Thomas ap Catesby Jones and the First Implementation of the Monroe Doctrine

by Gene A. Smith

Commodore Thomas ap Catesby Jones, USN (1789-1858).
Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum, Annapolis, Maryland.

COMMODORE THOMAS AP CATESBY JONES anticipated the rendezvous of the ships of the tiny United States Pacific Squadron. The Welsh-born Virginian had an all-important question to put to his three fellow officers. It was September 8, 1842 and Jones' flagship, the U.S.S. United States, was one day out of Callao, Peru. Jones backed topsails long enough for the ship commanders to board the "Old States." Upon their arrival Captain James Armstrong of the United States, Commander Cornelius K. Stribling of the sloop Cyane, and Commander Thomas A. Dornin of the sloop Dale were presented with the information that brought the ships to sea. Jones then asked, "Is the rumor of war between the United States and Mexico...and the cession of the Californias...to Great Britain, sufficiently probable to justify the withdrawal...of our naval force from the coast of Peru and Chile, to send to California?" The commanders unanimously answered this question, "yes, without doubt."

Jones' second question was more ambiguous. "Under what circumstances," he asked, "would it be proper for us to anticipate Great Britain in her contemplated military occupation of California?" After careful deliberation, the officers agreed that "in case the United States and Mexico are at war, it would be our bounden [sic] duty to possess ourselves of every point and port in California that we could take and defend...." Furthermore, they concurred should the "views of the late President James Monroe, in his cele-
brated message to Congress, December 2, 1823,” still be received as the “avowed and fixed policy of our country,... we should consider the military occupation of the Californias by any Power,... as a measure so decidedly hostile... as not only to warrant but to make it our duty to forestall... Great Britain.”3 Shortly after reaching this conclusion Jones and the Pacific squadron proceeded to the coast of California and seized Monterey in a mistaken attempt to prevent European occupation.

Thomas ap Catesby Jones’ seizure of Monterey set an important precedent for the United States. Jones and his officers believed they were acting in the best interests of their country. By basing their decision on the “views” of Monroe, they indicated they were thinking of national policy rather than limited military tactics. National policy suggested the idea of extending the area of freedom by expansion. The concept of expansion of the area of freedom became synonymous with preventing absolutist Europe from limiting the area of freedom.4 The principles of 1823 became the mode for preventing the spread of European absolutism, and Jones, whether acting rashly or because of conscious intent, became the first to use military power to support those principles.

On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe presented to Congress in his annual message three postulates on foreign policy for the Western Hemisphere, that later became known as the “Monroe Doctrine.” Monroe’s statement became the keystone of American policy for the Western Hemisphere even though European courts initially ignored the message.5 In The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827, British historian Harold Temperley summed up the doctrine’s significance to Europe. “The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 was a policy, an ideal, or in [Secretary of State John Quincy] Adams’ own phrase ‘a lecture.’ And in diplomacy lectures have importance for the future but do not permanently affect the present.”6 Temperley was correct in his assertion but his greatest contribution was his projection that the Doctrine’s importance lay in the future.

It is true that the United States would have to wait for the Monroe Doctrine to mature. But for how long? One historian pointed out that “if words were centrally significant,... we should have to date the birth of the Monroe Doctrine from 1853.” For it was during debates in March 1853 over Lewis Cass’ proposal that Congress
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adopt a resolution endorsing Monroe's principles that the declaration of 1823 attained the name "Monroe Doctrine." Senatorial newcomer, William Seward, admitted the proclamation of 1823 had become a tradition prior to 1853 even though the policy was referred to as the "principles of Mr. Monroe" or as "Monroe's declaration." Yet in the last analysis it did not matter whether the proclamation of 1823 was referred to as a "principle," a "declaration," or even a "doctrine," for Americans were "a practical people... [unwilling to] act upon abstract principles... unless there be a necessity, or at least an occasion." 

Under certain circumstances there was necessity or an occasion to warrant the propagation of the proclamation of 1823, however, the country's territorial integrity would have to be threatened before taking a stand in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. As such the country did not oppose the creation of a Portuguese monarchy in Brazil in 1824, the British takeover of the Falkland Islands in 1833, the French occupation of Vera Cruz in 1838 and intervention in the La Plata River region 1838-1840, or London's 1840 declaration that English law would reign over Honduras. In each case the principles of Monroe were violated but American policy makers did not perceive a threat to the country's territorial integrity.

Prior to 1840 the United States played a minor role in world affairs. But the forties brought new questions and a re-evaluation of where and under what conditions to apply the "principles" of 1823. American interests were becoming focused on Texas, Oregon, and California, the "Far famed 'Far West,'" and the rest of the Western Hemisphere was perceived as important only in relation to the continental expansion to the Pacific coast of North America. It was in response to a perceived threat against California that the "principles" of Monroe were first implemented. In all likelihood Thomas ap Catesby Jones' seizure of Monterey was the first implementation of the Monroe Doctrine. Whether it was in the name of "principles," "declarations," or of a "doctrine," and whether it was conscious action or a rash decision, military action was used to enforce Monroe's proclamation.

Jones was following a prescribed course for the country, one that was not novel. His actions were consistent with the tenor of the times. But in being the first to implement the Monroe Doctrine his actions, however, were novel. In 1823, when President Monroe pro-
claimed "the political system of the allied powers [Europe] is essentially different in this respect from that of America," he stated the obvious. In language equally conspicuous he pointed out that the United States "should consider any attempt on their [the Holy Alliance] part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." He continued, "with the existing colonies and dependencies we have not interfered and shall not interfere," and as such any attempt by a European power to control the destiny of independent nations in the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as "an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." These words certainly express the ideological cleavage between the Old World and New.\footnote{13}

The ideological rift between the United States and Europe was not new either. George Washington had recognized the difference and warned in his Farewell Address that "our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course."\footnote{14} Thomas Jefferson furthered Washington's argument and cautioned, in his inaugural address of 1801, that the country should have "entangling alliances with none." These themes were firmly entrenched in American foreign policy by the time James Monroe made his position known to the rest of the world.\footnote{15}

In 1823, the situation differed from that which Washington faced in 1796 or Jefferson in 1801. The United States had emerged from a conflict with Great Britain in 1815, and although the war was a stalemate, she gained a sense of security in North America. Yet America's ascendancy to the pivotal position of the Western Hemisphere was not only attributable to her quasi-victory over the British, but also the weaknesses created by revolutions throughout the Spanish empire and the emergence of powerless new countries in Latin America.

It has generally been perceived that the Spanish attempt in 1823-1824 to enlist the Holy Alliance's aid in the recovery of her colonies was a major reason for Monroe to assert that the Americas "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." When Monroe made this statement, he served notice on all Europe that the Western Hemisphere was "staked out" for the independent American republics. This part of the warning was aimed at Russian desires on the Pacific coast of North America as well as the Holy Alliance's attempt to regain
Spain’s colonial empire. It was obvious that Monroe was pointing his finger at all Europe and that the government of the United States was interested in the destiny of the Pacific coast.\textsuperscript{16}

Monroe strengthened his claim with an earlier statement from John Quincy Adams. In July 1823, Adams wrote to Richard Rush, American minister in London, “It is not imaginable... that any European Nation should entertain the project of settling a Colony on the Northwest Coast of America.... That the United States should... is pointed out by the finger of Nature.”\textsuperscript{17} Andrew Jackson even agreed, despite his hatred of Adams, and in 1833 authorized his chargé d'affaires in Mexico to buy a piece of the Pacific coast with the hope of “securing the bay of San Francisco.”\textsuperscript{18} By the 1840s the belief that North America was destined to be possessed by the United States was not only rhetoric but also was an assurance from Providence for continued growth and expansion. The “natural right” of expansion, however, unquestionably lay in military power and the absence of a powerful neighbor. In this sense, Monroe’s principles complemented destiny because they protected the Western Hemisphere from European colonization, and the United States from the presence of a powerful neighbor.

Monroe’s principles also strengthened democracy, which in the 1840s meant more than political or economic freedom; it also meant land acquisition. For lands not claimed or jointly claimed, the key was actual occupation rather than the issues of discovery, exploration, or natural boundaries. Furthermore, natural boundaries was a precarious term because its definition changed from generation to generation. At the end of the American Revolution the natural boundary of the United States was the Mississippi River, in 1803 it was the Rocky Mountains, whereas by the 1840s it was perceived as the Pacific Ocean. If the natural boundary was accepted as being the Pacific Ocean then European powers would not be able to create divisions in North America which might threaten the United States’ hegemony.\textsuperscript{19} In 1842, however, California belonged to Mexico even though England, France, and the United States were watching it with anticipation. Thomas ap Catesby Jones, recognizing that he could not allow California to be taken by a European power, seized the initiative and took Monterey utilizing the Monroe Doctrine as the basis of his actions.

During the forties, discussion of the meaning of Monroe’s mes-
sage usually centered on President James K. Polk, but the efforts of his predecessor, John Tyler, were equally important. In his annual message of 1842, Tyler wrote, "carefully abstaining from all interferences in questions exclusively referring themselves to the political interests of Europe, we may be permitted to hope an equal exemption from the interference of European Governments in what relates to the States of the American Continent." This message came only two months after Jones' abortive seizure, yet it is often overlooked in favor of Polk and the Oregon and California questions.

When Jones gained command of the Pacific Squadron late in 1841, his orders were straightforward: "The unsettled state of the nations bordering on the coast...renders it, in the first instance, necessary to protect the interests of the United States in that quarter." These orders reflect the uncertainty surrounding the Pacific basin. The Oregon question was unsettled, United States relations with Mexico were tense because of the Texas question, and rumor had it that Great Britain bought "the two Californias of Mexico for $7,000,000...." This possibility lent urgency to the contention that California belonged by some natural right to the United States and created an atmosphere favorable to preemptive action.

When Jones arrived in Callao, Peru, a rendezvous and supply depot for the Pacific Squadron in May 1842, he learned that two months earlier a French squadron had departed from Valparaiso, Chile, for an unknown destination. Jones, as well as British Admiral Richard Thomas, believed the French were planning a settlement in California. According to Jones, "California is deserving the attention of our Government," and any European colonization attempt would "be disastrous to our...interests" as well as make it impossible for the United States to protect her claims. This rumor, combined with a flurry of activity in early September, heightened tensions and became a precipitating cause for Jones' actions.

On September 5, 1842, a mail steamer arrived at Callao from Panama. Soon thereafter, H.M.S. Dublin, flagship of Admiral Thomas, weighed anchor with sealed orders. The steamer also brought information that led Jones to believe that the United States and Mexico were already at war.
Jones, troubled by the war news and the hasty departure of the British squadron, traveled to Lima to confer with the American chargé d'affaires, James Chamberlayne Pickett. While meeting with Pickett, dispatches arrived from John Parrott, United States consul at Mazatlán, Mexico. Enclosed with the dispatches were two newspapers compounding Jones' belief that war had begun. A copy of the Mexican El Cosmopolito, dated June 4, 1842, contained letters on the subject of Texas from the Mexican government and Waddy Thompson, American minister to Mexico. The tone of these notes and Parrott's suggestion that they would cause a breakdown of relations between the two countries substantiated Jones' belief that if war had not begun it was close at hand. A Boston newspaper ran an article from the New Orleans Advertiser of April 19 which claimed that "according to authentic information,... Mexico had ceded [sic] the Californias to Great Britain for seven millions of dollars!" After carefully considering all information at hand, Jones and Pickett concluded the reports were true. Afterwards, Jones returned the eight miles to Callao to ready his ships for the upcoming operation. Jones and Pickett decided if war with Mexico had begun the United States would be justified in forestalling British occupation of California.

Once the decision was made, Jones' plan was to put to sea, crowd sail, and reach California before the British. Once in California, he would land a force, build defenses on shore, and prevent the British from landing. Jones believed by taking possession of the country and holding it by right of conquest, that Britain's claim of a treaty of cession would be nullified by American occupation. Jones pressed forward with all possible speed, ignorant of the true British destination, the Mosquito Islands off the Atlantic coast of present-day Nicaragua.

Jones arrived at Monterey, California on October 19, 1842 and immediately called for the Mexican surrender of the harbor. Acting Governor Juan Bautista Alvarado and Mariano Silva, military commandant of Monterey, protested, claiming they knew nothing of hostilities between the two nations. Their protests were to no avail and they soon realized the defenses of the town provided only one sensible alternative, surrender without a fight. American forces landed in the city the following morning and raised the Stars and Stripes amid much hoopla.
The United States occupied Monterey for a day and a half before Jones learned the two countries were not at war. Since there was not a state of war the preventive seizure of Monterey was unnecessary. On the afternoon of October 21, Jones rehoisted the Mexican flag and normal relations resumed. The event may have been concluded, but the reverberations it created were not forgotten.

Although Jones' seizure temporarily damaged United States-Mexican relations, it brought the region one step closer to union with the United States. The fear of foreign influence, especially Anglo influence, was justified even though in 1840 the British Foreign Office officially denied having any interest in California. However, not all within the British government agreed. In 1841, Sir Richard Pakenham, minister to Mexico, outlined a plan to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Minister, in which Britain could easily secure California as a colony. Yet before his dispatch could reach England, the Earl of Aberdeen replaced Palmerston at the Foreign Office and Pakenham's dreams of a British California colony were shattered. Unofficial plans such as this hypnotized Americans and led one author to proclaim, "this idea that England is desirous to possess herself of the Californias, seems as great a bugbear with the American people, as the designs of Russia on India, are with the English."

Despite the British Foreign Office's denial some people still believed that because English capitalists held Mexican bonds California would soon be transferred under the Union Jack. Others believed if "John Bull" gained a foothold he would secure a monopoly on the Pacific and undermine American commerce to the point that the Stars and Stripes would never fly on the coast. The seizure of Monterey temporarily awakened the world to the existence of California as evidenced by the 1843 appointments of Thomas Oliver Larkin as United States consul, James Alexander Forbes as British vice-consul, and Louis Gasquet as French consul at Monterey. Yet in reality, Jones' landing indicated that the United States would have little problem taking California when and if hostilities did begin, thus adding force to the expansionist movement.

More important than Jones' thoughts about national policy was
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that he dusted off a document that had basically lain dormant for years. In 1824, European governments ignored Monroe’s message as nothing more than an exigency of American domestic policy. This was because the message threatened monarchy and the divine right of kings. During the summer of 1824, a European congress met at Verona to discuss the question of Spanish America, but Britain’s lack of participation all but settled the matter. Monroe’s message, and the British ad hoc support of it, served the immediate purpose of helping to settle the Spanish American issue, but afterwards the proclamation was placed on the shelf, not to be revived again until the 1840s.

Many historians claim that Jones’ seizure was merely the efforts of an overly-ambitious officer looking to further his career and that his application of Monroe’s principles was an attempt to provide ex post facto justification should he be in the wrong. That being the case, one could argue that his invoking the proclamation of 1823 was nothing more than an isolated incident that should not be viewed from the vantage point of national policy. But looking at the prevalent mood of the day, the orders he received, and the actions the government took against him, leads one to believe that this was not an isolated incident.

The Jones incident derailed Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s tripartite plan for the settlement of the Oregon question with Britain. It also forced the Tyler administration to cease negotiations for the purchase of California. Other than these inconveniences, relations were normalized. Jones’ punishment was that he was to be recalled and publicly reprimanded for his actions. Even though Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur agreed to recall his fellow Virginian, he made it clear to Secretary of State Daniel Webster and President John Tyler that he would not jeopardize morale in the navy by humiliating “an able and well-intentioned commander.” This was surprising, since Jones had, because of his personal vendetta against dueling, fallen from Upshur’s grace. Yet in the end, Upshur staunchly defended Jones. Perhaps Upshur felt partially responsible thinking he had misled the commodore during the several informal conferences the two had before Jones’ departure to the Pacific. Though the contents of these meetings are unknown they were probably aimed at providing explicit guidance.
during Jones’ absence and implanting in the commodore’s mind the difficulties in U.S.-Mexican and Anglo-American relations, but without arousing congressional attentions.50

The House of Representatives took action once news of the seizure reached Washington. Ex-president John Quincy Adams led the attack, believing that Jones’ actions were not, as some claimed, the efforts of a misguided officer but rather part of a grand scheme. He confronted Webster on March 25, 1843, at the State Department for three hours trying to gain information concerning the affair. Webster maintained that the administration was not responsible for the incident but that the commodore’s actions were a “freak of his own brain, without any authority or instructions whatever.” Webster, however, refused to answer Adams’ questions concerning the governments attempt to acquire California. The secretary avoided the issue by claiming his answers would reveal governmental secrets. Adams did not place credence in Webster’s response, but instead believed his explanations were simply a guise of duplicity.51 Adams rationalized that “it would have never entered into the head of Jones to commit such an outrage upon a nation whom he believed able to resent it.” Therefore, according to Adams, Jones was simply following orders.52

An investigation by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs exonerated Tyler and Webster and concluded that the seizure of Monterey “was entirely of [Jones’] own authority, and not in consequence of any orders or instructions given to him by the Government of the United States.”53 Though Jones was saddled with the responsibility he was not reprimanded even though he was replaced as commander of the Pacific Squadron by Commodore Alexander Dallas. Jones was to return home by any means he chose (resulting in a two-year Pacific cruise before rounding Cape Horn for Virginia), and his punishment was that he ultimately gained command of the Ohio, a 74-gun ship-of-the-line. He commanded the Pacific Squadron again from 1848-1850.54

If Jones’ seizure had merely been the product of the actions of an overzealous commander he probably would have been punished more rigorously. He also might have been forced to resign or retire. But instead he gained command of a ship-of-the-line, of which the United States Navy had few. Furthermore, he was allowed the leisure of a two-year cruise before returning to Wash-
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ington. This certainly could be viewed as anything other than punishment. In addition to his reassignment, Upshur was adamant in his defense of Jones. Had Jones been out of line he probably would have been made the scapegoat to harmonize relations between the United States and Mexico. Combined with this was Webster's and Tyler's position. Neither paid much heed to the Mexican minister's demand that Jones be reprimanded and neither publicly condemned Jones' actions.

Even though the House Committee on Foreign Affairs determined that Jones was fully responsible for the incident it is possible that the complicity of President Tyler was not beyond question. Tyler was involved in financing Duff Green's secret mission to London in 1843 to settle the Oregon question. Yet his involvement in that affair was hidden from the Senate and the public. Jones' seizure may have been another operation in which Tyler was able to disguise his involvement. According to Silas Reed, who claimed to be with the president when the news of the seizure reached the White House, Tyler had "hinted" to Jones before his departure to beware of French and British movements and above all, not to "let them gain a 'preemptive' right to any of the California harbors." Tyler, supposedly after hearing of the abortive seizure, then said, "Jones has got me into trouble, and I have done the same with him. I will, however, have to disavow his act to Mexico, but will make it all right with him." The position of these statesmen leads one to believe that Jones' actions, if not officially, were unofficially a part of policy and supported by the government.

Jones should be given credit for rekindling the Monroe Doctrine. Whether he was acting in the name of national policy, making an honest mistake, or merely furthering his own career, he was the first to take action based on the doctrine of 1823. As in most cases, when discussing the period of the 1840s one becomes immersed in the concept of "Manifest Destiny." But in this instance the two are linked. Destiny inspired American expansion and Monroe's principles prohibited European expansion. Jones' seizure was in the spirit of Manifest Destiny, but equally important it was in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. The future had finally arrived for the Monroe Doctrine and its first implementation by Jones and the U.S. Navy in October 1842 would force the rest of the world to take notice.
NOTES


2 Agreement signed by Jones, Armstrong, Stribling, and Dornin, September 18, 1842. H.R. 422, pp. 85-86.

3 Ibid.


8 Congressional Globe, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Appendix, p. 126.


10 Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 75.

11 Thomas Oliver Larkin to James G. Bennett, February 10, 1843, George P. Hammond, ed., The Larkin Papers (10 vols., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951-1968), 2:6; Larkin was a prosperous merchant in Monterey who in May 1843 was named U.S. consul to California.

12 Gene A. Smith, "The War that Wasn't; Thomas ap Catesby Jones' Seizure of Monterey," California History, 66 (June 1987):104-113. This article deals in detail with Jones' seizure, its causes and ramifications, yet only makes reference to the Monroe Doctrine.


14 George Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796, Ibid., 1:205-216.


20 John Tyler's Second Annual Message, December 6, 1842. Richardson, Messages of the Presidents, 5:2047-2063.

21 Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur to Jones, December 10, 1841, HR. 422, p. 50.

22 Niles National Register, January 28, 1843, 63:337.

23 The French squadron, as it turns out, sailed for the Marquesas and Washington Islands rather than for California. Jones to Upshur, September 13, 1842, H.R. 422, pp. 68-69.


25 Jones claimed that the English regularly advertised the sailing of their ships rather than slipping from port. This lends credence to Jones' belief that the British were heading to California. Confidential letter from Jones to Upshur, September 13, 1842, H.R. 422, p. 68-69.

26 Jones to Armstrong, Stribling, and Dornin, September 8, 1842, H.R. 422, pp. 84-85.
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22Circular to the Diplomatic Corps residing in Mexico from José María Bocanegra, May 31, 1842; Bocanegra to Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, May 31, 1842; Bocanegra to Waddy Thompson, Minister to Mexico, June 6, 1842; Thompson to Webster, June 20, 1842, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906, Record Group 59, Microfilm 97, Reel 12, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
23Jones to Armstrong, Stribling, and Dornin, September 8, 1842. H.R 422, p. 85.
25Jones to Upshur, September 13, 1842, H.R. 422, pp. 68-69.
26Jones to Upshur, October 24, 1842, H.R. 422, p. 70.
28Juan Bautista Alvarado to Manuel Micheltorena, October 19, 1842, H.R. 422, p. 20; Mariano Silva to Alvarado, October 19, 1842, H.R. 422, p. 21.
29Jones called his seizure defensive and quoted Emmerich Vattel, an eighteenth-century author who wrote on international law, as providing his authority, "Defensive war requires no declaration, nor even, on urgent occasions, an expressed order from the sovereign." Jones' justification sent to Upshur, October 23, 1842. H.R. 422, p. 88.
30Jones to Alvarado and Silva, October 21, 1842, H.R. 422, p. 81.
33Niles National Register, January 28, 1843, 63:337.
39John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary on March 25, 1843, that he considered "the bill for the occupation of the Oregon Territory, Captain Jones' movement on California, and all the movements for the annexation of Texas, were parts of one great system, looking to a war for conquest and plunder from Mexico, and a war with England and alliance with France." Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (12 vols., Philadelphia: J.B. Lip pencott & Co., 1874-1877), 1:546.
Merk, *Fruits*, pp. 16-17.


Upshur believed that Jones' attempt to force midshipmen to “pledge” to give up dueling or be forced to resign from the Navy was beyond the power given to the commodore by the Navy Department. According to Upshur the midshipmen were appointed by the president and thus could not be suspended by Jones. Upshur to Jones, June 13, 1842, *Letters to Officers*, RG 45, M 149, Reel 33: 418-423.


Adams memoirs of April 4, 1843, Ibid., 11:353.

*Daily National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser*, February 23, 1843, p. 3.


Duff Green was a journalist who had been a member of Andrew Jackson’s “kitchen cabinet” and one of the most influential leaders of the Democratic party. However, Green split with Jackson on several issues and became a supporter of William Henry Harrison, under whom he had served during the War of 1812. Due to Green’s efforts Tyler was placed on the Whig ticket as Harrison’s running mate in 1840. For his efforts Green was offered his choice of administration posts but instead asked to be sent as an unofficial representative to England and France. Through his contacts and writings Green molded English public opinion favorable to a reduction of tariff duties, a commercial treaty, and the settlement of the Oregon boundary. Fletcher M. Green, “Duff Green,” in Dumas Malone, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931), 7:540-542.

The Senate’s unsuccessful attempt to gain information on Tyler’s involvement in the Green mission to London in 1843 is chronicled in *Senate Documents*, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 436, No. 351.

Silas Reed to Lyon G. Tyler, April 8, 1885, Tyler, *The Letters and Times of the Tylers*, 2:698.

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