CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

AFTER ACTION REPORT

2 August 1990 to 30 September 1991

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
OPERATION DESERT STORM

Office of the Adjutant General
Organization and Training Directorate
February 1992
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PART I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MISSION

Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG) is the command and control headquarters for the California Army National Guard (CA ARNG). OTAG is responsible for training and equipping CA ARNG units to prepare them for service in time of war and national emergency, or when required to augment the Active Army.

OBJECTIVES

Prior to mobilization, OTAG prepares for mobilization of CA ARNG units in support of Forces Command (FORSCOM) Reserve Component mobilization plans.

Following mobilization, OTAG exercises command of mobilized ARNG units, provides increased levels of support, and directs the movement of mobilized units to their mobilization stations.

OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

OTAG supports the following CA ARNG elements:

1 - Division
8 - Brigades
1 - Group
31 - Battalions
169 - Company/Battery
Troop/DETachment

CA ARNG demonstrated its ability to alert, federalize, and rapidly deploy units to a theater of operations. The Department of the Army federalized twelve (12) CA ARNG units and 1259 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm. Ten (10) units were deployed to Southwest Asia, one (1) to Germany and one (1) to Fort Bliss, Texas.

Throughout the call-up, CA ARNG units arrived at their mobilization stations within 72 hours of federalization. This facilitated timely deployment and use as part of the Total Force. National Guard Bureau used days from arrival to departure at Mobilization Station as a prime indicator of ARNG unit readiness.

Sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Army National Guard units deployed within 45 days of being federalized.
DAYS REQUIRED TO DEPLOY FOLLOWING FEDERALIZATION

Forty-one percent (41%) of mobilized ARNG units deployed within 30 days of call-up and twenty-eight percent (28%) deployed within 20 days (ARNG After Action Report, National Guard Bureau, June 1991).

One hundred percent (100%) of mobilized CA ARNG units deployed within 45 days of call-up. Fifty percent percent (50%) deployed within 30 days and eight percent (8%) deployed within 20 days of federalization.

A more meaningful readiness indicator is the number of days units required to reach validation following arrival at the Mobilization Station. This number is a better readiness indicator because units were often not deployed immediately following validation. Deployment from Mobilization Station to theater was delayed for a variety of reasons, such as nonavailability of immediate airflow, awaiting sealift of equipment, or guidance from warfighting CINC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA ARNG UNIT</th>
<th>DAYS REQUIRED TO VALIDATE</th>
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<td>224 TC</td>
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<td>39 (*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>980 MEDSOM</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</tbody>
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(*) Longer validation period due to large numbers of unit vehicles and equipment.
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF CA ARNG UNIT MISSIONS

The twelve CA ARNG units called to Active Duty performed a myriad of missions. Regardless of where they were assigned, CA ARNG units made important contributions to the overall success of the campaign. The follow-
ing historical summary highlights the experiences of each unit.

HHD 143RD MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

The 143rd Military Police Battalion (Command and Control) was called into federal service on 14 January 1990 and deployed to SWA on 8 February 1990. It was assigned to 402nd EPW Camp, 800th MP Brigade. The 143rd was responsible for eight MP companies (six Guard and two ES-
cort), and had OPCON of two other companies from 185th MP Battalion. This made the 143rd the largest MP battalion in the theater, with over 1300 MPs assigned.

When the 143rd MP Battalion reached the camp site they found a six foot dirt berm approximately one square mile in size, with single strand concertina wire separating the three enclosures, processing and supply areas. The area was extremely flat and devoid of vegetation.

The camp was close enough to the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEB A) that the ground shook during air strikes. Artillery fire was con-
stant. The area was southeast of Hafar al Batin, a Main Supply Route.

Iraqi Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), arriving at an EPW camp manned by CA ARNG soldiers.
A company size reaction force was always on alert for perimeter defense and internal disturbances. The Battalion Operations Center controlled all communications.

When the ground war began on 23 February 1991 construction of the 402nd EPW Camp was not complete. EPWs began arriving almost immediately after the start of the ground attack. Most arrived at night in numbers ranging from 40-50 by air to several thousand by truck or bus.

The first several thousand EPWs were received directly from combat units, such as the British Coldstream Guards or the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. They arrived without prior warning, without manifests or tags. Coalition forces dropped the EPWs in an open field outside the enclosures, dumped their weapons and belongings in a pile and left, leaving the camp to sort things out.

During the Rear Area Protection mission for the tri-border area, the 143rd responded to numerous emergencies at the camp; primarily riots. A 143rd soldier, SGT Grenado, was awarded a purple heart for injuries received during one of these riots.

The morning after the ground war began there was so much smoke in the air from oil fires and explosions that unit vehicles had to have lights turned on.

The mission was consistent with the battalion motto, "Twice the work with half the people." The 143rd returned home on 25 May 1991.
CA ARNG Military Police units operated Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) camps near Hafar Al Batin, in the tri-border area.
HHD 185TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

HHD, 185th Military Police Battalion, Pittsburg, mobilized on 17 January 1991 and validated through their mobilization station, Fox Ord. The 185th deployed to Saudi Arabia on 7 February 1991 and were assigned to 800th MP Brigade, 22nd SUCOM.

The unit was constituted as a combat support military police battalion, but was utilized as a command and control battalion.

At the conclusion of combat activity the unit relocated to Khobar Towers, Dhahran where it assumed a law enforcement mission. The 185th returned home on 10 June 1991.

HHD 185TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

HHD, 185th Transportation Battalion, Fresno, was mobilized on 29 November 1990. The advance detachment moved to the Fort Ord Mobilization Station on 30 November, the main body following on 5 December.

Four weeks later (4 January 1991) the 47-soldier unit deployed by air to SWA and was assigned to 22nd Support Command. The 185th controlled five medium truck companies which compiled a total of 825,025,158 ton miles during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

During 24 January 1991 - 3 February 1991 the 185th supported the movement of 24th Infantry Division

MG Barry McCaffrey, Commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), recognized the contributions and the 185th Transportation Battalion and the other logisticians who supported his operation:

SUBJECT: 24 ID (M) Movement to Tactical Assembly Area during the period 24 Jan 91 - 3 Feb 91 from Eastern Saudi Arabia to our CAA

The movement involved movement of 1,779 trucks by unit, towboat and (other means) and convoying 6,566 wheeled vehicles over 459 kilometers. Much of the success of this movement must be attributed to support provided by movement control elements and transportation units of 24th ARM Corps and SUCOM. The efforts of several individuals are particularly worthy of note. LTC Steve Chambers proved invaluable in coordinating transportation assets, organizing convoys, and monitoring our movements to the CAA. Equally important were efforts displayed by leaders, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of various U.S., French, Egyptian and Host Nation transportation units. Their collective effort enabled the 24 ID (M) to rapidly close in our new area with all combat and combat support systems in a high state of readiness. In summary, the 24 ID (M) stands ready for future instructions. Efforts of corps and g.s.c. movement agencies and transportation units over the last ten days made this possible. Respectfully, Barry McCaffrey, Victory Site.
(Mechanized) from eastern Saudi Arabia to a Tactical Assembly Area from which the division would launch its devastating ground offensive.

The unit returned home on 6 July 1991.

224TH TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT

The 224th Transportation Detachment (Movement Control), the smallest unit in the California National Guard is a four soldier detachment. Essentially a traffic control unit, the 224th was activated on 21 September 1990 and deployed to Saudi Arabia on 3 October 1990.

The 224th was assigned to 330th Movement Control Center, 1st COSCOM and operated on various Main Supply Routes (MSRs). They operated well forward most of the time.

The 224th Transportation Detachment provided movement control for Coalition forces advancing into Iraq.

The unit regulated and controlled highway traffic within the forward combat area. While performing this mission they were required to conduct operations forward of major combat units.

At Christmas, 1990, the 224th supported the movement north by the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). From Fort Camel, near the town of AI Nahria, they controlled movements to logistics bases near the Iraqi border.

During combat operations the 224th operated in southern Iraq with elements of the French 6th Light Armored Division and 82nd Airborne Division.

SGT Edward Gorre, a member of the 224th, gave this account of a SCUD alert:

I remember one night, sitting out on point, I see a Saudi Arabian guard run over to his truck and start putting on his MOPP suit so I ran over to him and talked to him in what little Arabic I had learned. I said "a missile?" and he said yes and I said "Dhahrur?" and he said no, and I said "Rihad?" and he said no. He goes "Nahria," the town we were in, so I ran to the truck and went to MOPP level 4. We were sitting in the truck and suddenly this fog rolled over the town and I'm thinking "Oh, my God, something happened here." The lieutenant didn't have her mask on yet and she goes "I smell something," so she threw her mask on and we sitting there, but the SCUD never did hit Nahria. The SCUD actually hit somewhere else. It was just kind of something that made us think.
The 224th was sent into Iraq to the
town of Al Basra, about halfway be-
tween the border of Iraq and the
Euphrates River. They hoisted the
California flag and the American flag
and operated there for two weeks.
They assisted the redeployment of the
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
and the 82nd Airborne Division out of
Iraq.

Returning to Saudi Arabia, the detachment helped move the 24th
Mechanized back to Dhahran where the division began redeploying to the
United States. They then moved to
Kuwait City and redeployed the Tiger Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division
out of Kuwait.

The well-traveled 224th saw first-
hand the widely reported destruction
around Kuwait City and saw the devas-
tating oil fires set by the retreating
Iraqis:

"At night time when you went by the
fires you could stand a quarter mile
from the fire and feel the heat on you,
ye: the air was cold. It was incredible,
the sight of it, everything burning."

At the end of February the detach-
ment left Kuwait. The 224th
Transportation Detachment returned
to Travis Air Force Base on 21 April

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270TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
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The 270th Military Police Company,
Sacramento, California, mobilized on
6 December 1990 and deployed to its
mobilization station 10 December
1990.

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SGT Jennifer Clary of the 270th MP Company on the ARCENT headquarters gate in Dhahran.
The 270th validated on 21 December 1990 and deployed to Saudi Arabia 19 January 1991 with 141 soldiers. The 270th deployed into Dhahran Royal Saudi Air Force Base, where it was assigned to 210th MP Battalion (MI ARNG), 89th MP Brigade.

PFC Jason Wyatt, 270th Mp Company, at a security post in Dhahran.

The 270th provided security inside the airbase as well as mobile security around the perimeter. The unit worked closely with Saudi, British and U.S. Air Force Security Police who made up the balance of the airbase security. Additional missions performed during the deployment included security of the Dhahran International Hotel, location of the Joint Information Bureau and personal security for LTG Pagenis.

The unit returned home on 3 June 1991.

649TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

The 649th Military Police Company (San Luis Obispo and Alameda) was called into federal service on 3 January 1990, conducted its mobilization validation training at Fort Ord and deployed to SWA on 3 February 1990.

The 649th is organized as a combat support military police unit but was assigned to EPW guard missions during Desert Storm.

The company moved to Hafar al Batin to conduct EPW operations at the 402nd EPW Camp, assigned to 143rd MP Battalion, 89th MP Brigade.

The unit returned home on 25 May 1991.

PFC David Howell prepares a 649th MP Company vehicle for the desert.
**970TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY**

The 970th Military Police Company (Guard), from San Mateo and San Rafael, was mobilized 6 December 1990 and moved to its Mobilization Station (Fort Ord) for validation.

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A CA ARNG Military Police post in Dhahran.

On 9 January 1991 the 970th Military Police Company deployed to Saudi Arabia where it was assigned to 403rd EPW Camp, 143rd MP Battalion (CA ARNG).

Prior to the beginning of the Allied ground offensive, the 970th provided exterior security for the Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Processing Center, 403rd MP Camp. The unit also relieved each of the Guard companies and provided exterior security for the EPW main compound enclosures.

During their deployment, the 970th conducted several EPW transport missions, moving prisoners between the 401st and 403rd EPW Processing Centers. The EPW Center processed 1000 prisoners a day over an eleven day period.

The unit returned home on 6 July 1991.

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**980TH MEDICAL SUPPLY AND OPTICAL MAINTENANCE COMPANY (MEDSOM)**

The 980th Medical Supply and Optical Maintenance Company (MEDSOM), a Sacramento unit, was federalized on 6 December 1990. The advance party reported to Fort Ord Mobilization Station 9 December, with main body and equipment following two days later.

Arriving in Saudi Arabia on 28 December, the 980th MEDSOM began joint operations with 47th MEDSOM, a III Corps Active Component unit from Fort Hood, Texas.
In early January this joint operation was officially designated United States Army Medical Materiel Center - Saudi Arabia (USAMMC-SA). This organization was part of 22nd SUPCOM.

980th MEADSOM was a key component of USAMMC-SA. The unit's contributions to the campaign included the following:

- Supplied 50 major theater medical units
- 44 theater hospitals
- 3 hospital ships
- 3 MEADSOMs
- Supported 550 different customers
- Processed over 300,000 customer requests
- Controlled $66 million of medical supplies
- Maintained over 4200 different medical items
- Issued over $7 million of controlled substances

- During January-
  February 1990, issued over $100 million of medical supplies
- Shipped over 20,000 pallets
- Fabricated over 48,000 corrective lenses
- Performed over 1,800 eye examinations
- Provided medical supplies directly to Kurdish, Kuwaiti and Iraqi refugees

1113TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

The 1113th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo), Sacramento, California, was mobilized for Federal service on 27 September 1990. After training at Fort Ord, they departed from Travis Air Force Base and arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 3 November 1990. The unit was assigned to 1st Area Support Group, 22nd SUPCOM.

During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESSERT STORM the 1113th Transportation Company provided long haul transportation throughout the theater of operations, including missions inside Kuwait.

In the performance of their mission the members of the 1113th Transpor-
The 113th was welcomed home on 11 May 1991.

The 2668th Transportation Company (Light/Medium Truck), Fresno, California, was mobilized for Federal service on 20 September 1990 with 129 personnel. The unit arrived in Saudi Arabia on 3 November 1990.

The first mission of the 2668th Transportation Company was to transport supplies and personnel to forward positions in northern Saudi Arabia. During DESERT SHIELD (pre-combat) the unit transported 20,730 tons of cargo, moved 13,467 personnel and drove 524,264 accident-free miles.

During the ground campaign the company transported the advance party of the 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) to its assembly area. During DESERT STORM the unit drove 337,861 accident-free miles.


Friends and family welcome the 2668th Transportation Company home.
The 870th Military Police Company, with armories in Pittsburg and Placerville, California was mobilized on 6 December 1990 and validated at the Presidio of San Francisco.

While in Germany, the 870th was based at Karlsruhe, near the French border in Baden-Wurttemburg. Karlsruhe was considered a primary terrorist target because it had been the site of several highly publicized terrorist trials. The 870th provided security at the North Sea port of Bremerhaven and for ammunition trains in France.

On 21 December 1990, the 150-soldier unit deployed to Germany, where the 870th Military Police Company replaced the 66th MP Company, which deployed to SWA. The company was assigned to 21st TAACOM.

The unit returned to Travis Air Force Base in May, 1991, travelling in two increments (7 May and 30 May) to the Presidio of San Francisco, for out-processing. They were released from active duty at home station on 16 May and 8 June 1991.
The 126th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), headquartered in Sacramento, was mobilized in November 1990 and deployed to Fort Bliss and Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

The Air Ambulance unit provided evacuation support to military installations and surrounding communities. During their deployment the 126th supported U.S. Army operations in Honduras. Three members of the unit were killed when their helicopter crashed while on a night medevac mission in mountainous terrain.

The 126th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) returned to its CA ARNG home at Master Air Force Base, Sacramento, on 3 July 1991.

MISSIONS OF A MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

CA ARNG Military Police units operated throughout the SWA theater and faced a variety of challenges. The 970th MP Company was assigned a Guard mis-

sion with the 403rd EPW Camp. The following excerpt from the 970th MP Company After Action Report illustrates some of the problems they faced handling large numbers of Iraqi EPWs.

The 970th and other Guard companies were tasked with several prisoner transport missions. These missions involved moving EPWs from the Bronx site to various camps located closer to the Saudi/Iraqi border. The method of transportation was by either school bus, tour bus, or five ton Mercedes "circus" trucks. The missions took 24-36 hours round trip along hazardous MSR's. The unit provided drivers and security personnel.

One convoy departed at 2130 with 40 drivers from the 970th transporting 1100 prisoners in buses and "circus" trucks. Some vehicles had inadequate lights, others had bald tires and worn-out engines. All were poorly maintained. One bus without windshield wipers almost collided with a vehicle which had no tail lights. The bus swerved off the road and nearly overturned, severely injuring one of the EPWs. There were no strip maps issued to the drivers. The entire convoy got lost twice.

When the convoy arrived at the Saudi camp, it took two hours to debark the prisoners. At the drop-off point there were no latrine facilities and no hot coffee for the drivers. Immediately after releasing the prisoners the buses were put back on the road for the 15 hour return trip to Bronx.
TRAVELS OF THE 224TH

The 224th Transportation Detachment, CA ARNG, four-soldier movement control team, operated in Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, Kuwait and in Kuwait City. They may have seen more of the SWA theater than any other ARNG unit. The following narrative from detachment member SGT Edward Goller describes what they found in the Iraqi town of Al Basea.

Al Basea was mainly military, soldiers living in the town, and buildings were pretty much bombed out. It was funny, on one warehouse there was a blue door, a brown building with a blue door. The blue door seemed to be a great target for aircraft. You could see where all the missiles had been locked in through this one door. All you could see were big missile holes in this door where they had just locked all the rounds through.

We walked around to look at things and saw areas where they just dropped their AK-47s and tracked vehicles were just rolling over them. There were AK-47s best, lying all over the place. I saw where an airplane had bombed a truck while it was rolling down the road and the truck caught on fire and went through a building and burnt it up.

We had one Iraqi man come up, I guess he had a 9mm pistol that U.S. forces had taken away from him. I guess he wanted to protect himself. They called Civil Affairs, took the rounds from his and gave him back his 9mm and he was just...he had nothing, he was walking around with nothing.

So we fed him. He just demolished a can of Dinty Moore beef stew that I've never seen go so fast into someone in my life. Then he asked for a cigarette so we gave him a pack of cigarettes and I think he smoked the whole pack within 15 minutes. He seemed appreciative of what happened. Then he came back the next day with three of his friends, so we fed them.

The town was basically a big minefield. I think we had seven or eight people in three days get blown up.
We worked with a Medevac team, received calls and got the Medevacs up in the air. So we had, basically, a Medevac mission during that time, too. EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) went through the town and completely blew up everything that was there. It was eventual. 

After the ceasefire, the 224th found itself in Kuwait City.

We moved to the southwest corner of Kuwait City, where we hooked up with the Tiger Brigade. We started deploying them. We went down to the beach area, and this is where the fortifications were very good. There were trenches everywhere, bunkers, reinforced with concrete. You could see all of the beautiful houses all along the beach, we're talking southern California style, condos, swimming pools, jet skis, boats and things there. Iraqi soldiers had turned them into fighting positions, breaking out the windows and had gun ports in the walls.

They had it set up so you could go from one end of the beach to the other in a trench without ever leaving cover. They had antiaircraft guns all over, towed 23mm quad guns all along the beach.

Two Kuwaiti people came up to me and saw this big hole and they said, "Is it from the boom?" I said yes and they followed me down the beach but they would not step anywhere that I had not already stepped. Then we went into a bunker and they stood 15 feet away and watched for me to come out and they said "Boom?" and I said no, no boom. So they followed us around. It was kind of humorous. I'm glad I had the opportunity to go now. It did take a bit out of what I had planned to with my life. I had a set plan, enrolled in school and all. It was history, it was great to be a part of history, to help in the effort of doing what we did. Changing my life? It's a good step in the way that I had planned.

CA ARNG UNITS WERE READY FOR FEDERALIZATION

The performance of mobilised CA ARNG units was a result of years of training and preparation. CA ARNG units not only train to Army tactical and operational standards, they train to meet mobilization requirements. All twelve called-up CA ARNG units met or exceeded deployability criteria when federalized. This was largely attributable to well-managed training programs and mobilization plans.

One hundred percent (100%) of CA ARNG soldiers called-up reported for active duty. Ninety-four percent (94%) of these were deployable. Six
percent (6%) of called-up CA ARNG soldiers were not eligible for deployment because they were awaiting initial entry training, high school students, attending Officer Candidate School, or for medical reasons.

All twelve federalized CA ARNG units completed postmobilization training within the unit commander’s Unit Status Report (USR) estimate of the number of days needed for training.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Departure ceremonies in Sacramento, Fresno, Alameda and San Mateo recognized deploying CA ARNG units and resulted in favorable media coverage. Public opinion approved OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The call-up of hometown units enhanced this approval.

Mobilized CA ARNG soldiers were supported and recognized by their local communities. The call-up of hometown units personalized DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM for many citizens.

SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

CALL-UP AND PREDEPLOYMENT

Processing at Home Station. The existing CA ARNG Mobilization Plan (CAL STARC UMPS) was not consistent with current FORSCOM mobilization requirements. Units used Forces Command Mobilization and Planning System (FORMDEPS) as a mobilization guide. Part 3, RC Unit Commander’s Handbook (RCUCH) was a realistic checklist for mobilizing units to use prior to moving to the Mobilization Station.

One result of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM is that states are revising Mobilization Plans to the FORMDEPS model.

Equipment shortages required intensive cross-leveling between federalized units and non-deploying CA ARNG units, resulting in a lowering of readiness status of the latter.

Information flow from FORSCOM to STARC was hindered by a tendency to overclassify messages.
MOBILIZATION STATION PROCESSING

Initially, Mobilization Stations did not adhere to FORMDEPS guidance.

Physical conditioning of CA ARNG soldiers was substandard. This has already resulted in major changes in CA ARNG physical training programs.

Identification and processing of non-deployable personnel was time-consuming.

Personnel and equipment problems identified at Mobilization Stations required corrective action by representatives from Mobilization Branch.

Active efforts by CA ARNG liaison personnel at Mobilization Stations solved most of these problems as noted in Memorandum, USASIX (AFKC-LG-P), January 1991, Subject: Reserve and Guard Mobilization Highlights.

During the initial phases of the Desert Shield call-up, the California National Guard State Headquarters set a good example of support and assistance to its mobilizing units. Outside observers witnessed three to six State HQ personnel specifically designated as individual unit support. Their assignment was to stay with the unit until it leaves.

POSTMOBILIZATION TRAINING AND VALIDATION

CA ARNG units mobilized at four different Mobilization Stations (MS). Each MS had different validation standards and procedures. Although Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR) form the basis for postmobilization training (FORSOMM Regulation 500-33), PTSR data did not drive Mobilization Station training programs.

The PTSR provides unit-specific information. Commanders use PTSR data to tailor unit training programs. Ideally, premobilization training is focused

Members of the 270th MP Company training at Camp Parks Mobilization Station. In Saipan Arabia, SSG Gil Duplomore (far left) served as a bodyguard for LTG William G. Pagonis, Commander, 32nd Support Command. Also pictured (left to right) SSG Gregory McKowen, SSG Gary Wales, CPT Dawn East and SGT
on tasks which support wartime missions and minimize postmobilization training time.

This system failed at the Mobilization Station level. Training requirements were altered or dictated by the MS without input by unit commanders. This often resulted in a lengthened postmobilization training period at the MS.

**MOBILIZATION EXERCISES**

The CA ARNG Mobilization Processing Preparedness Program (MP) was a major participant in the mobilization of called-up units. For a number of years MP has assisted CA ARNG units with personnel, medical and dental files, updating records to ensure that units are ready for any deployment contingency.

The MP team concept proved useful during the transition from Reserve Component to Active Component status.

**CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION**

CA ARNG Organization and Training Directorate (Mobilization Branch) reported to two senior headquarters, National Guard Bureau and 6th United States Army. Both headquarters required continuous unit status updates be submitted in a secure mode. Requests to use a secure facsimile communications (FAX) were disapproved by both NCIB and 6USA. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMMCSS) was used to forward this information. (WMMCSS) is time and labor intensive. The report requirements from NGB and 6USA were different, although the actual data was similar.

**AUTOMATED UNIT EQUIPMENT LIST (AUEL)**

Unit movement data changed due to cross-leveling. This required changes in Automated Unit Equipment Listings (AUEL).

Not all CA ARNG units were familiar with AUEL, pointing out the need for commands and State Movement Control Center to place increased emphasis on AUEL and updating of Unit Movement Data.

**ACQUIRING AND DISTRIBUTING PERSONNEL**

A significant personnel staffing effort was necessary to implement Stop Loss for CA ARNG. Clear guidance was not contained in AMOPS.

NGB has recommended that Department of Army (HQDA ODCPER) revise AMOPS so that Stop Loss can be uniformly implemented during a call-up without detailed staffing, and to draft legislation so that Stop Loss applies to all RC soldiers.

During full or partial mobilization, Mobilization Stations perform cross-leveling. This did not apply during the Presidential call-up for Desert Shield. Most CA ARNG cross-leveling occurred at unit home stations. OTAG, Senior Commands and other CA ARNG units cooperated in a joint effort to backfill the mobilized units as appropriate.
CALL-UP AND PREDEPLOYMENT

Issue: Staff planning for possible mobilization of CA ARNG Units

a. Discussion: Planning for future operations of the STARC Mobilization Assistance Teams (MAT) will assist units in preparation for mobilization. The MAT concept grew from the CA STARC Mobilization Preparedness Processing Program (MP$^3$). MP$^3$ is a CA ARNG Mobilization Branch program to help CA ARNG units prepare for mobilization. Team visits are not an inspection but a quick fix for personnel and training problems: ID cards, dog tags, HIV testing, panoramic X-rays, physicals, wills, review of MOB plans, etc. (Mobilization Branch) had experienced MP$^3$ teams available to start the planning process. Reference library documents and equipment were already packed in MP$^3$ trailers and personnel were readily available. This system was activated quickly due to expertise gained by MP$^3$ personnel during unit assistance visits. MATs were not activated after 23 August 1990 to assist unit alerted for DESERT SHIELD. Because the unit had been processed by MP$^3$ during the preceding 12 months there was limited assistance necessary.

b. Lessons Learned: The MP$^3$ team visits greatly reduced the time and need for MAT.

c. Recommendations:

1. Continue MP$^3$ program to prepare units for mobilization.
2. Update MP$^3$ SOP to include special requirements for all Mobilization Stations listed for CA ARNG Units.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch.

Issue: Use of established military chain of command.

a. Discussion: During mobilization there was a propensity to disregard unit chain of command for a variety of reasons, including a concern that units were not getting complete and timely information.

1. Intermediate headquarters were left out of the flow of orders, direction and information both up and down the chain.
2. Intermediate headquarters were held responsible for unit actions, when in many cases they were not aware of the issue until it was a problem.
Intermediate headquarters were denied the experience that could be gained from being a full player in the mobilization of their subordinate units.

b. Lessons Learned: Unit commanders had to respond to too many headquarters. USPPO, 6th Army, OTAG Mobilization Stations and Readiness Group, each with their own, well meaning agendas, were dealing directly with units.

c. Recommendations: The chain of command works and should be used. The chain of command develops staffs, provides a picture of units as they mobilize, builds experience necessary for effective training and readiness, and fixes responsibility.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade

Issue: Authorization to activate 10% personnel at SRCOMs and intermediate headquarters.

a. Discussion: The increased workload at SRCOMs and intermediate headquarters is beyond the capability of the authorized FTUS staffing, particularly in the areas of personnel administration, logistics and family assistance.

b. Lessons Learned: Additional personnel are needed to allow staff to continue normal support activities.

c. Recommendations: Each level of command of a mobilized unit should be authorized to activate 10% of the headquarters unit personnel to assist in mobilization.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade

40th Infantry Division volunteers who deployed with the 270th MP Company (left to right) SFC Robert J. Cont EXPRESS, SPC Oliver L. Cornelius, SPC Rene A. Zamora, SGT Rodney D. Loses, SFC Stanley Foster.
Issue: Transfers of Non-deployable Personnel

a. Discussion: During the mobilization process several personnel were non-deployable for a myriad of reasons. Many of these individuals were non-deployable under the current mobilization criteria (such as temporary profiles, Non-MOSO, overstrength, etc.), but should be retained as viable, functional members of the CA ARNG that could be deployable in the future. Unfortunately, all of these individuals ended up being transferred two and three times until they were assigned or attached to a unit that did not deploy.

b. Lessons Learned: This resulted in significant personnel turmoil, severe overstrength, and a multitude of administrative problems. Because of unit loyalty and/or geographic location, it was not feasible to assign the soldiers to other units within the CA ARNG.

c. Recommendations:

(1) A "Holding Company" concept should be established at each SRCOM to accommodate those personnel that cannot be mobilized.
(2) The FTUS manning can be formed from those FTUS personnel not mobilized with their units and/or temporary positions.
(3) This not only retains integrity within the SRCOM but could provide a replacement pool as these personnel become deployable.

Issue: MP³ Processing

a. Discussion: MP³ processing was conducted at home station to facilitate and expedite personnel processing at the mobilization station. The MP team copied pertinent state information from the 201 files, made and issued ID cards, verified dependent information and updated shot records.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Much of this work was done in vain because the unit went through Fort Ord's version of MP³ which duplicated efforts. The soldiers were required to stand in line and fill out the same forms.
(2) Some forms and information were not available to the Fort Ord processing team.
(3) The forms were redone, shots were administered, marriage certificates, birth certificates, and mortgage information were copied and verified.

c. Recommendations:

(1) MP³ Processing should meet active army standards and requirements.
(2) Mobilization stations should accept valid CA ARNG forms.
(3) MP should use Active Component forms, or replicas thereof.
(4) Establish a system that eliminates the need for the Active
Army to see verifiable information. (5) MP	extsuperscript{3} should do more extensive processing yearly. Soldiers must provide or verify completed VHA forms, rental agreements, rent receipts, and marriage and birth certificates.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

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**MOBILIZATION STATION PROCESSING**

**Issue: Process Non-deployables at Mobilization Station**

a. Discussion: Several soldiers were identified as non-deployable based upon information the unit had about the individual. The information was not documented and therefore no formal action was completed prior to reaching the mobilization station. From the time of alert, the SI identified the potential non-deployables to higher headquarters for disposition. Prior to arriving at the MOB station, there was no guidance as to categorization and processing of non-deployables.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The SI had to identify the non-deployables to higher headquarters and initiate paperwork required to transfer the soldiers out. The soldiers had to be evaluated by medical authority or counseled to document the problem. The SI then coordinated Medical Review boards to substantiate reasons for non-deployability.

(2) Once documented, transfer orders were prepared to move them out of the unit.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Guidance from MOB site should be provided prior to activation.

(2) The unit should not keep non-deployables in units. They should be identified early and prior to reaching the Mobilization station.

(3) Standardize retention standards so the reserve component cannot retain non-deployable soldiers.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

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**Issue: MOS Qualification of Individuals**

a. Discussion: Units had several MOS qualification issues when they arrived at the mobilization station. Some soldiers did not have orders showing the MOS needed for their position. On one or two occasions, the battalion needed MOS qualification approval from higher headquarters. One officer was in a slot that differed from his basic branch. These situations were brought up to higher headquarters which was unable to provide an answer to the soldier’s deployability. When no answer was given by higher headquarters, the BN
SI asked about deployability qualifications. The soldiers in question were coded in SITREP as qualified with no back-up documentation. The coding was accepted by SITPERS.

b. Lessons Learned: More attention needs to be placed upon MOS qualification.

c. Recommendations: Units need to know the standards for MOS qualification and receive assistance on retaining non-MOS qualified individuals that the command wants to keep. Criteria needs to be standardized prior to arriving at the Mobilization station.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

POSTMOBILIZATION PROCESSING AND VALIDATION

Issue: Property Closeouts and Reports of Survey

a. Discussion:

(1) Mobilized units were subjected to property closeouts and related Reports of Survey within 48-72 hours without regard to Report of Survey procedures.

(2) AR 735-5 requires investigations of Reports of Survey losses and recovery actions for lost/missing property.

(3) Mobilized units had ARNG document registers closed, which precludes assignment of any recovery document numbers.

(4) Deployment of key personnel (unit commander, supply sergeant, full-time personnel), particularly those from Detachment 1, 649th MP Company, further precluded completion of required investigations.

(5) OTAG logistics staff still requested investigation notwithstanding the above.

b. Lessons Learned: Closing of ARNG unit property books broke the property control chain of investigation.

c. Recommendation: Revise AR 735-5 to give precise guidance on handling such issues; consider one of the following options.

(1) A method of excluding losses for mobilized units.

(2) Provide for suspension of normal investigation to allow forwarding to Active Component command of mobilized unit and extended report processing time.

(3) Alternate methods of investigation by USFFOs for the supported STARC.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Bde.

Issue: Wills and Powers of Attorney

a. Discussion: Active Army legal assistance offices produce wills and powers of attorney using a software program called "LAWS." This results in a professional looking document. CA ARNG forms are sufficient from a legal point of view but do not have the polished look of LAWS products.

b. Lessom Learned: CA ARNG produced wills and powers of attorney
were often discarded at Mobilization Stations, requiring new forms be produced for many mobilized soldiers.

c. Recommendations:
(1) Provide computer support and software to JAO personnel.
(2) Coordinate with appropriate USAR JAO detachments to provide support personnel and equipment to produce legal documents for mobilizing soldiers.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Bde

Issue: Notary Public Shortages

a. Discussion: Mobilizing units did not have sufficient Notaries Public to sign Powers of Attorney. State law authorizes officers on Title 10 active duty to notarize documents, but civilian financial institutions did not accept Title 10 notarizations.

b. Lessons Learned: Insufficient Notaries Public delayed production of legal documents.

c. Recommendations: (1) Develop a roster of CA ARNG personnel who are Notaries Public.
(2) Use these personnel to support called-up units.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Bde

Issue: Map Support Problems

a. Discussion: From mobilization to deployment, attempts to obtain map products were frustrating. While at the mobilization site (Fort Ord) the unit was issued only one map set of the theater of operations and advised that higher headquarters in SWA would support further requests. However, requests for the required number of maps were never filled in SWA.

b. Lessons Learned: Unit coordinated with CA ARNG units already in country and with the 130th RAOC who provided map product support. Other battalion staff elements had to also look outside the brigade to obtain map product support. In most instances, map support was better when dealing with unofficial sources.

c. Recommendations: Higher headquarters should develop and follow an SOP for the explicit required minimum distribution to their subordinate elements.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

Issue: Mission-Specific Training Prior to Deployment

a. Discussion: The battalion was mobilized as an MTOE 19-476L unit. However, soon after mobilization, the unit learned that its mission would be to command and control MP Guard and Escort Guard units at an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Camp. Although this unit has trained with EPW
scenarios and EPW handling is part of the basic mission, the unit had never undergone any extensive training in the operation in which the unit would be involved. There was no clear cut, defined guidance from higher head­quaters as to exactly what would be expected from the battalion in terms of operations or potential missions. No METL or training guidance was provided. While at Fort Ord during mobilization, no mission specific training was offered nor was it available from Fort Ord assets. No time was provided for the 185th MP Bn to conduct its own mission-specific training.

b. Lessons Learned: The unit coordinated with a reserve component EPW processing unit while at Fort Ord and conducted classes on EPW Operations after duty hours. This proved to be too little, too late. The instructor’s expertise was in the area of processing EPW, not guard or escort guard operations.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The Mobilization Station should insure mission-specific training is provided.

(2) The gaining unit should transmit a METL to the unit being deployed at the earliest possible date.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

Issue: Poor Quality of Training at Mobilization Station

a. Discussion: During the unit’s mobilization at Fort Ord, the two­week training schedule prepared by the unit in advance was required to be abandoned in favor of mandatory training required by Fort Ord. The training was poorly prepared. Classes often had to be rescheduled because the trainers had failed to coordinate the necessary resources to conduct the training; the result was much wasted training time. The battalion had no opportunity to conduct collective training.

Physical training was scheduled twice daily by Fort Ord and greatly affected the ability of the unit to program and conduct training. The training requirements did not allow for the various levels of physical fitness among the soldiers in the unit resulting in approximately 18 injuries during the first week of training. The high injury rate added to the difficulty in training and processing the unit members for deployment.

b. Lessons Learned: The mobilization station cannot be relied upon to provide adequate and relevant training which addresses the particular needs of a unit and its members.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The active unit responsible should coordinate in advance with the deploying unit to ensure a consolidated training schedule which meets the needs of both the installation and the unit is developed and in place prior to the unit’s arrival at the mobilization site.

(2) The active unit should consider the specific mission oriented training needs of the deploying unit and make every effort to locate and supply the necessary instructor resources.
(3) If adequate instruction support is unavailable at the installation, the unit should be given the time to prepare its own training.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

**Issue: Lack of Logistical Support**

a. Discussion: Requisitions which were filled out and turned in at Fort Ord upon mobilization were not filled. While unit was told that the requisitions would be filled "in country", unit received only a small fraction of its fill requests. Upon establishing classes of supply accounts, unit attempted to fill existing requisitions individually. Some requisitions required local purchase of items to complete a mission. Little success was achieved in tracking special orders.

b. Lessons Learned: To cut down the waiting period for parts and supplies needed, the system of ordering supplies through the reserve component and the active component should be standardized.

c. Recommendation: When a reserve component unit becomes activated, the requisitions should be coded into the active component systems. This would cut down the amount of duplicate work. This would also cut down the amount of time needed to process the requisitions.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

**Issue: Lack of Mission-Essential Communications Equipment**

a. Discussion: Prior to moving to the mobilization site, the unit lost much of its mission essential commo equipment based on the fact that it was not listed on the MTOE. Two KG-84s were taken on this basis and unit was assured by the senior headquarters that these items would be replaced at Fort Ord; this did not happen. In addition, some units' equipment was sent over by boat. This meant they were without their organic communication equipment during combat operations. Some units were mobilized without their full complement of communication equipment because they did not have it or were not allowed to take it out of country. This equipment included radios, field wire, speech security equipment, field telephones and antennas. All of the shortages were identified at the mobilization site and ordered; however, the orders were never filled prior to the units leaving CONUS but filled in the theater.

b. Lessons Learned: Units were unable to communicate with higher, lower and adjacent commands
throughout the theater. Prior planning is required to ensure that communication needs are met.

c. Recommendations: USFPO should ensure that communication requisitions are filled, especially ERC Code items. Brigade and division level commands should emphasize the importance of maintaining the MTOE required communication equipment. Theaters should have contingency plans for units that arrive without communication equipment.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

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DEPLOYMENT

Issue: Poor Mail Service

a. Discussion: Mail was misrouted, late or undelivered. Higher headquarters in theater did not know the location of the unit and failed to notify the APO of the unit's exact location. Some individuals received boxes that were deliberately opened, contents taken, and resealed, not noting that the boxes were found opened by the APO or opened for inspection. Some individuals never received packages (mail/phone orders) sent first class by vendors in CONUS. Some individuals received mail that was apparently censored without being so noted.

b. Lessons Learned: Coordination of mail delivery had to handled directly with the higher headquarters postal unit and the APO at Dhahran Air Force Base to correct the problem.

c. Recommendations: Higher headquarters in theater should ensure that the respective APOs are informed of the whereabouts of each unit and the particulars regarding special case situations. Guidelines should be published by the higher headquarters.

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

Issue: Poor communications with deployed units.

a. Discussion: Improvement is needed in communicating with deployed units. For a great deal of time, communications with units and individuals were done through the spouses as there was no other way. Using the spouses to "pass the word" became an unexpected asset that helped with support issues as well as command and control iterates.

b. Lessons Learned: Utilizing the spouses and families from the beginning and making the soldiers, spouses and units aware and encouraged to this would add to efficiency, especially in early deployment.

c. Recommendations: Command and control elements need to be informed of the importance of updates and frequent contact statewide. If not frequent, then on a scheduled basis. Once this is established, a network or plan should be developed for all necessary POCs to be involved.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade
REDEPLOYMENT

Issue: Redeployment AUELS

a. Discussion: Brigade units forward deployed to Desert Storm and commenced CONUS redeployment with no AUEL or equipment data transmitted via CONUSA SIX through CA TAG to the Brigade.

b. Lessons Learned: Lack of AUELS impacted planning for re-equipping MP units deployed with non-standard MTOE equipment. Also impacted was coordination for HMMWVs and Brigade recovery operations for returning battalion and company units.

c. Recommendations: The theater command and MCTMCC should provide parent command non-deployed headquarters with more timely AUEL updates. FORSCOM should transmit AUEL updates via WWMMCS as soon as deployment AUELS are available. FORSCOM should transmit CENTCOM AUEL input for ARNG units via WWMMCS to TAGs of deployed units.

Each TAG then provides a copy to the affected S&COM.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade

DEMOBILIZATION

Issue: Demobilization Station Procedures

a. Discussion: Fort Ord and Presidio of San Francisco used different procedures to demobilize units. Presidio of San Francisco used a 5-day demobilization process while Fort Ord used a 72-hour process.

b. Lessons Learned: Soldiers who demobilized in 72 hours did not have adequate time to complete all tasks, e.g., a thorough review of DD Form 214.

c. Recommendations: Demobilization Stations should follow a uniform standard that allows adequate time for out-processing.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch.

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**Issue: Demobilization Physical Examinations**

a. Discussion: REFRAID physicals given to redeploying soldiers were not within the standards of AR 40-201. Soldiers received physical examinations either before departing SWA or at the Demobilization Station. REFRAID physicals determine whether a soldier suffered any injuries, illnesses or change in medical condition while on Active Duty.

b. Lessons Learned: Many redeployed soldiers received inadequate REFRAID physicals. This will inhibit soldiers with valid medical problems presenting claims to evaluation boards.

c. Recommendations: Every effort must be made to verify illnesses and injuries suffered by soldiers on Active Duty. Reserve Component evaluation boards should be considered for assistance at Demobilization Stations.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch.

**Issue: Line of Duty (LOD) Determination**

a. Discussion: Many soldiers who were injured during DESSERT SHIELD/DESSERT STORM were evacuated to hospitals many miles away. LOD paperwork was not always completed. Attempts to complete DA Forms 2173 were sometimes unsuccessful because medical units redeployed, making it impossible to obtain statements by treatment personnel.

b. Lessons Learned: Some soldiers returned home without proper documentation to support claims for injuries incurred on Active Duty. This could result in a loss of medical treatment benefits or disability pay.

c. Recommendations: A thorough medical review of all soldiers at the Demobilization Station should be given to all redeploying soldiers. Medical personnel at RMS should complete all appropriate LOD paperwork.


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**SWA SUSTAINMENT FORCE**

**Issue: Support at Fort Dix Mobilization Station**

a. Discussion: 49th MP Brigade sent one and CTAG sent four representatives to assist soldiers processing through Fort Dix. California was one of only five states to send any type of liaison or clerical assistance.

b. Lessons Learned: Problems were solved more quickly with the presence of representatives from California. Soldiers voiced their appreciation of the support.

c. Recommendations: CTAG and Senior Commands should support mobilization efforts with qualified personnel to assist soldiers through the mobilization process. Soldiers feel more confident with assistance from their own state/unit rather than from installations or more senior headquarters.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade.
issue: Eliminating unqualified individuals from TTRAD

a. Discussion: In light of tighter mobilization rules and the possibility that states would bear the expense of nonqualified soldiers being REFRAD, CA ARNG made every effort to eliminate overweight and other unqualified personnel. This prevented the embarrassment and fiscal responsibility faced by other states. California also mandated that no volunteer would depart the state without orders in hand.

b. Lessons Learned: Fort Dix was impressed that California chose not to deploy individuals without orders. This eliminated many personnel and finance problems at the Mobilization Station.

c. Recommendations: CA ARNG should continue the proactive approach of eliminating unqualified personnel before they depart for the mobilization process.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade.
This section covers maintenance, logistics and personnel issues, as well as other lessons learned submitted by the units.

MAINTENANCE

Issue: Inability to Obtain Proper Maintenance on AN/GRC-142 (RATT)

a. Discussion: Maintenance work performed on the Radio Teletype (RATT) by maintenance facilities and signal units was poor and inadequate due to poor workmanship and outdated non-repairable equipment that should be replaced. Prior to the unit's deployment the RATT was technically inspected by the Stockton OMS and represented as operational; however, several problems were found and corrected during the TI at Fort Ord. After the army installed the KG-84 crypto equipment, they did not verify operation and the equipment was inoperative when it arrived in country. Attempts to have the unit repaired were unsuccessful. The RATT was never 100% operational and it could not enter the net and could not send and receive hard copy messages while the unit was on missions hundreds of miles away. This caused the Battalion 33 to travel hundreds of miles to coordinate missions and movement.

b. Lessons Learned: The reliability of the RATT cannot be counted on.

c. Recommendations:

1) The RATT van AN/GRC-142/122 must be technically inspected as a whole component. Problems should be brought to the attention of appropriate parties and consideration should be given to the replacement of problem components.

2) OMS need to obtain current FMs and TMs concerning installation of new communications equipment, in particular, the Teletypewriter (UGC-76), Dedicated Loop Encryption Device (KG-84A) and the interconnecting box that is used in conjunction with the KG-84).

d. Submitted by: 185th MP Bn

Issue: Poor Condition of Unit Weapons

a. Discussion: During the mobilization process, maintenance inspections revealed that some units had individual and crew-served weapons that were in very poor condition. Many weapons were Not Mis-
sion Capable (NMC) for the following reasons:
(1) Dirt and rust on weapons.
(2) Broken weapons com-
ponents.
(3) Mismatched bolts (requiring complete gaging and headspacing).

b. Lessons Learned:
(1) Weapons deficiencies identi-
fied in previous inspections had not been corrected.
(2) Many man-hours were spent bringing weapons up to stand-
ards which could have been precluded by an effective unit weapons main-
tenance program.

c. Recommendations:
(1) Commanders must give priority to maintenance and repair of weapons.
(2) Higher commands should follow up inspections to ensure deficiencies are corrected.

d. Submitted by: Director of Main-
tenance.

b. Lessons Learned:
(1) Units with NMC masks re-
quired a cross-leveling of masks with other units at the expense of non-
deploying units.
(2) NMC masks are still in the hands of non-deploying units and will require complete inspection in order to properly classify NMC masks for turn-in.

c. Recommendations:
(1) Protective masks must be properly stored, maintained and in-
spected.
(2) Unit maintenance visits and evaluations should routinely inspect this area.

d. Submitted by: Director of Main-
tenance.

Issue: Readiness of Communications Equipment and Sets

a. Discussion: Radio sets (part-
icularly in MP units) were generally not stored and accounted for in a "set configuration." Operators were al-
lowed to pick serviceable components off the shelf to make an operational set when required for a training mis-
sion.

b. Lessons Learned:
(1) This approach led to many NMC communications components.
(2) Some NMC components which were tagged for repair as the result of a previous inspection (some-
times as long as two years previously)
had not been turned in.

**c. Recommendations:**

1. Units must aggressively enforce storage and issue of communications equipment in set configurations. Intermixing of components from different sets is not authorized.
2. Unit Commanders should ensure that unserviceable equipment is promptly turned in for repair.
3. A vehicle with an unserviceable communications component (radio, antenna, matching unit, etc.) is an unserviceable system and should not be fielded until the entire system is operational.

d. Submitted by: Director of Maintenance.

**Issue: Unit Maintenance Training**

a. Discussion: The majority of maintenance problems identified during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilization are the result of poor preventive maintenance by unit personnel.

b. Lessons Learned:

1. Materiel Condition Status Reports (DA Form 2406) were generally not prepared accurately. The most common error was that units with vehicles assigned radios were not reported as "systems." The vehicles were considered Mission Capable (MC) even though many radio sets were NMC.
2. Units did not maintain "system" DD Form 314s.

**c. Recommendations:**

1. This should be sounding the alarm to commanders that maintenance of unit equipment requires a much higher priority on unit training programs.
2. A closer look at Unit Status Reports (USRAs) by higher headquarters may be in order.
3. In some cases, "subjective upgrades" might be questioned, particularly in the areas of available personnel and unit MOS.

d. Submitted by: Director of Maintenance.
PERSONNEL

**Issue: Non-Deployable Personnel** (Personnel actions involving personnel who have been determined non-deployable by NGB, FORMDEFs, etc.)

a. Discussion: From the battalion administration level, this process was the most time consuming. Initially, all non-deployables must be identified. This action generates other pertinent personnel actions such as:

1. Replacements located
2. Transfer/MOS orders
3. SIDPERS input
4. Travel arrangements

b. Lessons Learned: Many man-hours were spent on personnel actions which could have been precluded by proper procedures.

c. Recommendations:

1. Command focus needed to continually screen non-deployables and take corrective/discharge action.
2. Keep non-deployable status to a minimum in accordance with the CAL-STARC-MP.
3. Upon transfer, service member must come under command and control of gaining unit.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch, STARC

**Issue: Personnel Tracking System**

a. Discussion: Throughout the postmobilization and deployment phases, personnel were cross-leveled based on the needs of the Army, released from active duty, medically evacuated or sent home to or to other assignments because of emergency situations. In many cases CA ARNG and the SRCOM had no idea where these soldiers were sent. In one instance, 49th MP Brigade did not find out that a soldier had been medically evacuated from SWA and had been at Letterman Army Medical Center (LAMC) for two days, until his wife called asking when he was going to be released. Further investigation revealed that LAMC had sent notification to the soldier’s unit, 270th MP Co in Sacramento, and to the Medical Services Command in Fort Sam Houston, TX, as required by their SOP. 270th MP Co was deployed to SWA, so no one was available to receive the notification or pass it on.

b. Lessons Learned: Neither 6th Army nor CA ARNG were in receipt of this information, which severely hampered tracking of CA ARNG soldiers. In discussion with LAMC, it was learned that this problem exists throughout CONUS.

c. Recommendations: A positive reporting system should be established requiring that all CONUS based commands, installations, and medical facilities submit daily reports to their respective Army Area Commands (AAC). Reports should include the standard line information on all soldiers currently assigned or attached that belong to activated reserve units. From this report, these AACs can notify TAG of any changes in personnel assignments and locations. This is critical to ensure accurate tracking of personnel that are not with their deployed unit.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade
Issue: Liaison Officers Located Full-Time in STARC : Mobilization, Operation Center (MOC)

a. Discussion: Liaison personnel representing administrative, logistics, maintenance and Senior Commands (SRCOMs) worked incoming/outgoing actions from MOC.

b. Lessons Learned: Due to the high volume of actions and questions related to Desert Shield, liaison personnel from the above disciplines and from SRCOMs were brought into the MOC. The presence of these experts greatly enhanced the efficiency of MOC operations.

c. Recommendations:
   (1) Continue staffing MOC with personnel representatives during increased mobilization activities.
   (2) Have a Liaison Officer for affected major commands at MOC.
   (3) In early stages of operations, have LOG representative in MOC to coordinate logistic actions.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch, STARC.

Issue: ADSW and ADT Pay Problems

a. Discussion: Once mobilized units are converted to JUMPS-AC, personnel who were previously on ADSW or due ADT pay have had difficulty receiving the pay due from amended ADSW orders or ADT 1379s. Several members of the 2668th Transportation Company were on ADSW with the Drug Interdiction Program and ADSW in support of Camp Roberts prior to mobilization. The non-executed part of the ADSW orders was not revoked until several days later and even then STIPERS had not changed the Pay Status Code from "V" to "X". These soldiers were not paid timely for their attendance at the September training assembly. Once the 2668th TC converted to JUMPS-AC, Military Pay Branch estimated it would take approximately 90-120 days to get their pay.

b. Lessons Learned: The following forms were required by USAF/PAC: DP Form 827, copy of DA Form 1379, original ADSW orders, and orders taking them off ADSW.

c. Recommendations: Future units ordered to active duty should look at each Pay Status Code and take immediate action with STIPERS and the Orders Branch to get each member due pay into a Pay Status Code 'X'.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch, STARC.

Issue: Unavailable rosters - Family Assistance Centers

a. Discussion: Detailed rosters were not available to stateside units or Family Assistance Centers (FAC). Most information needed to solve problems was not available to the FAC initially. What was available was acquired after much diligent work and digging. Of all the information needed, the most important were rosters of personnel deployed and those not deployed.

b. Lessons Learned: Just as accountability is paramount at all levels of command, so is it the linchpin for the family support spouses and the Family Assistance Centers. Accountability was critical when problems...
developed and attempts were made to communicate to the families.

c. Recommendations: Requirements and procedures need to be established to provide the command and the FACS with rosters by name, rank, SSN, address, and phone by each mobilization entity.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade

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LOGISTICS

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Issue: Accounting for unit personnel/Casualty Reporting

a. Discussion: No system was in place for stateside units or FACS to track or account for casualties, emergency leave or anyone deployed and subsequently returned to home station. A short time after deployment, casualties began. The Family Assistance personnel would initially find out from the families and at that time the families would be upset and expecting detailed information. The situation of emergency leave was similar, except in most cases the family had initiated the request for leave through the Red Cross, but still would be the first to notify FAC and the command, expecting specifics.

b. Lessons Learned: As part of mobilization and mobilization training, the soldiers and spouses need to understand the process on casualties, especially if the soldier calls (minor injury/illness) or if a military rep calls (life-threatening injury). Both need to attempt to communicate between themselves as many particulars as possible to include location and contact procedures.

c. Recommendations: Soldiers and families need to be made aware of the process of casualty reporting. Also, procedures need to be developed and employed to inform units and FAC reps on casualties, emergency leave or anyone deployed and then evacuated or returned to the states.

d. Submitted by: 49th MP Brigade

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Issue: Automated Unit Equipment Listings (AUELS)

a. Discussion: The impact of current Unit Movement Data is not apparent until at the time of mobilization. With the efforts to improve unit equipment status, the requirement to update Unit Movement Data was difficult. Assigned personnel were not trained or familiar with the functional requirements.

b. Lessons Learned: Commands did not have updated Unit Movement Data.

c. Recommendations:
(1) Commands need to emphasize updating and maintaining Unit Movement Data.
(2) The State Movement Control Center needs to provide recurrent training and awareness programs for unit movement control personnel.

d. Submitted by: Mobilization Branch, STARC
OTHER ISSUES

Coordinate plan advance party activities at mobilization station (clearances, billeting, security, movements, legal assistance, PSM, etc.)

Area briefings: Provide unit with updated information on area of deployment, to include customs and habits of people, types of flora and fauna, religion, economy, language, etc.

Physical security plan for home station, enroute to mob station, at mob station and enroute to deployment area. Includes continuous physical security for weapons, vehicles, supplies and files. Procurement of padlocks, chains, etc.


Security clearances. Submission of paperwork. Foreign nationals requiring clearances are nondeployable. Unit security manager responsibility during deployment (guidance from Mobilization Station).

Movement plan to go to Mobilization Station.

NCO/DPIODP training in preparation of Postmobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR) and Unit Status Report (USR). Accurate, current reports are required within 22 hours of arrival at Mobilization Station.

Batteries: Prepare a list of the many types of batteries found in unit equipment. Regularly test batteries currently in inventory; store properly and requisition when needed. Many mobilized units were short of batteries.

Hand receipts: Update hand receipts and keep them current.

Identify shortages and shortfalls: Monitor all equipment and training shortages. Mobilized CA ARNG units had postmobilization needs in the following areas:

- OCE
- Protective masks
- Individual and crew-served weapons
- Vehicle maintenance

Excess Equipment will have to be turned in prior to movement to the Mobilization Station. Units should identify excess equipment and prepare a plan to turn it in.

Weapons systems: Inspect all weapons systems. Request contact teams to assist with inspection and repair.

Chemical Defense Equipment: Inspect all CDE equipment to include protective masks. Contact Teams are available to help.

Unit Manning Report (UMR) should be continually reviewed for non-MOS qualified soldiers and vacant positions. Non-quals are non-deployable.
DEERS: Updating Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Report Systems (DEERS) was a major, time-consuming project for many mobilized units. The enrollment form (DA 1172) should be retained by family members as it is their proof of benefit eligibility. (DEERS is already a priority in CA ARNG units.)

Immunizations: Commanders should ensure that personnel have current shot records, updated for appropriate CAPSTONE requirements. This delayed processing of some called-up CA ARNG personnel.

Family Support: Organize and/or update unit Family Support Group and Family Support Plan. Unit members who are single parents should provide unit commander with a written plan for the care of children.

Legal: Wills and Powers of Attorney are important premobilization documents. They should be complete, correct and current.

Pay: Direct Deposit (SUREPAY) is mandatory for IDT pay. Upon mobilization, Active Component pay will require a new Direct Deposit form. Consider having unit members complete a blank Direct Deposit form to expedite processing upon mobilization.

Alert roster: It must be current. Update and correct it regularly.

UCMI Refresher: This is a good subject for NOCDP/ODP. Commanders need to remain current on UCMI.

Refresher: Survival skills (call for fire/call for medevac, CED, MRP reading, first aid, NBC)

Drivers/operators: International road and traffic signs.

OPSEC briefings for all unit personnel (unit nomenclature, size, destination, composition, strength, capabilities).

Field sanitation teams — identify, train, equip. Many illnesses in Saudi Arabia were directly attributable to poor field sanitation.

Fifty caliber (.50) machinegun training: headspace and timing.

Chemical Defense/NBC training: Train personnel to keep mask and weapon with them at all times. Consider issuing masks and/or weapons each drill even if non-tactical. Conduct spontaneous masking drills.
PART IV: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
2 August 1990 to 30 September 1991

BACKGROUND

Prior to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the last federal call-up of California Army National Guard units in support of combat operations occurred 13 May 1963, when 1st Squadron, 18th Cavalry and the 40th Aviation Company were mobilized during the Vietnam conflict.

7 August 1990

The 82nd Airborne Division is ordered to deploy to Saudi Arabia. One month later there will be over 100,000 U.S. troops in the Southwest Asia (SWA) theater.

THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

2 August 1990

Iraqi forces invade Kuwait. Iraq masses troops on the Saudi border.

4 August 1990

Saudi Arabia begins a mobilization of its forces.

Following a visit to Saudi Arabia by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and diplomatic initiatives by Secretary of State James Baker, the United States pledges to deploy forces to Saudi Arabia to counter the Iraqi threat.

FIRST CALL-UPS

National Guard Bureau begins planning for a selected call-up of National Guard units under 10 U.S.C. 676 (200K Call Up), which authorizes the President to order 200,000 reservists to active duty for 180 days.

13 August 1990

NOB-ARR sends a message to all States identifying units being considered for activation and providing general guidance on the call-up process.

24 August 1990

Chief National Guard Bureau sends the first alert message to the states, Subject: Alert Order (#1) for Presidential Call-up of Selected Reserve, which alerts 69 Army National Guard units for federalization in support of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

The first CA ARNG units are alerted: 2668th Transportation Company and 224th Transportation Detachment.

25 August 1991

The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 665, approving use of force to enforce trade sanctions against Iraq.

20 September 1990

The 2668th Transportation Company (127 personnel) and the 224th Transportation Detachment (4 personnel) are mobilized.

24 September 1990

224th Transportation Detachment and 2668th Transportation Company report to the mobilization station.

27 September 1990

The 1113th Transportation Company is called to Active Duty.

30 September 1990

The 1113th Transportation Company reports to the Fort Ord Mobilization Station.

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES CONTINUE

During October 1990 Allied force totals in Saudi Arabia reach 200,000 US, 6000 British, 4000 French, 40,000 Saudi and 42,000 Arab troops.

Troop Command's 59th and 159th Army Bands supported numerous CA ARNG mobilization activities.
3 October 1990

The Secretary of the Army authorizes the involuntary order to active duty of retired RC/AC personnel, to serve in family support activities.

During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, CA ARNG recalled a total of nine (9) retired personnel to administer family support programs.

The total number of ARNG units federalized reaches 89 with 8,735 soldiers from 34 states and territories.

4 October 1990

The 224th Transportation Detachment deploys to Saudi Arabia.

3 November 1990

The 2668th Transportation Company and the 1113th Transportation Company deploy to Saudi Arabia.

8 November 1990

President Bush orders a massive U.S. deployment to SWA to support a possible offensive military option.

After much debate and congressional pressure, the Secretary of the Defense announces the activation of three ARNG roundout brigades: 48th Brigade (GA ARNG), 155th Armor Brigade (MS ARNG) and 256th Infantry Brigade (LA ARNG).

CA ARNG Organization and Training Mobilization Branch continues 24-hour operation of the MOC to coordinate call-ups of additional CA ARNG units.

15 November 1990

NGA-ARR alerts the three roundout brigades and 84 other units, totaling 16,006 personnel.

The 126th Medical Company (AA) mobilizes with 113 personnel.

17 November 1990

Thirty-four (34) ARNG units with 4590 personnel are mobilized.

26 November 1990

Four additional CA ARNG units mobilize: 980th MEDSOM (135 personnel), 270th MP Company (158 personnel),

The 970th MP Company prepares to move to the Mobilization Station.
personnel), and 970th MP Company (101 personnel).

29 November 1990
The 185th Transportation Battalion mobilizes with 49 personnel.

3 December 1990
The 649th MP Company mobilizes with 152 personnel.

10 January 1991
970th MP Company arrives in SWA.

12 January 1991
The U.S. Congress approves the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

14 January 1991
The 143rd MP Bn HHD (33 personnel) and the 185th MP Bn HHD (72 personnel) mobilize.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

Operation Desert Shield becomes Operation Desert Storm at 161900 Jan 91 (EST).

The coalition air campaign against Iraqi forces begins at 1830 hours. President Bush notifies Congressional leaders and delivers a televised address to the nation.

18 January 1991
The President, pursuant to Title 10 USC, Section 673, signs an Executive Order entitled "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty," authorizing the call to active duty of Ready Reserve units and individual members not assigned to units.

The Secretary of Defense sends Memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Call of Ready Reserve Units and Personnel to Active Duty, which authorizes
the Army to call up to 223,000 members of the Army Reserve for a period of 12 months.

19 January 1991

270th MP Company deploys to Saudi Arabia and is assigned to 89th MP Brigade. The unit is responsible for providing security for the Royal Saudi Air Force Base at Dhahran, along with Saudi, British, and U.S. Air

Concrete anti-terrorist barriers surround ARCENT headquarters in Dhahran.

Police. The 270th MP Company also secures the Dhahran International Hotel, and provides personal security for LtG Pagonis.

20 January 1991

143rd and 185th MP Battalions move to their Mobilization Stations.

26 January 1991

Iraq creates a large oil spill in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Kuwait.

The three ARNG roundout brigades continue predeployment training at

| NTC Fort Irwin (48th Brigade), Fort Hood (25th Brigade), and Fort Carson (155th Brigade). |

30 January 1991

An Iraqi force of about 1,500 troops and 50 tanks launches a surprise moonlight attack on the northern Saudi town of Khafji.

Baghdad Radio announces that Saddam Hussein personally planned the Khafji attack and claims Iraq scored a moral victory against U.S. "infidels" and their allies.

31 January 1991

In a "hellacious" battle, U.S. Marines and coalition forces from Qatar and Saudi Arabia counterattack Iraqi troops in Khafji.

Two U.S. Army soldiers, one a female, are reported missing near Khafji.

A pool report says B-52 bombers pounded a column of 1,000 Iraqi vehicles stretching 10 miles. The column was believed to be moving to join the Khafji battle.

1 February 1991

649th MP Company arrives in Saudi Arabia and is assigned to FFW camp operations.

Coalition forces drive the Iraqis from Khafji, capturing 500 prisoners and destroying about 75 Iraqi armored vehicles.

Baghdad radio says captured allied fliers will be treated as criminals, not
prisoners of war, ior having carried out indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

A Harrier pilot operating over southern Kuwait reports too many targets to choose from: "It's like you flipped on the light in the kitchen at night and the cockroaches start scurrying."

Logistics base 'Fort Camel' near the tri-border.

5 February 1991

The allies are flying air missions at the rate of more than one a minute. Since the beginning of the air campaign the nine-nation air forces have flown more than 44,000 sorties.

U.S. military briefers in Riyadh say the Iraqis are moving field headquarters into schools and mosques and hiding warplanes on residential streets to take advantage of an allied pledge not to bomb civilian targets.

6 February 1991

President Bush declares that a ground war may be inevitable and says he will rely solely on his military advisers in deciding any timetable.

Almost all U.S. ground units have completed train-up in Saudi Arabia and are maneuvering into assembly areas close to the Kuwaiti border.

7 February 1991

143d MP Bn HHD and 185th MP Bn HHD arrive in Saudi Arabia and are assigned to the 800th MP Bde.

Debriefing of Iraqi defectors indicates that more than 25% of the positions in Iraq's regular army in Kuwait are either deserted or unmanned. Some units are experiencing severe shortages of basic supplies.

U.S. Air Force pilots say they shot down two Iraqi SU-25s and two MiG-21s as they tried to flee to Iran.

American officers say 10 Iraqi jets made it to Iran, raising the total that have sought refuge there to 120.

8 February 1991

Coalition warplanes attack front-line Iraqi troops and Iraqi Republican Guard units in what one officer called "isolating and shaping the battlefield."

The U.S. battleship Wisconsin fires its 16-inch guns in action for the first time since the Korean War.

The Iraqi government says it is "waiting impatiently" for a ground war to begin and vows to send "hundreds of thousands" of Americans home in coffins.

143rd and 185th MP Battalions deploy to SWA, twenty-one (21) days after federalization.
9 February 1991

Coalition aircraft strike Iraqi ground positions in Kuwait, destroying about 600 Iraqi tanks.

Iraqi prisoners tell the allies of Iraqi "execution battalion" positioned behind the front lines. The units kill deserters and intimidate those considering fleeing the Iraqi forces.

At least 20 Iraq explosions, resulting from heavy bombing during the night in southern Iraq, shake buildings in the Iranian border cities of Khormanshahr and Asadain.

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf says some of the Iraqi pilots defecting to Iran "actually bombed, you know, tried to bomb Saddam Hussein" in his presidential palace.

10 February 1991

Officials say 21 Iraqi soldiers deserted in three days, bringing the EPW total to 900.

12 February 1991

640th MP Company deploys to Hafar al Batin. The unit assists with construction and operation of the 402nd MP camp. During DESERT STORM the 649th MP Company will process over 1100 EPW in a 12 hour period.

More than 140 Iraqi warplanes that have fled to safety in Iran were flown by inexperienced pilots and lack the maintenance support to pose a serious threat, according to reports in the Los Angeles Times.

SCUD attacks injure six people in Tel Aviv. Another SCUD fired at Riyadh is destroyed by a Patriot missile but debris injures two people on the ground. It is the 39th SCUD fired toward Saudi Arabia, and the 16th aimed at Riyadh.

About 300 Afghan guerrillas arrive in Saudi Arabia to join the coalition forces.

14 February 1991

U.S. aircraft strike an underground shelter in Baghdad identified as a command and control bunker. The Iraq government claims that over 500 civilians were killed. Journalists record scenes of carnage at the site.

White House Press Secretary Madlin Fitzwater suggests that Saddam Hussein deliberately placed civilians at the site to prevent attacks or to score propaganda points if allied bombing produced casualties.

15 February 1991

An ARCEN spokesman says the Iraqis have lost 1300 of their 4200 tanks, 1100 of 3100 artillery pieces, and 800 of 2800 armored vehicles.

Coalition forces report a surge in Iraqi soldiers crossing the Kuwaiti border to surrender, adding 350 to the more than 1000 already taken.

16 February 1991

The Los Angeles Times reports that "Friction is increasingly evident in the Gaff as the United States tries to meld military regulars and reservists."
A four-man CBS news crew, including correspondent Bob Simon, is being held in Baghaid, network officials report.

17 February 1991

During a skirmish on the Kuwaiti-Saudi border two U.S. soldiers are killed and six wounded by "friendly fire." The incident occurred when Hellfire missiles from a U.S. AH-64 Apache gunship helicopter struck an M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. These were the first fatalities suffered by a U.S. Army unit engaged in ground combat.

The ARCENT brief in Riyadh states that 2600 sorties were flown, bringing the total to 78,000 since the beginning of the air campaign.

19 February 1991

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf says in an interview that the Iraqi military machine is "on the verge of collapse" and is losing about two battalions of tanks to allied air attacks each day.

The number of sorties flow by coalition air forces now total 83,000.

An Iranian newspaper reports that more than 20,000 Iraqi troops have been killed and more than 60,000 wounded since the beginning of the air campaign.

20 February 1991

An airmobile raid by U.S. Army AH-64 Apache gunships captures the better part of an Iraqi infantry battalion. CH-47 Chinook helicopters ferry 450-500 Iraqis to EPW camps in Saudi Arabia.

The allies fly 2900 air sorties, the largest daily tally so far.

U.S. officials say that the leading killer of U.S. personnel is traffic accidents on unpaved roads built through northern Saudi Arabia, far outnumbering casualties due to enemy and "friendly fire."

21 February 1991

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney says allied forces are preparing "one of the largest land assaults of modern times" but offers no hints of when a full-scale land war might begin.

Los Angeles Times reports that Central Intelligence Agency estimates that 10% to 15% of Iraq's tanks and artillery in Kuwait have been destroyed, far below the Pentagon's 35% figure.

CENTCOM directs that future troop flow to SWA be paced on hold. ARNG units in the mobilization pipeline remain in CONUS until further notice.

Iraq launches five or six SCUDS at Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but all of them are apparently downed by Patriot missiles.
Saddam Hussein declares in a 40-minute radio address that Iraq is willing and ready to fight a ground war if President Bush continues to reject peace efforts.

Campus anti-war protests draw scant crowds. About 100 students turn out at UCLA, which has 36,000 students.

22 February 1991

President Bush issues an ultimatum to Iraq, warning of a land war if pullout from Kuwait does not begin immediately.

Iraqi troops set fire to hundreds of Kuwait’s oil wells in an apparent “scorched earth” policy that blankets the occupied nation with smoke.

23 February 1991

Coalition forces begin the ground offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

A column of Kuwaiti troops move north as the ground offensive begins.

U.S. military spokesmen in Riyadh accused Iraq of executing scores of Kuwaiti civilians. Intelligence estimates 2000-10000 Kuwaitis have been arrested by Iraqi occupation forces.

24 February 1991

The coalition allies push ahead on three fronts, advancing faster than expected in the biggest armor/mechanized assault since World War II.

The so-called “Saddam Line” fortifications along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border fall easily to a joint Army-Marine assault.

“They are moving north with great speed,” said CINC ARCENT, GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf. “So far, the offensive is progressing with dramatic success.”

Over 10,000 EFW are reported taken in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

25 February 1991

Coalition forces reach the outskirts of Kuwait City.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s government orders its forces to withdraw from Kuwait.

An Iraqi SCUD missile slams into a barracks in Duharen. Twenty-seven reservists from Pennsylvania are killed.

The number of Iraqi EFW rises to over 25,000. Over 270 Iraqi tanks have been destroyed so far.

More than 600 oil fires are reported burning in Kuwait.

26 February 1991

Iraq announces a withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with a Soviet-
Iraq plan. Coalition forces continue the attack and report capturing over 20,000 prisoners.

27 February 1991

Allied armored forces drive toward the Euphrates River, cutting off the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions, elite elements of the Iraqi army.

28 February 1991

The President announces a condition-
al cease-fire effective 282400
February 1991, contingent upon release of allied Prisoners of War and Iraqi compliance with all United Na-
tions resolutions.

REDEPLOYMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

18 April 1991

Message from National Guard Bureau, Subject: TTAD Volunteers for Redeployment Operations:

There is a developing need to provide a yet unspecified number of soldiers with specific MOS to support redeployment operations. Volunteers will serve in TTAD status for 3 to 9 months.

This operation will evolve into a residual SWA force of 12 ARNG companies and two ARNG provisional units. Over 200 CA ARNG volunteers will serve in these units.

21 April 1991

2668th Transportation Company redeploy from SWA.

27 April 1991

224th Transportation Detachment redeploy from SWA.

28 April 1991

2668th Transportation Company Released From Active Duty (REFRAD).

The 224th Transportation Detachment back home: ILT Margarita Perez, SGT Ed Gorre, SFC Glenn Jones and SFC Claude Rhey.

3 May 1991

224th Transportation Detachment REFRAD.

11 May 1991

1113th Transportation Detachment redeploy from SWA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 May 1991</td>
<td>649th Military Police Company redeploy from SWA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May 1991</td>
<td>A UH-1 medical evacuation helicopter from 126th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) crashes while on a mission in Honduras. Three CA ARNG personnel are killed:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT Sasah Dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1LT Vicki Boyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSG Linda Simonds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 1991</td>
<td>649th Military Police Company REFRAD, 143rd Military Police Battalion redeploy from SWA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1991</td>
<td>A memorial service is conducted at Mather AFB for the three 126th Medical Company soldiers killed in Honduras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 1991</td>
<td>980th MEDSOM redeploy from SWA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 1991</td>
<td>980th MEDSOM REFRAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 June 1991</td>
<td>1113th Transportation Company REFRAD, 185th Military Police Battalion redeploy from SWA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14 June 1991

FORSOM message, Subject: Implementation Guidance for ARCENT Residual Force Structure, specifies which AC, USAR and ARNG units will be retained in SWA.

FORSOM message, Subject: Desert Storm Personnel Sustainment Plan/Saudi Arabia, describes requirements and entitlements for residual force volunteers. Fort Dix is designated the Mobilization Station for the residual force.

15 June 1991

The Washington Times reports that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein believed until the last moments before the Gulf war that he could beat the world's most modern army. Saddam's conviction was reinforced when he learned that the symbol of President Bush's Republican Party is an elephant. "When I heard of it I was completely surprised. I said Praise Be to God." Saddam then recited to his generals a verse from the Koran recalling the defeat of an Ethiopian army that used war elephants to attack Mecca.

23 June 1991

185th Military Police Battalion REFRAD.

First group of CA ARNG volunteers for SWA Sustainment Force report to the Fort Dix Mobilization Station. (1 officer and 10 enlisted personnel, assigned to 2220th Truck Company).

Members of the 126th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) at Fort Bliss, June 1991.
29 June 1991
185th Transportation Battalion redeployed from SWA.

3 July 1991
126th Medical Company (AA) REFRAD. 185th Transportation Battalion returns home from Fort Ord.

1LT Mark Osining, 870th MP Company, after receiving the Bundeswehr's coveted Schutzenschild award for marksmanship.

6 July 1991
970th Military Police Company redeployed from SWA. 185th Transportation Battalion REFRAD.

7 July 1991
970th Military Police Company REFRAD.

12 July 1991
270th Military Police Company REFRAD.

17 July 1991
A CA ARNG Maintenance and Logistics team at Port of Oakland reports that one hundred (100) pieces of CA ARNG equipment have been returned from SWA. Equipment requiring repair work was either driven or shipped to the Fresno maintenance shop. Two captured Iraqi towed artillery pieces were also transported to Fresno.

The team reported that many vehicles were washed with salt water in SWA prior to loading. After a 35-day ocean voyage there was considerable rust and corrosion of the vehicles. Electrical components were also damaged.

1 August 1991
Four (4) CA ARNG noncommissioned officers report to Fort Dix to support Mobilization Station processing of ARNG volunteers for the SWA Sustainment Force. California is one of only five states to provide such assistance.

4 August 1991
Backfill of ARNG volunteers for the SWA Sustainment Force continues, with 126 additional CA ARNG soldiers reporting to the Fort Dix Mobilization Station. The majority
of these CA ARNG volunteers are assigned to 838th Military Police Company, a residual unit belonging to the Ohio National Guard. Most of these volunteers come from 670th MP Company and 40th MP Company. The 838th MP Company becomes a de facto CA ARNG unit.

19 August 1991

CA ARNG volunteers participating in the SWA Sustainment Force total 189 personnel.

15 September 1991

The final CA ARNG volunteers for the SWA Sustainment Force report to Fort Dix. CA ARNG has 204 personnel assigned, the fourth largest number of volunteers from any state.

6 November 1991

Ending an intense effort by American, European and other foreign contractors, the last burning oil well in Kuwait is capped.

15 November 1991

Some ARNG units will be retained in SWA into 1992, including the 838th MP Company, which is composed primarily of CA ARNG personnel. Other volunteers serving with the residual force are given the opportunity to extend their SWA tours or return to CONUS.

26 November 1991

The Los Angeles Times reports that well-to-do Kuwaitis once again have the maid service that has provided them with one of the world’s least strenuous lifestyles. A diplomat estimates that 100,000 maids have returned out of an estimated prewar level of 180,000. The prewar figure meant that Kuwait had nine times more maids than soldiers.
PART V: SOLDIER SURVEY

Information in this section comes from asking soldiers who responded to a two-part survey. The survey was anonymous, although several soldiers volunteered their names and units. Responses ranged from thoughtful and detailed to brief, single word entries.

**QUESTIONNAIRE - PART ONE**

In *Part One*, soldiers were asked for their opinions on eleven issues relating to call-up, mobilization, and mobilization station processing.

1. My peacetime MOS training prepared me for Active Duty.
2. I was in good physical condition before mobilization.
3. My family was prepared for my call to Active Duty.
4. Weekend drills helped prepare me for my wartime mission.
5. Annual training helped prepare me for my wartime mission.
6. Preparation time at my home station was too short.
7. Mob station training prepared me for my wartime mission.
8. My fellow soldiers had the skills to do our unit mission.
9. Training time at the mob station was too short.
10. I was in good physical condition when I left the mob station.
11. I needed more time at the demob station.

Soldiers were asked to select one of four possible responses:

   a - AGREE
   b - SOMEWHAT AGREE
   c - SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
   d - DISAGREE

The tabulated responses are graphed on the following pages.
AAR Questionnaire - Question 3

- Agree: 32%
- Somewhat Agree: 22%
- Disagree: 18%
- Strongly Disagree: 28%

My call to active duty.
My family was prepared for.
Annual training helped prepare me for my wartime mission.
AAR Questionnaire - Question 6

Agree: 28%
Somewhat Agree: 33%
Somewhat Disagree: 22%
Disagree: 27%
AAR Questionnaire - Question 8

47% Agree
34% Somewhat Agree
11% Somewhat Disagree
8% Disagree
Why fellow soldiers had the site-to-do our unit mission.
AAR Questionnaire - Question 9

Station was too short.
Training Time at the MOP.
I needed more time at the MOB station.
QUESTIONNAIRE - PART TWO

Part Two asked CA ARNG Desert Storm soldiers to provide written responses to seven training-related issues. The issues pertain to how they viewed the quality of training prior to their call-up and their ideas on how to improve training.

In general, soldiers felt training based on the Mission Essential Task List (METL) was more positive than Common Task Training (CTT). Soldiers preferred Annual Training (AT) to weekend drills (Inactive Duty Training). There were strong comments about leadership and leader proficiency.

These are the Part Two questions:

- How can California Army National Guard units improve physical fitness standards during weekend drills and annual training?
- What types of CA ARNG training were LEAST and MOST valuable in preparing you and your unit for your wartime mission?
- What military skills did your soldiers need more training to accomplish?
- What were the biggest time wasters in the mobilization process?
- What training should be CHANGED OR DELETED to better prepare California Army National Guard units for mobilization?
- What training should be EM-PHASIZED or ADDED to better prepare California Army National Guard units for mobilization?
- Any other comments or recommendations the soldiers had.

A cross-section of responses, both positive and negative, are collected on the following pages and presented without comment as opinions and ideas from CA ARNG soldiers who were mobilized for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

SOLDIER RESPONSES:

I had a great time in Desert Storm, but my greatest concerns lie in the area of personnel. When violations of the UCMJ go unpunished and rank is “given away” it is hard to have a lot faith in the command. I also think we need to do something about respect for rank and responsibility of NCOs. For those who abuse their rank it should be taken away. It peeves me that people are only promoted to their level of incompetence.

Less drills but a longer time such as MUTHAS away from home station.

Soldier comments and recommendations continue to the end of this section.

#1 - Let commanders lead and accomplish wartime mission training.
#2 - Let commanders fire/discharge worthless soldiers that bring down the morale of the unit. Months upon months are wasted complying with
regs to discharge duds. Give commander support to build strong units well trained to go to war, not units fit with inflated rank to show “good numbers.” This stops recruitment of fresh new blood. Fire deadbeats!

The Guard is too lax and easy going. It needs to shape up and act more military.

It would have been nice if my company had all its MTOE equipment prior to MOB. Throughout the years the state or whoever has not filled our orders for needed equipment.

MP³ was a waste again this year! It cost us a MUTA-5 of which only a MUTA-3 was used to do MP³ plus the cost of commercial buses to transport troops to Camp Roberts. MP³ always seems to lose records, documents or incorrectly fill our forms.

Weekend drill training is very poor. All other training is pretty good.

There needs to be closer affiliation between Active Duty National Guard and Reserve Component units, to include standardization in promotions, combined exercises and equity in distribution of equipment. (Submitted by a unit commander)

49th Brigade was very supportive. State should work on standardizing forms and paperwork to match of the active component.

I don’t believe anything good can come from doing PT only 2 days a month. I would like to see unit commanders push to get soldiers into a gym or athletic club at a special Guard rate. Physical fitness can only be achieved if worked at least 5 days a week. I know I would work out in a club or gym if rates were made more affordable! I hope you take my opinion seriously. I know I’m not the only one that feels this way.

The Guard is now headed in the right direction.

1. MP³ doesn’t work. Active Army uses a different system. 2. Duplication of admin functions at Fort Ord and Sacramento a waste of time. 3. Procedures need to be written for a “come as you are” war. Current procedures

LTC Mike Hodge, Commander, 185th MP Battalion, with CSM Luis Alvarez and Executive Officer MAJ Mel Bussell as the 185th returns to California.
don’t work. 4. DA should not have put 2 MEDSOMs in the same location. 5. Dif-
ferent promotion standards between com-
ponents hindered “esprit de corps.”

MP³ should be conducted during AT by
the U.S. Army.

There needs to be better contact and con-
rol of those individuals retained on ac-
tive duty for medical purposes. Pay gets
messed up and many of us find ourselves
still in never never land 6 months later
due to our having been kept on active
duty. My NG unit has charged me for my
gear, which I still have because I am still
on active duty. The army doesn’t even
really know what to do with us as we’re
not really a part of their system. It’s
messed up.

More time and money should be spent on
military schools! Offer schools in lieu of
Annual Training. A soldier can learn
much more from an Active Duty school
than Annual Training.

Information was terrible. Commanders
were the last to know. The troops formed
“perceptions” before leaving the country.
The last thing you need going into a con-
lict is someone doubting the commander.

We should have had more talk about
air raids and train about it. In Saudi
we were not prepared for air raids and
SCUD attacks.

The morale of a few soldiers suf-
fered. Some just joined the Guard
for the school money, not to fight or
support the foot troops, medics, etc. in
this desert war. I can’t understand
why they signed the dotted line to
serve our country when all they
wanted was money for school. (Get
rid of people like that.)

Re-educate the Active Army person-
nel that when reservists are activated
we are the army. On my uniform,
over my heart it reads U.S. Army, not
California Guard or reserve or militia.
Changing our TOE at the last minute
was frustrating. All the equipment up-
dating we did prior to mobilization
was in vain. It was very disheartening
to hear we were deploying as guards
instead of combat MPs as we have
been for some time. Proud to serve.
(Soldier gave name and unit.)

I’m pleasantly surprised someone
cares enough to do this survey. I just
hope this is not just a show, but is it?

The Regular Army was dismal in its
so-called efforts to train us for war.
We didn’t even have enough
magnets for our weapons. The train-
ing we received at Fort Ord was al-
most none and most of it was done by
ourselves. Sincerely, (soldier’s name).

Too many people are promoted be-
cause of seniority, not ability! Army
NCO standards need to be enforced.
Training needs to be better (more in-
teresting, hands-on type) but this is
the responsibility of the NCOs, and if they fail the entire system fails. I've seen too many good soldiers leave and too many bad soldiers remain in since we have redeployed. Please feel free to contact me.

Uniforms weren't issue on a regular/equal basis. Some people still don't have new boots, others got three pairs and some were forced to wear totally worn out boots because supply didn't like them.

The CA ARNG did well, I believe, in the tasks demanded of it. Some of the others states' units were embarrassingly poor and this contributed to an overall attitude among RA types that the NG was poorly trained. Thank you for your interest.

I've got an ETS date of 1993 and because of the fact that I have been to two different Guard units and have found in general, the Guard is a shame to the military. The crap I saw the Guard do in SWA, the way the Guard makes a mockery of handing our pins and ribbons and justifying issued these once highly respected items, disgusted me to an unbelievable disbelief. These issues and more are the reasons why I won't be extending. I don't need the extra cash that bad. I expected more and never visualized it. I would rather waste my time doing nothing useful on my own than someone else make that decision for me. The National Guard is a sorry part of today's military.

The key word is leadership integrity, keeping the spirit going strong, the soldier informed, the family feeling secure, and unit strong for battle.

The National Guard is on this kick about getting overweight people to lose weight. When we go on field training they feed me MREs. You expect me to take this weight stuff seriously and then you give us MREs. Get real!

Better training NCOs. Change regulations on amount of ammunition allowed (only 2 rounds) when on guard duty. Why weren't wartime promotions given as promised?

In my opinion, the leadership at all levels of the -- MP Co was incompetent and unprepared to lead its unit in other than peace-time training missions. also, this unit was poorly used by not fulfilling the mission that it trained for.

CPT Daniel W. Smith and ISG Ron Bacigalupo, Commander and First Sergeant of the 270th MP Company.
Basically, we did good getting together. We were too long at Fort Ord which made people antsy and we got on each other's nerves. We were raring to go and needed to. We did a fine job and I'm very proud of my unit. I worked for another fine unit and logged in 5000 miles on my own.

AGRs should be kept at home station as a rear backup. For they don't like to perform duties as the reserve soldier. One comment that was said to me by our supply sergeant when asked for supplies, 'I can't give that up to you. We have to take it back to California. You don't understand. This is my full-time job. You're part-time. I can't afford to make someone mad!' We wound up having to go steal what we needed from another unit.

Our biggest problem was squad leaders that were E5 while E6s were under them. The E6s did not want the responsibility but wanted the pay. Get the NCOs to schools and get rid of the good old boys. We had a lot of great E5s who could not be promoted because an E6 who had no motivation or leadership skills held the slot.

The Guard has been a joke up until now and this is the time to get the fat, lazy people out.

I feel strongly about what happened to us. I hope someone really cares and acts upon input from us. Otherwise I wouldn't bother to comment.

Reconsider policy on females in combat. Men have been warriors for hundreds of centuries. It won't change like a fad or a certain popular style.

If we learned anything from mobilization it should be that the one army concept is an illusion. We will be relegated to "unimportant" tasks in times of war. Administrative preparation must be consistent with requirements of the MOB station. If they are not, "REP" is a waste of time.

Use only one captain to cross the pond.

Train officers on interpersonal skills.

Headquarters Platoon, 270th MP Company.
Continue on. One cannot predict exactly what one will need to know. Someone will know enough to teach others and the NG/Reserve forces are a quick study.

We made it thanks to God answering our prayers.

CPT Dawn East, 270th MP Company, with Host Country representative.

Give us equipment to fight a war with, i.e., the M880 we had for us before MOB was deadline when we arrived at MOB station. TEACH the active Army about the things that are different about the reserve component.

Instead of asking these questions about things you probably will not change ask our unit about the leadership we had. You should get some answers you will not believe.

State family support was great but a breakdown in communications occurred on a local level if a member did not live in the immediate area of their company headquarters.

If the Iraqis had been a serious threat (like the North Koreans) I would estimate at least half our unit personnel would have come back in body bags. We were LUCKY! Guard personnel need to become "soldiers" upon mobilization.

Only through improved CTR training programs and additional leadership training can we hope to bring home our people from a war with a competent, determined enemy.

Our unit, I felt, didn’t have any problems during our mobilization. It went smooth and we were off to war! I feel we did a great job!

There were very few awards given (at-taboys). Lack of consideration for older soldiers. Lack of promotions. Also the promotion competition is not fair, does not take into account civilian job and education. (Soldier gave name)

You could teach the officers or how to let the senior NCOs do their job and not to interfere with them. (including the commanding officers)

This was a really big problem in Saudi Arabia (They were all know-it-alls.) and that was a joke!

Demob -- big joke. Clearly obvious the Army just wanted to get rid of us. Virtually no medical exams. Only a financial review if you knew you had a problem. I was on active duty including a tour in Vietnam. I was not impressed with the Regular Army then and I wasn’t this time either.

Financial difficulties began when pay from civilian job ended and Army pay had not yet begin. Financial difficulties continue 7 months after Demob as dental bills have not been covered as promised and we are now being billed for an alleged overpayment which can not be verified or disputed.
My commander and first sergeant were not very good at their job. It was our NCO's that have been in our unit for over 11 years that kept us together. The troops did all the work, not our captain or first sergeant.

To make us CA ARNG more prepared train us until we drop! My unit wants more training! If we have nothing to do we'll become less combat ready.

I really find it offensive that certain women were excused from the war because they are single parents and yet they are still in the Guard. They should be discharged if they can't go to war. The same thing goes for the woman in my unit that got pregnant in Saudi Arabia and got to go home before the rest of us. She should have been medically discharged yet she still holds a full time job at our armory. Why are these people being paid to drill if they won't serve when called upon?

Personnel should be mobilized with the same weapon that he has been training with, not give a different one upon MOS. Personnel found to be non-deployable due to permanent profile or anything that would keep them from being deployed for a long time should be discharged, even technicians.

When I was in the field artillery, Regular Army advisors from Fort Carson said we NCOs shot better than any regulars they had seen. When activated to DI as MPs the people in the Germaa community said they were sad to see us go. So in conclusion I thing the NCO/Reserve system works well.

I changed units prior to the activation. I feel that the "filler" concept needs some more attention and the idea perhaps considered that a ready pool of eligible personnel be kept current and these personnel considered as "fillers."

We train at Annual Training on battlefield circulation control, route security, KFW, area security. Yet, when we were mobilized we were sent to Germany to perform garrison MP duty. We performed our mission in what anyone would consider an exemplary manner.

More PT. more running with packs. I was able to run with the pack but after I got there I felt like dying. I was getting better but it would have been easier if I had more PT.

I was in good physical shape when I left California but came home with a hernia (corrective surgery in Germany) and a shoulder injury (rotator cup) and never was able to get any benefits even thought I filled out form after form and hand carried them from my unit to the processing unit. I think the Army could have done better by me on that issue.

We were totally unprepared for the paperwork that we had to do to accomplish our mission. Cal Guard has rules for MPs that make no sense. We are in two different worlds. Let's get on the same page as the active service so we're better prepared for the next call-up.

Most employers (usually large corporations) were very supportive of the part time soldier. It's the smaller companies that I feel need a little push in the righ direction if the Guard is to continue as a major force in today's
military. I think it is time that the state and federal governments make an effort to reward those companies that support the Guard, maybe by tax credits or contract preferences, like what is given to minority or woman owned companies.

Accept the National Guard for what it is. It is not the Regular Army. the Guard’s best role is to back up the regulars. As replacements in Germany and support elements for the front line troops. National Guard troops are older, more cohesive and more adaptable. Regular Army units are always in better physical condition, younger and better trained in the primary mission.

My main complaint is as follows. While on Active Duty the Active Army would not support the “Guard.” Now that we “Guard” are Regular Army we could not be supported by the Guard.

I am tired of practicing the mission with both hands tied. We need real training, i.e., combat soldiers using paintball guns or medevac using HP hoist. It is easy to simulate. It’s time to pick up the pace and train as real as possible, within the realm of safety.

Physical fitness should be accomplished through training designed to improve an individual’s physical condition rather than to meet suspense dues, quotas, etc. I and many others are currently in-service connected disability because of the need for good PT training.

This unit needs officers that are not just politically motivated. They need to be more concerned with the people in their unit and not just their career. Many individuals jumped at the chance to go, others wanted to stay. Approximately one third stayed back. There was zero attempt to ask for volunteers. Several people we went have since left. Many were ruined financially. Others were embittered by the lack of concern by our former Commanding Officer. I went and served willingly and proudly.

Our unit was actually more prepared for war and more capable of the mission which we were assigned than the Regular Army unit we replaced. However, there were too many people for the work we were tasked with, so much of our time was wasted. We did get some excellent training from the Regular Army and civilians. I hope we can utilize civilian training to keep us ready for both our federal and state missions.

My unit served in CONUS. The Regular Army disliked us and didn’t want a National Guard unit before we arrived. However, we were able to win them over by proving we were better than the Regular Army in every test we were given and in our mission.

I found that after deployment the National Guard after stating they were here to help and take care of families lied. After having problems at home and contacting the Army JAG they told me I was Guard. Then contacting NG JAG they told me call Army, I was not Guard any more. Brigade did not want to assist me. Out of sight, out of mind.

I was proud to serve. I did my job well. However, I paid a personal price since I lost my business and came
back unemployed. No program or interest is being shown in veterans who suffered employment loss as a result of activation. I am still an unemployed father of five with no job six months later. (Soldier gave name and address)

Because of our inferiority complex and the entrenched attitude between the Guard and Regulars I feel as though myself and the unit missed the chance of a lifetime to learn and hone skills. Also a group of us had problems with reemployment and OTAG has been useless. We are now resorting to McClellan, the Presidio and possible a civilian lawyer to deal with South Pacific Trans. Co.

Our unit went to Fort Bliss for medevac support. We were needed and did a great job. But they had civilian contract maintenance so our crew chiefs and mechanics got no MOS training and were bored to death. I think an Army unit needs to work on their own helicopters and equipment.

There was too much bickering, complaining and infighting. People were afraid someone else would know their job and take it away, rather than work together and make life more satisfying.

Basically I was ready to go. Much of my technical expertise comes from the full-time technicians. I would like to see more hands-on technical training and less time spent on the basic soldier skills.

This unit did an outstanding job of turning in half of its TOE and personnel doing a 100% inventory on the old TOE and 100% on the new TOE, loading a convoy in 4 days and reporting to Fort Bliss in a total of 5 days. We accomplished most of this on our own.

It was interesting to see how people on "weekends only" were great but after experience those same individuals day in and day out some were quite obnoxious. Snivelers, whiners and crybabies. Must be aviators.

1. Removing "good old boy" politics form the command and NCO structure would streamline and strengthen the ARNG. 2. Computerization of personnel records (retirement points) and awards would greatly improve morale.

If the Guard wanna to prepare my unit better give us UH-60 so we can have the most professional equipment for the very professional people in my unit.