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California National Guard and the Mexican Border, 1914-16

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IN THE SPRING of 1914, property owners in Imperial Valley, California, sent letters and telegrams to Gov. Hiram Johnson's office requesting that contingents of the California National Guard be sent to the Mexican border where, for several weeks, there had been spasmodic raids by bands from Lower California. The Imperial Valley communities were further alarmed by a report that the Mexicans were about to cut the portion of the American irrigation canal which ran through Mexican territory.¹

All of this was part of a much larger picture,² involving the relations between Mexico and the United States which had become strained after the abdication of Porfirio Diaz, Mexican dictator-president, in 1911. Strained relations within Mexico herself characterized the same years, but all factions were opposed to the Diaz policy of close cooperation with America. "Yankeeophobia" had its heyday during this period, with Mexican writers castigating the United States for her exploitation of Mexican oil and mineral resources.³ Soon after the assassination of Francisco Madero by the Huerta group in 1913, and the latter's rise to power, President Woodrow Wilson decided to take a hand in stabilizing the Mexican government. His policy of non-recognition and "watchful waiting" proved exasperating to Huerta's administration. Indeed, Wilson's reversal of the traditional American policy of recognition of de facto governments, plus his efforts to win the great European powers over to his views, virtually doomed Huerta. On their part, American property-holders along the border were disgusted with "watchful waiting" and were angry that little had been done to punish Mexico for allowing her citizens to commit depredations on American soil. Finally on April 9, 1914, came the attack on Americans at the Mexican oil-center port of Tampico. When the Huerta government's apologies seemed insufficient, Wilson, on April twentieth, asked con-

gress for authority to intervene by force of arms in Mexico. The next day American forces bombarded and captured Vera Cruz. Diplomatic relations were completely severed and war seemed imminent.

Since 1911, Mexican army posts along the border had been reinforced on several occasions. American regular troops were scattered from San Diego, California, to Brownsville, Texas, but were too few in numbers to provide adequate protection to all parts of the line; and early in 1914 a brigade was transferred to El Paso, Texas, one of the centers of trouble for the moment, thus leaving southern California protected only by the garrison at Fort Rosecrans in San Diego County.⁴ With the movement of regulars to El Paso had come an increase in depredations along the California border. San Diegans were alarmed over the supposed reinforcement of Mexican forces based just across the border at Tiajuana, and their voices were added to those of El Centro and the Imperial Valley in requesting state protection.⁵ Though there was little evidence that the raids were officially sponsored by the Mexican government or were carried out by Mexican troops, Governor Johnson could not afford to ignore the cry of several thousand voters in an election year. Accordingly, on April twenty-third, just two days after the shelling of Vera Cruz, the Los Angeles battalion⁶ of the 7th California infantry under Col. W. G. Schreiber received telegraphic orders to proceed to the border town of Calexico, California, "to protect life and property." By 8:30 A. M. the following day, the battalion, some 221 strong, had established camp one-half mile north of Calexico.⁷

At the same time, relief was furnished the population of San Diego. The 5th and 8th companies, coast artillery corps, California National Guard, and the 3d division of California naval militia,⁸ all based in San Diego, were ordered to active duty. These organizations were formed into a provisional brigade and placed under the command of Maj. Herbert R. Fay of the coast artillery corps.⁹ As the San Diego water system seemed to be most vulnerable to sabotage, the above-mentioned units took up positions at the various reservoirs and water conduits.¹⁰ Disposition of troops was as follows: Maj. Herbert R. Fay and staff to Coronado Wye;¹¹ Capt. R. J. Hay and medical staff to Coronado Wye; Lt. D. M. Stewart and 3d division, California Naval Militia, to Highlands Reservoir (near Palm City), with the exception of one detachment under Boatswain-Mate Watson to Cuyamaca Water Company; Capt. S. E. Clyde and one platoon, 5th Co., to Otay Lake; Capt. J. C. Bush and one platoon, 8th Co., to Morena Dam; 1st Lt. W. W. Rhein and one platoon,

5th Co., to Sweetwater Dam; 1st Lt. James Muerhead and one platoon, 8th Co., to junction of San Diego and Coronado pipe lines.¹²

National guardsmen found the duty interesting almost from the beginning. On April twenty-fourth, two tons of dynamite were removed from a stone quarry near Sweetwater Reservoir, and the ten Mexicans employed by the company were discharged when it was rumored that an attempt was to be made to blow up the dam.¹³ The next day, Major Fay was asked to confer with Capt. C. M. Condon, commanding officer of U. S. regulars in the San Ysidro area, concerning the poisoning of the San Diego water supply. A large amount of cyanide of potassium had disappeared and was assumed to be in the hands of Mexican guerrillas. As a result of the conference, Fay increased the guard around the vital reservoirs.¹⁴

On April 26, 1914, the guard detachment at Camp Otay noticed a small band of men "acting in a suspicious manner in traversing the Otay Mesa." These men were moving in a "northerly direction from the Mexican line" and gave every indication of wishing to remain unobserved. Fay's headquarters were notified and small units of state troops dispatched to intercept the party. As a result of this maneuver, three badly-frightened Chinese, making illegal entry into the United States, were captured and turned over to immigration officials in San Diego.¹⁵ The whole affair proved a disappointment to the eager young soldiers who hoped to apprehend Mexican guerrillas.

Still more excitement was to come to the San Diego contingent the same afternoon. National guard headquarters received a telephone message from the regular army commander stating that he had information that Mexico was making an attempt to smuggle rifles across the border to Mexican volunteers in the United States. The national guard forces were requested to cooperate with the regulars in guarding all roads and trails leading into Mexico from the San Diego-Yuma post road. Orders to that effect were issued to the commanding officers of the various camps, and, by nightfall, every road and trail from Palm City to Campo was covered by national guard troops. As the night passed without event, the detachments were returned next morning to their respective camps.¹⁶ This routine was repeated each day for the next several days.¹⁷

On the last day of April, some sixty Mexican internees escaped from the Point Loma, California, refugee camp where they were being held by U. S. regular troops under Capt. Frederick W. Benteen. The internees were made up primarily of Mexican federalist army troops, who

had fled across the border to American soil during their civil war with the Villa-led constitutionalist troops. Under the rules of warfare, the United States had been obligated to intern these soldiers. They had been disarmed and allowed to filter back into Mexico; but the numbers seeking temporary sanctuary in the United States increased to such an extent that the army was forced to set up internment camps to handle them.¹⁸ It was from one of these prison camps that the sixty, mentioned above, had tunneled their way to freedom. The San Diego detachments of state troops were asked to aid in the recapture of these escapees. Small units, usually of squad strength, were sent out from each of the national guard camps to patrol the possible avenues of escape into Mexico. By the end of the first day no less than fourteen of the prisoners had been retaken, the California troops making capture of six.¹⁹ Startling success marked the efforts of the guard troops during the next two days. By nightfall of May second, all except six of the prisoners had been caught, with the amateur soldiers bagging over forty.²⁰

In a move to facilitate communications between the San Diego units, a radio station was established on top of Red Butte, a small mountain just east of the city, and connected with Fay's 1st provisional-brigade headquarters at Camp Otay by field telephone. This appears to have been the first occasion on which radio was used by the California National Guard while in active service, and it proved of inestimable value during the ensuing days. The forces could now be spread more thinly, as they could be assembled without delay into larger units in case of necessity.²¹ Inspection tours were made by generals Wankowski and Forbes, and, on May eighth, 1st provisional-brigade headquarters were moved to Malta Square in Chula Vista (ten miles south of San Diego), whence routine patrols went out daily.²² Comparative peace and quiet prevailed for the next few days and the need for the guard seemed at an end.

Finally on May eleventh, after some eighteen days on active duty, the coast artillery and naval militia units around San Diego were withdrawn.²³ The 7th California infantry units, which had been stationed at Calexico, had been relieved three days earlier, as their sector proved to be calm from the beginning.²⁴

The international picture, too, was somewhat alleviated by May 1, 1914. The "A B C powers" (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) officially offered their good offices to effect, if possible, a settlement of difficulties between the United States and Mexico. Both Wilson and Huerta accepted. Representatives of the "A B C powers" met with delegates

of the United States and Mexico at Niagara Falls, Canada. Little was accomplished at this meeting, but the situation was further relieved in July 1914, when Huerta, bowing to President Wilson's pressure, went into voluntary exile. He was succeeded by Venustiano Carranza, whom Wilson had reluctantly supported. However, the peace was short-lived.

Francisco Villa, a picturesque bandit leader and rival of Carranza, rebelled against the new government. He believed that he was the logical candidate for the Mexican presidency and was bitterly vindictive toward the United States for supporting his opponent.²⁵ In January 1916, eighteen Americans were killed at Santa Ysabel. Two months later, American blood was shed on American soil. After the moon had set on the night of March 8, 1916, a band of Villa's troops, estimated at between 500 and 1000, raided the little border-town of Columbus, New Mexico. In the fight seven American soldiers were killed and seven more were wounded. In addition, eight civilians were killed and two were injured. No less than seventy-eight Mexican Villistas were slain with many more wounded.²⁶ American protests rose to a crescendo.

Two days after the Columbus foray, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing was directed to lead an expeditionary force into Mexico for the purpose of catching and punishing Villa. With the half-hearted approval of the Carranza regime, the Pershing punitive expedition crossed the international border on March fifteenth, and took up the chase.²⁷ Several of Villa's lieutenants were taken as Pershing pushed deeper into Mexico, but the wily Mexican avoided capture.²⁸ The practice it afforded the army may have been worth the cost of the expedition, but the continued violation of Mexican soil antagonized Carranza and aroused the suspicion of South Americans.²⁹

With the American forces on the border depleted by the absence of Pershing's units, new depredations were visited on American citizens along the border. Four Americans lost their lives in a Mexican attack on Glen Springs, Texas, on May 5, 1916.³⁰ Ten days later a small force of the 14th U. S. cavalry was assaulted at San Ignacio, Texas, and four troopers were fatally wounded.³¹ Something had to be done.

Anticipating further aggression upon the territory of the United States, President Wilson on May 9, 1916, called into federal service the national guard organizations of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, who were directed to proceed to Douglas, Columbus, and San Antonio, respectively.³² Even thus strengthened, the forces along the border were inadequate to patrol the long and difficult line between the United

States and Mexico. Consequently, to further insure lives and property, Wilson on June 18, 1916, ordered to active duty a large part of the organized militia and national guard of the other states. The California National Guard was included in this call.³³

Approximately 135,000 officers and enlisted men were rapidly mobilized in their respective state mobilization-camps. There they were subjected to a rigid physical examination conforming to that given the regular army. They were inspected, mustered, and equipped under the direct supervision of officers of the U. S. army, who had been detailed for that duty. As soon as possible, these amateur soldiers were transferred to large training camps in the southern department and stationed in close proximity to troops of the regular army, some 40,000 of whom had been occupying the Rio Grande district for over a year.³⁴

In compliance with the president's call, Governor Johnson directed the officers and men of the California National Guard to assemble at their armories immediately. Within a matter of twelve hours after the receipt of the governor's orders, all unit commanders in the state reported their organizations ready to entrain.³⁵

Meanwhile, the preparation of the state mobilization camp at Sacramento was being rushed. Under the direction of officers from the state staff, the state fair grounds were quickly transformed into a military camp. Sewer pipes and water mains were laid. Water was piped over the entire inner field of the race track and shower baths were installed. Work on the camp was completed on June twenty-second, only a few hours before the first contingent of troops arrived.³⁶

Entrainment of approximately 4600 guardsmen and the moving of them from all parts of California to the mobilization camp was accomplished without a hitch. Hardly a troop train was behind schedule.³⁷

At the mobilization camp, the national guard high command began to run into difficulty. The national defense act of 1916 had become the military law of the land only two weeks previously, and few, if any, national guard organizations had made a move to comply with its provisions. Among other things, the act provided for greater federalization of the national guard through a dual oath of allegiance to the United States and to the state. In general, the purpose of this oath was: (1) to establish a uniform period of enlistment; (2) to invalidate discharges granted by state authorities not in conformity with the regulations of the federal government; (3) to make unnecessary a new oath of allegiance upon muster into federal service.³⁸ In addition, standards for

national guard officers were raised and higher tactical units were prescribed.³⁹ To have implemented the new law concurrently with the mobilization for border duty would have taken too much time. Therefore, on June 23, 1916, the adjutants-general of the various states were instructed to disregard the provisions of the national defense act for the time being and transfer each unit to the border as it became reasonably equipped for field service.⁴⁰

With the military policy thus simplified, national guard officers proceeded with the task of readying their troops for border service. Rigid physical examinations, similar to those prescribed for the regular army, were given the guardsmen. At the same time officers wrestled with the problem of bringing the guard units up to regular army standards in uniforms, arms, and equipment. Theoretically, national guard troops were already operating at those standards, but this proved far from true in many states.

That the California National Guard was able to proceed to the border reasonably well armed and accoutered was largely due to the energy and sagacity of Adj.-Gen. Charles W. Thomas. Educated at Stanford and Harvard, General Thomas was particularly well fitted for the state's highest military office. He had been commissioned a second lieutenant in the Woodlands militia company in 1900 and had advanced rapidly in the national guard hierarchy until appointed adjutant-general on August 20, 1915. In his climb to the top he had gained valuable experience on every level — company, battalion, regiment, and brigade — and had recognized early the importance of good relations with the regular army. Consequently, when the call to active service came, he was able to cut governmental red-tape and secure much in the way of arms and equipment directly from the regular army establishments at the presidio in San Francisco.

Movement of the California troops to the southern border began on July 1, 1916, under a strict cloak of censorship. First to leave the Sacramento mobilization camp were soldiers of the 2d California infantry and of the 1st battalion, field artillery. Two days and 1171 miles later these units disembarked in the hot and dusty border-town of Nogales, Arizona. In rapid succession the other organizations followed. The 5th infantry departed on July third and arrived in Nogales on July fifth. The 7th infantry reached the Arizona town on July sixth, after an uncomfortable three-day train ride. Brigade headquarters and other miscellaneous troops broke camp at Sacramento on July fourth and detrained

at the border on the afternoon of July sixth.⁴¹ The entire operation of mobilizing, mustering, and transporting the California National Guard to defensive positions had been accomplished in a little over a fortnight. Had the state troops been fully trained, equipped, and ready for action this would have been a notable achievement.⁴² As it was, the guard would have been hard pressed to contain an aggressive attack, while an invasion of Mexico would have been out of the question. Oppressive heat and desert terrain would have decimated their ranks before they had marched a hundred miles.

In many states the national guard or organized militia was in a deplorable condition. Average regimental strength stood at 820 men compared to the proposed war-strength of 1900 men. Effective power of the state organizations was further cut by physical examination rejections and dependency exemptions. Maj.-Gen. Hugh Scott, army chief of staff, estimated that twenty-five per cent were physically disqualified, eight per cent failed to respond to the call of active duty, and seventeen per cent were excused because of dependents.⁴³ California organizations fared somewhat better than the nation as a whole. Each of the infantry regiments was made up of approximately 1050 officers and men, well above the nation's average;⁴⁴ 4487 of the 4600 troops transported to the Sacramento mobilization camp were accepted and sent to the border.⁴⁵ Yet, even California was far from its minimum war quota of 6954 officers and men.⁴⁶ In other words, California's effective strength was less than sixty-five per cent of the war minimum.

On arrival at the Mexican line, California troops were assigned to the 16th national guard division, a paper division,⁴⁷ and established Camp Stephen Little, one mile north of Nogales. Then began a period of time during which the soldiers were to learn and appreciate the real meaning of the phrase "watchful waiting."

Duty on the border proved to be of the most exasperating kind which a soldier can be called upon to perform. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker summed up the reasons for this in concise terms when he pointed out:

The movement and enthusiasm of active military operations supplies a spirit of its own, but the soldier who is required to wait inactive finds it difficult to reconcile himself to the privations of camp life and to the separation from home, friends, and normal occupation required of him, and yet this most trying of services is just what has been required . . . of the National Guard on the border.⁴⁸

From reveille until noon, the guardsman's day was occupied with drill

and military inspections. In the afternoon, "details," "police," and "regulations" became the most important words in his vocabulary. At night, guard duty along the international boundary line was in order. Add to this depressing routine the uninspiring food, the heat and dust of southern Arizona during the summer months, and it is easy to visualize the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the state troops.⁴⁹

The average national guard enlisted-man was unable to appreciate or understand Wilson's over-all policy. "We came down here to fight; not to sit around in camp," was heard in every national guard camp from Brownsville to Nogales.⁵⁰ When it became obvious that the military did not intend to invade Mexico, a small, but vociferous, minority of the guardsmen set up a clamor demanding that they be relieved from active duty and sent home. Families of the men besieged civil and military officials with letters and telegrams.⁵¹ As a result of this campaign, a number of guardsmen were relieved from active duty and sent home toward the end of July. Those relieved were, for the most part, men with dependent families.⁵² A surprisingly large number, however, were discharged because of disabilities. No fewer than 626 California guardsmen were to be found in the latter category, with disabilities ranging from defective vision and flat feet to acute gonorrhoea.⁵³ This high number is difficult to understand, as the physical examination taken at the Sacramento mobilization camp only a month before professed to have conformed to army standards. Surely such disabilities as flat feet and acute tuberculosis would have been apparent at that time. Either the guard officials were trying for a good mobilization record at the time of the first physical examination, or the examining officers at Nogales were sympathetic to the guardsmen's desire to return home and thereby "doctored" the records. The first possibility seems the more logical since the entire national guard program was under fire at the time.⁵⁴

Steps had to be taken to prevent the complete stripping of border units of their manpower. To remove further need for dependency discharges, congress voted \$2,000,000 to be used to alleviate the suffering of the families of the national guardsmen.⁵⁵ At the same time, the regular army recruiting-service began recruiting for the national guard units in federal service.⁵⁶

In August the national guard found it necessary to set up schools to train privates to take over positions left vacant by the discharge of non-commissioned officers.⁵⁷ This became necessary when it was found that a majority of those discharged for dependency reasons were to be found

in the non-commissioned officer category. An army without its corporals and sergeants is in a sad condition, whatever might be the opinion of the privates.

For a moment on August fourth, it seemed possible that the California National Guard troops would get their long-awaited chance for action. Shortly after 1:00 A.M. Sentry Claude Howard of the 12th U. S. infantry was shot by a sniper hidden on the Mexican side of the Santa Cruz River. Ten members of Co. C, 5th California infantry, on patrol duty in the vicinity returned the sniper's fire. The fusillade aroused soldiers from both sides of the river, and, when a large body of Mexican soldiers were observed approaching the international bridge from the Mexican side, a battle seemed imminent. American reinforcements were rushed to the scene, but there was no further demonstration by the Mexicans. In keeping with Wilson's policy, orders were issued by the U. S. commander demanding utmost restraint on the part of the Americans. A formal request was made to General Calles, Mexican commandant of the state of Sonora, for full explanation of the shooting.⁵⁸

August passed without further incident, and rumors that the guard was being sent home began to circulate. Newspapers were largely responsible for the perplexity of the state troops as to when their term of service would end. Headlines reading "Guardsmen Will Return To Their Homes Soon" were followed by vague and unedifying columns of incoherence. Wild rumors fixing the date for departure would sweep the camp, and when the heralded date passed uneventfully a new date would be set. Finally the troops became so disgusted that the mere mentioning of "return home" was taboo and "rumor mongers" were severely dealt with.⁵⁹

Much to the relief of the troops, September brought cooler weather to southern Arizona. The days were still warm but the nights cold. Now the hue and cry went up for extra blankets and sweaters. Requisitions were made, and after the usual delay of several weeks the quartermaster corps forwarded an extra blanket for each man. Sweaters proved harder to get, only about one-half of the guardsmen being able to secure them. The nights presented a real problem. One national guardsman described it thus:

Instead of retiring scantily clad in regulation underwear and wrapped in a blanket, the Guardsman now removed leggins and shoes only, donned a sweater (if he were the lucky possessor of one), put on several extra pairs of socks, wrapped himself in two blankets, with poncho and overcoat on top, and even then slept with some discomfort.⁶⁰

The movement of 150,000 national guardsmen to the border had had a quieting effect on Mexico. Wilson had in Bismarckian fashion used the army as an arm of diplomacy. Regardless of the efficiency or otherwise of the force, its numbers served to overawe the Mexican jingoist who had clamored for war with the United States. By the end of August it was apparent that all the national guard would not be needed.

On September first, orders were issued directing the return of several regiments of state troops to their home station. The 5th California infantry was one of those returned.⁶¹ In compliance with these orders, fifty officers and 651 enlisted men of the regiment left Nogales on September first for the state mobilization camp at Sacramento. One officer and thirty-five men, a supply company, were left at Nogales to care for the horses and other regimental property. Two days later this supply company departed for Sacramento with the horses, mules, and wagons.⁶² On arriving at Sacramento on September fourth, the 5th infantry went into camp, where routine duties were performed until the regiment was mustered out of federal service on October 7, 1916.⁶³

Other California organizations remained on the border and spent the next several weeks in intensive training maneuvers. On September 9, 1916, the 1st California brigade was ordered by the commanding general of the Nogales district "to proceed by marching" to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for target and field practice. The fifty-mile march was accomplished between September tenth and September fifteenth, with heavy packs, loose sand, and choking dust during the day, plus cold nights and pup tents.⁶⁴ Camp was finally established four miles beyond Fort Huachuca at Garden Canyon where the brigade remained until October seventh. Rifle practice and unit maneuvers became the order of the day during this three-weeks period. The rigorous routine was broken on October seventh, when the California brigade was ordered back to Nogales. Somewhat hardened by their recent experiences, the troops were able this time to negotiate the distance in three days — two days less than the outgoing march had taken.⁶⁵

Orders were issued on October 18, 1916, directing the 1st brigade headquarters, the 7th infantry regiment, Co. B of the signal corps, and the 1st squadron cavalry to move to mobilization camp in Los Angeles, to muster out of federal service. The directive was carried out with dispatch, with the brigade headquarters and the 7th infantry entraining at Nogales on October eighteenth and establishing camp at Exposition Park in Los Angeles on October twentieth. Other units followed in

rapid order with Co. B, signal corps, arriving in Los Angeles on October twenty-first, the 2d infantry regiment on October twenty-fifth, and the 1st squadron of cavalry on the twenty-eighth. The mustering out of these units and other miscellaneous troops extended over the next five months.⁶⁶

It is difficult to determine accurately the real accomplishments of the national guard while on the border. The guard was not called upon to engage the enemy, with a few minor exceptions, and consequently many observers remember only the debacle of mobilization and the unpreparedness of the state forces. However, it seems likely that the mere presence on the border of 150,000 state troops discouraged further depredations on American soil by Mexicans. Maj.-Gen. William A. Mann, chief of the militia bureau, states flatly "that they [the national guard] had rendered more valuable service to their country by preventing war than by making it."⁶⁷ As to personnel, misfits were eliminated, good men dressed into shape and made accustomed to the larger part they were to play in World War I, for which the Mexican border served as training ground.⁶⁸ Summed up by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Reily:

Without the Mexican Border Service it is extremely doubtful if General Pershing would have had the 300,000 with which he intervened in the Second Battle of the Marne; the 500,000 with which he smashed the Saint Mihiel salient and prepared the way for Foch's intended November 14, attack to open the Moselle Valley route into Germany and the 1,200,000 used in the Argonne to first push back, then break the pivot of the German line in France.⁶⁹

NOTES

1. Calif. Adj.-Gen.'s Office, *An. Rept.* [hereafter cited as *AGO Rept.*], 1914-20 (Sacramento, 1920), p. 46.
2. J. Fred Rippey, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), pp. 344-60.
3. J. Fred Rippey, "Literary Yankeeophobia in Hispanic America," *Journ. Internat. Rels.*, XII (Jan. and Apr. 1921), 350 ff, 524 ff.
4. U. S. War Dept., *An. Rept.* [hereafter cited as *USWD Rept.*], 1914 (Washington, D. C., 1914), I, 135-36.
5. *AGO Rept.*, 1914-20, pp. 13-14.

6. According to Field Return, 7th infantry detachment, Apr. 30, 1914, this force was composed of the following:

Co. A	Los Angeles	Capt. Warren J. Holder
Co. B	" "	Capt. Edwin M. Mettler
Co. C	" "	Capt. James Irwin
Co. F	" "	Capt. Frank McReynolds
Detach. Hosp. Corps	" "	1st Lt. Samuel M. Alter
HQ Detach.	" "	Col. W. G. Schribers [Schreiber]

7. Field Return (note 6 above), Apr. 24, 1914. Unless stated otherwise, all reports, field returns, orders, letters and telegrams here cited are in the adj.-gen's files, Sacramento.

8. The Calif. naval militia was under the adj.-gen. at this time.

9. Gen. Order No. 1; also in Monthly Return, 3d div., Calif. naval militia, Apr. 1914.

10. Letter, Maj. Herbert R. Fay to Adj.-Gen. Edwin A. Forbes, Apr. 25, 1914.

11. Later moved to Camp Otay.

12. Field Order No. 1, provisional brigade, Apr. 23, 1914.

13. Letter, Fay to Forbes, Apr. 25, 1914.

14. Same to same, Apr. 26, 1914.

15. Same to same, Apr. 27, 1914.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Same to same, Apr. 29, 1914.

18. Capt. George H. Estes, "The Internment of Mexican Troops in 1914," *Infantry Journ.*, XI (May-June 1915), 747-69.

19. Letters, Fay to Forbes, Apr. 30, 1914.

20. Same to same, May 2, 1914. In this report to the adj.-gen., Major Fay mentions only twenty-eight captives, but "about fifty" is given as the correct figure in *AGO Report.*, 1910-14, p. 47.

21. Letter, Fay to Forbes, May 4, 1914.

22. Same to same, May 8, 1914.

23. Same to same, May 11, 1914.

24. Field Order, 7th infantry detachment, May 8, 1914.

25. Rippey (note 2 above), p. 345.

26. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 186-87.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-88.

28. Frank Tompkins, *Chasing Villa* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1934), *passim*.

29. Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (New York, 1950), p. 443.

30. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 188.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 280; see also *Sen. Doc. 695*, 64th Cong., 2d sess., 1917, pp. 1-60. A concurrent resolution of the Calif. legislature, adopted May 17, 1861,

reads as follows: "California is ready . . . at all times to respond to any requisition that may be made upon her to defend the republic against foreign or domestic foe." (*Calif. Stats.*, 1861, p. 686). Only twice prior to 1914 (viz., in 1861 and 1898) were California troops required to serve as defenders of the nation's borders.

33. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 281.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 1132-33.
35. *AGO Rept.*, 1914-20, p. 13.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 944.
39. *U. S. Stats.*, XXXIX (1916), 197-202.
40. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 12-14.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
42. "The Mobilization of the National Guard," *Infantry Journ.*, XIII (July-Oct. 1916), 76-79.
43. *Universal Military Training Hearings*, on U. S. sen. bill 1695, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1917), pp. 120-23.
44. *AGO Rept.*, 1914-20, pp. 14-19.
45. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 433.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 1132.
47. "The National Guard of California" (manuscript, adj.-gen.'s office, Sacramento), VIII, 53; the seventeen volumes in this collection were compiled in 1940, with the assistance of the Works Project Administration, from records in the adj.-gen.'s office, state archives, and state library.
48. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 15.
49. Roger Batchelder, *Watching and Waiting on the Border* (Boston, 1917), pp. 68-80.
50. *USWD Rept.*, 1917, I, 854.
51. George Marvin, "The Folks They Left Behind Them," *Worlds Work*, XXXII (Oct. 1916), 690-95; contains excerpts from letters sent to President Wilson, the secy.-of-war, etc.
52. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 14.
53. Letters, Gen. Robert Wankowski to commanding officer, 1st Calif. brigade, July 29, 1916; see also telegram, Wankowski to Adj.-Gen. Thomas, July 28, 1916.
54. "Mobilizing the National Guard—a Lesson on Preparedness," *Current Opinion*, LXI (Aug. 1916), 75-77; one of many articles castigating inefficiency of the process. Shortly before, Secy.-of-War L. M. Garrison had proposed a continental army, with elimination of the national guard. Upon failure of Wilson to support his plan, Garrison resigned from the cabinet.
55. *USWD Rept.*, 1916, I, 14.
56. Tompkins (note 28 above), p. 228. By Oct. 1916, over 15,000 had been recruited.

57. Field Return, 1st Calif. brigade, Aug. 1916.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Batchelder (note 49 above), pp. 115-16.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Leaving the border at about the same time were three regiments from New York, two from New Jersey, one from Maryland, two from Illinois, two from Missouri, one from Oregon, one from Washington (state), and one from Louisiana, making in all about 15,000 troops.

62. Field Return, 1st Calif. brigade, Sept. 3, 1916.

63. *AGO Rept.*, 1914-20, p. 18.

64. Field Return, 1st Calif. brigade, Sept. 1916.

65. *Ibid.*, Oct. 1916.

66. *AGO Rept.*, 1914-20, pp. 14-19.

67. *USWD Rept.*, 1917, I, 854. Had the state troops been returned to their homes before the general election of Nov. 4, 1916, it is possible that Charles Evans Hughes, and not Woodrow Wilson, would have won the presidency. "Mobilization for peace and not for war" was difficult to understand, and Wilson won California by less than 3000 votes. At least that many voters were basking in the Arizona sun or in mobilization camps, their absentee ballots uncast. Several other states were equally precarious.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

69. Tompkins, *op. cit.*, p. 229.