PROPOSALS FOR THE COLONIZATION OF CALIFORNIA BY ENGLAND

In Connection with
The Mexican Debt to British Bondholders
1837-1846

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INTRODUCTION

During the decade preceding the Mexican War with the United States, the Mexican debt to British bondholders gave rise, directly or indirectly, to many rumors concerning British designs on California and to numerous reports of the cession of that province to England. The British press gave them attention, commenting on their lack of foundation or the benefits to be gained by England, were they to materialize. They were scooped up by alarmists and sent out in the American press with warnings to their government at Washington, plus added phrases on "Manifest Destiny." Mexican politicians played them up in their press to discredit the opposition, and they found their way into the jealous French press. One such report in the French Presse led to a direct question in the House of Commons as to its foundation and brought forth denials, by both the present and the past governments, of the existence of any correspondence seeking the cession of California. Since most of the assertions during this period grew out of debt negotiations, and the proposals for British colonization were made in connection with terms of the debt, it is well to trace briefly the history of that debt and show its relation to California.

THE MEXICAN DEBT TO BRITISH BONDHOLDERS

The Origin of the Debt. In the early days of the Mexican Republic when her finances were in a critical condition, two loans were made in London, one in October, 1823, and the second in February, 1825, amounting in all to thirty-two million dollars. The interest on these issues was paid up to July 1, 1827, and then stopped. In 1830, the Mexican Congress planned to capitalize the unpaid interest up to April 1, 1831, and also half of the interest falling due up to 1836, by issuing new bonds. This arrangement, agreed to by the bondholders, added seven and a half more millions to the debt. Interest falling due under this agreement was paid up to July, 1832, but nothing was paid during the years 1833, 1834, 1835, and 1836.
The Conversion of 1837 and the "Deferred" Bonds. In April, 1837, the Mexican Government proposed a new consolidated fund for the debt and the interest due. New bonds were to be issued for one-half of the holdings. The other half was to be discharged by land warrants or "inscriptions" giving the right to locate on vacant lands in the departments of Texas, Chihuahua, New Mexico, Sonora, and California at the rate of four acres for one pound sterling. The warrants were to be for not less than four hundred acres nor for more than ten thousand acres of land.

This proposal was accepted in September, 1837, by the bondholders, with modifications in the terms relating to the portion to be discharged by land warrants. "Deferred" bonds, instead of land warrants, were to be issued. Bearing no interest until October 1, 1847, these might at the holder's option be exchanged for warrants on vacant lands. Bonds not exchanged were to become interest bearing in 1847. This counter-proposal was accepted by the Mexican representatives in London and the agreement signed on September 14, 1837. As further security for the debt, the Mexican Government had proposed to hypothecate 100,000,000 acres of land in these northern departments. In addition, the bondholders asked that 25,000,000 acres be hypothecated in a region suitable for colonization with the nearest communication to the Atlantic. This was to be held open exclusively for location through the "deferred" bonds.3

Debt Developments and Negotiations, 1838-1845. The London agents, anticipating approval of the agreement, proceeded to effect the conversion. The Mexican Government disapproved it, however, as exceeding the authority granted in April, 1837, and further complications were added by French activities in Mexico in 1838 and 1839. In December, 1838, after urgent representation by the British Chargé d'Affairs, the executive recommended approval of the agreement of September, 1837, but Congressional approval was delayed until June 1, 1839. As approved, the amount of the debt now exceeded $46,000,000, one-third of which was already converted.

Meanwhile, interest from 1837 remained unpaid and had accumulated. This was disposed of by an arrangement in London, in February, 1842, which, after diplomatic pressure, was approved by the Government in August. In proceeding with the conversion, Lizardi and Company issued bonds, including some covering their commission, to the amount of nearly $55,000,000; this was well in excess of a maximum of $46,236,890 contemplated in a governmental order of July 29, 1839. Responsibility for this was denied by the Government, but on December 13, 1843, it finally recognized the debt as $54,573,730. Thus the Mexican debt grew and became a cumbersome burden.

In April, 1845, the Mexican Government, realizing the failure of the colonization project, endeavored to forestall difficulties to be expected when the "deferred" bonds began drawing interest in October, 1847. A law was passed for the "definite settlement of the foreign debt." Interest was not to
be capitalized, nor were the interest rates to be raised; the amount of the debt
was not to be increased, and no national property was to be alienated or any
territory hypothecated. War with the United States began while negotiations
were in progress for the conversion of the debt on this basis.4

*The Conversion of 1837 and Colonization.* The colonization proposal of
1837 was primarily designed to reduce the foreign debt by one-half and to
secure occupation of vacant lands. The selection of the northern departments
from Texas to California was evidently motivated by a desire to secure
British assistance, through bondholding colonists, in protecting her northern
frontier from "ambitious designs" by her neighbor on the north. Since most
of the bondholders were more interested in receiving cash than vacant land,
the many negotiations on the debt and political developments in Texas, the
region most desired, aided in defeating Mexico's attempt to preserve her
northern departments.

There were, however, several sincere proposals for taking advantage of the
"deferred" bonds, especially for the colonization of California. It was only
natural that the press of jealous nations should interpret Her Majesty's
financial support of the bondholders and known proposals for British coloni-
zation, or for the outright cession of California in payment of the debt, as
bona fide evidence of British designs.

**PROPOSALS FOR THE CESSION OF CALIFORNIA
AND COLONIZATION BY ENGLAND**

*Forbes' Proposal of Cession and Colonization, 1839.* In 1835, Alexander
Forbes, a merchant at Tepic and partner of Eustace Barron, British Consul
there, wrote the manuscript of his book on California. The chapter on "Upper
California Considered as a Field for European Colonization"5 shows that he
was interested in the colonization of California before the debt conversion of
1837 and the appearance of the "deferred" bonds. Delay in printing enabled
him, in June, 1838, to insert his notable colonization proposal. Its appearance
in 1839 led to considerable comment and numerous rumors, especially since
he advocated the transfer of California to the British bondholders in payment
of the debt, thus changing its sovereignty. Besides extinguishing a burden-
some debt, Mexico would dispose of a "disjointed part of the republic," which
could never be profitable nor "possibly remain united" to the Mexican re-
public, being to "all intents and purposes separated." This "would be getting
rid of the debt for nothing."

If the creditors should accept such a proposal, and he thought they would,
they might form a company similar to the East India Company with a sort
of sovereignty over the region. With good management and an English popu-
lation it would realize a revenue equal to the interest on the debt.

His brother in London, in a preface to the book, added that the plan was
worth the attention of the parties involved in the loan to Mexico and even of the British Government itself.6

*Views and Reviews of the Forbes Proposal.* Bancroft says that foreign interference in California of one sort or another was often talked about after 1836. Among these was the rumored cession of California to England in payment of the Mexican debt. In connection with the debt negotiations and the colonization features of the conversion of 1837, “there may have originated a proposition to cancel the debt at once.” He had no official evidence of such, but stated that such rumors came to California from different sources and were “accepted and published as a fact by Forbes in 1839.”7

Forbes’ book was reviewed as early as February 23, 1839, by the London *Athenaeum.* It declined to discuss the author’s scheme of colonization. Danger to England of Russian encroachment in California was discredited. “We should rejoice” at its settlement by a nation “whose activity and persevering industry” would render them “valuable neighbors.” In the “Appendix Relating to Steam Navigation in the Pacific” was found Forbes’ motive in writing the book.8 Perhaps Forbes visualized the commercial future of the Pacific and California’s part in it.

With other reviewers Forbes fared better. The London *Times* held it “not merely very curious and interesting, but well worthy the attention of the English politician.” Besides raising the price of Mexican stock and the shares of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, it would “profit the public as well.”9 William Kennedy, English authority on Texas, was satisfied that “extensive benefits must accrue from the possession of this neglected province.”10 Similar approval was expressed by other periodicals.

The American press was naturally hostile to his scheme. *Niles’ Register* had no doubt that “Mr. Forbes was employed by his government to give popularity to their scheme of territorial aggrandisement.”11 Mr. Warner, former American resident of Oregon, saw the ruin of prospects in the Oregon territory, should the English accomplish the cession of California.12

It was only natural that Forbes’ book and comments on his proposal should encourage numerous rumors concerning the cession of California to England. However, the British bondholders were primarily interested in land in or near Texas and in November, 1840, asked the government to support intended colonization in that region. Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, in general favored the scheme and instructed Pakenham, Minister to Mexico, to give it “friendly countenance and support.”13

*The Pakenham Proposal and Its Rejection, 1841.* Official British interest in California first appears in connection with the “Graham Affair,” and Pakenham, lacking real knowledge of California, was primarily concerned with British naval prestige in the Pacific.14 Soon after this he talked with James A. Forbes of California, later British Vice-Consul (often mistaken for Alexander Forbes of Tepic) and received several letters from Barron, stat-
ing the great value of Upper California. The journey of Duflot du Mofras, an attaché of the French legation at Mexico, through California, apparently aroused suspicions of French designs in that quarter. As a result he enclosed in a despatch to Palmerston a plan designed ultimately to secure California to England.

On August 30, 1841, Pakenham wrote that “It is much to be regretted that advantage should not be taken” of the debt arrangement “to establish an English population in the magnificent Territory of Upper California.” Colonization features of the arrangement were stated. Plans made with reference to Texas, now independent, must be “considered a dead letter,” while Chihuahua and New Mexico “are not eligible districts for colonization.” In his opinion no part of the new world offered “greater natural advantages for the establishment of an English colony” than Upper California. Further, its “commanding position on the Pacific,” fine harbors and excellent forests rendered it politically desirable that California “should not fall into the hands of any Power but England.”

Details were given to show that it would be easy to form a company “for the establishment of an English colony in California” which would prove a successful business venture. An enterprise of that kind sanctioned and supported by Her Majesty’s Government would soon find qualified persons ready to carry it out. The results would be a prosperous colony with English sentiments and also the attainment of a political objective. Though the colony at first would be nominally dependent on the Mexican Government, “this state of things would not last forever, nor . . . be attended with serious inconvenience.”

This proposition, molded by Barron and Forbes, evidently looked forward to a “Texas development” in California favoring England. At this time a change in government brought Aberdeen to the foreign office and his reply ended Pakenham’s dream of an English California. Referred to the Colonial Office, Lord Stanley replied that he was not “anxious for the formation of new and distant colonies” involving heavy expenditures and “liabilities of misunderstanding and collisions with Foreign Powers” and was less prepared to recommend the vesting of a company with powers of sovereignty and placing of British protection afterwards. Aberdeen transmitted this reply to Pakenham without comment, thus expressing his indifference.

A “little England” policy, evidently due to the revolt in Canada two or three years previous, lies behind this cool reception. Pakenham understood, quickly lost interest, and no further suggestions seeking to acquire an interest in California were made by either Pakenham or his successor, Bankhead, until nearly five years later. This proposal of course had no direct connection with rumored designs on California since it was not made public, but it is interesting to note that there were rumors that “England is now disposed to negotiate.”
Sir George Simpson on the Debt and English Colonization, 1842. In the years 1841-1842, Sir George Simpson, a governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s territories, made a journey around the world inspecting company posts and establishments. The visit of so important a person in California, in January, 1842, naturally caused considerable apprehension in the American press. It was generally admitted by then that California was destined for independence, the only doubt being whether California was to fall to the English or to the Americans.

In his narrative of the journey (not published until 1847), he wrote that England could not afford to acquire additional territory by “force or fraud,” but she had one road open to her to gain California “without either the violence of marauders or the effrontery of diplomats.” This was via the Mexican debt to British subjects. Assuming a share of the debt in exchange for the possession of California would not only relieve Mexico of a burdensome debt and benefit the creditors, but would be eagerly preferred by the native Californians “to the only other possible alternative of seeing their country follow in the wake of Texas.”

Meanwhile, by the time he arrived in Hawaii he seems to have changed his attitude regarding the use of “force or fraud.” He wrote his partner, Sir John Pelley, a letter evidently intended for the eyes of the government. After pointing out California’s natural advantages, agricultural, political, commercial and strategic, he added that British residents who formerly hoped England would obtain California in liquidation of the Mexican debt now felt that it would be a sacrifice of money, for California could easily be acquired with a small outlay. The whole population was dissatisfied with the inefficient Mexican Government, which gave them neither protection nor assistance, and were apprehensive of falling into the grasp of the United States. He believed that with a little encouragement the Californians would declare their independence and claim British protection. Confidential communications convinced him that the presence of a cruiser, assurances of British protection and the promise of appointments to influential Californians was all that was needed. To stimulate interest and action he added that such a step favoring the United States would soon be taken if Great Britain did not act.

This letter was forwarded to the Foreign Office and later returned to Pelley. The “little England” attitude toward Pakenham’s proposal has already been noted; the government was probably equally indifferent to the suggestions by Simpson. Yet contemporary rumors told of British designs and activities in line with Simpson’s suggestions. As a result, these rumors and desires caused both England and the United States to maintain large squadrons in the Pacific between 1842 and 1846, when previously one ship had been considered sufficient to protect nationals and commerce.
The “Tripartite Agreement” and California, 1842-1843. Rumors of the cession of California to England in payment of the debt led to similar plans favoring the United States. Early in 1842, this took the ambitious form of an effort to settle the three vexed questions of Texas, Oregon, and California through an arrangement between Great Britain, Mexico, and the United States. Probable terms would include the recognition of Texan independence by Mexico, the settling of the Oregon boundary on the line of the Columbia, the cession of Upper California to the United States, and a payment by the United States to Mexico of several million dollars for the cession of California, part of this sum to go to American claimants against Mexico and the remainder to English creditors or bondholders of Mexico. This ambitious plan was sponsored by President Tyler and Secretary Webster.

They hoped to secure San Francisco Bay through the “good offices” of England in using her influences with Mexico. Lord Ashburton, then in the United States, was approached. He thought England would make no objections to the cession of Upper California to the United States, were it voluntary on the part of Mexico. Ashburton never coveted California. Aberdeen in London told Everett, American Minister to England, that there was no objection to American acquisition of California, but he was not disposed to become a party to any arrangement. No action was taken with the Ashburton mission during the summer of 1842, due to pressure of other matters.

At the beginning of 1843 the idea was again taken up and assumed an important place in administrative plans. An outline for the basis of negotiations was sent to London and the Mexican Minister at Washington was sounded. Tyler felt the assent of Mexico to a treaty surrendering her title to California was all that was wanting, but the natural Mexican aversion to relinquishing territory, plus her increased hostility towards the United States as a result of the Jones episode at Monterey, put an end to negotiations on that point.

Wyllie's Efforts Towards Colonizing California, 1843-1844. Though the British Government lacked interest in colonizing California, many holders of “deferred” bonds were willing to speculate, the more so with the passing of the years. Most of these preferred a location on the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of Texas. The Texan Government in 1840 was even willing to assume one million sterling of the debt as an incentive towards the colonization of her vacant lands, also seeking British support through the colonists. That Palmerston was willing to support colonization in this direction has been shown, and active support of a contested grant to one Beales was given. In line with this there came a rumor that “. . . England wishes to occupy the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande (the seat of the Beales grant), so as to prosecute designs on California; . . .”

A number of bondholders, however, were more interested in California and saw a profitable future there. Among the most active of these was Robert C. Wyllie, who endeavored to swing sentiment towards that neglected terri-
In 1843, he set about gathering information on California to be used in his book (report) on Mexican finances and colonization. He consulted Alexander Forbes and others and wrote a long letter to William Hartnell, an English merchant at Monterey, seeking information on twenty-four different points relating to the country, its land, its products, its trade, and its people.26

In June, after their conversation, Forbes wrote a long letter to Wyllie outlining his plan of securing remuneration to the bondholders through the colonization of California. There was to be a land-tax on the present occupiers of land, equal to that paid by the colonists; free trade was necessary to nullify present restrictions on commerce. There were recent reports of gold near Los Angeles, also silver veins and valuable pitch; mineral riches were to be reserved to the government or company; preventing ruinous speculation. Agricultural colonists were to be preferred and a complicated form of government was to be avoided. Such a plan, carefully worked out to protect the settlers, would save California to Mexico, cancel $25,000,000 of the debt and make that region populous—an asset to the Mexican Government. Wyllie printed it in his report.27

In October, Wyllie addressed a long letter to Bocanegra, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, pointing out the great advantages to be derived by Mexico from the colonization of her public lands. The United States' method of disposing of public lands, which added an immense revenue to the treasury, was explained in detail and all its benefits were pointed out. Mexico was urged to adopt a similar liberal plan of colonization which would encourage agricultural Europeans to colonize her vacant lands. Proceeds should be applied to extinguish the public debt, thereby raising the financial credit of Mexico. Bondholders had failed to cash in their “deferred” bonds for land warrants because the Government had neglected to emit necessary decrees promised and sanctioned by the Conversion of 1837. Thousands of European immigrants to the United States had “fulfilled faithfully their obligations to their adopted country”; they would do the same for Mexico and at the same time protect the northern frontier from aggression. Outlines of his colonization plan were presented to other Mexican officials also.28

In his report to the bondholders, Wyllie told of his efforts to secure action by Mexican officials, but found them hesitant to treat with any person unless he had power direct from the bondholders, binding them to consent without modifications to any agreement made. This was difficult to get because bondholders were continually changing. Wyllie himself had applied for land warrants equivalent to £10,000 in “deferred” bonds, but was told by the Mexican agents that they had no instructions as to the manner of executing the exchange. Attention was called to his outline plan for colonization, as well as to that of Alexander Forbes. Rumored British designs on California, in connection with “deferred” bonds, was denied. Wyllie was concerned over this misapprehension of British designs as early as 1840.29
In April, 1844, Hartnell answered Wyllie's "twenty-four questions." He had also talked to Governor Micheltorena, who was friendly to the English and interested in sharing in the speculations. Wyllie replied in November that in view of the American outlook on California, "the only power which could save California was Great Britain, and nothing could justify her interference so much, as previous grants of land . . . to British subjects." Hartnell was urged to be ready to grab all he could for Wyllie and himself if a crisis threatened, and if the Governor wished to favor them he could secretly have one-third of their share. No more is heard of the Wyllie plan unless the McNamara project can be considered an outgrowth of it.

McNamara's Plan of Irish Colonization, 1844-1846. Late in 1844, Eugene McNamara, an Irish priest, laid before Bankhead, British Minister to Mexico, a plan for the colonization of California by 10,000 Irish immigrants. Bankhead neglected for some six months to report it to Aberdeen, who received it in silence. McNamara, however, was motivated by a desire to "... advance the cause of Catholicism ... contribute to the happiness of my people, ... [and] put an obstacle in the way of further usurpations on the part of an anti-Catholic nation. ..." He would bring over one thousand Irish families, "the best of colonists," and establish colonies on the Bay of San Francisco, near Monterey, and at Santa Barbara. Each colonist was to receive one square league of land; land was to be hypothecated in payment of their traveling expenses. Customs duties at San Francisco for a period of years was asked. Claiming approval of the Archbishop of Mexico, this plan was urged upon the hesitant Mexican Government to save California from the "secret intrigues" of the "American usurpers."

Herrera approved his plans, though Paredes, who succeeded him as President, objected. He was advised to go to California, select suitable lands, and submit his project to the Departmental authorities. Accordingly he went to California, securing passage on the H.B.M. ship Juno and arriving early in the summer of 1846, and submitted his petition. In July the assembly approved a grant of 3,000 leagues, with some modifications of his original plan. It was located between the San Joaquin River and the Sierra Nevada. The date may have been fixed to make it antedate the raising of the American flag at Monterey on July 7, but it was illegal in other respects and was not pressed for recognition later.

Before his return to Mexico, he learned through Larkin, American Consul at Monterey, that the United States would not recognize his grant. He told Larkin that he represented a private company in London. It is here that there may be a connection with the Mexican debt to British bondholders. A company of speculators, perhaps bondholders, foreseeing the increased land values if the United States acquired California, may have sought to possess...
as large a tract as possible. Anyway, the activities of that "patriotic dreamer" are interesting and were much talked about.

The Mackintosh Plan to Colonize California with 500,000 Europeans, 1845-1846. Mackintosh, a British consul in Mexico and partner in the firm Manning and Marshall, worked out a plan of colonization, following the main outlines of that presented earlier by Pakenham, and submitted it to Bankhead in July, 1845. This project was drawn up in more careful detail than any other submitted to the British Government. Mackintosh proposed to place 500,000 European colonists in California in twenty years with a view to turning over control of the province to England. He seems to have had Mexican support, for Paredes promised to give "every possible facility" for the execution of the plan.

The plan was forwarded to Aberdeen to ascertain how far the British Government would back it. London partners of Mackintosh were also involved and evidently consulted Aberdeen. No reply was given either to Bankhead or to the promoters, but Aberdeen did speak of it to Thomas Murphy, Mexican Minister to London, while they were discussing ways and means of saving California from the American aggression. Aberdeen felt that it was too late to put the plan into operation and it would also be "unbecoming." It would give the United States ground for offense through its apparent intention of blocking her, and furthermore would be ineffective, after all, against American immigration.

England Passes up Her Opportunities in California, 1845-1846. As the opening of the Mexican War approached, England and Mexico became increasingly concerned over the future of California. While maintaining a "little England" policy as far as supporting projects for the acquisition of California went, Aberdeen did instruct his agents to use their efforts to discourage the "establishment of a protectoral power over California by any other foreign state." They were to keep "vigilantly alive to every creditable report" concerning the activities of American citizens, but were not to "encourage a spirit of resistance or disobedience in the inhabitants of the Province" against their Mexican rulers. James A. Forbes, British Vice Consul at Monterey, was reprimanded for his protest against Frémont's presence in California.

By this time Mexico, after long neglecting California, and England, whose opportunities had passed by, realized the value of California—only too late. American immigrants were taking possession. Murphy, in seeking British assistance in the expected war with the United States, tried every possible means of securing British interest. In November, 1845, he secured the assistance of Mr. Price, a partner with Mackintosh in the firm of Manning and Marshall, and J. D. Powles, vice chairman of the Mexican bondholders committee, in drawing up a colonization plan. A company, to be formed, was to purchase 50,000,000 acres of land in California and pay for it with £5,000,000
in “deferred” bonds and £1,250,000 in cash. The cash, to be paid to Mexico in installments, was to be borrowed at three per cent interest, Great Britain to guarantee the loan. By this time the British cabinet was thoroughly disgusted with Mexico for refusing to recognize the independence of Texas and play her game, and Herrera’s government had been overthrown, making Murphy’s position insecure.

In 1846, when war with the United States seemed inevitable, Paredes, who was now President of Mexico, proposed to Bankhead the transfer of California to England as security for a loan. This was considered an “indirect offer of sale,” the first ever hinted at by Mexican authorities. Towards these prospects of establishing an English colony in California the Admiralty office was enthusiastic, coveting San Francisco Bay as a naval stronghold, and Sir Robert Peel, Prime Minister, was somewhat dazzled by them. Aberdeen’s policy was adopted by Palmerston, again at the foreign office, and he was not disposed to enter into any treaty for California. He knew that by then, Mexican control over California was lost and she could not effect a transfer to England.

Even in the House of Commons this policy was upheld, though with some criticism. As a result of the French Presse report that Santa Anna’s fall revealed negotiations to transfer California to England for 25,000,000 piastres, Wortley, in March, 1845, asked the basis for the statement and if there had ever been any such correspondence. The report was stated to be “utterly without foundation” and both Peel and Palmerston denied knowledge of any such correspondence. Later during a debate on the Mexican problem, Lord Bentinck and Disraeli criticized the administration’s lack of aggressiveness and failure to protect the “bondholder’s mortgage” on California, but several members defended the Cabinet. The attitude of the English officials may be summed up in Ashburton’s statement: “We certainly do not want colonies, and least of all such as will be unmanageable from this distance, and only serve to embroil us with our neighbors.”

The attitude was not entirely popular, however, with the British press. The Mexican correspondent of the London Times made much of the value of California to England. Failure to interfere would mean annexation by the United States and the Americans would not stop there, but push southward, endangering British mining interests. Mexico might even become a part of the American Union. English control of California was necessary to check the United States and he saw the fate of Oregon decided by the possessor of California. Other papers and periodicals backed this up and criticized the administration’s spinelessness. “. . . An active minister, who had a forecast of the future, might secure it as an appendage to Oregon, our unquestionable right to which is too clear to be surrendered. . . .”

Many other proposals for British colonization of California, besides these, were suggested by “would-be statesmen or patriotic dreamers,” but none were
seriously considered. They merely added fuel to the pot that was already bubbling rumors of British designs, intrigues, and activities towards the annexation of California by England. The outbreak of war between Mexico and the United States ended the question quickly.

NOTES

2. George L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 1, 447.
4. Edgar Turlington, Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors, pp. 73-79, 90; Payno y Flores, Mexico, p. 28.
10. Ibid., June 18, 1841, p. 11.
11. Niles' Register, April 4, 1840, Vol. 58, p. 70.
19. E. g., see The Colonial Magazine, V, 236.