THE ACTIVITIES OF TWO AGENCIES OF THE
CPH BRANCH, HIS, G-2, WDGS
THE INTERROGATION SECTION
FORT HUNT, VIRGINIA
TRACY, CALIFORNIA
AND
THE MIS-X SECTION
FORT HUNT, VIRGINIA
Covering the Period from
1 August 1942
to
1 August 1945

Prepared by
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Lieutenant Colonel, AUS
Originally with POW Branch, Fort Hunt, 14 November 1942 to 7 October 1943
Subsequently Commanding Officer, 2692 Headquarters Company, CSDIC, AFHQ and 624 DIC (MIS) ETOUSA from 18 October 1943 to 1 June 1945
This report is not the work of a single individual. While the undersigned must assume full responsibility for the arrangement of materials included and for the actual writing of the report, he has drawn freely upon previously prepared reports, both from the Interrogation Section and from MIS-X Periodic Summaries. The latter, usually appearing monthly, serve as nothing else could to trace the progressive development of the activities of MIS-X over the period of the three years of its existence. Also, each sub-section of MIS-X has prepared, or is now in process of preparing, a detailed history of its activities. These have been made available in rough draft to the author of this report and should serve, when finally completed, to provide a detailed record for future reference.

During the past year also various officers of the Interrogation Section have prepared tentative reports on their respective sub-sections. Unfortunately, it is now difficult to determine, in all cases, the actual authorship of each of these reports. However, the author has found of especial usefulness reports of this nature made by Lt. Colonel W. H. Zeh of the Air Sub-Section, Major T. L. Morris of the Technical Sub-Section, Major E. W. Lohrke of the Document Sub-Section, Major S. S. Szlapka of the Editorial and Evaluating Sub-Section, and Captain A. A. Wulff of the Enemy Intelligence Sub-Section. By the free use of these, it has been possible to present a reasonably accurate picture of the interrogation procedure at Fort Hunt.

/s/ THOMAS C. VAN CLEVE
THOMAS C. VAN CLEVE
Lt. Colonel, AUS
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**INTERROGATION CENTER**

P. O. BOX 651, Tracy, California

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At the time of its activation the prisoner of War Branch of MIS (later to be known as the Captured Personnel and Material Branch) was grouped with the Military Attachés, Psychological Warfare, Foreign liaison, and the Geographic Section, under the Assistant Chief of MIS for Administration (ACMIS-A) (See Chart #I). Thereafter, minor shifts were made in its position in the chain of command as indicated in the charts below until, finally, in the reorganization of GO2 in the summer of 1944 a more fundamental change was made. These were as follows:

April 1943 - Together with the Special Branch under the immediate control of the Deputy of A. C. of S., G-2, and Chief of MIS (Chart II).

August 1943 - Under the Deputy for Administration, G-2, through the Executive Office and the Organization Control Staff, together with C.I., Collection Group, Historical Branch, Service Group, Training Group (Chart III).

Sept. 1943 - Immediately under the Deputy for Intelligence, G-2, and grouped with the Planning and Strategy Group, Collection Group, Order of Battle Branch, and the Theater Group (Chart IV).

June 1944 - Immediately under the Supervision of Source Control - through the Director of Information to the Chief of MIS (Chart V). At this time also it ceased to be designated as the Prisoner of War Branch and was hence forth described as the Captured Personnel and Material Branch.
November, 1942

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 and Chief of MIS.

Military Intelligence Service

Asst. Chief of MIS for Administration (ACMIS-A)

Administration

Operations

Prisoner of War

Chain of Command from the A. C. of S., G-2, to the Chief, Prisoner of War Branch.
April, 1943

UNCLASSIFIED

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 and Chief, M.I.S.

Intelligence Group

Special Branch

Prisoner of War Branch

Chain of Command from the A.C. of S., G-2, to the Chief, Prisoner of War Branch.

II

UNCLASSIFIED
Chain of Command from the A. C. of S., G-2 to the Chief, Prisoner of War Branch.

August, 1943
Planning and Order of Strategy Battle Group

Order of Battle Branch

Collection Group

Prisoner of War Branch

Theater Group

Chain of Command from the A. C. of S., G-2, to the Chief, Prisoner of War Branch.
December, 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

Chief, MIS.
Deputy Chief, MIS.

Director of Information

Supervision of Source Control

Captured Personnel and Material Branch

Chain of Command from
The A. C. of S., G-2, to the Chief of Captured Personnel and Material Branch.
PART I
ORIGIN OF THE INTERROGATION CENTERS
FOR THE
INTERROGATION OF WAR PRISONERS
FORT HUNT AND TRACY
PART I

ORIGIN OF THE INTERROGATION CENTERS FOR THE INTERROGATION OF WAR PRISONERS

A. Historical Sketch to Time of Activation

Between 25 June and 17 December 1941, ONI made a study of the center located near London for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War. This study "was carried on by correspondence and first-hand information secured by a representative sent to England for that specific purpose." (1) As a result of this study a Memorandum containing recommendations, approved by the Secretary of Navy for the formation of Interrogation centers to be used in the Interrogation of war Prisoners, was forwarded to the Secretary of War. (2) This memorandum requested the Secretary of War to give approval to these recommendations and "initiate such action as may be necessary to place them in effect."

In detail, these recommendations were:

1. "The experience of the British during the present war appears to have demonstrated -- and our examination of the subject would lend support to the view -- that a greater certainty for obtaining proper results from the interrogation of captured submarine crews, airmen, and a limited number of selected army prisoners, was assured only when it was possible for trained officers to conduct such interrogations in a central interrogation center rather than at the time of capture.

2. Since the joint Army and Navy agreement provides that Naval prisoners of war will be in the custody of the Navy only so long as is necessary to effect their transfer to Army custody,

(1) See Record of Events reference the Establishment of an Interrogation Center for Interrogation of War Prisoners, W/D MID 26 Feb 42.

(2) Secretary of Navy, Washington, to the Secretary of War, Serial #01564016, 18 Dec 41.
formal interrogation must take place and must be completed over. It is therefore necessary for the Provost Marshal General of the Office of the Provost Marshal General to cooperate in providing, furnishing and maintaining such interrogation centers as may be instituted.

3. An Interrogation Section has been established in the Office of Naval Intelligence, which will be responsible for all details in connection with the interrogation of prisoners of war of interest to the Naval service.

4. In order that provision for adequate and continued interrogation may be provided, it is recommended that:

a. This section operate in conjunction with such parallel activity as may be established by the Army.

b. That the Secretary of War be requested to provide suitable Interrogation Centers in accordance with recommendations to be submitted by the Interrogation Sections, funds for providing and equipping such centers to be provided from appropriations now available to the War Department." (3)

Pertinent papers were sent to G-2 for study, and between 19 December 1941, and 1 January 1942, a study was made by Lt. Col. Holbrook of CI and Major Bendetson of the FMG. Subsequently these two officers conferred with representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As a result of this conference the following recommendations were made to the A. C. of S., G-2:

1. "That the War Department provide a suitable joint

Army-Navy interrogation center at a location to be selected, to be equipped in accordance with the British plan, such interrogation center to be operated as an exempted station by the Provost Marshal General. The staff of the interrogation center will include a number of carefully selected officers from the two services who would report directly to M.I.D. and O.M.I. at which offices the result of interrogation would be evaluated for dissemination."

This recommendation also called attention to the "substantial" cost of such a center resulting from the "special nature of the equipment,"

(3) Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Subject Interrogation Sections and Interrogation Centers etc., Serial #01584116, 15 Dec. 41, signed T. S. Wilkinson, Capt, U.S.N.
and stated that, "in view of the reported success with which the British have operated a similar installation," the Provost Marshal concurred in the proposal. (4)

In reply to questions from the A. C. of S., G-2, respecting, (a) the initial number and location of such centers, and (b) the estimated cost of acquisition and construction (exclusive of technical equipment), a second memorandum was prepared by the Chief of Aliens Division, Major Karl R. Bendetson. As to a, the PMG recommended "the initial establishment of two centers: one within a radius of 100 miles from Washington, D. C., preferably in Virginia, and another on the West Coast in California area, preferably in the vicinity either of San Francisco or Los Angeles."

With reference to b, this Memorandum referred to the British use of "one or more country estates" as interrogation centers and suggested the probability of a similar arrangement here. As to actual costs, the PMG pleaded insufficient information, but offered "to assist the Corps of Engineers in formulating estimates by forming descriptive data on the general plan."

It is an incredible feature of this Memorandum that it suggested a capacity of only 25 prisoners of war for each of those centers. (5) A similar American organization, 6824 DIC (MIS) operating in ETOUSA, was equipped to hold from 250 to 300 prisoners.

After considering the above memoranda, the A. C. of S., G-2, recommended to the Chief of Staff the approval of the PMG letter of 26

(4) Memorandum from W/D Office of the PMG, Aliens Division, Subject: Joint Interrogation Center, 24 Dec 41.
(5) Memorandum from W/D PMG, Subject: Joint Interrogation Center, 26 Dec 41.
December 1941 and also:

a. "That the Provost Marshal General be instructed to consult with G-2 ONI as to the proper locations of interrogation centers, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast, and to make every effort to find suitable facilities already constructed.

b. That the Provost Marshal General be instructed to prepare for inclusion in supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1942 and the appropriations for the fiscal year 1943 requests for funds necessary for the procurement of sites, equipping same with technical apparatus, provision security of prisoners, and construction of quarters for detachments necessary for guarding same." (6)

Accordingly, the Secretary of War advised the Secretary of Navy that:

"The War Department realizes the value of these centers and is taking steps to establish two such centers, one on the East Coast, in the vicinity of Washington, and one on the West Coast, probably in the easter part of California. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division and the Provost Marshal General have been instructed to consult with ONI as to suitable locations for these establishments." (7)

On 8 January 1942 the AGO instructed the PMG to proceed with the selection of sites in accordance with the letters of the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War of 18 December 1941, with inclosure, and reply thereto of 6 January 1942, (8) The Plans and Training Branch of G-2 was designated as consulting office for MTD and Col. Banfill detailed Major Hoffman as his representative. During the next ten days a study was made as to the needs and objectives of the Interrogation Center and also

(6) Memorandum for C. of S. from AC of S., G-2, 2 Jan 42, Approved by C. of S., 6 Jan 42.
(7) Memorandum to the Secretary of Navy, Subject: Joint Intelligence Sections, 6 Jan 42.
(8) Memorandum of AG, Subject: Joint Interrogation Centers, to the PMG, 8 Jan 42.
a number of sites in the vicinity of Washington, Baltimore and Frederick were visited. Three guiding principles were claimed to be essential in the choice of the site in the Washington area:

- a. Security
- b. Must be within a radius of 100 miles of Washington
- c. Must have suitable facilities already constructed

Various properties not too distant from Washington were considered as desirable locations for the Joint Interrogation Center. The site most favored was SWANNANOA, an estate in Augusta and Nelson counties, Virginia, 97 miles from Richmond and 129 miles from Washington. Representatives from ONI and G-2 were agreed that SWANNANOA would meet all their requirements for an interrogation center after reconditioning and after a few minor conversions. (9) Another site favorably considered was an estate in Marwood, Maryland. Publicity, however, harmful to the interests of a Joint Interrogation Center, rendered this location undesirable, and the Deputy Chief of Staff ordered that no further action be taken until approved by him. (10)

It was not, therefore, until 15 May 1942 that it was definitely decided to locate the Joint Interrogation Center at Fort Hunt, George Washington Parkway, Virginia, when the Acting Secretary of Interior granted permission to the Secretary of War, "to use and occupy for war purposes all of that area, with the exception of the old powder magazines"

(9) Memorandum, Aliens Division, Subject: Inspection of Swannanoa, Virginia, 21 Jan 42.

(10) Memorandum for the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, signed Catesby ap C. Jones, Colonel, General Staff, 28 April 1942.
and antiquated gun emplacements which have been removed to national Archives for the storage of nitrate films, within Fort Hunt Reservation, George Washington Parkway, Virginia." At the same time authority was granted to erect additional housing facilities, "the exact location of such structures to be determined by the Superintendent, National Capitol Parks, and the proper Army authorities." (11)

Meanwhile, during January and February 1942 a joint study was made of sound engineering projects (listening sets, etc.) "in which the Army and Navy have mutual interests." (12) This study involved the investigation of the various products of manufacturers and distributors of sound equipment. As a result of this investigation representatives of G-2 and ONI, recommended the Memovox Recorder built according to specifications of Dr. J. F. Lee of the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department. (13) Accordingly, the Secretary of War directed: "that the Chief Signal Officer procure and install all the equipment listed below in an Interrogation Center to be designated by the Provost Marshal General:

20 each Memovox Transcriber Recorders Model AABVA or equal, together with spare parts, records, and supplies

5 each Memovox Recorder and Producer Instruments, Model AP-100 or equal, together with headphones and foot control boxes.

(13) Memorandum to Chief, Aliens Division, signed Earl L. Edwards, 1st Lt., Ing., 27 Jan 42.
Miscellaneous wiring and supplies as may be necessary for the operation of these machines." (14)

By 25 May 1942 the amount of $217,000.00 had been allocated by the Chief of Engineers for the necessary construction at Fort Hunt, and orders had been issued for immediate construction. (15) It was estimated by the District Engineer that the necessary construction would be completed on 1 July 1942, this estimate, of course, subject to the delivery of materials. (16) Difficulty in the procurement of essential signal equipment occasioned some delay in the final completion of the Interrogation Center of Fort Hunt. Further delay was caused also by the failure of guard personnel to arrive when required. (17)

It was not until 22 July 1942 that work had been completed on the main prison of the Interrogation center, furniture acquired and telephones installed. Meanwhile, the LISTENING EQUIPMENT, was in process of installation and the guards were in training. (18) On 30 July 1942, a Report on Progress at Fort Hunt, Virginia, was able to announce that all construction was completed, furniture received and in place, telephones

(14) Memorandum for the PMG, Subject: Technical Apparatus for Interrogation Centers, signed, Breton Somervell, Brigadier General, Assistant Chief of Staff (with concurring indorsements) 2 Feb 42.
(15) Memorandum for General Strong, Subject: Comment on Memorandum from the Provost Marshal General, signed Catesby ap C. Jones, Colonel, G.S.C., Chief, Interrogating Branch, 25 May 1942.
(16) Memorandum for Chief of Military Intelligence Service, Subject: Report on Progress, etc., 9 Jun 42.
installed, including a direct line to headquarters MIS and to the Navy, and that fourteen listening machines were placed in operation. (19)

Meanwhile, in April 1942 necessary steps and had been taken to activate the Prisoner of War Interrogation Center and the Chief of Military Intelligence Service had requested an allotment of Personnel, officers and men, as listed below.

**OFFICERS**

1. Colonel
   - CO Army Interrogation Center
2. 3 Lt. Colonels
   - Chiefs of Language Section
3. 7 Majors
   - Executive Assistants, Psychologists
4. 16 Captains
   - Translators, Interrogators
5. 41 1st Lieutenants
   - Translators, Interrogators, Listeners

**ENLISTED MEN**

1. 4 Master Sergeants
   - Administration
2. 1 Technical Sergeant
   - (070) Draftsman
3. 15 Staff Sergeants
   - Administration Translators (267), (674), (055)
4. 16 Sergeants
   - 1 Supply (186) Translator-Typists and Stenographers (267)
5. 13 Corporals
   - 8 (055), 4 (213) and 1 (128)
6. 12 Privates
   - (695) Orderlies

In September 1943 these grades and ratings were readjusted in conformity with the following memorandum:

(20) Memorandum for A. C. of S., G-1, Subject: Prisoner of War Interrogation Center, from Chief, MIS, 21 April 1942 and AG 320.2 (4-18-42) OP-A, 25 Apr 42.
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WDGS.

Thru: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS.

Subject: Prisoner of War Interrogation Center Personnel.

1. The allotment of grades and ratings to the Military Intelligence Service is revised to provide for each of the Prisoner of War Interrogation Centers at Fort Hunt, Virginia, and Byron Hot Springs, California, as follows:

a. Officers, AUS.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Arm or Service</th>
<th>Col</th>
<th>Lt Col</th>
<th>Maj</th>
<th>Capt</th>
<th>1st Lt</th>
<th>2nd Lt</th>
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<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
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b. Enlisted Men.

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<th>Mr 1st</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
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2. The above reduction in grades of officers from the recommendation as submitted by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is to provide the reorganization in the same percentage of grades as previously allotted Fort Hunt Interrogation Center.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ A. O. Kelly

Adjutant General

On 20 October 1942 a new branch of Military Intelligence Service was organized to be known as the PRISONER OF WAR BRANCH (P.O.W. Branch). It is composed of two departments:
a. The Interrogation Bn. (Former Interrogation Center)
b. The MI-X Branch

The chief of this Branch was Colonel Catesby ap C. Jones. (21)

On 6 June 1944 the designation of the Prisoner of War Branch was changed to CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL BRANCH (CPM Branch) and Colonel Russell H. Sweet, formerly Executive Officer, P.O.W. Branch, succeeded Colonel Catesby ap C. Jones as Chief of CPM Branch, the latter going to the Policy Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S. (22)

To meet the changed conditions resulting from the addition to MIS of the MI-X Branch an increase in allotment of officers for duty with MIS was authorized by the AGO as follows:

6 - Colonels - Section Chiefs
4 - Lieutenant Colonels - Executive Assistants
8 - Majors - Instructors and Sub-section Chiefs
13 - Captains - Instructors and Listeners
29 - 1st Lieutenants - Instructors and Listeners

It was contemplated that twenty-eight (28) of these officers would be employed in Washington and thirty-two (32) in the field. (23) Although slight changes were made from time to time in the T/O it has remained

(21) MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEFS, ALL groups, branches, and sections, Subject: Prisoner of War Branch, signed, T. E. Roderick, Colonel, General Staff, Executive Officer, MIS, 29 Oct 42.
(22) Memorandum -- Subject: Change in Designation of Prisoner of War Branch, MIS, G-2, W.D.G.S., 7 June 1944, signed Catesby ap C. Jones, Colonel, G.S.C., Assistant Executive, G-2.
(23) See Memorandum for the A. G. of S., G-1, Subject: Prisoner of War, MI-X Branch, 22 Oct 42; and AG 320.2 (1-22-42) PO-M-SFIAO.
Substantially the same since September 1943. Thus the personnel status in July 1945 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Total Officer Personnel</th>
<th>Total W.O. Enlisted</th>
<th>Total Civilian</th>
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<tr>
<td>Present Personnel</td>
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<td>257</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
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<th>CPM Branch</th>
<th>Washington</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>CPM Branch</th>
<th>Alexandria</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present Personnel</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(24) See Personnel Estimates CPM Branch for Dir/Info, signed Russell H. Sweet, Colonel, GSC, Chief, CPM Branch, 18 Apr 45 and attached list for 21 July 45.
B. Establishment of and Subsequent Changes in the Commands of Fort Hunt and Tracy

As early as 15 May 1942 a War Department Memorandum outlined the general principles governing the command of the Interrogation Centers within the continental United States. (25)

These general principles were:

1. Interrogation Centers were placed under the control of the Provost Marshal General.

2. Facilities at these centers were to be available for the interrogation of prisoners of war by the Military Intelligence Service and Office of Naval Intelligence.

3. The interrogation centers at Fort Hunt, Virginia, and at "Byron Hot Springs," California, were to be "exempted activities."

4. The Provost Marshal General was to designate their respective Commanding Officers, who were to be responsible for the operation of the camps and for procuring "from the respective Corps Areas upon requisition the necessary supplies, equipment and overhead personnel, other than interrogation, for their operation."

5. Interrogation personnel were to be furnished by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Interrogation Sections.

6. The Commanding Generals of the Third Corps Area and the Ninth Corps Area respectively were to assume jurisdiction in court-martial and auditing, and were to "furnish

(25) AG 383.6 (5-15-42) MC - SP
the necessary personnel, supplies and equipment upon requisition from the Commanding Officer of the Interrogation Center (Fort Hunt or Tracy) within the Corps Area of their command.

An additional Memorandum from the Adjutant General's Office (AG 383.6 (9-2-42) MS-SPAAAM-H) elucidates further the dual command of Interrogation Centers:

1. Such centers "are not classified as Prisoner of War Alien Enemy Camps, but are considered as Temporary Detention Centers for the specific purpose only of interrogating certain prisoners of war captured either by the Army or Navy."

2. "Military reservations, at which Interrogation Centers are located, are divided into two parts for the purpose of command:

   a. That portion of the reservation inside the inner fence of the prisoner enclosure is known as the Interrogation Center, which is operated by, and is the responsibility of, the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service.

   b. The remainder of the reservation is operated by, and is the responsibility of, the Commanding General of the Appropriate Service Command."

The same Memorandum proceeds to define in detail the functions of the two commands:
1. Functions of the Senior Officer, representing the Military Intelligence Service:
   a. Responsible for the coordination of Army and Navy activities within the Center with the Post Commanders, requesting such assistance from the Post Commander in the way of guards, mess arrangements, interrogating, guarding and exercising of prisoners as may be necessary.
   b. Will be responsible for the correct processing of prisoner of war mail.
   c. Is authorized to deal direct with the Chief of Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D.C.

2. Functions of the Service Commanders at Fort Hunt and "Byron Hot Springs":
   a. They will exercise jurisdiction over, and will be responsible for, the post, exclusive of the Center (Interrogation Center), including the following:
      (1) the performance of administrative, housekeeping, and supply functions.
      (2) He has no responsibility nor authority in connection with the commands or training of troops located at such stations, except troops of the station complement or those attached to his command for training.
(3) Exercise courts-martial jurisdiction over all personnel.

(4) Be responsible for the training of Escort Guard Companies at such installations.

(5) Have no control whatsoever of the part of the reservation "pertaining to the Interrogation Center."

3. Other inter-relationships explained in this Memorandum:

a. Housekeeping facilities for personnel within the Interrogation Center were to be supplied and operated by the Post Commanders, but "under the general supervision of the senior representative of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service."

b. In the event that the M.I.S. or the O.N.I. should desire to establish protective custody over certain selected prisoners outside the Center, a receipt for such prisoners was to be furnished the Post Commander by the senior representative of the Military Intelligence Service, "prior to their release from the Center. Responsibility for safeguarding and returning such prisoners to the Center rests with the senior representative of the Military Intelligence Service. No prisoner should be allowed non-protective custody inside or outside the reservation."
c. Responsibility for insuring "that the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau are properly applied with the Office of the Provost Marshal General," all Service Commanders, Post Commanders, and Senior Military Intelligence Service representatives concerned, will render such reports as the Provost Marshal General may require in order that he may fulfill his responsibility."

Experience both at Fort Hunt and "Byron Hot Springs" soon revealed that inefficiency was inherent in this system of dual commands. Accordingly, after eight months of operating under this system of dual control, the A. C. of S., G-2, pointed out in a Memorandum to the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, "that a unified control will result in greater efficiency and improved morale." (26)

The Memorandum of the A. C. of S., G-2, together with a Memorandum from the Chief, Prisoner of War Branch, setting forth in greater detail the inefficiencies of the dual system, were forwarded, through channels, to the Commanding General, Military District of Washington. The request was at first refused as contrary to existing regulations (Secret letter, War Department, File AG 383.6 (9-2-42) MS-SPAAM-N, dated September 4, 1942) requiring that Interrogation Centers be divided in two parts for the purpose of command. (27)

(26) Memorandum, Through Commanding General, S.O.S., Subject: Relief of Post Commander, Fort Hunt, Virginia, 3 Mar 43.
(27) See 1st Ind to the above request of the A. C. of S., G-2, 13 Mar 43.
The A. C. of S., G-2, then requested that the secret letter, War Department, the Adjutant General's Office, The AG File (9-2-42) MS-SPAAH-W, dated September 4, 1942, Subject: Joint Interrogation Centers, be revoked and that you prepare a new letter placing control of joint interrogation centers in the continental United States under the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, as the office having primary interest in same." (28)

Although the initial correspondence respecting the elimination of the dual command had dealt primarily with Fort Hunt, the A. C. of S., G-2, now made it clear that this change should be all inclusive:

There are now two joint interrogation centers in the continental United States, one at Fort Hunt, Virginia, and another at Byron Hot Springs, California. It is desired that these centers and any other organized hereafter will be administered similarly to the manner in which the harbor defenses are now operated."

On 14 April 1943 the respective Post Commanders of Fort Hunt and Byron Hot Springs were ordered reassigned within the jurisdiction of their Corps Areas or else made available for reassignment by the Adjutant General. (29)

Meanwhile, on 20 April 1943, it was directed that: "The Senior Military Intelligence Service Officer assigned to duty at the station is designated as the Commanding Officer, and as such, he is responsible for the proper performance of all functions at his post which are the

(28) See 3rd Ind, Ibid.
(29) AG 320.2 (4-9-43) PO-M-SPG AO, Joint Interrogation Centers, forwarded 14 Apr 43.
responsibility of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service as well as those functions which are the responsibility of the Post Commander. The post commanders of these installations command all military personnel and are similarly in charge of all civilian personnel serving thereat, regardless of the duties they perform. The post commanders report to and are under the supervision of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service for functions which are the responsibility of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service. They are responsible to and are under the supervision of the Service Commander for the adequate performance of functions which are the responsibility of the Service Commander."

In addition to the above duties, the Post Commander had also the following responsibilities:

a. Operation and coordination of all Army and Navy activities within the center.

b. Proper application of the terms of the Geneva Convention.

c. Correct processing of P/N mail (30)

The unity of command thus effected resulted speedily in the promotion of the desired esprit de corps and efficiency so essential to a Detailed Interrogation Center. It has been observed, both in the establishments of this character located in the United States, as well as in the theater of military operations, that essential security and

(30) Note: The Reports required by the Geneva Convention were to be rendered, as before, through the PMG. AG 383.6 (4-18-43) OB-5 SPAM-5.
efficient functioning of the unit are possible only when complete centralization of command exists. In the American Detached Interrogation Centers operating variously in North Africa, Italy and France the Guard company was organized as an integral part of the Center. (31)

C. List of Commanding Officers

P. O. Box 1142, Alexandria, Virginia

Colonel Daniel W. Kent - 1 July 1942 to 21 October 1942
Colonel Russell H. Sweet - 21 October 1942 to 1 February 1943
Colonel John L. Walker - 1 February 1943 to 18 July 1945
Colonel Zenas R. Bliss - 18 July 1945 to end

P. O. Box 651, Tracy, California

Colonel Daniel W. Kent - 5 November 1942 to 7 February 1945
Colonel Zenas R. Bliss - 7 February 1945 to 18 July 1945

(31) See Historical Notes on American Detached Interrogation Centers, 2692 Headquarters Company, CSDIC (AFHQ), and 6824 DIC (MIS), p. 52, by Thomas C. Van Cleve, Lt. Col., Commanding Officer from 1 October 1943 to 27 May 1945.
PART II

THE INTERROGATION BRANCY - CPM

UNCLASSIFIED
A. Forward: The Scope of Interrogation at Fort Hunt and Tracy

The British preceded the Americans in the development and exploiting of detailed interrogation as a basis of military intelligence. Their experiments with the method of procuring military intelligence proved to be invaluable as a guide to Americans, seeking to activate interrogation units during the early months of the war. Interrogation for military intelligence falls naturally into two broad categories:

1. The search for and the recording of day by day tactical intelligence of the enemy's forces, his disposition and intentions. Such information is of immediate usefulness and must, therefore, be gathered in the field or at base interrogation centers within the actual theater of operations.

2. Strategic and detailed technical intelligence and all other intelligence of a non-tactical nature or of "high level" nature is best obtained through base Detailed Interrogation Centers located either in the rear of Army Group Command in the theater itself or in the immediate vicinity of the War Department or, in case of an inter-allied war, near to the Supreme Allied Headquarters as, for example, near Washington or London in the late war.
Several such Detailed Interrogation Centers were operated World War II, with results which yielded incalculable information, in North Africa, Italy, Southern France, Northern France, England and Fort Hunt, Virginia. In some detail, the subjects on which intelligence is to be obtained by detailed interrogation in such centers are:

1. All matters having to do with overall strategic intelligence.

2. All ordnance, signal, and technical intelligence involving theoretical or scientific knowledge of the principles upon which armament, signal equipment or other technical equipment, are constructed or operated.

3. All non-Operation Intelligence, including such subjects as War Economy, Industrial Development, War Finance, and Civilian Morale.

4. Organizational Details of the Enemy High Command, Staff organization, Espionage and Counter Espionage, Hospital Organization, Organization of Railways and Highways for Military Transport, Black Lists and White Lists, involving the study of objectionable political groups or organizations, or groups and individuals more likely to be found "friendly" to an invading power.

5. All Order of Battle information having to do with the Armed Forces as a whole: their command, method of recruiting, nature and employment of special units, hospitalization, discipline, etc.
6. Information respecting the enemy in dealing with occupied policing, economic organization, employment of local agents, etc.

It is the purpose of this report to show how such intelligence has been obtained by means of interrogation, under typical conditions, at Fort Hunt; to describe the internal organization of the unit; the qualifications of the interrogating personnel; and the nature of its equipment for obtaining, editing, and distributing such intelligence.

It became apparent early in the war that proper results from interrogation are to be obtained only when the actual interrogating is accomplished by trained officers under conditions affording every facility for their accurate and intelligence briefing respecting all information desired by the Army, Navy, or Air Forces. For purpose of modern warfare, the technique of interrogation is a specialized one. Individual interrogators may not be assumed to be expert in all the fields of intelligence mentioned above. They are expert only in the technique of interrogation, and require at all times competent briefing from the various agencies or services of the armed forces. From the outset, therefore, it is essential that closest liaison to be established and maintained between the Detailed Interrogation Center and such agencies as Signal Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, Ordnance Intelligence, etc. General briefing will not suffice; there must be constant liaison so that the interrogators may at all times be fully oriented as to specific information desired.
B. Selection of Prisoners of War for Interrogation.

In contrast with a Detailed Interrogation Center located in the actual theater of operations, such as 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center, which selects its prisoners directly from the theater concentration centers, Fort Hunt must rely upon a variety of sources for its knowledgeable prisoners of war. Generally speaking, these sources are:

1. Prisoners selected within the actual theater of operations.

Through various selecting agencies located within the theater of operations prisoners of war thought to be suitable to the requirements of Fort Hunt were sent by plane or by ship, earmarked for special detailed interrogation. It was a regular feature of the work of the American Section of CSDIC (AFHQ) to select and move such prisoners directly from North Africa or Italy to Fort Hunt. The criterion of selection was "long term technical or strategic information." Thus, when a particularly knowledgeable prisoner was brought in who possessed such detailed information as to require continued interrogation over a long period and under the guidance of technical advisors, he was sent, after the First Detailed Interrogation, to Fort Hunt, together with such information as has previously been obtained from him. In theory, this procedure was excellent, but was restricted, in practice, by the claim to priority by CSIOC U.K. At no time during the operation of the American Section of CSDIC (AFHQ) was an equitable distribution of desirable prisoners of war established between Fort Hunt and CSIOC U.K. In France also 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center undertook to supply a limited number of specially selected prisoners of war to be flown twice monthly to Fort Hunt by the end of the
In Germany this procedure was proving its effectiveness. It is unfortunate that a similar system had not been inaugurated at the beginning and maintained throughout the war.

2. Selection of Prisoners of War at the camps in the United States:

Especially during the early period of the activities of Fort Hunt prisoners desired for interrogation were selected from the large prisoner of war camps located in various parts of the United States. Screening teams were sent to the respective camps, prisoners were selected and segregated and ultimately sent to a railhead near the Interrogation Center where they were picked up and transported by unit transport to Fort Hunt or a holding camp for detailed interrogation. While many prisoners of value from the intelligence point of view were selected in this manner, the method proved to be in many ways unsatisfactory:

a. The prison camps were widely scattered throughout the United States, necessitating long trips and long absences from Fort Hunt of valuable interrogating personnel, both officers and enlisted men.

b. Moreover, it often required weeks or even months to obtain necessary shipping space for prisoners thus selected.

c. In the absence of a special segregation compound for Fort Hunt selections within the camps, prisoners who had previously been screened systematically briefed newly
arrived prisoners respecting the screening to which they were to be subjected. Thus, would often be contaminated by mingling with the "old timers."

Note: Attention might be called to the fact that this difficulty was avoided in North Africa, Italy and France, by arranging with the PMG for the construction of a segregation compound for the exclusive use of CSDIC or DIC. It was found that this actually entailed very little additional construction and also greatly minimized the possibility of friction between DIC personnel and the camp guards.

3. Selection of Prisoners of War at the Ports.

In the period following the Normandy Campaign the most effective method of selecting prisoners of war for Fort Hunt was through immediate screening at the ports of debarkation (Newport News, Brooklyn, and Boston). The prisoners of war were examined individually by an experienced screening officer, and they were either designated on the spot for final screening or rejected as useless. Each prisoner thus appearing, carried with him his own work sheet, bearing his name, rank and internment serial number, his birthplace, the complete inscription of his identification tag, his place of residence, civilian occupation, etc. (see attached form on next page) In many instances a mere glance at this FORM would serve to eliminate a particular prisoner. Thus it was possible to carry out a large number of tentative screenings in a short time. The prisoners, in most cases, accepted this FORM as an essential procedure in debarkation and filled in the requested information. Because
Page 26 of this document was not included in our original copy of the document.
of brief interrogations previously made before their shipment from Europe, they did not suspect the full import of this questionnaire. Tentatively selected prisoners were then briefly interrogated for further screening, after delousing and other sanitary requirements, and those finally selected were moved immediately to the train destined for Fort Hunt prisoners.

C. Bases of Selection

In general initial selections could be made on three bases: (1) Regional qualifications, (2) Technical qualifications, (3) Civilian activities or military experience.

In greater detail these bases may be analyzed as follows:

1. Target information respecting industrial centers, bombing damage, etc., could reasonably be expected from an intelligence prisoner coming from the area in question.

2. Signal personnel, tank crews, machine gunners, ordnance personnel, artillerymen, may be swiftly included in a tentative selected list without too detailed screening.

3. Prisoners known to have been previously employed by munitions plants, armament or airplane manufacturers, chemical works, etc., may be assumed to be capable of providing valuable details respecting these particular plants, etc.
(4) S.S., ABWEHR and SICHERHEITS DIENST personnel may usually be selected upon recognition, unless such personnel is abundantly available.

(5) Often selections may be made in conformity with particular requests, because of previous party affiliations, previous record of alleged criminal, or because of some record of service which may make their information useful to a special agency, such as Psychological Warfare, OSS, AMG, FBI, the State Department, the Treasury Department. For example, toward the end of the European phase of the war all prisoners in any way previously connected with German financial administration, of priority interest, were considered of special intelligence value.
tentatively earmarked for interrogation at Fort Hunt itself. For this purpose, a special holding camp at Pine Grove Furnace, Pennsylvania, was employed. A Memorandum of 5 May 1943 directed the Commanding General, Army Service Forces to activate the Prisoner of War Internment Camp at Pine Grove Furnace, Pennsylvania, at the earliest possible date. (32) Since the beginning of the year, necessary priorities had been sought for the speedy adaptation and equipment of this camp (33)

While this camp was to be under the operation of the Commanding General, Third Service Command, it was to be used "exclusively for a special purpose and any instructions pertaining thereto" were to be classified as SECRET. (34) This "special" purpose was the holding of prisoners of war pending their detailed interrogation at Fort Hunt. It was to be activated on 20 May 1943.

The procedure governing the relationships between Fort Hunt and the Third Service Command was set forth in the following communication entitled:

An Agreement for Movement of Prisoners of War between Box 1142 Installations and Internment Camps of the Third Service Command Dated 7/10/43

1. Box 1142 will transport Prisoners of War from their installation to Ft. Meade and the reverse.

(33) SPMGA (24) 254, Office of P.M.G., Washington, 15 Feb 43, with 1st and 2nd Indorsements.
(34) Ag 320.2 5-11-43, Subject: Establishment of Pine Grove Furnace, Pennsylvania. The classification was later changed to "Confidential" (AG 320.2 5-27-43, OB-I-SPAAH-M).
2. The Third Service Command will move Prisoners of War from Ft. Meade to 3300 SU and the reverse.

3. The Third Service Command is responsible for processing all Prisoners of War that they receive.

4. Box 1142 is responsible for processing all Prisoners of War that they will receive direct.

5. When Box 1142 is through with Prisoners of War that should be shipped to permanent internment camps, Box 1142 notifies the Third Service Command and FMGO that the Prisoners of War are being moved to Ft. Meade to await further orders.

6. When Box 1142 wants to move a Prisoner of War from their custody to 3300 SU, Box 1142 will notify the Third Service Command. (35)

The nearness of this camp to Fort Hunt and its relative isolation made it highly desirable for all holding purposes, but primarily, for holding such prisoners were thought, after tentative screening, to be potentially useful for detailed interrogation. Moreover, it forestalled the possibility that prisoners, thought to be valuable, would be "contaminated" by contact with other more security conscious and less "cooperative" prisoners. Here also it was possible to subject each prisoner to a more leisurely screening, thus eliminating still further the "duds" or more useless prisoners. It has happened at times that only 20% of an originally selected group would be retained for detailed interrogation at Fort Hunt.

(35) The 3300th SU, Pine Grove Furnace Internment Camp was redesignated the 3300th Service Unit, Prisoner of War Camp, Pine Grove Furnace, Penna., Hq. 3rd Service Command, General Orders, No. 74, 31 Jul 43
E. The Handling of Prisoners of War

1. Transport of Prisoners

The Prisoner of War Camp at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, a distance of approximately forty miles from Fort Hunt, was used as a holding compound and also as a "cover" for intelligence operations at Fort Hunt. All prisoners of war and their records were routed through Fort Meade, with the exception of those flown from overseas, in which case Fort Meade was notified of their arrival. From here prisoners were moved in unit buses, closed and ventilated in such a way as to prevent visibility. (See photograph opposite next page).

Buses were divided into compartments segregating Nazis and Anti-Nazis, officers and enlisted men. Convoys were accompanied by M.P. Detachment, an officer and escort guards. The Post Adjutant served as Prisoner of War Control Officer for both enclosures, arranging details of movements between Fort Meade and Fort Hunt or Pine Grove Furnace.

2. Reception and Processing

Upon arrival at the Interrogation Center a formal Intake was carried out. Prisoners were seated side by side on a long bench in the reception or "intake" room and were then called into the first processing room for preliminary interrogation, search, declaration of and receipts for personal property. The Enclosure Administrative Officer searched, took up and receipted for all money, which was forwarded to Fort Meade, Maryland, for deposit in the trust fund to the credit of the prisoner. The Military Intelligence Processing Officer
completed the personnel form and retained all papers, documents,
and other articles which were thought to be of military value. Other effects were returned to the prisoner. He was then
moved to the Dressing Room where all clothing was removed and placed
in a barracks bag which was tagged and clearly marked for identification.
He then proceeded to the Shower Room and the office of the Medical
Examiner. Afterwards, he went to the Supply Room for clothing, toilet
articles, etc., and then, under guard, to a designated detention room.

The typical room was designed for two occupants, and contained
only essential furniture: two beds, two benches and a built-in table.
(See photograph, next page) The room had previously been examined
for concealed messages or unauthorized matter of any sort. A latrine
was located in each corridor to which the prisoner, under guard, was
escorted upon request. All rooms and latrines were cleaned by pri-
soners of war. Inmates were fed the regular issue rations in their
rooms from truck-borne thermos containers. The food was served on
trays which were picked up immediately upon the completion of the meal.
Medical care was provided by the Camp Medical Officer, as indicated by
the processing examination or as required by the individual prisoner
of war.

There were four exercise yards, one for each corridor, and pris-
oners were admitted in such manner and in such numbers as to preserve
the desired segregation. Under ordinary conditions each prisoner was
allowed at least one hour per day in the exercise yards. Upon de-
parture from the center, the prisoner was carefully identified by the
3. Enclosure "A" and "B"

a. Enclosure "A". There are two prisoners of war enclosures at Fort Hunt. Enclosures "A" and "B". Building "A", first occupied in August 1942, was designed as a self-contained unit—a two-story rectangular structure, combining under one roof twenty-two rooms for prisoners of war. None of these are capable of holding three prisoners each and three are designed for solitary segregations. In this building also there are five interrogation rooms, a kitchen, guard room, control officer's room, and miscellaneous store rooms. (See photograph)

Two single-story buildings were constructed as office buildings for M.I. and O.N.I. personnel and for technical equipment. These buildings were attached to the east of the main building in the form of a double crossed "T". (See plan attached)

An Evaluation Building and a Document Section Building of the portable type were also erected within the compound. This enclosure is surrounded by two "cyclone" wire fences with double apron barbed wire on the top and the fences are separated by a corridor fifteen feet in width. Four guard towers are installed, one at each corner of the enclosure. (See photograph)

b. Enclosure "B". Enclosure "B" was completed and placed in operation on 14 April 1944, and is of a distinctly different type of construction. It consists of four wings stemming from a central
hub surmounted by a guard tower. (See photograph, next page)

The building is at the outer entrance of the west wing and the kitchen is separated from the guard room by the main entrance corridor which leads through the South Wing. The four wings contain twenty-four rooms for prisoners, two persons to a room. In addition, there are five interrogation rooms, an assembly room, welfare officer's room, control officer's room, and the processing section located in the South Wing, consisting of five rooms, reception, disrobing, shower, medical examination, and clothing issue. One latrine is located in each wing and one guard room. There are four exercise pens with wire barrier and wood screening erected parallel with the room windows on the wings to prevent observation or contact between prisoners in rooms and exercise pens. The pens are enclosed by concrete walls and "cyclone" fence, surmounted by barbed wire, and the entire fence is protected by an electrical contact alarm system in the Central Guard Tower and also in the Control Officer's office. (See photograph, next page)

4. Administration and Guard

a. Enclosure "B" was planned and constructed on the basis of experience gained in the operation of the first enclosure ("A" Building). The following was found to be the minimum Personnel necessary for efficient operation of the central tower type of building ("B" Enclosure):

One administrative Officer whose duties include the supervision of the guard, movement of P/W's to and from the
In rooms, room changes as directed by the MI Control Officer, exercising of prisoners, messing, sanitation, housekeeping, supply and issue of clothing, and the keeping of records. (His duties in connection with the reception and processing of P/M's are as outlined elsewhere.) One Sergeant of the Guard, two Control Corporals for movement of P/M's, who operate on an eight hour shift basis, sixteen privates of the Guard, two Cooks, two Food Servers, a Janitor and three KP's (inmates). The guard personnel operates on a twenty-four hours on and twenty-four hours of basis, thus two Platoons are required, or a total of thirty-two Privates and two Sergeants. The three Corporals of the reliefs are furnished from the Main Post Guard, their duties are not confined entirely to the enclosure. The Officer of the Day and the Officer of the Guard substitute for the enclosure Administrative Officer between Retreat and Reveille.

F. The Process of Interrogation and the Report

After the prisoners have been placed in their rooms, the Evaluation of Documents Officer studies the material taken from the prisoners during the "intake" and evaluates it. This material usually consists of personal letters, snapshots, etc.

1. The Process

At the next meeting of the Interrogation Officers, these newcomers are briefly discussed and such information as has been obtained at the
screening process, and from the prisoner's documents is made known to the assembled officers. Upon the basis of this information, the individual prisoners are then assigned to one of the sections for interrogation. His background determines whether the prisoner is sent to the Air Section, the Geographic Section, the Army Section, etc., for interrogation. The head of each section in turn then allocates the prisoners assigned to his particular section to the Interrogating officers working in his section, using care to try to assign each prisoner to the Interrogating Officer who is best qualified by temperament, experience, etc., to handle him.

As soon as a prisoner is assigned to an Interrogation Officer, he obtains all information available on the prisoner. He briefs himself thoroughly by studying the document evaluation and, in some cases, the documents themselves. These documents are very often military papers; however, as often as not, there are personal papers such as letters, photographs, etc. The Interrogation Officer uses these personal items on occasion to encourage cooperation and they are usually handed back to the prisoner after a friendlier footing has been established.

After the Interrogation Officer has briefed himself thoroughly (a good interrogation lasting about one hour requires from three to six hours of preparatory work), he has the prisoner ordered into an interrogation room. The method of escorting the prisoner to the interrogation room may vary according to the physical facilities available. At this station, the Interrogation Officer calls the monitors over the
inter-office teletalk and requests the particular prisoner for interroga-
tion. The monitors are fully informed through their monitoring procedure of the status of each prisoner and therefore check his room to ascertain whether any significant room conversation is then in pro-
gress between the designated prisoner and his roommate. If such is not the case, they will check the interrogation rooms for a vacancy and then inform the Interrogation Officer via the teletalk that a certain interro-
gation room is available for him and that the prisoner is being escorted to that room. The Interrogation Officer then proceeds to his interrogation room. This is closed after he has entered and a knock at the door by the guard indicates the entrance of the prisoner.

From this point on, it is difficult to narrate definitely the pro-
cedure followed because each individual Interrogation Officer has his own method of handling the various situations which may confront him, and each prisoner, being a different individual, requires different treatment. In general, however, the Interrogation Officer will order the prisoner to enter and, after some questioning, will order the pris-
soner either to stand at attention during the subsequent questioning or to sit down.

Depending upon the type of prisoner and the information desired, the Interrogation Officer will have instructed the monitors, at the time he ordered the prisoner, to take notes on the interrogation or to have the interrogation completely recorded. Some prisoners do not object to having notes made in their presence and will talk freely in spite of it; others seem to become shy and to close up when they see the Inter-
rogating Officer proceed to take notes of what they are saying. Therefore,
notes are taken by the monitors, or a record is made of the interrogation, whichever the situation might demand.

Upon completion of the interrogation, the Interrogation Officer gives the signal (a light flash or buzzer arrangement), and the guard then relieves him of the prisoner. The Interrogation Officers are locked up with the prisoner during interrogation. The Interrogation Officer then instructs the monitors that he has completed the interrogation and signs out on the record sheet, showing that he interrogated that particular prisoner on a certain day, at a certain time. He then gives the monitors any necessary instructions concerning the monitoring of the subsequent room conversations. It is important to ascertain the reaction of the prisoner when he returns to his room and starts to discuss the interrogation with his roommate.

In preparing his report on a prisoner, the Interrogation Officer bases it on information received from records of room conversations, from the documents he studied, and upon the direct interrogation of the prisoner, as well as on reports received from a Stool Pigeon (S.P.), in case one has been used. The report is then submitted to the Evaluation Section for evaluation and editing and upon completion is forwarded to the proper authorities.

2. Use of Stool Pigeons

The stool pigeon, along with listening devices, has become an essential aid in the obtaining of military intelligence through prisoner
of war interrogations. The more security minded the prisoners, the greater is the need for stool pigeons in "breaking" them. Thus, during the earlier part of the war with Germany, stool pigeons were considered as essential to an interrogating center. During the final year of the war this need was reduced to the minimum by virtue of the more "cooperative" attitude of large numbers of prisoners of war, some of whom voluntarily, and in many instances openly, aided in obtaining desired information from fellow prisoners. The choice of a qualified stool pigeon requires the utmost care. He must be thoroughly reliable, a quality normally not to be expected of men who are willing to perform this degrading function. The war with Germany, however, not infrequently produced men who felt that cooperation with the Allied Powers in the curshing of the Nazis was, in actuality, a noble service. Knowledge of cruelties visited upon their families at home, punishment or humiliation suffered by themselves during the rise of Hitler, were often sufficient to induce normally loyal men to turn against their leaders. Such men must be intelligent, specialists, if possible. For example, an intelligent flyer from the GAF has been found to be an invaluable aid in the extracting of essential Air intelligence. In the American DIC in France a colonel of exceptional intelligence, but of undying hatred of the Nazis, although formerly a high staff position, voluntarily offered his aid in obtaining desired information from other German officers who were prisoners of war. Constant checking of his efforts—through "listening-in"—proved beyond question his absolute reliability.
The ideal S.P. is a good actor. He must be skilled enough to play many roles. He must have, above all, a retentive memory and versatile conversational powers.

The employment of the Stool Pigeon varies according to the situation. He must be employed only when necessary, sometimes he will be found occupying the room as the roommate of the intended subject. Thus, he plays the role of a fellow prisoner, living from day to day with the subject. Again, he may be suddenly placed in the room after a prisoner has been interrogated to obtain specific information which direct interrogation failed to produce. Or he may be placed in the exercise pen to become "friendly" with obstinate prisoners. In general, it is best to place the S.P. under the constant direction of an officer "handler" who becomes fully acquainted with the S.P.'s capacities, his temperament, and his methods of work. The S.P. is usually a paid agent, often sensitive to any curtailing of his privileges or to any decline in the quality of his rations. He must, of course, be protected at all times from possible detection. Moreover, he must be fully "briefed" as to each mission on which he is sent—he must understand definitely the information which is to be sought. Often he must be permitted to employ his own methods. He must be made to feel that he is performing a valuable service.

In the European Theater of Operations one prevalent defect has been found in the habitual employment of the S.P. Interrogators tend to leave the job to him. More than once interrogators have lost their capacity for interrogation by seeking to employ the easier method afforded by the S.P. It should be pointed out that some C.O.'s of Interrogation Centers
feel that the presence of S.P.'s in their unit is much more a liability than an asset.

3. The Interrogation Sub-Sections
   
a. The Navy Section - Its Unique Position

   It was indicated at the beginning of this narrative that the Navy played the initial role in stirring the interest of the War Department in a Joint Interrogation Center. The fact that the Army, "by an agreement in effect during the World War, recently renewed, is charged with the custody of all prisoners of war," indicated from the outset that the administration of such an Interrogation Center should be an Army function. While the Naval exponents of this center recognized this Army function as essential on the purely administrative side, they actually visualized the establishment "not jointly as is the case with the British, but on a parallel basis, with each Service providing a setup suitable to its needs." Although the Post Commander is responsible for "the operation and coordination of all Army and Navy activities within the Center," the Navy has been permitted to preserve the degree of independence essential to the accomplishment of its peculiar operational requirements. Accordingly, any organizational chart depicting the sectional inter-relationships under the Chief Interrogating Officer, would indicate this independent position of the Navy Section. Operationally, directives governing the substance of Naval Interrogations would originate with the
appropriate branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

On the other hand, Naval prisoners of war, when fully interrogated by the Navy, were made available for further interrogation. This procedure applied equally to the Army prisoners who were desired by the Navy for further interrogation. Although in the beginning there were but few restrictions as to the subjects upon which a Naval prisoner could be interrogated by an Army Interrogator, ONI took the position, "that no operational, technical, or tactical naval information obtained from prisoners of war shall be disseminated by the Army." Although this position was not at first concurred in by the A. C. of S., G-2, and the Chief of the Prisoner of War Branch (36) the point was finally yielded:

"in view of the fact that the Navy is shortly taking over the Anti-Submarine Command, lock, stock, and barrel, this meaning that the Army Air Forces as such will not participate in anti-submarine warfare, it is not considered advisable to pursue further the point with the Navy that we should be able to disseminate information which you obtain from German Naval prisoners of war." (37)

b. The following plan was drawn up as a means of establishing operational procedure satisfactory alike to the Army and Navy in their activities at Fort Hunt and Tracy:

(36) See Memorandum for General Strong, Subject: Comments on Paragraph E of Proposed SOP for Interrogation Center, 16 Jul 43.

(37) Memo for Colonel Jones, Chief, POWB, signed H.K., 18 Jul 43.
Standard Operating Procedure for Interrogation

Section A. Arrival of Prisoners.

1. Upon notification of the arrival of new prisoners, the Chief Interrogating Officer and the Chief Monitoring Officer shall prepare a berthing plan in consultation with the officer of the guard and submit it to the Commanding Officer for approval. In case of naval prisoners, the berthing plan shall be prepared in accordance with the wishes of the naval officer on duty at the Post in so far as quarters and security allow.

2. Upon arrival of prisoners, they shall be processed by the Chief Interrogating Officer and the Chief Monitoring Officer. In the case of naval prisoners, a naval officer will be present. Searching of the Prisoner of War and of his effects will be done by the guard under the direction of the Chief Interrogating Officer who shall make final decisions as to which belongings may be retained by the prisoner of war. The Chief Interrogator will also assign the effects to the proper officers for examination. In the case of naval prisoners, this will normally be done by the naval officers.

3. Berthing assignments will be made by the Chief Interrogating Officer after processing. In the case of naval prisoners, the berthing assignment will be, in so far as possible, in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Interrogator, Navy, or his representative.

Section B. Interrogation.

1. Requests for interrogation of prisoners of war will be directed by the Chief Interrogating Officer who will make the room assignments, order the prisoners of war brought in for interrogation and keep a record of all interrogations. All requests to visit prisoners of war informally in their rooms shall also be channeled through the Chief Interrogating Officer. A proposed schedule of daily interrogations shall be submitted in advance. The Chief Interrogating Officer through the Chief Monitoring Officer will order the necessary recordings if requested. The proposed schedule of daily interrogations will be followed as closely as possible. However, this may be altered at the request of the Officer in Charge of an interrogation as may become necessary during the actual conduct of the interrogation in process.

2. As soon as possible after each interrogation, a brief report of the interrogation will be submitted to the Chief Interrogating Officer (in duplicate) in the following form:
Report of Interrogation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P/W</th>
<th>Interrogator(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The report should cover the following:

Estimate of P/W's personality.
Military History and Background of P/W.
Outline of Topics covered in Interrogation.
Specific Information, such as proper names, localities.
Technical details should be included as fully as possible.
Special points of interest for monitoring.
Suggested lines for further interrogation.

3. Information obtained from prisoners of war in direct interrogation may be made available for evaluation by anyone of the four following procedures:

   a. Through the detailed report of interrogating officers prepared from memory or on the basis of notes. No recording made.

   b. Monitoring of interrogation and recording of such portions as may be deemed essential by the monitor or requested by means of a pre-arranged signal given by the interrogating officer.

   c. By means of full recording of the interrogation and subsequent preparation of a detailed report made after listening to the playback. In such cases portions of the recording may be indicated for full transcription.

   d. Full recording made, with full transcription. Elimination of unessential material in process of editing and extracting.

4. It shall be the responsibility of the Chief Interrogating Officer to see to it that prisoners of war are returned to the proper rooms and are not disturbed until a reasonable time shall have elapsed to allow for reactions to be watched.

5. When interrogators operate in teams, one member of the team shall assist in monitoring the room to which the prisoner of war has returned until the other member has had time to submit his report and the watch can be taken over by the monitors. In case an interrogator is working alone, he shall request a monitor for his interrogation, who can then take over the room conversation until the report is prepared.

6. All priority requests on interrogation recordings shall be directed to the Chief Interrogating Officer.
7. Besides the duties indicated above, the Chief Interrogator shall be responsible for the following functions:

a. Co-ordination of whatever available information is available on an incoming group of prisoners of war. In the case of naval prisoners this information will be furnished by the Chief Interrogator, Navy or his representative.

b. The initial briefing of Interrogating Officers and Chief Monitor and such subsequent briefings as may be necessary. In the case of naval prisoners, such briefings will be by the Chief Interrogator, Navy, or his representative.

c. Preparation of a daily interrogation schedule, in accordance with Section B, paragraph 1.

d. Co-ordination and direction of room changes as requested by 1Os or Chief Monitor. In the case of naval prisoners of war under interrogation by the Navy, the room changes will be made in consultation with the Chief Interrogator, Navy, or his representative.

Section C. Monitoring and Transcription.

1. All monitoring is under the immediate direction of the Chief Monitor who will work in close co-operation with the Chief Interrogating Officer, or, in the case of naval prisoners, with the Chief Interrogator, Navy.

2. Upon arrival of new prisoners of war, the Chief Monitor and Chief Interrogating Officer, or in the case of naval prisoners, the Chief Interrogator, Navy, will together select those rooms which are to be constantly monitored and they will together make any subsequent reassignments.

3. All monitoring shall be done by earphones and complete silence must at all times prevail in the supply room.

4. The normal monitoring hours shall be from 0700 hours to 2200 hours unless special circumstances shall require longer monitoring.

5. Monitoring and transcribing will be carried out for the present according to the following schedule:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Day:</th>
<th>Second Day:</th>
<th>Third Day:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>0700 - 1200</td>
<td>0700 - 1200</td>
<td>0700 - 1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>Transcribing</td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Transcribing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transcribing</td>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>Transcribing</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Transcribing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. All transcriptions will normally be made by the same individuals who made the recording, although reassignment of recordings may be made by the Chief Monitor.

7. Transcribing will be done under the direction of the Chief Monitor in the following manner:

   a. Recordings will be transcribed in the original language in two copies - one original and one carbon - and submitted to the Chief Monitor. After checking the recording, the Chief Monitor will turn over the transcription to the Chief Interrogating Officer. The Chief Monitor will keep "book" on all recordings and transcriptions.

   b. Doubtful words in a transcription shall be indicated by (?). Passages not understood shall be indicated by dots (........).

   c. In cases of recordings of interrogations, the transcriptions shall be submitted to the respective interrogator for review.

### Section D. Preliminary Evaluation, Editing and Translation.

1. After submission to the Chief Interrogating Officer, the transcription will be turned over to the proper representative of each branch of the service stationed at the center for preliminary evaluation.

2. This evaluating officer will indicate and edit pertinent passages and return the recordings to the Chief Interrogating Officer for translation of such passages. The Chief Interrogating Officer will forward the transcription and the accompanying translation to the Army or Navy Evaluation Section, whichever the case may be, where the material will be extracted or combined with other pertinent material preparatory to dissemination.
Section E. Final Evaluation and Dissemination

1. No operation, technical or tactical naval information obtained from prisoners of war shall be disseminated by the Army.

2. No operational, technical or tactical military (Army) information obtained from prisoners of war shall be disseminated by the Navy.

3. Information of a general nature, not covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section may be disseminated by either service after evaluation on the spot by the service having cognizance of the prisoners from whom it is obtained.

4. Dissemination of evaluated information will be made by the cognizant service through the regularly established channels.

Approved: John L. Riheldaffer, Commander, U.S. Navy, (Ret.), Head of Special Activities Branch, Division of Naval Intelligence.

Approved: CATWY ap C. Jones, Colonel, G.S.C., Chief, Prisoner of War Branch.

Sub-Sections under the Chief Interrogating Officer

The obvious organization of a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center would include Naval, Army, and Air Sections. The need of specialization, moreover, often calls for the establishment of other sections for temporary, if not permanent, operation. It is quite possible in the course of a war that various sections may appear and disappear. In addition to the Navy, which occupies a somewhat unique position, the following sections or sub-sections have been fairly constant in their operation at Fort Hunt and fall, for general supervision, under the Chief Interrogating Officer.
c. The Enemy Intelligence Section was organized in order to centralize research in German Espionage, Sabotage, and Counter-Intelligence for the benefit of the entire interrogation staff.

At the outset, a group of officers secured briefing and studied the major fields of enemy intelligence with the intention of instructing screening teams. When suitable Ps/N arrived, a picture of German Intelligence, both historical and timely, was secured. Personality files, specialized reading materials, and liaison information served to keep abreast of all Abwehr, R.S.H.A., S.D., G.F.P., and underground movements in Germany.

Closest liaison with other interrogating sections prevented too narrow a compartmentalization permitting utilization of specialists in codes, scientific subjects, and army O.B. to work in cooperation with Enemy Intelligence Section.

d. The Army Sub-Section, specializing in all intelligence of primary interest to the Army, including Order of Battle, German General Staff, Military Organizations, Storage, Weapons, Equipment, and Personalties other than those dealt with by the Enemy Intelligence Sub-Section.

e. Air Sub-Section, dealing with Technical Equipment of the G.A.F., Material of interest to the Air Service, V-Weapons, Bombing Intelligence.

f. Scientific Research Sub-Section, a specialized department primarily interested in purely scientific intelligence research centers in Germany, personalities, etc.
g. Industrial Economics Sub-Section, dealing with Enemy Economics, Finance, and Industrial Activity in general. (Note: This Sub-Section is similar to the Non-Operational Sub-Section of the American Detailed Interrogation Center in the European Theater.)

h. Eastern European Sub-Section, dealing with special political, industrial, economic, and military data pertinent to Eastern Europe as a whole.

4. Evaluation and Other Functional Sub-Sections

In addition to these purely operational sub-sections, there are also five other functional sub-sections which come more or less jointly under the supervision of the Chief Interrogating Officer and the Chief Editing and Evaluation Officer. These are:

a. Evaluation Sub-Section, concerned with evaluation and editing of intelligence obtained through interrogation, with translations, and with dissemination of completed reports.

b. Morale Sub-Section, responsible for the general supervision of prisoners of war as to their general morale and as to their usefulness as sources of information.

c. Monitoring Sub-Section, responsible for the monitoring of P/W rooms and interrogations and for recording and transcribing.

d. Library Sub-Section, the function of which is to maintain files, reference materials in general, including maps.
e. Document Sub-Section, concerned with the study and dissemination of captured German Documents. (38)

(38) For details of the inter-relationship of these sub-sections, see the accompanying organizational chart.
PART III

EDITING - MONITORING - TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
Pages 51-55 of this document were not included in our original copy of the document.
PART III

EDITING - MONITORING - TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

A. Process of Evaluating and Editing

When interrogations were completed or when monitors had made their reports upon information obtained from "listening" in (all transcriptions of recordings of interrogations and room conversations), these were all centralized in an Evaluation and Editing Sub-Section. The function of this sub-section was to sift the material and to evaluate its importance for general dissemination or for limited dissemination to interested agencies. Above all else, this was an editorial section, not only preparing the report for final dissemination, but also maintaining a running card index file of information, and checking all reports for repetitions or obsolete materials. It was responsible also for the collecting and filing of information from outside sources which might be employed for checking or for elaboration of reports prepared within the Interrogation Center. The purpose of the files and of the card indices was not only to provide a background to the evaluators and editors, but also to serve as a record of materials received or disseminated.

The sub-section was headed by a Chief Evaluating and Editing Officer, an assistant, an Order of Battle Analyst, a Morale Analyst, a clerk and two secretaries. Moreover, the Chief Evaluating and Editing Officer and his assistant fulfilled the additional function of briefing Interrogation Officers. It was a function of the Chief Evaluating and Editing Officer to maintain liaison with the CPM Office in the Pentagon Building and with other branches of the service as necessity arose. Proposed sketches, charts and other illustrative materials to be included in reports were

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Closely associated with the Evaluation Section was the Research and Background Center, organized for the purpose of maintaining records pertinent to the work of interrogation. This center was divided into three departments:

a. The map section
b. The filing and record section
c. The library

The map section consisted of approximately 5000 maps, a complete coverage of Germany and of German occupied territory. In addition there were some 250 city plans of German, French, Czechoslovakian, Austrian and Yugoslavian cities available.

A research target file was kept for the purpose of providing information as complete as possible on industrial installations and other important targets. This file contained aerial photos, allied intelligence and bombing reports, as well as the files of Fort Hunt reports. Included also in these records were the daily Photographic Accession List of the AC/AS Intelligence as well as the Interpretation Report Bulletin of the Military Intelligence Photo Interpretation Branch. Both of these came in 3x5 cards and those of pertinent interest were kept in a separate Military Intelligence Photo Interpretation File.

As the name indicates, the Filing and Record Section consisted of two divisions. One of these maintained records of prisoners interrogated on this post, including all documents pertaining to each prisoner, the so-called P/M 201 file, which were to be forwarded to the Record Section. These files were arranged alphabetically and were kept at hand for necessary reference.
The second division or sub-section was exclusively a filing or information division, maintaining a personality file extracted from allied or other interrogating agencies. Each week from 400 to 500 names were added to this file.

Also regional and subject indices were kept, providing a ready reference check list of subjects previously dealt with in reports from various intelligence agencies.

This section was responsible also for the maintenance of miscellaneous files, including dissemination information etc.

The library contained a comprehensive set of Field Manuals, Tactical Manuals, a large assortment of strategic surveys of European countries, as well as Baedekers, Industrial Directives, Atlases and assorted Dictionaries.
The Document Sub-Section was formed in May, 1943, with a senior officer and two staff sergeant-linguists, for the purpose of examining the documents of all prisoners of war brought to Fort Hunt for interrogation, all documents taken from prisoners at Ports of Debarkation in the United States, and such captured material as might be sent to Fort Hunt for evaluation from abroad. Later the section was expanded to include, as additional personnel, a first lieutenant, a corporal and four German prisoners who had turned stool pigeons.

Documents taken from prisoners either on their arrival at Fort Hunt or prior to this, often shed valuable light on the education, background and training of the prisoner. The document sub-section received the papers, examined them and drew up a careful briefing report which was furnished to the interrogating officer before he began his formal interrogation. With this report in mind, the interrogating officer had a considerable advantage over the prisoner to begin with, knowing a great deal in advance about the prisoner's background and, in some cases, where the prisoner's pay book was available, a great deal about his training and movements in the army. Such a display of knowledge on an interrogator's part never failed to impress a prisoner. Documents captured in the field and documents taken from prisoners at the various ports of debarkation furnished the document sub-section with its main source of material for report. These documents were of great variety, ranging from pay-books, a most fertile source on Order of Battle information, through personal letters and diaries, to newspaper clippings, various orders and bulletins, ration coupons, railway tickets etc.

Material captured in bulk at enemy headquarters was sometimes forwarded
to Fort Hunt for evaluation would often include weapons and training manuals, various unit reports and records of great Order of Battle value, maps and published orders.

An arrangement with the Intelligence Command at one of the principal ports of entry of prisoners made it possible for documents taken from prisoners on disembarkation to be packaged and forwarded directly to Fort Hunt by truck. Recommendations for prisoners to be brought to Fort Hunt for examination could sometimes be made on the basis of a prisoner's documents. After examination and appraisal, all documents were returned to their owners via Fort Meade, except those which were taken from prisoners at Fort Hunt. These documents were returned to the prisoner on his departure or, in some instances, during the course of the interrogation.

Among the subjects covered in the Document Sub-Section reports were: Order of Battle, enemy weapons, propaganda, enemy morale, economic and political conditions, air raid damage and industrial locations.
C. The Monitoring Sub-Section or "Listening-In"

The monitoring or "listening in" to the conversations of prisoners of war with the object of "picking up" valuable items of military intelligence has become, during the war with Germany, an essential feature of a Detailed Interrogation Center such as Fort Hunt, CSDIC (UK), 6824 DIC etc. Whatever moral scruples may have served to impede the development of this activity in the past have disappeared in the face of war waged by an enemy, both brutal and unscrupulous. Failure to make use of "listening in" devices would be to allow the Nazis a decided advantage. Like the bombing of cities or the use of submarines against merchant shipping, "Eavesdropping," however repulsive it may be to standards of civilized conduct, is a potential "new weapon" in modern warfare. Even the most obstinate Nazi who arrogantly refuses to reply to the questions of an interrogator, may reveal, during conversations with his prisoner roommate, the most valuable intelligence. Accordingly, the systematic "monitoring" of or "listening in" on the conversations of knowledgeable prisoners of war is an accepted feature of the work of a Detailed Interrogation Center.

Moreover, the technical apparatus employed in this procedure is equally useful as an aid to actual interrogation. An interrogator, suspecting that notes taken during an interrogation may cause the prisoner to refuse to talk may drop in upon the prisoner for a "conversation" if not for a formal interrogation, knowing that what is said will be recorded by the recording machine in the technical section. In short, "listening in" is normally employed for two purposes in a Detailed Interrogation Center:

1. To record the conversation of unsuspecting prisoners of war.
2. To record the details of a formal interrogation without re-
The ability of a recording and transcribing system to take down
verbatim, to reproduce when desired, and to repeat a phrase or sentence
over and over again if necessary, is indispensable. Also, the value to
the interrogator of "playing back" his own recordings can hardly be
exaggerated as a means of studying his own weaknesses or of perfecting
his technique. Obscure points, otherwise difficult to recall, serve to
refresh his memory and to assure the accuracy of his interrogation reports.

Equally important also, in the "listening in" to the reaction of a
prisoner after he has been interrogated and when he returns to his room-
mate with whom he is eager to discuss his interrogation. He enjoys
repeating the questions and explaining how he has succeeded in "misleading
the interrogator." At the same time he may be depended upon, in many
instances, to reveal the desired facts to his prison mate. Thus the
Monitor and Transcriber become the indispensable partners of the Inter-
rogator. In turn, the interrogator keeps the monitor fully informed as to
items of intelligence which are especially desired. In this way the
Monitors know that intelligence to seek for and how to evaluate it in the
light of their knowledge of the prisoner.

Accordingly, the Monitoring Sub-Section is primarily interested in
collection -- how to stimulate it, and how to direct it into useful
channels. In the light of the knowledge of a particular prisoner of war,
gained through listening in, he might be stimulated to talk by means of
carefully chosen books, articles from newspapers, technical manuals, etc.
Small attentions to his creature comfort, administered by the Welfare
Officer who ascertains from the recorded conversations what the prisoner
desires, might serve to "soften" him and to make him more available for
The proper functioning of a Monitoring Section is dependent upon many factors, but the Chief of these are the human factor and the mechanical. "Listening in" over long periods, day after day and week after week is a tedious business. No other function of an Interrogation Center requires a greater effort of concentration or a keener perception of what constitutes valuable information. The Monitor must be a linguist of exceptional skill, understanding many dialects. The ordinary prisoner of war is rarely a cultivated man, employing a pure language. He may speak the language of a Bavarian peasant, of a woodman from Thuringia, or a semi-Slavic patois. This factor, together with the extraordinary sensitiveness of the microphone to extraneous noises, the song of a bird or the Hum of a passing airplane motor, the patter of rain upon the roof, impose upon the Monitor a difficult task of "listening." The best linguists often fail on this assignment for the want of a perfectly trained ear or for the lack of power of concentration. It is necessary, therefore, to plan carefully the schedules of Monitors. The Monitor must be made to feel that he is an essential part of the Interrogation Section. He must be led to regard his work with enthusiasm, to perform it efficiently. High morale is essential to his best performance.

The completed monitoring report, like the interrogation report is submitted to the Editing and Evaluating Sub-Section where it is put into final form for dissemination through appropriate Army, Navy or Air Intelligence channels.

In the general maintenance of this Sub-Section there are three essential functions:
1. The acoustical and electrical engineering, including research, development, manufacturing, the selection and installation of appropriate equipment, together with routine mechanical operation and maintenance.

2. The actual work of linguistics: "Listening in," electrical recording and transcribing into written form from prisoner of war conversations.

3. The administration and the liaison and coordination of the Monitoring Section with the Army, Navy, Air, the Morale Section and the Guard Unit.

The first of these was the function of the Signal Officer. In summary his duties were:

1. Supervision of specialized training of Signal Corps Radio Technicians in audiofrequency transmitting and disc recording.

2. Mechanical operation and repair.

3. Modification and improvement of existing monitoring and recording facilities.

4. Research development, design, manufacture, and installation of improved replacements and extension of existing facilities.

5. Experimentation with, and acoustical measurement of, sound transmission and characteristics of building materials.

6. Procurement, installation, and maintenance of an independent inter-office communicating system.
7. Procurement, improvisation, installation and maintenance of prison break alarms and detectors, call systems, etc.

The second function of the Monitoring system was directed by the Chief Monitor Officer whose functions were:

1. Review and continuous study of all subjects relating to the special experiences of prisoners of war to be "monitored." What information is the particular prisoner of war likely to possess? How can he be induced to discuss what he knows?

2. To become familiar with the monitoring and recording machines.

3. To develop the ability to concentrate upon "listening in" for long periods at a time.

4. To perfect his language and dialectical knowledge from the point of view of listening.

5. Detailed information on Order of Battle, armor, enemy tactics, materiel, munitions, equipment, etc. He must possess this information in such manner as to make use of it in determining what is valuable intelligence. The ability to determine this on the spot is essential to intelligence monitoring.

6. Self briefing on all current matters of intelligence being worked on by the Army, Navy and Air Sections.

7. The briefing of all monitors under his command, not only in general matters of intelligence interest, but on specific matters pertinent to a particular prisoner of war.
The Chief Monitor Officer is also responsible for coordination and liaison. His responsibilities in this work are:

1. Basic training of monitoring and transcribing linguists.

2. Constant liaison with all Interrogation sections and other agencies with the view of briefing his monitors as to desired intelligence.

3. Determining and arranging room movements so as to bring together for conversational purposes appropriate prisoners of war. This requires an intelligent liaison with Army, Navy, Air and Guard personnel.

4. Stimulating conversation through effective propaganda.
D. Technical Equipment: Listening & Recording

Installation and Employment at Fort Hunt.

The initial technical equipment at Fort Hunt consisted of twenty Memovox dual turntable AABVA disc recorders and fourteen Memovox portable transcribers, together with standard RCA broadcasting microphones, recommended by the Naval Research Laboratories and purchased through the Provost Marshal General. These required considerable modification after installation, as determined through actual experience and experimentation. An essential contribution to improvement was made through the use of appropriate acoustical and electrical measuring apparatus, lent by the National Bureau of Standards. Need of improvements was thus ascertained with respect to the following:

a. Sound proofing
b. Inconspicuous acoustic treatment
c. Microphone pick-up efficiency
d. Modernization of the recording principle
e. Controlled amplifier equalization
f. Increased recording turntable speed.

The extensive sound proofing thus indicated was not feasible in view of the building modification and reconstruction that would be necessary. Acoustic treatment was relatively simple through the use of carpeting and through the substitution of unpainted cellotex wall board for the suspicious looking perforated cellotex tile block ceilings originally installed. This type of ceiling, moreover, served admirably for microphone concealment, and, at the same time, proved to be adequate as a sound conductor. The choice
of this texture of wall board was made after repeated
its sound transmission qualities as contrasted with various other com-
mercial products commonly employed for interior construction.

Increased efficiency in microphone conversion of acoustical energy
of a somewhat unique pick-up unit, employing the dynamic principle, but
with greatly exaggerated magnetic field, and intersecting voice coil. It
was fitted also with an exponential horn for further acoustical amplifica-
tion. The output level, however, of this device so substantially over-
shadows the conventional commercial microphone that it more than compen-
sates for the attenuation introduced by the solid partitioning ceiling.
This, together with thorough sound-proofing of the back side of the unit
with cotton batting and rock wool, served effectively to exclude all but
exceptional occasional outside interfering noises. For critical record-
ings of a high priority nature, several of the recorders were converted
from the embossing to the engraving process of cutting, to reduce surface
noise and distortion. This was accomplished through the addition of
adjustable counterbalances and engraving styli with standard instantaneous
acetate recording blanks. Reduction of interfering noises and increased
clarity of sound reproduction were further enhanced by the revision of
amplifier circuits to include a low frequency cut-off below the speech
spectrum and an adjustable treble frequency emphasizing equalizer for con-
trolling sibilance response. The increase of the speed ratio between the
driving motor and the driven turntable, decreased the playing time from
one hour to forty minutes. This time reduction, however, proved to be
justifiable, in view of the reduction or elimination of the high frequency
attenuation and distortion, accompanying the excessive groove
speed characteristics in recording, prior to these modifications.

The purpose of these alterations had been to increase intelligibility in transmission and recording of the monitoring system, so that guarded confidential conversations would become wholly intelligible, and even whispering could be transmitted with the maximum of clarity. This was actually achieved by the employment of the so-called "binaural sound transmission," i.e. the adapting of a separate transmission system for each ear from two independent microphones spaced approximately three feet apart concealed in each room. This is to monitoring what the stereopticon is to photography. Its usefulness is two-fold; it increases intelligibility, and reduces to the minimum the mental fatigue and nervous exhaustion inherent in the normal concentration requisite to "listening in."

Moreover, the flexibility of the switching control for both these channels provides the monitor with another facility. When prisoners, say in adjacent rooms, are carrying on inter-communication between windows, the monitor may listen to both sides of the conversation simultaneously, or may, if circumstances require, audit simultaneously two rooms removed from each other. Thus, a single monitor, while engaged in active monitoring of one room, may "stand by" for developments in a temporarily inactive room. By virtue of the fact that each channel has its own turntable as auxiliary to it, the monitor may make two independent recordings simultaneously.

E. Extension of Original Monitoring Facilities

With the addition of the "B" enclosure as a means of expanding the operations of Fort Hunt, an opportunity presented itself for the installation of improved technical equipment. The roof of the building constituting
the four wings were specially designed with an eye to effective sound-proofing of the attic space. This was accomplished by the use of cellotex sheeting, both on the under side and the top (beneath the tar paper roofing), and with the addition of rock wool fibre, filling the space between.

Each of the 29 detention and interrogation rooms is equipped with two microphones. Each pair is separated in the attic over each ceiling by a center lighting fixture, and each microphone is separately housed in double walled cellotex boxes (with one inch air column between walls). The boxes are generouslly insulated, inside and out, with loosely packed rock-wool, The open bottom of the boxes containing the bell shaped end of the microphone downward is set directly on top of the ceiling cellotex board.

The fifty-eight microphones are individually connected with sixty-four line amplifiers (6 spare amplifiers) located in a closet adjoining the Guard Officer's office. The connections are through twisted sixteen gauge copper shielded pairs, strung in loose cables along the cat-walks provided in the attic of each wing of the building.

The sixty-four line amplifiers are mounted in four banks of sixteen amplifiers, each in heavy steel, fan ventilated cabinet. The filament and plate supply is furnished externally and consists of four filament transformers and two (one regular, and one emergency) high voltage power packs mounted in another heavy steel, fan ventilated cabinet. These were manufactured in accordance with Fort Hunt specifications.

The "M" building is located about one hundred feet outside "B" enclosure wall, a single story, hollow tile structure, with concrete floor, twenty-five by eighty feet. The building, air conditioned, and without windows, has the same roofing construction as that of the "B" enclosure.
A narrow corridor divides the seventeen sound-proof rooms.

A 10 K.V.A. Kohler emergency power unit is housed in a small lean-to wing outside the workshop. Emergency power is available to both the "E" building and to the "B" enclosure. There is a separate power unit for "A" enclosure.

The incoming 101 pair telephone cable from the "B" enclosure's microphone line amplifiers appears on a cable head in the workshop, where it is "jumper connected" to a multiple connected telephone cable distribution system for the fourteen monitor rooms and the office of the Chief Monitor. Therefore, a total of sixteen cable-head outlets is provided in the "M" building, each containing all the microphone positions in the "B" enclosure.
PART IV

INTERROGATION CENTER, P.O. BOX 651

TRACY, CALIFORNIA
A. ITS ESTABLISHMENT

From the beginning it was planned that two Interrogation Centers would be established: one in the vicinity of Washington and another on the West Coast in the California area, "preferably in the vicinity either of San Francisco or Los Angeles." (39) On 1 May 1942, the Chief of Engineers was directed: "in accordance with War Department Construction Policy, you immediately take steps to provide an interrogation center on the west coast of the type and in the general locality indicated in the attached communication." The Chief of Engineers was further instructed to make this selection, "in collaboration with the Provost Marshal General and the Chief Signal Officer." (40)

In conformity with these instructions, Byron Hot Springs, California, was chosen as an appropriate site and information from the PMG indicated that "condemnation proceedings will be instituted and that possession of property will be effective June 1, 1942." (41)

In view of the secret character of the activities of the Interrogation Center at Byron Hot Springs, it was decided that the official mailing address would be:

Post Office Box 661
Tracy, California

Construction work was begun immediately and the District Engineers

(39) (See Memorandum (cited above), Aliens Division, Subject: Joint Interrogation Center, 26 Dec 41)
(40) Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, Subject: Purchase of Site for Use as an Interrogation Center, 1 May 1942.
(41) Memorandum for General Strong, Subject: Comment On Memorandum from the Provost Marshal General, signed Catesby ap C. Jones, Col., GSC, 25 May 1942
expected its completion about 15 December 1942. On the basis of this estimate, Colonel D. W. Dent, Chief of the Tracy interrogation Center, notified the Chief of Prisoner of War Branch, Washington, that the new center would be ready to receive prisoners of war about the end of December, 1942. (42)

In the same Memorandum also the mission of the Tracy establishment was described as follows:

"It is contemplated to use this Interrogation Center primarily for Japanese prisoners. However, we will be prepared to receive prisoners of other nationalities in the event that the supply of Japanese prisoners runs out." Tracy was to be directly connected by means of a TWX machine, with the scrambler apparatus attached, with the War Department. (43)

Although it was anticipated that a majority of the Japanese prisoners would be Army prisoners, the Navy was expected to cooperate in the Tracy Center as in the center at Fort Hunt.

B. FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES AT CAMP TRACY

The actual Interrogation Center at Tracy, California, has a capacity of approximately 44 prisoners of war. The main operational facilities are in the hotel building:

- **Basement** - MIS and Navy Offices
- **1st Floor** - Officers' Quarters, Mess Hall (Officer & EM), Officers' Club and kitchen
- **2nd Floor** - ½ Officers' Quarters; ½ Interrogation Rooms and Guards

(42) Memorandum for General Strong, Subject: Bryon Hot Springs, signed Catesby ap. C. Jones, Col., GSC, 5 Dec 1942.
(43) Ibid.
3rd Floor - Prisoners' Quarters

Other buildings on this post are grouped within an area approximately 850 feet by 900 feet, consisting of overflow of Officers' Quarters, MP Barracks, Barracks for MIS Personnel, Dispensary and Dental Clinic, Laundry, Guard House, Storehouses, Telephone Exchange, Post Exchange, Barber Shop, Recreation Hall, Post Headquarters, and Commanding Officer's Quarters, etc. (For details of the Post Layout, see accompanying chart.)

Prisoners of War destined for interrogation at Tracy were received, screened and held at the Prisoner of War Processing Center, Fort McDowell (Angel Island), San Francisco. This center, operated by the FMG had a holding capacity of 500. After tentative interrogation by Screening Teams at Angel Island for purpose of selecting knowledgeable prisoners, the individuals selected were moved to Tracy for detailed interrogation. Upon the completion of interrogations prisoners were removed to the Dumping Enclosure at Stoneman, California. Here they were sometimes reinterrogated for additional desired information. Thus, during the months of April, May and June, 1945, some 156 such reinterrogations were made at Stoneman.

At Tracy, the selected prisoners were interrogated in accordance with general directives from interested military agencies and Extract Reports were sent to the CPM Branch for final editing and distribution. On the basis of these Extract Reports additional briefings were forwarded through the CPM Branch, Washington, to the Commanding Officer at Tracy for further detailed interrogations. Accordingly, it might sometimes happen that an individual prisoner would undergo numerous interrogations.
This was particularly true of a highly-placed prisoner who was capable of supplying various information. In order to allow for such additional interrogations, prisoners were held a minimum of three weeks at Stoneman before being transferred to a permanent holding camp.

Naval prisoners, upon completion of interrogation by the Navy, were turned over to the Army interrogators either for further questioning or for final disposition through the usual channels. Copies of all Naval Reports as well as Army Reports were forwarded to the CPM Branch. All prisoners of war transport between Tracy and Angel Island or Tracy and Stoneman was handled by the Unit Motor Pool. Rosters of screened discards and completed selected prisoners were sent periodically to the CPM BRANCH, who notified the PMG of their release. From there on such prisoners became the responsibility of the PMG.

For the purposes of this report, it would be repetitious to discuss in detail the actual processes of handling the prisoners of war or detailed interrogations. While minor differences existed between Tracy and Fort Hunt in the internal organization for interrogation, such differences were solely for convenience of local operations. In general, the methods and the results sought were similar. Obviously, temperamental differences between the Japanese and the Germans would account for some variations in methods and some contracts in results. A memorandum for the A. C. of S., G-2, Subject: Assignment of Military Intelligence Personnel, 21 October 1943, signed Col. Catesby ap C. Jones, serves to give an accurate picture of the Byron Hot Springs establishment and its relations with Fort Hunt.
"This Post is exclusively an interrogation Post. It is organized similarly to Fort Hunt, to which there is no MIS-X Section stationed there. The Post was originally obtained and rehabilitated for the purpose of interrogating Japanese prisoners of war. However, due to the limited number of Jap prisoners, the excellent facilities of the Post are used largely for the purpose of interrogating German prisoners of war. The Navy conduct all their interrogations for the West Coast at this Post.

All activities of the POW Branch are interallied and interservice, necessitating a close liaison with all agencies of the War Department. The close contact established with these two posts by this office is necessary to the successful accomplishment of the mission of this Branch. Officers are frequently interchanged, the post are in daily touch with this office and are furnished the desired intelligence required by all technical branches of the War Department. Also, officers from this Branch have rendered valuable assistance in all the prisoner of war internment camps by assisting in the processing and segregation of prisoners of war with varied political points of view."
Pages 77-78 of this document were not included in our original copy of the document.
PART V

ACTIVATION AND FUNCTIONS OF MIS-X
PART V

ACTIVATION AND FUNCTIONS OF MIS-X

1. Origin and Activation

MIS-X was activated on 6 October 1942 in conformity with the directive of the Secretary of War and on the basis of a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, 2 September 1942, making the following recommendations:

1. That a section be established under the control of the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service for the following purposes:
   a. To coordinate provision of assistance and information pertaining to evasion of capture and escape methods to American Army personnel in theaters of operation.
   b. To supervise training of selected key personnel in accomplishing this purpose.
   c. To supervise and coordinate collection, evaluation and dissemination of information from American prisoners of war in all theaters, and to develop the means of communication therefor.

2. That the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, detail to Section for duty, upon its establishment, such officer or officers from the Army Air Forces as may be required to coordinate activities of the Army Air Forces in connection therewith.
3. That necessary funds for execution of the mission of this section to be provided from sources under the control of the Secretary of War, or from such other channels as may be made available. (44)

B. Mission of the MIX Section

In a Memorandum for the Executive Officer, MIS (29 December 1942) the following were described as the functions of the MI-X section, Prisoner of War Branch:

1. Indoctrine Air Force Intelligence Officers who will in turn instruct air crews in the various theaters of operations on evasion of capture when forced down in enemy territory.

2. Instructions on escape—including the instilling of escape psychology in combat airmen and communicating plans for escape to American Prisoners of War by means of codes.

3. Instruction in proper conduct after capture and to inform Intelligence Officers of Rights of Prisoners of War under International Law.

4. To secure military information from American or Allied escaped prisoners on their return to allied territory.

5. To obtain by means of code from Prisoners of War

(44) MID 904 (9/2/42) 2 Sept 42 Memo for the Chief of Staff, Approved by order of the Secretary of War, 6 Oct 42.
still in captivity information concerning locations of prisons, conditions of imprisonment, opportunities for escape, reasons for failure of attempts to escape, and other pertinent intelligence.

6. To assist in the preparation and distribution of escape kits, and emergency kits containing maps, money, and other necessities to be furnished air crews on missions and to incorporate new ideas and improvements in such equipment.

7. Plan and carry on correspondence with Prisoner of War by means of codes which will be taught to key personnel by this branch.

8. To maintain close liaison with the British MI-9 Branch which is conducting similar operations." (45)

C. Sub-Sections of MIS-X

In accordance with these memoranda MIS-X was established with its functions distributed among five sub-sections:
a. Interrogation or Interview Sub-Section
b. Correspondence Sub-Section
c. PW Camp Locations
d. Training and Briefing
e. Technical Sub-Section

(45) Memorandum - Subject: Functions of the MI-X Section, Prisoner of War Branch, signed Catesby ap C. Jones. Co-director, Chief, Prisoner of War Branch. 29 Dec 42.
The functions of each of these sub-sections are:

1. The Interrogation or Interview Sub-Section: This sub-section has three chief functions:
   a. The interviewing or interrogation of returned evaders, escapers, and repatriates from enemy or enemy-occupied territory.
   b. The collection and preparation of valuable military information gained from these.
   c. Reports on the experiences of outstanding individuals in these categories.

2. Correspondence Sub-Section:
   Functions:
   a. Communicating with Prisoners of War by means of secret codes in letters and radio broadcasts.
   b. Continuous development of new codes and means of communication.
3. P.W. Camp Locations:

Functions of the Sub-Section:

a. Responsible for the collection and maintenance of information on prison camps in which U.S. military personnel are held.

b. Preparation of periodic bulletins on camp conditions, treatment, atrocities, morale, strength and location of all known prison camps.

c. Distribution of these reports to MIS-X detachments in the theaters of operation, to appropriate agencies in the War and State Departments, and to the Red Cross.

4. Training and Briefing Sub-Section:

Functions of:

a. Training of Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers for the purpose of briefing personnel of all three services in the Continental United States or in the theaters of operation on methods of survival, evasion and escape, and on the rights of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.

5. Technical Sub-Section:

Functions of:

a. Responsible for the procurement and manufacture of evasion aids and equipment.
b. For the distribution of such aids to MIS-X theater detachments.

c. For the manufacture and procurement of escape devices and aids for prisoners of war. The distribution through parcels to the various prison camps in enemy territory. (46)

D. The Administrative Department of MIS-X:

Before proceeding to the detailed description of the functions of each of the intelligence sub-sections, it should be pointed out that the MIS-X Section, like the Interrogation Section of CPW, has its separate administrative head or Section Chief. The latter, together with the Administrative Officer and Assistant Administrative Officer, constitute the directing, coordinating and liaison agency of the entire Section.

1. The Section Chief is responsible for advising and consulting with his superiors on all matters pertaining to the section; for planning, supervising, reviewing and coordinating the work of the section. He is liaison officer between sections. Edits and advises on special correspondence.

2. The Administrative Officer is responsible to the Section Chief. Coordinates and supervises the clerical work performed in the section. Processes officers and enlisted men assigned, attached, or

(46) Memo for the Deputy A. C. of C. for Activity; MIS-X Activities, signed, Russell H. 8. 46.
entering the school as students. Obtains Security Registration. Lectures on Post Orientation section. Maintains statistics of escapees and evaders. Responsible for proper securing, recording, sorting and distribution of mail and secret mail.

Maintains the following files:

(a) Index file of POW's in German and Italian Camps
(b) Cross index or camp file showing separation of POW's by camps
(c) File of Internees by Neutral Countries
(d) Code Users Register Card check list
(e) MIS-X Equipment and Supply Records
(f) MIS-X Personnel Placement Questionnaire

Extracts and disseminates information from the following reports submitted daily:

(a) Censorship Submission Reports
(b) Monitoring Center Recorded Radio Reports
(c) Paraphrase of State Department Cable Exports
(d) News Bulletin Reports
(e) Military Attaché W/DGS Reports
(f) W/D AGO's Next of Kin Reports
(g) W/D Bureau of Public Relation Future Release Reports
(h) W/D Classified Message Center Incoming Messages
(i) POW Information Bureau (PMO) Reports
Performs special work for the heads of each section.

3. **Assistant Administrative Officer**: Duties are dissemination of Censorship information to all P/W camp personalities in the Southwest Pacific (Japan Prison Camps). Checking all P/W camp personnel for C.U.'s listed as missing in action for a change of status.

   Maintaining a special file for American P/W's in enemy hands to whom special parcels are sent. Keeping a C.U. file; C.U. contact file; next of kin of the contact file; and maintaining a camp personality list on the European Theater P/W's.

   Assisting in handling of E and E personnel, occasionally helping on the actual interview of escape and evasion personnel. Administrative duties in the absence of the Executive Officer.

**E. Personnel Chart MIS-X, Grades and Ratings (End of April 1945)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>MIS-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>6 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonels</td>
<td>5 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>13 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lts</td>
<td>29 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lts</td>
<td>6 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Almt. Strength |  Vacs |
### Enlisted Men vs. MIS-X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>MIS-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M/Sgts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/Sgts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Sgts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sgts</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pfc</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Detailed Activities of Each of the MIS-X Sub-Sections:

1. The Interrogation of Interview Sub-Section of MIS-X

   1. Duties of the Chief of the Interrogation or Interview Sub-Section

      a. This officer is responsible for the preparation and distribution of Ex-Reports (reports on liberated Pots/W) and for the direction of the officers and EM of his Sub-Section. He receives each evader or escaper to be interviewed and after tentative questioning, designates an officer of his Sub-Section to carry out the necessary detailed interrogation or, when desirable, proceeds with the detailed interrogation himself. He makes necessary arrangements for the interview of the escaper or evader
by other branches, such as the Technical Sub-Section, MIS-X or the Interrogation Branch of CPM, and makes recommendations as to the ultimate fate of the evader—i.e., whether or not he will be employed by the Training Sub-Section, etc.

b. The Chief of Sub-Section is responsible also for the reading and editing of all Ex-Reports before stenciling, arranging the information for the main report and placing in appropriate appendices information for the distribution to various branches of MIS.

c. He compiles casualty information received from subject interviewed and forwards it to the AGO. When desirable also he may be called upon to lecture in the Training School or participate in briefing missions.

2. Other officers of the Interrogation or Interview Section. Approximately three officers have been regularly employed under the Chief of this Sub-Section. While their primary duty has been to interrogate evaders or escapers for useful information pertinent to the function of all the sections of MIS-X, their detailed duties have been:
a. To collect information on escape and evasion routes and helpers.

b. To maintain a file of such information obtained both from interrogation and other sources.

c. To collect and analyze all collateral information concerning routes, as well as information on politics, economics and travel in enemy territory.

d. To transmit all pertinent information respecting such routes, etc., to Prisoners of War.

e. To prepare and edit narrative reports on escapers and evaders.

f. To rewrite radio scripts for the purpose of incorporating code messages.

3. Enlisted personnel in the Interrogation or Interview Section of MIS-X.

In addition, approximately three enlisted men have been employed as clerks, stenographers, mimeograph operators, etc., in this Sub-Section.

INTERVIEW SUB-SECTION

Report on Interrogations
November 1945 to & Incl. July 1946

E & E PERSONNEL

Following is a record of E and E personnel interviewed by this Sub-Section and on whom Ex-Reports were made:
Army Personnel:.............. 664
Navy Personnel:................ 16
USMC Personnel:............... 8
Civilian Personnel:............. 4

GRAND TOTAL:................... 682

Countries from Which These Men Returned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Islands</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indo-China</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey Island</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriatic Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebessee Islands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceram Island</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua Island</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL:................... 682

II Number of E and E personnel interviewed by this Sub-Section, but on whom no reports were disseminated, because the accounts of their experiences were valueless, having nothing new to add to previous Ex-Reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Personnel</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL:................... 504
### Countries from Which These Men Entered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Islands</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL:** 604

### III Number of E and E Personnel who were interviewed at ETOUSA and interviewed by this Sub-Section, but on whom no reports were disseminated, with a view to use in MIS-X:

**Army Personnel:** 299

### Countries from Which These Men Returned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL:** 299

### IV Total number of E and E personnel who passed through this Interview Sub-Section during the period November 1943 to and including July 1946:

**Army Personnel:** 1455

**Navy Personnel:** 18

**USMC Personnel:** 9

**Civilian Personnel:** 5

**GRAND TOTAL:** 1485

---

**UNCLASSIFIED**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reported Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>233</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippine Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indo China</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey Island</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriatic Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebes Islands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceram Island</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua Island</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL:...........1486**

**INTERVIEW SUB-SECTION**

Report on Interrogation
To Date

**REPATRIATED PERSONNEL**

The following is a record of Repatriated Personnel interviewed to date and on whom R-Reports were made:

1. **US Army Air Forces**
   - Officers........25
   - Enlisted Men..17
   **TOTAL........40**

2. **US Army Ground Forces**
   - Officers........15
   - Enlisted Men..15
   **TOTAL........30**

3. **US Navy (All Units)**
   - Enlisted Men..3
   **TOTAL........3**

4. **British Army**
   - Enlisted Men..1
   **TOTAL........2**

5. In addition to the above, one civilian was interrogated.
TOTAL ARMY REPARTIATES INTERROGATED:........70
TOTAL NAVY REPARTIATES INTERROGATED:.......3
TOTAL BRITISH REPARTIATES INTERROGATED:...1
TOTAL CIVILIAN REPARTIATES INTERROGATED: 1

GRAND TOTAL REPATRIATES INTERROGATED:....75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps from Which These Men Returned</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stalag Luft 3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 17B</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 2B</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oflag 64</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag Luft I</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 3B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 5B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 8B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag Luft 4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlag und Milag Nord</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilag 7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 3C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 9C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 7A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 13C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag 13D</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalag Luft 6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 75

II In addition, a supplementary report was issued to R-Reports Nos. 42-71 on information furnished by 107 repatriates interviewed at Halloran General Hospital in February 1945. Also, a composite R-Report No. 76, was compiled from information furnished by 75 Protected Personnel, who were interrogated at Charleston, S.C., during March 1945.

III To date, 919 repatriates have been screened and interviewed, including the ones on whom R-Reports have been published.
II Correspondence Sub-Section

In a measure, this Sub-Section may be regarded as the eyes and ears of MIS-X, responsible not only for the code correspondence, but for the extracting of intelligence information obtained from such correspondence and for its dissemination. Here, as in the case of the other sub-sections, the details as to functions can best be presented by an analysis of the duties of the various officers of this Sub-Section.

1. Chief of the Correspondence Sub-Section
   Duties: Responsible for advising and consulting with superiors on all matters pertaining to this Sub-Section. Responsible for planning, supervising, reviewing and coordinating the work of the Sub-Section.

2. Duties of Writing, Sub-Section Chief
   a. Reading of cross-section of letters (in photostat) outgoing from friends and relatives of POW's who are code users. From these he obtains background material for MIS-X Special Correspondence.
   b. Preparation of messages to be sent in code to Prisoners of War.
   c. Reading of special reports and suggesting of suitable subjects for messages.
   d. Liaison with Technical Sections in preparing information which this Sub-Section desired to send to camps.
e. Double checking of information before preparing actual messages.

f. Assigning of messages to other workers in his section.

g. Criticism of finished letters—as to naturalness, smoothness, etc.

h. Correspondence with next-of-kin who are cooperating.

i. Writing of covering letters to accompany the finished products being returned to next-of-kin for copying.

j. Writing of follow-up letters, when difficulties arise.

k. Reading of all incoming letters from all POW's on MIS-X Watch List.

l. Supervising the decoding of messages contained in such incoming letters.

m. Notifying censorship authorities of references to MIS-X activities (references which have not already been deleted in final examination).

n. Preparing of Extracts from POW Correspondence bulletin. This includes significant information found in clear text.

o. Background lectures on MIS-X correspondence activities, given to various groups passing through MIS-X Training Section.
3. Duties of Officer Section of this Section

a. Encoding messages in letters to prisoners of War. Preparation of these letters so that they read fluently, maintaining the style of the next-of-kin sender even when code messages added or incorporated.

b. Expert use of all codes employed, and the ability to instruct others in their use.

c. Preparation of letters from fictitious correspondents—often calling for vivid imagination.

d. Ability to adapt his style to the style of writing of others.

e. Instruction of others in the employment of codes.

4. Enlisted Personnel—Correspondence Section

This section has some 18 enlisted personnel variously employed:

a. Checking and filing of incoming photostat letters and the maintenance of next-of-kin files.

b. Typing and checking of outgoing letters.

c. Assistant code instructors.

d. General stenography and routine filing.

e. Inventing of new codes and analyzing of suspected enemy correspondence.

f. Cryptographic specialists.
5. Specialized Sub-Sections of Correspondence Sub-Section

It has been found necessary to set up certain highly specialized sub-divisions where the duties are of such nature as to require constant and detailed attention or where the problems involved do not fall naturally into the normal functions of the Correspondence Sub-Section.

a. "E" Sub-Section (Philippine Island Correspondence).

This division deals with Asiatic-Pacific Prisoners of War, sending letters to POW's in this area and examining letters received from them. Responsible also for censoring and preparing for dispatch mail to and from Prisoners of War in the Philippine Islands.

b. Censorship Sub-Section--Duties of:

(1) To maintain liaison with the censorship office

(2) Supervising of photostating of special letters from C.O.'s in the enemy hands and dispatching of special mail for the Correspondence Sub-Section.

(3) Supervising of special parcels for the Technical Sub-Section.

6. Achievement of Correspondence Sub-Section MIS-X

Experience of this Sub-Section has indicated that it can fulfill its mission in four different ways:
a. By furnishing a means of escape to camps on escape, informing them of special packages containing escape aids being sent into the camps.

b. By providing a medium through which men held prisoners in Germany or Japan are able to forward intelligence incidentally gathered while moving through enemy territory or while imprisoned.

c. By making it possible for allied prisoners to report violations of the Geneva Convention or to send other S.O.S. messages from their places of imprisonment to their own countries.

d. By contributing to the building up and maintaining the morale of men held prisoner of war by the enemy.

These various missions have been carried out chiefly by utilizing the personal mail received and sent by American prisoners of war in the enemy camps as a medium for transmission. This involved the selection of a method of incorporating code messages in these letters in such way as to arouse no suspicion in the censorship offices of the enemy. Accordingly, a number of codes suitable for use in the average personal letter were adopted. A report of the Correspondence Sub-Section dated 31 July 1946 makes the following statement respecting these codes:
All evidence obtainable from returned prisoners who were code users (C.U's) in various German prison camps indicates that at no time were the German authorities suspicious of the letters. This secrecy, however, could be preserved only by exercising the greatest possible care in the composition of the code-containing letters. This involved not only naturalness of style, but maintenance of similarity (postmarks, censorship stamps, and general physical appearance) in all correspondence to or from a given prisoner of war. Whatever evidence there is that these letters were subjected to special scrutiny by the Germans indicates merely a search for secret inks. Code letters of this type continued to be successfully sent and received to and from American prisoners as late as June 1945. 

(47) These codes are analyzed in detail in Report Incorporating an Exposition of the correspondence work, MIS-X, APPENDIX A, 31 Jul 45.

(48) See Ibid. APPENDIX "B" for interviews with returning P/M Code Users.
The following list will serve to indicate the number of actual Code Users in the various branches of the services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>5,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Officers</td>
<td>3,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Enlisted Men</td>
<td>1,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Ground Forces</strong></td>
<td>3,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Officers</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Enlisted Men</td>
<td>2,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Officers</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Forces</strong></td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Officers</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Enlisted Men</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Registered Code Users</strong></td>
<td>9,696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Necessarily, the greatest care must be employed in the selection of Code Users. It was one of the practical defects of the system that it was not possible to train all personnel as Code Users. This, of course, would be physically impossible and would be extremely dangerous from the point of view of security. Mental capacity, discretion and unquestionable loyalty are essential qualifications of Code Users.

In general, the following list will indicate the chief categories receiving instruction as Code Users:

1. At the War Department—to specially selected classes of Army, Navy. Army officers taught were mostly
Air Corps Intelligence Officers and MIS-X Intelligence Officers departing for the theaters.

2. Selected groups of officers and enlisted men in the theaters, prior to entry into combat.

3. Occasional officers selected by the Navy and Marine Corps to be instructed in correspondence work.

4. Selected officers and enlisted men already captured and in enemy camps — instructed by a fellow prisoner who had been trained prior to capture as a Code User.

While the instruction of such individuals was concerned chiefly with the mastery of codes and with practice writing of letters incorporating codes, it was necessary also to include other training details:

a. A clear statement of why the particular individuals were chosen for training.

b. A thorough briefing in security, including:

(1) Impressing of individuals with the reasons why he was not to instruct others unless authorized to do so by the Correspondence Sub-Section.

(2) In case of capture — to employ only carefully selected individuals in the prison camp for instruction.
(3) Necessity of abstaining from divulging any information concerning the existence of the system.

(4) Specific precautions to be observed in the employment of the codes.

Each Code User was instructed also as to the types of information to be sought and how to report it by code in personal correspondence, including:

a. Location of important targets such as gasoline or munition dumps, railway yards, command or staff headquarters.

b. Casualty reports for air crews, using the following abbreviations:

A for FLAK
F for FIGHTER
B for BOMBED
N for NOT BOMBED
D for DESTROYED
P for PROBABLY DESTROYED
S for DAMAGED
The two types of letters usually employed for correspondence with the prisoners were:

a. The next-of-kin letter prepared in collaboration with a regular correspondent, incorporating of desired communication in code within the letter proper. This type of letter, of course, required recopying by the original writer.

b. The Phony Letter—a letter from a fictitious correspondent, including "faked" censorship deletions.

It is obvious that this system can be made to work only with full cooperation from both the PMG and Censorship, the former to keep the Correspondence Sub-Section fully informed as to the captured Americans, and the latter in order to insure that vital portions of a letter would not be censored.

While the Correspondence Sub-Section was able to fulfill its mission in the Western Theater, certain insuperable difficulties rendered its work less satisfactory in the Asiatic-Pacific. "The most important adverse condition was the failure of Japan to report Americans who were taken prisoner, only two Code Users having been reported captured up to 30 June 1945.... Other adverse conditions were the smallness of volume and slowness of movement of mail to and from Americans who were prisoners of the Japanese, and the fact that, in many
instances, the Japanese allowed only 25 to 50 word forms to be written by prisoners of war. The shortness of these forms made the inclusion of a coded message far more difficult, although not impossible."

III Prisoner of War Camps—Conditions and Locations

The activities of this Sub-Section were carried on by two subdivisions or departments, one of which dealt with European, and the other with Asiatic-Pacific Camp Conditions, and locations. Information sought respecting these camps falls into the following general categories:

A. German Camp Conditions—Locations

1. Functions
   a. Codes and Correspondence: Censorship and other restrictions, privileges and security factors existing in various camps; transit time of letters to and from camps; key personnel imprisoned in these camps; segregation of Americans from British and other nationalities; names of likely correspondents for code and news letters; enemy propaganda within the camps; general morale of prisoners of war; status of non-citizens posing as United States Prisoners of War; exchanges of identity, etc.
war in enemy camps; evidences of pilfering, censorship of parcels; special skills among prisoners of various camps; transit time of parcels; camp locations and escape routes pertinent to the making of special maps; information respecting possible escape helpers; preparation of forged papers; radio; uniforms of enemy guards, and characteristic details of dress of civilians. In general, investigation and reporting on all matters pertaining to escape.

e. Training: Pre and post-capture experiences; German interrogations of prisoners of war; escape attempts and activities, barriers, opportunities, punishments; organization of American prisoners of war within the camps; evasion of capture and underground help in occupied countries.

d. Transmission of welfare intelligence to interested agencies such as the State Department, the Office of the Provost Marshal General, G-1, and the American Red Cross.

e. Strengths: Record of camp populations; movements and transfers within or to and from the camps. Twice monthly there was published a strength list showing location of camps, number and category of prisoners and
brief description. This has been accomplished among various agencies.

f. Violations of Geneva Convention: Maintenance of files on German failure to comply with the Geneva Convention, and on names and offenses of war criminals in relation to camp discipline, etc.

g. Research for locating and pin-pointing of prisoner of war camps where allied prisoners are held with a view particularly to guiding the Air Force in avoiding bombing of such locations.

2. Sources of Information.

a. Routine Sources: American, British and Canadian Censorship Reports and Extracts; Reports of the International Red Cross and Protecting Powers; List of Information supplied by British MI-9, MI-19, CSDIC, Military Attachés, FW and X(MIS-ETO), OSS, IS9 (WE-A), and reports of the Interrogation Branch of CPK.

b. Occasional Additional Sources: Unofficial personal contacts with the Prisoner of War Information Bureau of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, the Special War Problems Division of the State Department and the Prisoner of War Branch of the American Red Cross.

Note: It is characteristic of a Top Secret Unit such as MIS-X that sources such as the above could be approached only with the utmost tact and discretion. To most of these agencies the very existence of MIS-X was unknown.
e. Various Geographic and Military Branches of MIS and AAF were frequently requested to supply information, maps, and photographs.

d. The Correspondence Section of MIS-X which was at times able to supply information unique as it was valuable.

e. Repatriated Prisoners of War: The first hand experiences and detailed descriptions of such repatriated persons offered the richest and most valuable source of information respecting both camps and camp life among the prisoners. Through the cooperation of the State Department knowledgeable repatriates were flown from Europe to Washington for prompt interrogation by MIS-X. Moreover, all other repatriates were interviewed upon their return to the United States. Thus, after the repatriation of October 1943, 17 repatriates were thoroughly interrogated. Similarly, after the September 1944 repatriation of 233 prisoners and the exchange of 493 in January 1945, valuable information was supplied to the Camp Conditions Sub-Section through cooperation of the Interviewing Sub-Section.
3. Dissemination of Information
   a. Information concerning camp conditions was constantly required by:

   (1) P/W Branch of USSTAF
   (2) The P and X Branch of MIS
   (3) G-1, SHAEF
   (4) Various War Department Agencies

   b. Information concerning conditions of particular camps for officers of the Training and Correspondence Sections making contact with prisoners' of war next-of-kin.

   c. To Air Forces for bombing guidance.

   d. To the American Red Cross in the preparation of lists and locations of camps.

   e. To State Department as a basis for initiating formal requests for improvements of camp conditions.

4. Preparation of Reports:

   Reports of the sub-section issued either regularly or occasionally as conditions required were:

   a. "R"—Repatriation Reports, based on the interrogation of repatriates, including data on capture, interrogation, escape information and general military intelligence.

   Such reports included also a Secret or Top Secret Appendix, for strictly limited distribution to MIS agencies,
b. Strength Reports (appearing twice each month).
(See above under "Functions," paragraph 5.)

c. Special Reports:

(1) One, appearing on 1 July 1944, dealing with "X" activities.

(2) A "Confidential" Report of 15 July 1944, dealing with all non-secret matters pertaining to enemy prisoner of war camps.

(3) Special "War Crimes" Report to the Judge Advocate General's Office.

d. "Extracts"—Brief reports, issued periodically, bringing prisoner of war information up to date.

Note: The Sub-section is now engaged in the preparation of a detailed history of German Prisoner of War Camps.

B. Japanese Camp Conditions—Locations

Since 1944 the Camp Conditions Sub-Section has devoted special attention to Japanese prisoner camps, carrying on extensive research, based on a variety of sources, respecting the location, the strength and the general conditions of Prisoner of War Camps in Japan. The activities of this Sub-Section are, in large measure, best described
1. General Camp Conditions Reports
   a. The first of these reports on Japanese camp conditions, entitled PRISONER OF WAR CONDITIONS IN JAPAN was issued on 15 May 1944 and describes the condition prevailing in the various prison camps of Japan proper. This report, some 43 pages in length, is generously illustrated with sketch maps, photographs, percentage graphs, etc.
   b. A second such report, entitled PRISONER OF WAR CAMP CONDITIONS ON THE ASIATIC MAINLAND, issued on 1 July 1944.
   c. The third report, PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND, consisted of 22 pages of text with four sketch maps and seven photographs of camp sites.
   d. The fourth report, PRISONERS OF WAR IN TAIWAN (FORMOSA) was issued 20 October 1944.

2. Extracts
   In addition to the more comprehensive type of report noted above, Extracts have been issued, sometimes three or four times a week with a view of keeping the camp condition information up to date.
setting the standard for those to follow by evaluating incoming material as it was received and making it immediately available. During the month of May 1945 as many as 16 such Extracts were issued.

3. Strength and Location Reports.

These reports are designed as a means of recording in detail the strength and description of all known POW and CAC Camps. The following is a list of such reports prepared, between 15 April 1944 and 10 August 1945:

a. 15 April 44--PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS--JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (33 pages.)

b. 20 December--LOCATION AND STRENGTH REPORT OF PRISONER OF WAR AND CIVILIAN ASSEMBLY CENTERS IN JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

c. Change No. 1 to the December Report was issued on 16 February 1946 on the basis of new information.

d. Change No. 2 to the December Report was issued 10 April 1946 on the basis of new information.

e. 1 July 1946--LOCATION AND STRENGTH REPORT OF POW AND CIVILIAN CENTERS IN JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (49 pages--350 copies).
was supplemented in April 1946 by photo interpretation with the object of obtaining aerial photographs of all Japanese Prison Camps. During the month of May locations were "spotted" and air coverage obtained on seven POW camps. With the continuation of the war this activity would have contributed greatly to the positive achievements of the sub-section.

IV Training and Briefing Sub-Section

1. Duties of the Chief of the Training and Briefing Sub-Section:
   a. Coordination of training with USAAF (plans and training).
   b. Supervision of schools for AAF Intelligence Officers and USMC officers.
   c. Planning and routing of briefers to Air Corps Units in 3rd phase training throughout the U.S.A.
   d. Lecturing to various officers in training.
   e. Preparation of schedules for AAF Intelligence Officers course.
   f. To aid in the preparation of and coordination with the schedules for Marine I.O.'s classes.
g. To contact Plans and Training Division, AAF relative to existing situation or the development of new situations with respect to:

(1) briefing in the field

(2) classes to be included at the Training Section.

h. To study and digest Evasion and Escape Reports or any other classified material upon its initial reception and to assist in its proper dissemination.

i. To make occasional briefing trips to give field briefings or to participate in activities of various Air Force Headquarters in coordinating and setting up Escape & Evasion programs.

j. To initiate and supervise initial briefings of such programs.

2. Duties of Assistant to Chief of Training Section (in charge of School).

a. To assist in the preparation of school schedules for AAF Intelligence Course and to coordinate with schedule of Marine and Intelligence Officers Classes.

b. To supervise lectures in both classes.

c. To introduce lecturers or evaders with appropriate remarks.
d. To present the manner of presentation of new lecturers or evaders with the view of making appropriate selection for further service in the school or in the field.

e. To maintain schedules for evaders in response to requests for their services.

f. To request and obtain orders for briefers or evaders whose services are desired at various stations.

g. To meet and to indoctrinate as well as orient, all new classes at the Training School.

h. To be available for interviews by students at the Training School regarding curriculum, orders, leave, transportation or any other pertinent matters.

i. To supervise and grade all written outlines of assigned work and to offer necessary criticisms of all work in the Training School.

j. To assist the Chief of Sub-Section in any and all matters pertaining to the operation of the Sub-Section.

3. Briefers

In addition to the above officers directing training there have been available a number of officers (approximately 18) for the purpose of carrying out essential briefings. The duties of these Briefers may be outlined in detail as follows:
a. Study and research of Escape and evasion Reports and Prisoner of War conditions, together with other published and secret material.

b. To deliver classified lectures to various components of the Army Air Forces, including traveling from one air base to another in the continental United States, briefing of combat crews, pilots, and other authorized personnel prior to their movement overseas.

c. Lecturing to classes of students attending MIS Training School.

d. Attending practice lectures given by students and participating in critique.

e. Assisting in training personnel from Army Air Forces, Marine Corps, Ground Forces and Navy in the function of MIS-E.

f. Research and general study of material to be stressed in special lectures and briefings proposed for Ground Forces.

g. Occasional interrogating of escapers and evaders for MIS records.

h. Interviewing escapers and evaders previous to their departure on briefing trips.

i. Arranging for appropriate planning of lecture routine to coordinate escapers' or evaders' experiences with general lecture content.
j. Planning and arranging of itineraries with respect to lecture periods, places, transportation, etc.

k. Liaison activities between MIS-X and Intelligence Officers of units of the Army Air Forces, including the building up and continuance of good will for the proper accomplishment of MIS-X missions.

The following record will serve to illustrate the typical activity of a Briefer. This record is selected at random from the files of MIS-X (Training Sub-Section) and covers the period from 27 September 1943 to 21 April 1944:

Reported for duty.

Number of briefing missions to date................................. 9
Total possible days......................................................... 196
Number of days actually on missions............................... 116
(80 days on Post, class-room briefing)
Average briefings per day........................................... 63 (61.115)
Total number of personnel briefed............................... 11,087 (61x181.67)
* Total number of individual briefings.......................... 61
Average Personnel per briefing.................................... 181.67 (11,087/61)
Total number of miles air travel................................ 29,119
(air miles on map)
Number of states briefed............................................. 16
Number of states visited............................................. 28

* Includes only briefings in-field. Does not include class-room briefing.
As of June 1945 the following personnel of the various branches of the Armed Services had been briefed or trained by the Training and Briefing Section of MIS-X:

A. Briefing

1. Total number of AAF Operation Crew Members Briefed to date: 339,248
2. Total number of AGF Personnel briefed to date: 805,072
3. Grand total of all personnel briefed to date: 1,144,320

B. Training-Intelligence Officers from all branches

1. Grand total of Air Intelligence Officers Trained: 226
2. Grand total of Marine Aviation Intelligence Officers trained: 87
3. Grand total of Navy Aviation Intelligence Officers trained: 56
4. Grand total of Army Ground Force Intelligence Officers trained: 30
5. Total trained: 400

4. Asiatic-Pacific, Sub-Section (Training Section)—Duties of Chief of Sub-Section.

a. To gather information on Escape, Evasion, and Survival and on camp conditions in the Asiatic-Pacific Theaters.

b. Collecting and studying and evaluating pertinent materials.

c. Interviewing evaders, escapers, and other persons who have been in the theater and who have information of value.

e. Specialization in all matters pertaining to Asiatic-Pacific Theaters.

5. Enlisted Personnel Employed in Training Sub-Section

In addition to the officer personnel above mentioned approximately seven enlisted men are employed in this Sub-Section in various capacities:

a. Clerks, typists, secretarial duties.

b. Maintenance of records of student personnel and of briefings.

c. Compilation of all events having to do with the Section's activities.

d. Distribution of MIS-X manuals.

e. Preparation of sub-section reports.

f. Preparation of forms for the sub-section.

g. Preparation of schedules.

h. Mail clerks for the sub-section—handling code-mail.

i. Messenger duties.

j. Maintenance of security-check files.

k. Draftsmen.
V. TECHNICAL SUB-SECTION

In general, the Technical Sub-Section is responsible for the designing, the manufacture or procurement and the proper distribution of all equipment employed in Escape or Evasion activities.

1. Duties of Sub-Section Chief:
   a. Supervision of all technical operations.
   b. Determination of sub-section policies.
   c. Approval of all sub-section correspondence.
   d. Liaison with manufacturers on special Escape and Evasion Equipment.
   e. Liaison with WD officials and Special Govt. Agencies and procurement of escape and evasion equipment.
   f. Approval of procurement of all items.
   g. Maintains records of expenditures of confidential funds.
   h. Reports to and consults with Executive and Assistant Executive of MIS-X on all matters pertaining to the section.
   i. All liaison with civilian cooperators.

2. Other Officers of Technical Sub-Section:

   In addition to an Assistant Sub-Section Chief, who assumes the duties of Sub-Section Chief during the frequent absences of the latter in line of duty, there are approximately nine additional officers among whom the following sectional duties are distributed:
   a. Supervision of warehouse and warehouse personnel.
   b. Radio development, experiment, testing, and repair.
   c. Liaison with Signal Corps.
d. Correspondence and reports concerning equipment.

e. Procurement of Escape and Evasion equipment under supervision of the Chief of Sub-Section.

f. Procurement and maintenance of equipment and supplies for warehouse, wood-shop, radio shop and chemical laboratory.

g. Preparation of purchase requests and purchase orders.

h. Tracing and locating of shipments of classified equipment which fails or is delayed in reaching its destination overseas.

i. Preparation and packing of escape kits.

j. Maintenance of perpetual inventory system for warehouse, shop and laboratory.

k. Study of appropriate equipment (maps, etc.) for particular regions or camps.

l. Determination of what prisoner of war is to receive a special "escape" parcel.

m. Chemical experimentation in the development of certain types of evasion or escape equipment.

n. Preparation of passes and identification cards for use in enemy countries.

o. Radio research—selection of appropriate radio parts, determination of voltages, frequencies and kind of electric current available in areas where activity is contemplated.

p. Interview evaders or escapers with respect to appropriate clothing, etc. for a particular area.
3. Use of enlisted personnel in the Technical Sub-Section:

Ten or eleven enlisted men, mostly class A, are employed as required in the Technical Sub-Section. Their various duties are summarized as follows:

a. Selecting of names from prisoners of war files for use in sending escape parcels.

b. Clerical duties in preparation of parcels for shipment.

c. Preparation of file cards showing name, parcel number, prisoner of war number, camp, label number, address, postmark, censorship stamp number, type of box and wrapping, next-of-kin name and address, contents, date and special items.

d. Warehouse clerks.

e. Shop operatives—wood work, power metal working machines.

f. Construction of models, designs, etc. for escape equipment.

g. Repair of tools.

h. Clerks and general stenographers.

i. Special drivers.

j. Printers and type-cutters for special printing jobs.

k. Radio repair.

The Technical Sub-Section necessarily functions in close liaison with all others, particularly with the Training and Correspondence Sub-Sections. Through the one it acquaints personnel, officers and men, who may be placed in the position of evaders of escapers with the use of the various evasion materials and, through the other, it is able to supply prisoners of war with desired types of such equipment. An
understanding of the scope of the operation is gained from the following summary of evasion materials actually shipped by the sub-section from its origin to August, 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>ETO</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kit, Type E-3</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>23,755</td>
<td>39,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kit, Type E-3A</td>
<td>22,528</td>
<td>102,761</td>
<td>125,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kit, Type E-17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92,544</td>
<td>92,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood Chits</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>315,916</td>
<td>315,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signalling Mirrors</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>59,030</td>
<td>64,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps</td>
<td>9,368</td>
<td>657,480</td>
<td>666,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointie Talkie Booklets</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>64,431</td>
<td>64,551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Type E-3 and Type E-3A kit can be considered as one total if desired, since the E-3A was a comparatively slight modification of the Type E-3. For a more detailed statement of the activities of this Sub-Section of MIS-X, in the Southwest Pacific Area, see the tables at the end of Part V.
G. MIS-X in the Theaters of War

Since the entrance of the United States into World War II, closest liaison has been maintained between MIS-X and its British counterpart MI-9. This liaison is apparent not only in the early training period, during which MIS-X was given the unlimited benefits of British experience, but throughout active operations in the theaters of war this co-partnership has been maintained. In May, 1943, spheres of influence were agreed upon between the War Office in London and the War Department in Washington and approved by JIC, London, in order to insure satisfactory cooperation throughout the world. (49)

It was agreed that MI-9 in the Middle East and North Africa would be controlled by "A" Force on an Inter-Allied basis "as already arranged between respective Commanders in Chief." Requisitions for purses and for escape aids were to be made through the nearest "A" Force Headquarters who was authorized to obtain them from Washington, London, or from local sources, whichever of these could provide them most quickly. Coordination of these operations, as between CSDIC at Algiers, Maadi and PAIC, were to be coordinated by Commander Rodd, who was authorized to "maintain correct balances, according to operation needs, to Commanders in Chief of Mediterranean Navy and Air, AFHQ, Middle East and PAIC jointly and severally." (50)

(49) See Cipher Message "Welling, No. 84603 of 28 May 1943 for DMI (2234 IN."

The British were to control all MI-9 work in India, but arrangements were to be made with MIS-X for personnel to be attached to GSI(E) as necessary for serving the requirements of American units in that area for escape equipment.

MIS-X was primarily responsible for China, but agreed to retain a British detachment under Colonel Rides who was ordered to render any assistance to American operating in that theater. Moreover, Colonel Rides was authorized to augment his personnel with Americans if this should be found mutually desirable to the DMI for India and the American Commander there. (51)

For geographical reasons the American sphere of influence was to include Australia and New Zealand and, in general, the Pacific area as a whole, and it was the responsibility of MIS-X to coordinate the activities there on an Inter-Allied and Inter-Service basis. Future equipment required was to be obtained by the United States. As in all other theaters, the activity of MIS-X in the Pacific areas included:

1. Precapture training
2. Survival
3. Post capture rescue
4. Interrogation of prisoners of war (52)

In summary, these spheres of action were:

A. U. S. Primary Responsibilities:

1. China, Headquarters Chungking (Inter-Allied), designated

(51) Signal for India (for DMI) No. 84601, 28 May 1943
(52) Cable No. WAR 31619, 15 Sept 44, from MIS/Fol Gr II to CG, USAF Pacific Ocean Areas, Fort Shafter, T-H.
as Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS).

2. Southwest Pacific, Headquarters Manila (Inter Allied), designated as MIS-X Section (G-2 GHQ).

3. Pacific Ocean Area, Headquarters Pearl Harbor, designated MIS-X Section, JICPOA. (Inter-Service primarily).

B. British Primary Responsibility.

1. European Theater, Headquarters London and Paris, PW and X Section, G-2, ETO Base and I.S.9 (WEA) SHAPE.


3. India-Burma Theater, Headquarters New Delhi, MIS-X Section of G-2.

Usually in each of these spheres of action there was at least one liaison officer from the Allied country not primarily responsible for that theater. Thus, in June, 1943, a U. S. Liaison Officer was requested for New Delhi. (53)

The part played by MIS-X of the CPM Branch, Washington, is best illustrated by the activities of that organization in the spheres which are primarily the responsibility of the United States. A memorandum describing these activities in the Southwest Pacific Theater, as of 5 March 1945, will serve to illustrate the actual operations of MIS-X in the field at a time when they were at their height:

"The southern section of MIS-X (Hq., Brisbane) under direction of Wing/Commander John Lamb, extends its activities and services to U. S., Australian, British, New Zealand and Dutch land, sea and air forces based on Australia and islands east and south of New Guinea and to our allied forces on New Guinea. Its staff is

(53) Cable #2754 Commanding General Forces China, Burma, India.
composed of RAAF, RAN and AIF personnel and two U. S. officers as administrative and finance liaison for the main section at Hq., USAFFE. The pattern of activities and services follows that developed by U. S. personnel who composed MIS-X initially with Main Hq. at Brisbane.

The Brisbane office is well organized and doing an excellent job in a logical and thorough manner. Apparently it enjoys the unqualified support of all forces which it serves. Its survival and evasion bulletins are prepared with great care and detail. They are designed for operational use, principally by Allied Air Forces. All available sources of intelligence are utilized. Information concerning enemy dispositions and movements is mapped day by day as a basis for current supplements and notes to area bulletins and briefings on survival and evasion. Briefers are required to be familiar with the areas on which they lecture, to study maps and photographic charts, and to actually fly over the areas on reconnaissance, if possible. Briefing missions are so scheduled as to allow ample time for introduction to each commander and his staff and for thorough indoctrination of all personnel concerned. Of course, the comparatively stable situation in the southern areas and few combat missions facilitates a more thorough and deliberate procedure than is possible in the active northern areas of the theater.

The Brisbane office continues to produce or procure in Australia certain special aids to survival and evasion which are peculiarly suited to this theater or which cannot be obtained from the U. S. in time to meet operational requirements. This procedure was initiated by the Chief of MIS-X Section during the early days of its existence. The results accomplished are commendable.

The Northern Division, Hq., Tacloban, under the direction of Major Paul Kraus (U.S.A.C.) Chief of the Section, extends its services and activities to all U.S. and Allied forces based on the Philippine Islands and on island areas north and west of New Guinea and all U.S. Forces based on New Guinea. Its staff is composed of U. S. Army and Navy personnel. They are now distributed in Australia, New Guinea, Morotai, Mindoro, Leyte and Luzon. While this wide dispersal of personnel creates delay and difficulties in administration and control, it does extend the services of the section to Replacement Training Centers and the principal operation Hq. of the Army and Navy air and other forces in the northern areas, where they are especially needed in the present phase of military operations.
As was pointed out in the discussion of the activation of MIS-X, its mission was broadly defined in the following language: to "aid the return to Allied lines of personnel who may become isolated in inaccessible or enemy territory." Described more specifically, this mission includes:

a. "Basic indoctrination of combat personnel with the will and knowledge to survive in inaccessible areas, to evade capture in enemy controlled territory, and to return to Allied controlled areas.

b. Collection and dissemination of intelligence on survival and evasion, with briefings and publications on specific areas, including the location of native and friendly areas for assistance.

c. Induction of combat personnel on behavior in event of capture and the will to escape.

d. Collection and dissemination of the experiences of combat personnel who have successfully survived, evaded capture and/or escaped, dissemination being made by written reports and by briefing tours in which these personnel take part.

e. Provision of special aids to survival and evasion for issue to combat personnel, including principally large scale cloth maps of areas of operation, emergency medical and food kits, jungle knives, special language glossaries, signalling mirrors and Allied personnel identifications."

The mission of MIS-X in the Southwest Pacific Area may best be illustrated by summarizing its activities during the course of a
single month at the height of operations. The month of May is chosen for this illustration in consideration of the fact that by this month the organization of MIS-X in this area was complete. (54)

A. BRIEFING REPORT

1. Northern Division SWPA:
   a. A grand total of 6,834 officers and enlisted men were briefed by Northern Division during the month of May, 1945.
   b. Of this total, 857 were U.S. Naval personnel; 666 were replacement pilots at the Combat Information Training Center at Nadzab; 46 were officers of the Counter Intelligence School, USAFFE; 70 were members of the Mexican Air Force (under operational control of 5th Fighter Command); and the balance of 5196 were combat personnel of the U.S. Army Air Forces.
   c. Northern Division briefing personnel made a total of seventeen briefing trips this month.

2. Southern Division SWPA:
   a. A grand total of 1,034 officers and enlisted men were briefed during the month of May, 1945, by Southern Division.
   b. Of this total, 434 were British Pacific Fleet personnel; 50 were Royal Netherlands Air Force personnel; 80 were Royal Air Force personnel; and 470 were Royal Australian Air Force personnel.
   c. Briefing itineraries were arranged for officers of Southern Division who made 10 briefing trips this month. In addition,

two briefing trips are not included, figures will be included in the June report.

B. DUTIES OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO BRIEF

1. Officers assigned to briefing shall keep themselves cognizant of the tactical situation in the theater of war, especially as regards escape and evasion.

2. Officers assigned to briefing duty shall keep themselves constantly cognizant of the tactical situation in the theater of war, especially as regards escape and evasion.

3. Before each mission, an outline of proposed briefing shall be submitted to Acting Officer in Charge Briefing Unit as follows:
   a. Disposition of enemy forces and unfriendly natives.
   b. Disposition of friendly forces: Own or allied troops, guerrillas and friendly natives.
   c. Appearance of friendly, especially as regards dress.
   d. Appearance of enemy troops and unfriendly natives, especially as regards dress.
   e. Location of safe areas and their characteristics, i.e., whether mountainous, forested, swampy, etc.
   f. Enemy shipping and small boat traffic.
   g. Types of evasion recommended for mission, i.e., ditch at sea and depend on Air-Sea Rescue facilities, bail out over friendly area, or crash land.
   h. Current tactical situation as regards air strikes. This outline shall be discussed in detail before departure for each mission, and annotated map submitted.
4. Officers assigned to briefing shall interview A-2, A-3 and commanding officers of squadrons regarding tactical situation, special rescue and evasion problems before briefing. They will remain in the vicinity and be available not less than 72 hours.

C. REPORTS:

1. Briefers shall submit reports to Chief of Unit on or before the tenth day of every month. Reports will contain the following information:
   a. Identification of units briefed.
   b. Time and date of briefing.
   c. Place of briefing.
   d. Number of personnel.
   e. Whether officer or enlisted man.
   f. Material distributed, itemized as to unit.

2. Briefers shall report all information on Escape and Evasion to Chief of Unit.

3. Chief of Unit shall prepare a monthly report including items listed in paragraph one above to Director, Northern Division. Chief of Unit will also submit a consolidated Northern and Southern Division monthly report to Chief, MIS-X.

In the Southwest Pacific Area, the Supply Unit (Technical Sub-Section) was equally active. This sub-section has for its primary duty the distribution of Evasion and Escape Equipment. The following list includes the vital equipment distributed by MIS in the Southwest Pacific Area to the end of June 1946: (55)

(55) For complete details of this activity, see Monthly Report MIS-X, June, 1945, Part III.
Pages 131-134 of this document were not included in our original copy of the document.
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is obvious that in a Branch of MIS such as the Captured Personnel and Material Branch that many suggestions and recommendations for improvement may be made as a result of long operation. Without seeking to enumerate all of these, the following seem to be the most pertinent in relation to future planning.

A. The Two Sections, MIS-X and the Interrogation Center:

It is questionable whether or not the combining of MIS-X and the Interrogation Center constituting the CPM Branch was an appropriate arrangement. As will be observed in the records of the activities of each of these sections, there was little in common between them. MIS-X was primarily an agency concerned with the escape and evasion activities of captured Allied soldiers. The Interrogation Center was an Intelligence agency devoted to the gathering of information respecting the enemy by means of interrogation of enemy prisoners of war. For more efficient operation it would have been advisable to separate these activities narrowly within the general structure of MIS.

B. The Interrogation Center - Channels of Control:

The Interrogation Center should have been made immediately responsible to the Chief of MIS, without the unnecessary and cumbersome channeling through some intermediary agency such as
the Supervisor of Source Control. Every experience in the Theaters of War as in the United States indicates that Interrogation of Prisoners of War is the most fruitful source of accurate Intelligence under war conditions. Its information should flow as speedily as possible to the appropriate agencies. The Chief of an Interrogation Center should be, more than anyone else, the competent judge of the quality of the Intelligence contained in the reports of his section. Only those officers who are in immediate and daily contact with interrogation are competent to pass judgment as to whether or not the information thus obtained is in conformity with the briefing requirements of the agency or the command which has requested it. The major Intelligence duty of a Commanding Officer of a Detailed Interrogation Center is the supervision of reports issuing from his section. If he is incompetent to do this, then he should not be assigned to this duty. Placing a Supervisor of Reports over him merely serves to complicate what should normally be a clear and direct function. The most expeditious flow of material is possible only under a simple and direct control.

C. Liaison of the Interrogation Center with Other Intelligence Agencies:

From the outset the Interrogation Center of the CPM Branch should have been in closest possible liaison with all other Intelligence agencies such as the Technical Intelligence, Ordnance Intelligence, Order of Battle, etc.
Intelligence, etc., etc. Its usefulness lies in its ability to obtain Intelligence desired by such agencies. The major portions of its interrogations should be based upon carefully prepared briefings from these agencies and its interrogators should work in direct cooperation with experts supplied by them. Even the most experienced interrogator is not an expert in these special branches of Intelligence. The interrogation should be made only by a trained interrogator, but he should be guided at every step by the briefings of experts.

It should be a function of the Commanding Officer of an Interrogation Center to keep in touch with these other agencies -- to find what they require and to procure from them specific briefings or questionnaires as to the exact Intelligence desired. Under no circumstances must the Interrogation Center be permitted to operate in a vacuum. This tendency is highly probable because of the security requirements under which an Interrogation Center must operate.

D. Coordination of Interrogation Center and Document Section

The Interrogation Center and the Document Section should be closely coordinated. The captured documents must be placed at the disposal of the interrogators and should be made available to them as long as necessary. They should then be passed on to the Document Section for more leisurely study and ultimate disposal.
E. Unified Command

The C.P.M. Branch should be a unified command with respect to its service and guard personnel and its Intelligence personnel. There should be no division of function as between the Service Command and the Intelligence Command. The guard personnel should be assigned to and trained exclusively for its duties with the Interrogation Center.