INFANTRY 40th DIVISION

The Years of

WORLD WAR II

1 DECEMBER 1941 - 7 APRIL 1946
INFANTRY 40th DIVISION
The years between 1926 and 1941 saw the steady development of the 40th Infantry Division as the California National Guard. Devoted to the order and stability of the State, and to the defense of the Nation, thousands of its members gave themselves of this service almost completely in lieu of other avocation. Well may the State of California, and the sister States of Utah and Nevada, from whom came the Artillery and other Special Units, take pride in the powerful organization which answered the call of the President in March of 1941. The history here undertaken can but add to that pride. The promise of those earlier days was bravely fulfilled.

In a sense this is not truly a history. Much that should be included is missing due to the impossibility of obtaining data. Nor is it an entire review. No description is attempted of the weariness of endless battle, the monotonous weeks of cold food and unchanged clothing, the harried nights in muddy foxholes, the murderous enemy fire, nor the sight of mangled buddies being carried to the rear; such experiences being indelibly stamped in the minds of the brave men who endured them. But it is believed that the spirit of this body of fighting men will be found in these pages, together with the historical and pictorial record of the ability and morale which led to the selection of the Sunburst Division as the proposed spearhead of the last great operation planned for World War II—the invasion of Japan!

Neither tongue nor pen can do more than renew the memories of those who served with the 40th Division. But the preparation of this review has been carried forward with the sincere hope that such memories may be brightened and kept clear through the years. With sorrow for the loss, and deep pride in remembrance of comradeship, dedication is made to the brothers in arms who gave their lives in the service of their country.
The
Commanding Generals
To the Officers and Men of the 40th Division:

Nothing that may be written within the covers of this volume, can properly or adequately record your role during the many grim and weary years of fighting since March of 1941, when as your Commanding General, I had the honor of taking you, the 40th Infantry Division, into Federal service.

This message is merely my token tribute to every man who wore the shoulder patch of the "Sunshine Division," a humble tribute to your individual and collective accomplishments and to your distinguished performance of every assigned task on the field of battle.

Such performance is ample personal reward for the near quarter century of service with your wonderful organization, which I had the privilege to fully organize, command and train for a period of years, before severe illness caused my separation from the Division.

Subsequently, I watched your operations with keen interest and unfailing appreciation. Finally, to every officer and man of the 40th Division, best wishes for a peaceful and successful life, from

Your Former Commander,

WALTER P. STORY
Major General (Ret.)
WALTER P. STORY

Major General, U. S. A.

Commanding the 40th Infantry Division from June 23, 1937, through its initial period of Federal service until he became ill in June 1941.
To the Fortieth Infantry Division:

It was my privilege and pleasure to command you from late June, 1941, until the middle of April, 1942, that period including some of the training at San Luis Obispo and the deployment in Southern California following Pearl Harbor.

I came as a stranger—an outlander, yet the acceptance of my direction and the cooperation accorded me left nothing to be desired, from even so high a type of personnel—officer and enlisted—as comprised the Division. My days with you are an unlimited source of satisfaction.

From the outset, I was convinced of your high combat potential. I have followed your war service with constant interest, with joy in your achievements, with grief for your losses and regret that I could not have shared your trials and hardships.

Your record in the Pacific Theater is truly immortal. One who has had the honor to serve with you or who may in the future belong to you will inevitably say with pride: "I, too, am of the Fortieth."

E. J. DAWLEY
Major General, U.S.A.
ERNEST J. DAWLEY

Major General, U. S. A.

Commanding the 40th Infantry Division from June 1941 to April 1942, when he assumed command of the VI Corps.
To the Fortieth Division:

As your Division Commander from April 1942 until July 1945, I am deeply proud of your accomplishments in World War II. The singleness of purpose you pursued during training, coupled with courage, skill and unselfishness you displayed in combat, could only result in the decisive successes you achieved in defeating the enemy, wherever you met him.

I am grateful to have been associated with you.

As through the pages of this history we relive our experiences—the beach defense and intensive training in the Hawaiian Islands; the dust, mud and dank jungle of Guadalcanal; the futile hunt for Japs on New Britain; the invasion of and heavy fighting on Luzon, Panay, Negras Occidental, and Mindanao; and the occupation of Korea—let us pause and salute our gallant dead, whose supreme sacrifice contributed so notably to the Victory.

RAPP BRUSH
Major General
U. S. Army
RAPP BRUSH

Major General, U. S. A.

Commanding 40th Infantry Division through all of its active combat experience; from April 1942 to July 1945.
To the veterans of the 40th Infantry Division—living and dead—whose courage, leadership, and sacrifices attained the unexcelled combat achievements and established the enviable record of the “Sunburst Division” in the Pacific Theater.

Beginning at Guadalcanal and New Britain, this record was continued through the landing at Lingayen Gulf; seizure of the central Luzon plains; participation in the Leyte, Masbate, and Mindanao operations; the lightning liberation of the Islands of Panay and Negros against an enemy superior in numbers; culminated in the occupation of Southern Korea and the liberation of the Koreans from years of Japanese domination.

It was a privilege and a great honor to have been associated with the 40th Infantry Division as one of its leaders.

Donald J. Myers
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Commanding

DONALD J. MYERS
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Commanding
DONALD J. MYERS
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Commanding the 40th Infantry Division through preparation for operation "Olympic" and during the occupation of Korea, from August 1945 to April 1946.
The
Assistant Division Commanders
To the Soldiers of the 40th Infantry Division:

During World War II it was my privilege to serve with the 40th Infantry Division from its induction in March, 1941, until shortly after its arrival on the Island of New Britain in July, 1944. It was with great regret that I left, for another duty assignment, the many close friends and the fine fighting machine which the Division had become through its months of arduous training followed by more months of defensive operations against the enemy.

It was only natural when put to the supreme test of offensive combat in the Philippine Islands, that you covered yourselves with glory to the credit of your country and yourselves. Throughout your service you men of the 40th have typified all that is best in the civilian American fighting man, who, through his individual initiative, ability, and courage, has added a new and glorious page to our history and has demonstrated to the world that he stands ready, with his life if need be, to roll back the threatening clouds of oppression which cast their shadow over the world.

My compliments and best wishes to the soldiers of the 40th Division.

Sincerely,

R. E. MITTELSTAEDT
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
RICHARD E. MITTELSTAEDT
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Assistant Division Commander, 40th Infantry Division from February 1942 to May 1944
General Shoe is believed to be on duty with the occupation forces in Korea. Efforts to contact him having proved unsuccessful, no message to his former comrades-in-arms is available for this page.

The service of this distinguished soldier with the 40th Division will always remain a bright portion of the memories of every member of that command. The force and directness, the inspiration to morale, and the generous expenditure of his every faculty on behalf of all echelons which characterized General Shoe’s entire tenure as Assistant Division Commander cannot fail to be major elements in such memories.

—THE HISTORY TEAM
ROBERT O. SHOE

Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Assistant Division Commander, 40th Infantry Division from July 1944 to January 1946
The

Division Artillery Commanders
HEADQUARTERS FORTIETH DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO 40
February 7, 1946

To Members of the 40th Division Artillery:

The saga of the achievements of this Command is rich in the qualities of fortitude, devotion, and selfless service to the American people.

Too much cannot be said for the skill and initiative with which all set about to accomplish the task at hand. The outstanding successes accomplished in combat, reflected in classic examples of fighting, proclaimed the highest qualities of gunnery and soldiering.

Your combined efforts and devotion resulted in a team which had no superior. The recollection of this will never be dimmed. To each one of you this shall remain a satisfaction throughout life.

I express to each one of you my deep pride in having served with you. I commend you and to you extend my enduring appreciation of a job superbly done.

Faithfully,

HARCOURT HERVEY
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Commanding
HARCOURT HERVEY

Brigadier General

Artillery Commander, 40th Infantry Division throughout the war and the occupation of Korea; from February 1942 to February 1946; commanded 40th Infantry Division for periods approximating a total of three months, of which over one month was during combat operations.
The R. C. I.
Commanders
To the Members of the 108th Infantry Regiment:

The war just ended marks the close of another chapter in the long and gallant history of the 108th Infantry.

The Nation, the state of New York and the communities from which this regiment came, share with pride the important contribution it made in bringing victory to our forces in the Pacific. The part played by each individual will be a source of much pride and satisfaction in years to come.

I am sure each member of the regiment will resume his duties as a citizen with the same loyalty, leadership and devotion that marked his service in the armed forces. You return to civilian life with my wishes for your good fortune in the future.

M. C. Bradley
Colonel, 108th Infantry.
It is a matter of deep regret that contact with Colonel Stratta has proved impossible. He is at present on duty in Europe, and efforts to obtain a statement from him, in connection with his command of the 108th Infantry, have met with no response.

The soldiers who served with him in the campaigns in the Philippines will know beyond question that his command will remain one of the most cherished memories of his life, and that his every good wish goes to each member of that command.

—The History Team.
Colonel Murray is presently reported with the headquarters of U. S. Army forces in Tokyo. No reply has been received to our request for letter. The unfortunate omission of an expression of his sentiments on command of the 160th Infantry will of course be as great a matter of concern to him as it is to those responsible for the preparation of the Division History.

One of the oldest of the unit leaders, in point of years of service with the Division, Colonel Murray carried the high responsibility of defense in Southern California in the frantic period immediately following December 7, 1941. Following this, his became the trying task of organization and reorganization and the sustaining of morale and efficiency in the succeeding years of defense and special training. The long and weary months in the Hawaiian Islands, in Guadalcanal, and in New Britain constantly proved his leadership. And in combat operations in the Philippine Islands he was the “Soldier’s Soldier.”

—The History Team.
To the Personnel of the 160th Infantry Regiment:

It is difficult to express the depth of feeling which results from my memories of command of this splendid organization. Throughout the period of my service with you I found a high degree of loyalty, of morale, and of professional efficiency. Such attributes, when consistently the distinguishing features of a unit, provide a sure basis for satisfaction and pride on the part of the commander.

The success which attended your actions in combat, and your superior discharge of the extreme responsibility of occupation duty in Korea reflect great credit not only upon you, but also upon the military service of our country.

R. G. STANTON
Colonel, Infantry, U.S.A.
My service in the 40th Infantry Division began with its reorganization after World War I, and I can say with heartfelt enthusiasm that I have always been proud of its fine accomplishments.

As for the 185th Infantry, which I had the honor and happiness to command for many months and in many places:—there was a regiment! Men and officers alike; it was an outfit to talk about, to admire, to love. Perhaps the lowest point in misery to which I have ever sunk was reached on that day when I said, “Goodbye.” It deflates my ego, but warms my heart to know that the Regiment thereafter attained heights of glory which transcended my fondest expectations.

JOHN U. CALKINS
Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION:

Please do not accept this as a personal message from me, but rather as a greeting from the men who served in the 185th Infantry from the date of its induction into Federal service in 1941 to the date of its deactivation in 1946.

Many changes in key personnel were experienced during these years, but the Regiment took these changes in stride and carried on in a manner which brought commendation from Division, Corps, and Army commanders.

Our record in combat speaks for itself. While there were many outstanding personal performances in line of duty beyond the call of duty, it is our firm conviction that the glorious record of the 185th Infantry can be accounted for in one word, "Team-Work."

In combat, we functioned as a combat team, and we salute those men of the 213th Field Artillery, 115th Engineers, 115th Medical Battalion, and others who were habitually attached to the 185th Combat Team and who contributed so much to the success of the Regiment's operations.

We are proud to have been part of the 40th Division, without interruption from the date of induction to the date of deactivation, and to have contributed to its magnificent record as a fighting Infantry Division.

We shall always cherish the memory of our friends and comrades-in-arms who are lying under small white crosses along the shores of New Britain, Luzon, Panay, and Negros and our fervent prayer is that they shall not have been sacrificed in vain.

To our friends and comrades-in-arms that were wounded or stricken with tropical diseases, our best wishes for a speedy recovery and adjustment to normal life.

Let us carry on in peace with the same spirit that characterized our conduct in combat. We fought and our comrades died, to retain the American way of life. The war was won. Now let us win the peace.

JOHN B. MALONEY  
Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.  
Commanding from June 1944 to August 1945
In the recent war the 185th Infantry proved clearly its superiority over the enemy.

To the many members of this fine Regiment I offer my most earnest congratulations on the manner in which, when there was a job to be done, you were not found wanting. Although your profession required great sacrifices, there always existed among you a spirit of loyalty, of good will, of comradeship, and of deep devotion to the cause of our country: attributes which brought you victory in every campaign. It has been a pleasure, a privilege, and a great honor to be your commander. In the years ahead the intimacy of our association will be the most pleasant of memories.

Let none of you forget those gallant soldiers of the Regiment who laid down their lives in defense of the principles which gave America her birth.

LEONARD E. ECHOLS
Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.
The Field Artillery
Battalion Commanders
"Melican soldier NOT jungle fighter—he remove jungle!"
143RD F. A. BN.

WALLACE H. NICKELL
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from February 1942 to July 1945

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STEWART H. KNOWLTON
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from July 1945 to November 1945
We regret the impossibility of obtaining a picture of Lieutenant Colonel Smith.
—The History Team

GEORGE E. SMITH
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding from February 1942 to June 1943

CHARLES C. THORSTENSEN
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from July 1943 to October 1945
We regret the impossibility of obtaining a picture of Lieutenant Colonel Eskelsen.
—The History Team

RUEL M. ESKELEN
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from February 1942 to April 1945

JOE E. WHITESIDES
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from April 1945 to November 1945
MALCOLM B. BURNHAM
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from November 1942 to March 1945

ALAN B. BURNHAM
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from November 1942 to March 1945

BERNARD E. HAGEN
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, U. S. A.
Commanding from March 1945 to February 1946

222ND F. A. BN.
Separate Battalion
and Detachment Commanders
40TH Q. M. C.

EDMOND B. MORGAN
Lieutenant Colonel, Q.M.C., U.S.A.
Commanding from February, 1942 to April, 1945

ROBERT F. HASSARD
Major, Q.M.C., U.S.A.
Commanding from April, 1945 to November, 1945
We regret the impossibility of obtaining a picture of Lieutenant Colonel Weiler.

—The History Team

WILLIAM WEILER
Lieutenant Colonel, C. of E., U. S. A.
Commanding from February, 1942 to February, 1943

JOHN K. WRIGHT
Lieutenant Colonel, C. of E., U. S. A.
Commanding from February, 1943 to December, 1945
115TH MEDICAL BN.

GEORGE DAWSON
Lieutenant Colonel, M.C., U.S.A.
Commanding from April 1942 to December 1943

WALTER A. RICKER
Lieutenant Colonel, M.C., U.S.A.
Commanding from December 1943 to September 1945

SIGNAL DET.

CLYDE R. SMITH
Lieutenant Colonel, S.C., U.S.A.
Commanding (Div. Signal Off.) February 1942 to April 1945

CHEMICAL WARFARE DET.

ROBERT Z. GREIG
Lieutenant Colonel, C.W.S., U.S.A.
Commanding from February 1942 to August 1945

MILITARY POLICE DET.

OSCAR W. GRAY
Major, C. of E., U.S.A.
Commanding from February 1942 to March 1945

ORDNANCE DET.

PAUL Q. ROBERTS
Lieutenant Colonel, Ord., U.S.A.
Commanding from February 1942 to May 1945

“We regret the impossibility of obtaining pictures of the above named officers.”

—THE HISTORY TEAM
Awards And Decorations
AWARD OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
MEDAL OF HONOR

By the direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 9 July 1918 (WD Bul. 43, 1918), a Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty was awarded by the War Department in the name of Congress to the following enlisted man:

Staff Sergeant John C. Sjogren (Army serial No. 36421567), Company I, 160th Infantry Regiment, Army of the United States, led an attack on 23 May 1945 near San Jose Hacienda, Negros, Philippine Islands, against a high, precipitous ridge defended by a company of enemy riflemen, who were entrenched in spider holes and supported by well-sealed pillboxes housing automatic weapons with interlocking bands of fire. The terrain was such that only one squad could advance at a time, and from a knoll atop the ridge a pillbox covered the only approach with automatic fire. Against this enemy stronghold, Sergeant Sjogren led the first squad to open the assault. Deploying his men, he moved forward and was hurling grenades when he saw that his next in command, at the opposite flank had been wounded. Without hesitation, he crossed 20 yards of exposed terrain in the face of enemy fire and exploding dynamite charges, moved the man to cover, and administered first aid. He then worked his way forward and, advancing directly into the enemy fire, killed eight Japanese in spider holes, guarding the approach to the pillbox. Crawling to within a few feet of the pillbox while his men concentrated their bullets on the fire port, he began dropping grenades through the narrow firing slit. The enemy immediately threw two or three of these unexploded grenades out, and fragments from one wounded him in the hand and back. However, by hurling grenades through the embrasure faster than the enemy could return them, he succeeded in destroying the occupants. Despite his wounds, he directed his squad to follow him in a systematic attack on the remaining positions, which he eliminated in like manner, taking tremendous risks, overcoming bitter resistance, and never hesitating in his relentless advance. To silence one of the pillboxes, he wrenched a light machine gun out through the embrasure as it was firing before blowing up the occupants with hand grenades. During this action, Sergeant Sjogren, by his heroic bravery, aggressiveness, and skill as a soldier, single handedly killed 43 enemy soldiers and destroyed nine pillboxes, thereby paving the way for his company’s successful advance.
AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR

HQ, 40TH INF DIV

BRUSH, Rapp, Maj, Gen. GO 1, H40D, 1-4-45.
SMOR, Robert O., Brig, Gen. GO 1, H40D, 2-17-45.
GATES, Jack R., Capt. GO 5, H40D, 2-1-45.
SHERER, Myrl D., Lt. Col. GO 73, H40D, 3-4-45.
CHILD, Wshard L., Maj. GO 8, H40D, 1-32-44.
COOMER, Oswald, Jr., Lt. Col. GO 131, H40D, 6-22-45.
JONES, Kenneth G., Wg., GO 131, H40D, 6-25-45.
MURRAY, Charles H., Jr., Lt. Col. GO 146, H40D, 7-11-45.

33D MAL CONT DET

LIGGIO, Blagio P., T/5, GO 13, H40D, 1-21-45.

251ST STA HOSP

PARMAN, Joseph L., Pfc, GO 165, H40D, 10-11-44.

G40TH TD BN

RAYFIELD, Braxton, Sgt., GO 17, H40D, 10-21-44.
BEAGLEY, Grant R., Sgt., GO 16, H40D, 10-21-44.

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BEAGLEY, Grant R., Sgt., GO 16, H40D, 10-21-44.
POTTER, Donald E., 1st Sgt., GO 141, H40D, 7-5-45
SKINNER, Kenyon R., Maj., GO 53, HSA, 8-8-45.
MILLER, Clark R., 2nd Lt., GO 58, HSA, 8-9-45.
PERCARY, Garrey W., T/Sgt., GO 53, HSA, 8-3-45.
LOFAN, James A., 1st Lt., GO 13, HSA, 8-25-45.
MOLNAR, Alexander, 2/Sgt., GO 55, HSA, 8-3-45.
NOTTHOFF, Joseph, Pfc., GO 55, HSA, 8-3-45.
SHELTON, Donald, Cpl., 1st Lt., GO 15, HSA, 8-3-45.
BARRETT, Merle R., Pvt., GO 71, H40D, 8-3-45.
ZENNINGS, John C., Maj., GO 58, HSA, 8-3-45.
BEERMAKER, John R., 1st Lt., GO 141, H40D, 7-11-45.
DELANEY, Robert M., 2nd Lt., GO 65, H40D, 7-11-45.
KONTO, Joseph, Pfc., GO 144, H40D, 7-21-45.
HIVOWER, Charles, Pvt., GO 57, HSA, 8-3-45.
CALYTON, Melvin E., T/Sgt., GO 141, H40D, 7-21-45.
CLARK, Richard, Jr., Cpl., GO 153, HSA, 7-21-45.
GOEDE, Frederick W., 1st Lt., GO 153, H40D, 7-21-45.
GOETZ, Richard W., 1st Lt., GO 153, H40D, 7-21-45.
PARADES, Romeo J., Pvt., GO 151, H40D, 7-21-45.

McCURDY, John A., 1st Lt., GO 97, H40D, 5-24-45.
MARTIN, Melvin D., Capt., GO 129, H40D, 6-25-45.
BROWN, Melvin W., Pvt., GO 135, H40D, 6-29-45.
LYON, James L., 2d Lt., GO 140, H40D, 7-5-45.
BOARDMAN, Clifford E., T/5 GO 101, H40D, 5-30-45.
FERRARI, Alfred J., T/5, GO 218, H40D, 11-8-45.
JUSTICE, Burnice, T/4, GO 218, H40D, 11-8-45.
ADKINS, Ward, T/5, GO 218, H40D, 11-8-45.
MUNYON, Robert W., Capt., GO 3, H40D, 1-30-45.
STEVENSON, Don W., Capt., GO 39, H40D, 3-20-45.
PINDAR, George F., Lt. Col., GO 125, H40D, 6-16-45.
OSTRANDER, Earl, T/5, GO 143, H40D, 7-9-45.
FIELD, Joseph E., Cpl., GO 194, H40D, 10-10-45.
WIMER, Buster, S/Sgt., GO 194, H40D, 10-10-45.
SMITH, Addison, Maj., GO 196, H40D, 10-14-45.
JONES, Harold D., Cpl., H40D, GO 14, 15 Feb. 45.
DE ANGELIS, Anthony, T/5, H40D, GO 14, 15 Feb. 45.
LEETHAM, Julius A., 1st Lt., GO 3, H40D, 1-30-45.
MOORE, Donald A., 2d Lt., GO 3, H40D, 1-30-45.
SCHUMAN, Richard K., 1st Lt., GO 21, H40D, 2-24-45.
WRIGHT, John K., Ill, Lt. Col., GO 183, H40D, 9-4-45.
HOFFMAN, James E., Capt., GO 176, H40D, 8-25-45.
ROTH, Hubert V., T/4, GO 176, H40D, 8-25-45.
SINGLETON, Lauren W., Lt. Col., GO 125, H40D, 6-16-45.
DOWDY, William M., Maj., GO 135, H40D, 6-29-45.
LEVIN, Albert, T/5, H40D, GO 14, 15 Feb. 45.
YOUNG, Gerald O., Pfc, H40D, GO 14, 15 Feb. 45.
JACKS, Morris W., CWO, GO 23, H40D, 2-26-45.
KELLEY, Joseph M., 1st Lt., GO 138, H40D, 7-1-45.
STANTON, Raymund G., Col., GO 163, H40D, 7-28-45.
CROSBY, Richard D., Maj., GO 170, H40D, 8-17-45.
STRATTA, Maurice D., Col., GO 85, HSA, 7-30-45.
LYNCH, Francis J., Lt. Col., GO 88, H8A, 8-3-45.
GUTIERREZ, Carlos T., Pfc, H115M, GO 18, 5 May 45.
PHILLEY, Frank L., T/5, H115M, GO 18, 5 May 45.
PRUETT, William H., Sgt., H115M, GO 18, 5 May 45.
40TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

ANDERSON, Chester G., Pvt., H40D, GO 7, 3 Feb. 45.

HICKENS, Edward W., Pvt., H40D, GO 7, 3 Feb. 45.

LAWSON, Thomas O., Capt., H115M, GO 33, 30 Oct. 45.

PERRIN, Thomas, Pfc., H115M, GO 1, 25 Jan. 45.

JOHNSON, Samuel P., Sgt., H115M, GO 37, 14 Nov. 45.


115TH MED BN

McBEE, Wayne K., Pfc, H115M, GO 1, 25 Jan. 45.

HUCKER, Edmund O., Pfc, H115M, GO 6, 27 Feb. 45.

LAWSON, Thomas O., Capt., H115M, GO 33, 30 Oct. 45.


108TH INFANTRY


BARTUCCA, Andrew, Pfc, H108, GO 2, 3 Feb. 45.

BELCHER, Andrew, Pfc., H108, GO 1, 27 Jan. 45.

BEGAO, Virginia, Pfc., H108, GO 1, 27 Jan. 45.


COHEN, Jacob, Pfc., H115M, GO 4, 13 Feb. 45.

COHEN, Mark, Pfc., H115M, GO 4, 13 Feb. 45.


FREEMAN, Robert B., S/Sgt., H115M, GO 6, 27 Feb. 45.

HALSEY, Earl T., Pfc., H108, GO 18, 18 Mar. 45.

MUNOZ, Ike, Pfc., H108, GO 18, 18 Mar. 45.

NOWACKI, Thaddeus, S/Sgt., H108, GO 18, 18 Mar. 45.

CRANE, Fred T., Pfc., H108, GO 18, 18 Mar. 45.
REED, Charles W., Pfc, H 108, GO 18, 18 Mar 45.


STUPP, George W., Col, H 108, GO 18, 18 Mar 45.

TAYLOR, Charles A., Pfc, H 108, GO 18, 18 Mar 45.

TROCHER, Ray J., 2/Sgt, H 108, GO 18, 18 Mar 45.

VOSBURGH, Oliver A., Pfc, H 108, GO 18, 18 Mar 45.


COUCH, Elbert O., Pvt, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

LENNAN, Orel J., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

PHILIP, Francis V., 2/Sgt, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

TENGDA, Frank J., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

PARK, Ronald D., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

HEJDUK, William, 2nd Lt, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

THOMPSON, Edmund G., 2d Lt, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

TUTT, Curtis M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

WINTER, Edward, Jr, Lt, Col, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

BARTER, Robert M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

JOHNSON, Robert N., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

MILLER, Lawrence A., Cpt, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

CURLES, Harold G., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

MORIN, Crespin, Pfc, H 99 Evac Hos, GO 18, 1 Jun 45.

CURLES, Harold G., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

CYPHER, Charles R., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

STORM, Robert W., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

TOWT, Andrew, 1st Lt., H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

ROSS, Robert A., Pfc, H 99 Evac Hos, GO 18, 1 Jun 45.

KLOVSTAD, John E., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

TUTT, Curtis M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

WHITEHEAD, Paul, Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

CARTER, Robert M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

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CARTER, Robert M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.

CARTER, Robert M., Pfc, H 108, GO 21, 5 Apr 45.
EVANS, Joseph F., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 2, 15 Feb. 45.
EVANS, John B., Pfc., H 115 M, GO 2, 15 Feb. 45.
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EVANS, John B., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 2, 15 Feb. 45.
DUTCHER, Samuel L., Pfc, H 160, GO 17, 13 Mar. 45. ALVORD, Herbert D., Sgt., H 37 F Hos, GO 3, 20 Apr. 45.
RADABAUGH, Orlie E., Sgt., H 37 F Hos, GO 3, 20 Apr. 45. MORTO, Joe, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
EDWIN, C. P. Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
SANCHEZ, Livuardo, Sgt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45. SPRINGER, Daniel L., Pfc, H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
TRUJILLO, Juan B., S/Sgt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
BARNES, John N., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
MANNING, Dominic, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
MARTINI, Frank, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
GILES, H. J., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
ALFRED, W., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
MATTHEWS, Lee H., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
CUTLER, J., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 4, 21 Apr. 45.
HOUGHTON, Elbert V., T/Sgt, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
JASCHKE, Edward J., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
MORRIS, Thomas P., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
SMITH, Miles H., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
STOTH, Earl D., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
THYBREDS, Golden D., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
TOPHAM, Roy J., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
WILLIAM, Kenneth R., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
WOODDE, Harold H., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
ZINK, Joseph C., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
ZOLLER, Frank D., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
GOMEZ, Marches E., Pfc, H 160, GO 40, 11 May 45.
DE LA CRUZ, Domingo, Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
MORRIS, Sidney L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
DE LA CRUZ, Domingo, Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
KAUWNC, Tony J., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
KAIJZ, Harold W., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
NICKA, Russel E., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
WARREN, James L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
BAYZIO, Albert R., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
DOUGLAS, James A., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
DRAKE, Jack, Cpl, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
HALL, Clesco L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
HOLLIS, William H., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
MILLER, Robert A., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
OWEN, Andrew R., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
TYLER, Aceye B., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
YATES, Samuel B., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
ABAT, Nick, Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
ADAMS, Charles P., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
JONES, Donald L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
KLEINBERG, Donald L., Pvt, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
MARTIN, Carl L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
MASON, James W., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
NOLAN, John C., Pvt, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
YATES, Samuel B., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
ADAMS, Charles P., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
ALEXANDER, Albert L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
BARDIN, Robert E., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 21, 11 May 45.
ALVANEY, Robert W., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 13 Feb. 45.

BARNES, Joseph L., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

BLOTH, John W., 2/Sgt, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

BYMAT, John L., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

CHURCH, Anthony J., S/Sgt, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

MORGAN, Ernest J., Cpl, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

DUNICEL, Clifford T., Sgt, H 135, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

DONLEY, Eugene B., T/Sgt, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

DOME, Gerald, Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

DYKES, Louis W., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

GILGUTH, Norman W., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

HALL, Kenneth R., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

KIRK, Ray C., Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

PARKER, Oliver, Pfc, H 185, GO 9, 17 Mar. 45.

PHILLIPS, Joe B., Pfc, H 185, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

RUSCH, John, Pvt, H 185, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

TOVAR, Juan, Pfc, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

TUCKER, Shack C., Pfc, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

WILSON, Daniel E., Pfc, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

SUN, Henry L., Pvt, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

VENNIGLIA, Anthony, Pfc, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

WILBER, Arnold R., Pfc, H 186, GO 9, 12 Feb. 45.

WILSON, Vernon F., 2d Lt, H 186, GO 12, 24 Feb. 45.

WILLIAMSON, Charles R., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

WILLIAMSON, Thomas J., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

WILLSON, Robert L., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

WINDELL, Charlie, Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

WIT, John, Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

WRIGHT, Robert L., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

XANTHO, L., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.

YOUNG, John R., Pfc, H 186, GO 10, 16 Feb. 45.
PRZYCHOWICZ, Stanley J., Sgt., H 185, GO 70, 23 Nov. 45.

STACY, Joseph M., Pvt., H 185, GO 70, 23 Nov. 45.

VARRIANCE, Antonio, 2/4, H 185, GO 70, 23 Nov. 45.

WILDE, William L., Pvt., H 185, GO 70, 23 Nov. 45.

COBER, Raymond E., Pfc, H 185, GO 70, 11 Dec. 45.

CHOWNOWSKI, Thomas J., Pvt., H 185, GO 70, 14 Dec. 45.

CRANE, Warren E., Capt., H 185, GO 78, 12 Dec. 45.

DIPPEL, Harry P., Pvt., H 185, GO 78, 12 Dec. 45.

GRAFHAUER, Henry E., Pfc, H 185, GO 78, 12 Dec. 45.

KUCZAN, Anthony, J., Sgt., H 185, GO 78, 12 Dec. 45.

143RD FA BN

KINDER, Malcolm A., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

CONTY, Thomas A., 2/4, H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

BIRCH, Ralph C., Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

BIGELOW, Raymond D., Pfc., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

BYRNE, James A., Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

MCDONALD, Dwight W., Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

MEDELL, Dwight L., Pfc., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

WALLACE, Joseph, Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

CLARK, Charles, Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

GORMAN, E. J., Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

PEERSON, Hal, Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

KOECH, Studen, Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

ERWIN, Ferre E., 2/4, H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

WEST, Chester E., Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

BLACKWOOD, James P., 2/4, H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

LARKOS, Larry, Pvt., H 143 FA, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

COLLINS, Harold, Pvt., H 37 F Bos, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

KAVAVLY, Raymond, Pvt., H 37 F Bos, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

PBULSKY, Roger, M., Pvt., H 37 F Bos, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

PHOBEL, Tschern, F/4, H 37 F Bos, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.

CUMMING, A. M., Raymon, F., Cpl., H 37 F Bos, GO 1, 29 Jan. 45.
HENSLEY, Bert, W., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
HUMPHREY, BRUCE L., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
KINDSTON, Harry E., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
KORCHILY, George T., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
MILLER, Fred, Jr., Pfc., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
MOTT, William E., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
OBERST, Clarence W., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
RAMSEY, John R., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
RUSSELL, Charles H., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
SHEPHERD, WALTER H., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
SMITH, Clinton M., Pfc., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.
WORLD, H., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 18, F 4 Aug 45.

AWARO OF THE ARMY COMMENDATION RIBBON

40TH INF DIV FINANCE
MORKS, Gordon B., M/Sgt, H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
WOOTEN, Cecil C., 2d Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.

HQS SPL TRS & 40TH INF DIV SP SV
KOCH, Karl E., 2d Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
SHAPIRO, Milton, Tec 3, H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
ANDERSON, W. P. (2d Lt.), Arthington, Ptc, H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.

40TH INF DIV

BULLITT, John M., 1st Lt. (G-4), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
HAMBROCK, Claude M., M/Sgt, H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
HORN, Albert H., 1st Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
KLOVSTAD, John E., 2d Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
KULSKE, Richard, Pvt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
LAWRENCE, George E., 1st Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
LENHART, WALTER C., Capt., (SA), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
MATT, Gordon J., Pvt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
NEVIN, Frank, 2d Lt. (AG), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
DAMIL, Napoleon J., Capt., (AG), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
FUREY, Charles A., Capt., (8A), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
DOYLE, Harold F., 1st Lt., (AG), H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.
BAKER, Earle J., 1st Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
PETERSON, Charles W., 1st Lt., H AD-D, GO, 2-14-46.

437TH FIELD HOSPITAL
ROSENFELD, Edward A., 1st Lt, H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MCCORMICK, William C., Sgt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
COFFMAN, Jack B., Pfc, H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
CUNTRABAS, Antonio J., Pfc, H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
WISNIA, W., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
SCHUPP, Melvin P., Pfc, H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
H-wise, C., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MAZZA, Pietro J., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
KING, James M., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
Browning, John E., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
FARNHAM, R., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MIKOVSKY, J., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
DOMANSKI, James, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
HAIR, Andrus, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MASSIE, James, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
HEWITT, Donald, Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MENDEZ, Edward J., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
COPeland, Horace C., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
DAVIDSON, Kenneth F., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
ANDERSON, James L., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
HAIR, Frank D., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
BROWN, Charles R., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
PELLERI, Charles E., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
FLORES, Basilio P., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
BATES, James E., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
HANSEN, Wing A., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
WAGNER, Earl, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
KUEH, Robert, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
ANSER, W. F., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
VAUGHN, Robert, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
ZINN, John A., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.

24TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL

BRADY, Cecil L., Pfc., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
BRUZZONE, Stephen, T/4, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
CHAPMAN, John P., Pfc, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
CORKER, Robert F., T/4, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
FOSTER, Earl E., T/4, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
HALBKE, Victor R., T/5, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
HOFMANN, James A., Pfc, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
DEE, John D., Pvt., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
SELVE, Joseph F., Pvt., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
HUEY, Frank A., Pvt., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
PHELPS, James L., Pvt., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
WARMAN, George C., Pfc, H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.
MULLIN, Francis A., Pvt., H 24 D, GO 4, 2 Feb 45.

80TH CHEMICAL BN

HALL, Alvin C., 1st Lt, H 115 M, GO 2, 13 Feb 45.
PINK, William W., 1st Lt., H 115 M, GO 2, 13 Feb 45.
WINFIELD, U. T., Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 8, 24 Feb 45.
MORRIS, Gordon B., M/Sgt, H AD-D, GO, 2-1-46.
WOOTEN, Cecil C. 2d Lt, H AD-D, GO, 2-24-46.

462ND FA BN
EARNEST, John K., Pvt., H 115 M, GO 17, 1 May 45.
SANDER, Raymond H., Sgt., H 115 M GO 17, 1 May 45.
DI FRANCESCO, Nick J., Pfc., H 37 F Hos, GO 19, 8 May 45.
HECK, Quincy T., Pfc, H 115 M, GO 19, 8 May 45.
GONZALES, John A., T/4, H 37 F Hos, GO 18, 11 May 45.

47OTH AAA BN
COLBAN, Arthur F., Pfc, H 37 F Hos, GO 19, 17 May 45.
KOTZIAN, Gunther F., Cpl., H 37 F Hos, GO 26, 7 June 45.
IORIO, Louis, Pvt., H 37 F Hos, GO 26, 7 June 45.

716TH TANK BN
CONNELL, Donald C., Cpl., H 115 M, GO 23, 21 May 45.

AWARD OF THE ARMY COMMENDATION RIBBON
VENTURA, Samuel M., 1st Lt., H Ao-D, GO, 2-17-46.
CZERZTK, Mike J., S/Sgt., H Ao-D, GO, 2-17-46.
GORMAN, William R., Sgt., H Ao-D, GO, 2-17-46.
THOMPSON, Ralph E., 1st Lt., H Ao-D, GO, 2-18-46.
WILSON, Frederick M., 1st Lt., H Ao-D, GO, 2-18-46.
JONES, Harold E., Pfc, H Ao-D, GO, 2-19-46.

160TH INF REGT
ANDERSON, Einar V., T/Sgt., H Ao D GO, 2-5-46.
PLANK, James D., Cpl., H Ao D, GO, 2-6-46.
HUNT, William P., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-10-46.
HALE, William M., M/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-10-46.
STARK, Garylord W., T/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-19-46.
CORNISH, Timothy C., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-12-46.
JACKSON, James M., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-12-46.
WHARTON, Stuart T., 2d Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
BENDR, Wilbur K., Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
FAULK, Ewell A., Pfc., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
CHESTER, Norman T., Pvt., H Ao D, GO, 2-17-46.
HUSBERT, Granville W., Capt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
LOWE, Glen M., 1st Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
STERNBERG, James W., Jr., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 5-21-46.
ROALSTAD, Dale E., M/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-25-46.
CHAMBER, Robert M., T/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-25-46.

185TH INF REGT
IVANOVICH, Louis J., Tech 6, H Ao D, GO, 2-17-46.
PAULSON, William H., Tech 6, H Ao D, GO, 2-17-46.
AMTH, Vernon A., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-18-46.
BALL, Thomas F., Capt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
GRAY, Reginald A., Jr., Capt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
KOONTZ, John F., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
HEINTZ, Irwin C., 2d Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-24-46.

HQ 40TH DIV ARTY
NIELSON, Denver L., Pfc, H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
RISCH, Carl J., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.

143D FA BN
LA RARKE, Jack H., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-20-46.
LOVIELL, William H., CWO, H Ao D, GO, 2-20-46.
BENNETT, Max C., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-23-46.
COURNIT, Fred E., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-24-46.

164TH FA BN
MISTRETTA, Charles J., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-3-46.
GOTTLEIB, David, S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-11-46.
BONK, Robert C., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
DOHILLY, Howard J., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
KERR, Thomas C., 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
REYNOLDS, Floyd C., S/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.

213TH FA BN
SAUL, Sunshine, 1st Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-24-46.
FISHER, Norman W., Jr., 2d Lt., H Ao D, GO, 2-9-46.

749TH FA BN
DOHM, Ivan F., Cpl., H Ao D, GO, 2-14-46.
MAZZOLA, Christopher, Pfc., H Ao D, GO, 2-18-46.
SPENCER, Bert F., M/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
TEACHAY, Harry W., M/Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
BAUGHMAN, Leonard E., 1st Sgt., H Ao D, GO, 2-21-46.
Training Days
at San Luis Obispo
Camp San Luis Obispo
In the summer and fall of 1941 the Division completed absorption of the first groups of inductees, received new equipment, and rounded out a vigorous training program which included both basic work and the Washington and Hunter Liggett maneuvers. New terms, new techniques, new organizations; all were mastered. “TBA,” “TO&E,” and “1st Echelon Maintenance” came to be as familiar as had been “Duty Roster,” and “Sick Book.” The giant, who for so many years had been on starvation rations, found himself with the power which was to be shown again and again during the years of the war. Not a little of that strength derived from the traditions of pride and esprit de corps which had long been inherent in all components. With expansion, the new members quickly absorbed such sentiments, and the cohesion and solidarity resulting throughout the Division was of a remarkably high order.

Some sense of the grim years ahead must have been at large in those days of training. The earnest study, the uncomplaining acceptance of discipline, the furious application to “bayonet training,” “gun drill,” “extended order,” etc.; these could not have resulted from mere novelty. With rare exceptions personnel were uniformly devoted to the ugly but vital business of preparing for war! Pictures included in this section were selected at random, from many phases of training; all show the same concentration, the same sincerity of purpose. (How many times these scenes were to be repeated in deadly earnest!) That such efforts were productive of a splendid result may be seen in the comment of a distinguished officer:

“The entire operation of the 40th Division during the Washington maneuvers was characterized by soldierly execution. I have from many observers, both military and civilians, extremely laudatory remarks on the efficiency and businesslike conduct of individuals of all ranks and grades during that maneuver, and when it was completed the Division was in excellent condition and ready to carry on. I find high morale in the Division; I have found nothing but the greatest eagerness and desire to excel.”
Homemade machine gun built by soldiers, comes in for practice alongside .50 cal. machine gun.

Two soldiers sprawl on maneuver grounds during automatic rifle practice.

Ready For Fire Order

Automatic Rifle Practice—and Good Concealment
Top left: Heavy machine gun overnight problem. Above: Two soldiers take advantage of tall western grass while on problem with automatic rifle. Center: Lone rifleman nestles between bridge siding and bank while he aims his automatic rifle. Bottom: A machine gun nest.

Below: Regimental message center in action in the field.

Right top: Wire party sets out to lay a battery communications system.

Right bottom: Repairing range finder
The Engineers Erect a Bridge

Interior and Exterior of Mobile Machine Shop

A Bulldozer Knocks Down a Tree

Truck Repair
Mechanic Adjusts Tappets

Finding Range With B. C. Scope

Below: Change Uniform and This Could Be in the Bambam Hills
Bottom: Accurate delivery of initial burst of fire
A Sergeant Lifts a Wounded Soldier in a Litter Drill

Troops Marching Toward Mountains in Background
Digging in Number 2 Loads

Action!
Trucking Meat and Potatoes

Signal Company tackles problem of wire laying.

Precision Work

Personnel Unit at Headquarters
Mortar and Crew in Firing Position

Riflemen Charge With Fixed Bayonets

A Soldier Dresses the Head of a Casualty

Patrol Advances Under Cover

Map Reading With Anti-Tank Company
Fixing Tag to Wounded

Taking Wounded Soldier Out of Ambulance

Crew Lays Mortar

Bayonet Drill
Swabbing the Bore

Loading the Piece

A Patrol Builds up a Firing Line

Squad Column Advancing
Defense and Special Training

Southern California
Fort Lewis
The Hawaiian Islands
Guadalcanal
New Britain

December 7, 1941—December 9, 1944
FIRST FIELD ORDER

FO No. 1

Hq San Pedro Sub Section
8 Dec 41 4:45P

MAPS: Road Map State of Calif.—Los Angeles and Vic. San Luis Obispo Calif

1. A state of war exists between the United States and Japan.
   a. The provisions of Rainbow 5 are put into effect.

2. SAN PEDRO SUB SECTOR: Troops of the San Pedro Sub Sector will organize and defend the area indicated by "defensive-offensive" action. They will defeat and destroy any invading force before it lands or while attempting to gain a foothold either by boats or airplanes. Occupation of position on order from Section Headquarters, (opn map)

3. a. 185 Inf (less 1st Bn and 3rd Bn) attached, Co. C 115th Eng. Organize and defend area (opn map). Beach to be defended by beach guard detachments and connecting motor patrols not to exceed one battalion. Observation to be provided for all portions of beach, minimum once hourly. Reserve (opn map) committed on Sub Sector orders only.

   b. 1st Bn 185th Inf (attached Btry A 145 FA and Det 115th Engrs) prepared to provide local protection for Harbor defenses of San Pedro.

   e. 115th Engineers (less Cos A B C and Det with 1st Bn 185 Inf) prepared to place guarded demolitions on existing wharves, critical railroad and road bridges. Prepare tank obstructions on defiles in area. Prepare underwater Obstacles at critical beaches indicated (opn map). Assist Infantry and Artillery in organization of the ground to defend critical beaches.

   d. 1st Bn 145th FA (less Btry A) from a position of readiness, prepare to support units of subsector. Priority of beaches on which artillery will be prepared to fire (see par. X)

   e. Reserves: 3rd Bn 185th Inf. (opn map). Committed on Sub Sector Command only. Motors attached for movement of entire battalion. Plans: Prepared to counter any force that effects a landing either by boat, parachute or airplane. Priority of preparation to follow priority of Par. X.

   f. Headquarters and Headquarters Btry 65th FA Brig to be attached to 40th Inf. Div. Hq.

X,1. All units, forces and installations are responsible for own interior guard and anti-sabotage defense and local defense against low flying aircraft and parachute troops.

2. Use of toxic agents is prohibited. Smoke and non-toxic agents may be used.

3. Priority of areas to be defended:
   a. Los Angeles and vicinity
   b. El Segundo
   c. Beaches
      1. Long Beach to New Port Bay
      2. Santa Monica to Malaga Cove
      3. Ventura to Mugu Lagoon
      4. Dume Cove
      5. Santa Barbara

4. Within each of the areas indicated, defense priorities are:
   a. Vital industrial plants when damage to or cessation of work threat would seriously interfere with national defense.
b. Oil storage and loading facilities for the fleet.
c. Permanent fortifications and naval establishments.
d. Important airdromes and other military establishments.
e. Other important commercial and transportation centers and public utilities.

5. Liaison officers to be exchanged as follows.
   Monterey Sub Sector
   San Diego Sub Sector
   Southern California Sector
   Commander San Pedro Sector, 11th Naval District

6. March Plan Annex No. 1
4. Administrative Instruction Annex No. 2
5. Signal Instructions Annex No. 3
   Command Post San Pedro Sub Sector, Exposition Park  Open 2:30 P.M. 9 Dec. 41.
   Remaining units (opn map)

By command of Major General DAWLEY
   M. C. BRADLEY,
   Lt. Col. G. S. C.
   Actg. Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

EUGENE W. RIDEOUT,
Major, 184th Inf.
Actg. Asst. AC of S G-3

ANNEXES:
   No. 1 March Plan, accompanied by Overlay No. 1 and No. 2
   No. 2 Administrative Instructions
   No. 3 Signal Instructions.

DISTRIBUTION:
   1st Bn 185th Inf. 1
   185th Inf 1
   1st Bn 145th FA 1
   115th Eng. 1
   1st Bn 143 FA 1
   Spec Trps 40 1
   Hq 56th Brig FA 1
   115th Med 1
   115th Q. M. 1
   Hq III AC 1
   File 2
President Roosevelt signs Declaration of War on Japan, December 8, 1941
HISTORY OF THE 40TH DIVISION

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

The shock of Pearl Harbor was translated into instant action for the troops at San Luis Obispo. Plans for disposition in defense of coastline and for security of vital installations (bridges, tunnels, airfields, dams, etc.) in the southwest had already been made. Movement in accordance with these plans was carried out at a whirlwind pace. Trains, busses and the organic transportation of the Division; all were pressed into service. Speed was of the essence—and speed was made! Truck and bus drivers handled their vehicles for hours beyond normal limits of human endurance. State and city police provided escorts for the long convoy. Within forty eight hours the 40th Division was spread out over an area of 350,000 square miles—and Camp San Luis Obispo was a silent, empty shell!

In the distribution of troops some overlapping occurred, but generally the 160th Infantry was in the extreme southwest, the 184th Infantry in the center and south, and the 185th Infantry along the coast. The 159th Infantry had already been separated from the Division, and the 108th Infantry was not to join until after arrival in the Hawaiian Islands. The Artillery, Engineers, and Special Troops were disposed in localities of vital importance where distances were too great, or the numbers of troops needed for guard duty too extensive, for the Infantry to handle. Much of the responsibility for coastal defense also devolved upon the Artillery:—with gun positions in some cases actually on the beaches! Division Headquarters was located in the office spaces of the Los Angeles Olympic Swimming Stadium at Exposition Park. The early Station List, prepared in March of 1942, indicates the extraordinary dispersal.

Hq. San Pedro Sub Sector (40th Div.) Exposition Park, Los Angeles.
40th Cav. Recon. Troop La Mesa
115th Engrs Bn (less A, B & C) Hollywood Track, Inglewood.
Cos A & C 115th Engrs, Camp Cooke
Co B 115th Engrs, National City
40th Div. Arty, Hq & Hq Btry Exposition Park, Los Angeles.
143rd F. A. Bn (less A, B & C) Santa Barbara
Btry A, 143rd F. A. Elwood and Capitán
Btry B, 143rd F. A. Summerland and Carpinteria
Btry C, 143rd F. A. Gardena
164th F. A. Bn (less A, B & C) Gardena
Btry A, 164th F. A. El Segundo
Btry B, 164th F. A. Ft. MacArthur
Btry C, 164th F. A. Aliso and Dana Point
22nd F. A. Bn (less A) Escondido
Btry A, 22nd F. A. Carlsbad
40th M. P. Co. Exposition Park, Los Angeles
160th Infantry, Hq & Spec. Units Houghton Pk. Long Beach.
1st Bn, 160th Inf. Mun. Airport, Long Beach
2nd Bn, 160th Inf. Banning Park, Wilmington
3rd Bn, 160th Inf. Recreation Park, Long Beach
184th Infantry, Hq. and 3rd Bn. Del Mar
1st Bn, 184th Inf. (less A) La Mesa
Co A, 184th Inf. San Clemente Island
2nd Bn. 184th Inf. Lindberg Field, San Diego
185th Inf., Hq., Spec. Units, & 1st Bn (less A) Centinela Park, Inglewood.
Co. A, 185th Inf. Catalina Island
2nd Bn. 185th Inf. Recreation Park, Santa Monica
3rd Bn. 185th Inf. Ventura
115th Q. M. Van Nuys
40th Division Finance Van Nuys
40th Division Signal Co. Exposition Park, Los Angeles
640th Tank Destroyer Bn. Griffith Park, Los Angeles

From these indicated Command Posts troops were flung out to such distances in many cases as to make even contact difficult; to say nothing of coordination, and maintenance of records, (elements of the 160th Infantry were for a time in the vicinity of Yuma, Arizona, and Salt Lake City, Utah.) Every unit was stretched to desperate thinness. Any attack by an appreciable force of the enemy would have effected an initial penetration. But security was provided; warning of such action was instantly available; the stand which would have been made by our forces must have caused a definite commitment by the invader, and given time for the arrival of support from 4th Army and other units. Of equal, or even greater importance, adequate
On guard at Fort MacArthur the night after war broke out

Strange things happened in those hectic days—some heroic, some comic, some tragic. One Heavy Weapons Company found itself responsible for the defense of Fort MacArthur, and actually manned thirty-four emplaced machine guns for twenty-four hours per day until the terrible possibility of our own fourteen inch guns being turned onto the city of Los Angeles was over. Officers, cooks, drivers—every individual in that company took shifts on those guns, in addition to other duties. One Rifle Company undertook, with strong points and motorized patrols, to secure 150 miles of coastline! Many good citizens were rudely shocked by the abrupt termination of their privilege to drive automobiles as, when, and where they pleased. Certain cows suddenly became beef upon failure to answer the "challenge during the hours of darkness"! Two ladies had an opportunity to observe, no doubt with marked interest, the effect of a shell fragment passing through the bed in which they had been sleeping prior to being aroused by the racket of AA guns firing on supposed enemy planes one night (this, by the way, involved the much debated occasion concerning which Secretary of the Navy Knox made the famous statement to the effect that the whole incident was a false alarm due to "jittery nerves", while Secretary of War Stimson indicated that at least fifteen enemy planes were over the area at the time the firing was going on).

It was a time of "alarms and excursions". Newspaper headlines such as—

"Enemy Planes Sighted Over California Coast"
"Probability Enemy Carrier Lurking Off Coast"
"Subs Raid California Ships"
"Belief Held Japanese May Have Sub Base On Peninsula"
"Jap Spy Suspect Seized"

This and several others like it would have been in the hands of the Japs in the event of capture of Fort MacArthur.
Patrol Ready for Action Against Low Flying Planes

One of the roving patrols which covered so many miles along the coast.

Reception Committee Actually on the Beach

Defenders Defiled in Sand Dunes

Even the old French 75's were put into action in beach defenses.

The S. S. Absaroka, torpedoed within rifle shot of the shore. Only load of lumber kept her from sinking.
Sabotage foiled on vital installations like bridge in background

Civilian authorities cooperated to fullest extent

Shipyard guard with armored car for roving patrols in entire area.

A few casualties occurred, though not from enemy action

Risky work. Demolition squad going after dud resulting from anti-aircraft bombardment February 25th.

The Red Cross girls helped a lot with their coffee on the long cold nights.
Troops moved out in a hurry at every alert

"Japanese On Coast Send Vital Data To Tokyo"
"Japs May Attempt Landing" — and many others of similar portent, together with current radio broadcasts, caused public anxiety to run high. Pride mingled with grief over the reports of the heroic struggles, against impossible odds, of our forces on Wake Island and at Bataan. The news of the loss of friends and former comrades, or friendly “enemies” in previous Pacific Coast maneuvers, could not fail to add to the pain and the fury with which the soldiers of the Division waited for the expected attack. Quislings and potential saboteurs from among nationals of all Axis countries (and a few of our own!) were being taken into custody. Hundreds of Japanese were under surveillance. The Governor of California issued a proclamation setting forth a state of emergency—"With 1000 miles of coast line along the Pacific, the geographical position of California places it in the first line of defense against invasion, and this State may at any time become a theater of war." And on February 24th, 1942 the Japs made the first actual attack on the soil of the United States; apparently anxious to injure American oil production, an enemy submarine shelled the oil fields in the vicinity of Santa Barbara!

Even after the first rush was over, and duties were clearly outlined, the Division took no chances of being caught off guard. A 24 hour alert was in force seven days a week against any emergency. Full strength was maintained on all posts and in all details during day-light hours, and skeleton crews in each of the various stations of the defense were on duty during the night. All men were required to be able to report to proper post within thirty minutes in the event of an alarm. It was a matter of very real satisfaction to the command that, in spite of the general concern over the situation, measures taken by this Division were appreciated to the extent indicated by the following commendation in the “Los Angeles Times”:—"All is calm in California, but beneath that calmness there is the sane, methodical way of doing the things that must be done in an area designated by the Army as a theater of operations. Californians have been made mildly aware of defense preparations by troop movements in their midst. The thoroughness with which defensive action was carried out was accompanied by a minimum of confusion or excitement, and must be an uncomfortable display of efficiency for those reporting to the enemy."

The mood of sardonic humor, combined with a grim appreciation of reality, which prevailed throughout this period was illustrated in the column of a well-known newspaper man who worked up a brief skit on Hirohito’s familiar act of reporting to his ancestors:—"Jap Emperor
Artillery observer personnel ready to give instant data for the laying of guns where they would do the most good.

No far behind the coast line, mortars like this one were constantly ready to drop their fires on enemy landing attempts.

One of the first positions ever set up with the artillery's new pride and joy, the 105 Howitzer.

Not much company for this soldier, but he was ready to cover a lot of ground if the Japs tried to move in.

The little 37's were expected to fill in gaps which the larger weapons could not reach.

A strong patrol, well dispersed and ready for action behind the beaches.
has just told his ancestors that there is a war—he must have figured maybe it is too hot to read the newspapers where they are! Emperor says, 'Hon. Mr. Bones, this are Hirohito, with blood on my hands. It are innocent blood, Hon. Ancestor, in best Japanese tradition—we sneak up on enemy in dark while he think we are at peace with him, and we kill him in cold blood before he know there is a war—it amuses us very much, Hon. Ancestor. We lie, and bow, and scrape like decent human beings in Washington—they believe we in earnest. We carry on Samurai tradition, Hon. Mr. Bones, only now instead of dripping sword we use sneaking planes to murder women and children thousands of miles away—it are much more efficient than sword. Hon. Adolph promise us half the world—what you think, Hon. Ancestor, are he on level? Sometimes we believe he almost as big a liar as we are—that are saying hon. mouthful. Save me a spot, Mr. Bones—those Americans don't seem to know when they are licked—maybe I'll be seeing you soon'.

A novel form of school was undertaken in January of 1942; novel in the experience of the Division. At the instance of General Dawley, and accompanied by his constant interest, the 40th Division Officers School was developed in an old C. C. C. camp in Griffith Park, Los Angeles. It was promptly dubbed "Dawley Tech":—and thus it will remain in the affectionate remembrance of all who were there. Under the direction of Lt. Col. Daniel Hudelson this school operated for approximately six weeks as a refresher and "speeder-upper" course for the large group of officers inducted into the Division immediately after the commencement of the war. The fire and drive which characterized Col. Hudelson were instantly injected into every phase of the school's activities. Basic training was the order of business, and time was of the essence! In a word:—Benning in six weeks, with Spartan quarters and mess! Seldom has any collection of young men learned so much, so hard, so fast! Yet at "commencement" the concensus of opinion (even among those who found the going roughest) seemed to be that while life in general was no bed of roses around that place, it was still a mighty fine institution of which to have been an "inmate". EDITOR'S NOTE:—Most of the faculty studied most of every night in order to stay out in front of the students!

Early in February the evacuation of alien Japanese from the Pacific Coast commenced with the movement from Terminal Island, Los Angeles Harbor. An important Navy base, this spot had long been the location of a large Japanese fishing colony. Such a combination was obviously impossible. And throughout the Western Defense Command the movement of Japanese to internment camps was under way. Among the first of such camps were those at Arvin and Delano. On 21 February the President gave approval to proposed action on the evacuation of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship, from the Pacific Coast. Several States, following the leadership of Colorado, had offered to care for them. Under the direction of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding the Western Defense Command, this operation was vigorously, yet humanely, carried out. As the majority of the displaced people realized, with conditions as they were, the course pursued by the Army was actually for the best interest of all concerned. Much of the responsibility for the movement of these thousands, and for the guarding of their effects, devolved upon the 40th Division. Such responsibility was carefully and thoroughly discharged, and no untoward incident occurred.

Near the end of February the 40th Division Replacement Training Center was put into operation at Camp Haan, California. Organized as a provisional regiment, the center was under command of Lt. Col. William B. Zeller. Since several officers assigned to duty there, including Col. Zeller, had been on the faculty at the 40th Division Officers School, and nearly all the provisional company officers had been students there, it was at once clear that the same urgency and intensity in training would be in effect. Of the thousands of men reporting to Camp Haan for training as members of the 40th Division, the overwhelming majority had but the vaguest of ideas as to what soldiering meant (nor were they, initially, particularly frantic to acquire such knowledge). But they were Americans, they knew their country's need, and they

Facilities for policing up the person were a trifle primitive in some posts.
Top: Camp Haan. The first time a great many of these men had ever seen a tank in action. Bottom: Demonstrations like this gave men an idea of what they could depend on in the allied arms.
LEARNED. Soon the evidence of their knowledge and appreciation of discipline and teamwork was clear, and the ferocity with which many applied themselves to individual basic training was remarkable. Ceremonies, competitive exercises (including a night compass march which had everybody punch drunk), and elaborate demonstrations which included allied arms were all used to the maximum to develop spirit and morale. Through the kindness of certain ladies in the neighboring city of Riverside guidons were made (handmade) for a number of companies. These were presented only after the units concerned had each demonstrated fitness to function as a company. Thereafter those guidons were proudly borne (some were cherished for years by individuals concerned, and turned up in places like New Britain and Luzon). While no claim could be made that the six weeks at Camp Haan turned out finished soldiers, it is none the less true that the men who had been at the Division Training Center went on to their assignments in regiments and battalions physically fit, mentally alert, and well ready to continue with more advanced training. The Center amply justified its formation, and the effort so lavishly expended by its instructor personnel.

On 18 February the Division became a “triangular” infantry division instead of “square”, and the brigades were dissolved. From this triangularization the following units were evolved to make up the new complement:

- Headquarters, 40th Infantry Division
- Headquarters and M. P Company, 40th Infantry Division (Hq Co. 40th MP).
- 40th Signal Company
- 40th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Hq Co. 80th Inf. Brigade).
- 160th Infantry
- 184th Infantry
- 185th Infantry
- Hq and Hq Battery, 40th Div. Arty. (Hq, 65th F. A. Brigade).
- 143rd F. A. Bn. (105mm Howitzers) 1st Battalion
- 143rd F. A. Regiment).
- 164th F. A. Bn. (105mm Howitzers) (2nd Battalion
- 143rd F. A. Regiment).
- 213th F. A. Bn. (105mm Howitzers) (1st Bn. 145th
- F. A. Regiment).
- 222nd F. A. Bn. (155mm Howitzers) (1st Bn. 222nd
- F. A. Regiment).
- 115th Med. Bn. (Hq, Hq & Sv Co, Cos A, B, E, H
- 115th Med Regiment).
- 115th Q. M. Bn. (Hq, Hq Co, Cos A, B, E 115th Q. M.
- Regiment).

At this time the 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion was also activated from units of the Division, principally Battery G and H of the 222nd Field Artillery Regiment. The Tank Destroyer Battalion remained attached until March 1945, on Luzon. And, on 16 February, Brigadier General Harcourt Hervey became the Division Artillery Commander, and Brigadier General Richard E. Mittelstaedt was assigned to duty as the Assistant Division Commander.

On approximately 12 April Major General Dawley was ordered to command of VI Corps. He was replaced by Brig. Gen. Rapp Brush, who was destined to guide the 40th through its trying periods of combat. Upon his departure General Dawley made the following statement:

“At this time when I am relinquishing command of this fine Division, I wish all to know of my appreciation of their efforts and their attainments.

“The nine months I have been in command have been the most pleasurable and profitable of my career.

“The Division is engaged on one of the most arduous, difficult and important tasks that can be given any such unit in the continental United States. It has met every requirement. It has kept the soldiers’ faith.”

Very shortly thereafter (22 April), assembly and movement to Fort Lewis were ordered. The early months of the war had proved a period of strain, of frayed tempers, of unavoidable confusion, and of tremendous effort. But the broad picture of the Division’s first war duty was good; the job which had to be done was done well; the record of justified confidence in this command was established, never to be shaken.

FORT LEWIS

Under the aggressive leadership of our new Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Rapp Brush, an intensive program of re-organization, experiment, and training was undertaken immediately. And the training was rigorous and exacting. Added to the need for perfection in those basic functions with which we had long been familiar, there were now a great variety of new weapons, new equipment, and new phases of soldiering for all arms, in anticipation of action in the Pacific. Obstacle courses, night operations, forced marches, and close-supporting fires were stressed. Team play, the necessity for concerted unit action, became almost a phobia. Squad leaders and Section leaders came to an almost uncanny knowledge of
the complete functioning of every member of their combat organizations—and to instant and drastic action on "behalf" of any unfortunate soul who might be laggard. The personal supervision devoted to training by General Brush was extraordinary. And numerous specialists who felt that they could get by with spurious generalities in answer to questions from the "Old Man" were rudely shocked by the discovery that he knew more than they were supposed to!

In the latter part of April Col. Donald J. Myers became Chief of Staff. This officer, who served with the Division for only a short period at that time, was nevertheless remembered by a great number of the personnel of the 40th, and warmly welcomed back when he returned to us in Panay, P. I. as the Commanding General in July of 1945.

During May, June and July there was a progressive increase in the development of advance training problems, culminating in the GHQ tests. The Division Artillery units travelled to the Field Artillery Firing Center at Yakima, Washington, during the month of June for their tests, and returned to support the Infantry Regiments in the RCT tests in the first two weeks of July. Incidentally, it was in this period that knowledge and practiee in the plan and operation of the "Regimental Combat Team" became firmly planted in the troop mind. The expansion, flexibility, and efficiency of this combat organization, which were to come with the years before action on Luzon, were based on the studies of that summer at Fort Lewis. And closely associated in this development was the constant increase in the realization of joint responsibility and mutual dependence between Infantry and Artillery which was to pay such wonderful dividends in battle. RCT 160 was actually formed and prepared for departure on a special mission until a change in orders occurred.

In June the 184th Infantry was lost to the Division;
being transferred to the Western Defense Command for coast defense duties. It was later to become a part of the 7th Division, and to perform gallantly with that division for the duration of the war, and in the initial period of occupation in Korea.

In late June or early July the Division Commander received his second star. The gratification which he must have felt was equalled by the pride and pleasure of all ranks in this well-merited promotion. The confidence which is inspired by a leader in the members of his command is to a great extent the measure of his success. Certainly there would never be any question of that confidence in General Brush.

Throughout that summer one question was constantly in the mind of all personnel: “When do we get a chance at the Japs:—when do we go overseas?” Again and again the rumors of imminent departure would go surging through the camp, only to be dropped as nothing but another disappointment. But at long last the orders for movement to Port of Embarkation at Camp Stoneman came through on 25 July, and the first units sailed from there for the Hawaiian Islands on 8 August.

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The trip from the mainland to the Hawaiian Islands was uneventful, but there was nothing monotonous about it. Fire drills, gun drills, abandon ship drills, the police and inspection of quarters, speculation over the constant shifting of the ships’ courses, and the spreading of endless tall stories about how many Japanese submarines there were all around our convoys kept everyone well occupied. One ship in one of the convoys carried a large number of Army Nurses. There was, for some time, a good deal of lively discussion as to whether or not certain officers were swimming back and forth each night:—one gentleman in the 160th Infantry being especially under consideration.

By early October all units were in the Islands and the Division took over the defense of the outer islands from the 27th Division. On 1 September the 108th Infantry was attached to the 40th Division. This regiment, having served with distinction for many years with the 27th Division, now became the third major element of the fighting team which was to remain together for the balance of the war. Immediately upon arrival in the “Big Island” of Hawaii the 160th Infantry found itself attached to the 27th Division, but such attachment was short-lived. Various adjustments being completed, the 40th was disposed in Hawaiian defense as follows. Division Headquarters was at Kalaheo, Kauai, where it served as headquarters for Kauai District, General Brush in command. The 185th Infantry, 213th Field Artillery Battalion, 222nd Field Artillery Battalion, 115 Medical Battalion, 40th Quartermaster Company (replaced 115th Q. M. Bn.—Oct., 1942), 40th Signal Company, 740th Ordnance Company (replaced 115th Ordnance Platoon—Oct., 1942), 40th Military Police Platoon, and 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Co. C) were attached to the Kauai District. The 160th Infantry, 143 Field Artil-
lery Battalion, one company of 115th Engineers, and a detachment of 40th Signal Company were located on Hawaii, and came under the district command of General Gibson. The 108th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion), Battery C, 164th Field Artillery Battalion, 115th Engineer Battalion (less one Co.), 40th Reconnaissance Troop, and detachments from 40th Division Headquarters, 40th Division Artillery Headquarters Battery, 40th Signal Company, and 40th Military Police Platoon were assigned to duty on Maui, under the district command of General Mittelstaedt. The 2nd Battalion of the 108th Infantry, and the 164th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery C) were disposed on Molokai, and Lanai.

The Hawaiian Islands were in imminent danger of attack. The Japanese held springboard bases, from which to launch amphibious operations, in the Gilberts, in Mille Atoll in the Marshalls, and on Wake Island. The narrowness of the escape from disaster at Midway was painfully evident. If that disaster had only been averted through the vigor and alertness of the Navy, and at such dreadful cost, was it not logical to assume that the Japanese would mount another and greater attack, this time at the base which by now they must see should have been taken in the first place;—the Hawaiian Islands? With the shocking logic of such reasoning clear to everyone in the Islands, the defensive plans and operations were very real. "Blackout" was strictly enforced, marvels of camouflage were performed, censorship was rigid, patrols were in constant movement day and night, special assault teams to destroy beach-heads were continuously on the alert, and thousands of weary hours were spent in replacement of and addition to shoreline defensive wire, gun positions, strong points, trails, etc. Troops learned to exist in small, isolated, independent units for weeks at a time; in some cases with communication and supply established only through the action of patrols. "Stand-to" before dawn was a daily requirement for all military personnel.

Training, both basic and in furtherance of defensive plans, was continuous. A large amount of practical firing was conducted by both Infantry and Artillery, and numerous ranges were developed. Practise marches under conditions of extreme hardship were carried out; elements of the 160th Infantry going through some sessions on the Puna Trail in Hawaii which will never be forgotten. In the later stages of training an officer from the Division was assigned to the duty of supervising the work of a detachment of Signal Corps photographers, and of discovering areas most suitable for the preparation of a film of jungle training. Ironically enough, one of the areas selected by this officer, and included in the film, was used to a great extent at a considerably later period by a division of Marines.

An additional responsibility in the matter of training was imposed upon troops of this Division very shortly after arrival in the Islands. Civilian Defense Corps had passed away a good many hours.
been organized in a number of the islands. These groups were formed on the Army basic structure, and the pattern of their training, in so far as possible, was identical with that of the Army. Supervision of such training was naturally included in defense requirements of the 40th. And while many officers and detachments of selected enlisted men devoted long hours to such training, it was a labor which was amply repaid. Largely manned by Filipino plantation personnel and officered by responsible citizens of the Hawaiian Islands, such organizations as the “Hawaii Rifles”, showed an aptitude for training, and an eagerness to come to grips with the Japanese (nearly all had relatives in the Philippines), which would have proved them a valuable support to the military forces in the event of invasion.

Our stay in the “Paradise of the Pacific” was not without a pleasant side. As the defense became more secure, and the imminence of the threat of invasion more remote, time became available for social contact with the residents of the various islands. From the first, these people had done everything in their power to show their welcome of the Army forces, and to cooperate to the fullest extent. Their kindness and hospitality proved, throughout our stay, to be completely in accord with the tradition concerning the warm-hearted character of those who live in the Hawaiian Islands.

In July of 1943 the Division was concentrated on the island of Oahu, relieving the 24th Division of the island defenses in the North Sector. Since this island contained the great Army and Navy bases, Hickam, Pearl Harbor, etc., as well as Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department and the Central Pacific Command, defensive measures were still very complete. Added to the importance of the commands in Oahu was concern over alerts from enemy air and submarine activity in the vicinity. Teams from Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department were constantly inspecting the entire perimeter of the island, and troubles came “in bunches” to the local commander whose unit was slow or inefficient in carrying out the proper action on the occasion of a simulated “attack” at any point. Oahu, though not distinguished by the bar¬baric beauty of volcanic terrain which characterized Hawaii and Kauai, yet had one feature which was close to the consciousness of every soldier in the islands. Travel

Left, top: Plenty of studying was done on the way out from the mainland. Top, center: Camouflaged pillbox and defensive wire. It would have been rough going for enemy troops landing in this vicinity. Bottom, center: A good illustration of the enormous “double apron” fence which made a practical perimeter out of every island in the Hawaiian group. Bottom: A thoroughly camouflaged command post.

Like the old French 75's back in California, the British 75's were in action on Hawaii.
This 105 is ready for business in a well camouflaged firing bay in the Hawaiian Islands.

Lava like this was hard on shoes and tires.

The situation was so tense that extra guns like these were manned by infantrymen in addition to other duties.
Top: Kauai volunteers ready to move out in a hurry to any threatened point in the islands.

Above: Presentation of awards at division review, Schofield Barracks, December 1943.

Top: Lt. General Richardson, commanding central Pacific area and Major General Brush confer at Schofield Barracks.

Above: Pineapple fields of the Hawaiian Islands.

Hard at it. Crews like this one installed thousands of miles of protective wire along the beaches.

It wasn't all hard work in the Hawaiian Islands.

Aerial view of division review at Schofield Barracks, December 1943.
Top: Part of the 'combat in cities' course at Kuhuku, Oahu
Above: Beautiful Camouflage

Right, top: The "full dress" landing at Waumanelo
Center: One of the milder forms of mayhem at the Schofield Barracks Ranger School.
Bottom: All weapons and all kinds of positions were in the defense of the islands.

Well camouflaged beach machine gun pill box. These were installed and manned all over the islands.
Another big one ready to work on the invader. Troops of the 40th will long remember the thorns on Kiavi trees in the background.

here was almost invariably through the rolling carpets of silver-gray pineapple fields, and many a soldier from the outer islands came to a sudden realization of the aptness of the nickname belonging to the Hawaiian Department, the “Pineapple Army”.

In October the 6th Division took over the North Sector defenses, and the 40th entered upon a period of intensive amphibious and jungle training. All units of the Division went through elementary and advance amphibious training at Wainae and Waimanelo respectively, and most of the Division took jungle training at the Unit Jungle Training Center at Kahana, which was originally set up and operated by a specially selected cadre of our own personnel. In passing, it should be observed that the vicinity of Waimanelo is referred to as “Windward Oahu”. Troops participating in amphibious practice operations there were very soon in a position to testify to the sound basis for such nomenclature; several thousand of them getting a taste of what small craft operation in rough water meant which was as shocking as it was soaking!

The “Hawaii Rifles” Parade

The spectacle of a wild-haired Navy coxswain “shooting” breakers with an LCVP, as a Hawaiian would with a surf-board, will long be remembered! During October and November combat teams started a training cycle which involved actual amphibious landings and occupation of positions, using live ammunition, and simulating as nearly as possible actual combat conditions in the jungle. Each part of the training cycle involved a move; first to Hut City in Schofield Barracks; thence to Kahuku at the north of the island; finally to Pali Camp at the foot of the Pali Road on northeastern Oahu. The RCT formations at this time were substantially as for the balance of the war; RCT 108:—108th Infantry-164th Field Artillery Battalion, RCT 160:—160th Infantry—143rd Field Artillery Battalion, RCT 185:—185th Infantry—213th Field Artillery Battalion. One company of 115th Engineers and one company of 115th Medical Battalion were also assigned to each RCT. The beaches and jungles of Oahu proved to be ideal for this type of training, and many lessons were learned which better equipped the Division for events of the future.

In early December movement orders were received, and once again morale took a jump in the knowledge that we were to get one step closer to the Japs. Films showing the terrible cost of the capture of Tarawa, and lectures by officers who had seen action against the enemy in both the Gilberts and in Guadalcanal, had produced a sobering effect upon the Division, but in no way lessened the desire to add our part to paying off the heavy score run up by the “sons of Heaven”. On 20 December the first units sailed for Guadalcanal.

GUADALCANAL

By the middle of January, 1944 the movement from Oahu was complete, and the Division settled down to living and training in the mud and the heat of this famous (infamous!) island. At this time we became a part of the South Pacific Command, troops of which had already secured not only Guadalcanal, but also New Georgia, Rendova, and the Empress Augusta Bay perimeter on Bougainville. No 40th Division man has a good word to say for Guadalcanal. Within twenty-four hours of arrival it was agreed by all personnel that the most fitting punishment for the Japs would be to give the place back to them, and then make them stay there!

The area selected for the quartering of the Division left
something to be desired. It was soon discovered that the
terrific rains and the flooding of a small river in our midst
would make minor naval operations possible in any com­
pany or battery street on a moments notice. Unit com­
manders were disturbed by the discovery that the con­
tents of latrines were being washed about among the
tents of troops. Bridges were washed out almost as fast
as they could be installed. And on one occasion three 21:
ton trucks and a "cat" were observed to be involved in
the attempt to move one of the trucks through the only
road providing supply for two Infantry battalions. As
an added "attraction", the malaria which had taken so
great a toll among the troops who conquered the Japanese
on the island was still a considerable menace.
Thanks to the generous (and occasionally uncon­
scious!) help of the Sea Bees, the tremendous efforts of
the 115th Engineers, and the ingenuity of individual unit
commanders, living conditions were tolerable by the end
of February. With the amounts of sand, rock, gravel,
and coral which had been hauled in and distributed
throughout the entire area it seemed that the Division
had actually lifted itself above the water level! Training
during this initial period was necessarily sporadic. Cer­
tain patrols were carried out; particularly across the
mountains to the vicinity of Father LeClerq's mission
on the west side, and also around the northern end of
the island. The latter action rendered certain the com­
plete absence of any remaining Japs. Water discipline,
atabrine discipline, and the sad familiarity with a nu­
tritious but wholly unappetizing diet became the com­
monplaces which they were to remain for the duration
of the war. It was of note that the prompt and con­
tinuous action on all phases of malaria control was re­
warded by a remarkably low rate of hospitalization.
As new equipment arrived, and training in the form
of long jungle marches and continuous Artillery practice
firing were pushed, it became evident that the Division
was about to engage in its first combat. Finally the secret
was out; the 40th, as a part of the 1st Marine Amphibious
Corps, was to land on New Ireland, and take Kavieng,
site of one of the main Jap airfields in the South Pacific.

Top: One of the seven Jap troop carriers which stayed at
Guadalcanal. The U. S. Army Air Corps gave them a hearty
welcome. Top center: The normal state of affairs on Guadal­
canal. Bottom center: The chapel at the Guadalcanal Ceme­
tery. A voluntary labor group of the natives. Above: Troop
quarters on Guadalcanal during a rare dry moment.

Debarkation at Guadalcanal. Many a G. I. got sicker bouncing
around on this barge than he did on the trip down from Oahu.
Plans for this operation (known as the “FORE-ARM”), included a diversionary strike by the 160th Infantry at Lossuk Bay two days in advance of the main effort at the northwest end of the island.

Two practice landings were made from the ships which were to take the Division to New Ireland; these ships being completely combat-loaded. All was in readiness for the campaign when word was received that troops under General MacArthur’s command had taken Negros Island in the Admiralty group, with its fine airfield, nullifying the necessity for taking Kavieng. A glance at a map of the South Pacific will show that with the Admiralty Islands in American hands, the Japs on New Ireland were “cut off at the pockets.” Information obtained at a later date indicated that the “FORE-ARM” operation would have been very costly, and that the 160th Infantry would in all probability have found itself at Lossuk Bay in a situation similar to that horror encountered by the Marines at Tarawa. There seems no doubt that the brilliance of General MacArthur’s instantaneous development of initial success in what had started as no more than a raid at Negros Island proved indirectly to be the saving of a great many casualties in the 40th Division.

It was only natural that morale should take a nose dive at the announcement of this further disappointment in our hopes to “get at the Japs.” It was quite a shock to have everything called off actually on the eve of departure. And the removal of the carefully stowed combat loads in the ships assigned to the Division was a dismal business. But spirits were lifted in a few weeks when orders came to move to New Britain and relieve the 1st Marine Division at Cape Gloucester and the Army forces at Arawe. Advance elements left early in April, and on 24 April the Division convoy sailed for Borgen Bay, New Britain.

NEW BRITAIN

Following the relief of units which had been engaged with the Japanese on New Britain, the 40th Division be-
The last sight of Guadalcanal. One more Jap ship that will never sail again.

came the major element of the “BACKHANDER” task force, of which General Brush assumed command. Combat teams were placed across the “road to Rabaul” with RCT 185 located at Talasea on the northern side of the island, and RCT 108 at Arawe on the southern side. RCT 160 remained at Cape Gloucester near the western end of New Britain. Division Headquarters, all of Division Special Troops, and many of the attached units, including the 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were dispersed in the Cape Gloucester area.

Here on New Britain men of the 40th saw enemy troops for the first time when patrols of the 185th Infantry clashed on several occasions with isolated, retreating groups of Japanese soldiers trying to make their way back to Jap held territory on the Gazelle Peninsula. But the New Britain campaign was essentially static in nature. The principal mission of the “BACKHANDER” task force was to carry out the neutralization of enemy forces in all parts of the island other than the Gazelle Peninsula, and to contain the large Japanese body remaining in the vicinity of Rabaul. This was effected through constant patrol and reconnaissance activities rather than the usual function of the Infantry to find, attack, follow, and destroy the enemy. While the entire campaign brought forth no major battle, one very important operation was the taking of Hoskins air-strip, formerly held by the Japanese. This action was conducted by a small task force from the 2nd Battalion of the 185th Infantry on 7 May, 1944. There was no opposition to this landing, the Japs having previously withdrawn, but a number of casualties resulted from mines and booby traps which covered the field.

One of the main problems of RCT 185 was the matter of supply and evacuation. 150 miles of dense jungle separated this organization from the base of supply at Cape Gloucester. This distance had to be covered by planes.
A good example of native construction done for various military requirements. This one is a regimental command post.

Arawe Boulevard

This was one of the dust storms when the photographer was at least able to get a picture.
and boats, since there was nothing resembling a road between the two localities. Such roads as were vital in the Talasea-Hoskins area were constructed by elements of the 115th Engineers. Jungle conditions, rain, and mud made such construction and maintenance an enormous task, and much of the credit for the success of the operation by RCT 185 must go to the Engineers. LCM's brought in practically all the supplies, and emergency evacuations were handled by Navy PBY's and Army Air Corps L-5's. The Division Artillery's Cub planes took care of the necessary liaison for both the Talasea and Arawe forces, flying daily schedules when weather permitted.

On the Arawe side RCT 108 spent most of its time battling mud caused by incessant rains which blanketed the area. On one occasion the Commanding Officer of the 108th Infantry visited Division Headquarters at Cape Gloucester and arrived in the midst of a howling dust storm. He was so interested to discover that, according to his own statement, he was "not in mud up to his hips!" that he did not notice either the wind or the dust. But even the mud could not stop the 108th from carrying out the job assigned. Patrols were dispatched in the direction of Rabaul as far as Gasmata, and training activities were carried on at Arawe in defiance of the weather. Supply of this force was by means of small freighters and LCM's directly from Finschaven, the main base on New Guinea.

At Cape Gloucester the balance of the "BACKHANDER" force sweated out its eight months on New Britain with large ship unloading details, daily training schedules, and a diet in which fresh foods were conspicuous by their absence.

Our good friends the Aussies in New Britain

Note size of jeep on comparison with jungle trees in New Britain
Necessity was certainly the mother of invention on New Britain. And Heaven only knew the source for all the parts in this strictly G. I. washing machine.

absence. There was little relief from the heat and the monotony. Swimming and fishing in the ocean (the fishing being frequently by the hand-grenade method), athletic programs, and movies three nights a week provided about all the relaxation there was. A few U. S. O. shows managed to get through, and played before hugely enthusiastic audiences. The feature of life in the vicinity of Cape Gloucester which will probably remain most indelibly stamped in the memories of all who were there was the terrific wind and dust storms. For over two months these winds assumed hurricane proportions nearly every day. One man was killed and several injured by falling trees. Tents were torn to ribbons, and even parts of buildings were blown away. And the fine, volcanic dust penetrated everything—including eyes, ears, nose and mouth.

All things must come to an end; even a stretch like that on New Britain cannot last indefinitely (though quite a few men had begun to wonder if we were to spend the balance of the war there!). On 19 October RCT 185 was relieved by the Australian 1st Division, and in the first week of November RCT 108 was also moved into the Gloucester area. Throughout the month of November and the early part of December the Division stirred itself to tremendous activity. Practice amphibious landings were made from several different kinds of ships, Infantrymen and Artillerymen went through a number of test problems to check their efficiency individually and in units, new equipment was issued, and replacements arrived and were assigned. The assembling of the huge quantity of equipment and supplies required to insure success in a major assault landing was under way. It proved a challenge to the administrative agencies of the Division which will not be forgotten by any supply personnel. In this connection, it may be noted that the subsequent evacuation of the material left on New Britain will not be forgotten by any member of the Rear Eschelon—nor the life which its members led while doing the job! Despite all handicaps and snafus ships were once again combat loaded, men and equipment checked and found ready, and the Division sailed from Borgen Bay 9 December. The Sunburst Division (reinforced), with the 37th Infantry Division on its left, was to make an assault landing at Lingayen, Luzon, under command of Major General Oscar W. Griswold in the XIV Corps, as the opening of the M-1 operation to free the Philippine's largest island from the grip of the Japanese!
The Campaign in the Phillipines
LUZON

Campaign
Jan 9 - March 4, 1945
EN ROUTE

For strategic reasons the target date for the Luzon landings was delayed approximately twenty days. Taking advantage of the additional time available, a rehearsal of the landing was made at Lae, New Guinea, and difficulties ironed out, after which all ships returned to Manus.

Departing from Manus December 31st, the convoy, following a course through Surigao Straits, thence along the western shore of Panay and Mindoro, headed toward Luzon.

Uneventful for the first eight days, the daily routine of shipboard life was suddenly brought to a tense pitch when one Jap plane of a group of six broke through the convoy’s aerial defenses and crash-dived one of the escort carriers, causing damage which forced its withdrawal from the convoy.

LANDING AND SEIZURE OF BEACHHEAD

At 0936 on January 9, 1945, S-Day, the first assault wave hit the beach at Lingayen in what turned out to be an unopposed landing. The Japs had destroyed all supplies and equipment they could not carry and cleared out of the area three days before when the first naval bombardment struck them.

The landing was made with the 160th RCT on the left and the 185th RCT on the right, with the 108th in Division and Corps Reserve.

Most of the S-Day objectives had been secured before any opposition was met, the first resulting in seven Japs killed and one Formosan and three Chinese laborers captured.

The next morning found the drive down the Luzon Plain toward Manila underway with only slight opposition from rear guard troops. All operations of this and succeeding days were hampered by the lack of suitable crossings of the rivers and many small streams that flow across the Plain. The 115th Engineer Battalion constructed pontoon bridges, built many small bridges, and made numerous fills, approaches and bypasses as rapidly as the assault troops moved inland.

The 108th RCT was released from Corps Reserve on the tenth and later moved into position at the front on the right of the 160th.

While the 160th and 108th RCT’s were advancing through Bugallon and Aguilar, the 185th RCT and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop were cleaning out and securing Port Sual and Alaminos to the northwest. Elements of the 185th pushed southward on the west coast and reached Santa Cruz on January 23rd. RCT 185 continued patrolling on the peninsula as well as along the eastern foothills of the Zambales Mountains as far south as Camiling to protect against any possible enemy threat from that flank.

Mangatarem, Camiling, and Santa Ignacia were entered and passed before our leading elements entered the burning city of Tarlac, provincial capital of Tarlac Province on the 21st. The Japs did not leave many buildings standing in this city.

After San Miguel and Capas were occupied enemy contacts became more numerous, and engineer and infantry perimeters received small attacks during the night. The 40th Reconnaissance Troop had a skirmish south of Bambam and the 640th Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance Company had a stiff engagement at Magalong.
The completely burned town of Bambam was entered on the 23rd by elements of the 160th Infantry who received sniper fire and 120-mm fire from Fort Stotsenburg.

The Bambam Airfield was secured by the 1st Battalion of the 160th Infantry, and Division Artillery Cub planes were operating from it in a few hours.

In sixteen days, against rear-guard delaying forces, the Division had advanced seventy miles down the highway to Manila to the crossing of the Bamban River. South of the river and west of the highway the large flat plain of Clark Field extends westward several thousand yards to Fort Stotsenburg. North of the river and west of the main highway a series of east-west ridges emanating from the Zambales end abruptly in sharp cliffs overlooking the town of Bamban and the highway. Near the base of these cliffs a series of huge supply tunnels dug deep into the rocky sides and connected by a vehicular road faced to the east. In these jagged Bamban Hills—some barren, some matted with jungle thicket, and all bristling with fortified tunnels or caves—the enemy was found and fixed on ground of his own choosing. Accordingly, the direction of attack was changed to the west, with the mission of capturing and securing Clark Field and rendering the routes to Manila free from enemy infiltration and harassing artillery fire.

It was the eve of the bitter battle of the Zambales Mountains.

FORT STOTSENBURG AND THE BAMBAM HILLS

Guerrilla and civilian estimates of enemy strength in the Bamban-Stotsenburg area varied considerably, and insufficient enemy order of battle information precluded arrival at any conclusive figure. However, at the beginning of the operation, it was estimated that approximately 3000 Japs occupied positions in the Zambales foothills to an undetermined depth along a front approximately 6000 yards long.

On January 24th, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 160th Infantry began the assault.

Under fire from enemy positions on the dominating terrain, the battalions attacked up the steep slopes of separate ridges later named Stratta Hill and Stout Hill after the respective battalion commanders. On the sheer cliff sides of the rocky hills facing Bamban from the west, Japs had entrenched themselves in cleverly designed caves and tunnels. A pattern that was many times thereafter repeated in the inhospitable terrain of these mountains was established in the first days of our assault upon this, the Japanese first line of defense—a line which, despite all previous air and artillery bombardment, required for final destruction the use of all weapons including direct fire from tanks, self-propelled guns, flame throwers, hand grenades and demolitions.

As our infantry advanced, enemy machine guns deep
in the cave recesses opened fire. Lumbering M-7's and M-10's were brought into position on the undulating slopes at the foot of the hills and faced toward the cliffs. With deadly accuracy the caves were blasted until sealed or silenced. Our artillery concentrations, setting fire to the hillsides, disclosed individual rifle and machine gun pits when the camouflage was burned away. Six-inch naval guns similarly emplaced were neutralized in the same manner. As infantry advanced, small arms fire and hand grenades were used to clean out the positions, and flamethrower teams destroyed possible survivors in the larger caves.

Also on January 24th the 3rd Battalion, 185th Infantry, was moved to Santo Domingo near Capas in Division reserve. Later, the entire regiment, having completed operations in the Northern Zambales, was moved into the Bamban area. In view of possible employment on the enemy's rear, the battalion initiated reconnaissance of routes leading southeast from O'Donnell. Trails were found to be poorly developed and unsuitable for supply and evacuation needs.

During the 25th, the 108th Infantry, turning west at Susuba and Canupo, began its move into the hills on the right of the 160th. Troops moving up the high ground west of Hill 5, 5500 yards northwest of Bamban, received intense machine gun and rifle fire in the beginning of a vicious four-day fight to take this and Thrall Hill, 1000 yards to the south, named in tribute to Major Norman E. Thrall, battalion commander, who was killed during the action.

From the bushy crevices and reverse slopes of the hills the enemy delivered short range fire against our infantry clinging to the barren precipitous slopes. So close were the opposing forces that in some instances hand grenades were traded by tossing them over the pointed crests of hills. Heavy mortar concentrations from unknown positions were laid on our perimeters during the night.

Concurrent with the above operations, mechanized reconnaissance continued to the south and east in the direction of Mount Arayat and into the outskirts of Angeles, which was found lightly held.

On the 26th the reconnaissance company of the 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, with one platoon of tanks and one platoon of M-10 tank destroyers, attached, conducted a reconnaissance in force of Clark Field. Heavy enemy fire disclosed the location of his well concealed artillery positions, enabling our artillery to execute effective counter-battery fire. Several pillboxes and machine gun positions were destroyed. The reconnaissance confirmed the presence of minefields, and determined the type and strength of the enemy defenses in that area.

By the close of the 26th, both regiments were in position to begin the final assaults. On the 27th, the 160th

This was the kind of terrain which made the going so rough for men of the 40th.
reached the crest of Stratta Hill in the face of artillery, mortar and small arms fire.

The following day, the 108th Infantry secured Hill 5 after overcoming three days of desperate enemy resistance from positions on Thrall Hill, 1000 yards south. After another day’s reduction of caves and gun positions there, our troops gained possession.

During the struggle for Hill 5 and Thrall Hill, the Japanese Kamii Butai had been destroyed as an effective unit and its remnants driven into the mountains. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Mobile Infantry Regiment, major element of the butai, had been destroyed completely and its threat and mission buried in the numerous caves and tunnels in and about the hills.

With the annihilation of this battalion began the slow swinging back of the enemy’s left flank to an eventual dissolution in the suicidal defenses of Hills 1500 and 1700, 12,000 yards southwest.

Meanwhile, the 129th Infantry from the 37th Division, then attached to the 40th Division, had overrun Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg and were on the way up the slopes of Top of the World in the face of heavy artillery, mortar, machine gun and rifle fire.

Mute testimony to the effectiveness of the airforce’s all-out effort to neutralize enemy air bases prior to the landing on Luzon were the hundreds of destroyed enemy aircraft which littered the Clark Field area.

On February 1st the division was directed to establish a small garrison at Guagua, 20 miles to the south, reconnoiter the Guagua-Dinalupihan road, and establish contact with the XI Corps, which had landed at Mariveles on the west coast and was then moving across the neck of Bataan Peninsula.

Elements of the 185th and one platoon of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop were ordered to Guagua, and patrolling of the area commenced without delay. Contact with elements of the XI Corps was made on February 5th at Dinalupihan.
On January 28th, from Hill 620, halfway up the long, razor-back Murray Ridge leading from Stratta Hill to Storm King Mountain, the 160th Infantry began its battle for that well defended ground.

The first of the repeatedly futile banzai counterattacks launched against our troops during the course of the Bamban-Stotsenburg campaign, in which the Japs, after their piecemeal fashion, dissipated their forces to the point of exhaustion, came in the late afternoon of the 29th. Elements of the Okamota Butai, seeking to thwart the 160th advance, five times charged our lines and five times were repulsed with a known 53 Japs killed in the hour's action.

 Ahead lay the densely wooded Storm King Mountain, occupied by the Jap 2nd Glider-Borne Infantry. Advancing with two battalions and pounding the target with heavy artillery concentrations, the mountain finally fell to our forces. The only enemy remaining on the ridge were isolated on a narrow promontory, since named McSevney Point in memory of Major John D. McSevney, battalion commander, killed in action while reconnoitering the hill prior to the attack.

The only suitable avenue of approach to the promontory of the gliderborne troops was from the east along the narrow neck of ground connecting the main mass of Storm King Mountain and this last out-jutting promontory overlooking the reverse slope of the mountain. Forced to advance along this slender, jungle-covered corridor, our troops received concentrated crossfires from all weapons.

In space a scant 300 yards long and 75 yards at the widest point, our troops ran up against a 70mm field piece, three 90mm mortars, ten knee mortars, ten heavy machine guns, 17 light machine guns and 150 rifle pits. The positions had been well prepared, some being formed by digging the earth from under the roots of large trees. Each was provided with an underground recess for protection against artillery fire. All had been covered with logs and earth and concealed by fresh and growing bamboo. Being almost impossible to locate until fire was delivered, their destruction was costly. There the 2nd Company of the 2nd Glider-Borne Infantry Regiment reinforced was able to hold up our advance during ten days of bitter fighting, and inflict greater casualties upon us than had the entire reinforced kamoto Butai in its defense of the lower Stratta, Stout and Ruckle Hills and Hill 620. All resistance was overcome and the hill occupied on February 6th.

During the struggle for Storm King Mountain the Division Artillery had not only rendered excellent support, but had begun the softening up of the next objective as well. On the Clark Field plains a battery of 120mm dual-purpose guns had been captured in perfect firing condition. Gun characteristics and range charts were developed by test firing the guns; then, manned by a selected crew, the guns were used against long range targets in the hills. Over 1200 rounds were fired from these guns during the period.

Patrols probing the wooded draws and slopes at the base of Scattered Trees Ridge and Snake Hill West, the next defensive position to be attacked, had suffered casualties from intense machine gun and rifle fire. It was apparent that the enemy had based his defense plan on the assumption that our advance would be along the valleys. Our plan of attack, therefore, called for an advance along the steep bare ridge line.

Translations of captured documents and the clarification of enemy maps showing details of the cavernous defense system aided the 160th Infantry in planning their attack against these Jap positions. Here on these two lofty 1200-foot ridges the Japs had constructed a defensive system of interconnected tunnels and caves hewn in the solid rock which were both mutually supporting and self-sufficient. Defense of this vital area had been entrusted to the Takaya Shitai, composed principally of elements of the 2nd Glider-Borne Infantry Regiment along with naval units (SNLF), headquarters of which were shown on a captured map to be on Object Hill, 1500 yards southwest of Snake Hill West. From the beginning of the action, it was apparent that the enemy had placed some of his best troops in this sector. All evidences pointed to well equipped, well fed fighting units, imbued with the Bushido doctrine of suicidal defense.

A forward regimental OP-CP was installed on Storm King Mountain, providing excellent observation to the front. Single 155 guns from the 222nd Field Artillery Battalion, and later a single 90mm gun, were towed up the mountain and emplaced to provide direct fire on suitable targets. The combination provided the regimental commander with an unusually rapid means of bringing ac-
accurate direct fire from heavy weapons on any enemy which could be detected.

On February 11th, the 1st Battalion jumped off to attack Scattered Trees Ridge, and the 2nd Battalion opened its drive up Snake Hill West. Both battalions encountered heavy, short range fire from emplaced weapons in this assault on the most complex and elaborate sector of the remarkable defense system encountered in the Bamban-Stotsenburg operation. As our troops advanced, thrusting demolitions in successive tunnels and caves, they were under fire from all calibers of automatic weapons.

By dark on February 12th, 160th troops had fought to the top of both Scattered Trees Hill and Snake Hill West. But the task of routing the remaining enemy resistance from strongholds in the hillsides was far from completed.

From the summits of the two hills the advance was south and west, on to Object Hill, another caved and tunnelled bulwark of enemy defense lying across the western end of the draw, around and over Tit Hill, where from large caves, heavy mortar and machine gun fire was again received by our advancing troops. Here, within a roughly triangular area formed by Snake Hill West and Scattered Trees Hill constituting the base angles and Object Hill the apex, a four-day battle was waged that ended with the final breaking of all organized resistance in that area and opened the door for the long swing southwest to Sacobia Ridge.

Third Battalion elements had penetrated to forward positions on Object Hill, when they were pinned down by withering fire from three directions. Isolated for two days from their rear units, “I” and “F” Companies could be supplied with ammunition and water only by cub plane drops. Flanking movements by supporting elements around the northern side of the hill and south around Tit Hill eventually effected the release of the beleaguered 3rd Battalion troops; but only after continued bitter fighting were our positions secured.

Throughout this action the 185th Infantry from positions on Hill 1500 placed M-7 and M-10 direct fire on caves along the reverse slope of Snake Hill West and on enemy entrenchments on the reverse slopes of Object Hill. Toward the end of the operation, on February 27th, four large caves estimated at a 50-man capacity were taken under artillery and mortar fire from the 185th sector and destroyed with an estimated 100 Japs killed and a Jap ammunition dump blown up.

Losses suffered in defending these positions destroyed the combat effectiveness of the Takaya Shitai. Accumulating evidence from documents, prisoners of war, and civilian reports indicated a general withdrawal southwest toward Sacobia Ridge of at least the navy personnel after our troops had occupied Object Hill. Only isolated pockets of resistance remained on reverse slopes of Snake Hill West and in the draw between the two hills then in rear of our lines. To the end of the division’s occupation of the zone, however, scattered enemy resistance continued in...
isolated areas despite repeated fire from M-7, M-10, 155mm and heavy air strikes.

An attack on Sacobia Ridge became the next mission for the 160th. However, before this could be undertaken the Jap defenses further south in the area west of Top of the World had to be reduced and the forces routed from their hill positions. The Battle of the Seven Hills, then drawing to a close, effected this and cleared the area south of the Sacobia River.

**BATTLE OF THE SEVEN HILLS**

On February 2nd, the 108th Infantry, having completed mopping up of the Thrall Hill area, relieved the 129th Infantry of the 37th Division on the Division left flank, being relieved in turn by the 3rd Battalion, 185th.

From positions on Top of the World, seven hills immediately confronted the 108th Infantry as mopping up around Top of the World drew to a close. Arbitrarily numbered 1 to 7, these hills provided the series of strongpoints which protected the right flank of the Jap defense, strongpoints which one by one were eventually destroyed. Hills 1, 2 and 3, 1100 to 1300 feet in elevation, were to the front. To the left, at a distance of 1500 yards and at a slightly lower elevation, stood Hill 4. On the right, 1500 yards northwest of Top of the World, stood Hill 5. Further south, Hill 6, 1000 feet high, formed the enemy's extreme right flank anchor. A thousand yards west from Hill 6, Hill 7 rose 1300 feet from the rocky precipitous bank of the Sacobia River's south fork.

To entrenchments throughout the seven hills the battered Eguchi Shitai had withdrawn after its loss of Top of the World. Composed in the main of Airfield Battalions, the Eguchi Shitai had the mission of halting our advance west of Stotsenburg, and the additional complementary mission of launching infiltrations into the Clark Field-Stotsenburg area. An uncounted number of automatic weapons, removed from aircraft destroyed on Clark Field, had been carried back into the hills to augment the enemy's organic weapons. Every knoll and knob of ground was literally studded with light and heavy machine guns and 20mm and 25mm aircraft weapons. Furthermore, the area, as captured documents indicated, contained a rich and central supply system, the defense of which was of critical importance to an enemy hopelessly isolated from any resupply sources.

This then was the general picture on the enemy's right (south) flank on the morning of February 9th, when the 108th left positions on Top of the World overran Hills 1, 2 and 4, and advanced toward Hills 3 and 6.

In the drive to swing back the enemy's right flank, the 3rd Battalion attacked Hill 6, and the 2nd Battalion Hill 3, with the 1st Battalion in reserve. Intense opposition was encountered and for the first 24 hours the 1st Battalion was under repeated counterattacks supported by mortar and automatic weapons fire. By the end of the day the 2nd Battalion had secured Hill 3 and was moving south into the valley floor to assist in the development of strongly defended Hill 6 the next day. Two enemy tanks were encountered in this move. One was destroyed by machine gun and bazooka fire. This marked the first tank action in the area since the 129th Infantry destroyed three out of nine tanks encountered on Clark Field in the early stages of the operation.

On the morning of February 10th, a Jap counterattack against Hill 4 was repulsed by our troops and the massed fires of Division Artillery. By the end of the day, despite the adverse terrain, Hill 3 was free of enemy, Hill 4 remaining secure, and Hill 6 was under heavy fire from our encircling troops. As an indication of the intensity of the 24-hour action, it is interesting to note the following:

- 304 enemy dead counted during the 24-hour period;
- 8 twin 20mm guns destroyed;
- 5 single 20mm guns destroyed;
- 3 120mm D/P naval guns destroyed;
- 1 medium tank destroyed.

After an unremitting three-day struggle across rugged, almost impassable terrain, late in the afternoon of February 12th, against intense, strongly emplaced fire from Jap weapons, Hill 6 fell to our control. However, isolated cave and tunnel positions remained intact. The next step was the reduction of Hill 7, 1000 yards to the west, last stronghold on the enemy right flank.

A short, stubby knob on a broad, gently rising base, Hill 7 became the focal point for the enemy's fanatical last-ditch stand. The 108th I & R Platoon, patrolling around the enemy's right flank, had failed to find a route suitable for movement of a battalion to a point from which an attack could be launched against the flank or rear. The attack therefore had to be made frontally by crossing an open flat leading to the base of the hill.

Two battalions struck. Jap machine guns and mortars rendered the approach a deadly inferno. Throughout the 13th, 14th and 15th, the 108th struggled for possession of this hill. Having once gained the crest, supplies could not be replenished because of the exposure of carrying parties to intense enemy fire. Repeated counterattacks finally exhausted the supply of small arms ammunition within the perimeter, and the troops were forced to withdraw for the night.

On the 16th, the advance was resumed and by late afternoon the attack succeeded. The 3rd Battalion secured the hill and the 1st Battalion, 300 yards to the south, was still advancing. In the succeeding two days, troops of the 108th continued 2000 yards west, wiping out the diminishing resistance on our left flank and firmly establishing control over the extensive supply area along the south fork of the Sacobia River.

It will not be amiss to describe here the huge supply installation which fell into our hands after the enemy's rout. Beginning at a point some 1500 yards southwest of Top of the World and extending west for over 3000 yards, this supply area apparently had been designed to serve the entire Stotsenburg area.

Though an uncounted number of supply caves were sealed during the process of eliminating enemy resistance and an unknown quantity of Jap supplies lost thereby, the following partial list of captured items serves to give some idea of the type and extent of the dumps:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210 vehicles (military and civilian), including tracked personnel carriers and bulldozers;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167 machine guns, light and heavy;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65—20mm guns (German make);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51—13mm guns (German make);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—75mm field guns;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncounted quantities of radios, telephone equipment, tires, transmitters, generators, wire, tools, miscellaneous equipment, and food.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the above, two 15cm self-propelled guns were found, one completely destroyed and the other burned. These guns had delivered fire upon our troops in Top of the World and Snake Hill West areas, and at the time were believed to be Jap medium tanks mounting 70mm guns and employed as artillery. The capture of these guns was the first indication that weapons of this type were in use by the Japanese army.

Interesting because of the implications to the enemy’s situation were the Jap planes which had been sighted on three occasions over enemy positions on our front. On both February 9th and 13th, two planes circled positions west of Top of the World and were observed to drop several bundles by parachute. On the 15th, an artillery forward observer discovered one of the parachutes. Attached was a container holding blasting caps, detonators and ready-made booby traps.

Four days later, on the 19th, two more planes circled the same area. Subsequently, three groups of parachutes were observed northwest of Snake Hill West. A note found later in the vicinity of the parachutes was addressed to a Vice Admiral Kondo, and informed him that a drop was being made for him of whiskey and cigarettes from Singapore.

The purpose of these air drops may never be known, outside, of course, of the understandable drop of whiskey and cigarettes for the Admiral’s sinking spirits. The enemy could hardly have expected these few bundles to alleviate his supply situation which, aggravated by the loss of his main supply dump, had become critical.

On the 19th of February, leaving one battalion to hold the Division left flank, the 108th Infantry was moved from the Stotsenburg area to the north in the vicinity of Hill 29, on the right of the 185th Infantry.

Concurrent with the Storm King and Top of the World operations, Snake Hill North and Hill 1000 on our north flank had been occupied by the 185th after rifle, mortar and machine gun fire, scattered at times but intense during certain periods, had been met. On February 15th two companies of the regiment advanced under fire to the summit of Hill 1500, while one company slowly made its way up around the northwest slope. Artillery and direct fire weapons again were used to blast the Japs from their caves and keep them under cover until the infantry was able to reach them with demolition charges. Once the peak was reached, numerous caves and dug-in positions remained on the west and northwest slope to be wiped out before the hill would be free of resistance. In order to reduce caves on the reverse slopes, frontal assault against which would have been costly, drums of gas were lowered from above the cave openings and electrically detonated. For the next seven days troops continued the destruction by demolitions and fire. On the west slope of the hill, during the initial advance, six Japs, acknowledging the futility of their situation, had committed suicide by holding hand grenades to their chests. An additional six Japs followed this pattern of self-destruction during the mopping up operations.

FINAL PHASE

With three regiments in line, the division was now confronted by a concentrated area of resistance bedded in rock and stretching 6000 yards from mountain top to mountain top. The north flank was based on Hills 1700 and 29. To the south, where the two forks of the Sacobia River cut their jagged way through rocky ground, the rugged and harsh terrain of Sacobia Ridge formed the southern anchor.

On February 23rd, a coordinated attack by the three regiments was launched against the remaining enemy positions.

On the right, the 108th Infantry advanced along the hill mass leading southwest toward Hill 29. Intense mortar and machine gun fire was encountered approximately 1200 yards northwest of the hill, where an enemy force was able to deliver direct fire from caves and flanking fire from positions cleverly concealed by cogon grass and brush in a small draw on the regiment’s right. A Napalm air strike following morning destroyed enemy positions in the draw, and the advance continued. The fol-
The following day saw the 108th troops in control of Hill 29 and the high ground to the north and west, and an attack underway on a hill 2000 yards to the southwest, where Japs also occupied caves and dug-in positions. By February 26th this latter hill was in our possession and mopping up operations were being conducted to route the remaining Japs from their strongholds.

Thus, in three days the 108th had rolled back the enemy left flank. The number of extensive positions found abandoned with ammunition and weapons left in place gave evidence that the enemy had intended to make a determined stand in and about Hill 29. Prevented from doing so by the weight of our ground attack and pounding of our artillery and air, the enemy was forced to withdraw behind Hills 1700 and 1400, his possession of which was then being hotly contested by the 185th.

Hill 1700, rocky and barren, is connected by a low saddle with Hill 1500, 1000 yards to the northeast. Three steep, converging knife-edged ridges offer the only approaches to its peak. Japs entrenched in deep caves midway up the precipitous sides and atop the pinpoint peak of the hill commanded all three approaches. Two thousand yards northwest of Hill 1700, Hill 1400, sloping upwards at the southwestern end, dominates the Malagao and Marimla Rivers and the lower areas behind Hill 1700. Under cover of the thickly wooded river beds were several hundred enemy troops.

With Hill 1500 secured by the 185th troops on February 15th, only Hills 1400 and 1700 in that sector remained in Jap hands. In coordination with the 108th and 160th Infantry, the 185th, led by its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, launched its attack. Progress against Hill 1700 was extremely slow because of the withering crossfire the enemy was able to direct at our troops scaling the precipitous approaches. To outflank the enemy and clear the area to the north, from which direction a second attack against Hill 1700 could be launched, the 3rd Battalion circled wide and advanced southwest onto Hill 1400, which was secured by the end of the day. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion reached a shelf-like position on the north-east slope of Hill 1700 and dug in for the night. The day action had cost the enemy 140 dead.

During the next two days, the 2nd Battalion, with the 1st Battalion assisting and supported by direct fire from M-7's from Hill 1400 area, continued the attack on Hill 1700 by systematically exterminating the enemy defenders and demolishing the cave positions. At the end of the third day's fighting, Hill 1700 was in our possession. Despite the intensity of the action and the large number of enemy dead counted (343), our losses were small. Control of Hills 1400 and 1700 provided positions dominating the entire central division zone and made use of nearby hills by the enemy untenable. Movement along the Marimla, Cauayan and Malagao Rivers was denied to the enemy, and areas to the southwest in front of the 160th Infantry were within range of our fire and observation.

The enemy made one last attempt to loosen our hold of his former left flank when, in the early hours of the 28th, he attempted a night attack on the 3rd Battalion perimeter on the southwest end of Hill 1400. A body of Japs estimated to be about 75 advanced on the perimeter and began to dig in. Caught in position by illuminating flares, they were felled on at short range by our heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The next morning 47 were counted killed.

On our left flank, south and southwest of Snake Hill West, bypassed pockets of enemy resistance remained in caves and draws, and on Object Hill, Japs continued to hold reverse slope positions. But the general drift of the enemy, following his rout in the Snake Hill West-Scattered Trees Hill area, had been to the southwest, where another cave and trench system, previously prepared by impressed Filipino labor, awaited his last stand.

On the morning of February 24th, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 160th Infantry attacked Sacobia Ridge, with the 2nd Battalion leading from the southeast and the 3rd coming down from the north. Almost impassable terrain impeded the advance. Deep gullies and ravines had to be crossed under heavy Jap fire, and the steep, sheer cliffs bordering the Sacobia River made direct advance impossible and deployment slow and costly. Three enemy counterattacks launched against 3rd Battalion troops were repulsed with several casualties to our troops. Enemy action continued throughout the night, with our troops under constant mortar and machine gun fire. Carrying parties attempting to reach troops from the northeast were pelted with mortar fire, and the enemy repeatedly launched night infiltration attacks.

Heavy artillery concentration the following day preceded the 160th's renewed attack which was launched in the face of machine gun and mortar fire. Twelve hundred yards were gained in the day's action, and our troops occupied positions on Williams Ridge, overlooking Ribble Ridge, named in memory of Major James A. Williams and Major Frank Ribble who were shot down while making a reconnaissance of that area in an artillery cub plane. In succeeding days, mopping up continued and by the 27th Sacobia Ridge was secured.

With capture of Sacobia and Williams Ridge, the enemy was deprived of use of the Sacobia River north and...
south fork valleys, and remaining elements around Snake Hill West and Object Hill were completely isolated.

Since the beginning of the Luzon campaign other divisional units had been busily engaged in insuring the uninterrupted advance of the regiments.

The 115th Engineer Battalion, having performed a remarkable job of bridge building and road repairing from Lingayen to Bamban, assumed additional and even more difficult duties during operations at Bamban. Early in the operation, work was begun on clearing the extensive minefields in the Clark Field area. Mines consisted of 100 to 550-pound aerial bombs buried fuze up, and numerous other improvised types. Before completion, over 550 mines were removed from the fields.

Following closely behind the advancing troops, engineer demolition crews sealed or destroyed the caves and pillboxes overrun by the infantry to destroy any small groups hiding within and to prevent reoccupancy by the enemy. Virtually a never-ending job, over 600 caves were closed up to the time of the division relief.

Roads capable of handling the heavy traffic of tanks, artillery pieces and supply trucks were constructed close behind each regiment as it advanced over terrain in which only foot paths had previously existed. Bulldozers, often subjected to enemy small arms fire, pushed the roads up steep rocky grades, along knife-edge ridges and through densely vegetated areas as far forward as the front lines. Despite the ruggedness of the terrain, the regiments were never without a means of bringing their heavy supporting weapons and supplies forward.

Medical personnel performed outstanding service in the difficult and dangerous work of carrying wounded from forward areas down the precipitous slopes to collecting points. Frequently under fire, individual acts of heroism on the part of the litter bearers were recorded in numerous instances.

The reconnaissance troop continually patrolled the Capas-O'Donnell-Tiaong road, as well as roads on the division left flank. Several small contacts were made during the period, and an entrenched enemy outpost of approximately 100 was routed by fire from foothills south of O'Donnell.

Thus, by March 1st, after 53 days continuous fighting and 37 days after entering Bamban, the enemy had been driven into the mountains, 10,000 to 17,000 yards west of his first line of defense; his organized resistance had ceased to exist; huge quantities of supplies had been destroyed or captured; illness was making greater and greater inroads upon his dwindling strength; 6087 Japs had been counted dead, and additional hundreds were known to have been killed by our air and artillery fire. What forces he could muster from the battered remnants of the Takyama, Takaya and Eguchi Shitais, would serve only as isolated small groups in scattered positions in the Zambales Mountains.

To the east, planes were safely operating from Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg was secure. Traffic on the National Highway to Manila was free from enemy fire. Only the distant mopping up of withdrawing groups of stragglers remained of the Bamban-Stotsenburg operation.

Relief of the 40th Division in the Bamban-Stotsenburg area by the 43rd Division was accomplished on March 2nd, and the Division moved to the San Fabian-San Jacinto-Manaoag area, near Lingayen Gulf, for a brief rest.

High tide in Luzon—Old Glory goes up on Hill 1700
Campaign
MARCH 18 - MARCH 28 1945
THE PANAY OPERATION

Preparation

While the major elements of the Japanese forces in the Philippines had been engaged in the campaigns of Leyte and Luzon, the existence of enemy strong points athwart the main sea lanes of the archipelago could not be ignored. Occupation of Panay and Negros was, therefore, a necessary prerequisite for the successful conclusion of the Philippines campaign. Of the two islands, Panay because of fine harbor at Iloilo and the protected shipping lanes of Guimaras Strait, was selected as the first objective, with subsequent landings to be made on Guimaras and Negros islands.

Upon relief of the 40th Infantry Division in the Bamban-Stotsenburg area by the 43rd Infantry Division, the 108th Infantry Combat Team passed to control of the Eighth Army Area Command and departed from San Fabian, Luzon, for combat duty on the island of Leyte. Orders were received placing the remainder of the Division under the operational control of the Eighth Army for employment in the Panay-Negros operation. Following the movement to the San Fabian-San Jacinto-Manaoag area, in Pangasinan Province, preparations for the operation began. Naval units under command of Rear Admiral Strubel arrived in Lingayen Gulf to coordinate plans for the landings.

Through the efforts of the guerilla organization on Panay—the 6th Military District, numbering approximately 21,000 enlisted men and 1500 officers under the command of Colonel Peralta—the enemy situation on the island was relatively well known to our forces prior to landing. Although originally intended to be used as a major supply base by the Japanese forces, Panay had come to serve principally as a hospital and rehabilitation base for the enemy troops. Following our landings on Leyte and Luzon, many elements were shipped from Panay to reinforce the Leyte and Negros garrisons, leaving only a small force on the island for its defense. Because of our air and naval blockade, the enemy had for some time been dependent upon submarines for supply, and for his subsistence upon whatever products could be secured from local sources.

The plan of operation called for the main effort of the Division to be made against Iloilo, with a secondary attack by one battalion in the direction of Jaro to block any movement from the city in that direction. The action was to be conducted by the 185th Regimental Combat Team. The 40th Reconnaissance Troop was to move north and in the direction of Santa Barbara airfield to interpose themselves between the Iloilo garrison and the mountains to which they might attempt to withdraw, and to detect and delay the consolidation or movement of any enemy forces along the roads. Combat aircraft were directed to strafe all serviceable barges in the harbor to prevent evacuation by water.

The 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, was to remain in reserve initially and defend the beachhead. Amphibious patrols of the 160th were to be prepared to land by rubber boat on the northwest and southeast coasts of Guimaras Island on S plus 1, to determine enemy strength and activity thereon and locate suitable landing beaches for the battalion in the event a landing became necessary.

The 160th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion) was to move from Luzon on the turnaround shipping, arriving in time to participate in the Negros operation.
Taking advantage of the guerrilla airfields which had been built in the relatively secure northern end of the island, artillery cub planes, transported in C-47's, were flown to Panay on S minus 2. When assembled, the planes were test flown and held in readiness to provide aerial observation over the target area prior to and during the landing.

Departure from San Fabian, Luzon, was made in the early morning hours of March 15, 1945. The task force experienced an uneventful trip to the objective area.

The Landing and Seizure of Iloilo

At 0930 on March 18th, after a short period of naval gunfire from escorting destroyers, two Battalion Landing Teams of the 185th RCT landed on Tigbauan beach. Only a few rounds of scattered rifle fire were received from the handful of Japs who had been left behind by the withdrawing garrison. Seven of these Japs were killed and two were captured. Identifications thus secured confirmed the presence of at least the 2nd Company, 170th Independent Infantry Battalion. Immediately following the landing, one platoon of the 185th Infantry secured the important concrete bridge over the Sibalon River and the barrio of Tigbauan. By 1200, the reserve battalion was ashore and the assault units were advancing east toward the objective. At the close of the first day, the 1st Battalion, 185th Infantry, advanced ten miles to Arevalo, 5000 yards west of Iloilo, and the other two battalions were in position at Oton and San Nicholas. Only light opposition, consisting mostly of sniper rifle fire had been received.

The bulk of the Jap garrison at Tigbauan had withdrawn to the north. Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, using guerrilla guides, made several contacts with this group as it continued its retreat into the hills, while the 40th Reconnaissance Troop moved in two columns, one north toward Alimodian and the second toward San Miguel and Santa Barbara. A small group of enemy near Cordova, who withdrew when fired upon, was the only contact made.

On the second day, at Molo, western outskirts of the city, the 1st Battalion met their first resistance in the form of rifle and machine gun fire from positions built into and behind concrete walls. After a sharp engagement in which medium tanks were employed to blast the enemy machine gun positions the town was secured and approximately 500 civilians, temporarily imprisoned in the church, were released.

Branching off to the northeast at San Nicholas, the 3rd Battalion, 185th Infantry, attacked and secured Mandurro airfield against only token resistance. By noon of the second day, elements of the 3rd Battalion had reached Carpenter Bridge, spanning the Iloilo River north of Molo. The bridge had been extensively mined with electrically controlled aerial bombs, but the suddenness of our approach had taken the small Jap bridge guard by surprise and the pillbox from which the mines had been controlled was captured intact. Until late in the evening the enemy entrenched in pillboxes and foxholes just south of the bridge contested our possession with sporadic rifle, machine gun and knee mortar fire.
At Jaro, north of Iloilo City, a patrol received light mortar and small arms fire, and 300 yards southeast of the barrio the enemy destroyed the small bridge over the Tigón River, which had been mined after the fashion of Carpenter Bridge.

Elements of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop driving north to Maasin and northwest to Pototan and Janiuay had established no enemy contact. Other elements were attacking enemy targets near Santa Barbara airfield, where guerrilla leaders reported that their forces had surrounded an estimated 125 Japs.

**Capture of Iloilo**

The evening of the second day found the enemy in Iloilo under attack by our troops from the direction of Molo and Mandurriao, the western outskirts of Jaro had been reached, and guerrilla forces were in defensive positions along a line straddling the Iloilo-Pavia road just north of Jaro. All effort was being directed toward the defeat of the enemy with a minimum of damage to the city, and at the same time preventing his escape into the western high ground.

During the night of the 19th, large fires were observed burning in Iloilo and Jaro. In the dark of the early morning hours virtually the entire enemy garrison of Iloilo began an orderly but hasty withdrawal northward from the city. Burning their vehicles along the road to delay our pursuit, the Japs attacked the guerrilla line with a heavy concentration of mortar, machine gun and rifle fire. The Filipino forces, unable to offer sustained resistance, were forced to give way. It was later estimated that 1000 Japs, accompanied by approximately 200 Japanese and Filipino civilians, participated in the evacuation. At the same time, activity again flared up at Carpenter Bridge when a small enemy group in undisclosed positions on the southern side of the river suddenly opened up with mortar and machine gun fire. They were quickly silenced, and their positions subsequently destroyed. As a result of the enemy withdrawal our troops during the
morning of the 20th occupied Iloilo City as well as La Paz and Jaro.

Despite the acute food shortage, occasioned by the Jap-imposed restrictions of movement to and from the city, American liberating forces were warmly welcomed by the civilians with gifts of eggs, fruit, and candies made from the local comotes and coconuts. In the city which had been only partially destroyed by the retreating Jap forces, numerous baricaded buildings, pillboxes, and rifle pits were found abandoned. Fortunately, the dock and warehouse facilities suffered only minor damage. Some ineffective attempts had been made to mine the bridges and roads, but the demolitions were poorly installed and easily detected.

Having succeeded in passing through the guerilla lines, the enemy hurried north along the road to Pavia. Elements of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop were directed to proceed toward Pavia from the north to intercept the force. Contact was made with the enemy on the northern outskirts of the barrio, and a fire fight ensued. As the enemy units were attempting to elude our forces by taking to the Tigon River valley, combat aircraft which had been ordered to attack strafed and bombed the area. Meanwhile, 185th elements moving rapidly northward contacted groups of stragglers and rear elements of the column. Dispersed, disorganized and forced to leave behind all supplies other than those which could be hand-carried, the Jap forces quickly degenerated into small groups, avoiding contact with our troops whenever possible in their attempt to gain refuge in the mountains northwest of Cabatuán. At least 100 enemy were known to have been killed in the Pavia action and in scattered contacts along the evacuation routes.

Increasing evidence obtained from prisoners of war and captured documents indicated that the Japanese commander in Iloilo City had apparently until the very last moment intended to remain and defend the city. The final decision to abandon Iloilo City came as a distinct about-face, a last and desperate attempt to avoid inevitable annihilation at the hands of the American forces. The suddenness and power of our attack had created a strong element of panic. Fraught with indecision, and pressed for time, the enemy failed to execute the defensive measures he had so laboriously prepared. Bridges prepared for demolition were not destroyed; road-blocks were left undefended; mines in a position to offer considerable delay to our mechanized elements were detonated long before our tanks and armored cars approached; the Iloilo City power plant had been extensively mined but suffered only minor damage from our own artillery fire.

The chaos in the enemy command was strikingly demonstrated late in the night of the 20th, when apparently unaware of the Jap retreat a 75-foot Jap motor launch confidently berthed at the dock near the Customs House. Two Japs, debarking to tie up the boat, were captured and the remaining five of the crew of seven attempted escape. One was killed and the other four were subsequently captured.

On the 21st, combat patrols of the 185th Infantry reached Zarraga, seven miles east of Santa Barbara, and Pototan, eleven miles northeast of Santa Barbara, without enemy contact. North of San Miguel an unestimated number of enemy were contacted who fled before our fire. Fifteen of these Japs were killed. During the two preceding days, elements of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop had been in contact with the Japs in the Santa Barbara area, leveling barracks, destroying supply and ammunition dumps and maintaining harassing fire upon the Jap garrison. As a result of the combined action of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop and the guerrilla forces, 34 Japs had been counted killed. By the morning of the 22nd of March, Santa Barbara airfield was secure and the routed Jap survivors had joined the groups of stragglers heading northwest. On the same day, northwest of Cabatuán a combat patrol from the 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, which had moved the day before to the barrio with the mission of intercepting any enemy forces attempting to reach high ground from the east, contacted an unestimated number of enemy in the vicinity of Jimbanban.

In accordance with the original plan, an amphibious patrol from the 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, early on the 22nd of March landed by rubber boat on Guimaras Island, off the southeast coast of Panay. At Buenavista, on the west coast of the island, guerrillas reported they had recently wiped out the small garrison of approximately 20 Japs. In this barrio the bodies of 28 civilians, slaughtered by the Japs, were found, at least seven of them having been tied together and bayoneted. The only enemy remaining on the island were small groups which had long since taken to the hills.

On March 23rd a small combat patrol from the 185th Infantry landed on Inampulugan Island with the mission of rendering inoperative the mine control station reported to be there. Several bursts of rifle fire were received from the small garrison of 24 enlisted men and one officer of the Naval Guard Force as they fled into the central hill area, abandoning the mine control station, which proved to be one of the most elaborate and intricate mine control systems discovered up to that time in the Pacific.

Meanwhile, on the island of Panay, isolated contacts were continuing with small groups of stragglers in the general Alimodian-Cabatuán-Pototan area. Near Pandac, northwest of Mandurriao, one warrant officer and three ordnance enlisted men on March 24th surprised a group of 21 Japs eating lunch and killed all of them.

Panay guerilla leaders in conference with Division G-2
Prisoners and captured documents disclosed that the Japs' original intention had been to establish a second line of defense in the Cabatuan area, but the rapidity of our drive had frustrated that aim. The 1st Company of the 170th Independent Infantry Battalion stationed at Cabatuan at the time of our landing had never been contacted by our troops. It was believed that following the dispersal of the enemy forces in Iloilo, the company had withdrawn into the northwestern mountains.

Gruesome evidence of the hopeless situation into which the enemy had been forced after his evacuation of Iloilo was furnished by the account given by two Filipino women, who with four Jap babies were the only survivors of the mass suicide and murder of 62 Japanese civilians in the area south of Jimanban. A group of Jap soldiers, their flight apparently slowed by the civilians whom they had forced or persuaded to evacuate with them from the city, were overtaken by our troops. Driven to a final stand, they stabbed and bayonetted the women and children prior to their own destruction by our fire.

In La Paz, northern suburb of Iloilo, Jap prisoners were captured who testified further of the desperate measures taken by the Japs during their evacuation. In the La Paz hospital, on the night of the withdrawal, about fifty bedridden military patients were given an injection of a drug which rendered them unconscious. The hospital was then set afire. Only a few of the patients were able to escape cremation by crawling out of the burning building before 400 Japs remained in the areas north and northwest of the drug injection took effect.

By the 24th of March, it was estimated that 300 to 400 Japs remained in the areas north and northwest of Iloilo City. All were slowly making their way to the high ground west of Cabatuan, avoiding contact with our forces when possible. From numerous barrios in the path of these stragglers, civilians reported foraging parties murdering entire families after stealing their food. One American officer investigating these reports in the northern outskirts of San Miguel found one man and fourteen women and children, all Filipinos, who had been tied together by the Japs and then bayonetted in the stomach or stabbed in the neck.

After the Jimanban contacts, where our infantry and cannon company fire in scattered engagements had annihilated close to 200 Japs, few contacts were made in the lowland of the Iloilo Plain. Later, elements of the 160th Infantry began establishing contacts with hastily organized enemy positions in the Mount Tigaubaun area, in the mountains northwest of Leon, and in the northern Sibalon River valley. Mechanized reconnaissance by the 40th Reconnaissance Troop had confirmed the report that the island's northern coastal regions were free of enemy, and only in San Jose, Antique Province, did an enemy unit exist that still maintained its tactical and organizational integrity.

Following the departure of the Division elements from Panay for the Negros landing, guerrilla forces were employed for the destruction of the Jap force at San Jose. Repeated air strikes and strafing had rendered the airfield inoperative, and the long-continued guerrilla harassment and confinement had weakened somewhat the fighting effectiveness of the enemy garrison. On April 9th the attack was made by elements of the 65th Infantry (Guerrilla Forces) and by the end of the 10th the town and airfield were secured by guerrilla troops. Remnants of the enemy garrison had withdrawn into the mountainous high ground to the northwest. A total of 118 Japs were killed in this engagement.

Throughout the months of April and May, the 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, which had been left on Panay as garrison troops, made repeated contacts with enemy groups in the Cabatuan area. On the 7th of May, intense machine gun and rifle fire was received from an estimated 150 to 200 Japs in well dug-in positions in the mountains in the vicinity of Bucari, twelve miles northwest of Cabatuan, and one of our supply trains moving north in the Sibalon River valley 4000 yards northwest of Leon, was attacked by approximately fifteen Japs. On the 13th of May, eighteen B-24's bombed enemy positions in this area, destroying the fortifications and dispersing the enemy forces. Subsequent to this air strike, no major contacts were made with Jap troops and the elements of the 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, withdrew to the Iloilo Plain for garrison and training activities. Only patrol action was continued to investigate reports of Jap foraging parties and to destroy those groups which attempted to descend into the lower plain.

NEGROS

Campaign
MARCH 29 - JUNE 15 1945
THE NEGROS OPERATION

Plan of Operation

Following the seizure of the principal plain of Panay and the scattering of the remnants of the defending forces into the hills, the Division, reinforced, less RCT 108 and 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry, continued its campaign for the liberation of the Western Visayas by mounting a shore-to-shore operation against the neighboring island of Negros.

Fourth largest of the Philippine Islands, Negros had been an important enemy air staging base during the Leyte operation. The island was also important for its many sugar centrals which the Japanese were using for the production of fuel alcohol, and for the Insular sawmill at Fabrica on the north coast, largest hardwood mill in the world. By now, however, our air attacks had rendered all of the island’s numerous airfields unserviceable, and the major fuel plants inoperative.

Cut off from outside sources by our seizure of adjacent islands, the Japanese forces were limited in supplies, particularly food. Sufficient weapons and ammunition to effect a limited offensive or a stubborn defense, however, were on hand. Also available to the enemy were machine guns mounted on numerous wrecked planes dotting the island airfields. The food problem had been partially alleviated by commandeering all available civilian stocks.

Y-Day was set for March 29th, H-Hour for 0800. The landing was to be made by RCT 185 in LVT’s, followed by RCT 160 (less 2nd Battalion and Cannon Company). After seizing and securing the beachhead, the troops were to push rapidly northward to secure the towns of Bacolod, Talisay and Silay, as well as the adjacent airfields. The 503rd Parachute Combat Team, then on Mindoro, was to be prepared to make an air landing at a time and place to be designated by the Division Commander, at which time it would come under Division control.

Elements of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop were to land shortly after H-Hour and push reconnaissance immediately along the roads north and east to Cancilayan, Murcia and Concepcion to locate any enemy forces or enemy movement on that flank, with a secondary mission of intercepting and delaying the evacuation of enemy forces toward the mountains. At the same time, one platoon of the troop was to perform similar missions in the Maao Sugar Central-La Carlota-San Enrique-Valladolid area south and east of the beachhead.

Of considerable concern was the wide unfordable Bago River, across which our forces would have to move to reach their objective. The 600-foot steel and concrete bridge spanning the river near its mouth was known to be prepared for demolition. Pillboxes at the north end of the bridge housed controls for electrical detonation. If the bridge were destroyed, which seemed inevitable, our
advance to the north would be seriously delayed and the shock of our attack mitigated. If the crossing was to be seized intact, the bridge guard and control operators would have to be completely surprised and quickly overcome. A plan to land a reinforced platoon under cover of darkness three hours prior to the assault landing to secure the crossing was therefore adopted. The mission was assigned to Company F, 185th Infantry.

Seizure of the West Coast

The Division embarked from Panay on March 28th, and the operation proceeded as planned. The reinforced platoon, totaling one officer and 64 men including three heavy weapons squads, a demolition squad and radio team, landed as scheduled at Pulupandan by LCM's. Its landing was undetected.

Moving inland it observed nine Japs driving carabao carts north along the highway from the town toward the bridge. To avoid disclosing their presence by firing at the Jap party, the platoon raced silently parallel to the highway and reached the bridge first. Had the platoon opened fire before reaching the objective, the bridge guards would have been forewarned, the element of surprise lost, and the mission a failure. Upon reaching the bank of the river, the platoon opened fire on the nine, as well as the startled bridge guard, while the demolition squad cut the control wires. All Japs were killed in the brief fight. The bridge was secured at the cost of one American life.

Twenty electrically controlled aerial bombs, ranging in size from ten 110-pounders to two of 1000 pounds, were found lashed to the bridge trusses or buried at the abutments.

The main landing three hours later was unopposed. RCT 185, landing battalions in column moved immediately across the secured bridge, passed through Bago town against minor opposition, and moved rapidly to the north. Slight contacts were made at several small bridges which had also been mined, but all crossings were secured intact. The first serious enemy resistance was not met until the Magsungay River, 1500 yards south of Bacolod, was reached at 1500. There intense small arms and some 90mm mortar fire was received before the enemy was routed from pillboxes and the crossing secured. It was subsequently determined that the Brigade Headquarters at Bacolod had no knowledge of our landing until our advance elements had reached that point. By dark on Y-Day, the Lupit River bridge at the south edge of Bacolod had also been crossed after flanking the defending enemy pocket.

That night the enemy attempted the first of a series of infiltration attacks on the principal bridges under our control. The Bago bridge guard was fired on by a small party in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture or destroy the crossing. Similar attacks made by small demolition parties continued during the first few weeks at various points on our line of communication, but were repulsed with most of the enemy involved killed.

With our forces at the outskirts of Bacolod prepared to launch an attack in the morning, the hostile garrison evacuated under cover of darkness, leaving only a token force to make our entry as costly as possible. Before leaving, the principal business district was set afire and several ammunition dumps destroyed. The town was secured by
noon the following day after eliminating the snipers who had been left behind. Seventy-five enemy dead were counted. Forward elements continued advancing north beyond the town, and by the end of the day had reached within 500 yards of Talisay without further contact.

To the south, the Reconnaissance Troop was carrying out its mission. No contacts developed along the roads in the San Enrique-La Carlota-Pontvedra sector, but civilians reported enemy groups totaling about 200-300 were making their way cross-country through swamps toward the northeast. On Y-plus-1, other elements of the Troop, operating in the Alimodian area northwest of Maa Sugar Central, intercepted approximately 125 of that number concealed in a bamboo thicket. Deploying armored cars on three sides of the thicket, the Troop opened fire. A heavy fire fight ensued, until with air support the Troop all but annihilated the enemy force. One hundred fourteen enemy dead were counted, and five Filipino collaborators were captured.

The following day a platoon from the Reconnaissance Troop reached Murcia and found it recently evacuated, while approximately 6000 yards east of Bacolod the I & R Platoon of the 185th Infantry observed an estimated 100 enemy moving east along the road toward Granada. The group was believed to be the tail end of a larger force moving to Concepcion. A platoon from the Reconnaissance Troop, moving down the same road the following day, met resistance from entrenched enemy at Concepcion. Contact was maintained until the end of the day, when the decision was reached to send one battalion of the 160th Infantry to that area the following morning. During the night the enemy withdrew farther east, and only small contacts were made by the battalion.

What had been anticipated was now evident. The main enemy force did not intend to defend the coastal area, but rather was accelerating the movement of supplies and personnel to the hills surrounding Negritos. Accordingly, the 185th Infantry moved as rapidly as possible to overtake the retreating units. Moving inland from the Bacolod-Talisay area, it quickly secured the Silay airfield area, and the Imbang River bridge, thus reducing the enemy's evacuation routes to those farther north, of which three were most notable. The first and most important was the road leading generally from northeast of Silay along the south bank of the Malago River to Negritos, thence southeast to the Patog area. The Japs had expended considerable labor on the mountain terminus of this road, extending and improving it to their purpose. The second route was southeast from Victorias and north of the Malago Valley. The third, used by troops evacuating from the Fabrica and northeast coast areas, ran south from Manapla through the barrios of Santa Isabela and San Isidro. Both these latter routes also led into the Negritos area.

At the same time it was occupying the Silay airfield area, the 185th moved against the town of Talisay. The practically isolated garrison defended bitterly against our attacks from the south and east, and put up heavy fire from all types of weapons up to and including 90mm mor-

enemy remaining in these occupied areas were small groups of tars. However, the town was taken on April 2nd and on April 3rd, the sixth day of the campaign, lightly defended control of the most important section of the west coast, on the west coast were secured. The Division stood in Silay to Pulupandan, and the area south of Pulupandan was in the hands of the guerillas. Inland, guerillas were in control of the plains area south of Murcia. The only enemy remaining in these occupied areas were small groups of stragglers attempting to reach the main force. Although portions of the capital city, Bacolod, had been burned, its principal utilities had been saved and were being put into operation by our service troops. The towns of Talisay and Silay had been secured with a minimum of damage to civilian life and property. Known enemy casualties for the first six days were 382 killed and eight captured.

Reconnaissance of the North and East Coasts

Following the securing of Silay airfield, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated reconnaissance east toward the enemy base at Guimbalaon. Upon completion of that mission the reconnaissance of the north coast was undertaken. Following a route through Saravia and the airfields of Alicante and Malago, they found the area completely evacuated by the enemy. Forging the Malago River near the destroyed bridge, the Troop moved on to Fabrica through Manapla, finding several bridges mined but only one destroyed. Guerillas and civilians stated the Japs had been hurriedly moving southwest for the past week or more, skirting the Mount Silay foothills to rendezvous with Bacolod forces in the Patog area. The Troop reached the Insular sawmill just west of Fabrica on the 6th of April. As the bridge over the Himugaan River was destroyed and there was no ford, they were unable to continue westward until the attached engineers could construct a ferry crossing. Meanwhile, the Troop contacted one of the mill superintendents and made a hasty survey of the sawmill area. Approximately eighty percent of the mill had been destroyed by burning, but much machinery and cut lumber were found undamaged. Engineers set to work to salvage as much of the equipment and materials as possible and to place the mill in operating condition.

Moving its command post to the sawmill area, the troop continued patrols to the west and provided security for the engineer detachment working at the mill. Reports were frequently received from guerillas and civilians that some Japs were still evacuating toward the mountains, but no contacts were made. These same sources also stated that occasional groups of enemy stragglers from Cebu were landing on Negros and on the small islands just off the northeast and east coasts.

On April 12th, the necessary materials arrived and a ferry was established across the Himugaan. The troop immediately extended its reconnaissance on around the coast finding some bridges destroyed, but crossing the streams by various expedients. San Carlos, on the east coast, was reached on the 13th, and the Escalante area to the north was thoroughly searched but no contact was made.

On the 16th, one platoon reconnoitered east to west over the trans-island road running from Pinckawan to Pontevedra, finding it maintained in good condition by civilians and guerillas. The following day other elements reached Tanjay, twelve miles north of the Negros Oriental capital, Dumaguete. Neither of these patrols made any enemy contact.

The troop’s next mission was to obtain information regarding the enemy garrison at Dumaguete, which would be of value to the elements of the Americal Division, scheduled to make a landing at that point on April 26th. The troop’s movement southward, limited by Eighth Army order to barrio Looc, there contacted guerilla leaders and secured the information, which was relayed to the Americal Division. Remaining in position until the landing, which was unopposed, the patrol contacted the commander of the assault force and placed itself at his disposal for such reconnaissance missions as he might desire. Its mission complete, the patrol returned to Fabrica. During the remainder of the Negros’ operation the troop maintained patrols along the north coast and conducted several dismounted reconnaissance missions on the flanks of the enemy defensive positions near Patog.

Road to Banana Ridge

As mentioned previously, the original plan had called for an air landing by the 503rd Parachute Combat Team on order from the Commanding General. Alicante airfield had been tentatively selected as the target, with the mission of seizing the airfields, clearing the enemy from the northwest part of Negros, and protecting the left flank of the 185th. When the enemy’s evacuation of this area had been confirmed the plan was changed. The regiment, less one battalion, landed by water at Pandan Point on April 8th, and moved into line on the Division left flank astride the Silay-Manzanares road in position to advance abreast of the 185th Infantry.

The road along which the regiment was to fight its way in the succeeding weeks followed the crest of a long, narrow steep-sided ridge. As the advance progressed the road was found to be extensively mined. Aerial bombs obviously buried in haste were found at frequent intervals. Fortunately, the inexpert installation made detection simple and they were easily removed. Enemy defensive positions along the crest, consisting of pillboxes connected to personnel caves deep in the adjacent ravines, were difficult to destroy until the road had been widened.
and improved to permit tanks to move forward. Tank traps, constructed by cutting about a ten-foot section of the road to a depth of eight feet were encountered at several points. Roofed with saplings and covered with a layer of earth to give the appearance of a continuous road, they were immediately discovered when crossed by foot patrols. They presented no problem other than the inconvenience of moving material forward to bridge the narrow gap. The rugged terrain on either side of the road, with its precipitous slopes, enemy-infested, jungle-filled draws, and numerous fingerlike, divergent ridges, was combed by patrols as the advance progressed.

The enemy seemed well equipped with small arms including both light and heavy machine guns, grenade dischargers, and mortars, plus some 22-mm. and 40-mm. guns. Characteristically, he conserved his none too plentiful ammunition supply by holding his fire until our troops were at point-blank range. From the beginning, night attacks, generally of small size, were a regular feature of the enemy’s operations.

The 503rd’s advance against such a defense in such a terrain could only be made at considerable cost. Nevertheless, the regiment succeeded in inflicting considerably more casualties than it suffered, and took a heavy toll of enemy arms and equipment. During the period April 17th to May 1st inclusive, 307 enemy dead were counted. Besides uncounted individual arms, numerous machine guns were captured and/or destroyed, and several large supply dumps including food, a critical item with the enemy, were captured.

The 1st Battalion of the 503rd, which had been held at Mindoro in Army reserve, landed on Negros and rejoined the regiment on April 24th.

As the enemy’s main positions were approached and his major supply points threatened, his resistance stiffened. By May 2nd the main force of the 503rd had pushed eastward to a point approximately 3500 yards southeast of Manzanares and onto Banana Ridge, perpendicular to the axis of the advance, and last remaining high ground west of the deep gorge cut by the Malago River. Numerous minor contacts but no serious threat had developed on the left flank. On the right, contact was being maintained with the 185th Infantry. At this time, plans were laid for a coordinated attack on Patog by the 503rd and 185th RCT’s. The scheme called for the 503rd RCT to move south on Banana Ridge into the Patog area. At the same time, the 185th RCT, then at Lantawan, would advance on Patog from the east.

The 4th and 5th of May were devoted to patrolling and to artillery fire in preparation for the attack. Heavy rains hindered air strikes and delayed construction of the supply roads necessary for the bringing forward of heavy equipment. The troops jumped off on the 6th of May. Heavy resistance was expected immediately on Banana Ridge. Many of the enemy were thought to have escaped destruction by the preparatory bombardment simply by holing up in the deep caves and stout dugouts they had prepared well down on the reverse slopes of the ridges. The defilade and the method of construction rendered them all but impervious to our bombing and shelling.

The 185th, attacking Patog from the east, met bitter resistance. As this opposition was overcome the defenders of Banana Ridge, alarmed at the prospect of being attacked simultaneously from front and flank, suddenly abandoned their well prepared positions and fled eastward across the Malago River. Patrols working in all directions from Banana Ridge made only minor contacts with isolated groups during the succeeding days. The Patog area had been freed of enemy. On May 13th, leaving the 3rd Battalion in position attached to the 185th, the regiment moved to Murcia on the right flank of the 160th Infantry.

Capture of Guimbalaon and Lantawan

Several months prior to our landing the enemy had begun transporting huge quantities of supplies from the coastal towns to the Negritos-Patog defensive area. When the threat of our landing became a reality, every effort was made to hasten the incompletely task. Trucks, carrying parties and carabao carts were feverishly moving along roads from Guimbalaon to Patog. Such a lucrative target did not pass unattended. Day and night concentrations of fighters and dive bombers attacked the columns from March 31st until Guimbalaon was taken. Daily they destroyed trucks, installations and dumps, and inflicted uncounted casualties on personnel. Covering the routes of evacuation to Negritos and Patog, they forced the enemy to limit his movements to the hours of darkness.

The barrio of Guimbalaon was known to be the rendezvous and supply point for the fleeing troops and became the first objective of the 185th Infantry as it paralleled the 503rd’s advance to the hills. Indications were that the enemy planned originally to make an initial stand along the line Guimbalaon-Concepcion, but by April 1st it became apparent that he was forced to alter his intentions due to the unexpected swiftness of our advance which he had not been able to hinder.

On April 3rd a platoon of the Reconnaissance Troop, moving up from the Granada area to reconnoiter the eastern portion of the Silay-Guimbalaon road, made only minor contacts until it reached within 500 yards of Guimbalaon. There fire was encountered from enemy entrenched around the supply point. The platoon deployed and attempted to approach the barrio, first from the west and then from the south. Both times, it was repulsed by heavy rifle, 20-mm. and 37-mm. fire. Dense undergrowth in the wooded area prohibited complete observation, but at least 100 Japs were estimated to be in the im-

Wrecked Jap vehicles were common sights.
mediate vicinity of the barrio, and several gun positions were definitely located. During the action, the troops directed supporting aircraft against the target with good results.

Elements of the 185th followed up the next day and secured the area after a brief fire fight. Harassed by air and artillery in his attempts at evacuation, and pursued by ground troops advancing from the west, the enemy was forced to leave behind him considerable quantities of undamaged supplies and equipment. Principal items captured in the dumps were vehicles, engineer, medical and signal supplies, some arms, ammunition and vital stocks of food.

Throughout the week following capture of Guimbalaon, enemy action remained essentially delaying and harassing. The number of night infiltration attempts and diversionary raids "to confuse the enemy as to the location of the main defenses" increased. Demolition squads also made several feeble and unsuccessful attacks on installations in rear areas, notably bridges.

The enemy's AA guns, principally 20-mm and 40-mm, were somewhat more successful. Firing short bursts as our planes swooped low overhead, they succeeded in shooting down one B-24, one F4U, and damaging two other planes. Before the operation came to a close, a total of seven planes were lost over the Patog area, and several additional damaged.

As the battle moved farther east resistance became stronger. The first organized defense line, in the vicinity of San Juan, fell April 11th, just one week after the capture of Guimbalaon. This "line" consisted of mutually supporting pillboxes and trenches, but many of these were found to be unoccupied. Night attacks continued but were growing more costly to the enemy. During two days, April 11th-12th, the 185th killed 61 of the attackers.

Prior to dawn on the morning of the 13th, the enemy launched his first and only strong offensive action. An estimated 200 Japs made an attack on engineer, artillery and infantry perimeters in the 185th area. Repulsed in a three-hour battle which ended at dawn, they left behind 44 dead. Only minor damage was suffered by our forces.

On April 14th, the regiment took the high ground of San Juan and stood at the gateway of the long narrow corridor reaching to Lantawan. Before launching an attack against this formidable defense area, a two-day preparatory bombardment was conducted by our artillery and air force, during which another combat plane was lost to enemy AA fire. The third day brought torrential rains which forced the postponement of the attack until the following morning, the 17th. Jumping off, the ground troops immediately encountered heavy resistance. The enemy positions were of the same type and arrangement as those found in the 503rd area, and their defenders used the same tactics. From numerous well constructed bunkers, pillboxes, trenches and foxholes came fire of calibers ranging from small arms to three-inch guns. A particularly strongly defended position was a tank trap encountered 4000 yards west of San Juan.

The trap, dug to a depth of eighteen feet at a point where the road narrowed to a bare ten feet by sheer cliffs on either side, was covered by enemy fire. Self-propelled weapons could not be brought forward to support the infantry until the high ground beyond was secured to permit bulldozers to fill the trap. Repeated attacks were launched against the hostile positions. Each time the attackers were subjected to heavy mortar concentrations and artillery fire. After two days of bitter fighting, the area was finally cleared, bulldozers had repaired the road, and tanks rumbled forward.

Debouching onto the wide, flat Lantawan Plateau, surrounded by growth covered ridges and jungle-filled draws, the 1st Battalion deployed under heavy mortar and artillery fire. The 3rd Battalion on the left, pushing across deep ravines, reached the north edge of the plateau on the same day. On April 24th, the battalions joined and supported by tanks fought to the eastern edge of the plateau, where they began cleaning out caves, spider holes and pillboxes along the fringes of the deep Malisbog draw. The road having been secured and improved, 105-mm. howitzers, 40-mm. and 90-mm. AA guns, tanks and M-7's were moved forward and emplaced close to the front lines in position for direct fire.

To the east, high wooded Virgne Ridge, named in memory of 1st Lieut. Sidney E. Virgne, who was killed during the attack, commanded both the Lantawan plain and the Patog area. Separating Virgne Ridge from our forward positions, the forbidding Malisbog draw, deep and dense with vegetation, concealed an unknown number of Japanese. Firing artillery point-blank from the brink of the gorge and pounding rear areas by successive air strikes, two days were again spent in softening up enemy positions. On May 1st, the attack began. Infantry advancing across the draw attacking from two directions, reached the crest of Virgne Ridge against only light resistance. Several more days were spent in cleaning out bypassed enemy pockets and reaching the western edge of Patog. Patrols entering Patog made only minor enemy contacts before meeting patrols of the 503rd advancing south down Banana Ridge. Enemy positions were found abandoned, bivouac areas deserted. The remaining enemy had hastily withdrawn southward to the wooded ridges leading to Hills 4055 and 4500.

Concepcion to Dolan Hill

On Y-Day, the 160th Infantry, minus the 2nd Battalion and Cannon Company, which remained on Panay, constituted the Division Reserve afloat. On Y-plus-1, the
RCT landed and took over the beachhead area. On Y-plus-2, one battalion moved down the Talisay-Concepcion road to engage the Jap force which reconnaissance had contacted the day before. Patrols preceding the battalion reconnoitered east from Granada to Concepcion, in which area civilians had reported several hundred Japs dug in along the road, but only minor contacts were made. The enemy apparently was continuing his withdrawal. Combat elements moving forward the following day, however, found Concepcion reoccupied by the enemy during the night. After a brief fire fight the barrio was finally secured on the same day the 185th occupied Guimbalaon. Moving approximately two miles farther east, the 160th encountered only moderate resistance.

The next regimental objective was the prominent ter-

Dolan Hill—a costly objective

rain feature. Hill 3155, later named Dolan Hill in tribute to 1st Lieutenant John W. Dolan, first officer to be killed in the attack. This hill commanded the approaches to the Patog area from the west and was indicated as the left flank of the enemy’s defensive line. During the approach it was believed that elements of Colonel Yamaguchi’s 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion, and probably elements of the 102nd Division Transport Regiment, the 32nd Airfield Company, and the 61st Anchorage Unit were among the defending forces. However, nearly all the 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion (less the 3rd Company, destroyed at Alimodian by the Reconnaissance Troop) and elements of the 355th Independent Infantry Battalion were actually engaged before Dolan Hill was finally taken.

In this sector, too, the enemy fought a delaying action from prepared and temporary positions on the flat open terrain west of the hill, his resistance stiffening in measure as the battle neared the mountains. The Japs were particularly active at night, using harassing fire freely against our perimeters in addition to frequent night infiltration attacks and diversionary raids.

As the advance elements drew within range, enemy positions on the forward slopes of the hill opened up with a heavy fire which they sporadically maintained throughout the ensuing weeks. Mortar and 20mm automatic fire was particularly heavy.

Patrols reconnoitering far out on the right flank made minor contacts and located enemy defensive positions near the base of Hill 4055, just southeast of Dolan Hill.
One company was sent to the area to develop the situation on that flank. Separated from the battalion by deep ravines, the unit received its supplies by air drops from cub planes. It was during one such drop that Major Francis E. Tredget, regimental supply officer, lost his life when the plane was shot down by enemy fire.

The 3rd Battalion, working across draws on the northern slopes of Dolan Hill in an effort to support and establish contact with the 185th, then approaching Lantawan, met determined resistance from well entrenched enemy at several points. Impeded in their movement by the deep cut, thickly vegetated draws, three days were spent in reducing the hostile positions and mopping up bypassed areas.

On April 17th, after two days of artillery and aerial preparation and one day of bad weather, elements of the 1st Battalion jumped off on an attack up the northwest slopes of Dolan Hill.

Opposition was light the first day, but the advance was slow. Climbing the steep slope by grasping branches and roots, successive enemy positions were reached and overcome by the infantry. Late the second day, forward elements were within 100 yards of the hill crest. There the battle of Dolan Hill began in earnest. Establishing a perimeter on the steep mountainside, the battalion dug in for the night, prepared to continue the attack the following day. That night, from their strongly entrenched positions above the infantry, the enemy laid down a withering fire. Blocks of dynamite, pole charges and grenades were tossed into the perimeter by the hostile forces on top of the hill. Unable to bring counterfire of flat trajectory weapons to bear, and too close for artillery support, the unit was finally withdrawn. Our artillery covered the withdrawal and blasted the Jap positions throughout the remainder of the night.

During the succeeding days, several attempts to reach the crest met with the same determined resistance. Air and artillery blasted the enemy location, but their well prepared positions withstood the pounding, and results were negligible. On April 21st, a small knoll near the crest was reached and held. Both sides had suffered casualties. A number of enemy machine guns had been destroyed but the hostile force had not been dislodged. His defensive positions had been cleverly designed. Personnel caves on the reverse slope of the knoll were connected by a network of communication trenches to mutually supporting pillboxes well hidden on the narrow ridge. High on the crest of the hill in rear of these positions, machine guns sighted to cover the forward positions were later found.

For several days the situation remained unchanged. Sandbags were stacked in front of our positions to afford protection from snipers and machine guns. Any movement forward of this protection met with heavy fire from automatic weapons and mortars. Attempts were made to flank the enemy pocket, but the sheer sides of the rocky ridge prevented such moves. A trench dug forward from our position to a point where the enemy could be observed was partially successful, but observers were subjected to heavy small arms fire.

The exhausting task of supplying the assault units became more complicated. Hundreds of native carriers were employed in carrying ammunition and rations up the precipitous slopes to permit the employment of the maximum number of troops in the fighting. Engineers began bulldozing a winding road up the mountain to replace the "trail of a thousand steps" which the troops had blazed for the carriers.

Weather was another impediment. Heavy rains were common, and although mornings were not infrequently clear, low lying clouds almost invariably settled over the high ground during the afternoon, cutting visibility to a few feet.

Finally the decision was made to withdraw the troops from the hill for four days while all available air and artillery was concentrated on the enemy positions. P-38's, F4U's and A-20's, carrying 250 and 1000 pound bombs, strafed and bombed the hilltop in over 100 sorties. Massed fires of the division artillery were laid in successive concentrations on the area, and intermittent shelling continued night and day. Early on May 15th, the fifth day, the infantry moved again to the crest under the protection of heavy artillery fire. The four-day preparation had proved devastating in its effect. The once dense vegetation had been completely cleared: not a leaf remained on the bare tree stumps; 41 enemy pillboxes were found blasted to bits; over 200 enemy dead were discovered, and
Our troops moved to the crest unopposed. Patrols working down the sides of the ridge made several minor contacts, but the dazed remnants of the enemy force were unable to resist the occupation.

Meanwhile, the regiment had been clearing its flanks. Position by position, the enemy defenses on the northwestern slopes were reduced. The large draw running northwest from the crest of the hill offered particularly difficult terrain in which to operate. Thickly wooded, steep-sided and deep, it offered perfect concealment and much natural cover to the defenders. Patrols combed it yard by yard, completely destroying each dugout, pillbox and cave discovered to prevent reoccupation.

From April 26th to 29th, the 2nd Battalion, 185th Infantry, attached to the 160th Infantry, was employed on the regiment's right in an attempt to reach the crests of Dolan Hill and Hill 4055 from that flank. The advance under enemy fire, however, was slow due to the virtually impassable terrain and the battalion was finally returned to the 185th at Lantawan where it could be more effectively employed.

**Terkukuni and Kasagi Ridge**

By this time, the enemy situation was rapidly deteriorating. Heavy casualties were known to have been sustained by the enemy and his food and ammunition supplies were slowly dwindling. Approximately 500 effectives constituted his total combat strength, according to estimates. All that remained of his original defensive line was a small pocket on the north end of Dolan Hill and the Hill 4055 entrenchments. His division headquarters had been discovered and shelled by artillery and finally overrun by infantry. It was believed that the seizure of Hill 4055 would render his forces impotent and end the Negros operation.

By May 11th, the 185th Infantry was pushing south from Patog. The 3rd Battalion, 503rd, was meeting stubborn resistance along a line running west from the Malago and several hundred yards south of Patog astride the ridge which the Japs had named Terukuni. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 185th were engaged in cleaning out the deep ravine of the Malisbog on the right of the 503rd, while the 1st Battalion advanced up a ridge running south from Lantawan. This slope, actually the northern part of Hill 4055 mass, the Japanese had named Kasagi Ridge.

From the crest of Dolan Hill the 160th was in position to assist by fire and observation the advance of the 185th on Kasagi. Elements of the 185th advanced 500 yards the first day and 400 on the second. The ground had been well prepared by the enemy, with particular attention to sniper positions. Automatic weapons were numerous, and many heavy machine guns were encountered. Terukuni Ridge just to the east was also strongly fortified in the same manner. Its heavy rain forest was spotted with snipers both on the ground and in the trees, and on at least one occasion a machine gun was encountered mount-
ed on a platform built in a tree. Also in this area was the enemy's last known 20mm guns.

Both Terukuni and Kasagi were subjected to bombardment by artillery, mortars and aircraft, as the 185th moved forward. Gains were still in hundreds of yards. Enemy positions were cleverly concealed, and the Japs were careful not to give them away unnecessarily. Patrols carried the burden of the operation, locating defense points and in most cases destroying them on the spot.

The 160th Infantry at this time had consolidated its positions on the crest of Dolan Hill and was feeling out the enemy stronghold on the edge of the spur which ran north therefrom. This last stand position on the hill was a knot of strongly entrenched, well constructed pillboxes and interlacing trenches. In order to reduce this defense area it was necessary for one unit to encircle it by moving around the flanks along slopes verging on the vertical, while the other attacked frontally. Such movements were necessarily slow and subject to immediate and heavy enemy fire at any time they were observed. Having encircled the position, the assault units faced each other at a distance of 150 yards with the enemy position them. Artillery was registered on the enemy pocket. Precision adjustment was necessitated by the proximity of our troops. On the morning of May 3rd, a division concentration was laid on the area. When fire was lifted the infantry closed in and easily overran the position. One hundred twenty-nine enemy dead were counted in the area, 15 machine guns were captured, and 42 pillboxes destroyed. The last of the enemy's basic combat units, the 172nd Independent Infantry Battalion of the 77th Brigade, had been destroyed.

During the next few days several enemy stragglers were killed, but the battle for Dolan Hill, the core of the enemy defense on Negros, was over.

The occupation of Dolan Hill lent security to the 185's right flank on Kasagi Ridge, but the problem of hunting down each separate enemy position continued there and on Terukuni. Most of these positions were small, but on the Malisbog side of Terkuni, approximately a mile south of Patog, a strong defense was encountered. In an area about 100 yards in depth, a series of pillboxes defended by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and by at least one 20mm gun extended across the ridge. Snipers hidden in trees and on the flanks made the development of this defense area difficult. When strongpoints were taken under artillery or mortar fire the enemy would either move to adjacent positions or forward toward our troops into the safety zone which had been left between them and the target area.

Gradually, the enemy withdrew from both Terukuni and Kasagi. Rear guards maintained the stubborn resistance while hospitals, food stocks and other supplies were evacuated. Until May 29th, heavy fire was received from enemy on Kasagi, just below the crest of Hill 4055. That night, the enemy evacuated, and patrols and advance elements which reached the top of the hill the next day did so with only minor contact. On May 31st, the positions in the Malisbog area, described above, were strongly defended. On June 1st, they were found abandoned. Numerous prisoners of war reported that the enemy was making their withdrawal to the south and east toward Mount Mandalagan and Sulphur Springs.

However, from the Patog area some remnants retreated east across the deep Malago ravine. During the advance along Terukuni contacts were made on the left flank along the Malago River east and southeast of Patog. Moving across the river our forces destroyed the enemy they could contact and scattered the remainder until, except for a concentration of 100-200 in the vicinity of Mount Silay, only small groups and individuals with little or no arms or food remained.

Hills 3355 and 4055

The disastrous defeats suffered by the enemy in the Patog area and on Dolan Hill had rendered the enemy force impotent. Less than 2000 effective combat troops remained and they, suffering from fatigue and hunger, exposed to sickness and disease, were incapable of any offensive action. Small arms ammunition was limited and food stocks were sufficient for not more than two months. Morale was extremely low and mutual disrespect between officers and enlisted men was rampant. To attack was impossible, to continue the defense in the forward areas meant annihilation, and to remain long in the mountains meant starvation. The only possible hope of survival was to disengage and seek sources of food in the cultivated areas along the coastal plain or in the valleys to the south and east.

As was subsequently determined, General Kono, the
Japanese commander, ordered a withdrawal to Yamamoto Valley near Mount Mandalagan. The force was divided into four main groups. The first of these, including the division headquarters, was to bivouac in Yamamoto Valley; the second would forage north along the Himugaan River to the Fabrica area; the third in the direction of San Carlos; and the fourth along the upper reaches of the Bago River. Rear guards consisting largely of personnel who were physically incapable of movement were left in position to delay our pursuit.

Routes to these areas passed southeast of Hill 4055 and over Hill 3355 and Hill 4500, known to the Japs as Tenshin Mountain. Sulphur Springs, near Hill 3355, became a temporary resupply point. The plan was learned from various sources almost as soon as it was contemplated, and moves were made to interfere with it. Immediately following the capture of Patog the 503rd Parachute Infantry had been moved to the Division right flank near Murcia and was given the mission of cutting the withdrawal route by securing Hills 3355 and 4500.

Moving quickly through the wide draw which led to Hill 3355 from the west, the regiment encountered generally moderate resistance from small organized enemy groups in the area. A stiffer defense was met, however, when the top of Hill 3355 itself was reached. The main attack was up the northwest slope over a ridge running southeast from Hill 4055. Along this ridge ran one of the enemy’s main evacuation routes. A secondary attack was also made on the southwest slope of Hill 3355.

Both assaults met strong resistance. The enemy still had a number of automatic weapons and sufficient ammunition in this area to contest the severance of his routes of withdrawal. All advances against the hill met with fire from prepared positions. Patrols searching in the direction of Hill 4055 encountered strong opposition both on and off the trail. In the draw along which the approach had been made both stragglers and small organized groups continued to be encountered and destroyed.

However, the enemy’s plan did not contemplate defending Hill 3355 to the bitter end, and when our advance elements reached the top of the hill on May 27th they found the area evacuated.

Documents and prisoners indicated that Hill 4500, just to the north, had been an assembly area for the retreating enemy. Forces were immediately dispatched to clear that area and destroy such installations or supplies as might be found. Resistance was sporadic and whenever withdrawing Japs could be contacted a brisk fire fight generally ensued, but the enemy’s desire to avoid our troops as much as possible and to complete his evacuation as planned was obvious.

The action resulted in the capture of many supplies which the Japs could ill afford to spare. Prisoners, who now began surrendering in increasing numbers, regu-
larly reported extreme shortages of food, arms and ammunition. They confirmed reports that their field hospital, which had been forced to move time and again, was totally without medical supplies. Abandoning all hope for their sick and wounded, and unwilling to “waste” food on the dying, patients were put on half rations. When the hospitals were moved, patients who were not able to stand the long trek over the mountains were deserted and left to their fate. Their only hope of relief was the hand grenades they had been given with which to destroy themselves.

By June 1st, our patrols were operating east of Hill 4500 as well as beyond 3355. Few contacts were made. A reconnaissance patrol up the Bago River toward Mount Mandalagan made no contact, but guerrillas in the area reported frequent contacts with small foraging parties.

Close of the Operation

That the Japanese on Negros were now thoroughly beaten could not be doubted. Every terrain feature which in their original plans they had contemplated defending had been overrun and the survivors scattered.

From the beginning of the campaign in the hills, regular drops of surrender leaflets had been made on all enemy areas. Following the capture of Dolan Hill, the G-2 Language Section, with the voluntary help of a prisoner, delivered via public address system appeals for the enemy to surrender. Broadcasts were also conducted in the Patog and Hill 3355 areas. Results were not immediate, but propaganda coupled with the enemy’s calamitous situation eventually brought daily surrenders of groups averaging from five to ten men.

In their statements these prisoners universally confirmed reports regarding the enemy’s shortage of supplies and loss of personnel and acknowledged the hopelessness not only of their own situation but that of the Japanese nation as well.

At the close of May, 4000 Jap dead had been counted and 4,600 more estimated killed, with 90 prisoners captured or surrendered.

During June, the 503rd Parachute Combat Team, augmented by the 7th Military District, took over the sectors of the 185th and 160th Infantry Regiments.

On the 1st of July, responsibility for all of Negros and operational control of the 7th Military District and certain non-divisional Army units passed to the Commanding Officer, 503rd Parachute Combat Team.

As 40th Division elements and certain attached units were relieved, they were moved to Iloilo, Panay, where the Division was being concentrated.

Battalion command post on the slopes on Dolan Hill. The mud was unbelievable.

A time for prayer. On the lower slopes of Dolan Hill.

Wonderful work by surgeons saved many a wounded G. I.
Campaigns by R. C. J. 108

On

Leyte, Masbata and Mindanao
LEYTE CAMPAIGN

On March 8, 1945, the 108th RCT, including the 164th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 115th Engineers, and Company C, 115th Medical Battalion sailed from Lingayen, Luzon, to Ormoc, Leyte. There the RCT came under the 8th Army Area Command and was given the mission of destroying enemy forces still operating in the northwestern part of Leyte.

Before embarking from Luzon, 1,038 officers and enlisted men from the 108th had been transferred to the 160th Infantry and 185th Infantry, bringing those units to strength. On its arrival at Ormoc, the 108th and other units of the RCT were brought up to strength with the addition of 67 officers and 1,860 enlisted men.

From April 10th to May 1st, the First and Third Battalions conducted an offensive in the Villaba-Abijao-Bugabuga area killing 1,007 Japs while suffering 15 men killed in action.

MASBATE

On April 7, 1945, the Masbate Task Force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George Wood, which consisted of the Second Battalion, AT Platoon, Cannon Company, platoons from Company C, 115th Engineers and Company C, 115th Medics, and other attached units landed at Masbate town on the island of Masbate, north of Leyte.

For three weeks this force covered Masbate's hills destroying the enemy until there were not enough Japs left to be considered a threat, and their elimination was turned over to Filipino guerrillas.

MINDINAO CAMPAIGN

Without a rest after successfully terminating its operations on Leyte and Masbate, RCT 108 was completely assembled and combat loaded at Ormoc on May 8th.

At 0830 on May 10, 1945, the First Battalion made an assault landing, which was surprisingly unopposed, at Bugo on Macajalar Bay on northern Mindanao. The rest of the RCT was ashore by 1200 and the advance down the Sayre Highway, main tactical highway on Mindanao, was begun.

Many defensive positions were found along the highway, but none were occupied. The enemy was reported withdrawing and his column was bombed and strafed by supporting planes.

The Del Monte airdromes were secured by the Third Battalion on the morning of May 12th. Again many well-organized unoccupied defensive positions were found along the highway, and large quantities of enemy mortar ammunition, aerial bombs, and disabled trucks and engineering equipment were captured.

On the 13th, First and Third Battalion patrols ran into heavy fire at the entrance to Mangima Canyon and the First Battalion CP received 31 rounds of 90mm mortar fire. This was the first determined resistance encountered by the 108th on Mindanao, and developed into one of the most difficult operations in the Philippines.

After an air strike on the morning of the 15th, the Second and Third Battalions launched an attack with the Third Battalion running into heavy mortar, artillery, and rifle fire, in addition to a wired-in mine field. The enemy occupied advantageous positions, expertly camouflaged, and covered his mine fields with fire.

The attack was continued the next day by the First Battalion, and the Mangima River was crossed against stiff resistance supported by fire from tanks. As the attack pressed forward, our covering fire drove the enemy into their caves, allowing the assault platoons to move up to the entrances and destroy many Japs and positions, using bazookas, grenades, and rifles.

It was imperative that an early junction of the 108th and the 31st Infantry Division be expedited to open adequate supply lines to our forces operating in Central Mindanao.

On Q-plus 7, 17th May, while the First Battalion was still engaged in the bitter fight for Mangima Canyon, the Second Battalion, bypassing the resistance, was once more advancing on the Sayre Highway. The Third Battalion had been withdrawn from the canyon and ordered to follow the Second Battalion. PW's reported that all Jap troops were withdrawing to Malaybalay.

Upon completion of mopping up operations in Mangima Canyon, the First Battalion joined in the advance. Artillery had displaced from Del Monte to the rim of the canyon after an effective bombardment on Maluko had severely damaged the enemy and influenced his evacuation and abandonment of the town.

At Maluko the bridge across the Calaman River had been destroyed, as well as numerous smaller bridges along the route of advance. It was impossible to keep supply lines open and to displace artillery because of the rapid advance, which continued with supplies being dropped from the air.

At 1430 on May 24th, leading elements of the First Battalion contacted leading elements of the First Battalion, 155th Infantry, 2,000 yards south of Impalutao.

Recognizing the significance of this meeting, Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger, Commanding General of the Eighth Army, sent the following commendation:

"My wholehearted commendation goes to every member of the 108th Regimental Combat Team for the courage, determination, and speed displayed in their successful junction with the 31st Infantry Division at Impalutao, Bukidnon, Mindanao. This rapid thrust over extremely difficult terrain and against enemy resistance has succeeded in dividing the Japanese forces on Mindanao. It will materially assist in the ultimate, complete destruction of the Japanese forces. It is with a feeling of utmost pride that I congratulate each officer and man of your command for the completion of a job well done."

However, this junction did not end operations of the 108th on Mindanao.

The First, Second, and Third Battalions were ordered to proceed to Malaybalay. These units arrived there at 1030 on May 26th, and reverted to 31st Division control. The 865th Engineer Aviation Battalion, with the 108th AT Company attached for security, was ordered to continue construction of bridges along the Sayre Highway to Malaybalay, assisted by Company C, 115th Engineer Battalion.

On May 30th, operations began by separate Battalions. The First was attached to the 124th Infantry and began shuttling to Managok.

Contact was not made until June 7th when a patrol from Company A reached the 124th Infantry position west of Maglamin. Activity of this battalion until June 15th consisted of securing the lines of communications,
supply, and evacuation for forces operating in the vicinity
of Maglamin.

The initial assignment of the Second Battalion was to
relieve elements of the 155th Infantry guarding lines of
communications along the Sayre Highway and vital in­
stallations in the Malaybalay area. Company G, reinforced
moved to Alnib to seek out and destroy the enemy in an
independent action.

On June 11th a patrol from G Company was ambushed
in the vicinity of Kratoan by group of approximately 40
Japs who faked surrender. Fifteen Japs were killed in the
ensuing fire fight; Company G's casualties were one kill­
ed and five wounded.

By June 6th the Second Battalion had been relieved
of security missions in the Malabalay area and moved into
an assembly area 3,500 yards west of Managok. Their
orders were to relieve the First Battalion, 124th Infantry,
on the Managok-Maglamin trail. This relief was effected
June 8th and the advance continued against heavy ma­
chine gun and sniper fire.

Due to the extreme difficulty of supply along the trail,
the advance had to be halted to allow rations to be
brought up. Supply by air drops began on June 13th. The
enemy was found to be in a desperate condition for food,
but scattered groups still fought bitterly.

On June 5th the Third Battalion participated in a
parade celebrating the opening of the Sayre Highway. The
parade was reviewed by General of the Armies Douglas
MacArthur.

On June 6th the Third Battalion was attached to the
124th Infantry. During the ensuing six days the battalion
fought its way through Silae to Cabanglasan. Patrolling
was carried out to the east, south, and west, and on June
15th contact was made between the Second and Third
Battalions.

The 164th Field Artillery Battalion reached Malaybalay
on June 3rd and went into an assembly area. From posi­
tions of Managok, they provided supporting fires until
June 14th, when all friendly forces were out of range.
Two were killed and eight wounded on June 10th when
20 rounds of enemy knee mortar fire dropped on the 115th
Engineer Dump and Third Battalion field train at the
Malaybalay air strip.

In the Mindanao campaign, the 164th Field Artillery
Battalion fired 2,767 rounds in 50 concentrations. Expert
medical aid and hazardous evacuation were performed by
Company C, 115th Medical Battalion. The work of Com­
pany C, 115th Engineer Battalion in constructing bridges
and improving the heavily used Sayre Highway was par­
ticularly outstanding.

Casualties for the RCT were 43 killed or died, and 148
wounded. Two hundred eighty-six Japs were killed, 19
captured. In addition, guerilla forces killed 151 of the
enemy and took three prisoners.

As a result of the operations of the RCT 108 on this
island, the Bugo-Del Monte area was secured for use
by friendly forces, organized defense of a large part of
the island was destroyed, and the vital Sayre Highway
was opened as the primary route of supply to forces op­
erating inland.

Soon after its arrival on Panay, the 108th RCT re­
ceived another commendation, this time from Major
General F. C. Sibert, Commanding General of the X
Corps. It read:

"I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the 108th
Regimental Combat Team for its contribution to the
Victor Five Operation.

The Manner in which it accomplished all assigned mis­
sions, under the most trying conditions, was notable and
reflects great credit on the proficiency and experience of
your command.

The Commanding General, Eighth Army, felicitated
the X Corps upon the success of the operation. That suc­
cess was due in no small measure to the cooperation and
effort of your personnel."

RCT 108 was relieved on June 15th and retraced its
steps back over the Sayre Highway to Bugo where it
sailed for Panay to rejoin the 40th Division on June
20th.

After six months of continuous combat, broken only by
fifteen days in which the Division was busily engaged in
preparation for the Visayan campaign, the Division en­
tered upon a well-earned period of rest and recreation.
The Division's part in the Philippine campaign was finish­
ed. All major islands of the group were once again in
American hands, and battered remnants were all that
remained of the once proud Imperial Japanese Army of
the Philippines.

After the 40th Division, less the 108th RCT, withdrew
from NEGROS, following the completion of the VICTOR­
ONE and VICTOR-ONE-ABLE Central Philippine Op­
erations, it moved to PANAY where it commenced after­
combat rehabilitation. In July the 108th RCT returned
from MINDANAO and joined the Division on PANAY.
The Division consolidated its forces with the 108th In­
fantry in the OTON area, the 160th and 185th Infantry
PROPOSED OLYMPIC OPERATION - INITIAL ATTACK BY 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION - SPEARHEADED BY 160TH INFANTRY.
Preparation for the Olympic Campaign
Regiments in the SANTA BARBARA area and the Division Artillery in the TIGBAUAN area. The Division Commander, Major General Rapp Brush, who had led the Division throughout its Philippine Island Campaigns, returned to the United States on temporary duty and subsequently retired; Brigadier General Donald J. Myers was then assigned to the Division and assumed command. The 40th Division was scheduled to play an important part in the forthcoming invasion of Japan. Under theegis of the 6th Army, the Division was to make a preliminary landing against five islands off Southern Kyushu several days in advance of the main effort of the OLYMPIC Operation. These amphibious landings were intended to secure the principle islands of the KOSH- IKI RETTO Group and thereby afford security to the main effort directed against Southern Kyushu by the 6th Army. In two carefully guarded planning buildings, the staff of the 40th Division held continued planning conferences, and worked out in detail the complex problems presented by this amphibious mission. Careful coordination with the Navy was established and elaborate plans laid for supplying troops fighting on barren, volcanic islands in a wet-cold climate without local water supplies. Shortly before V-J day, tentative Field Order No. 19 was completed and prepared for submission to Sixth Army Headquarters.

In addition to planning for the OLYMPIC Operation, the Division was, from 1 July until the Japanese surrender on 16 August, concerned with the relief and return to PANAY of supporting service units still concluding missions of NEGROS, the reception and screening of replacements, the re-equipping of the Division, and, finally a detailed program of combat refresher training. Troops attended Division schools on the M-7 self-propelled Howitzer, combined tank-infantry tactics, chemical warfare, operation of the Wessel supply vehicle, graves registration, and signal training. Of outstanding importance to troops destined for a campaign of island warfare were the amphibious training school at SUBIC BAY, LUZON and the amphibious training problems on PANAY and NEGROS. The school was conducted by General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, and the Division sent selected officers to attend. In the amphibious problems conducted by the Division, using ships of TRANSRON 47, troops made actual landings on the Southwestern coast of NEGROS, near the little town of HIMAMAY-LAN, 25 kilometers south of VAL- LODALID and at White Beach, TIGBAUAN, PANAY. Concurrent with this amphibious training which could accommodate only one RCT at a time, all units not so engaged were subjected to intense combat training punctuated by field exercises designed to simulate all the exigencies of combat.

On 16 August, 1945, Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced the cessation of all hostilities and although an estimated twelve days were needed for the orders to reach all outlying Japanese outposts, the war was officially ended. In order to disseminate the surrender news to the 1,700 odd Japanese soldiers on Panay, liaison planes dropped information pamphlets throughout the island stipulating that surrender panels be displayed by all units and that a preliminary surrender meeting was scheduled for 27 August. A surrender party of no more than twenty-five Japanese was directed to report on that day to American officers at the dam above MAASIN. On 28 August, a day late, an American reconnaissance plane observed the surrender party near the dam; a meeting was duly effected between the Japanese and Americans, and in the ensuing conference plans were made to receive the formal surrender of all Japanese forces on PANAY and to evacuate them from the MT SINGIT and BUCARI Areas. On 1 September, Lieutenant Colonel Ryoichi Tozuke, Commanding Officer of all Imperial Japanese Forces on PANAY, Philippine Islands, and his staff, surrendered their arms and samurai swords to the advance surrender party. This group responded to our drop message on the Japanese surrender, and came down to learn the terms imposed by Colonel R. G. Stanton, commanding 160th Infantry. The announcement of Japan’s surrender on 16 August necessitated cessation of all hostilities, and although an estimated twelve days were needed for the orders to reach all outlying Japanese outposts, the war was officially ended. In order to disseminate the surrender news to the 1,700 odd Japanese soldiers on Panay, liaison planes dropped information pamphlets throughout the island stipulating that surrender panels be displayed by all units and that a preliminary surrender meeting was scheduled for 27 August. A surrender party of no more than twenty-five Japanese was directed to report on that day to American officers at the dam above Maasin. On 28 Aug., a day late, the meeting was duly effected between the Japanese and the Americans. In the ensuing conference plans were made to receive the formal surrender of all Japanese forces on Panay, and to evacuate them from the Mt. SINGIT and BUCARI areas. On 1 September, Lieut. Col. Ryoichi Tozuke, Commanding Officer of all Imperial Japanese Forces on Panay, Philippine Islands, and his staff, surrendered their arms and samurai swords

The advance surrender party. This group responded to our drop message on the Japanese surrender, and came down to learn the terms imposed by Colonel R. G. Stanton, commanding 160th Infantry.
to the Commanding Officer, 160th Infantry. And on the
next day the formal instrument of surrender was signed
at a ceremony on the Santa Barbara airstrip. Within a
few days over 1750 Japanese soldiers and civilian camp fol-
lowers, including women and children, had been confined
in the Santa Barbara Prisoner-of-War Compound.

PREPARATION FOR THE BLACKLIST
OPERATION

The Occupation of Southern Korea

The announcement of Japan's surrender on 16 Aug-
ust necessitated the immediate cancellation of all plan-
ing for the OLYMPIC Operation and the prompt in-
ception of a training program designed to prepare the
troops for the occupation of Korea. All schools and train-
ing problems were suspended and all attending personnel
ordered to return post-haste to their parent units. While
the Division consolidated its equipment at ILOILO pre-
paratory to embarkation, all RCT's initiated elaborate
plans to cope with the anticipated exigencies of military
government. Personnel, both officers and enlisted men,
were selected on the basis of civilian and military experi-
ence to form Regimental Military Government Teams.
Although detailed information on "The Hermit Kingdom"
was limited and consisted largely of geographical and
topographical data, the Regimental Military Government
Teams were carefully briefed in their responsibilities and

Many of the sick and wounded managed to walk in

This one could not make it by walking
soldiers to handle this heavy machine gun. They carried it approximately 17 miles.

The Japanese were ordered to bring out all arms and ammunition when they surrendered on Panay, P. I. It took the four soldiers to handle this heavy machine gun. They carried it approximately 17 miles.

on the available intelligence of Korean customs, history and political composition. In addition to the specialized instruction of these teams, all Division troops were given careful and methodical indoctrination in the responsibilities of the individual soldier participating in the occupation of Korea. Emphasis was constantly made upon the maintenance of a high order of military courtesy and discipline in an effort to impress upon all soldiers that they were ambassadors of democracy and not arrogant harbingers of a conquering nation. The entire program revolved about the concept that the behavior of all soldiers should be motivated by a "kindly but firm" attitude, applicable as well to the conquered Japanese as to the liberated Koreans.

An 19 August the Commanding General of the XXIV Corps was appointed as the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea and was told he would "act for CINCAFPAC in reception of surrender of senior Japanese Commanders and all Japanese ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in Korea South of 38 degrees North Latitude." On 20 August, Brigadier General Myers, Commanding General, 40th Division, with a planning staff consisting of the AC of S, G-3, and Assistant AC of S, G-3, AC of S, G-4, AC of S, G-2, Signal Officer, Judge Advocate General acting as Civil Affairs Officer, and the Division Transportation Quartermaster departed for OKINAWA by plane to report to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps. On the 22nd, the 40th Infantry Division was notified that as of 15 August it was relieved from control of 6th Army and passed to control of XXIV Corps. At the meeting in OKINAWA, plans for the occupation of Southern Korea were discussed and the AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4, dated 15 August, which delineated the fundamental operations and policies to be followed in the movement to and occupation of Korea, was presented in detail to the Division Commander and his staff. On 24 August the Commanding General and his planning party returned to PANAY and were soon followed by a liaison officer with Field Order No. 55, Headquarters XXIV Corps, dated 28 August 1945.

Field Order No. 55 expanded in detail the original AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4. In brief summary, the order directed as follows: XXIV Corps to establish control over Japanese armed forces and the civilian population in Korea and to impose surrender terms requiring immediate military action; the occupation would be effected in three phases: Phase I, or BAKER-FORTY, was the joint overwater operation, landing at INCH'ON and occupation of the KYONGSANG Area. E Day for BAKER-FORTY was tentatively set as 7 September and the operation was to be performed by the 7th Infantry Division; Phase II, or BAKER-FORTY-ONE, to be effected by the 40th Infantry Division, comprised the occupation of BUSAN and Southeastern Korea, while the final phase, BAKER-FORTY-TWO, was to include the occupation of KUNSAN-CHONGJU Area of Southwestern Korea. The mission of the 40th Infantry Division was to embark at ILOILO in shipping under the control of the 7th Amphibious Force, the overwater movement to be under the direction of COMPHIB Group 13 using ships of TRANSPORT 21, and the convoys were to land at INCH'ON, Korea, "or as may be directed." The Division was to move inland, relieve the 7th Division of responsibility for the area south of INCH'ON-KYONGSANG, extend communication routes south and east and establish headquarters at the Port of BUSAN in Southeastern Korea. Particular emphasis was laid upon making full preparations for a possible resumption of hostilities and the Division outloaded from PANAY and landed in Korea as a combat force.

The end of August and the first week in September found the 40th Infantry Division consolidating its personnel, and preparing to unload. Suitable beaches for outloading were selected by the Division and approved by representatives from Amphibious Group 13 which was responsible for lifting the 40th Infantry Division with attached troops, consisting of 14,389 officers and enlisted men. The loading was accomplished by the separate RCT's and convoys leaving ILOILO were accompanied by a token naval escort whose principle function was to protect the convoys from the floating mines which abounded in the Yellow Sea area. The first ship to leave PANAY was the LSD CARTER HALL, which departed on 7 September with the advance party of the 40th Division and elements of the 532nd EB & SR. On 12 September, with its cargo loaded, the tractor group of the 160th Infantry and the heavy equipment of the 532nd EB & SR began loading personnel and on 13 September this group departed ILOILO. It was the first slow convoy of the first echelon and consisted of six LST's, five LSM's and one PCE. On 13 September, the first fast convoy of the first echelon, consisting of five APA's, one AKA and one PCE, departed. On 17 September the first slow convoy of the second echelon, consisting of five LST's, five LSM's and one APD departed ILOILO; on 18 September the first slow convoy of the third echelon departed ILOILO and on 22 September the departure of the fast convoy of the third echelon, consisting of four APA's, one AKA and one APD, completed the lift of the 40th Infantry Division with the exception of two LST loads of heavy replacement equipment. It is interesting to note that the severity of seasonal storms made it necessary for the two LST's to proceed to LINGAYEN GULF where they were incorporated into a larger task unit which, leaving on 5 October, com-
Terms of surrender are read to Jap commander by Colonel Stanton through U. S. Army interpreter.

pleted the 40th Division lift. Throughout the loading phase of the movement to Korea, loading operations were constantly disrupted by the inlenancy of the weather. Heavy surfs prevented beaching of LSM's and LST's for days at a time, and rolling ground swells and driving rain inhabited the movement of cargo and troops to APA's and AKA's. In spite of these obstacles, however, the 40th Division effected a close and efficient coordination with the Navy and in its history of the movement of the 40th Division, COMPHIB Group 13 stated that "excellent cooperation was received from the Commanding General 40th Division. Planning was thorough and loading was accomplished in a smooth and expeditious manner."

A certain amount of administrative confusion was created by the delay in determining the port of debarkation —whether, that is, it was to be PUSAN or INCH'ON. On 15 September, three telegrams were dispatched which portray the extent of this bewilderment. From Commander, 7th Fleet, to Commander, 5th Fleet: CINCAFPAC Advanced Echelon indicates PUSAN mine-sweep completed, but COMINPACT conflicts, therefore question on safety of harbor; from USAAFIK to CINCAFPAC: Question on completion of minesweeping in PUSAN Harbor, also statement favoring PUSAN as port of debarkation if harbor made safe; CINCAFPAC to XXIV Corps: No 'reliable source' reports that PUSAN Harbor safely cleared of mines. On 19 September, XXIV Corps radioed Commanding General 40th Infantry Division to land at PUSAN where an ASCOM 24 shore party would aid in debarkation. On 20 September, XXIV Corps operations summary reported on successful progress of arrangements for unloading the Division at PUSAN. But on 22 September, contrary to expectations, the first convoy, led by the USS ZEILIN, landed at INCHON, Korea.
JAP COMMANDER SIGNS SURRENDER INSTRUMENT
The Occupation of Korea
ARRIVAL AND DISPERSION TO ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY

The advance party of the Division had arrived in INCH'ON on 15 September and on the following day had departed for Pusan to arrange for suitable bivouac areas. Reconnaissance parties termed all roads as “fair to impassable”, thus necessitating the use of railroads for the transportation to Pusan. By 2 October the entire 160th Infantry had closed at Pusan, as well as the remaining elements of the 143rd Field Artillery Battalion, 21st Portable Surgical Hospital, Signal Company, Company A of 115th Medical Battalion, and Company B of 724th Military Police Battalion.

The move by rail to Pusan was a difficult and tedious process, requiring constant planning and continued adaptation to adverse conditions. It was complicated by these factors: (1) the harbor at InchrOn has an extraordinary tidal drop of thirty feet which necessitated ships standing off from shore, and the movement of all cargo by lighterage through a tidal basin, (2) mechanical unloading devices and facilities were not perfected and much local equipment which was of excellent construction had, through neglect and faulty operation, deteriorated and become useless; (3) the railroad system was in a woeful state of disrepair and confusion; the equipment was defective, there were few technical experts and these few were often inexperienced. Moreover, there were only about 300 flat cars in Southern Korea and the U.S. train requirements for the movement of the rolling stock of an Infantry Division is 347 cars. This situation was further complicated by the fact that there was only one main line between INCH’ON and PUSAN. Thus the scarcity of equipment coupled with the piecemeal arrival of the Division required the shuttling of trains between PUSAN and INCH’ON. These factors contributed to making the move from INCH’ON a series of slow, painstaking remedies to unusual and constant perplexities.

On 2 October the 1st Battalion, 3rd Battalion and Regimental Headquarters, 185th Infantry, arrived in TAEGU and began to establish its permanent bivouac areas there while, at the same time, dispatching reconnaissance patrols throughout its Zone of Responsibility. The advance party of the 108th Infantry left INCH’ON on 4 October for ULSAN to prepare for the arrival of the 1st Battalion and by 7 October had occupied AXIOXG, YOXGDOK, KYONGJU and other major towns within its Zone of Responsibility. On 4 October, Division Artillery dispatched an advance party to CHINHAE Naval Base to prepare for occupation and by 8 October the Division Artillery Command Post opened at CHINHAE and the extension of reconnaissance, communication, and occupation was begun. On 29 September, XXIV Corps directed that “the 40th Division will be prepared to extend control into the province of CHOLLA-NAMDO until arrival of 6th Division.” The 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry, which had remained at INCH’ON to function as the Division shore party until 8 October, was moved to CHOLLA-NAMDO Province as the occupation force.

40th DIVISION TROOP LIST
As of 15 Dec 45


Attached: 749th Field Artillery Battalion, 20th Portable Surgical Hospital, 21st Portable Surgical Hospital. 175th Malaria Control Unit. 216th Malaria Control Unit.

TACTICAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Although the 40th Infantry Division was prepared for immediate combat in the event of some treacherous and unexpected resumption of hostilities in defiance of the surrender terms, it nonetheless anticipated that its most arduous and exacting duty would be the establishment of local government and the suppression of any discontented or subversive groups intending to disrupt or hamper a peaceful occupation. In Field Order No. 20, published on 5 September by Headquarters 40th Infantry Division, it was stated that “in the initial occupation Military Government control would be a command responsibility.” In order to fulfill the obligations implicit in this order, Regimental Military Government Teams were formed and trained; members of these teams were expected to contribute to tactical commanders assuming control over Korean cities the specialized knowledge required to organize and supervise such municipal functions as the public utilities, including water supply and electricity, the civil police and fire departments as well as civil administration. The paucity of information, the rapidity of train-
The development of these parties and their gradual consolidation either by name or by affiliation into five major organizations was accompanied by a general cleavage between liberal and conservative groups; that is to say, between those unwilling to support or recognize Military Government and those who promised cooperation. At the Keuk Chang Theater, PUSAN, on 5 October 1945, members of the Korean Preparation Rehabilitation Committee in disagreement over communistic and radical policies split into two factions, thus forming the two major political parties in Southern Korea: conservative members of the original committee established the Democratic Party while the remainder formed the powerful People’s Republic Party when, under Military Government pressure, directed against its self-styled existence as the Korean Government, the party changed its name to the People’s Party. The officer charged with executing these orders of government or any branch thereof. If such conditions exist, proper authorities will be reestablished immediately.

In Operations Memorandum No. 14, Area Commanders were further instructed in their civic responsibilities and were ordered to

1. Remove and appoint public officials as necessary.
2. Support officials installed and inform the populace;

The officer charged with executing these orders of governmental supervision and control was often faced with a decision, the difficulty of which was increased by his inexperience, the barriers of language, and the complexity of local politics—the decision, that is, between supporting competent Japanese officials in spite of public disfavor or permitting untrained but popular Koreans to oust the former officials. Often the most capable men in the community were Japanese; Field Order No. 21, however, directed that all Japanese officials be replaced “with competent Koreans”, particularly in positions requiring specialized training and experience. Yet such men as administrative or technical supervisors of the railroads, trustworthy and qualified policemen and so on, were not abundant. Because it was desired that the conversion of Korea to an independent state be effected with a minimum of confusion and disorder, many competent Japanese officials were temporarily retained, in some cases for several months, however much they were despised by the radical elements in Korea.

The necessity for prompt and sagacious decisions by the small detachments sent to turbulent cities was of vital importance to the peaceful establishment of a liberated Korea. Frequently civil governments were overrun by the People’s Republic Party which declined to accept the officials initially sanctioned or established by area commanders. In YONGSAN, within the 108th Infantry’s Zone of Responsibility, thirty members of the party expelled all high officials of the city on the justification that they were pro-Japanese and traitors to Korea.
In HADONG, the People's Republic Party occupied all public offices and flatly refused to recognize Military Government as a legitimate instrument for governing Korea. Party members proclaimed their purpose of seizing all Japanese property and distributing it to the Koreans and, furthermore, threatened civil war if they were thwarted by American troops. When troops had been dispatched to the city and order was restored, Counter Intelligence Corps investigation revealed that the party’s claim to the support of a popular majority in the city was unfounded and indicated rather that the citizens of HADONG were terrified by the excesses committed by party members. On 31 October, the People’s Republic Party at HYOPCHON seized the government, burned the courthouse and all municipal records, forced the city treasurer to open the safe, and extorted donations and enrollment in the party on threat of burning and looting their homes. Party members then embarked on a campaign of urging the people, by posters and public demonstrations, to kill all pro-American officials and to agitate against the occupation forces so as to prevent the proper functioning of Military Government. In CHINJU, American troops imprisoned five men implicated in burning the courthouse. On 5 January, however, members of the Korean Revolutionary Alliance Association released these prisoners by threatening the local police chief.

Many of these demonstrations of antagonism to the American occupation forces were inspired by communist agitators. In a letter dated 9 October, censored and translated by Civil Censorship Detachment, the Japanese writer stated:

If the United States Military Government gives up political power to Koreans the administration of Korea will be communist. The idea of communism is deeply rooted in the Korean people.

In TAEGU, the pastor of the Holiness Church was threatened by men who insisted that because he was pro-American he must be also anti-communist and opposed to the welfare and the independence of Korea. This assumed opposition between the two ideologies was frequently encountered as justification for active defiance of Military Government, particularly from the People’s Republic Party.

The extent to which communism is “rooted in the
Korean people" is difficult to determine; but its roots undoubtedly were deep in the most aggressive and loquacious party in Korea, the People's Republic Party, which, with its numerous affiliated youth organizations, farmer's associations and labor groups, rallied together the radical and discontented elements of the Southern Provinces. In a meeting of all youth organizations in KYONGSANG-NAMDO Province in which support to the People's Republic was pledged, it was stated that because Military Government officials are traitors against the Korean race, we must have friendly relations with Soviet Russia as that government is the representative of the farmers and laborers." This relationship bore tangible fruit when, on 28 December, a premature press release announced in fragmentary form the conclusions reached by Russia and America at the Moscow Conference pertaining to the political and economic future of Korea. Immediately following the announcement, all political parties joined in demonstrations, though with few disorders, against what was termed the proposed 'trusteeship' of Korea. Military Government employees and civil officials went on strike; markets closed and every large city was the scene of constant parades, participated in by men, women and children carrying such banners as "Opposition to Trust Rule in Korea." It should be noted that some strikes were engineered rather than expressions of genuine opposition. In CHANGNYONG, two interpreters for tactical troops quit their jobs because they feared attacks directed against their families if they refused to oppose trusteeship and continued to remain in Military Government employ. Repatriation shipping was halted in expectation of a railroad strike. Typical of the brightly colored posters which adorned conspicuous walls and poles is that which was posted in PUSAN:

To our allied country ! ! !
Give to Korean liberty or give to we death.
We at any risk support Anti-Trust Government.
Give we Atom Boomb or give we Free! ! !

Agitation against the plan gradually diminished throughout the Division Zone of Responsibility following the wide dissemination of the speech delivered on 21 December by the Commanding General, XXIV Corps; in this speech Lieutenant General Hodge explained in some detail the ramifications of the Moscow Communiqué and pointed with clarity at the benefits which Korea would enjoy under a temporary trusteeship. On 2 January, the
crisis had passed and shipping was resumed, and by 7 January all workers had returned to their jobs without further threat of strikes.

On 2 January the Communist Party announced its support of the so-called 'Trusteeship' and was shortly followed by the People's Republic Party Headquarters in SEOUL. Due, however, to the inadequacies of communication, many branches of the latter party in Southern Korea continued to protest the plan long after the party headquarters had announced its support. On 15 January 1946, the Nationalist and Democratic Parties were united in opposition to trusteeship, although they continued to urge cooperation with Military Government; the Communist and People's Republic Parties were united in favor of the plan, while continuing to exert riotous pressure on those officials who supported Military Government.

The great burden of responsibility placed upon troop commanders in the initial phase of the occupation which required that, in addition to quelling civil disturbances, establishing proper guard posts, and maintaining constant reconnaissance patrols they should also perform the functions of Military Government in three provinces, began to lift in late November 1945. Typical of the civic responsibilities borne by tactical commanders was the administration of CHINJU, where an American Army Lieutenant Colonel became Military Governor of CHINJU GUN (County), a Lieutenant became mayor of CHINJU City, and a Captain, the Chief of Police. These tactical troop commanders received, inventoried, and guarded Japanese installations and supplies and, at the same time, organized, coordinated and supervised the peaceful administration of the municipal and county government. When order was established, the need for tactical troops diminished and the essential factor to Korean welfare became the presence of trained supervisors of government. This need is exemplified by the telegram dispatched on 10 October from the 40th Division Artillery:

The situation in MASAN indicates emphatic desirability of immediate occupation by Military Government personnel. This is a seaport city of 50,000, complex political and economic structure. Army troop personnel do not possess necessary technical and professional qualifications for effective direction of this city.
On 24 November, the Commanding General XXIV Corps directed that Military Government Field Agencies "take over the affairs of government as rapidly as possible to where the territorial commanders act as guardians of the peace, advisors and occupational heads of areas." An increasing number of qualified Military Government personnel as well as the diminution of civil disorders led to a gradual transfer of responsibilities from tactical troops to Military Government Agencies and on 21 December XXIV Corps announced that on 14 January 1946 the full responsibility for all government affairs would pass to United States Military Government and directed that until that date territorial commanders were "to place upon Military Government Field Agencies those responsibilities which are shortly to fall to them, and by close supervision to teach these agencies to walk alone. . ." Field Order Number 1, Headquarters USAFIK, dated 23 December 1945, directed the independence of Military Government from tactical troops and ordered the gradual relief of these troops of their guard, patrol and police functions by Korean agencies under Military Government supervision.

The large stocks of foodstuffs and equipment which had been zealously guarded by Division troops were turned over to the Korean Commodity Corporation and the Materials Control Corporation; Civil Police, led by men trained in SEOUL, gradually assumed responsibility for civil rest, and Korean police and special deputies continued to relieve tactical troops throughout the month of January; harbor authorities assumed police control of the seaports; and on 14 January, territorial commanders of the 40th Division were relieved of all Military Government responsibilities as scheduled and the preparation commenced for the relief of the Division by the 6th Infantry Division and for the embarkation of the Division for the United States as a Category IV Unit.
Evacuation and Repatriation
Through the Port of Pusan, Korea
28 Sept. 1945–15 Nov. 1945
MISSION

In Field Order No. 56, Hq. XXIV Corps, dated 21 September 1945, the 40th Infantry Division was directed, in addition to its duties of occupation, the establishment of Military Government, the supervision of disarmament and control of Japanese within its Zone of Responsibility, to “maintain control of Japanese civilians and Japanese Armed Forces moving through the Ports of PUSAN and CHINHAE for Japan (and) to move repatriated Koreans from PUSAN to native provinces.” The specific task of processing and loading aboard ship Japanese civilian and military personnel from Pier No. 1 in PUSAN was assigned to the 160th Infantry Regiment.

The problem attendant upon this projected large-scale handling of peoples whose language was known only to a few were complicated by such factors as: (1) the necessity for speed; (2) the coordination of transportation facilities of which the native organization had long been predicated on an oriental neglect of accuracy and promptness; (3) the prevention of looted Korean wealth being transported to Japan and (4) the maintenance of health and sanitation of our own troops among a people not habituated to western standards of cleanliness.

TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EVACUEES

On 21 September 1945 the Japanese Garrison in PUSAN was notified by the advance party of the 40th Infantry Division that all troops within the city, except for specified groups such as Liaison, Medical and Supply Detachments, must evacuate PUSAN in anticipation of the arrival of the 40th Infantry Division. On 23 September Hq. Co., 40th Infantry Division and the 3rd Battalion of the 160th Infantry arrived in PUSAN by rail from INCH’ON. By 26 September the major portion of the 160th Infantry had arrived in PUSAN, Prepared bivouac areas, and initiated the relief of Japanese guards of local installations. The Standing Operating Procedure developed by the 40th Infantry Division at ILOILO, PANAY, Philippine Islands, for the surrender of Japanese troops from its own Zone of Responsibility by October 5th, and proceeded then with the evacuation of all Japanese military personnel south of 38° North Latitude. Chart No. 1 traces the total weekly progress in the evacuation of troops and civilians and indicates how, after the first week in which control of shipments was almost impossible, the repatriation of Japanese troops predominated over the repatriation of civilians until 19 October. In order to facilitate the prompt evacuation of soldiers and to insure their speedy demobilization in Japan, civilian movements were curtailed on 7 October, thus permitting the evacuation of 55,632 military personnel from 5-18 October. By 18 October almost all Japanese soldiers stationed in Southern Korea had been evacuated. Exceptions were the PUSAN Liaison Detachment, scattered guard posts in cities such as MOKPO (MOPPO), ROSU

He also had to restrain any unauthorized arrival of repatriates which might overflow the already crowded housing conditions of the assembly area. Beginning on 23 September, daily conferences were conducted by this officer with the PUSAN shipping master, a railroad executive, representatives of local Japanese Relief Societies and ranking members of the PUSAN Japanese Garrison in the dining room of the Railway Hotel. With an American Officer from the 180th Language Detachment as interpreter, policies were established which would govern transportation: Japanese troops and civilians were to be evacuated from Pier No. 1 at a rate not lower than 4,000 per day (See Chart No. 2); both troops and civilians were to remain in their own areas until called; this call was to be routed through Japanese Military Communication Agencies. Shipment quotas were planned four days in advance to make allowances for unavoidable accidents and mechanical failures of trains and engines and were based upon the estimated number and capacity of refugee ships to arrive in PUSAN as well as the consideration of retaining a 5,000 man surplus in the assembly area. After 17 October, a liaison officer from Military Government attended these conferences and calls for troops and civilians were made through Military Government Headquarters at SEOUL.

Throughout the entire evacuation process, obstacles of language, mechanical defects in material, improperly trained railroad employees, and, above all, the inability of Korean civilians to comprehend the requirements of a time schedule hampered the smooth functioning of transportation. Too frequently, such penciled notations as this were given as explanation for a failure to meet a quota: “engine is little no good now is improving and then shortly will depart”; interpretations of “little” might range from a misplaced nut to an exploded boiler and “shortly” could mean one hour or one day.

In spite of unpredictable delays, on 26 September the first refugee ships to leave Korea, the KONEI MARU and the KOAN MARU, having brought 7,031 Koreans from Japan, left for HAKATA, KYUSHU with 3,675 Japanese troops and 5,341 civilians aboard. A General Officer, Sub Chief of Staff of the 17th Japanese Army Group, assisted with the Japanese military organization in exacting prompt obedience to schedules published by the Transportation Officer, and by the end of the first week 23,843 soldiers and 17,413 civilians had been evacuated.

The 40th Infantry Division had cleared all Japanese troops from its own Zone of Responsibility by October 5th, and proceeded then with the evacuation of all Japanese military personnel south of 38° North Latitude. Chart No. 1 traces the total weekly progress in the evacuation of troops and civilians and indicates how, after the first week in which control of shipments was almost impossible, the repatriation of Japanese troops predominated over the repatriation of civilians until 19 October. In order to facilitate the prompt evacuation of soldiers and to insure their speedy demobilization in Japan, civilian movements were curtailed on 7 October, thus permitting the evacuation of 55,632 military personnel from 5-18 October. By 18 October almost all Japanese soldiers stationed in Southern Korea had been evacuated. Exceptions were the PUSAN Liaison Detachment, scattered guard posts in cities such as MOKPO (MOPPO), ROSU
Typical Japanese Soldier

(REISUI) and KUNSAN (GUNZAN), soldiers awaiting to accompany their families, and, finally, over 12,000 Kempei Tai and Allied Prisoner-of-War Camp Guards being investigated by CIC in TAI DEN for their possible connection with war crimes and atrocities. The 7,328 troops evacuated between 19-25 October were composed largely of soldiers who accompanied their families, and the soldier exodus of 10,771 in the week of 2-8 November resulted from the release of many Kempei Tai from investigation.

The overall trend of Japanese troop evacuation is shown graphically in Chart No. 3, where the rise in total evacuations of troops stops abruptly around 18 October, to rise slightly on 1 November when it reaches the total figure of 99,237; that only 7 soldiers were processed and evacuated to Japan from 9-16 November testifies to the near completion of a large part of this task.

From 28 September till 18 October 25,974 civilians were evacuated. But with the cessation of large shipments of troops, civilian trains, loaded to more than comfortable capacity, arrived in PUSAN with increasing frequency and enabled refugee ships to evacuate to Japan 164,344 men, women and children from 18 October to 15 November. Chart No. 3 indicates the antipodal trends of troop and civilian evacuation; until 18 October civilian movements remained fairly constant and then entered a period of rapid increase while the military evacuees at first rose quickly, then after the 18th, levelled off.

It should be noted here that although the statistics of this report include the movement of troops and civilians up to and including 15 November, the mission of repatriation was not completed by that date. Japanese military personnel were not entirely evacuated until 1 November and it was anticipated that the repatriation of Japanese and Korean civilians would continue into January 1946.
PROCESSING ON PIER NO. 1

Through the narrow portal of Pier No. 1 streamed a total of 589,628 Korean civilians and Japanese soldiers and civilians (vid Chart No. 3). The reception of 291,977 incoming Koreans at PUSAN was relatively simple. Ships of all descriptions, from tiny power launches carrying 50-75 passengers to steamers with 5,000 persons aboard, brought the refugees to Pier No. 1 where they were discharged and separated into geographical groups by Korean Refugee Societies. These societies instructed the refugees in train schedules, sold them tickets and informed them of possible accommodations and sources of food and clothing. Chart No. 3 indicates the close balance between total incoming Koreans and total outgoing Japanese during the period. This balance is accounted for by the fact that the difference between the total number of Koreans arriving on one ship and the Japanese who in turn were loaded into the same ship was compensated for by the innumerable small launches which brought in civilians but did not evacuate Japanese. Chart No. 4 illustrates that, unlike the shipments of either Japanese civilians or soldiers (See Chart No. 2), the daily average of incoming Koreans sustained a high and fairly constant flow. The relatively low peaks reached between 5 October and 18 October may be explained by the prevalence of serious climatic disturbances between Korea and Japan which made difficult the passage of smaller ships.

The inequality of value between Korean and Japanese currency necessitated the establishment on 20 October of two exchange booths in PUSAN. One booth, under the egis of the 160th Infantry, exchanged for the Japanese evacuees limited amounts of Korean yen for Japanese yen while, at the same time, serving as the collection agency for Y-300,949,105 of excess currency voluntarily surrendered by the repatriates or confiscated in the routine search. This excess currency was turned over to Mil-
Japanese soldiers arrive in Pusan

Military Government and deposited under a Special Account in the Bank of Chosen. A second booth was founded to service incoming Koreans and between 21 October and 15 November a total of Y39,313,000 of Japanese currency was exchanged for Korean yen.

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS 40th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 40
OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM 16 October 1945
NUMBER 13
Processing of Evacuees Both Military and Civilian Prior To Movement To Japan
Operations Memorandum Number 12, this headquarters, subject as above, dated 7 October 1945, is hereby rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

1. In the processing of evacuees both military and civilian prior to evacuation from Korea to Japan careful investigation will be made to insure that the following is complied with:

   a. Money permitted to be carried to Japan:

      (1) Commissioned Japanese Army and Navy Officers returning to Japan may carry out a maximum of 500 yen. Other grades and enlisted men may carry out a maximum of 250 yen.

      (a) Currency in excess of such amounts will be taken up by Japanese Army and Navy Finance Officers and turned over to the American Finance Officer against bulk receipts. This money will be deposited in the Bank of Chosen to the credit of “Special Accounts, Japanese Armed Forces Personal Fund.”

      (b) All Japanese Military unit funds and funds in the hands of Finance Officers will be turned over to the American Finance Officer to be deposited in the Bank of Chosen to the credit of “Special Accounts, Japanese Military Funds.” Receipts will be given and records kept showing the name of the unit, its Korean location, and the amount and description of the fund.

      (c) The Japanese Army will perform all clerical work in connection with the above.

      (d) When funds are turned over they will be segregated as to type and bundled in even hundreds. They will be accompanied by itemized accounts in duplicate showing source.

   (2) Japanese civilians, regardless of age, may carry out a maximum of 1,000 yen per person.

      (a) Excess currency will be taken up against in individual receipts and records maintained containing name, Korean address, proposed address in Japan, amount and description.

      (b) Currency, when confiscated, together with pertinent records, will be turned in to the Finance Officer.

   (3) Bank of Chosen notes will not be taken out. If the Bank of Japan notes are not available for exchange, Bank of Thailand or Bank of Chosen notes may be carried out to the limits set forth above.

   b. Jewelry and Securities:

      (1) Civilian and military personnel will not be permitted to carry out gold, silver, jewelry, securities, financial instruments, or other property except wearing apparel and personal possessions of value only to the owner.

      (a) Japanese military and civilian evacuees will be permitted to retain watches, personal jewelry, and similar trinkets obviously not loot.

      (b) All negotiable instruments including Bank Pass Books, will be taken up and a receipt given to the owner.
Evacuation Statistics

GRAPHIC CHART
SHOWING NUMBER OF JAPANESE EVACUATED FROM PUSAN, KOREA TO JAPAN — SEPT 28 THRU NOV 15

CHART NO. 1

Evacuation Statistics

GRAPHIC CHART
SHOWING DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF JAPANESE EVACUATED FROM PUSAN, KOREA TO JAPAN — SEPT 28 THRU NOV 15

CHART NO. 2

Evacuation Statistics

GRAPHIC CHART
SHOWING PROGRESSIVE TOTAL OF ALL PERSONS ENTERING OR LEAVING THE PORT OF PUSAN, KOREA — SEPT 28 THRU NOV 15, 1945

CHART NO. 3

Korean Repatriation

GRAPHIC CHART
SHOWING NUMBER OF KOREAN REPATRIATES ENTERING PORT OF PUSAN, KOREA — SEPT 28 THRU NOV 15, 1945

CHART NO. 4
(2) All such property in excess of the personal allowance will be confiscated. A receipt will be given showing the description of the article, name of its owner, the owner’s Korean address, prospective Japanese address, and any information which may be used to identify the article.

c. Cameras:
All Japanese military and civilian evacuees will be permitted to retain personal cameras obviously not loot.

d. Supplies:
Troops will be permitted to retain ten (10) days medical and office supplies and rations for demobilization purposes.

e. Flags:
(1) All Japanese battle flags, colors and standards of company and larger units will be surrendered upon departure from Korea.
(2) Individual battle flags of value only to the owner may be carried out.

f. Arms:
(1) No arms of any description, including swords and sabers, will be taken by the evacuees.
(2) Swords and sabers which are confiscated shall be tagged with the description of the article and identification of the owner.
(a) All swords which belong to Japanese General Officers or which appear to have considerable monetary value or historical background will be segregated and held. Commanders will be prepared to receive swords from Japanese Officers who desire their swords appraised for the above purposes. These swords will be tagged with the owner’s name, address, and with history of sword if available. Receipts for such swords will be issued to respective Japanese Officers.

(g. Miscellaneous:
(1) Japanese military and civilian evacuees will take out only what they can carry individually, subject to the foregoing restrictions, except that:
(a) Baggage for Japanese Officers, in addition to authorized military equipment, will be limited to the following: General Officers, two (2) pieces—all other officers one (1) piece. Officer baggage will be of the small wicker type baggage carrier or similar size.
(2) All KEMPEI TAI and former Japanese Prisoner-of-War Camp guards will be moved to Japan when processed and released by C. I. C.
(3) Japanese military organizational records will be screened for intelligence information, but may be retained for demobilization purposes.
(4) Insignia, Medals, and Service Ribbons may be carried out by Japanese military personnel.
(5) Rosters of Japanese troops will be prepared in duplicate by the Japanese for use upon embarkation. Upon embarkation, Japanese troops will be checked off by roster. Both copies of rosters will be retained for file.

2. Japanese troops being evacuated from Ports of Embarkation to Japan will be permitted to retain only the following articles of clothing and equipment; all other articles brought to the Port will be confiscated by processing troops of the U. S. Army:

a. Clothing and Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shirts, cotton, Khaki</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underwear</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sox, cotton, pair</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap, cloth, Khaki, peaked</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, drill, long pair</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunic, Drill</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes, rubber, split toe, pair</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes, leather, pair</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess Tin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt, Leather</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Bottle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid Field Dressing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haversack</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold-all Canvas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcoat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raincoat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leggings, wrap around, or 1 pair leather puttees</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform, wool</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap, wool</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilet, set</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underwear, set, wool</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloves, pair</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Miscellaneous:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fountain Pen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pencils</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing Pad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle of Ink</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Material (Books, Magazines)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td>1 Doz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condums</td>
<td>1 Doz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>2 Cartons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Stamps</td>
<td>1 Box</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official:
WILSON
G-3

Distribution:
CG XXIV Corps (3)
CG
CG Div. Arty. (25)
CO 160th Inf. (25)
G-2
G-3
Adm Asst
CO 108th Inf (8)
Mil Govt

But the most important task by far was to prevent Japanese repatriates from taking contraband to Japan. On 27 and 28 September initial CINCAFPAC Orders were
received which imposed strict limitations on baggage for each individual; each civilian was permitted to carry 1,000 yen, and all military personnel were limited to 500 yen per officer and 250 yen per enlisted man; funds in excess of these amounts were confiscated, receipted for, and entered into a Special Account in the Bank of Chosen. Later directives furnished an itemized list of permissible clothing and placed additional restrictions on all jewelry obviously loot as well as financial instruments, letters of credit and other certificates of monetary value; likewise all arms were collected and sabers belonging to general officers or which evidenced antiquity or particular value were tagged for museum pieces. On the other hand, items such as cameras, watches, and other personal possessions obviously not loot were permitted as legitimate property. These directives from XXIV Corps were consolidated and published by the 40th Infantry Division in Operations Memorandum No. 13 (see page 21-25).

All Japanese soldiers and their baggage were subjected to a close and thorough examination. The Japanese soldiers marched onto the Pier and opened their packs while teams of 30 to 50 American enlisted men and officers methodically searched their persons and baggage, collecting contraband goods, dumping them into one-quarter ton trailers, and then transporting them to nearby warehouses. As one group completed this inspection, it traversed the Pier to embarkation while a new group silently took its place. Processing teams were prepared to evacuate Japanese soldiers from Pier No. 1 at the rate of five hundred per hour twenty-four hours a day. At night, searchlights from a docked U. S. destroyer assisted in the illumination of this grimly systematic search and etched in fantastic shadows the silent and passive movement of troops and civilians across the Pier.

In the first days of the evacuation process the inspection of civilians, particularly women, was often perfunctory. The sight of homeless men, women and children carrying their pitifully inadequate possessions on their backs (when, that is, the adults were not burdened with children or ailing relatives) excited little enthusiasm among American Troops to pick among their homely relics. But from G-2 came reports that large amounts of contraband were being taken from Korea by civilians. Information from other sources gave credibility to these reports. One Japanese advised his friends: “when you go to Japan have a woman carry your money as the United States soldiers are not strict in the search of women, otherwise you are only permitted 1,000 yen”; and another writer advised a friend that “... all surplus is confiscated ... sew your money inside your pants or prepare other safe means”; and still another gave counsel “to hide your money in your cigarette pack or in your soap”. From these and other sources it was also determined that soldiers frequently used civilians to carry out their excess currency and contraband baggage. Strict and exacting supervision on all inspections was then instituted and male civilians were searched with the same rigid adherence to regulations as had characterized the scrutiny of soldiers while the female civilians underwent the same procedure under the watchful eyes of Korean women.

The increased surveillance of departing personnel resulted in the confiscation of a large amount of contraband. Many repatriates, on being informed of currency restrictions, converted their money into clothing and articles valuable in Japan. One soldier had discarded from his bags all military equipment and replaced his blankets, extra clothing, etc., with an elaborate diversified, and expensive stock of cosmetics and lingerie. Another repatriate, a civilian, converted his savings into seventy kimonos of high grade hand-stitched silk. As the inspecting teams developed their adeptness in the detection of concealed items, an increasing amount of excess currency was impounded which had been secreted in thermos bottles or baby blankets or sewed into the lining of apparel. One Sergeant was surprised when a handsome walking stick carried by a venerable old man disjointed in his hands and spilled on the Pier a cache of 80,000 yen.

Nor did the search of women prove fruitless. From the guarded doors of their inspection chamber came quantities of valuable silks and excess kimonos, and many thousands of yen which had been stitched into their undergarments or concealed about their bodies.

Another facet of the processing was the necessity for maintaining sanitation in an area flooded with transients to whom cleanliness was no habit. When the processing first began, myriad flies and mosquitoes that fed on many years' accumulation of filth, menaced the health and morale of the processing troops. Immediately upon the arrival of Japanese soldiers at the assembly area behind Pier No. 1, police details of 200 to 300 Japanese were established. These prisoners of war, with the aid of shovels, rakes, brooms, and PUSAN Fire Department pumps and hoses, first cleared and washed the Pier and surrounding areas, then sprayed in every corner gallons of DDT.

Allied with this program of sanitation was the Medical Department's insistence upon immunization of all repatriated Japanese in order to prevent the transmission to Japan of communicable and lice-borne diseases endemic to Korea. An additional link in the processing chain was forged on 1 October when all repatriates were vaccinated for typhoid and small-pox. After 20 October vaccinations were given at SEOUL to many of the evacuees prior to their departure for PUSAN which necessitated the vaccination at Pier No. 1 of only about 35% of the total refugees. Serum were administered twenty-four hours a day by members of the Japanese Medical Society in PUSAN operating under the control of the SEOUL Medical School and closely supervised by the Division Surgeon. On 20 October, a delousing program was initiated and all repatriates were dusted with DDT by hand and motor sprayers. For the many sick and ailing persons who were unable to board a ship, provisions were made for their entrance and temporary treatment in two civilian hospitals and one military hospital. When a sizeable group of patients had been gathered, it was evacuated to Japan, accompanied by Japanese doctors and medicines.

For two months humanity streamed through the gateway of Pier No. 1. Silent, passive, always obedient and subservient, the Japanese soldiers and civilians massed in PUSAN by the thousands, squatted in the open or under the inadequate shelter of leaky warehouses, quietly consumed their meager rations of fish, rice, soy beans and sake, and as silently were processed and evacuated to Japan. Despite the grim tragedy of their defeat and evacuation, life continued. Some persons, exhausted by travel and without hope for the future, arrived sick in
The weary road of the conquered. Japanese soldiers of the Korean garrison waiting for ships to take them back to Japan.

On Pier One in Pusan, Korea. Jap soldiers about to be loaded aboard ship for Japan.

The Japanese civilians were a greater problem in evacuation than the soldiers.

PUSAN and occasionally died, while eight babies were born to open their eyes on a shattered Japan. Incoming Koreans, uprooted from their homes in KYUSHU, HOKKAIDO, or HONSHU, jammed the railroad station in patient anticipation of their return to homes which many had never seen. To the American men and officers engaged in the mechanics of this operation,—soldiers of whom one Japanese writer spoke as being “... very good, for the Americans are the most cultured of peoples” —the homeless repatriates presented a kaleidoscopic panorama of squalor and misery, testimony of the defeat of a nation and the collapse of a conqueror's dream.

The total personnel processed at the time this report was submitted to the Commanding General XXIV Corps on 19 December, 1945 was 876,282 which includes 394,089 Japanese evacuated and 482,193 Koreans repatriated.

RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE AND KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLES

I. JAPANESE

a. Civil Disturbances and Espionage.

Japanese soldiers and civilians remained unexpectedly docile and obedient to the orders and policies of the American occupying forces and there were few disturbances attributable to their disaffection. Reports were received and confirmed that departing Japanese soldiers left hand grenades in chimney flues and on 15 October one such bomb exploded, though without causing significant damage. Another example of booby trapping by departing Japanese was explained in a letter censored by the Civil Censorship Detachment dated 3 November 1945:

Upon evacuating their homes in Korea many Japanese have laid gunpowder under the tatami (rice-mats) which explodes later, killing the Korean occupants. The former principal of our school arranged pistol ammunition in this manner under the floor of his home.

Careful Counter Intelligence Corps investigation, however, never established the veracity of this report. A large fire in the Gunzi Factory at TAEGU, was traced to three Japanese civilians who admitted their culpability not only for the fire but for the inadequate water pressure which hampered efforts to control the blaze. On 13 October, a fire in a private home in PUSAN was imputed to the former Japanese landlord who was quoted as saying: “No one, much less the United States Government, will live in my house.” Counter Intelligence Corps investigation revealed that the Kempei Tai, or Japanese Secret Police, had many members unaccounted for; but few acts of violence or sabotage were ascribed to members of this organization, although two interpreters employed by Military Government were identified as being either working for or members of the Kempei Tai. Investigation of a band of so-called “Sea Robbers” who attacked the refugee ship TAIKO MARU in October indicated the possibility that these pirates, operating from islands beyond the Division zone of responsibility, were former members of the Kempei Tai. The TAIKO MARU had been stopped and plundered enroute to PUSAN, and ar-
rived at Pier No. 1 with three corpses aboard. Survivors reported that eleven other passengers had been thrown overboard by the plunderers. Several Korean newspapers reported that "... pirate groups, composed of 1,000 former members of the Japanese Military Police, are active in the Korean Straits." Positive substantiation of these numerous reports of the membership of the "Sea Robbers" was never received by this headquarters.

Japanese letters, censored and translated by the Civil Censorship Detachment, indicated the existence of certain Japanese who planned revenge by advocating future wars. In one letter the writer stated that "We should not fail to note the reasons for defeat in this war, We must be victorious in the next war which is certain between America and Japan," and another author advised a friend to study chemistry, while a third proclaimed his devotion to scientific research so that he could "get revenge in the next war." One letter written on 5 November indicated the probability that some Japanese continue to exercise a control over Korean industry, "On the surface Koreans will manage this company," the writer stated, "but secretly, Japanese will occupy the key positions in the firm."

b. Secret Shipping.

During the period between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of occupational troops in Korea, thousands of Japanese civilians, in anticipation of rigid allied control of repatriation, fled with all their possessions to their homeland. When the 40th Infantry Division occupied PUSAN, however, the Japanese emigration was channelled through Pier No. 1 and severe regulations were imposed upon the quantity and nature of goods permitted to leave Korea. These regulations were intended to prevent the transfer to Japan of wealth properly belonging to Korea, but seized by the Japanese during their long and autocratic control. In Field Order No. 21, dated 4 October, area commanders were directed to "apprehend Japanese civilians and/or military personnel attempting to depart Korea from points other than Pier No. 1, PUSAN"; and although the disciplined obedience of the Japanese military prevented soldiers from evading the regulations, many civilians attempted and often succeeded in leaving Korea by secret ship.

From several sources, sufficient evidence of the magnitude of secret shipping accumulated to inspire rigorous measures designed to impede and halt these flagrant violations of orders published by the occupying forces. On 8 October, two monitored telephone calls to SEOUL from PUSAN indicated the prevalence of smuggling. From innumerable letters censored and translated by the Civil Censorship Detachment much was learned not only of the extent of this illicit traffic in contraband goods but also of the evasive methods employed and the name of ships and organizations responsible. Typical of such letters was one written on 7 October: "Mr. Kallone, who was discharged from the military service, has left PUSAN for Japan by secret passage on a ship of about sixty tons." Another writer advised a friend in Japan to arrange for the sale of valuable silk because "I will arrive and return by secret ship when I leave here. Many secret ships leave PUSAN everyday"; and a SEOUL business man informed a partner in Japan that "I intend to send many cargoes by secret ship from MOPPO harbor..."

Other letters mentioned DOKYUO, MASAN, KIOBE Island, MOKPO, CHUNGJU, CHINHAE and innumerable other coastal cities as being ports of exit for secret ships. On 15 October, a letter was censored which indicated the careful organizing that contributed to the initial success of the illegal movement of ships:

There are many secret ship companies in PUSAN. The prices are posted on bulletin boards and are usually about 150 yen per person. In going by secret ship you also avoid inspection by the military police and Korean women. The Nippon Sewakai Relief Society will tell you what companies to go to for secret passage. Three ships are sailing, one on the 16th, one on the 17th, and one on the 18th.

As one of the largest ports in Korea and the one most proximate to Japan, PUSAN was the scene of much smuggling. On 20 October, the 40th Infantry Division published Memorandum No. 9, which directed that "all sea-going craft except fishing vessels leaving PUSAN Harbor must be inspected by U. S. Customs Officials at Pier No. 1. All privately owned craft will leave port via the North Entrance." During the following week, however, Counter Intelligence Corps investigation and Military Police raids on ships loading at small docks and jetties other than Pier No. 1, revealed that most illegal shipping from the harbor went through the South Channel, thus evading the necessity of passing Pier No. 1. It was then required that custom certificates be issued to all craft operating on legitimate business and two harbor boats, manned by Army troops, were established to stop all craft leaving the harbor and to inspect them for possession of proper papers.

Continued investigation and repeated Military Police raids revealed that many Japanese were pooling quantities of baggage, the accumulated wealth of 35 years in Korea, and were entrusting it to shipping masters under the watchful eyes of two or three refugees. The remainder then submitted to the inspection at Pier No. 1 and, upon arriving in Japan, met the ship with their baggage. As the 40th Division increased its knowledge of the ramifications of this traffic, it increased its vigilance. On 13 October, a crew member on a ship in MASAN was shot by U. S. Army guards when the ship failed to halt for a patrol inspection. On 30 October in response to the request of the 40th Division, the commander of LST Flotilla 15 ordered the USS COFER and LST 54, docked at Pier No. 1, to make searchlight sweeps each 15 minutes during hours of darkness "in order to abolish the practice of transferring contraband goods from Japanese junks onto Japanese merchant vessels loading evacuees." Patrol activities in the South Channel were increased when it was discovered that the ruse of slipping out of the harbor at 0200 was effective. The prevalence of these practices created the necessity of establishing on 31 October, in cooperation with the Navy, a patrol system extending along the entire coast of Korea, South of 38° North Latitude and Navy ships utilized in this patrol were ordered to sink all craft not properly certificated and to confiscate all contraband goods.

Many offenders were apprehended and tried in Provost Courts. After one midnight raid in the harbor, executed by a Navy officer with Army patrol personnel,
twelve men were seized, three ships impounded with tons of valuable contraband silk, and two shipping companies implicated. Of the twelve men indicted for violation of Proclamation No. 2, which covered all acts inimical to the occupation, one was found not guilty and eleven were convicted and sentenced to five years in a penitentiary and a 75,000 yen fine. The Nippon Jin Sewakai, an organized relief agency officially sanctioned by United States Military Government, was implicated likewise and pressure applied against its leaders.

Through the intensity of preventive precautions and the severity of sentences imposed upon offenders, the amount of smuggling, though never entirely stopped, was greatly diminished. In mid-November, the Navy relieved its patrol ships from their coastwise operations because too few illicit ships were being contacted to warrant the expense of time; on 26 November, Counter Intelligence Corps reported that the diminution of secret shipping made it unnecessary for that agency to continue its investigation. And although on 8 December, the 40th Division had to radio both the 108th and the 185th RCT's to establish close supervision on harbors and to divert all illicit ships to PUSAN, the problem of smuggling had dissolved to minor importance.

c. Attitude Toward Occupying Forces.

Expressions of vengeance against the United States and the extent of secret shipping, however, were in marked contrast to the more prevalent attitudes of passive submission to orders, a mystified gratitude for the kindness of the American soldier and the appreciation for the American insistence upon preserving order and discipline and protecting the Japanese from vengeful Koreans. The following letters, written on 19 November by an officer of the PUSAN Liaison Detachment regarding the status of Japanese troops temporarily retained in PUSAN as a labor battalion, reflects the attitude most frequently encountered by American troops:

In spite of our working as common laborers, almost as though prisoners, we can spend our time comparatively pleasantly. The reason for this is to be found in the nature of the Americans and so we have to think much of the Americans. . . . . But I also find them a mystery to us. They are very generous to us, especially individually. They are neither arrogant, rude, oppressive, nor cruel to us—the defeated. They are, on the contrary, rather kind to us . . . If the situation were reversed, and we were the victorious, and employed them, as they do us, we would never be able to be so kind as they are. It is this very fact which mystifies us.

The reason that our soldiers can work so wholeheartedly is due to the nature of the American Army and the Americans. Why is their attitude so moderate? It is a mystery I cannot solve. . . .

2. KOREANS

a. Civil Disturbances.

In the confused interim between the Japanese surrender and the arrival and effective deployment of occupation troops, many Koreans undertook to satisfy their personal vengeance against the Japanese. In order to curb increasing number of robberies and incidents of brutality throughout Southern Korea, many communities organized Peace Preservation Committees or Chian Tai. Occupying troops, however, soon learned that these supposed law enforcement agencies were in reality responsible for much large-scale terrorism directed against the Japanese and their property. Typical of their organized depredations was the beating and robbery of members of the TAEGU Police Force who had been in office under the Japanese. The Chian Tai organizations were forced to disband and by early October they had turned over to tactical troops many weapons and considerable ammunition after announcing their official dissolution.

The termination of the police powers exercised by the Chian Tai did not, however, eradicate depredations committed against the Japanese by Koreans. Many Koreans, aware of the limited American personnel available for guard duty as well as the language difficulties which made apprehension of offenders difficult, sated their vengeance or cupidity by attacks upon both Japanese soldiers and civilians. Trains carrying Japanese civilians from inland cities to PUSAN were frequently boarded by small groups of armed bandits who robbed the passengers and then disappeared. On 28 October the Farmer's Committee at KOKI Station set up a road block, stopped all vehicles transporting Japanese refugees to Japan and demanded 500—1,000 yen toll per vehicle. Three men were arrested by U. S. troops and tried in a Provost Court, but only 24,500 yen was recovered from the culprits. Several secret organizations arose which, like the Chian Tai, had to be rigorously suppressed. One of these, the PUSAN Justice Society, was disbanded by Division troops in early October while another, the Iron Blood Party, which had terrorized passengers going through JAKUBOKU Station, avowed its intention to frighten Japanese civilians into immediate evacuation to Japan. Typical of several extortion rackets perpetrated by lawless Koreans against their one time oppressors is the case of KUMAGAI, a Japanese civilian, who sold his home preparatory to leaving for Japan. On 30 September a Korean buyer gave him 5,000 yen as a deposit on his home; two days later, the Korean returned with several accomplices, purporting to be from the Independence Army (an unidentified organization), assaulted KUMAGAI, retrieved the deposit money and, after forcing him to sign a Bill of Sale, evicted him. Several acts aimed specifically at the Japanese were committed by civilian convicts whom they had released from prison following the surrender. Disturbances in HAKO, KINSEN and KEISHU were imputed to these ex-prisoners. On 8 October, a Japanese sea captain's home was looted by such Korean convicts, his family beaten and slashed with sabers, and his money and jewelry stolen. In January, several serious disturbances in IPSIL-LI involving the destruction of several homes and beating of the mayor, vice-mayor and labor secretary of the city were imputed to seven Koreans recently returned from OKINAWA. They had been selected by city officials during the Japanese regime to serve as labor troops; upon their release they sought vengeance against these officials who, they maintained, were still pro-Japanese traitors to Korea.

Letters censored by Civil Censorship Detachment gave further indications of the extent of this terrorism which, in the interest of public security, was the responsibility
of area commanders to curb. One Japanese letter, typical of several, said that "Since the coming of the American Army into PUSAN, many Korean youths are invading the homes of Japanese, taking money, clothing, and committing other acts of terrorism. Prices are very high and we are on starvation wages. If we stay in PUSAN we will starve to death." This statement was true and indeed accentuates the attitude held by many Koreans: make life impossible for the Japanese in Korea and they will then be forced to make an immediate exit to Japan.

In a formal letter to General Hodge on 2 October, General TASHIMARU SUGAI, Commanding General of the Japanese Forces in Korea, voiced a protest against the looting of Japanese property instancing the common occurrences of enforced seizure of homes, of parties ostensibly formed to preserve peace seizing Japanese baggage and of the press inflaming the Koreans by their editorials to increase their anti-Japanese demonstrations.

In addition to the suppression of these acts directed specifically against Japanese people and property, Division troops were constantly harassed by incidents of general looting and burglary, usually from warehouses or isolated box-cars containing valuable foodstuffs, contraband silks and other material. Looting necessitated the consolidation of these supplies under U. S. troops for security. During the initial weeks of the occupation, looting of supplies became so widespread that on 5 October, in Daily Bulletin No. 85, "shoot to kill" orders were published which authorized guards to open fire on any looters failing to halt when challenged. All guards were instructed in the Korean word for "halt". On 5 December, however, the Division Commander issued a directive intended to curb the enthusiasm of green troops who were killing Koreans near warehouses, sometimes only on suspicion. "Because instances in which the shooting of civilians is necessary to the proper performance of military duties are very few, Military Police and guards will resort to shooting only (a) in self-defense, (b) when necessary to overcome active resistance."

Constant Military Police patrols within major cities, the prompt dispatch of small unit patrols to loci of civil unrest, the careful instruction and supervision of guards and, finally, the severity of sentences imposed upon offenders by Provost Courts, resulted in the successful maintenance of law and order in the Division Zone of Responsibility and, at the same time, forestalled any widespread criticism of disciplinary laxity within the American command. Because, as one letter, written on 30 September stated, "The American Army prohibits all anti-Japanese demonstrations by the Korean people," a Korean purge of Japanese civilians and soldiers was averted. In general, that letter writer spoke truly who praised the kindness and discipline of the American soldiers and averred that "Peace is secure since their arrival."

b. Attitude Toward Occupying Forces.

In Field Order No. 56, Headquarters XXIV Corps, 21 September 1945, the following order was issued to all units in the 40th Infantry Division:

All commanders will indoctrinate their men in the realization that as representatives of the United States, exemplary conduct and appearance will reflect great credit on their army and on their country, and that by such action the respect and obedience of both the defeated Japanese and the liberated Koreans can be insured.

The process of indoctrination began while the Division was still on PANAY; Information and Education officers lectured all troops on the customs and habits of the Korean people as well as the responsibilities and obligations of the individual soldier in an occupying force. In Korea, the exigencies of the occupation subjected many troops to great temptations, which occasionally resulted in unlawful acts. In order to curb such depredations as intimidating shopkeepers or appropriating watches and other small valuables from refugees, the program of indoctrination was intensified and regulations governing military courtesy and discipline were rigorously enforced. Because the American forces intended to impose no set government upon Korea but expected the Koreans to elect their own political destiny, effort was continually made to insure that there would be no repetition of one communist agitator's observation on American occupation: "We have cast the fox from the front gate and called the tiger to enter the door."

These policies of rigid enforcement of army regulations relative to the conduct of all military personnel and of the continued indoctrination of troops, resulted in sustaining a high degree of order and discipline. These policies were successful as given ample proof by the volume of censored mail indicating gratitude for the American forces and, in the occupation, the relative popularity of the U. S. Armed Forces. Typical of such letters is the following, censored by Civil Censorship Detachment in early November: "The Soviet Army's treatment of Japanese women in Northern Korea cannot be described. I shaved my head and dressed myself to look like a priest and escaped by foot... I do not worry about my life here as the city is in good order and the Americans are gentlemen." The essence of the success of the occupation mission is to be found in that statement, "The city is in good order and the Americans are gentlemen."

**LOCATION AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SUPPLIES**

In addition to its missions or evacuation and repatriation and the peaceful establishment of Military Government, the 40th Infantry Division was also charged with the responsibility of locating, protecting and disposing of huge quantities of captured enemy supplies. This equipment ranged in nature from contraband silks, impounded on Pier No. 1, to 1,000 kg. bombs, discovered with other ammunitions in one of a thousand supply caves drilled into the mountains of Southern Korea. During the first weeks of the occupation, all RCT's maintained constant reconnaissance patrol action throughout their zone of responsibility and located many warehouses, supply dumps, and caves. Several caves, discovered on KUDO Island, extended 450 feet into a hill where they opened into large chambers, the roofs of which were supported by giant concrete pillars. Such caves as these were used by the Japanese as bomb-proof factories and were too extensive to warrant the expenditure of explosives necessary for their destruction. Constant pilferage by Koreans necessitated the fixation of innumerable stationary guard posts.
as well as areas to be policed by roving patrols. Included among the Japanese installations guarded by occupying troops were many radar and radio stations, airports and landing strips. Of particular interest to intelligence officers was CHOSITO FORTRESS, where a battery of dual sixteen-inch guns, anti-aircraft mounts, and ten-inch mortars offered formidable defense to PUSAN Harbor. The ammunition was removed and the guns, with their complementary control instruments were destroyed on 23 January. Efforts were constantly made by all commanders concerned to reduce the number of guards necessary for the security of these supplies by consolidating all movable material into centrally located areas.

Equipment was disposed of in four ways: (1) by destruction—either by burial, by fire or by dumping at sea, (2) by transferring to the Korean Commodity Company, or the Materials Control Commission under United States Military Government, (3) by issue to American troops as souvenirs or, (4) by sale to American troops by the Materials Control Commission. On 30 October, in Operation Memorandum No. 16, the 40th Division announced its intention to intensify its program for disposing of enemy equipment. The 115th Engineer (C) Battalion, which had been distributed among the RCT’s for the purpose of constructing or repairing vital roads and bridges, was recalled to PUSAN to execute the major part of this disposal. In summary, the memorandum established the following system with the injunction that all enemy equipment would be disposed of by 1 December:

(1) 115th Engineer (C) Battalion (less detachments) will:
   a. Assemble vicinity PUSAN.
   b. Destroy enemy material in the PUSAN area.
   c. Coordinate the rail movement of heavy munitions such as bombs and artillery ammunition from the occupation zones to PUSAN.
   d. Provide for the disposal of heavy munitions by dropping them at sea.
   e. Institute direct liaison with Port Director, PUSAN, for Dropping Areas and tug power.

(2) 97th Bomb Disposal Squad will:
   a. Survey occupational areas to determine safety of heavy munitions prior to shipment to PUSAN by rail.
   b. Announce safety precautions necessary.
   c. Inactivate fused bombs.

(3) ASCOM 24 will:
   a. Coordinate with 115th Engineers for barge facilities.

(4) 770th Railway Operational Battalion will:
   a. Coordinate train movements.

(5) Area Commanders will:
   a. Dispose of equipment and prepare for rail movement to PUSAN of such heavy munitions as are located within their Zones of Responsibility.
   b. Dispose of foodstuffs and Class II supplies.
   c. Destroy small caliber ammunition within their Zones of Responsibility.

(6) All weapons of souvenir interest will be held for issue to troops.

Some useless equipment was destroyed in caves by the simple expedient of sealing the entrances by demolition. But the bulk of heavy explosives within the Division Zone of Responsibility were carefully loaded in box cars and shipped to PUSAN. There, the 115th Engineer Combat Battalion coordinated the operations of an ocean-going tug, four flat-bottom and five shell-backed barges, thirty U. S. Army trucks, and, in addition to American soldiers, an average of 200 Japanese labor troops a day. Explosives were carried far out to sea and dumped in areas authorized by the Port Director.

In spite of the elaborate precautions undertaken by all units involved in handling these foreign explosives, four serious explosions occurred, fortunately without causing death to American troops. On 15 October a ship’s hauser struck a steel plate on a pier in CHINHAE and the resultant spark fired loose black powder which, in turn, detonated 1,200 pounds of TNT. Houses were flattened by the blast, three Koreans were killed and the 21st Portable Surgical Hospital treated 150 severely burned laborers. In PUSAN, a brisk wind blew sparks from a small fire in the ASCOM 24 warehouse area and detonated 25—30,000 pounds of Japanese explosives loaded on a munitions barge. The explosion scattered fire and point detonating ammunition over a large area, igniting quantities of Class I supplies and woolen garments. The minor injury to five soldiers was less disastrous than the hardship borne by all troops in the 40th Division of curtailed rations and inadequate woolen clothing. On 12 November, a freak explosion killed three Korean pillagers and destroyed three ASCOM 24 warehouses in PUSAN. In order to secure powder for fashioning depth bombs to kill fish, the three adventurous Koreans attempted to remove, with hammer and chisel, the fuze of a large mine which had probably been dropped by a B-29 in early 1945. The mine exploded.

As indications of the quantity and kind of enemy equipment disposed of by the 40th Infantry Division, it is noted that the following were among that either destroyed or transferred to the Korean Commodity Company or Materials Control Commission: 87,055 blankets, 180,000 pairs of socks, 9,360,041 pounds of beans, 5,656,146 pounds of dried fish—a Japanese delicacy which, with 176,395 pounds of dried seaweed, left most American soldiers unimpressed—17,029 artillery shells, and 4,468 tons of dynamite. In addition to these inanimate supplies of war, many horses had been left behind by the Japanese. On 6 October, a radio from XXIV Corps directed that Japanese hostlers be retained to supervise the care of the animals, many of which were dying of starvation and disease. Area commanders then placed them up for public auction and in TAEGU alone, 640 of these animals were sold; months later, the same horses, which had been ridden by Japanese officers, were pulling ‘honey wagons’ for the inveterate Korean merchandisers of night-soil.

Another function of supply, undertaken by the 40th Infantry Division, was the unloading and transhipment of all coal arriving in Korea from Japan. Although of secondary importance to other missions of the Division,
the task was difficult. Until 19 November, coal had been unloaded by laborers under the PUSAN Shipping Company; but the need for coal was vital throughout Korea, particularly for the establishment and maintenance of Korean industry. On 15 November, a censored letter from PUSAN Shipping Company to its parent organization in Japan stated that “ships carrying coal are coming into PUSAN Port so continuously that we have not enough trains and sampans to unload them. We can unload 1,100 tons daily at present.” On 19 November, the 40th Division assumed responsibility for unloading coal. By careful coordination with the 770th Railway Operating Battalion, by an ingenious use of field expedients to renovate old equipment, and by unloading incoming ships from the water side onto barges and from the shore side onto railroad cars, the 115th Engineer (C) Battalion increased the tonnage of coal unloaded daily to over 3,000 tons and occasionally over 5,000 tons. By 15 December, the system of unloading was sufficiently efficient to enable the 40th Division to transfer this responsibility to the Marine Section, Transportation Bureau, of Military Government.

PERSONNEL

1. READJUSTMENT

With the Japanese surrender, the War Department had intensified its readjustment program and throughout the preparations for the occupation of Korea and during the occupation itself, the 40th Infantry Division underwent a continued fluctuation of personnel. The total strength for the organic units of the 40th Division was, on 18 August 1945, 741 officers, 32 warrant officers and 13,064 enlisted men. From 18 August to 14 September, when the office of the Adjutant General closed prior to movement to Korea, 1,068 enlisted men were readjusted on points, 98 enlisted men were sent home on overage discharges and 550 enlisted replacements were received. All men with the then current critical score were readjusted out of the Division prior to its departure. The gradual decimation of the Division continued with replacements never equaling discharges until, on 13 January 1946, the Division totalled 314 officers, 4 warrant officers and 6,594 enlisted men. All officers with 68 points or 47 months service, except those who had signed waivers, and all enlisted men with 48 points or 38 months of service had been readjusted. On 29 January, the Division was further reduced and all men eligible for discharge were dispatched to the disposition center. This readjustment included all officers with 67 points or 45 months service and all enlisted men with 45 points or 30 months service.

2. SPECIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES

With the Division widely dispersed throughout an area where local facilities for recreation were inadequate or constituted a menace to physical health, it was necessary to initiate plans to maintain the morale of troops. First priority went to the construction of attractive billeting areas; the standard of living conditions accepted by the Japanese troops, into whose vacated quarters troops moved, was not satisfactory to American soldiers. Camp sites were continually improved and decorated in a successful attempt to simulate “stateside” barracks surroundings.

In PUSAN, as in all central cities, available entertainment facilities were converted to conform to military standards and were utilized to a maximum. A daily paper, “The Sunburst Sentinel” was published, which, by distribution throughout the entire Zone Of Responsibility, kept the soldiers informed on current events. A recreation park was cleared of accumulated debris and besides providing an excellent area for battalion parades, was employed to the utmost for athletics. The Red Cross performed a splendid job of caring for the free-time comfort and well being of the troops. At the Monken Barracks in Pusan soldiers of the 160th Infantry actually built a complete building, suitable for the requirements of a regimental Red Cross canteen, which promptly became the center of recreational activity for a large percent of all personnel. This regiment also undertook the celebration of the Christmas season of 1945 in a manner most reminiscent of “back home.” Among the efforts directed along this line was the construction of an enormous cross, surmounted with the Christmas star, high in the hills to the rear of the regimental area. Faced with stainless steel, and illuminated at night by a huge Anti-Aircraft searchlight from three quarters of a mile away, the cross was a thing of spectacular beauty, and was actually reported by ships at sea! And the Division radio, WLKC, which as a member of the Armed Forces Radio Service, broadcasted not only canned music and shows but also, on occasion, live shows using soldier talent from the RCT’s as well as Army Nurses and American Red Cross girls.

Another and, to many men, a more important contribution to soldier morale was the policy adopted by the 40th Infantry Division to furnish a war trophy to all men readjusted on points. From weapons confiscated throughout the Division Zone of Responsibility a large stockpile of souvenirs was built from which were drawn sabers, rifles, binoculars, pistols and flags for issue to officers and enlisted men, according to their length of service with the Division.
PREPARATION FOR INACTIVATION

The 40th Division was scheduled to play only a temporary part in the occupation of Korea. Upon the completion of its mission of evacuation and repatriation, the establishment of Military Government, the maintenance of law and order and the consolidation and disposal of enemy equipment, it planned to withdraw its forces preparatory to returning to the United States. The peripheral zones of responsibility remained fluid throughout the period of occupation and the Division began its gradual withdrawal almost immediately after its initial stabilization. The first area to be absorbed by the 6th Division was CHOLLA-NAMDO Province in the Southwestern corner of Korea. The 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry, was relieved by the 20th Infantry of the 6th Division in this sector. On 20 October, the Battalion began assembling at KWANGJU and by 26 October the organization had departed for POHANG-DONG.

Also on 20 October, the 40th Division coordinated with the 6th Division for relief of eight counties in KYONGSANG-PUKTO Province in the Northern sector of the Division's Zone of Responsibility, occupied by elements of the 108th and 185th RCT's. On 25 October, the 6th Division relieved the 40th Division Artillery of five more GUNS, and by 3 November four more GUNS under the 185th RCT were relieved, thus completing the relief of all elements of the 15th RCT still within the 6th Division Zone of Responsibility. On 9 November, the 213th Field Artillery Battalion departed CHINJU for CHINHAE after its relief by the 6th Division and on 10 November the deployment of the 40th Division reached a temporary equilibrium.

On 12 November XXIV Corps announced that the 40th Infantry Division was to be inactivated in the United States and would embark from Korea as a Category IV Unit, broken into three march orders: Group 'A' to leave in late January, Group 'B' in February, and Group 'C' in early March. Coordinative planning was initiated with the 6th and 7th Divisions to effect the withdrawal of the 40th Division forces. On 20 December, the 6th Division assumed responsibility for HYOPCHON GUN, UIRYONG GUN, HAMAN GUN, and the western portion of CHANGWON GUN including the thriving seaport city of MASAN. On 10 January KUNWI and SONSAN GUNS, in the northwestern corner of the Division's Zone of Responsibility, passed to the 6th Division. TAEGU, however, remained the billeting area for the 185th RCT. By 30 January the 6th Division was to have assumed occupational responsibility for the entire Province of KYONGSANG-PUKTO and by 15 February of all remaining GUNS in KYONGSANG-NAMDO Province with the exception of TONGNAE GUN, in which PUSAN is situated.

The plan for return to the United States as a Category IV Unit laid in November did not materialize as conceived. Originally it was expected that personnel eligible to go home in February and March—about 1,700 men and officers—would accompany the Division. But the impetus to readjustment given by General Headquarters at TOKYO, sent these men home in January and February and the Division was scheduled to return as a Category IV Unit but with only a token force of less than 50 officers and enlisted men bearing the Division records, colors and guidons. The 40th Division was to enter the United States through a California port in order to quicken the interest of Californians in the National Guard. In Field Order No. 22, Headquarters 40th Infantry Division, final orders were issued anent the relief of the 40th Division by the 6th Division and indicated that between 10 January and 15 February the 108th Infantry would concentrate at KYONGJU, 185th Infantry at TAEGU, the 160th Infantry with Division Headquarters at PUSAN and Division Artillery at CHINHAE, and that all guard and Military Government responsibilities would gradually pass to the relieving Division.
The Last Days
"GOLDEN GATE"

The Dream of Thousands of G. I.'s in the Pacific. It came true when they came home.
So severe had been the reduction of Division strength by readjustment and by transfer to swell the ranks of units remaining in Korea that the little group which was assembled in the Railway Hotel in Pusan to await shipping facilities to the United States comprised only about thirty four officers and ten or twelve enlisted men! This detachment, headed by Brigadier General Myers, carried the responsibility for the movement and security of all Division records, and performed a highly important duty in this respect, as well as in the subsequent inactivation of the 40th.

The return to the U. S. A., aboard the S. S. Marine Devil was marked by the shocking discovery of two cases of oriental small-pox, which caused an immediate quarantine of the vessel upon arrival in San Francisco Bay. So near and yet so far! Thanks to the efforts of General Myers, who had arrived by plane in advance of the ship, and the efficiency of the U. S. Public Health, all persons aboard the Marine Devil were immediately vaccinated. On the fourth day quarantine was lifted, and the final move made to Camp Stoneman.

At Stoneman the last sad business—inactivation—was promptly undertaken, and on 7 April, 1946 the Federal duty of the Sunburst Division came to an end. The “epitaph” of the 40th was generously contributed by the “Stoneman Salvo”, the Camp paper.

"REMNANTS OF 40TH DIVISION HOME"

Forty six members of the once mighty 40th ("Sunburst") Division, the first division ever staged at Camp Stoneman, SFPE, during the early days of the war, returned here last Thursday for de-activation.

The 40th, composed principally of California National Guards, was staged here in August and September, 1942. From here they went on to glory in Pacific campaigns. Veterans of action on New Britain, doughboys of the 40th Infantry Division struck the Japs on Luzon in the Philippines on S-Day, and were first to reach Clark Field.

In 53 continuous days of combat, the 40th killed 6145 Japs and then went on to kill 5000 more on Panay and Negros before participating in the Mindanao campaign.

They went into Korea after V-J day and there processed more than a million repatriates in addition to other occupation duties.

High point men of the 40th have been discharged during the months since the end of the war, with only the small remnant of 46 members returning here last week.”

Thus the End of This Division

But no: that would be akin to saying “thus the end of courage,” or “thus the end of honor.” In a practical sense, the 40th Division is already being re-constituted as the California National Guard. The sunburst emblem will be worn again by thousands of men who, like those who preceded them in the days before World War II, believe deeply in the need for the Nation's defense. And in another sense, the sense which lies close to a man's heart, there will always be the warm pride of membership in the 40th Infantry Division for those who carried its name and fame through the war years in the Pacific.
Killed in Action

108TH INF REGT

MAJ. NORMAN R. TRRAILL
CAPT. WILLIAM W. BROWN
CAPT. WILLIAM K. MERRELL
1ST LT. JAMES R. CRUMPTON
1ST LT. KENNETH M. NELSON
2D LT. RUSSELL A. DONOHUE
2D LT. CARL M. NIELSEN

7/SGT. STANLEY P. DIARIO
7/SGT. MICHEL J. DONALEANSKI
7/SGT. BENNY P. DYMANS
7/SGT. CHARLES L. NELSON
7/SGT. MERWIN L. SHERMAN
8/SGT. WALTER W. BOWEN
8/SGT. LESTER W. CALDWELL
8/SGT. RAYMOND J. CHRISTENSEN
8/SGT. FRANK DAWSON
8/SGT. JOHN L. FISHER
8/SGT. LOUIS C. HOFFMAN
8/SGT. ELMER K. KUNTZ
8/SGT. JAMES P. LOHR
8/SGT. EDWARD J. MARCH
8/SGT. JOHN H. MCONEEL
8/SGT. RAYMOND A. SCHIMMER
8/SGT. BERT A. SMITH, JR.
8/SGT. VERNON M. TRIPLETT
8/SGT. JOHN A. WATSON
7/3/ RICHARD T. MOORE
9/SGT. SAMUEL J. ELLIS
9/SGT. WALTER W. FAHR
9/SGT. NICHOLAS C. POULOUTON
9/SGT. EDWARD C. GARRIF, JR.
9/SGT. WALTER J. GUDENBUR
9/SGT. VICTOR MERBERT
9/SGT. JAMES R. JOHNSTON
9/SGT. CARL A. NELSON
9/SGT. EVAN A. NICHOLS
9/SGT. WILLIAM A. PATTERSON
9/SGT. ERNEST A. RODRIGUEZ
9/SGT. JOSIE SAVULA
9/SGT. ELMER C. TOSTA
9/4 S/SGT. DAWD D. SANTON
9/4 S/SGT. RICHARD D. SCHMILL
S/SGT. JOHN R. ACKERMAN
S/SGT. WILLIAM L. ADAMS
S/SGT. LOUIE V. ANDERSON
S/SGT. WILLIAM C. ANDERSON
S/SGT. LUTCHINIS C. BENNETT
S/SGT. RICHARD L. HARDLETH
S/SGT. CHARLES P. KLEIN
S/3/ SGT. ALBERT L. BROWN
S/3/ SGT. LEROY MOOREHEAD
S/3/ HOWARD W. STEARS
SFC. WILLIAM M. APPLEBORN
SFC. ARTHUR D. ATKINSON
SFC. CHARLIE J. BEEDY
SFC. CALLOWAY B. BLACK
SFC. CLAUDE P. BOUGHAMER
SFC. JAMES C. BRADBAY
SFC. OWEN A. BRISBOIS
SFC. EUGENE D. BROWN, JR.
SFC. ROBERT E. BROGAN
SFC. JAMES B. BOUNTAIN
SFC. HAAK C. CHANG
SFC. GEORGE W. CHEINNEY
SFC. WILLIAM J. CHIVERS
SFC. ROBERT W. COLEMAN
SFC. EUGENE H. CONRAD
SFC. THOMAS M. COTRONE
SFC. LEE A. CRANE
SFC. JOHN W. CURD, JR.
SFC. GARNET L. DEAN
SFC. JOHN J. D'EREO
SFC. VIRGIL H. ENGLISH
SFC. GEORGE J. FISHER
SFC. RAY D. GAUDIN
SFC. LESTER B. GEARHART

PFC. LLOYD E. GIBSON
PFC. ARNOLDO GONZALEZ
PFC. FREDERICK P. GOW, JR.
PFC. VIRGIL W. HOWER
PFC. LEWIS K. GRIMSH
PFC. MARTIN GURKE
PFC. ALVIN K. HALL
PFC. LOUIS H. HELFLE
PFC. KENNETH L. HENSON
PFC. HOWARD M. HETT
PFC. VIRGIL D. HILL
PFC. CHARLES R. HINTON
PFC. HAROLD C. HINTON
PFC. PAUL T. HUBBERT
PFC. ROBERT A. HUMEN
PFC. LEROY H. HUSON
PFC. OSCAR V. JOHNSON
PFC. OWEN M. JONES
PFC. CHARLES KALUGER
PFC. ROBERT B. KELSON
PFC. WALLACE L. LAPS
PFC. ALFRED O. LAVERNE
PFC. GEORGE E. LEMONS
PFC. ERNEST L. LEPANE
PFC. EUGENE L. LEMOINE
PFC. CLAYD W. LINDEN
PFC. MABLE L. LINDSE
PFC. ORRILL G. MAIRKINS
PFC. EMIR H. MASTOWSSK
PFC. GEORGE C. MERE
PFC. RAYMOND M. MCMIN
PFC. GEORGE W. MCMANUS
PFC. JAMES J. MADE
PFC. GEORGE L. MENDOCHO, JR.
PFC. GEORGE W. MESSER
PFC. ANDREW L. MERRICK
PFC. STANLEY M. MOCADO
PFC. CARL W. MORGAN
PFC. FRANCIS C. MORRIS
PFC. JAMES A. MORSI
PFC. HAROLD R. MULLANEY
PFC. COUNSEL H. NEVAN
PFC. HOWARD F. NEWBERRY
PFC. FRANK NICOLOS
PFC. ROBERT L. NISKAMP
PFC. CHARLES R. ODONNELL
PFC. HAROLD O. OWEN
PFC. HOWARD M. PARKER
PFC. RICHARD E. PAYNE
PFC. RALPH C. PINKERTON
PFC. JOSEPH R. POLLARD
PFC. THOMAS J. POPEW
PFC. RODERICK R. RIOS
PFC. WALTZ J. REED
PFC. FLOYD J. RICHARDSON
PFC. RAYMOND F. ROGERS
PFC. EDMUND E. RODRIGUEZ
PFC. GEORGE F. SCHMITT
PFC. TERENCE PA. SCOTT
PFC. HARRY K. SCHEMIR
PFC. RALPH K. SKIM
PFC. WILLIAM D. SMITHON
PFC. IVAN T. SKOGOS
PFC. DONALD C. SKINNER
PFC. ROLFZ L. SMITHSON
PFC. SAMUEL W. SMITH
PFC. ROBERT L. STANTON
PFC. STANLEY A. STEFANSKI
PFC. ROY A. STRATTON
PFC. JACKSON D. TAYLOR
PFC. ROLFZ L. TOTT
PFC. SHELDON VICKERS
PFC. ROBERT L. WAGNER
PFC. ALLEN D. WATSON
PFC. DONALD R. WATSON
PFC. JEAN D. WEBELY
PFC. BERNIE WHEELER
PFC. PAUL D. WHITFORD
PFC. ALBERTA F. WOSIAK

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160TH INF REGT

MAJ. JOHN D. McEVET
MAJ. FRANCIS W. THREDID
CAPT. ALBERT G. RAYBURN
CAPT. EDWARD A. STILWELL
1ST LT. RICHARD J. CUMMINGS
1ST LT. JOHN W. DOLAN
1ST LT. WILMA Z. GIBBS
1ST LT. KENNETH J. HAMPTON
1ST LT. BERNARD J. NASH
1ST LT. KENNETH P. OMTVIT
1ST LT. ALFRED D. PERI
1ST LT. JAMES L. STOLZENBERG
1ST LT. EDGAR W. TOLBERT
1ST LT. PHILIP E. THOMPSON
1ST LT. HOWEL R. ANDREWS
1ST LT. JEROME Bolen
1ST LT. JOHN R. MULLIN
1ST LT. ROBERT L. KINER
9/SGT. FRED N. CAMERON
9/SGT. RALPH J. CANNON
9/SGT. CLIFFORD W. CARSON
9/SGT. ERNEST L. JOHNSON
9/SGT. BERNARD G. MCNAIY
9/SGT. CARL F. MEYER
9/SGT. WILLIAM S. SQUIRE
9/SGT. WENDELL L. BALTZER
9/SGT. ROYCE D. EDWARDS
9/SGT. RAYMOND J. CORDEN
9/SGT. FRANK F. BRAY
9/SGT. PHILIP B. DICKERSON
9/SGT. SAMUEL L. DUTCHER
9/SGT ROBERT E. DURANT
9/SGT. WILLIAM EVANSON
9/SGT. WILLIAM S. GIAM:"9/SGT. ROBERT L. HARDER
9/SGT. RICHARD HAMPTON
9/SGT. RALPH M. HANSEN
9/SGT. STUART O. HATHE
9/SGT. VICTOR L. HUNT
9/SGT. JOR R. MASON
9/SGT. WIRGIL P. MCDONALD
9/SGT. ARLEY J. MOORE
9/SGT. TOMAS C. MIHAIN
9/SGT. GEORGE C. MARCH
9/SGT. ALFRED F. SMITH
9/SGT. JAY D. SMITH
9/SGT. ROBERT W. SWANTON
9/SGT. RICHARD J. TESPE
9/SGT. MARTIN G. JOHNSON
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115TH ENG COMBAT BN
1ST LT. JACK G. KOHLER
2D LT. JAMES A. JONES
3LT. BRAM W. BRANNON

40TH CAV RCVN TR
1ST LT. JOHN J. LUTH
2D LT. RONALD J. FREDRICKSON
3LT. FRANK I. NOBLE

40TH SIG CO
1ST LT. KENNETH N. HANSON
2D LT. BERNARD WATZENBERG
3LT. JUAN D. LEVAY

40TH QM CO
CPL. JOHN N. PYLA
T/5 HARRY H. CHRIEST
PFC. WILLIAM L. BRADSHAW

160TH INF REGT
1ST LT. BILL A. MAXFIELD
2ND LT. CHARLES E. KOLOMINSKI

Missing in Action
160TH INF REGT
PVT. LEROY MEBB
LIBRARY REGULATIONS

1. Books, pamphlets, and periodicals must be charged at the loan desk (signature on book-loan card) before being taken from the Library.

2. Any item drawn from the Library must be returned within one month.

   Exceptions to this regulation are as follows:
   (1) Material issued to classes as a whole.
   (2) Material issued to instructors for professional use.
   (3) New books which are in demand must be returned within one week.
   (4) Books required for faculty use are subject to recall at any time.
   (5) All persons having library material in their possession will return same before leaving the post permanently.
   (6) Books loaned outside the School must be returned within two weeks.

3. Reference books and current periodicals will not be removed from the library.