equipment list. When the Battalion Commander held a Battery Commanders call, not enough chairs could be found to go around. Major West had a bench built (the Battery Commander's Bench) so that everybody had a seat.. The BC Bench become part of the 625th's T&OE. The bench was activated with the battalion, went to Camp Cooke, traveled across the sea to Camp Younghans, Japan, and then to Korea. Later it some how wound up in Major West's home in the San Fernando Valley, California.

Looking like just an ordinary wood bench painted white and displaying the battalion crest, the bench contained a secret. There was a cutout in the bottom plank, covered with glass, containing a piece of

shrapnel about six inches long from a 105mm howitzer.

Capt Maurice G. Ragner recalls how that shrapnel got there:

As the 40th Division prepared to leave for Japan, all units had to undergo several Preparation For Overseas Movement (POM) qualification courses. One of these courses was Overhead Artillery Fire. The 625th was conducting this course for the 223rd Inf in a gently rolling open area at Camp Cooke. I had a 3/4 ton truck with driver and radio operator. Major West, Major Fisher and myself were walking behind the truck as it slowly moved forward. We were all about 100 yards ahead of the advancing infantry as we adjusted the rounds to fall a safe distance ahead of us. All was going fine until suddenly a short round fell about 25 yards behind us. Believe me, we gave a quick “cease fire” and that was the end of the firing exercise. Although not much shrapnel goes ahead of a PW round, one piece about six inches long hit the truck. That piece was saved and latter put into a cut-out in a bottom plank of the bench, covered with glass as a constant reminder that “accidents can happen.



The BC Bench, Korea
Source: Capt Ragner



BC's on The Bench, Korea
Source: Capt Ragner

The Battalion Nomads

Under normal combat conditions, the battery forward observer and battalion liaison crews became nomads, spending most of their time away from the battalion since they are attached to the supported infantry regiment. The observations posts manned by the Forward Observers are

on the MLR with the infantry companies. The Liaison crews are co-located with the supported infantry battalion Hqs Company. These crews spend much of their time up front and not back with the firing batteries or headquarters. Close friendships were made with the grunts that were up there with them. The Forward Observer or the Reconnaissance Sergeant would transmit a call for fire and adjust the fire as necessary, providing surveillance data on his own fires and any other fires in his zone of observation. The teams were located at the front with the unit for which the battalion was providing direct support. It was the most dangerous job in the battalion, in terms of life expectancy during combat.

The observation posts were generally on the highest piece of ground which afforded the best field of observation. The ideal situation would have the active observation bunker on the forward slope with the living bunker on the reverse slope protected from enemy fire. The ideal was rarely achieved and the majority of the observation posts were bunkers containing the observation portal and living quarters combined. Wire would cover the opening to prevent grenades from being thrown into the bunker. The American bunkers usually stuck out like a sore thumb, compared to deeply dug-in and camouflaged enemy bunkers, and to the enemy it was like waving a red flag at a bull. As the fighting dragged on, the Ops became prime targets of the opposing forces who were terrified of our artillery fire. For the OP was the infantry's link to the artillery fire that would bring down massive amounts of destruction upon them.

In the static situation of the last two years of war, the daylight emphasis was precision fire on targets as small as machine gun nests. The primary observation instrument became not the field glasses normally used by forward observers but the BC Scope. The BC Scope allowed the observer to remain in cover while providing more accurate target observation. This underscored the need for BC Scopes at every OP. However, because of the extremely rugged terrain which limited fields of observation, a battalion in direct support might employ seven to nine observation posts. Even in the general support role, the battalion would man two or three OPS. The existing TO&E allotment (one BC Scope per firing battery, two for the Hqs Battery) was clearly inadequate in the present static situation. The needed BC Scope's were worth their weight

in gold and if not available through supply channels, they were begged, borrowed or “scrounged”

Fire Mission

A typical Fire Mission starts when an Forward Observer observes or is given the coordinates of a target and picks up the phone or radio handset. “Fire Mission” he calls, “azimuth 030, range 300, troop concentration.” The Fire Direction Center (FDC) operator, repeats the commands to the FDC crew which then plots the mission. Using a plotting board and various instruments, these commands are converted to range, deflection and elevation calculations. These calculations as well as shell type (HE, Smoke, WP) and powder charge commands are sent down to the firing battery. The battery FDC assigns one or more guns to the mission. The gun crews spring into action at the command of the Chief of Section. The Gunner, usually worked the sight on the left side of the tube that controlled the deflection or side-to side movement. The Assistant Gunner controlled the quadrant or up and down movement. The Loader and Powder man removed the shell from its canister, exposing the powder increments (which look like large tea bags tied together). The propelling charge is adjusted by removing those bags not needed for the mission. For example, if the command is given to fire “Charge 4”, bags 5, 6 and 7 are removed for later disposal away from the firing area. The round is reassembled and loaded into the piece and at the Chief of Section’s command “Fire”, the lanyard is pulled and the round is on it’s way. The Forward Observer continues to adjust the fire until the target is destroyed. A “Cease Fire, Target Destroyed” completes the mission.

Combat Pay

What Combat Pay? For many who served in Korea, it may be a surprise to learn about combat pay. Combat pay was authorized for personnel engaged in combat or direct combat support for at least six days in any one month. The Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952, authorizing combat pay in the amount of \$45 per month retroactive to June 1, 1951 was enacted July 10, 1952. Of course, being retroactive was not of much use to those who had rotated back to the states or had been discharged.

The 625th's Daily Journal for 24 July 1952 reads: "*DivArty instructs us to keep FO's on hill for 6 days instead of 5 days so they may be eligible for combat bonus pay.*"

Combat Artillery Badge

No such thing! True, there was no authorized Combat Artillery Badge in the Korean War. But it could be seen worn by some “Redlegs” on R & R in Japan or out on pass from Army Hospitals. Back at the front many on-line with the infantry could be found with the red badge. For me, I was always proud of the fact that my CAB was presented to me by Operation Sergeant of the 3rd Bn, 223rd Inf. He had acquired this non-regulation badge while on R&R in Japan. Although worn with age, it is a reminder of a hill long ago and far away.



Combat Artillery Badge, ca. 1950.

Source: SFC Robert Hanson

Ready... Fire 1... Fire 2... Fire 3...

Standing tall, from the polished olive-drab helmet liners with the 40th patch on the side and the red stripe of the artillery around the brim, to the sharply creased pants, bloused over spit-shined jump boots; the “Redlegs” stood at attention. Beside their spick-and-span 105mm howitzers, the Battery C gun crew was ready to fire another ceremonial salute. This was the “most salutingest” battery in the 40th Division, firing more than one hundred and twenty honor rounds for everyone from California Governor Earl Warren to Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins. Their blank rounds billowed white smoke over parade grounds from Camp Cooke, California to Camp Younghans and Camp Schimmelpennig in Japan. Governor Warren received a 19-gun salute at Camp Cooke. Five thousand miles away and ten months later, he was to

receive another 19-gun salute. The salute went off without a hitch and then it was time change back into fatigue uniforms, clean the guns and get back to field training.

Four of the battery's six howitzers were used for each set of salutes. Three of them to fire, and the fourth to serve as a loaded backup. "It almost made the men sick when we finally had to use the stand-by gun," said Lt Cyril E. Probasco, firing officer for the salutes. "While we were firing for General Burgs, one of the guns jammed, throwing the timing off." "The best salutes we fired were for General J. Lawton Collins," said M/Sgt John Chapel, "the timing was perfect."

40th Division Callsigns

The separate units of the 40th Div, like all Army units, were identified by callwords or callsigns. These were used for identifying units on signs, in documentation and when a numerical suffix was added, identifying individuals (e.g., Gamma 6 was the 625th Battalion Commander while Grizzly 6 was the 40th Division commander).

Hq & Hq, 40th Div	- GRIZZLY
40th Repl Co	- GARNET
40th Inf Div Band	- unknown
140th Medium Tank Bn	- GOGGLE
40th Recon Co	- GERONIMO
Hqs Btry, 40th DivArty	- GIANT
40th Div Aviation Co (Prov)	- GYRO
143rd FA Bn	- GREMLIN
625th FA Bn	- GAMMA
980th FA Bn	- GLACIER
981st FA Bn	- GOLDEN
140th AAA AW Bn	- GLIDER
578th Engr Bn	- GOPHER
160th Inf Regt	- GRENADIER
223rd Inf Regt	- GIBRALTAR
224th Inf Regt	- GALAHAD
115th Med Bn	- GASHER
40th MP Co	- GRAVEL
740th Ord Maint Co	- GRINDSTONE

Appendix G

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40th QM Co	- GADGET
40th Sig Co	- GINGER
1st Bn	- RED
2nd Bn	- WHITE
3rd Bn	- BLUE
Sv Co'S	- ORANGE
Med Co's	- BROWN
Tnk Co's	- GREEN
Heavy Mortor Co's	- BLACK
IPW	- GATER

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