THE BATTLE
at
CAMP CADY

by

Dennis G. Casebier
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Dennis G. Casebier
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This is the second edition of Carleton’s Pah-ute Indians. The first, Carleton’s Pah-Ute Indians, was published in 1930 by the Government Printing Office and was written by Bvt. Maj. J. L. Catterton under the direction of the Indian Bureau. The present book, Carleton’s Pah-Ute Indians, is a new edition of the same work, with the addition of new material and increased accuracy of information.

The story that describes the early history of the Pah-Ute Indians and the site of old Camp Cady has been treated in a history. These reports are public domain and are available for use.

The Battle at Camp Cady, located in the Mojave Desert, was a significant event in the history of the Pah-Ute Indians. The Battle was fought in 1867 and resulted in the loss of several hundred Pah-Ute warriors.

As in Carleton’s Pah-Ute Indians, the Pah-Ute were described as “Pah-Ute” in many ways over the years. The term has been used in various contexts, such as in the Southern Paiutes or Southern Utes. The term has been used in the literature, as well as in the field of anthropology.

The site of old Camp Cady, located near the Mojave River, has been the subject of much study and speculation. The site has been the subject of archaeological investigations and has been the location of many important discoveries.

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Foreword

This is the second book in the *Tales of the Mojave Road* series. The first, *Carleton's Pah-Ute Campaign*, dealt with the expedition conducted by Bvt. Maj. James H. Carleton, 1st Dragoons, against the Pah-Ute Indians of the Mojave Desert in 1860. It covered the first phase of Camp Cady history when that post was established and manned by Carleton and his troops during April, May, and June of 1860. The present book, *The Battle at Camp Cady*, is another Camp Cady story that describes the battle that took place at Cady between the Pah-Ute Indians and the Camp Cady garrison on July 29, 1866. This subject has been treated briefly in the published literature before, but it appears that the official reports of the battle have not been used. These reports are published in this book as an appendix.

The Battle at Camp Cady occurred at a critical point in the history of the Mojave Desert. During the same month that the fight took place a new mail service connecting San Bernardino and Prescott was inaugurated over the Mojave Road. The fight at Cady helped convince the army and the mail contractors that the Mojave Road was not safe and that military escorts would be needed for each mail. As a result, Camp Cady was maintained for several more years when it might otherwise have been discontinued. Also, an additional post was established at Rock Spring ninety miles to the east and outposts were established at other springs along the road between Cady and the Colorado River. During 1867 several conflicts occurred between the mail parties and the Indians. It is this writer's view that these incidents might have been avoided had the Battle at Camp Cady not prolonged the conflict that existed on the Mojave Desert. Further, it is believed that the battle could have been avoided had the commander at Cady acted with more prudence.

As in *Carleton's Pah-Ute Campaign*, I have referred to the desert Indians as “Pah-Utes.” The name of these Indians has been spelled in many ways over the years. Today they are frequently referred to as Southern Piutes or Southern Paiutes. I have used the name Pah-Utes because that form was widely used during the period being studied here. I should also note that not all of the Indians along the Mojave Road were Pah-Utes. Mohaves and Chemehuevis from the Colorado River country to the east and southeast were also frequently encountered. The distinction between the various tribes will be made in this series wherever appropriate.

The site of old Camp Cady is private property and I am indebted to Ken Wilhelm for permission to inspect and photograph this historic location.
Special acknowledgment is due to the Society of California Pioneers, and particularly to Jane Levy, for supplying biographical information and photographs of James Richmond Hardenbergh. Also, in the National Archives, I am indebted to Elmer O. Parker and Sara D. Jackson for the military records used in this study.

To Arda M. Haenszel of San Bernardino I am indebted for help in identifying geographical sites and for much general information. To Esther Haddan of Daggett I am indebted for information about Kane Spring.

The following friends helped by reading the manuscript and proofs at various stages and they are responsible for improvements in readability and for the elimination of many errors: Bill Alberts of Corona, E. I. Edwards of Yucca Valley, Marcella Higgins of Anaheim, Elizabeth Luoto of Fontana, and my wife, Marlou.

The next book in this series will be a history of the old army post Camp Rock Spring, California. This post was situated on the Mojave Road at Rock Spring in the Mid Hills region of the Providence Mountains. It was operated as an official army post in the years 1866, 1867, and 1868.

Dennis G. Casebier
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It was Sunday, July 23, 1860, on the 22d post situated on the border of the Mojave Desert. The thermometer stood lower than in any cooler place.

Second Lieutenant Jesse D. Harding, 9th U. S. Infantry, had been engaged in the defense of some posts in the desert for several weeks. He had buried his head at the 22d post before it had been attacked. The works at Cady had been attacked, but Harding had soundly defeated the enemy. Of the 16 men, 4 had been killed outright. The remaining 12 were carried into the fort in an exhausted condition.

When Harding returned to the post, a new panic set in. The fort had been abandoned by eight people left. These were a sergeant, three privates, two men, and a woman.

Hardenbergh feared to attack the fort, as the number of Indians in the fort was large. He reasoned that if the Indians could not bring the fort into action, he should not attack them. He braced himself and ordered a search for Indians that he was certain were in the fort.

But Hardenbergh had no intention of following up the Indians. He was determined to attack the Indians, but he did not want to be caught in a trap. The Indians had been ambushed, and as soon as possible a search was made.

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JAMES RICHMOND HARDENBERGH
Courtesy, Society of California Pioneers
THE BATTLE AT CAMP CADY

It was Sunday, July 29, 1866, at Camp Cady, California, an army post situated on the bank of the Mojave River far out into the great Mojave Desert. The thermometer stood well over one hundred in the coolest places.

Second Lieutenant James R. Hardenbergh, a young soldier in the 9th U. S. Infantry and presently commanding officer at Cady, must have buried his head in his hands and wondered if his career had ended before it had barely begun. Earlier that day he sallied out of his works at Cady to attack a band of Pah-Utes passing the camp and was soundly defeated. Of the six men he had led out that day, three had been killed outright. One was severely wounded and had just been carried into the fort pierced with three arrows. The others, including Hardenbergh, had retreated in complete panic to the fort, arriving there in an exhausted condition.

When Hardenbergh recovered sufficiently to assess his situation, a new panic set in. The Pah-Utes knew his numbers. There were only eight people left. These included Hardenbergh himself, the camp doctor, a sergeant, three privates available for duty, the private who had been severely wounded, and the wife of one of the soldiers.

Hardenbergh feared the end was in sight as he had estimated the number of Indians in the party he had seen at thirty-six. That band alone, he reasoned, could storm his fort and massacre them all. And the Indians could doubtless find more recruits in the nearby desert. He braced himself and his little command for the onslaught from the Indians that he was certain would come.

But Hardenbergh need not have worried. The Pah-Utes had no intention of following up the decisive victory they had achieved in the river bottom that day. They would not storm the works at Cady because a battle with the troops had never been in their plans. In retrospect, it appears that Hardenbergh and not the Indians was the hostile one. The Indians had fought an unwanted battle to defend themselves and as soon as possible afterwards they escaped into the desert.

One unique thing about this battle is that an opportunity is presented to gain at least a glimpse of the Indian’s side of the conflict. This is a rare occurrence. The Indians made no reports, kept no muster rolls, had no newspapers and—in short—were never given opportunity to tell their side of their troubles with white men. If they could have done this each time, the present impression of the history of the West might be significantly changed. Fortunately, in this case, an army officer—Capt. Philip A. Owen—attempted to see the Indians’ side of
Camp Cady was first established in 1860 by James H. Carleton in the interest of his friend Maj. James A. Garfield. It was a stop on the road to Tejon with his dragoons.

In the fall of 1860, a few skirmishes took place in the vicinity of Camp Cady. A few white men had settled in the area with the promise to return in the spring. Carleton in 1860, Pah-Utes were known to be a peaceful people. They rarely found there. It was a country away from the

The map shows the road from Camp Cady to Drum Barracks and connecting routes in Southern California.

2.

The story and wrote an account of the events, which is reproduced in the following:

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the story and wrote an objective account in his official report. His report is reproduced at the end of this paper in the appendix.

Camp Cady was first established on April 19, 1860 by Bvt. Maj. James H. Carleton of the 1st Dragoons. He named the new camp in honor of his friend Maj. Albemarle Cady of the 6th Infantry who at the time was in command of the army post at Fort Yuma, California. Cady was located at one of the few points along the Mojave River where the water flows on the surface the year around. The site was an important one strategically, as it was situated on the road to Fort Mojave and only nine miles from the point where the Salt Lake Trail left the Mojave River to travel across the desert to the oasis at Las Vegas, Nevada.

The camp was established to serve as an operations point while Carleton's two companies of dragoons scoured the desert looking for Pah-Utes to chastise. This campaign was prompted by the murder of a herder named Robert Wilburn on the Mojave River on January 23, 1860 and the murder of two other men, Thomas S. Williams and Jehu Jackman, at a point near Bitter Springs on March 18, 1860. Although the Pah-Utes were credited with these murders, many believed some Mormons were the instigators.

After Carleton had been in the field more than two months and had a few skirmishes, a number of Pah-Utes came into Cady to hear the terms of peace on July 2, 1860. Carleton told them why they were being chastised (it appears that some of the Indians may not have known about the murders until this time) and how to behave towards the Americans in the future. He promised if they behaved in the way outlined by him, other soldiers would return in the fall of that year with presents for the Pah-Utes. With this treaty made Carleton abandoned Camp Cady the next day, July 3, 1860, returning to Fort Tejon with his dragoons.

In the fall of 1860 the Pah-Utes gathered along the Mojave River in the vicinity of Camp Cady and further up the river where a few white men had settled and were starting ranches. However, Carleton's promise to return was never honored and the Indians began to bother passing travelers. It is a significant point that, after their dealings with Carleton in 1860, Pah-Utes were more frequently encountered on the road along the Mojave River than before. In earlier times they were rarely found there. It appears their natural habitat was in the desert country away from the river.
During the Civil War more land was taken up along the Mojave River with small ranches and stations being established. The result was more contact between white men and Pah-Utes. Depredations were committed and settlers were loud in their demands for military protection. Patrols were sent from Drum Barracks (near Wilmington, California) and Fort Mojave several times during the Civil War years.

The military authorities were always slow in providing protection against the Pah-Utes. First, the settlers along the Mojave River were largely secessionists, leaving a question in the minds of many about whether or not they deserved protection. Also, during the war the volunteer forces available to the army on the Pacific Coast were urgently needed in the more populated areas of southern California to hold the citizens in check. And, too, some military officers believed no real problem existed with the Indians in that quarter.

Finally, in early 1865, Col. James F. Curtis, 4th Infantry, California Volunteers, and commanding officer of the District of Southern California, traveled over the Mojave Road to inform himself of the "causes and extent of Indian troubles of which the settlers along the Mojave River complain." His findings were favorable to the settlers. As a result Camp Cady was reestablished as an army post at the site Carleton had used in 1860. April 23, 1865 is the date usually accepted for the second establishment of the post.

The troops stationed at Cady during 1865 and early 1866 were mostly infantry. They were provided with only a few horses for limited escort duties. Because it was impractical to do extensive scouting in this desert country on foot, the soldiers spent most of their time in camp constructing quarters for themselves and other post buildings.

On January 10, 1866, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, then commanding general of the military Department of California, arrived at Camp Cady on his way to Arizona over the Mojave Road. He was accompanied by a large staff including Bvt. Brig. Gen. Charles A. Whittier, a special inspector for the department. Whittier included the following remarks pertaining to the usefulness of the post in his report:

Troops were first stationed at Camp Cady in 1858 [1860], the position having been selected, I am informed, by the present Gen. Carleton. No land has ever been reserved for Military purposes and I am of the opinion that it would never be necessary to define a reservation, since there is little probability of the post being long occupied and since the country for miles around is not of such a character to induce any sane man to settle.

Careful inquiry upon the road failed to elicit any information, showing the presence of hostile Indians along or in the vicinity of the road from Los Angeles to Fort Mojave, with the exception of a small band estimated at the maximum at six (6) or seven (7) headed
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Wilmington, California) civil War years.

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by a Mexican, which is said to have committed one or two robberies.
Of this there is some doubt. The band is reported to live at a great
distance to the North. The petty robberies committed are as likely to
have been done by white men.

Frequent demands have been made upon the Department Com-
mander and Commanders in the District of Southern California for
troops to be stationed upon this route.

During the first months of 1866 the last of the Civil War volunteers
were being mustered-out of the service and the regulars were being
brought in from the East to take their places. Since there were delays
in getting the regulars to the West Coast, the army was spread thinly
through the Indian country. Posts were abandoned and garrisons
reduced.
Because of this shortage of troops and Whittier’s impression that Camp Cady was not needed (and doubtless Whittier’s impression reflected the views of his commanding general who was looking over his shoulder as he wrote) the post at Camp Cady was abandoned for a second time on April 1, 1866.11

Just as plans were being perfected to abandon the post three men were murdered, presumably by Indians, at the Dunlap Ranch near Cajon Pass. Even though Camp Cady had not actually been abandoned at this date (although it was abandoned a week later) this tragedy has been blamed upon the removal of the troops from Cady.12 Following the massacre, requests for protection were sent to the commanding officer at Drum Barracks and to the commanding general in San Francisco. Probably more effective than these letters sent in by citizens, however, was an article published in the Los Angeles News. It read in part as follows:

PROTECTION FROM INDIANS. — The course pursued by Gen. McDowell in removing the troops from Camp Cady, and other points between this city and Fort Mohave, has had the effect of injuring the business of this section of the State. — Just at the time the troops were removed the Indians began to show signs of hostility, and three men were killed by them on the Mohave river, and we also learn that since the removal of the troops a considerable number of stock has been stolen by Indians, and it is considered unsafe for small parties to travel the road almost any where from San Bernardino to Fort Mohave. . . . If Gen. McDowell had purposely sought to injure the trade of this section of the State he could not have chosen a more effectual way of doing so than to remove the protection from one of the principal thoroughfares of trade. We hope the matter will be properly brought to the attention of the Commanding General, and be promptly remedied.13

This article was repeated by other papers including the influential San Francisco Daily Alta California. Then, a few days later, the Alta published an account of another murder on the Mojave:

A reliable person, just in from the Mojave river, on the Salt Lake route, reports the Indians to be very troublesome; they are continually annoying trains and travelers, and several persons have already been killed by them. The report, this morning, is, that a gentleman taking through a large drove of stock to Montana went on in advance of his train to find a location for his camp, and on the train coming up, he was found shot and killed. The removal of the troops stationed at Camp Cady has had a very bad effect, as the Indians are emboldened to commit depredations without fear of punishment, and unless a detachment of cavalry is immediately sent to that or some other point on

With these widely dispersed troops at Cady, Whittier's impression that the post was not needed (and doubtless reflected the views of his commanding general who was looking over his shoulder as he wrote) the post at Camp Cady was abandoned again on April 1, 1866.11

As early as practical the 9th Infantry, in command of Drum Barracks and Company "D" 9th U.S. Infantry, had been ordered to send out a detachment, and a sufficiency of men was sent on May 1, 1866, to relieve Yard on account of the calamity of May.

In accordance with the order of May, yard was ordered to be removed to Yard on the border of May.

In addition to Yard and company, the 9th Infantry, in command of Drum Barracks, had been ordered to send out a detachment, and a sufficiency of men was sent on May 1, 1866, to relieve Yard on account of the calamity of May.

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Whittier’s impression that the Dunlap Ranch near Cady was abandoned for several months before the post three men who were looking over the property noticed that it had been abandoned for about two years.

At the post three men who were looking over the Dunlap Ranch near Cady were convinced that it had actually been abandoned for at least three years. They reported this to the commanding general in San Diego, and the news spread throughout the area.

In accordance with these instructions, 1st Lt. John Edmond Yard, 9th Infantry, in command of a detachment of twenty enlisted men, left Drum Barracks en route to Camp Cady on May 7, 1866. The trip out was necessarily slow because of the heavy supply wagons that accompanied Yard’s train. They arrived at Camp Cady about the middle of May.

In addition to Yard and the twenty enlisted men, it appears that the wife of one of the men went along to serve as laundress for the command. Also, a week or two after Yard arrived at Cady his command was augmented by the arrival of Assistant Surgeon L. W. Hays who was to serve with the little command as post doctor.

Yard was a competent and experienced young officer. Had he remained in command at Cady, the ignominious affair of July 29th might never have occurred. But Yard’s services were more urgently needed at Drum Barracks to replace Capt. Samuel Munson. Captain Munson administered the extensive business being carried on by the army of supplying quartermaster and subsistence stores for army posts all over southern California and Arizona. However, he had orders to report for duty with his regiment elsewhere and no suitable relief could be found for this responsible position except Lieutenant Yard. Consequently, 2d Lt. James Richmond Hardenbergh was sent out to command Cady and Yard was ordered to return to Drum Barracks.

Hardenbergh left Drum Barracks on July 9th, arrived at Camp Cady to relieve Yard on about July 16th, and Yard was back at Drum Barracks by the end of the month.

James Richmond Hardenbergh was born in New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1841, making him twenty-five years old in 1866. As a young man he had attended the Peekskill Military Academy in New York. His penmanship and the composition of his official reports do not suggest that he excelled in his studies.
His father and mother were separated. Young Hardenbergh came to California to be with his father shortly before the Civil War. Near the beginning of the war he inherited a sum of money with which, according to family tradition, he helped raise a company of the 1st Washington Territory Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Military records show that he served as second lieutenant of Company "G" in this regiment from August 31, 1862 to March 23, 1865. During this period he served at Forts Steilacoom and Vancouver in Washington Territory, at Fort Boise, Idaho, and he participated in campaigns against hostile Snake Indians.21

On May 28, 1865 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in Company "B" 2nd Cavalry, California Volunteers. He served as the junior officer in that company at Camps Babbitt and Independence, California.22 He was at Camp Independence from November 1865 to May 1866. In that time he should have acquired experience with army life on the desert and with desert Indians which would be useful to him at Camp Cady.

In his report of Hardenbergh's battle at Camp Cady, Captain Gwen said of Hardenbergh "though inexperienced, he is a brave, zealous, and energetic young officer." In 1867, while Hardenbergh was serving at Camp El Dorado on the Colorado River, an army inspector wrote of him: "The Qr. Master & Commissary, Lieut. Hardenbergh is without experience, & wanting in head & force." Both of these officers used the word inexperienced to describe Hardenbergh. And yet the record plainly shows that at the time they made their reports, Hardenbergh had more than four years of experience on active field duty with the army as a commissioned officer. The fact that Hardenbergh could appear inexperienced when in fact he had a great deal of experience might suggest that he was not very capable, if not actually incompetent. Based upon an investigation of Hardenbergh's performance in the period 1862 through 1870 when he was in the army, this researcher is convinced that his capability was much below that of the average commissioned officer.

At Cady Hardenbergh found himself with a garrison consisting of Dr. L. W. Hays, twenty men of Company "D" 9th Infantry, and the wife of one of the soldiers. Dr. Hays had served at Cady in 1865-1866 when the volunteers were there and therefore had some familiarity with affairs in the vicinity. Most of the men of Company "D" had never been to Cady before but they were veteran soldiers and would perform well anywhere if properly officered.

In June there were several Indian depredations in the Mojave Desert. Although none of them took place in the immediate vicinity of Camp Cady or along the Mojave River, they did serve to put the garrison on its guard. On June 4th a government express rider named George
Young Hardenbergh came before the Civil War. Near money with which, be a company of the 1st regiment. Military records of Company “G” in this 1865. During this period in Washington Territory, campaigns against hostile

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A 1972 view of a site near where the Battle at Camp Cady took place.
Andrews and his escort of one soldier were attacked at a point about forty miles east of Camp Cady near Soda Lake. A horse and pack were lost and the express rider carried the stone point of an arrow in his arm across one hundred miles of desert to Fort Mojave to have it removed by the post surgeon.24

On June 10th a civilian wagon train belonging to Daniel Hazzard was attacked near Marl Springs and one teamster was killed.25 On June 12th a man named Moses Little was murdered in a cabin on Macedonia Mountain to the north of Rock Spring.26

The events that led directly to the battle at Camp Cady on July 29th revolved around a settler living at Forks of the Road, nine miles up the river from Cady. His name is given in Captain Owen's report as "Mr. Crow."27 It is indicated that he was a Mormon and had his family living with him.

According to Owen a group of Indians passed by Crow's house one day late in July. Crow attempted to call them in, but they ignored him. Although he shouted at them using abusive language (Crow could speak Pah-Ute) they continued to ignore him. In a fit of rage Crow produced his rifle and fired at the Indians whereupon they disappeared in the brush.

At this point Crow became alarmed over the possible consequences of his rash act. Fearing the Indians would return, he packed up his family and took them to the Cottonwoods, another ranch thirty miles up the Mojave, and left them there for safety. He then traveled from Cottonwoods to Cady to ask for help from the military. On his way past his house he observed that it had not been disturbed. As a result of his making application to Hardenbergh for protection, the lieutenant sent Sergeant Walsh and a few men to the Forks of the Road to investigate. Arriving there the soldiers found the house had been rifled of its contents. This event, of course, was blamed on the Indians.

Meanwhile, at about this same time an unusually large number of wagons and other travelers had passed Camp Cady and requested escorts for protection on the road to Mojave. Hardenbergh provided these escorts from his small garrison and as a result had only eight enlisted men present for duty on July 29, 1866 when the battle took place.

Camp Cady was situated on the northern or left bank of the Mojave River. The course of the river was from west to east at this point. Cady was at the eastern end of the section of river where the water flowed on the surface. For about three miles above the post where there was water on or near the surface, the river bottom was a tangle of trees, grass, and had been made by cattle tramp through the brush to find water.

At about midday on July 29th, number thirty-six, was seen opposite the post. Hardenbergh had no doubt, what occurred on the desert and he concluded that the Indians were a weak race barely able to live in the barren desert, this conclusion was confirmed by the Indians. The realities of their conditions to small scale and numbers. Ten resolute white men were armed as any number of Pah-Utes was at one point. The command was known this.

As the Indians moved on the south side of the post, about a mile above the post, intended to attack Cady.

Doctor Hays was left with the families, and Russell and the wife of the fort in Hardenbergh's care.

Hardenbergh and Sergeants and Privates Atkins, Smith, and Pasley neared the post. The Indians he dismounted his soldiers then moved to a point with a strong number of Pah-Utes in numbers and surprise. Of the twenty men were killed at the first fire, made to a stand by himself.

Sergeant Walsh dropped before he had a propitious rear from his broken loose from the saddle, Walsh mounted the horse in an exhausted condition.

Private Stanley lost his life into the brush out of sight to Camp Cady at sundown.
Camp Cady on July Road, nine miles
the principal road from Cady and had his
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tangle of trees, grass, and brush. Roads and paths through the thicket
had been made by cattle from the post and by wood parties searching
through the brush to find fuel.

At about midday on July 29th, a band of Indians, estimated to
number thirty-six, was seen passing up the eastern bank of the river
opposite the post. Hardenbergh decided they were hostile. His decision,
no doubt, was influenced by the numerous depredations that had
occurred on the desert and by Mr. Crow's recent experience. Further,
he concluded that the Indians were going to attack the post. Since they
were a weak race barely managing to eke out a poor living in their
barren desert, this conclusion reflected a lack of knowledge about these
Indians. The realities of their strength forced them to limit any depre-
dations to small scale ambushes against one or two travelers in isolated
spots. Ten resolute white men in a fortified position and properly
supplied and armed—as were the men at Cady—could have held off
any number of Pah-Utes that could ever have been brought together
at one point. The commanding officer of Camp Cady should have
known this.

As the Indians moved slowly up the river, a soldier was sent to a hill
on the south side of the river. He observed the Indians halt at a point
about a mile above the fort. Hardenbergh, certain now that they
intended to attack Cady, determined to sally out and strike them first.
Doctor Hays was left in charge of the post. He had privates Mongan
and Russell and the wife of one of the soldiers to aid him in defending
the fort in Hardenbergh's absence. Hardenbergh and Sergeant Walsh each rode a horse. Corporal Jones
and Privates Atkins, Schmidt, Stanley, and White were on foot. As
Hardenbergh neared the spot where he expected to surprise the
Indians he dismounted and tied his horse to a tree as did Walsh. The
soldiers then moved to attack the unsuspecting Indians. But the Indians
had been observing Hardenbergh's movements. His attack was greeted
with a strong counterattack by the Indians who had the advantage of
numbers and surprise. Corporal Jones and Privates Atkins and Schmidt
were killed at the first fire, and Private White was wounded. No attempt
was made to make a stand against the Indians. It was every man for
himself.

Sergeant Walsh dropped his rifle and ran to the river bottom where
he had a propitious reunion with his horse. The sagacious horse had
broke loose from where he was anchored and Walsh chanced to find
him. Walsh mounted the horse and fled to Cady, arriving at the post
in an exhausted condition.

Private Stanley lost his rifle as did Walsh. Stanley managed to crawl
into the brush out of sight where he remained undetected and returned
to Camp Cady at sundown that evening.
Private White, who was wounded at the first fire, was pursued hotly by the Indians. When within sight of the fort he fell under a tree, unable to go any farther. He was pierced by three arrows. An Indian came upon him to deliver the death blow. With what must have been about his last ounce of strength, White removed the scarf from around his neck and offered it to the Indian. With a great show of gallantry, the "savage" accepted the offering and spared White's life.

Hardenbergh himself was pursued by the Indians. He ran back to his horse, attempting to untie him to ride to safety, but while fumbling with the knot the horse was hit three times with arrows. Hardenbergh abandoned the animal to his fate, running for the fort to save his own life. He had his carbine with which he kept the Indians at bay as they pursued him. Still, he reported that arrows whistled around him and that he did not know how he escaped. It appears that Hardenbergh received a slight arrow wound in his ankle, although he did not mention it in his official reports. He arrived at the post in such a condition that he reported that "the sergeant and myself was to (sic) much exhausted to do anything towards defending the camp."

The buildings at Cady consisted of a large adobe fort-like structure erected by Carleton in 1860, and a number of shacks scattered over a wide area and erected by the California Volunteers in 1865-1866. As soon as Hardenbergh was sufficiently recovered from his exhausting encounter with the Indians, he moved his remaining troops and all portable government property inside Carleton's fort.
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arrows. An Indian came
must have been about the scarf from around his
at show of gallantry, the
tale's life.

Indians. He ran back to his
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myself was to (sic) much the camp."

adobe fort-like structure of shacks scattered over
volunteers in 1865-1866.

from his exhausting remaining troops and all
s's fort.

FRANK WHITE
This picture was taken in Maine in 1865. Private White was wounded in the Battle at Camp Cady on July 29, 1866.

Courtesy, National Archives

13.
The inmates of the fort got little sleep that night or for the next few days. They spent long hours watching over the walls of the fort expecting an attack at any moment. One account alludes to the services performed by the unidentified woman at Cady in “manning” the rampart with a six-gun ready to discharge its contents should the Indians come within reach.30

Within a few days after the fight, some of Hardenbergh’s escorts returned from Fort Mojave thereby augmenting his little garrison. It appears a few citizens arrived at the post also. Hardenbergh still felt he was in imminent peril and dispatched his report to Drum Barracks with a plea for reinforcements.

On August 3, Hardenbergh’s report was received at Drum Barracks. Capt. Philip A. Owen, commanding the post, sent sixteen privates under command of Sgt. John Crane, an experienced Indian fighter, to Hardenbergh’s relief. As they were all mounted, they probably arrived at Cady within three days.31

The battle at Cady created considerable excitement in San Bernardino. Preparations were made to raise a company of civilian volunteers to cooperate with the military. It appears, however, that these plans may not have materialized.

Meanwhile, Hardenbergh’s report was forwarded to department headquarters with the result that Captain Owen received telegraphic instructions to march with the remainder of his company to Camp Cady to attempt to chastise the Indians.32 Owen left Drum Barracks on August 8th bound for Camp Cady. He did not arrive there until the 16th. His progress was slow because he was encumbered with a number of heavy slow-moving wagons.

Leaving Camp Cady at midnight on the 17th he attempted a night march to surprise a rancheria known to exist some fifteen miles south of Cady. The night was dark and stormy. Owen was much chagrined and disgusted with his guide when the sun rose on the 18th to show him he had marched in a great circle and had returned to within one-half mile of Camp Cady.

He tried again on the night of the 19th, this time succeeding in locating the rancheria only to find it deserted. He returned to Cady disappointed.

At this point Owen wisely concluded that it would be useless for his small Infantry company to try to do extensive scouting through the desert sands in the blistering summer sun. He conducted an investigation of the battle and the events leading up to it and then, leaving forty men to form the garrison at Cady, returned to Drum Barracks, arriving there on August 27.33

A few days later an official letter was received at Drum Barracks from department headquarters.

The report forwarded by Hardenbergh’s company was sent to the Governor in either an order or a letter before a court, as the necessity that an investigation of the matter be brought to him. The Court of Inquiry if he shall be duly elicted and an opportunity for the unfavorable evidence in possession of the Department.

Accordingly, Hardenbergh appointed which was to be at Camp Cady in Drum Barracks submitted a report. Unfortunately, it is not now be found. The report subsequently received an unfavorable evidence in possession of the Department.
that night or for the next over the walls of the fort until alludes to the services Cady in “manning” the its contents should the
of Hardenbergh’s escorts ting his little garrison. It so, Hardenbergh still felt report to Drum Barracks received at Drum Barracks. 1st, sent sixteen privates experienced Indian fighter, to ed, they probably arrived element in San Bernardino. of civilian volunteers to ver, that these plans may dard to department head-keved telegraphic instruc company to Camp Cady to Drum Barracks on August there until the 16th. His ed with a number of heavy 7th he attempted a night some fifteen miles south few was much chagrined ese on the 18th to show I returned to within one-
this time succeeding in d. He returned to Cady it would be useless for tensive scouting through he conducted an inves tig to it and then, leaving itmed to Drum Barracks, from department headquarters raising a question about Hardenbergh’s conduct during his fight with the Pah-Utes. It read:

The report forwarded through you of 2nd Lieutenant J. R. Hardenbergh’s combat with the Indians near Camp Cady, makes it necessary that an investigation should be had into his conduct on that occasion. The General is unwilling to pass judgment on the case in either an order or a letter, and is also unwilling to bring the subject before a court, as the Lieutenant may—and he trusts he will—show that his conduct was less liable to censure than his official report would seem to indicate. To avoid any prejudgment of the case and the possibility of doing this officer injustice, the General directs that this matter be brought to his notice with a view to his asking for a Court of Inquiry if he shall be disposed so to do, that the real facts may be fully elicited and an opportunity offered Lieutenant Hardenbergh of removing the unfavorable impression created by the only evidence at present in possession of the Department.34

Accordingly, Hardenbergh requested a Court of Inquiry. One was appointed which was to consist of two commissioned officers who were to be at Camp Cady in December of 1866.35 They held their Court and submitted a report. Unfortunately, however, a copy of the report cannot now be found. The official records do not show that Hardenbergh subsequently received any official censure for this affair, indicating that the Court of Inquiry probably cleared him of blame.
Hardenbergh remained on duty at Camp Cady until late in December of 1866. Shortly after the fight with the Pah-Utes at Cady, traffic on the Mojave Road received a fresh impetus with the inauguration of a new weekly mail route over the road connecting San Bernardino with Prescott. The troops were kept busy providing escorts for the mail riders between Camp Cady and Hardyville on the Colorado River.

The Pah-Utes were quiet for a few months after their combat at Camp Cady. Later, in 1867, they bothered the mail riders running between Camp Cady and Hardyville so frequently that it became necessary to establish additional army posts across the Mojave Desert at Soda Springs, Marl Springs, Rock Spring, and Pah-Ute Spring. Finally, in November of 1867, an effective peace was arranged with them by Maj. William Redwood Price, 8th Cavalry, then in command of Fort Mojave. The terms of the agreement required that the Indians leave hostages at Fort Mojave as insurance for the good conduct of the rest of the tribe.

In studying the causes of conflict between white men and Indians it is rare indeed that it can be said the entire fault belonged to one side or that one side was free of blame. The Battle at Camp Cady is no exception to this rule.

Since the earliest times the Pah-Utes had been guilty of depredations against weak parties traveling through their vast desert country. Also

since the earliest times the entire tribe for crimes were not committed by broken promises, a circumstance of no importance to the Indian. Also that Mr. Crow had a and perhaps critical mistake Hardenbergh to command.

Perhaps the most significant in conducting this study Pah-Ute as an unqualified of these primitive people as their practice of subsisting upon poor desert provided is the famous Frank White's life at River bottom on that July day that demands a reexamination of his people. One need only be completely helpless, resist was gone. He was spared and covered with dust and dusted fully capable of delivering work with the knife, and the prize. At that crucial moment for his life and his scalp. The
since the earliest times the white men were quick to condemn the entire tribe for crimes committed by only a few and which perhaps were not committed by Pah-Utes at all. Also, the white man had broken promises, a circumstance which may have been of more importance to the Indian than to the civilized white man. It is clear also that Mr. Crow had abused the Indians for no reason. The final and perhaps critical mistake made by the white men was to send Hardenbergh to command an army post in Indian country.

Perhaps the most significant impression gained by the present writer in conducting this study is that one should never classify the desert Pah-Ute as an unqualified savage. Frequently, in the available literature, these primitive people are referred to as degraded savages. Their practice of subsisting upon worms and roots and whatever else their poor desert provided is cited as proof. However, when that Indian spared Frank White’s life beneath the cottonwood tree on the Mojave River bottom on that July 29, 1866, he exhibited a regard for mankind that demands a reexamination of the label “savage” for him and for his people. One need only review the circumstances. Frank White was completely helpless, pierced with three arrows. His energy to resist was gone. He was gasping for breath in the intense desert heat and covered with dust and blood. His mortal enemy came upon him, fully capable of delivering the coup de grâce. One quick blow, a little work with the knife, and the savage would have secured his coveted prize. At that crucial moment Frank White offered his scarf in exchange for his life and his scalp. The Indian accepted. A savage?
Muster Roll at Camp Cady, California on July 29, 1866

So far as can be determined, there were eleven white people present at Camp Cady on July 29, 1866. These eleven people are listed immediately following with a few facts about each to help establish identity.39

2. Dr. L. W. Hays, Assistant Surgeon, United States Army. Post Surgeon at Camp Cady.
10. Pvt. Frank White, Company "D" 9th Infantry ("Frank White" was an alias. This man's real name was Azamond Stilphen). Age 21. Born Trenton, N.J. Participated in the fight at Camp Cady. Wounded with three arrows.
11. Wife of one of the soldiers. Otherwise unidentified.

Three reports concerning on the following pages.
First is Hardenbergh's letter on August 1, 1866. In this was the first news the battle and of Hardenbergh.
Next is a brief letter from in San Francisco. The letter of 1866. Owen reports the Hardenbergh at that point.
Finally is the long report. In it he gives an excellent and disappointing hostile Indians on the desire about the causes of the Battle.

These letters are reproduced handwritten documents in 1972.
Reports of the Battle at Camp Cady.

Three reports concerning the Battle at Camp Cady are reproduced on the following pages.

First is Hardenbergh’s letter to Captain Owen written at Camp Cady on August 1, 1866. In this letter Hardenbergh describes the battle. It was the first news the military at Drum Barracks received of the battle and of Hardenbergh’s condition at Cady.

Next is a brief letter from Captain Owen to department headquarters in San Francisco. The letter was dated at Drum Barracks on August 4, 1866. Owen reports the action he had taken to provide relief for Hardenbergh at that point.

Finally is the long report by Captain Owen dated August 28, 1866. In it he gives an excellent account of his march to Camp Cady and the unsuccessful and disappointing attempts to locate the rancherías of hostile Indians on the desert. Most importantly, he gives his opinions about the causes of the Battle at Camp Cady.

These letters are reproduced here as they appear in the original handwritten documents in the National Archives.

A faint trace of the old Mojave Road is still in evidence at this site near Camp Cady in 1972.
Camp Cady, Cal.
August 1st 1866

Captain Owens

Sir:

I had a severe fight with the Indians on Sunday July 28th [29th]. There was seven of us attacked the Indians on the opposite side of the river from this camp, about one mile from camp. The fight lasted about two hours. Corporal Jones, Privates Atkins and Smith [Schmidt] were killed. White was wounded, the Indians got their rifles and ammunition, also Sergeant Walsh’s and Stanley’s. I have not time at present, to make out my official report. I will refer you to Dr. Hayes for further particulars.40 We have all been expecting to be attacked in the fort as the Indians know our strength. I have only eight men with me to hold the camp, or rather the fort, for we have already abandoned the camp and taken to the fort. Send me as soon as possible reinforcements if you do not want us all killed. There is no way of escape for us. We can not retreat, but fight and die right here if they attack us in large numbers.

They came very near getting me, the Indians run me into camp. I was the last to leave the ground, on account of my going back for my horse, that was tied to a tree. While I was there the horse was shot three times, and it was getting too warm for me, and I was obliged to leave him, and make my escape. As I was retreating towards camp, I would keep up a continuous fire from my carbine. As I would fire the Indians would fall on the ground, and I would start and run, they following shooting arrows at me. I could hear them whistle all around me. How I escaped I can not tell. The only thing that saved sergeant Walsh’s life was his horse, the horse broke loose in the commencement of the fight, and took to the river bottom, on the sergeant’s retreat, he found the horse in the brush, he mounted him and rode into camp and fell off the horse, at his quarters exhausted. White was run in by the Indians, he fell under a tree this side the Hay Stack with three arrows sticking in him, just so soon as we could get physical strength, we packed him up to the quarters. Stanley made his escape by crawling into the brush, at the time the Indians made the charge, he came into camp at sundown.

The Indians could have killed every one of us and taken the camp. There were only three men in camp the Doctor Privates Mongan and Russell, the sergeant and myself was to much exhausted to do anything towards defending the camp.

I shall send you by next mail an inventory of the effects of Corporal Jones and Privates Atkins and Smith.

My regards to Mrs. Owens Yard.

To:
Captain P. A. Owens
Commanding Drum Barrac

ENDORSEMENT:

Respectfully forwarded Commg.
I think by stationing this sending escorts from here it goes through to Mohave as stated within, may be a General’s serious attention.

A A General U.S.A.
Dept of Cal.
General.
I have the honor to
R. Hardenburg, 9th Inf.
the Indian attack on M Officer to me reporting.
My regards to Mrs. Owens. Remember me to Captain Munson and Yard.

Very Resp. Sir.
Your Obdt. Servt.
Jas. R. Hardenbergh
2nd Lieut. 9th U.S. Inf.
Comdg. Post.

To:
Captain P. A. Owens
Commanding Drum Barracks.

ENDORSEMENT:

Hd. Qrs. Drum Bks.
Aug. 4. 1866

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the Maj. General Commg.
I think by stationing thirty (30) men at Cady instead of twenty (20), sending escorts from here then allowing them to remain until an escort goes through to Mohave & return, any future occurrences, such as is stated within, may be obviated. I respectfully invite the Comdg. General’s serious attention to such an arrangement.

P. A. Owen
Capt. 9th Inf.
Comdg.

H’D Quarters Drum Barracks, Cal.
August 4th 1866.

A A General U.S.A.
Dept of Cal.
General.

I have the honor to inclose herewith a report from Lieut. James R. Hardenburg, 9th Inf. Com’dg Camp Cady, giving an account of the Indian attack on Mr. Crow’s house; also a letter from the same Officer to me reporting a fight between his party and Indians near
Immediately on the receipt of the news I dispatched a Sergeant and sixteen privates, mounted and armed with Sharps Carbines, with sixty rounds of ammunition to each man, to the relief of the Garrison at Cady. I feel no apprehensions for the safety of the Lieut. and his command; as his force consists now of some twelve “soldiers” four having returned to the Camp from Fort Mojave (subsequent to the fight) and eight or ten Citizens; all well armed and provided with abundance of ammunition, water and subsistence within the fort. The Sergeant sent in charge of reinforcements; from this post, is, a brave, cool and determined man and experienced in Indian warfare.

On his arrival Lieut Hardenburg will be able to assume the offensive with every chance of success; I would earnestly recommend that a strong Detachment of cavalry be stationed at Camp Cady, if practicable, in addition to the twenty Infantry already there. Mounted Infantry seem to be of little avail. But few of the men can ride; the horses are in the majority of cases badly broken and under fire become unmanageable, to other than the skillful rider.

I shall keep H’d Qrs. advised of every occurrence of note.

Respectfully General
Your Obt. Servt
P.A. Owen
Captain 9th U. S. Inf.
Commanding Post.

Hd Qrs Drum Barracks Cal
August 28th 1866

A A Genl USA
Dept Cal

Genl

I have the honor to report that in obedience to telegraphic orders of the 4th Inst., from Dept Head Quarters I left this post on the 8th Inst. with nineteen men of my company and proceeded to Camp Cady, arriving there on the 16th Inst. My progress was necessarily slow because of a train of heavily loaded wagons belonging to my own and Secretary Carter’s party.

Before leaving here I made arrangements to secure the services of a competent guide to accompany me on scouts, one Williams who had been employed to drive Colonel Carter’s Ambulance, was ordered to report to me for the duty, but as will be shown, proved wholly incompetent.

After resting one day, thirty seven men and William south of Cady known to the settlers along the road was dark and stormy, vivid quick succession, succeeded by five hours, day broke to a fact that my incompetent guide to within a half mile or miles through heavy sand, but return to the post, at

This day (18th) I started with an escort of a non Citizen to drive his ambulance, this With the Escort and Citizens well armed men.

At midnight the springs also at his own request meet the Indians once more at the post in charge of Sergeant and tried soldier, as I was guide this time one of men to the place, and succeeded at dawn of day. I divided Lieut Hardenburg the command and advanced upon the Ranch having abandoned it appalling and whatever pertains my men disappointed and miles through deep sand. Without a guide, without able to obtain information now accomplished all in my disposal. To attempt Rocky mountains, without have been full and careful pillaging by the Indians over.

I made a full and careful and energetic young officer the Lieut’s opinion, for the and energetic young officer the savages to attack the design what was to prevent already extremely small g
After resting one day, I started at midnight on the 17th with thirty seven men and Williams as guide, for a point about fifteen miles south of Cady known as warm springs, where I was informed by settlers along the road was a large “Indian” Rancherie. The night was dark and stormy, vivid flashes of lightning followed each other in quick succession, succeeded by loud peals of thunder. After marching five hours, day broke to reveal to me the astonishing and mortifying fact that my incompetent guide had by describing a circle conducted me to within a half mile of Camp Cady. We had travelled about twenty miles through heavy sand & my footmen were worn out, and I could but return to the post, and make another attempt on another night.

This day (18th) I started secretary Carter on his journey to Prescott with an escort of a non Com’d Officer and eight privates with Williams to drive his ambulance, the mans services being no longer of use to me. With the Escort and Citizens the secretary had in his party twenty well armed men.

At midnight of the 19th I again started with thirty men for warm springs also at his own request, Lieut. Hardenburg, who was eager to meet the Indians once more in battle. I did not deem it unsafe to leave the post in charge of Sergeant John Crane of my company a trusty and tried soldier, as I would be absent but a short time. I had as a guide this time one of my teamsters (James Sharran) who had been to the place, and succeeded without difficulty in reaching the springs at dawn of day. I divided my small force into two parties, giving to Lieut Hardenburg the command of one and leading the other myself advanced upon the Rancheria which we found deserted, the Indians having abandoned it apparently about a week previous. I burned the huts and whatever pertained to them and returned to Camp, with my men disappointed and weary from the march of thirty or more miles through deep sand and on the return under a burning sun. Without a guide, without any knowledge of the country myself, unable to obtain information of the whereabouts of the Indians, I had now accomplished all in my power to do, with the means and men at my disposal. To attempt to lead a party over those sandy plains and rocky mountains, without knowing where to look for water, would have been little less than madness.

I made a full and careful investigation of the fight at Cady and the pillaging by the Indians of Mr. Crow’s house. In regard to the former, I disagree with Lieut Hardenburg and I write it with all deference to the Lieut’s opinion, for though inexperienced, he is a brave, zealous, and energetic young officer, in his belief that it was the intention of the savages to attack the camp, for if such had been their original design what to prevent them from executing it after three of the already extremely small garrison had been killed & a fourth disabled
by wounds, and the survivors exhausted by the exertion they had undergone, and the intense heat of the climate. Add to this too, their sparing the wounded man's life upon his simple act of giving them his neck handkerchief, and their immediate departure from the vicinity, and I think it is clearly evident that whatever evil they may have meditated, an attack on Camp Cady was not included in their plans.

From the most reliable information I could obtain, I can but conclude that Mr. Crow provoked the outrage upon his house. Crow is a Mormon, and speaks the Piute Language fluently. Seeing half a dozen Indians passing in rear of his house, he called to them to come down and talk with him. They took no notice of him, and he began to abuse them, mentioned the names of several of their chief's and denounced them as dogs and cowards. Failing thus to elicit the notice of the savages, he got his rifle and fired several shots at them, which were not even returned. By this time the Indians had reached the brush and were out of sight. Mr. Crow became alarmed and taking his family proceeded thirty miles up the river to the Cotton Wood Station. Leaving his wife and children there he started for Cady. His house when he passed it en route, had not been molested. He proceeded to the Camp, and the Lieut. sent a few men to Crow's place on their arrival there they found the house rifled of its contents. I cannot but believe that Mr. Crow would not have been molested had he behaved with more prudence.

I cannot readily believe it to be the desire or aim of the Indians along the Mojave route to take the lives of settlers or even to destroy their property; With the exception of horses and cattle occasionally stolen, nothing is touched by them, and surely nothing can be easier than for the Indians to lie in ambush near a house, kill the occupants on the appearance outside, burn the Hay and grain, rifle the house, and be off unseen with the stock.

Travel seems to be uninterrupted. Persons pass and repass along the road and see neither Indians nor Indian signs.

The settlers along the road are one and all urgent in their appeals to have troops stationed along the whole route, each one almost convincing me beyond doubt, that his own particular Ranch or its immediate vicinity, is the very best site for a military station.

For my own part, I am of opinion that a detachment of forty men provided with about twenty horses, and the same number of carbines to be used on escort duty, will be ample to Garrison Cady and keep the road open.

Should the Maj. Genl. Comd'g. contemplate a campaign against the Chimeuwawa and Pi-Ute tribes, I would respectfully suggest that it would be necessary to have at least one hundred men a large portion of which should be Cavalry.

It is politic to make war upon the tribes, for as tribes they are free, and committed by renegades and outlaws.

The citizens of San Bernardino, Los Angeles, and San Diego, have petitioned the people of the State to have a Post located at the mouth of the river from actual observation of the establishment of a Post at the Cotton Wood Station. Leaving his wife and children there he started for Cady. His house when he passed it en route, had not been molested. He proceeded to the Camp, and the Lieut. sent a few men to Crow's place on their arrival there they found the house rifled of its contents. I cannot but believe that Mr. Crow would not have been molested had he behaved with more prudence.

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by the exertion they had made. Add to this too, their simple act of giving them the departure from the whatever evil they may have not been included in the act of giving them a parting from the evil they may not have been included in their house. Crow is not a fluent speaker. Seeing half a dozen men to Crow's place to call to them to come near him, and he began to hear of their chief's and how thus to elicit the notice of several shots at them, which Indians had reached Cady. His not been molested. He procured a few men to Crow's place to be rifled of its contents. I have been informed that the people of San Bernardino and its vicinity have petitioned the Maj. Genl. Commanding to have a Military Post located at the mouth of the San Gorgonio pass. I know nothing about the advantages to be derived from the establishment of a Post at that point. It is about fifty miles south west of Cady, a good road leading to it. Also as I am informed by respectable and reliable citizens, a road leads a direct easterly route to La Paz, and still another south easterly, to Fort Yuma, with good grass, wood, and water at convenient distances. The distance to Fort Mojave via: the San Gorgonio pass is shortened about sixty miles, and the road is said to be entirely practicable. If such a post is established it should be garrisoned by at least a company of Cavalry, and a strong detachment of Infantry.

The garrison at Camp Cady now consists of one Commissioned Officer and forty enlisted men, fifteen of the latter are out on escort duty between that post and Prescott and two with a wagon loaded with subsistence stores from this depot. That leaves to garrison this post but thirty men a force almost inadequate to perform the duties required at the Depot, to guard the prisoners, and keep the post in order, especially when it is considered that frequent escorts have to be furnished. I have four on that duty at this time.

I regret exceedingly my inability to report a fight with and defeat of the Indians. Had my facilities for finding them been at all commensurate with the eagerness of not only myself, but every other man with me, complete success would have crowned my expedition.

Trusting that what I have done may meet with approval

I am General
Respectfully
Your Obt Servt
P A Owen
Captain 9th U S Infantry
Commanding.
Bibliographical Note

There are at least three other accounts of the Battle at Camp Cady in the published literature. The earliest of these is in Philip Johnston’s article on Camp Cady *Gibraltar of the Old Frontier* which appeared in the May 1934 issue of *Westways*. Johnston puts the date of the fight correctly as July 29, 1866. He reports a Lieutenant Hartman as being in charge of the troops, puts the number of troops at Cady during the engagement at twenty, and states that five soldiers were killed. He goes on to say that a posse of citizens from San Bernardino came to Cady’s relief.

There are some errors in this account. First, the lieutenant in charge of the forces at Camp Cady on July 29, 1866 was Lieutenant Hardenbergh and not a Lieutenant Hartman. In fact, it can be shown that there were no commissioned officers named Hartman in the regular United States Army at that time. Second, Hardenbergh did not have twenty soldiers available at the time of the battle. There were probably no more than eleven white people at Cady at the time counting Hardenbergh, the post doctor, and the wife of one of the enlisted men. A third error is in the statement that five men were killed when the number actually killed was only three. This can be established definitely from various army records. Last, Johnston mentions that a posse of citizens came from San Bernardino to Hardenbergh’s aid. From the information available, I believe this is not correct. However, a few citizens passing over the road may have stopped at Cady after the battle.

Johnston’s article on Camp Cady was followed by Leonard Waitman’s *The History of Camp Cady* which was originally published in the March 1954 quarterly of the Historical Society of Southern California and later reprinted in the Spring 1968 quarterly of the San Bernardino County Museum Association. Waitman repeats Johnston’s statements and quite correctly references Johnston as his source.

In 1965 Camp Cady is covered in Herbert M. Hart’s book *Old Forts of the Far West*. Hart mentions this incident and repeats all but one of Johnston’s errors. He leaves “Lieutenant Hartman” out of it but mentions that there were twenty troopers present, that five soldiers were killed, and that a posse came from San Bernardino. Hart does not reference his specific source for this information; however both Johnston’s and Waitman’s articles appear in his bibliography.

My conclusion is that Johnston started all the trouble in his article in 1934 and that his errors were simply repeated in the two subsequent articles. Where did Johnston get his information? It seems possible to me that his statements were based upon a letter that appeared in the September 16, 1871 issue of the San Bernardino Guardian. This letter was from San Bernardino to the County. While citizen traveler heard the st newspaper as follows:

> When Lieut. Hardman the Indians were very near the fort and the soldiers in the vicinity (eleven) was asked if they were to be repulsed, and the writer of 1871 might take the next day to San Bernardino. Once Hardman and then to Hart’s book *Old Forts of the Far West*. Hart mentions this incident and repeats all but one of Johnston’s errors. He leaves “Lieutenant Hartman” out of it but mentions that there were twenty troopers present, that five soldiers were killed, and that a posse came from San Bernardino. Hart does not reference his specific source for this information; however both Johnston’s and Waitman’s articles appear in his bibliography.

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When Lieut. Hardman was in command here [at Camp Cady], the Indians were very troublesome. They at one time gathered all the warriors in the vicinity and cooped up the Lieut. and his men (about 20) in the Fort. The Indians showing themselves very openly, and with derisive gestures and actions, finally the Lieut’s valor got the better of descretion and he made a sortie on his foes, they having the advantage of cover in the dense foliage on the banks of the river, he was disastrously repulsed, and returned to the Fort, leaving four or five of his men killed or wounded. They however had succeeded in sending out a messenger to San Bernardino for assistance; the citizens promptly responded, and in a few days quite a number of men arrived and relieved them from their predicament.

It is quite possible that Johnston read this article and changed “Hardman” to “Hartman.” He had a reasonable justification for doing this because at another place in the Guardian article the unidentified traveler mentions a man on the Mojave River named Hartman who was a former soldier (enlisted man) from Camp Cady. It may be that Johnston assumed that the appearance of the name Hardman was a typographical error and that Hartman was intended. In actual fact, the writer of 1871 might have been trying to spell something closer to Hardenbergh. Once Hardenbergh’s name had been transformed to Hardman and then to Hartman, it would be a simple matter for “about 20” soldiers present at Camp Cady to become the “Hartman with twenty soldiers” that Johnston has in his article. Also, “four or five of his men killed or wounded” could become “five of them were killed and several wounded.” As a final observation we might note that the writer of the 1871 letter is quite definite about the assistance from San Bernardino. However, he does not give them any formal organization that the word “posse” would imply.
Notes


4. For example, Lt. Col. Benj. L. Beall, 1st Dragoons, wrote as follows from Fort Tejon in 1860: “Report says that he [referring to the murder of Thomas S. Williams] was killed by Indians at the instigation of Mormons: again another report is in circulation that Mormons disguised as Indians killed him.” Beall to Mackall, 13 Apr. 1860 (NA, RG-393, Department of California Letters Received (hereafter cited as DCLR), B-16 of 1860). Maj. William Whann Mackall was adjutant general for the Department of California at the time.

5. The terms Carleton made with the Indians on that day are described in detail in the following letter: Carleton to Mackall, 2 July 1860 (NA, RG-393, DCLR, C-75 series of 1860).

6. The date the original Camp Cady was abandoned is taken from the following letter: Carleton to Mackall, 9 July 1860 (NA, RG-393, DCLR, C-78 of 1860).

7. Capt. (later major-general) Winfield S. Hancock, quartermaster in Los Angeles in 1860, was among the first to notice that the Pah-Utes were beginning to frequent the road along the Mojave River and to note that they had rarely been seen there in earlier times. See the following letter: Hancock to Carleton, 27 Sept. 1860 (NA, RG-393, DCLR, H-29 series of 1860).

8. The official report of Curtis’s tour of inspection over the Mojave Road is the following: Curtis to Drum, 2 Mar. 1865 (NA, RG-393, Department of the Pacific Letters Received, C-56 series of 1865). Maj. Richard C. Drum was Adjutant General for the Military Department of the Pacific at the time.

9. See “Camp Cady Post Return for April 1865” (NA, M-617, Roll 164).

10. The report of inspection of Camp Cady is the following: Whittier to Scott, 18 Jan. 1866 (NA, RG-159, Inspector General’s Office Letters Received, P-8 series of 1866). Maj. Robert N. Scott was Adjutant General for the Department of California at the time.


13. Los Angeles *News*, 13

14. San Francisco *Daily Alta California*

15. “Special Orders No. 4,” California Order Books (hereafter cited as COB)


18. Dr. Hays was ordered to Fort Yuma by the Adjutant General on 9 May 1866 (NA, RG-393, Department of the Pacific Letters Received, C-56 series of 1866).

19. “Special Orders No. 11,” California Order Books (COB)


23. Letter, Jones to Fry, January 1866 (NA, RG-393, Inspector General’s Office Letters Received, P-8 series of 1866). This letter was an item in the *Daily Alta California*, 1 July 1866.

24. There are accounts of the following newspapers: *Daily Alta California*, 1 July 1866.


26. Accounts of this item in *Daily Alta California*, 1 July 1866; and, Wilmington *Journal*, 30 June 1866.

27. Letter, Owen to A.A. Casebier, *Wilmington, California*, 1 July 1866.


16. “Regimental Return for the 9th Infantry for May 1866” (NA, M-665 Roll 103). An item in the Wilmington (California) Journal, 12 May 1866, states that Yard left with his detachment on 10 May instead of 7 May as implied in the Regimental Return.

17. This woman is mentioned as “Mrs. Corp. Lewis” in an item in the Wilmington Journal, 11 Aug. 1866. However, there were no men by the name Lewis in Company “D” 9th Infantry at the time. Therefore, her identity remains a mystery.

18. Dr. Hays was ordered to Camp Cady by the following: “Special Orders No. 95, 14 May 1866” (NA, RG-94, DCOB, Vol. 187).


23. Letter, Jones to Fry, 2 July 1867 (NA, RG-159, Inspector General’s Office Letters Received). Lt. Col. Roger Jones was inspector general for the military Division of the Pacific at the time. Lt. Col. James B. Fry was adjutant general for the division. This letter has been published in the following: Dennis G. Casebier, Camp El Dorado, Arizona Territory — Soldiers, Steamboats, and Miners on the Upper Colorado River (Tempe: Arizona Historical Foundation, 1970), 80-85.

24. There are accounts of the attack on George Andrews and his escort in the following newspapers: Prescott Arizona Miner, 13 June 1866; San Francisco Daily Alta California, 1 July 1866; and, Wilmington Journal, 30 June 1866.

25. See San Francisco Daily Alta California, 1 July 1866; and Wilmington Journal, 30 June 1866.

26. Accounts of this incident are given in the following: San Francisco Daily Alta California, 1 July 1866; San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin, 26 June 1866; and, Wilmington Journal, 30 June 1866.

relief after the battle at Camp Cady. His report of 28 Aug. is reproduced herewith in the appendix. The discussion of the battle at Camp Cady is based largely upon Owen's report (just referred to) and that of Hardenbergh himself which is in the following: Hardenbergh to Owen, 1 Aug. 1866 (NA, Adjutant General's Office Letters Received, M-619, Roll 533, Frames 182-186). Hardenbergh's report is also reproduced in the appendix to this paper. Accounts of the battle also appeared in the following newspapers: San Francisco Daily Alta California, 4 and 10 Aug. 1866; and, Wilmington Journal, 11 Aug. 1866.

28. For additional information about the men on duty at Camp Cady on the day of the battle, see the “Muster Roll” in the appendix to this paper.

29. According to family tradition Hardenbergh was wounded in the ankle during this battle. Also, it is mentioned in a paper in the following: “Pension File in the name of James Richmond Hardenbergh” (NA, RG-15).


32. A copy of these telegraphic instructions has not been found. However, receipt of the telegram and an abstract of its contents are documented in “Drum Barracks Post Return for August 1866” (NA, M-617, Roll 352).

33. The date of Owen's return to Drum Barracks is recorded in “Regimental Return for the 9th Infantry for August 1866” (NA, M-665, Roll 103).

34. Drum to Owen, 30 Aug. 1866 (NA, RG-393, Drum Barracks Letters Received).

35. The Court of Inquiry was established by “Special Orders No. 229, 21 Nov. 1866” (NA, RG-94, DCOB, Vol. 187). The officers constituting the Court were 1st Lt. Charles Hobart, 8th Cavalry, and 2d Lt. Joseph L. Jack, 14th Infantry.


37. The contractor for this mail route was James W. Parker of New York. He was paid at the rate of $23,247.00 per year for carrying the mail once each week in each direction between Prescott and San Bernardino by way of Hardyville on the Colorado River. See “Official Records on Mail Route No. 17201” (NA, RG-28, Mail Route Register Vol. 321, pp.2-4).

38. For details about Price's dealings with the Pah-Utes see the following letter: Price to Sherburne, 24 Nov. 1867 (NA, RG-393, District of Upper Colorado Letters Sent, Vol. 309).

39. The details about the enlisted men who were present at Camp Cady on the day of the battle are taken from the following sources: “Regimental Returns for the 9th Infantry” (NA, M-665, Roll 103); “Muster Rolls for Company “D” 9th Infantry” (NA, RG-94); “Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army” (NA, M-233).

40. Hardenbergh's reference to Doctor Hays suggests that the doctor was present at Drum Barracks, which would imply that he traveled there after the battle. This seems unlikely since medical aid was needed at Camp Cady.
31.

41. James P. T. Carter, Secretary of the Territory of Arizona, was on his way to attend the Third Legislative Assembly of the Territory which was to be convened at Prescott on 3 Oct. 1866. The commanding officers at Drum Barracks, Camp Cady, and Fort Mojave were required to provide the secretary with an escort and with transportation for his baggage. See “Special Orders No. 148, 26 July 1866” (NA, RG-94, DCOB, Vol. 187).

42. It seems likely that the “warm springs” referred to here is the present Kane Spring about five miles south of Newberry.
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