


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HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

Study No. 18



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Historical Section . Army Ground Forces

1946

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PREFATORY NOTE

Volume I of "History of the Fourth Army", approved by the Chief, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 13 December 1944,¹ carried the Army's history through August, 1944, when the Fifteenth Army was activated and an almost entirely new staff took over Fourth Army.

Volume II continues the history from that time until 1 September 1945, the date of the formal surrender of Japan.

Volume II is divided into five chapters--a general history of the command and four more detailed chapters on "Training," "Inspections," "Personnel" and "Redeployment," the four activities which include most of the Army's more important work during the last year of the war.

Copies of all reference documents referred to in footnotes in this volume have been assembled in one file in the Records Branch, Adjutant General Section, Headquarters Fourth Army. This file is entitled "File of the Historical Officer" and is under number 314.7.

All reference documents referred to in the text as "Secret" or "Confidential" have been downgraded to "Restricted". The classification of the history as a whole is "Restricted."

The date of writing of this volume was 1 October 1945. As of the date of writing the Records Branch, Adjutant General Section, Headquarters Fourth Army, had 15 cabinets of current files. All staff Sections, as of that date, maintained more or less complete files of non-record documents pertaining to their activities but the Adjutant General Section maintained all permanent files.

Standard Army filing practices were followed to the letter in the Records Branch.

Records were only fairly complete for the period from 15 September 1943 (when the Fourth Army was separated from the Western Defense Command and moved to San Jose, California) to 15 January 1944 (when Fourth Army moved from the Presidio of Monterey, California, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas). Records were complete from 15 January 1944 to the date of this writing.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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1 September 1945

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies


1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:



J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Acting Ground Adj General

1 Incl:
Historical Study

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The Army Ground Forces

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

Study No. 18

By

Capt. Jack B. Beardwood

Historical Section - Army Ground Forces

1946

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

The Fourth Army was one of the four field armies formed within the continental limits of the United States in the summer of 1932. The purpose of these armies, as stated by the Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, comes under five heads: (1) planning: to provide agencies "to complete the development of war plans prepared by the War Department General Staff"; (2) command and staff: to form higher commands "prepared to take the field and execute the plans prepared"; (3) training: "to provide agencies for the conduct of command post and other suitable peacetime training exercises"; (4) mobilization: "to provide ... an adequate force, within the minimum of time with the maximum of training, sufficient to protect any general mobilization that may be necessary"; (5) emergency defense: "to provide a force sufficient to handle all emergencies short of general mobilization."

The area of the Fourth Army was to comprise the Seventh and Ninth Corps Areas. Its mission was to deal with the Pacific Coast. The preliminary assignment of forces to the Fourth Army was as follows:

Headquarters, Fourth Army
Special Troops, Fourth Army
Army Troops, Fourth Army

VII Corps

34th Division (NG)
35th Division (NG)

IX Corps

3rd Division (RA)
40th Division (NG)
41st Division (NG)

XVII Corps

7th Division (RA)
88th Division (OR)

XIX Corps

89th Division (OR)
96th Division (OR)
102nd Division (OR)
104th Division (OR)

Cavalry Divisions

2nd Division (RA)
3rd Division (RA)
24th Division (NG)
66th Division (NG)

The senior corps area commander was to be the commander of each of the new armies, with a staff consisting of the corps area chief of staff and such other members of his corps area staff as he might designate. Major General Johnson Hagood assumed command of the Fourth Army on 15 August 1932, and announced that headquarters would be located at Omaha, Nebraska.² The initial staff consisted of Colonel Alexander M. Miller, Jr., GSC, Chief of Staff, and Colonel John O. Steger, AGD, Adjutant General.³

The only major events reflected in the existing records of the Army for the period preceding 1940 are as follows:

- 18 June 1936 - Announcement was made of the location of Headquarters Fourth Army at Presidio of San Francisco, California.⁴
- 20 October 1936 - Major General George S. Simonds assumed command of Fourth Army.⁵
- 24 May 1938 - Major General Albert J. Bowley assumed command of Ninth Corps Area and Fourth Army.⁶

On 5 December 1939 Major General John L. DeWitt was assigned to the command of Ninth Corps Area and Fourth Army⁷ and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.

Following the organization of General Headquarters, U. S. Army, in 1940, the Fourth Army was assigned to the Field Forces during the autumn of that year under the command of Lt. General John L. DeWitt, with station at the Presidio of San Francisco, California.⁸ The majority of key staff personnel was furnished by Headquarters, Ninth Corps Area, subsequently designated as the Ninth Service Command.⁹

Initially, the Fourth Army was assigned the following major units: IX Corps, Major General Kenyon A. Joyce, commanding, consisting of the 3rd and 41st Divisions; the III Army Corps, activated in December 1940, and stationed at the Presidio of Monterey, Major General Walter K. Wilson, commanding, subsequently made up of the 7th and the 40th Divisions; the Ninth Coast Artillery District, including harbor defenses of Puget Sound, Columbia River, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, Brigadier General Henry T. Burgin, commanding.

The Fourth Army was assigned a training mission. Initial training of assigned units culminated during the summer of 1941 in a Command Post Exercise and corps and army maneuvers. The Command Post Exercise and corps maneuvers were executed at the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, California and its vicinity, the Army maneuvers in the Pacific Northwest.

During the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, the Commanding General, Fourth Army, was assigned in addition the mission of constituting the Western Defense Command, preparing plans for the defense of the Pacific Coast, and setting up the defense of Alaska. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Army had plans completely prepared for the execution of its mission -- defense of the West Coast and Alaska. Before the smoke cleared away over Hawaii, assigned corps and divisional units were moving to defense positions along the Pacific Coast, while Alaskan installations reverted to full alert status.

Since the Western Defense Command prior to this time had been only a planning agency, the entire headquarters of the Fourth Army was incorporated into the defense command organization designated as Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.¹⁰ Troop concentrations were put into effect and troops, including reinforcements, immediately organized their defenses to carry out assigned missions.

Inasmuch as the operation of the Fourth Army, for the ensuing period of the merge, was incidental to the operation of Western Defense Command it is not proposed to cover the period in any detail in this narrative. The history of that period belongs more properly to Western Defense Command.

During the entire period from the outbreak of war to the occupation of Kiska Island, the efforts of Western Defense Command and Fourth Army were directed largely toward the defense of Alaska and expulsion of enemy Japanese from the Aleutians. Alaska was reinforced by units drawn from the continental defenses under control of Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, including infantry, field artillery and service troops, while Fourth Army and Western Defense Command was reinforced by one corps, three infantry divisions, three separate infantry regiments and numerous artillery, coast artillery, and antiaircraft units furnished by General Headquarters. In addition, the Fourth Air Force was placed under command of Fourth Army and Western Defense Command.¹¹

Separation of Fourth Army from the Western Defense Command was effected on 15 September 1943,¹² whereupon Fourth Army Headquarters was reorganized at the Presidio of San Francisco. The next day the headquarters moved to San Jose for temporary station,¹³ subsequently designated as a permanent station.¹⁴

A number of the officers designated for Army Headquarters had served for varying lengths of time with Fourth Army, either prior to its incorporation with Western Defense Command, during the period of consolidation with Western Defense Command, or with a sector staff under Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

On 18 September 1943, the Fourth Army closed its command post at the Presidio of San Francisco and opened at San Jose, California.¹⁵ In a new setting it embarked upon new tasks and new missions.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, Commanding General of the Fourth Army, was born at Weatherford, Texas in 1888. His father, Edward J. Simpson, served in the Confederate Army under General Nathan Bedford Forrest, in the famous Tennessee Cavalry.¹⁶

Graduated from West Point in 1909, he became, at the age of thirty, Chief of Staff of the 33d Division, a unit which saw considerable action in 1918. In the years between he served in the Philippine Islands, on the Mexican border with General Pershing's expedition, and at various posts in the continental United States, including a one-year assignment at the Panama Pacific Exposition in San Francisco and a detail as aide-de-camp to General George Bell, Jr., commander of the El Paso district, in 1917.

Entering the first World War as captain, he left it a lieutenant colonel, with four decorations for his war services: the Chevalier of the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre from France, and the Distinguished Service Medal and Silver Star citation from his own country. In between succeeding tours of duty he attended the advance course of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College. On graduation from the latter, General Simpson was assigned to the Military Intelligence Section of the War Department General Staff, where he eventually became executive officer. Following this assignment was a four-year tour of duty as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Pomona College, Pomona, California, after which he returned to the Army War College as instructor. In 1938, closely following his promotion to the grade of colonel, came his appointment as Director of the Military Intelligence Division of the College.

As a colonel, he was placed in command of the 9th Infantry at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and two months later he was appointed Brigadier General and Assistant Commander of the 2nd Division. In 1941 he was promoted to the rank of major general, and shortly afterward became commander of the 35th Infantry Division. In 1942 he assumed command of the 30th Division at Fort Jackson, and on 1 September of that year he became commanding general of the newly activated XII Corps.

On 27 September 1943, General Simpson was ordered to take command of the Fourth Army and was simultaneously elevated to the rank of lieutenant general.¹⁷ He formally assumed command of the Army on 13 October 1943,¹⁸ with his arrival at the Headquarters, San Jose, California.

MISSION AND POLICIES

As Commanding General of the Fourth Army, General Simpson commanded an Army whose most important mission was the training of major units of the Army Ground Forces for eventual combat duty overseas.

On assuming command, General Simpson set up two definite objectives for the Fourth Army Staff.¹⁹ The first was to learn to operate efficiently as a staff and carry out its current mission of training. The second was to prepare itself thoroughly for overseas combat duty. In regard to the Fourth Army's training mission, General Simpson believed that the Fourth Army had a distinct advantage in operating as a large homogenous unit, with no intervening corps, which permitted a close association of the staff with troops. This was an advantage with reference to his primary interest, stated in the words: "The Fourth was a field Army -- a fighting Army."

There were several particular phases of Fourth Army development which General Simpson personally stressed.²⁰ The most important of these was advance planning, and hardly less important, the maintenance of housekeeping and training standards. At one of his first staff meetings he declared in connection with these fundamentals: "My standard is superior, my aim is perfection."

General Simpson instructed his officers that while on visits of training inspection, they should demand a high standard of housekeeping in barracks, kitchens and storerooms in the units visited. He required the maintenance of a high standard in housekeeping in barracks, believing that excellence shown here would carry over into the field. He applied the same criterion to saluting, discipline, bearing and military courtesy.

The individual and tactical training program of the Fourth Army was of vital concern to General Simpson.²¹ He believed that the secret of effective training was careful preparation, first on the part of the higher commander of the group, regiment or battalion, down to the junior officers and non-commissioned officers.²² Advance planning was even more important in tactical training than in MTP. Training carried out without such planning was necessarily haphazard. Conversely thorough planning brought gratifying and effective results. A training field army, said General Simpson, was as good as the standards it set and maintained.²³

SAN JOSE

The short stay at San Jose served mainly to get the staff acquainted. The headquarters was housed in the Commercial Building, on North First Street, in downtown San Jose.²⁴ When General Simpson assumed command he found that office space for the headquarters, and housing accommodations for enlisted men, were inadequate. He immediately set about correcting these deficiencies.²⁵

During the seven weeks the Fourth Army was located at San Jose the original "cadre" of 38 officers and 13 warrant officers²⁶ was augmented by new personnel. By the 21st of October the staff comprised 180 officers,²⁷ brought from various stations throughout the United States.

Since only a few troops had been assigned to the Fourth Army,²⁸ there was little actual staff work to do. As a result, the efforts of the staff were concentrated on

not be necessary. In the extensive exchange of correspondence with the War Department on the project, General Moseley wrote, "...I am very anxious that our problem shall be a perfectly natural one, based on a natural situation which might confront the Third Army in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Rio Grande. Although funds will not permit us to have the Third Army in any one spot, each exercise can be based on the same general situation and be a perfectly natural incident in that general situation."¹²

The general situation finally agreed on was as follows:¹³

"A coalition of Brown powers has declared war on the United States, and gained control of the South Atlantic. The U. S. Fleet is engaged in the Pacific Ocean and unable to detach any units for operations elsewhere. Mexico, loyally adhering to her traditional friendly attitude, opposed the landing of Brown forces but was unable to prevent a hostile landing at Tampico. These BROWN forces and others which landed at Port Isabel, Port Aransas and Corpus Christi, have advanced northwest and are now threatening San Antonio and El Paso.

"Our Naval Intelligence reports a strong hostile convoy in the Gulf of Mexico sailing north toward the Gulf Coast of Mississippi apparently with the mission of opening the Mississippi River. Our Naval Offshore Patrols have encountered hostile naval scouting forces in the Gulf of Mexico but none along the Atlantic Coast.

"Except for coastal and land frontier guards, the mass of the Third Army was initially concentrated on the Pacific Coastal Frontier. It is now being moved to protect the Southern Land and Coastal Frontier with its reserves to be held in the vicinity of Fort Warren, Wyoming, at the disposition of GEQ."

The general situation's theoretical initial concentration of the Third Army on the Pacific Coastal Frontier was for the purpose of making an enemy invasion of Texas logical.¹⁴

The purpose of the maneuver, as stated by General Moseley, was to provide training in mobilization, concentration and field exercises under simulated conditions of modern warfare; to train active units of the Third Army to concentrate at existing strength for field exercises; to train all echelons in the logistics covering such a maneuver, and to develop further the spirit of cooperation among the three components of the Army.¹⁵

Third Army forces of the Fourth Corps Area were to assemble in DeSoto National Forest, Mississippi. Third Army Forces within the Eighth Corps Area (commanded by Major General Herbert J. Brees) were to be divided further in order to permit all National Guard units in the area to participate.¹⁶

The maneuver period of the Fourth Corps Area forces in the DeSoto National Forest extended from 31 July to 14 August. Brown forces with a strength of more than 1,000 officers and 14,000 enlisted men concentrated in the Biloxi-LaRue-Wortham area, with Biloxi as the Supply Base. Brown was represented by the 4th and 31st Divisions and Corps troops. Blue forces with a strength of more than 600 officers and nearly 8,000 enlisted men concentrated southeast of Wiggins, with Camp Shelby as the supply base. Blue was represented by the 30th Division and the 6th Cavalry. Both sides had observation aviation.¹⁷

The special situation, Blue and Brown, in summary was as follows:¹⁸

BLUE - The 30th Division with the 6th Cavalry and 16th Observation Squadron attached, moving by rail from the Pacific Coastal Frontier, had the mission of

getting settled and acquainted against the time when the Army would go to work in earnest. This time was not far off.

In the midst of discussions with the ACF Chief of Staff concerning housing facilities for his headquarters, General Simpson learned that he would probably not get the corps scheduled to operate under Fourth Army: namely, the IV Corps, stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, and the XVIII Corps, stationed at the Presidio of Monterey, California.²⁹ A few days later, this fact was confirmed by the Army Ground Forces.³⁰

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

Since XVIII Corps had been ordered to another station, General Simpson recommended that Fourth Army Headquarters be moved to the Presidio of Monterey, California, and take over the housing and office facilities vacated by the Corps. The Army Ground Forces approved this proposal.³¹

At this point Fourth Army was up against a problem of the first magnitude.³² With a new, and as yet incomplete staff, General Simpson was called upon to take over almost simultaneously units scattered over the entire length of the Pacific Coast whose supervision had recently required the attention of two corps headquarters.³³ At the same time the Army Headquarters was moving to a new location. In planning the simultaneous relief of the two corps, Fourth Army had to devise a method to accomplish this as expeditiously as possible, and, looking into the future, to shape a method of operation that would be workable when the Army no longer had the assistance of intervening corps headquarters. (This had to do with the control of miscellaneous units and will be covered more fully in a later chapter.)

At midnight 31 October - 1 November, the newly organized Army Headquarters assumed command of the two armored divisions, the special troops headquarters and the miscellaneous units of the XVIII Corps located in California, generally south of San Francisco.³⁴ And at midnight 5 - 6 November the four infantry divisions, the special troops headquarters, and the miscellaneous units of the IV Corps located in Oregon and Washington and the 4th Cavalry Brigade in southern California were similarly transferred to Fourth Army.³⁵

Inasmuch as Fourth Army Headquarters was moving to Monterey, the assumption of the functions of the XVIII Corps was relatively simple. About two-thirds of the Army staff moved immediately to Monterey and sat in for a few days on meetings having to do with corps operations before the corps was transferred.³⁶

The relief of the IV Corps posed the main problem. Fourth Army did not have enough personnel to handle the tremendous load. To meet this situation, it was decided that IV Corps, which had been operating with both an administrative and a training augmentation, would leave these augmentations with Fourth Army temporarily, inasmuch as similar augmentations were available to the corps at its new station.

With this additional staff, Fourth Army went to work.³⁷ The personnel of the administrative and training augmentation and the personnel of the Headquarters 8th Special Troops were temporarily formed into a forward echelon of Fourth Army with the commanding officer of the Special Troops Headquarters designated as officer in charge.

It had been apparent from the start that it would not be desirable for Army to cut off abruptly the administration of IV Corps because of the length of time required to transfer all the record and correspondence of the Corps to Army Headquarters. There were many matters that would not permit the long postponement necessary to make this transfer. To handle these, the idea of a forward echelon was conceived.³⁸

The forward echelon immediately took over from IV Corps. The Army in the meantime sent an officer from each section to go over the files and records of his section and determine which files would be needed at Army Headquarters. At the appropriate time, this officer with all the necessary records pertaining to his section's operations was moved back to Monterey. This movement was accomplished section by section over a period of about three weeks.³⁹ At the end of this period, the forward echelon was dissolved and the personnel of the Corps training augmentation was released by Fourth Army and re-joined IV Corps in the California-Arizona Maneuver Area.

In addition to taking over the troops of the two corps, Fourth Army inherited the task of closing the Oregon Maneuver Area.⁴⁰ Training there had been completed but the troops participating in the most recent exercises were still in the area. It was necessary to move these troops out to new stations and to rehabilitate the area preparatory to closing it.

Much credit is due IV Corps for its very commendable cooperation on this involved problem. Corps, sensing the situation confronting Fourth Army, undertook all of the administrative work necessary prior to abandonment of this training area.⁴¹ It issued all orders transferring units out of the area and provided personnel for the rehabilitation work.

Once the relief of the IV and the XVIII Corps had been accomplished and the Oregon Maneuver Area was closed, Fourth Army settled down to the supervision of training and administration of the 158,000 troops for which it had become responsible.⁴²

For the next few months the Army operated in the manner of a separate corps, carrying out the work of both an army headquarters and a corps headquarters directly under the Army Ground Forces. This double load made the operation during the remainder of the stay at the Presidio of Monterey a large task, since the number of officers and enlisted men continued below authorized strength. The Army commander insisted that the headquarters be kept at minimum operating strength consistent with proper efficiency.

From the moment that Fourth Army began its operation at the Presidio of Monterey the Adjutant General's Section instituted a system of maintaining a double set of records, both of which were completely indexed and kept current, at all times.⁴³ This far-sighted policy made possible the subsequent expeditious and smoothly-conducted transfer of Fourth Army units to the III Corps. When one unit relieves another the greatest single task is the adjustment of records to the satisfaction of both units.⁴⁴ In its method of operation Fourth Army had but to turn over one set of records to the relieving unit and keep one for its own use. This proved to be an excellent solution. Immediately on assuming command of the Third Army units the same system was instituted so that when the time came for Fourth Army to move again the same smooth turn-over could be expected.

FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS

Fourth Army had hardly been established on the west coast when the Army Ground Forces, on the 4th of January 1944, directed that the Fourth Army Headquarters move to Fort Sam Houston, Texas to assume the duties of the Third Army.⁴⁵ The III Corps was ordered from Fort McPherson, Georgia, to the Presidio of Monterey to replace Fourth Army.⁴⁶ Subsequent orders directed that a liaison detachment leave by air to be followed by an additional advance detail as soon thereafter as possible.

On the 7th of January, General Simpson, with a group of eight key officers, arrived at Fort Sam Houston⁴⁷ and the advance detachment arrived three days later.⁴⁸ The remainder of the headquarters left California on 15 January at which time III Corps assumed command.⁴⁹

The personnel of the Fourth Army sat in with the appropriate staff sections of Third Army until midnight 25-26 January. Command then passed to Fourth Army.⁵⁰ Third Army moved to other offices at Fort Sam Houston pending their departure and thus were available for consultation with Fourth Army staff officers. The previous experience of the Fourth Army staff in California, and the availability of the Third Army staff made this take-over comparatively easy.

For the first time Fourth Army reached full operating status. A sufficient number of officers was taken over from Third Army to bring Fourth Army over T/O strength,⁵¹ and, in its new station, Fourth Army had its first opportunity to work with subordinate corps headquarters: the XVIII, the XXI and XXIII.

In addition to the 282,000 troops of Third Army⁵² that were concerned in the transfer, Fourth Army became responsible for the operation of the extensive Louisiana Maneuver Area.⁵³

The move to San Antonio marked an important transition in the history of the Fourth Army. The Army's career on the west coast had been one of repeated change and adjustment, featured by transformation from a defense and training agency to an organization whose sole function was the preparation of troops for overseas combat. The headquarters had grown from a small organization whose functions resembled that of a separate corps to a full-strength army headquarters charged with the supervision of three corps, 19 divisions, and 282,000 men, and the direction of large scale maneuvers. In the change-over Fourth Army had developed a procedure for effecting the substitution of one headquarters for another with a minimum interruption of administration and training. The metamorphosis of the Army was accompanied by important changes in command relationships and was followed by a period in which the Army assumed the task of implementing and executing the training policies of Army Ground Forces and the War Department.

TRANSITION THROUGH AUGMENTATION

As Headquarters Fourth Army prepared to fulfill its primary mission in an active theater of combat, an officer and enlisted men augmentation group was organized on the premises occupied by the Fourth Army. This group was designated the Eighth Army and it was scheduled to replace the Fourth Army when it left Fort Sam Houston for the overseas staging area.

Prior to its departure from Texas, the Fourth Army was redesignated, for security reasons, the Ninth Army, while the newly-activated Eighth Army became the Fourth Army.⁵⁴

In April 1944, Major General John P. Lucas, who had just returned from Italy where he commanded the VI Corps from Salerno to Anzio, was named Deputy Commander of the newly organized Fourth Army. General Lucas brought to Fourth Army a wealth of experience acquired during 33 years of uninterrupted service as a regular Army officer. His service included combat in both World War I and II and participation in the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916.

Born on 14 January 1890 at Kearneysville, West Virginia, General Lucas was graduated from West Point with a Bachelor of Science degree on 13 June 1911. He was immediately assigned as a second lieutenant with the 14th Cavalry stationed at Camp Stotsenburg, Philippine Islands. During the major portion of his duty in the Philippines he was engaged in a survey of the Island of Luzon.

Re-assigned in August 1914 as a commander of a machine gun troop with the 13th Cavalry, General Lucas saw action against hostile Mexicans when Columbus, Texas, was raided by Villa in March 1916. Shortly thereafter, General Lucas was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.

He was attached to the punitive expedition to Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917, when he was named as Aide to Brigadier General George Bell, Jr. then stationed at El Paso, Texas. General Lucas next served with the 33d Division as Aide to the Commanding General and as Commandant of the Division Infantry School until January 1918 when he was named commanding officer of the 108th Field Signal Battalion, 33d Division, stationed at Camp Logan, Texas.

In May 1918, with the rank of Captain, he sailed for Europe where he was wounded in action near Amiens in June of the same year. Returning to the States he was assigned to the Army War College, and a tour of duty with the Committee on Education and Special Training, Washington, D. C. This was followed by an assignment as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the University of Michigan.

Transferring to the field artillery in 1920, General Lucas saw service with the 3d Field Artillery at Camp Grant, Illinois. Graduating from the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma in June 1921, he remained as an instructor until August 1923, when he was assigned to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Upon graduation he became Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Colorado Agricultural School, where he received his Master of Science degree in 1927.

Leaving Colorado Agricultural in July 1929, General Lucas was assigned command of the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, then stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas. Serving in this capacity until July 1931, he was then transferred to the Army War College from which he was graduated in June 1932.

Following graduation, he was assigned to the Personnel Division, War Department General Staff until June 1936 when he took a refresher course at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He was reassigned as commanding officer of the 4th Field Artillery in December 1936, and one year later he was appointed a member of the Field Artillery Board.

Returning to Fort Sill, Oklahoma as a full colonel in July 1940, General Lucas was designated commanding officer of the 1st Field Artillery. The following October he was assigned to the 2nd Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas as Field Artillery Commander, and was then nominated a Brigadier General (temp.)

General Lucas was named Commanding General of the 3d Infantry Division training at Fort Lewis, Washington, in July 1941, and on August 5th of the same year he was elevated to Major General (temp.) and was designated as Commanding General of the III Army Corps stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

In May 1943, General Lucas was assigned to Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations. In September he assumed command of VI Corps and led it through action that included establishment of the Salerno and Anzio beachheads.

Returning to the United States in April 1944, he was named Deputy Commander of the newly-activated Eighth Army, since re-designated the Fourth Army.

General Lucas was awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received in action in June 1918. On 2 June 1944 he was awarded the Silver Star in recognition of "his courage, inspiring example and high qualities of leadership displayed during an intense and determined air raid in January 1944, when his presence was responsible for the successful continuation of operations, which reflected great credit upon himself and the military."

As his first step in assuming command, General Lucas pledged himself to perpetuate the training policies established by the original Third and Fourth Armies.⁵⁵ He called a meeting of all Fourth Army officers and ranking non-commissioned officers and gave them a detailed account of his experiences overseas. So that the new Fourth Army might put particular emphasis on phases of training that combat had shown to be weak, General Lucas pointed out some of the weaknesses he had observed in American arms overseas. These included the need for more rigorous training in scouting and patrolling, greater proficiency in night operations, greater familiarity by all combat arms of mine and booby trap warfare. General Lucas pointed out that the infantry had a tendency to disregard the firepower of its own weapons and that too much dependence was placed on artillery to help in the taking of objectives. The Fourth Army Commander's talk covered 40 separate points, all based on his observations overseas.⁵⁶

General Lucas emphasized that "there has never been a time in the history of warfare when discipline was of more importance than it is at the present time. The experience of all combatants has been that the old 'spit and polish' units are the best on the battlefield."⁵⁷

Concluding, General Lucas declared that "it can be said with entire confidence that our training principles and training methods are correct. The methods and procedures that have demonstrated their soundness on maneuvers have proven equally sound when applied on the battlefield. On the other hand, there are few mistakes made on the battlefield that have not been previously made on maneuvers and that were not corrected."⁵⁸

Paying tribute to the American soldier, General Lucas said: "He is the finest in the world and is entitled to the most capable, intelligent and devoted leadership you and I can give him."⁵⁸

With the two-fold purpose of thoroughly acquainting himself with the commanders and chiefs of staff of Corps and Special Troops Headquarters, and the opportunity of outlining Army policy, General Lucas called a Corps and Special Troops Headquarters conference on 23-24 June 1944.

Once more General Lucas emphasized that he expected every unit under Fourth Army supervision to maintain a high degree of discipline, maintenance, housekeeping and military courtesy. He further demanded that definite, clear-cut decision from all channels of command be the rule rather than exception.⁶⁰

Thereafter Brigadier General Laurence B. Keiser, Chief of Staff, and Army General Staff officers thoroughly outlined Army policies and directives as they affected Corps and Special Troop Headquarters so that future misunderstandings would be avoided.

Each officer present was provided with a group of publications that included the newly-issued Memorandum No. 66, which was a revision of Memorandum No. 53, headed "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas Service";⁶¹ Initial Special Inspection Memorandum (ISI);⁶² Revised ISI Check List; Information Copy POM Procedure at this Headquarters; Revised Procedure Guide, Fourth Army, and copies of pertinent remarks made during the conference by Army Chief of Staff and General Staff officers.

Also distributed was a draft of a proposed POM Chart which Army contemplated issuing in the near future. An invitation was extended to the officers present to submit comments or suggestions for the Chart's improvement prior to 30 June 1944. The primary purpose of the chart was to prevent units waiting until the last moment to check their status for overseas movement.

In this connection General Keiser commented, "Immediately upon activation a unit should utilize this chart in its planning and as soon as practicable complete the preparations listed thereon."⁶³

So that the Army training program, which had been readjusted as a result of conclusions drawn from battle experience, could be administered with maximum efficiency, changes were adopted in Training Memorandum No. 1 in accordance with AGF directives.

The Memorandum was distributed to commanding officers of Corps and Special Troop Headquarters but not to units under their control. Permission, however, was given for the issuance of portions of the Memorandum as they affected individual units.⁶⁴ This relieved units from acquiring quantities of superfluous material which did not directly affect the training of the unit.

A new policy related to training inspections of units was also instituted, establishing inspection teams rather than individuals to conduct unit training inspections.⁶⁵

It was felt that by sending representatives from the various Staff Sections as a group to a particular post to examine the respective units minimized interference with training. Also, corps headquarters were requested to submit their projected inspection schedules as far in advance as possible so that Fourth Army inspections could be synchronized with those of corps.

Contrary to the belief that the Louisiana Maneuver Area would remain closed indefinitely, Fourth Army was advised on 30 June 1944 by the Army Ground Forces that the area would be reopened in September as the scene of an "Army Ground Force Maneuver" rather than a "Fourth Army Maneuver" as this was the only maneuver being staged by the Ground Forces.⁶⁶

The "Ground Force Maneuvers" were shortened from the originally scheduled two months to one month, with two phases represented during the month. The first phase was scheduled to begin on 17 September 1944, but on 24 August 1944, the Army Ground Forces set the proposed date for the start of maneuvers back to 20 October 1944.⁶⁷ This change resulted from the accelerated movement of combat units to overseas theaters with the necessity of revising and preparing units to participate in the maneuvers.

Fourth Army submitted a proposed list of necessary supporting units to Ground Forces for approval and issued an all-inclusive publication detailing maneuver procedure.⁶⁸ General Lucas was designated Maneuver Director and he, in turn, appointed Colonel Mert Proctor as Deputy Director.⁶⁹ Later Brigadier General William A. McCulloch was made Deputy Director.⁷⁰

On 6 August 1944, a general order was issued announcing the proposed activation on 21 August 1944 of the Fifteenth Army.⁷¹ On 1 September 1944 this new Army, composed of the chiefs of the old Fourth Army general and special staff sections, plus key officer and enlisted personnel, began moving to a new location at Fort Sam Houston, preparatory to its movement to the European Theater of Operations. The Fourth Army augmentation group, which was built up during the previous two months and which had sat in with the group that now became Headquarters Fifteenth Army, then became the new Fourth Army.⁷² General Lucas remained with the Fourth Army and his Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Galloway, became senior officer of the Fifteenth Army so he would accompany it overseas where it would receive its commanding general.

On 26 August 1944, the augmentation group attended a conference at which General Lucas and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Keiser, explained the plans and policies of the Fourth Army.⁷³

Thus, the Fourth Army had become a school and proving ground for training Army Headquarters for movement overseas. This involved a complicated system of shifting personnel and army designations. It also proved the efficacy of augmentation -- a system whereby understudies moved in, learned their jobs, then took over so that the experienced army headquarters men could go overseas with a newly designated army headquarters. The Fourth Army was thus the "parent" of the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies.

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS

At the Presidio of Monterey, Fourth Army had its first real opportunity to work as an integrated headquarters, to test its staff procedures and to start building the backlog of experience so necessary for smooth and efficient operation. When the Army reached Texas it was able to take on the increased burden of a greater number of troops plus the Louisiana Maneuver area without any disruption of subordinate units or any undue strain on the Army staff.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS

Since the Army's primary task was the training of troops for combat service, General Simpson insisted that corps and other subordinate units bend all efforts toward helping the Army accomplish this mission. All relationships with subordinate headquarters were predicated on this fact.

Regarding personnel, General Simpson insisted: "All headquarters will adhere to the AGF directive that all headquarters be kept to absolute minimum of personnel for efficient performance of (their) mission."¹

Addressing the commanders of the Special Troops Headquarters and representatives from the corps at a conference held shortly after Fourth Army, General Simpson told these officers: "I believe that much unnecessary correspondence between this headquarters and subordinate units is caused by failure to read and unequivocally interpret Army Regulations and directives distributed by higher headquarters. So called 'word straddles' must inevitably be returned for a definite decision conforming to existing regulations and directives."

Directives were issued in the form of numbered memoranda in lieu of mimeographed letters.² Distribution was made only to interested individuals or units.³

Fourth Army had dealings with three Service Commands: with the Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, while on the West Coast; with the Eighth Service Command, Dallas, Texas, and the Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, Georgia, while in Texas. Relations with the various Service Commands were amicable and cooperative. Fourth Army adjusted itself without difficulty to the requirements of the War Department Circular of 28 January 1944 by which station complements were reduced to the size necessary to operate the post with no troops present, and field force units were made responsible for post duties incident to their presence on the station.⁴ The War Department provided for adjudication of differences between post commanders and troop commanders, but if any differences occurred, they were eliminated before they came to the attention of Army headquarters.

OPERATIONS WITHOUT CORPS

During the period when Fourth Army was located on the West Coast, Army units were widely scattered and this fact, plus the unique operation of the Army without corps, made necessary the adoption of unusual methods of training and administration. The Army Ground Forces in July 1943 directed that, in general, corps would conduct training, and armies would absorb most of the administrative work.⁵ Having no corps, Fourth Army had to handle both training and administration.

Since training of troops was the primary duty of the Fourth Army, and administration was secondary, it became apparent quite early that the most helpful procedure would be to eliminate from the Army Staff as much administrative work as possible. Obviously, if the staff was called upon to do both there was a strong likelihood that one or the other, or both, might suffer.

Upon relieving the IV and the XVIII Corps, Army assumed control of eight Headquarters Special Troops as follows:⁶

- 1st Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Ford Ord, California
- 2nd Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp Cooke, California
- 3rd Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp Beale, California
- 4th Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp Roberts, California
- 5th Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp San Luis Obispo, California
- 6th Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp White, Oregon
- 7th Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Camp Adair, Oregon .
- 8th Hq & Hq Det, Special Troops, Fort Lewis, Washington

These Headquarters, Special Troops seemed to be the logical, and for that matter, the only subordinate units to which Army could decentralize a part of the work. How could these subheadquarters best serve Fourth Army?

In accordance with current AGF policy, the commanding officers of the Special Troops Headquarters were designated as direct representatives of the Army commander with authority to process certain matters requiring the action of a general officer and consistent with announced policies.⁷ The categories of matters to be processed by Special Troops Headquarters were enumerated in a memorandum on 12 November 1943.⁸ With this authority, Special Troops commanders could process and complete a great deal of routine administrative work, and thus remove a tremendous burden from Army Headquarters. The Special Troops Headquarters functioned as branch offices of the Fourth Army and their commanding officers were, in fact, Army staff officers.⁹

An officer on the staff of each numbered Special Troops Headquarters was detailed, by Fourth Army, as an Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Fourth Army, for the purpose of authenticating orders and correspondence for the commanding general, Fourth Army.¹⁰

In practice the system fulfilled all expectations. When Fourth Army moved to Fort Sam Houston the system was reinstated¹¹ and helped to keep administrative work of the newly acquired corps to a minimum.¹²

In order to relieve the corps of as much administrative work as possible and provide, on the ground, assistance and direction to corps troops, the various Special Troops Headquarters commanders as representatives of the Army commander were directed to cooperate with the corps commanders. The Special Troops Headquarters coordinated use of training areas, training aids, ranges, and relations between all troops of the Army, whether under corps or directly under Army, and the local service command representatives of the Post commander. Upon request of the corps commander, the Special Troops commander assisted the corps in the processing of corps units for overseas shipment by furnishing qualified inspection teams, supervision of inspections, and administrative assistance in POM.¹³

On the West Coast with no corps, Fourth Army found it necessary to conduct its own tests and "D" series exercises.¹⁴ At one time thirty-two members of the Army staff were used to conduct the individual training tests of one division.¹⁵ Personnel from the Army acted in supervisory or key positions and called on subordinate units for such additional personnel as was needed. In some cases the siphoning of additional officer

personnel from the units handicapped them slightly, but when the real need was pointed out to unit commanders they cooperated to the fullest extent. General Simpson, at all times, insisted that only the most qualified personnel be assigned to this training and administrative work.¹⁶

Another task imposed by lack of corps was the preparation of training reports. Normally these reports were prepared by corps while Army merely checked them, noted the deficiencies, and directed the necessary corrective action.¹⁷

General Simpson found advantages in operating without corps. In one of the first meetings with his staff he told his officers, "I think we have a splendid opportunity, the way we are situated without any corps under us, to get close to the troops and get oriented in our training mission."¹⁸

STAFF OPERATION

The staff of Headquarters Fourth Army was organized and operated in strict accordance with provisions of FM 101-5, Subject: "Staff and Combat Orders." Both the Army commander and the chief of staff were insistent on this point. A visit which General Simpson made to Africa in 1943 strengthened his conviction regarding it. The field experience of high-ranking officers in that theater showed that staff work broke down only when it departed from the principles contained in this field manual.¹⁹ General Moore made it clear from the beginning that the General Staff sections were to be coordinating and not operating agencies.²⁰

Two measures were instituted to bring about complete coordination among the staff sections. One was a daily meeting held by the chief of staff with the chiefs of the General Staff sections, at which all current business was discussed and policy matters were decided. At quarters meeting, held weekly and consisting of the entire officer personnel of the headquarters, General Staff officers briefed the rest of the staff on occurrences of the past week and on business pending for the succeeding week.²¹ All officers were thus kept oriented on the work conducted by the headquarters.

Fourth Army was plagued initially with the failure of a new staff to consult with other sections on matters of common interest. General Simpson and General Moore repeatedly emphasized the importance of coordination. Studies under consideration could be enriched and much waste motion eliminated. "I want to remind you," General Simpson told his staff, "of one important phase of completing staff work. If any section handles a paper and makes a study, remember that other sections may be interested in it too."²² General Moore told the headquarters: "The staff is to operate in accordance with War Department directives. All officers must read and become familiar with FM 101 5, the Headquarters Procedure Guide and AR 380-5. Members of the staff must be kept informed on what is going on, and they must inform each other as to their activities."²³

In the absence on the West Coast of intervening corps headquarters, members of the Army staff learned at first hand the problems of subordinate units. The relatively small size of the Army made this experience possible.

When the Fourth Army arrived at Fort Sam Houston and assimilated troops of the Third Army, it assumed the normal functions of a training army. Now for the first time the staff had an opportunity to operate through corps headquarters with an approximation to actual combat procedure.

As on the West Coast routine administration was devolved on commanders of the Special Troops Headquarters. The newly acquired corps concentrated on training. The Army staff was organized and functioned normally with emphasis on perfecting and coordinating staff procedure and the successful accomplishment of the Army's training mission.

The principles governing relations with subordinate units were not changed when General Lucas assumed command in April.

SUMMARY

The unique circumstance in this phase of the Fourth Army's development was the conduct of military matters without subordinate corps. Dealing directly with divisions, Army staff members had the valuable experience of closer supervision of unit training and saw at first hand how successfully their own directives could be followed by a lower headquarters. This resulted in appreciation of training problems and facilitated cooperation and understanding in carrying to a successful conclusion the Army's prime task -- preparing subordinate units for movement to combat theaters.

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER III

TRAINING POLICIES

From its inception, the Fourth Army's fundamental training objective was to bring units under its control to their highest state of combat efficiency so they were prepared to perform their primary mission at the earliest possible time.¹ This objective was continually emphasized by General Simpson in staff conferences, conversations with subordinate commanders, and on personal inspection trips.

In an address made before a Fourth Army School for Orientation Officers, General Simpson stated that "successful training consists of three vital parts: physical conditioning, technical mastery of weapons and operation, and that mental conditioning which we call 'combat morale.'"²

General Simpson placed particular emphasis on thorough and detailed advance training preparations with close supervision by instructional personnel. This was the keynote of his training policy.³ He insistently taught that the issuance of orders was only the first step in a successful training program. Thereafter, it was the responsibility of the unit commander to supervise all training, never delegating this responsibility to subordinate commanders.

Operating initially without corps, the Army staff had a splendid opportunity to familiarize itself with the application of doctrines from higher headquarters. On the basis of this experience the Army issued a new and comprehensive set of training directives, compiled with the cooperation of all special staff sections, and published as Training Memorandum No. 1 in December 1943. Revised drafts of this memorandum were published in 1 February 1944 and again on 27 March 1944, following the move to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This memorandum set forth the policies of the Army Ground Forces, the War Department and the Army commander on all aspects of unit training.⁴ It was found that AGF directives were framed in great detail and left little to be done beyond summarizing and reproducing them.⁵

The basic part of the Training Memorandum consisting of nineteen pages set forth the objectives and general plan for training of all units. In addition, there were forty-nine inclosures containing detailed instructions governing specific phases and types of training. The Memorandum was constructed to facilitate the publication of subsequent changes and revisions.

Corps and Special Troop headquarters were not furnished AGF or War Department training directives as such, but instead copies of the Fourth Army Training Memorandum No. 1, and instructed not to distribute this Memorandum as such to subordinate units.⁶ Smaller units would only be confused by the mass of training matter not applicable to them. The two agencies primarily charged with the supervision of training, having been provided with Fourth Army training doctrines, were given the widest latitude as to methods adopted to insure the conformity of subordinate units. Detailed training instructions for units of the lower echelons were reduced to a minimum.⁷ It was felt that the appropriate master and weekly training schedules were sufficient for divisions, brigades and separate units, providing their training was closely supervised by corps and Special Troops headquarters.⁸

INSPECTION, TESTS AND EXERCISES

In line with the Army policy of keeping paper work and reports from subordinate units to an absolute minimum, inspections were the primary means employed by the Army

staff to determine whether units were being trained in accordance with AGF policy and directives.⁹ Tests and exercises were used to discover deficiencies in training and to determine its status and quality.¹⁰

The tests and exercises prescribed for Fourth Army units were those outlined in AGF Training Directive, effective 1 November 1942, and subsequent changes thereto. These were passed on to Fourth Army units in the Training Memorandum mentioned above. The Army commander implemented these AGF directives by requiring strict observance of the qualities that build discipline.¹¹

General Simpson, in all his personal inspections, and in those of his staff, demanded that commanders show evidence of careful planning. He examined each unit personally for housekeeping standards, military courtesy, neatness of dress and military bearing.¹² General Simpson was a firm believer in personal inspections of all units he commanded.¹³ He realized that he could give great command impetus by talking with commanders and personally explaining his policies, noting deficiencies and commending units on good points.

In making these inspections, General Simpson was usually accompanied by representatives of as many General and Special Staff sections as was practicable. These staff officers would contact their opposite numbers in the subordinate unit being inspected and discuss mutual problems.¹⁴

In addition to the inspections of the commanding general, each section chief was responsible for making sufficient inspections of subordinate units to keep the Army commander advised as to the status of training in the specialized field concerned.¹⁵ On returning from these inspections, officers were required to fill out an Inspection Report answering twenty-eight questions which were of particular interest to the commanding general.¹⁶ These covered such subjects as: standards of housekeeping and training, conduct of orientation, adequacy of furloughs, classification of enlisted men, planning of training, and status of equipment.¹⁷

Immediately upon return from an inspection trip, officers were also required to make a detailed report to all interested staff sections and the chiefs of staff concerning the commendations and deficiencies noted and the correctional action recommended.¹⁸ A copy of this report was sent to the unit inspected through appropriate channels, directing correction of deficiencies and indicating action to be taken.¹⁹ Subsequent inspections were then made to determine whether or not the deficiencies had been corrected.

In addition to the inspections cited above, the Inspector General section made an inspection of all "alerted" units.

The tests and exercises prescribed by the Army Ground Forces were conducted under the active supervision of the Army staff while on the West Coast. On arrival in Texas, supervision of tests passed on to the Test Sections of the Corps and Special Troops headquarters.²⁰ The Army staff relieved the Corps and Special Troops headquarters of as much of the administrative load as possible so that these subordinate headquarters could concentrate on the supervision of training and tests.²¹

Weekly reports of all scheduled tests and exercises were submitted to the Army Ground Forces by Corps and Special Troops headquarters, specifying the place and date.²² Within fifteen days after the completion of the test, the testing headquarters was required to submit a report to Fourth Army including an overall unit grade and a brief evaluation of the status of training as reflected in the results of the test.²³

When he took over command of Fourth Army, General Lucas ordered that, insofar as was practicable, inspection teams, not inspecting individuals, would visit subordinate commands. This order was issued so that inspections would be taken care of in one combined tour and so that repeated small inspections by individuals would not cause "undue harassment to commanders in the field."²⁴ To facilitate this, corps headquarters were requested to submit their inspection schedules as far in advance as possible so that Army team inspections could jibe with those of corps.

Immediate inspection of units placed under "alert instructions" was charged to the senior tactical commanders of the unit involved. Spot checks of alerted units were conducted by Army headquarters. Status of training inspections were charged to corps for corps units and to commanding officers, special troop detachments, for non-corps units.

General Lucas demanded that "Status of Training" reports be submitted within 48 hours following the inspections. It was directed that inspection reports be brief, factual and render specific accounts of training observed, enumerating good points and deficiencies and include recommendations for remedial action.²⁵ In the case of inspections of divisions, the team chief was held responsible for the division-as-a-whole report which he compiled from reports submitted by each individual participating in the team inspection.

"D" SERIES TESTS

One of the first jobs confronting the Army staff when it assumed the responsibilities formerly carried by the IV and the XVIII Corps was the conduct of the "D" (Division) Series exercises for the 44th Infantry Division. Preparations for these exercises had been largely completed by the IV Corps, and at the request of General Simpson, the Corps commander left three members of the Corps training augmentation at Fort Lewis to complete preparations and assist Director headquarters during the series.²⁶

The commanding officer, Eighth Special Troops, Fort Lewis, was designated as deputy director and was furnished eight officers from the Army staff, to be used on the Staff, Director Headquarters. He was authorized to call on various Fourth Army divisions for the necessary umpires.

General Simpson, as director, visited Fort Lewis four times during the series giving the critique after each problem. The Division showed progress in technique as the series progressed, with corrective measures being taken to eliminate minor errors. The series was concluded with a satisfactory rating.

Plans had been initiated by the Operations Sub-section of G-5 for a similar series for the 13th Armored Division at Camp Beale, California, but the departure of the Division for Camp Bowie obviated the necessity for completing these plans.²⁷

By the time the move to Fort Sam Houston had been completed, it was possible for the Army to pass the active supervision of the "D" Series exercises to the corps, who were guided by the provisions of Training Memorandum No. 1 and by inclosure No. 4 thereto.

Whenever practical, the "D" Series were staged in the Louisiana Maneuver area, but the majority was staged in the vicinity of the Division's home station. When required, additional land was leased for this purpose through the appropriate Service Command.²⁸

The corps conducting each series submitted the problems to Army headquarters for review at least two weeks in advance. Upon completion of a division series, a letter report was submitted by the testing headquarters which included comments on the conduct

failed in its mission. The record does show that units of the division advanced aggressively, that some elements suffered severe tank losses in clashes with infantry, that others penetrated deep into Red territory in a comparatively short time, and that others made a brilliant "end run" at a critical stage of the battle.

In his critique General Krueger criticized the early commitment and continued use of the 2nd against organized resistance. "It reduced, through tank wastage, the strength available for the final blow, and forced the piece-meal rather than concentrated use of these vehicles", he said.⁹⁰

"The most effective use of armored forces and their natural foes, the massed anti-tank formations, can be attained only through thoughtful planning and perfect technique," General Krueger said. "There must be continuous reconnaissance to determine the practicability of the terrain for the use of armored forces. If this is done, then the direction of their attack should be such as to strike at a vital area or element in order to make their use worthwhile. To barge ahead, gain local successes in numerous places and then be stopped by a natural obstacle is a waste of power."⁹¹

General Krueger also stressed that defensive infantry affected by an armored penetration should remain steadfastly in place and continue the defense while other forces, including anti-tank formations, are rushed up to counterattack the flanks and rear of the penetration.

In the second and final problem the VIII Corps was given the mission of organizing and defending ground in the vicinity of Peason in order to cover the theoretical concentration of the Third Army in the Shreveport-Mansfield area. The 2nd Armored and other units were attached to the IV Corps, making it far the stronger. Operating under secret orders, the 2nd Armored crossed the Sabine and moved north on the Texas side of the river with the mission of recrossing the river and attacking the Blue rear in the Mansfield-Pleasant area. This it did, while infantry combat teams engaged the Blue frontally. General Krueger in his critique said he believed the Blues, whose lines were anchored on the Red and Sabine rivers, could have accomplished their mission had they "taken more active means of preventing the armored division from crossing the... rivers in its rear."⁹²

In preparation for these huge Corps vs. Corps maneuvers and for the bigger Army, and Army vs. Army, maneuvers yet to come, Third Army Headquarters had closed in San Antonio on 11 August 1941 and had opened simultaneously at Lake Charles, Louisiana.⁹³ Personnel and supplies of Headquarters and Headquarters Special Troops (which had been activated 2 June 1941⁹⁴) had moved into the maneuver area by motor convoy.

Countless and varied were the problems officers had to wrestle with in preparation for the big maneuvers and one of the most complex of these was supply. Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Loyal M. Haynes was assistant G-4 of Third Army at the time and he recalls that a dozen depots were set up in the maneuver area.⁹⁵

"The area over which they maneuvered was so great that centralization of supply was impracticable," General Haynes recalls. "Furthermore, even though we knew in advance - had to know - the general plan of action, and therefore where to supply, generally, we also had to make plans on the unpredictability of people like General Patton, then commanding the 2nd Armored Division. He loved to, and did, make 250-mile 'end-run sweeps.' I finally had it figured out so that wherever he went in the entire area he'd always be within 20 miles of gasoline supply for tanks. You cannot imagine the tasks involved... Third Army alone had 43,000 vehicles; we had \$900,000 worth of spare parts, either there or on call, and had to make arrangements for supply of eight different kinds of gasoline - for stoves, airplanes, cars, tanks, and so forth..."⁹⁶

of the problems; a report of outstanding performances and deficiencies noted; a general rating on the performance of the division; and a statement that the division had been informed of the results of these exercises. When a division had successfully completed a "D" Series, it was ready for advanced training with other arms and branches involving coordinated training with other divisions and corps and obtainable only through large scale maneuvers.

REVISION OF COMBAT TRAINING POLICIES

In conformity with recent adaptations of AGF training directives to combat experience, Fourth Army, after the arrival of General Lucas, made the following revisions in its training program:

All non-divisional units were required to have three weeks of maneuvers, combined training and field training. If non-divisional units could not participate in maneuvers or combined training with large units they were required to complete three continuous weeks in the field under combat conditions.

Combat experience had shown that tank and tank destroyer guns could be used to good advantage in indirect fire operations and that antiaircraft could be used profitably to break up enemy troop concentrations through air-burst firing. Consequently, tank, destroyer and antiaircraft gun units were required to be proficient in their secondary rôles or use as artillery. Corps headquarters were required to determine through observation, inspections and tests if these three types of non-divisional units were proficient in their secondary roles.²⁹

Non-divisional bands were required to take all individual and unit tests required to satisfy POM qualifications.

All directives except that on post-maneuver training pertaining to mine warfare were rescinded and on 29 June 1944 a new directive establishing the degree of training and proficiency for various types of AGF units was published.³⁰

The directive on tank-infantry training was rescinded and a new directive published 29 June 1944.³¹ It specified that tank and tank destroyer units completing unit training be attached to infantry divisions undergoing combined or post maneuver training. Such attachments were limited from four to eight weeks. On 22 August 1944, tank battalions of the 8th Armored Division were made available for this combined training and the Army Ground Forces directed that three tank battalions of the 8th Armored Division be made available to the XXII Corps.

Effective 1 August 1944, training of non-divisional combat and service units was placed in three classes, dependent on the sources of fillers or replacements.³² Each class was given a definite period for required training which could be extended only upon approval of the Army Ground Forces. This move was designed to accelerate the training schedule of non-divisional combat and service units.

The Army G-3 section was charged with the responsibility of processing all requests for quotas to service schools for armored, cavalry, infantry and military police units, and communications concerning personnel from other ground force agencies, were routed through Army G-3 so a close check could be maintained.

Rapid movement of fighting forces to theaters of combat during midsummer brought a fluctuating status to proposed fall maneuvers in the Louisiana Maneuver area. As of 25 August 1944, only two divisions -- the 8th Armored and the 10th Light -- were available for the maneuver. The Army Ground Forces directed that the date for the start of maneuvers be pushed back one month, from 17 September to 17 October.³³ Planning for

the maneuvers still continued with emphasis on closer relationships with and greater participation by both Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces. Lack of coordination had been a weakness of previous maneuvers.

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL AND ADVANCED TRAINING

The tactical and combat coordination of various elements comprising the Fourth Army was a constant training goal at all periods of the Army's history. The special training by which this coordination was developed and tested can best be divided into three major categories: Amphibious Training, Louisiana Maneuvers, and Air-Ground Training.

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

It had become increasingly evident from reports received on campaigns being waged in the Pacific that divisional and non-divisional units should have training in amphibious operations prior to their departure from the continental limits of the United States.

The War Department and the Army Ground Forces were giving increasing attention to this problem and prior to the separation of Fourth Army from Western Defense Command amphibious training had been conducted for some time at various points along the coast by the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet.¹

Before the Fourth Army moved to the Presidio of Monterey, units undergoing amphibious training were attached to the II Armored Corps (now the XVIII Corps) at San Jose, California. The mission of the II Armored Corps and the Fourth Army was to coordinate amphibious training as prescribed by the Army Ground Forces.²

On taking over from the II Armored Corps, General Simpson attended a conference with Brigadier General Pickett, U.S.M.C., Executive Officer, Amphibious Training Command, on 5 November 1943. It was agreed that the main emphasis was to be on training task forces of combined arms, complete within themselves, for amphibious operation. The actual instruction and practical work was to be performed by the Marine Corps under the supervision of the Amphibious Training Command. Fourth Army was to act in an advisory capacity and to coordinate the amphibious training with regular ACF ground training.

Training was to begin with the 81st Infantry Division on 1 December 1943. The infantry and engineer elements were to train at Camp San Luis Obispo. The antiaircraft battalions, composite tank battalions, and joint signal assault companies were to train in the San Diego area.³

Originally it was planned to conduct indoctrination and orientation course of instruction for the first four weeks and by the seventh week the first regimental combat team was to put to sea.⁴ As LCI's, LCM's, amphibious tractors, rubber boats, and additional radio equipment were not available during the early period the first regimental combat team did not put to sea until 20 March 1944.⁵

The 81st Infantry Division closed its training at Camp San Luis Obispo on 27 November 1943 and the divisional amphibious training program began on 1 December 1943. During the first month the following courses of instruction were given:⁶

A. INDOCTRINATION COURSE

1. Amphibious Operations, General
2. Task Organization

3. Troop Life Aboard Ship
4. Tactical Planning
5. Ship to Shore Movement
6. Intelligence
7. Naval Gunfire
8. Air Support
9. Field Artillery
10. Supply
11. Transport Loading
12. Shore Party
13. Communications
14. Combat Unit Loading
15. Lessons from Previous Operations

B. AMPHIBIOUS COMMUNICATION SCHOOL

1. School for Officers
2. Voice Radio Class
3. Message Center and Wire Class
4. Tropical Maintenance Course
5. Field Exercises in Communications

C. MEDICAL COURSE

D. NAVAL GUNFIRE COURSE

E. NAVAL GUNFIRE SPOTTERS COURSE

F. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL

G. STAFF SCHOOL

1. Division Staff School
2. Regimental Staff School
3. Battalion Staff School

After receiving the above courses of instruction the division underwent practical training on dry nets and wet nets by battalion landing teams. Because of the lack of proper equipment the date for advanced training was extended, and the division began additional ground training which included POM preparation, review of previous training, "attack of a fortified position" problems, two-sided maneuvers, and conditioning marches.⁷

Major E. A. Cragholm, Liaison Officer of Fourth Army, outlined some of the difficulties encountered in training an infantry division using Marine Corps personnel and Navy equipment. He pointed out that an infantry division, though engaged in taking amphibious training, must still continue its ground training, complete its tests, and prepare for POM in order to be ready for its primary mission. This placed a huge training burden on the division and called for the highest type of staff coordination.⁸

Although the amphibious training was conducted by the Marine Corps, the issuance of training programs, the outlining of schedules for amphibious schools, as well as ground training and other special training, required planning well in advance by the division.⁹

The Marine officer-instructors were credited by Major Cragholm with doing an excellent job. A high point was reached when Lt. Colonel James Roosevelt and Lt. Colonel Evan Carlson addressed the division on the latest battle and training tactics being used in the Pacific theater. In summarizing his remarks Major Cragholm stated that he

felt "a compilation of all information developed by the Marines should be established and filed with the Army Adjutant General's Office." He also suggested that officers of the Fourth Army should go to sea with the various divisions during their training exercises in order to become familiar with operation plans.

Major Cragholm also suggested that permanent liaison be maintained with the Marine Corps and the infantry division participating in the amphibious training. In his conclusions Major Cragholm felt strongly that a careful orientation of the division G-3 was necessary, and that during the three month training cycle, the liaison officer should spend at least one week of every month with the division taking amphibious training.

In developing the amphibious training program it was clear to all instructional units involved that the process would have to be continuous, and that instructor staffs and equipment of all types were to be turned over intact to units who were to follow the 81st Division in this type of training.¹⁰

The Fourth Army was associated with the conduct of amphibious training only in an advisory and coordinating capacity, and insofar as the 81st Infantry Division was concerned, only for the preliminary planning phases and the first seven weeks of training.

Fourth Army left for its new assignment at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, seven weeks before the 81st Division received enough ships to enable the first regimental combat team to put to sea. On its departure from the Pacific Coast, Army left sufficient personnel behind as augmentation with III Corps to explain Corps personnel the Army's participation in this amphibious training.¹¹ This ended participation of the Fourth Army in amphibious training.

LOUISIANA MANEUVERS

The coordination of the ground force elements, as well as air-ground cooperation, was particularly emphasized when various elements of the Army participated in the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1944.

General Simpson assumed command of the troops previously assigned to the Third Army just as the Fifth Maneuver period of the Louisiana exercises was closing. By this time, plans for the Sixth period were well under way, and the Army Ground Forces had already scheduled the following units to participate: Hq XVIII Corps, 8th Armored Division, 11th Airborne Division, 44th Infantry Division, 75th Infantry Division, and the 92d (Colored) Infantry Division plus supporting Army and corps type troops and elements of the II Tactical Air Division.

The main difficulty at this time was securing enough supporting troops, both combat and service, properly to carry out the designated objectives of the maneuvers. A number of units were requested from the Army Ground Forces but only a few were available.

By the time the Sixth period started on 7 February 1944, there were enough service troops in the area to maintain supply, but some elements such as tank, tank destroyer and artillery were not present in sufficient numbers to augment properly the major units. Throughout the entire period both combat and service elements were being removed for overseas duty and it was a continuous problem to keep the maneuvers operating on the scale originally planned.

The actual conduct of the exercises had been fairly well standardized by the Sixth Period of the maneuvers. The program had been under continual revision for a year by Headquarters, Third Army, and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, in order to stress the weak points that previous maneuvers had disclosed.¹²

The period included seven phases.¹³ The First Phase consisted of four controlled flag exercises. The exercises for the 8th Armored Division, 44th Infantry Division, and 75th Infantry Division were conducted by Director Headquarters. The XVIII Corps conducted flag exercises for the 11th Airborne Division and the 92d Infantry Division.

The four exercises for an Armored division consisted of (1) march to contact, reconnaissance and security, and attack to seize critical terrain; (2) offensive action to hold critical terrain and withdrawal to Corps Reserve; (3) exploitation of success of infantry by attack through an infantry-opened gap in enemy lines, and (4) flank attack, exploitation and pursuit.

For an Infantry or Airborne division they consisted of (1) reconnaissance, tactical march to contact, and development of hostile position; (2) reconnaissance of assembly position, movement to assembly position and attack; (3) defense of a hastily prepared position and daylight withdrawal, and (4) night withdrawal, occupation and organization of defensive position.

General Simpson, in a critique conducted for the 8th Armored Division, stressed the importance of the junior officers and the non-commissioned officers and asked them to "realize their responsibilities, accept them and step out and do things when the occasion arises."¹⁴

The Second Phase involved a coordinated attack of a prepared position: the defense was given a minimum of 24 hours of uninterrupted and unobserved work on the position. In this phase the XVIII Corps and 8th Armored Division, the 44th and 92nd Infantry Divisions operated against the 75th Infantry Division.¹⁵

This, the first free two-sided maneuver phase, revealed that "there was a lack of reporting of any information on the part of combat units; that intelligence sections, especially in the regimental and battalion echelons, showed evidence of greenness."¹⁶ In this connection, General Simpson commented, "No command can hope for success in battle without proper intelligence." He also dealt at length on proper advance formations to preserve freedom of maneuver until the corps is engaged in decisive combat, and to provide security to all elements of the command. He further noted that the commanders who had been most successful were the ones who evolved simple plans.¹⁷

An attack of an over-extended position and a delaying action on successive positions featured the Third Phase. Here, for the first time, practically every type of air-ground cooperation was used.¹⁸

One phase of the maneuvers that caused concern at this time was the lack of radio security. Colonel Edwards, Deputy Director of Maneuvers, said that "An officer (in charge of a radio intercept station at Director Headquarters) assured me that it would have been easy for him to have known the order of battle of some units, current troop movements, and the location of CP's, as well as predict the area and extent of future activities."¹⁹ Once again the outstanding deficiencies during this phase were the need for reconnaissance and control.²⁰

The Fourth Phase duplicated the Second Phase, except on different ground. This time the XVIII Corps, the 8th Armored Division, and the 44th and 75th Infantry Divisions were pitted against the 92nd Infantry. General Simpson expressed gratification with this phase, although some weaknesses were displayed.²¹ Columns on the march were not always within supporting distance of each other, and the flow of information from reconnaissance agencies was still meager.

At this time General Simpson stated that improvement in identification of vehicles was necessary. Excessively muddy conditions in the area covered bumper markings as

fast as they were cleaned off. Following a conference with the Deputy Director and his staff it was decided to use a tin plate with the proper color exposed on the top of the radiator of the vehicles. This was used in addition to the standard bumper markings, and proved very satisfactory throughout the remainder of the period.²²

Reduction of a bridgehead and attack and defense of a river line constituted the problems for the Fifth Phase. The XVIII Corps, with the 8th Armored Division and the 75th and 92nd Infantry Divisions, were to push the 44th Infantry across the Sabine River.

The conduct of this phase brought expressions of appreciation from General Simpson who said, "The advance of the Blue Corps on the whole was aggressive and well conducted. I think the action of the 92nd Division was well performed. The conduct of the defense as General Muir described it is certainly beyond any constructive criticism of mine."²³

Dissatisfaction was expressed with the actual crossing of the river as the boats crossed in distinct waves, and the infantry waiting to go across stood exposed on the river banks.²⁴

The Sixth Phase was similar to the Fifth except that the attacker had to cross his major elements. This time the 92nd Division defended. The 8th Armored Division was sent forward ahead of the infantry, seized the near bank of the river, and cleared it of all Red troops.²⁵

General Simpson concluded the critique by stating, "If the presence of armor in the attacking force is already known to the enemy, it is believed that the use which Blue initially made of the 8th Armored Division was proper and effective. If however, the enemy is not cognizant of the presence of armor, consideration might be given to using infantry to drive in enemy covering forces and keep the armor well concealed until such time as it could cross the river under cover of darkness and launch a surprise attack in a decisive direction." It was noted by General Simpson that the actual river crossing was a decided improvement over that in the previous phase.²⁶

The Seventh Phase involved movement to contact, meeting engagement, aggressive action by both sides, and withdrawal of the smaller forces. The XVIII Corps, with the 75th and 92d Infantry Divisions, initially operated against the Red Corps (Prov) with the 44th Infantry Division. Early on the second day, the 8th Armored Division was released to the Red Corps. Because of extremely bad weather the problem was called on the third day just as both forces were in position for attack.²⁷

At the final critique, General Simpson reminded everyone that this maneuver period was just another stepping-stone in training and the experience gained in maneuvers should form the foundation on which to build post-maneuver training at home stations. Everyone was reminded also that on completion of maneuvers he was subject to overseas duty and that every effort should be made to complete POM requirements.²⁸

In addition to standard training, certain specific phase of instruction were given during the Sixth Maneuver Period. The Army Ground Forces had directed that training in malaria control be conducted during maneuvers, preferably in the early part of each period.²⁹ Lack of necessary equipment delayed this training until the final phase when the entire area was declared malarious for four days. The majority of the troops entered into the spirit of malaria training and the results on the whole were satisfactory but lack of proper equipment tended to destroy realism.³⁰

The Army Ground Forces also directed that each infantry division in maneuvers was to be motorized at least once during the period.³¹ Although the lack of necessary transportation made this impossible, a sufficient number of trucks were obtained to

make one move each for the 75th and 92d Infantry Divisions. The 75th received a rating of "satisfactory" on this move and the 92d a "very satisfactory" rating.³²

When it was found that service forces, including truck companies, railhead companies and other service units, were not available in sufficient quantity to carry on the supplying of troop units in the area, the Army Ground Forces decided to suspend the Louisiana Maneuvers at the end of the Sixth Period.³³

AIR-GROUND TRAINING

Air-ground cooperation first became an important factor during the Third Phase of the Louisiana Maneuvers. General Simpson at the end of this phase reported that a lack of planes made it difficult to keep the troops "air conscious," resulting in an improper dispersal of installations, vehicles, and personnel.³⁴ General Simpson stated further that the lack of aircraft caused an allocation of combat aviation to one force only, with the other force receiving only tactical reconnaissance detachments.

On the credit side of air-ground cooperative action, General Simpson found that over 50 per cent of the reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and photographic missions were successful, and were so ruled by air-ground umpires. Unsuccessful missions resulted from losses attributed to anti-aircraft fire; changes in location of targets before the planes reached their objectives; and the inability of planes to locate properly a pre-designated target.³⁵

Despite a continued scarcity of aircraft, the development of air-ground cooperation reached its highest point during the Sixth Maneuver Period. Six different types of plane missions were engaged in, including reconnaissance missions, attack flights, photographic missions, chemical spray missions, and several flights for the purpose of supply.³⁶

Aircraft allocated to one force was distinguished from that of the other by painted markings. This type of identification proved inadequate, and it was recommended that, in the future, planes of one type should be allotted to one side only so that identification might be made by silhouette.³⁷

Other recommendations made by General Simpson in his final report were "... that the number of planes made available be sufficient to impress forcibly the value of passive and active air defense measures on all participating troops ... That measures be taken to obtain better coordination between air and ground forces in visual air-ground communications ... and that flight plans be disseminated to friendly troops in advance, insofar as is practicable."³⁸

General Simpson gave high praise to the aircraft warning service operated by the II Tactical Control Group for furnishing "information and intelligence of planes that was of inestimable value." In his final critique General Simpson said, "I wish to thank the air units that have taken part in the maneuvers for their fine cooperation and good work. I regret we have to postpone the maneuvers for the next period because we have been promised two tactical air divisions which would make many more planes available than in this period. I hope all units present here will continue in your task of making yourselves and your units more air-minded."³⁹

Continuing in this vein General Simpson added, "So far in this war we have not seen a great deal of fighting with close air support of frontline units, but as the war progresses, I believe we can count on closer and more air support. I believe we should perfect that with our units just as we have perfected artillery support of infantry. I believe we should look on air support in the same light, as we will see a great deal of it in the fighting over Europe before we finally knock out the Germans."⁴⁰

During the critique conducted at the end of the Sixth Phase, Lt. Col. Powell, Air Director, observed that, except in bad weather, the tactical reconnaissance was excellent, as were also visual air-ground communications, artillery adjustment, supply by air, and photographic reconnaissance. The performance of attack aviation, however, was rated as unsatisfactory owing to a lack of attack type planes in the Louisiana Maneuver area.⁴¹

The final critique of the Air Director made mention of the importance of dissemination of flight plans to interested ground units, a point that had been stressed by General Simpson in his report to the Army Ground Forces.⁴² Also included in the final critique was the report that air-ground visual communications proved most effective when colored smoke signals were used, supplemented by the night-time use of colored rocket signals. Panels had proved to be generally unsatisfactory owing to the wooded nature of the maneuver country.⁴³

Realizing the tremendous value of combined air-ground training and aware of the deficiencies caused by an insufficient number of planes, the War Department directed the Air Corps to furnish three tactical air divisions to meet the requirements of air-ground training during 1944. It was contemplated that two of the tactical air divisions would cooperate with the Red and Blue forces in field maneuvers. The employment of two opposing tactical air divisions was expected to enable air force units to maneuver against each other with a realism impossible in the past.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, considerable impetus to the study of aircraft recognition had been given through an AGF plan implemented by Lt. Col. Lewis, Assistant A-3 of the Third Air Force, and Col. Mead, G-3 of Fourth Army, whereby troops in the maneuver area as well as troops in training at Camp Polk, La., Camp Van Dorn, Miss., Camp McCain, Miss., and Camp Bowie, Texas were given a series of demonstrations.⁴⁵ The demonstrations were witnessed by all airborne infantry, armored units, as well as non-divisional corps and Headquarters Special Troops. Invitations were also extended to units of the Army Service Forces of the pertinent station complement.⁴⁶

Another measure to increase the effectiveness of air-ground training was the establishment of a new and comprehensive plan for the training of ground liaison officers who were to be assigned to all maneuver airfields, Tactical Air Division Headquarters, and Red and Blue Ground Force Headquarters.⁴⁷

These ground liaison officers were to be quartered with the units to which they were assigned and their duties were to promote understanding, cooperative spirit, and good feeling between air and ground commanders and their staff; to inform air units of the intentions and plans of ground forces; and to maintain operation maps showing disposition of friendly and enemy forces, with bomb lines prominently displayed.

They were to keep air units informed of the progress of ground battles and changes in location of forces; assist air units in establishing priorities for the performance of requested air missions by indicating the order of priority preferred by the ground unit commander; assist in briefing of air combat crews; assist in interrogating air combat crews and interpreting data reported; provide detailed information concerning requests for air photographs and assist in their identification and distribution; and to keep appropriate ground unit commanders informed concerning action being taken on request for photographic, reconnaissance, or combat missions and operations to be conducted by air units.⁴⁸

The closing of the maneuver area in the spring of 1944 made it necessary to hold these plans in abeyance for a time. Close relationships were continued with Air Corps agencies for the purpose of working together on plans for the future.

So that the Fourth Army would be more familiar with air-ground problems and possibilities, a liaison officer from the III Tactical Air Command was placed on duty with the Fourth Army G-3 Section on 15 May. This officer was sent to Corps headquarters to explain air force policies and to impress on the Corps the need for advance planning in all requests for air support.⁴⁹ When air corps support was requested for air-ground training by either corps or special troop headquarters, it was directed that Army and Corps units consolidate their training for more economical use of air support.

Planning for the scheduled fall maneuvers in Louisiana, arrangements were made for greater use of air support. It was planned to provide one tactical air division to each side.⁵⁰ Transport aircraft were also lined up to facilitate the play in maneuvers of supply by air.

Further stress was placed on the vital role of air support for ground troops when five air corps officers addressed every available officer and top-ranking non-commissioned officers at a four hour conference held at Fourth Army headquarters on 5 September 1944.⁵¹ Procedure for obtaining close-in air support for ground troops and the uses to which tactical and strategic air forces could be put were detailed by the air corps officers, three of whom had just returned from combat theaters. The necessity for close liaison between air and ground officers was underlined by all speakers. They declared that there was great need for a common understanding of each branch's problems and limitations.

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER V

PERSONNEL

After its reorganization in November 1943, the Fourth Army fluctuated in components, strength and character. Starting with two major units, comprised of armored divisions having an approximate strength of 20,000, the Army progressed in age, efficiency and experience to a point where its component strength reached a total of 304,170 officers and enlisted men as of 30 April 1944.¹

In the period from 1 May 1944 to 31 July 1944 the Fourth Army officer and enlisted strength totaled 307,308, thus keeping the Army strength very near the same level as the previous months. There was, however, an appreciable decline in the number of units operating under Army supervision. As time went on it was expected that several drastic changes would be noted in Army strength when several divisional units moved to perform their primary mission in late August or September 1944.²

The turnover of Fourth Army units was very rapid due to the training mission and POM requirements of Army Ground Forces, which resulted in a never-ending demand for both officers and enlisted personnel.

This rapid increase and equally rapid turnover of personnel in a relatively short time created serious personnel problems.

High on the list of major problems were those concerning personnel replacement, activation of qualified cadres, attainment of maximum leadership qualifications in all echelons of command, procurement of qualified personnel for alerted units, and the development of an adequate overseas replacement policy.³

In the case of enlisted personnel replacements, it was generally found that they were slow in arriving, often possessed low physical qualifications, and the quantity of specialists were limited in the various arms and services. Strict adherence to War Department policies regarding the utilization of available manpower, the training of necessary specialists in the units, and the maximum use of service school quotas were the means of solving the replacement problem.

The tremendous expansion of the Army brought about a steady increase in the demand for cadres for newly-activated units. This problem called for considerable reclassification, reassignment, and training of qualified personnel.⁴

Obtaining qualified personnel for alerted units was centralized in the Alert Section of G-1 and extended to the field through tactical Corps and Special Troop commanders. Emergency personnel requisitions for alerted units were filled from Fourth Army units when practical.⁵

During March and April 1944, the Army Ground Forces designated several major units of Fourth Army as a source for individual overseas replacements.

In order to present a comprehensive picture of the officer and enlisted personnel problems confronting G-1, each phase will be dealt with separately in the following narrative.

PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS

Shortly after the organization of Fourth Army in November 1943, the filling of

newly activated units, and replacement of personnel in old units, to make good normal attrition and transfers directed by higher headquarters, became an ever increasing problem. The continuing War Department manpower problem necessitated continuous checking of personnel in subordinate units. Staff inspections and the publishing of personnel memoranda to all units in the field were utilized.

The mechanics of requisitioning enlisted loss replacements were relatively simple and SOP.⁶ When the strength of a unit was reduced to 93 percent of T/O strength, a requisition was submitted through channels to Army headquarters where it was processed by AG-Classification and checked by G-1 and Special Staff sections concerned.

If surplus personnel of an appropriate army or service was available, the requisition was filled by the Army. If not, the requisition was forwarded to the Army Ground Forces. As a general rule, Fourth Army was able to fill unit requisitions. But in many instances, the Army Ground Forces, when called upon, could not furnish the replacements for several months, and when the replacements did arrive the personnel often was untrained and low in physical capacity. This caused undue hardships to units concerned and, on occasion, prolonged commitment dates for overseas duty.

Through cooperation with the 4th and 8th Service Commands, enlisted men having leadership qualities, intelligence and the required physical capacity were transferred from Army Service Force units to combat units. Fourth Army class "D" personnel numbering 6,500 men were transferred to the Army Service Forces, and an equal number of qualified ASF personnel were shifted to combat units. An additional 1,000 class "D" colored personnel were transferred to the 4th Service Command under a similar arrangement.⁷

Many complaints lodged with Army were based on the fact that replacements received did not fit general service requirements. As War Department policies emphasized the utilization of every available man, little could be done to correct this fault.⁸

Separate battalions and companies frequently were called on by Army to furnish replacements. Inspecting officers were advised to inquire of these units whether they were keeping a chart of men available by specialist number.⁹

Inadequate replacements furnished by replacement training centers for overseas duty resulted in the wholesale transfer of experience personnel from one division to another. This was not an isolated type of transfer since the method was practiced by other armies withdrawing as many as 3,300 men at a time. In an attempt to adjust this situation, when a unit was drained of personnel, Fourth Army did not draw on this organization for fillers for any alerted units under its command.¹⁰

Careful and continuous attention was given to raise the standard of infantrymen and to increase average AGCT scores of divisions and non-divisional units by filtering into them appropriate percentages of aviation cadets and ASTP personnel, and by transferring enlisted men with AGCT Grades III, IV, and V to ASF Personnel Reassignment Centers.¹¹

The Fourth Army received a total of 30,100 ASTP enlisted men during March and April 1944; of these, 25,600 were assigned to divisions and 4,500 to non-divisional units. Simultaneously, a total of 6,080 enlisted men with AGCT Grades III, IV, and V were transferred to the Southern Personnel Reassignment Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.¹²

During April and May 1944, a total of 5,510 aviation cadets were received by Fourth Army and distributed with 3,750 going to four divisions and 1,760 to certain non-divisional units.¹³

The reassignment of ASTP and Aviation Cadet Personnel had the immediate effect of appreciably raising the AGCT ratings of units to which they were assigned, particularly in divisions. Although all units profited from the reassignment of such personnel, the benefits were impaired by the continued assignment of substandard personnel to Army units as a result of the increasingly critical manpower shortage.

No particular morale problem resulted from these transfers. The men accepted their new status as a necessary and uncontestable evil and settled down to make the best of it. The most noticeable effect was an increase of efforts on the part of parents through influential personages to secure preferential assignments for their boys, particularly OCS assignments.¹⁴

Coincident with the reassignments mentioned above, authority was received to transfer a total of 6,080 Class III, IV and V men to Army Service Force installations. This also helped to raise the general AGCT rating of the Fourth Army.¹⁵

PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS (OFFICERS)

In general, owing to the large number of surplus officers of all branches in continental United States (except divisions, corps, and army headquarters), little difficulty was encountered in filling unit requisitions or securing officers for overseas shipment prior to April 1944.

It was the policy of the Fourth Army to have officer requisitions submitted by subordinate units, through channels, to Fourth Army Headquarters whenever a unit's officer strength fell below 5 per cent of T/O allowance plus authorized overstrength, if any.

When Fourth Army was called on by the Army Ground Forces to activate new units, close cooperation was maintained with the Special Staff sections concerned so that surplus officers, or officers who were qualified for promotion, could be assigned to new units. In all cases an earnest effort was made to secure officers for the key positions (Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, S-1, 2, 3, 4, and Special Service Officer) and to requisition the remainder of the officers from the Army Ground Forces to bring the unit to T/O plus authorized overstrength.

Whenever units which did not have their authorized T/O strength were altered, the Alert Section of G-1 called on the Special Staff section concerned to fill the vacancies by the reassignment of surplus officers who were then available in Fourth Army. If such officers were not available, requisitions were submitted to the Army Ground Forces (Attention: Task Force Division) requisitioning the necessary number of officers.

The replacement of officer personnel in Infantry, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineer, Chaplain, and Medical Corps proved to be a complex and involved situation at the time General Lucas became Deputy Commander of Fourth Army.

A heavy demand for Infantry officers for overseas replacement was noticeable during this period of Fourth Army development. The demand particularly affected non-alerted Infantry divisions even though the total number of officers demanded from this command by the Army Ground Forces diminished steadily up to 1 May 1944, this decrease was offset by the lack of available sources of replacement. Thus the tremendous turnover of Infantry company officers within non-alerted divisions was not mitigated as time progressed.

In some cases the losses sustained by Infantry divisions under Fourth Army had been partially alleviated by: (a) the Army Ground Forces increasing the size of

Infantry OCS classes, and (b) the conversion to Infantry of an increasing number of officers made available by the inactivation of Field Artillery, Tank Destroyer, Coast Artillery and Antiaircraft units.

The ability of Fourth Army further to meet Infantry overseas shipments was considerably helped by the lowering of requirements for Infantry POR shipment from its former standard to three months commissioned service. Officers who had been converted to Infantry from other type training were considered POR qualified when they had performed two months in a T/O job of an Infantry regiment or subordinate type unit.

At Fourth Army request, the Army Ground Forces granted a moratorium on the overseas shipment of armored-trained officers when it was found in the latter part of July 1944 that AGF replacement requests were literally draining the two armored divisions under command of Fourth Army -- the 8th and 13th -- of their officer personnel. Because of this moratorium it was felt by Fourth Army that by October 1944 both divisions would be able once more to furnish armored-trained officers for primary duty.

Officer shortages in Quartermaster truck companies and Ordnance officers in the 92d Division were replaced by Negroes, and when surplus Negro officers of that division were made available for assignment to colored service units under Fourth Army control.

Major officer replacement difficulties in filling satisfactorily Medical, Chaplain, and Engineer Combat battalions were still being encountered by the Fourth Army. The Engineer Combat situation was somewhat relieved by the reassignment to Fourth Army units of approximately 90 Engineer officers from AGF Replacement Depots No. 1 and 2. These officers filled many gaps for trained engineers in newly-activated Engineer combat units, to which a great many were reassigned in grades of majors and captains.

Medical and Chaplain officer replacements, both for continental and overseas duty, still remained a problem. They were required in considerable numbers at this time, not only for individual shipment overseas, but also to bring alerted units up to the required T/O strength. This constant drain on Medical and Chaplain personnel kept the medical strength of non-alerted units at about 75 percent of T/O strength. This situation was not appreciably relieved as Fourth Army prepared to go overseas.

PROVISION OF CADRES

In addition to training units for overseas duty, the Fourth Army was vitally concerned with training cadres for the activation of new units. During April 1944, Fourth Army was training a total of 125 cadres of the various arms and services.¹⁶

Obtaining qualified personnel capable of absorbing the necessary knowledge and training within the short time allotted created problems which could be met only by cooperation with higher and lower echelons of command. The major problems were solved by the methods stated below:

1. Insufficient time interval often existed between AGF cadre commitment date and the time that the cadre was to be utilized. In order to shorten this time interval, G-1 notified units concerned by telephone immediately upon receipt of Ground Force parent lists and confirmed the telephone conversation in writing later. This saved from four to six days.

2. Insufficient time interval between the receipt of AGF letters in Fourth Army headquarters and the actual date the cadre was required at some distant station was also a problem. This was handled as in paragraph 1 above.

map reading, German military correspondence and orders.¹⁵⁰ Texts were compiled by the faculty, with the aid of civilian lectures and visiting experts, including officers with intelligence experience in the first World War.

As a by-product of the research made at the school, a special demonstration involving dramatic presentation of techniques and values involved in proper interrogation of prisoners was produced. With a cast of actors from the faculty and student body, this production, entitled "Hill 66", was presented 21 times at nine posts, with an estimated 10,850 troops of the Third Army as a combined audience.¹⁵¹

Three courses were conducted at the school. Centralization of all IPW training by the War Department, however, soon became more than rumor. On 17 June 1943 the director of the Third Army school submitted on request a lengthy outline for a War Department school.¹⁵² Most of the faculty, both commissioned and enlisted, were transferred by War Department orders dated 1 July 1942 to the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Md., and there proceeded to establish the War Department IPW School.¹⁵³ Many students followed the faculty to Camp Ritchie, and the commandant of the Military Intelligence Training Center told the Chief of Staff Third Army, that every single enlisted man who had graduated from the Third Army School was desired for transfer. Although officer graduates were likewise desired for military intelligence duty, the extreme shortage of commissioned personnel obviated any large-scale transfer. A very great percentage of the 171 enlisted graduates were assigned to the Military Intelligence Training Center, where they entered the basic intelligence course and were then held available for task forces and other combat duties.¹⁵⁴

Developments on world-wide battlefronts likewise demanded attention from Third Army training specialists. The failure to apply "scorched earth" tactics in Malaya and the subsequent heavy loss of property useful to the enemy led to special demolition training for troops of all arms.

"Mobile warfare has created a wide variety of problems for commanders of small units which involve the use of demolitions, and which often must be solved without engineer assistance," the training directive stated. "This necessitates the training in the use of explosives of a limited number of men in each company and similar unit of the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery."¹⁵⁵

The demolition training was given in five two-hour periods, including lectures, demonstrations, and practical work. This latter phase included calculation and placing of charges, and placing and charting a mine field. All personnel given the training witnessed the burying and exploding of a service anti-tank mine. Both TNT and dynamite were used in the training and each student was required to actually handle all blasting materials involved. Qualified engineer officers and enlisted men were used as instructors.

A 44-hour weekly training program was ordered for all Third Army units early in 1942, with corps and unit commanders authorized to extend this period to 48 hours when justified by the status of training.¹⁵⁶ Third Army schools which were designed to improve training throughout the year included instruction for umpire instructors, liaison officers, and air-ground schools which were conducted by each corps.¹⁵⁷

The training problems involved by modern war fought under changing conditions in every terrain were aptly illustrated by the subjects of Third Army training memorandums for the last half of 1942. Typical are the following: "Captured Prisoners and Documents", "Observation Aviation", "Combat Intelligence", "Air Support", "Chemical Warfare Training", and "Air-Ground Coordination".¹⁵⁸

3. Alerting and shipping of parent units overseas before they had had ample time to train their units for cadre was solved largely by directing parent units to start cadre training immediately upon activation and inspecting units periodically to see that this was accomplished. It was also possible to transfer a portion of the qualified cadremen into parent units when such were available, or to form complete cadres from surplus qualified non-commissioned officers and transfer them to parent units. When none of these was possible or practicable, Fourth Army headquarters would call the Army Ground Forces and request that the unit be removed from the parent unit list or transfer the cadre personnel to some other similar unit for the completion of their cadre training.

NEGRO AND FILIPINO TROOPS

No major racial problems were encountered by Fourth Army.

Few racial problems involving violence and soldier-civilian altercations had developed in the command as of 19 August 1944. An awareness of the potentialities which might develop was carefully maintained by the G-1, G-2 and Special Service sections.¹⁷

Minor problems arose from time to time regarding Filipino and Negro troops. Their average schooling was inferior, their work in civilian life was generally less skilled than that of white personnel, and their association with white troops had been limited and restricted through social and historical differences.

When, in January 1944, the Army Ground Forces directed the Fourth Army to ascertain whether the 1st and 2d Filipino Regiments it had inherited from the XVIII Ccrps could be ready to perform their primary mission in the spring, only the 1st was certified as ready to meet the requirements. This was attributed to two reasons: (a) both regiments had suffered a serious strength loss when men over 38 years were permitted to apply for discharge in 1943, and (b) several groups of 200, recruited from both organizations topflight trainees, had been furnished an advanced training center at the Presidio of Monterey.

Reinforced with officer and enlisted personnel combed from the 2d Regiment, the 1st was marked ready while the fate of the 2d hung in the balance as the III Corps took over.¹⁸

The training and welfare of colored personnel was of vital interest to the commanding general of the Fourth Army. Rumors and reports of dissatisfaction were given the personal attention by all sections of the staff in an effort to ascertain causes and fix responsibility. Wide dissemination was given to Army Ground Forces and War Department policies regarding the handling of colored troops, both officers and enlisted men.

In addition to the fundamental problems of illiteracy and venereal disease with Negro units, Fourth Army was faced with the task of obtaining officers, both colored and white, who were capable of properly leading these troops. Every effort was made to secure well-qualified officers and to insure that the senior commanding officer had an efficiency rating of "excellent" or better. Those who had less than an "excellent" rating were removed early in the training period of the unit and replaced with more highly-qualified officers.¹⁹

Negro troops of the Fourth Army -- the 92d Division and a varied number of non-divisional units among the 2d Cavalry Division, which terminated its association with Fourth Army on 1 February 1944 after a brief period -- comprised an average strength of 27,548.²⁰

The venereal rate of Negro troops in Fourth Army during a three month period averaged 61.93 per one thousand per annum higher than the venereal rate of white troops during the same period of time.²¹

OFFICER RECLASSIFICATION

The Commanding General of the Fourth Army took a personal interest in maintaining and securing competent leadership in all echelons of command. Every effort was made to reclassify or reassign officers who failed to meet the necessary leadership qualifications.

Commanders of subordinate units in Fourth Army, in general, had done an excellent job of placing officers in the most appropriate positions. Before instituting the convention of reclassification boards, it was the policy of Fourth Army to make a careful study of inefficiency cases with a view to utilizing officers, if possible, in other commands or branches of the service.

Unjustifiable reclassification procedures arising from jealousy, favoritism, and other personal reasons, were almost negligible. The primary reasons for reclassification procedures in the command were due to misconduct, neglect of duty, and inefficiency.

On 31 January 1944 a Fourth Army Reclassification Center was authorized by Fourth Army. This was the direct result of a War Department letter revising AR 605-230.²² Delegation of reclassification jurisdiction over captains and lieutenants to subordinate commanders exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over these officers was further authorized.²³

After the Board's formation, 36 cases were heard at Fort Sam Houston, up to and including September 1944. To insure fair treatment, all reclassification proceedings were reviewed by the Army Judge Advocate General.²⁴

SERVICE SCHOOLS

As the need for competent leadership increased, Fourth Army was confronted with growing quotas of officers and enlisted men for service schools.

To handle the large volume of administration, a schools branch was located in the Adjutant General's Office, Miscellaneous Division.²⁵ The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, prepared the Commanding General's policy concerning the attendance of Fourth Army personnel at service schools.²⁶

Quotas for the majority of courses conducted by Army Service Forces schools were requested from the Army Ground Forces in accordance with AGF directives.²⁷ The directives required that consolidated requests for quotas reach the Army Ground Forces not later than the 10th day of each month for the class starting approximately six weeks later. Actual experience showed that from eight to twelve weeks elapsed between the unit commander's request and the beginning of the course.

During this long period many changes in the status of personnel were produced by sickness, transfers, cadres or because units were alerted or "frozen" for completion of training. These changes caused a large number of vacancies. Every effort was made to re-allot these quotas from other units.

The School Branch Officer of Fourth Army recommended that a publication (mimeographed), in loose leaf form, be published by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, covering the following points as an aid to the efficient operation of school matters in the future.

1. A uniform set of instructions governing the movement of students to service schools. These applied to all schools.
2. Description of all courses available to units of the Army Ground Forces only, including:
 - a. Army or service to which course was available.
 - b. T/O SSN positions students would be qualified to occupy upon graduation.
 - c. Duration and approximate starting date of each course.
 - d. Entrance requirements.
 - e. Special instructions: i.e., equipment, clothing, etc.
3. Index or list of courses.

This publication could be published immediately without regard to completeness, and loose-leaf additions and changes made thereto as information became available. Kept current, such a publication facilitated advance planning on the part of troops. Distribution of the publication was made to corps, divisions, special troops, and extracts thereto to other interested units.

The Schools Branch Officer of Fourth Army further recommended that the Schools Branch be removed from the Miscellaneous Division of the Adjutant General's office and be operated in the Classification Division.²⁸

HEALTH AND SANITATION

No major health and sanitation problems were encountered in the Fourth Army command during this period. A continuous shortage of medical corps officers caused a certain amount of inconvenience, especially in the smaller units with only the minimum of medical corps officers essential to furnish an adequate medical service and conduct the prescribed training.

The major units were short-handed also, but had enough to perform their required missions. The filling of alerted units to T/O strength further depleted the number of medical corps personnel in the major units. Utilization of medical administrative corps and dental corps officers in lieu of medical corps officers wherever practicable helped to solve this problem.

There was a rather marked increase of respiratory diseases in the command during December 1943, but fortunately the diseases were mild in nature and the duration of disability was short. The peak had passed prior to 1 January 1944. The problem was solved by insisting on a rigid compliance with the preventative measures for respiratory diseases prescribed by Army Regulations.²⁹

The venereal disease rate in the Fourth Army was never alarming and maximum preventive and treatment measures were exercised with such emphasis in all channels of command that the rate was only about eight per thousand per annum.³⁰ The venereal disease rate during the four-month period from January through April 1944 is shown on the accompanying chart.

PERSONNEL FOR ALERTED UNITS

The "Alert" subsection of the Fourth Army G-1 consisted of two officers and one

VENEREAL DISEASES

Period	Color	Mean Strength	Number of Cases								Rate Per 1,000 Per Annum (not including EPTI)	Total Days Lost From Duty Per month; New and Old Cases
			Syph- illis		Gonor- rhea		Others		Total			
			Not EPTI	EPTI	Not EPTI	EPTI	Not EPTI	EPTI	Not EPTI	EPTI		
Jan 44	White	256405	55	8	346	4	17	1	418	13	21.19	5438
	Negro	24205	32	3	116	16	11		159	19	85.40	1639
	Total	280610	87	11	462	20	28	1	577	32	26.73	7077
Feb 44	White	266572	48	4	355	4	9	2	412	10	20.09	6287
	Negro	26018	35		90	1	19		144	1	71.95	1479
	Total	292590	83	4	445	5	28	2	556	11	24.70	7766
Mar 44	White	280519	51	4	421	3	9		481	7	17.83	6355
	Negro	32426	72	1	170	9	31		273	10	87.55	2887
	Total	312945	123	5	591	12	40		754	17	25.08	9242
Apr 44	White	243350	42	15	330	2	9		381	17	20.38	3795
	Negro	39105	89	2	260		34		383	2	127.31	2567
	Total	282455	131	17	590	2	43		764	19	35.16	6362

enlisted man, whose sole function was the handling of personnel requisitions for alerted units. This subsection assumed all personnel responsibilities for alerted units from the date of commitment to the date of departure for a port of embarkation. On receipt of alert instructions for a unit, the Alert Section contacted the Senior Tactical Commanders and gave them the necessary personnel instructions for the complete preparation of the unit for overseas duty.

Commanders of corps, divisions, special troops headquarters and headquarters detachments, and separate brigades were designated Senior Tactical Commanders for all troops assigned or attached to their commands and were held responsible for the preparation of the unit for an overseas assignment.

Instructions were given to all Senior Tactical Commanders to (a) conduct a complete physical examination of all personnel immediately on receipt of alert notice to determine that all men to accompany a unit were physically qualified for overseas service; (b) submit emergency requisitions by telephone or TWX to Fourth Army headquarters within four days subsequent to the first notification of alert status to bring personnel of alerted units to T/O strength plus future known losses, and (c) letter "Personnel Status Report" was submitted on the alerted units to reach Fourth Army headquarters within twelve days after receipt of notification that the unit was alerted.

All emergency requisitions received by Fourth Army headquarters were routed immediately to the Alert Subsection, G-1, for processing. The Alert subsection coordinated and asked AG-C and Special Staff sections concerned to determine the advisability and possibility of filling requisitions from units of Fourth Army. When the necessary personnel could not be obtained from Fourth Army units, emergency requisitions were sent to Army Ground Forces by TWX.

ENLISTED MEN OVERSEAS REPLACEMENTS

In October 1943 the Army Ground Forces directed that all surplus non-commissioned officers who had been trained in infantry, field artillery, cavalry, coast artillery (antiaircraft), coast artillery (seacoast defense), armored and tank destroyer, and who were qualified for overseas shipment, would be reported to the Army Ground Forces for transfer to AGF Replacement Depots.³¹

The report was submitted to the Army Ground Forces in November 1943, and from time to time the Army Ground Forces directed transfer of these NCO's to Replacement Depots. The Fourth Army did not consider this method very successful or desirable. The report submitted to the Army Ground Forces in November was not fully applicable after a few weeks because the surplus NCO's had not been frozen and hence were not always available when called for at a later date.

In March and April 1944, the Army Ground Forces, in compliance with War Department directives, ordered that certain major units submit availability reports of enlisted men in grades 6 and 7 qualified for overseas duty. Fourth Army units so designated by the Army Ground Forces consisted of five infantry divisions, two armored divisions, five tank destroyer battalions, and one light tank battalion.³² Fourth Army considered this an efficient means of providing for individual replacements for overseas shipments. But the system was relatively new and had yet to be tested.

In April 1944 the Army Ground Forces also selected four Fourth Army infantry regiments for the purpose of retaining enlisted men of various arms and services as infantry replacements for overseas shipment. All enlisted men from these four regiments, with the exception of a cadre, were shipped to AGF Replacement Depots and the regiments were refilled with personnel from various arms and services to be trained as infantry overseas replacements.

The enlisted personnel turnover in all Fourth Army units was continuous because of the necessity of providing overseas replacements; the reinforcing of high priority and alerted units with key personnel (who in many cases could not be trained within the unit in time to meet port calls); and the further complication of having key personnel volunteer for officers candidate training or the paratrooper program. As a result, units under Fourth Army control were faced with the ever-present problem of securing or training specialist personnel.

Meanwhile continuous emphasis was placed on replacements for the combat arms of the service, particularly infantry. This replacement problem was met by vigorous action under current War Department directives authorizing the transfer of enlisted men from service units when such men had the physical capacity, leadership qualities, and intelligence required by combat units. Although the demand was successfully met, it did create increasingly serious personnel problems in service type units, particularly quartermaster.

One solution found was the inactivation of various Fourth Army units, particularly antiaircraft and tank destroyer, whose personnel was released for training and replacement in combat-type units. In order to carry out successfully this program the Army Ground Forces designated certain units as Rotational Pool Units from which personnel could be drawn as needed.

The War Department policy of not permitting men under 19 years of age to be used as infantry or armored individual replacements necessitated the mass reassignment of men in the 18-year-age bracket from replacement training centers to divisions in order to relieve more mature men in divisions for assignment to combat duty.

These enlisted replacement problems continued to plague Fourth Army as it prepared for overseas duty.

OFFICER OVERSEAS REPLACEMENTS

The Army Ground Forces called on Fourth Army for an increasing number of officers of all branches and grades for overseas replacements beginning in January 1944. By April 1944, so many officers had been sent to replacement depots that nearly all units of the Army command were below T/O strength, and since all pools of officers had been depleted by this time, the Army Ground Forces was not able to fill requisitions to bring the units either to T/O or to T/O plus authorized overstrength.

The branches having large surpluses were tank destroyer, armored command, cavalry, and field artillery, for these arms had few calls for overseas replacements.

When the Army Ground Forces called on Fourth Army for overseas replacements, the request was placed with the Special Staff section concerned and recommendations were secured as to unit sources of these officers. If there was no Special Staff section to handle the branch concerned, G-1 would prepare a list showing the number of surplus officers assigned to each unit. The number of replacements requisitioned would be apportioned to the units on the basis of the number of surplus officers within the unit.

The Army Ground Forces would ordinarily give the Fourth Army Headquarters advance notice by telephone of impending overseas shipment, and the units would be advised immediately of the number they were expected to furnish. This method gave the units sufficient time to POR the officers, so that when they received the call, the officers could be given the maximum amount of leave, with only a small disruption to training.

It was discovered in November 1943 that because of the acute shortage of medical officers, Fourth Army could not expect requisitions for medical officers to be filled

by the Army Ground Forces or the War Department. Therefore it had to fill the requisitions of alerted units by reassigning the available medical officers within the command. The situation became so critical that few divisions had more than 40 or 50 per cent of their authorized medical officers.

It was also discovered that units were not complying with all the directives on overseas replacements. An increasing number of complaints were received from replacement depots stating that units had furnished unqualified overseas replacements. To overcome this deficiency, Fourth Army made it a practice to quote, in every TWX directing units to send officers as replacements, all the current directives on making an officer POR.

FURLOUGHS

Particular attention was placed on the policy of furloughs, and although occasionally furlough authorizations were exceeded, on the whole, units complied with AGF directives.

Fourth Army inspecting officers were urged to consider the matter of furloughs carefully, bearing in mind that furloughs would be granted for periods not to exceed seven days plus travel time, that five to seven per cent of the enlisted strength was to be on furlough at all times, and to note other factors incident to furloughs in alerted units and units in specific stages of training.³³

CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Intelligence training holds a unique position in the general over-all training of troops. While, for instance, G-3 or G-4 carry on some semblance of their combat tasks while they are training -- working tactical problems and take care of supply -- G-2 is faced primarily with application of theories. Thus, G-2 failures normally cannot show up until a unit goes into combat and G-2 faces concrete situations, not theories.

It is doubly important, therefore, that particular emphasis be placed on G-2 training, especially on combat intelligence. One of the earliest lessons learned in World War II was the failure of units to recognize, before being committed to battle, the importance of combat intelligence. While in the United States, and this was particularly true during the dangerous subversive days that followed Pearl Harbor, units had practical demonstration of the necessity for counterintelligence work and anti-subversive drives. But the need for combat intelligence could not be seen visually and it was the Fourth Army's responsibility to see that units going overseas got the finest and most thorough training possible in combat intelligence. The Fourth Army policy concerning intelligence training was predicated on these facts.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

On arrival at the Presidio of Monterey, Fourth Army began the supervision of combat intelligence training in the field. Without the assistance of corps headquarters to handle the testing the inspection of smaller units, the Army G-2 staff of nine officers found it necessary to spend a large percentage of their time traveling to the widely-dispersed units along the West Coast. Operating without corps, Fourth Army was charged directly with conducting tests, making inspections and exercising general supervision of intelligence training activities. Valuable experience was thus acquired as to problems actually encountered in the field and, on the basis of this direct supervision of combat intelligence testing, modifications of the testing procedure were later recommended to the Army Ground Forces and were, to a large degree, accepted.

Every effort was made to apply the lessons learned by combat experience throughout the world. It became necessary to place more and more emphasis on such basic intelligence subjects as: Map Reading, Use of Compass, Sketching and Message Writing.¹ Fourth Army's Training Memorandum No. 1 continued to be the basic authority governing the conduct of intelligence training for subordinate units.

By assisting in the conduct of "D" (Division) series and Individual Training Period tests the G-2 section was able to secure a clearer picture of the status of intelligence training in the units tests.² The AGF "Combat Intelligence Training Tests" were the most important single means of checking the adequacy of intelligence training.³

While the Fourth Army was stationed at Monterey these tests were applied to two infantry divisions and an armored division. In the course of this testing many questions arose concerning what personnel and what units were required to take each test. These problems were solved by discussions and conferences with commanders concerned and served to furnish the G-2 section with valuable information on which to base interpretations of existing directives as well as future recommendations for amendments to those directives.⁴

The tremendous increase in the number of units under Fourth Army control following the transfer to Fort Sam Houston, plus the responsibility of handling G-2 matters in the Louisiana Maneuvers, greatly increased the task of the G-2 section. Some of the work was decentralized by authorizing the two subordinate corps and the 14 separate

Special Troops Headquarters to conduct Combat Intelligence Tests for units under their supervision.⁵

By conferences, correspondence and personal visits, officers of the G-2 section helped to orient subordinate commanders as to what was expected in the way of aggressive intelligence programs and accurate reports.⁶ After a thorough study of AGF directives, together with T/O's of the many types of units, charts were compiled to show clearly what personnel were required to take the tests.⁷ These charts proved most helpful to the subordinate units and were responsible for a considerable reduction in the number of reports that had to be returned for correction.

As a result of a telephone conversation between Colonel Rogers, G-2 of AGF, and Colonel Bixel, G-2, Fourth Army, on 30 January 1944, a series of recommendations for the improvement and revision of the AGF Combat Intelligence Training Tests were forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces on 19 February 1944.⁸ It was suggested that the revised tests should refer to units by exact T/O designation rather than by descriptive title, make clear what constitutes T/O intelligence personnel, specify more clearly the headquarters that were authorized to conduct the tests, and allow individuals or units making unsatisfactory scores to be retested.⁹

Detailed suggestions were made for the revision of tests given to individuals and units on the basis of experience gained by Fourth Army G-2 in the actual conduct of these tests. The Fourth Army recommended that requirements should be made more specific to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, that certain tests should be simplified, and that increased emphasis should be placed on such subjects as reconnaissance, map reading, establishment of an OP, sketching, etc. It was also recommended that a check sheet be used with each test and that a point system be employed in grading the test.¹⁰

In conclusion, Colonel Bixel wrote: "It is the opinion of this headquarters that the tests are generally sound in concept and that they have served and are serving as definite stimuli in Combat Intelligence Training."¹¹

A study of the revised Combat Intelligence Training Tests issued by AGF on 15 June 1944 reveals that a large number of the above Fourth Army recommendations were embodied in the new tests.

To re-emphasize the importance of Combat Intelligence Training and to assure uniform procedure under the revised Combat Intelligence Training Tests of 15 June 1944, a conference of all subordinate G-2's was held to discuss interpretation of the AGF directive as it pertained to personnel and units to be tested, and the conduct and reporting of the tests.¹²

Since Army Ground Forces had specifically authorized subordinate headquarters to institute any additional intelligence tests they felt were necessary¹³ and General Simpson had directed that intelligence training be stressed in general training tests, the G-2 section made a study of current training tests in order that they might be revised to require a higher level of intelligence training.¹⁴ Twelve tests were inserted in the ITP testing program which were designed to extend the personnel tested to the limit of their capabilities consistent with their period of training and branch of service.¹⁵

In many service and non-divisional units whose T/O did not provide for intelligence officers, it was found that frequently intelligence training had been neglected.¹⁶ To remedy this, instructions were issued that commanders of all units would appoint an officer or non-commissioned officer who, in addition to his other duties, would be responsible for the conduct of basic intelligence training and whatever intelligence training was particularly appropriate to that type of unit.¹⁷

Another obstacle to the proper conduct of intelligence training was the tendency of many commanders frequently to shift their intelligence officers to other assignments and to replace them with inexperienced men. This policy was vigorously opposed by Army Headquarters and a special paragraph dealing with this point was inserted in the general inspection form. When adverse remarks were made under this heading, Fourth Army brought it to the attention of the commander concerned for corrective action.¹⁸

At a staff conference on 24 June 1944, Colonel Reinburg, Fourth Army G-2, pointed out that inspections of subordinate units "occasionally reveal ... that an intelligence officer has not been designated in each unit." He emphasized that, in combat units, an intelligence officer is required in all companies and battalions.¹⁹

The status of intelligence training in subordinate units was checked constantly both by G-2 inspections and by the general inspection reports prepared by various officers of the Army Staff who made frequent and extensive inspection trips. For the use of officers of the G-2 section making inspections solely of intelligence training, a detailed and comprehensive check list was devised to cover every aspect of intelligence and counterintelligence training in the unit visited.²⁰ It was believed that if all questions included in this check list were adequately answered, a true and complete picture of the status of intelligence training in that unit would be presented.

No outstanding developments or change in policy occurred to affect the G-2 section following creation of the new Fourth Army under General Lucas. Procedures as initiated by the former Army Commander were continued "with little change."²¹ On the basis of his experience in Italy, General Lucas stressed the extreme value of combat intelligence and the necessity of firm groundwork prior to movement overseas.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

At the time when Fourth Army was divorced from WDC and began to operate again as an independent entity, a burdensome and complicated counter-subversive system was in effect. Army was responsible for seeing that all subordinate units had a counter-subversive system; that the proper number of operatives were employed; that the requisite number of reports were submitted by these operatives; and that monthly reports were submitted on all subversive or potentially subversive personnel. Final action on any case was decided upon by the Commanding General of the appropriate Service Command. Under this system, the counterintelligence sub-section found it necessary to devote its entire time to administrative paper work to the exclusion of other duties.²²

When this system was abolished by the War Department in December 1943, Fourth Army immediately directed its subordinate units to eliminate the monthly reports and to report only when cases were opened or closed, or substantial information had been added.²³ This greatly reduced the amount of paper work and permitted more time to be spent on the study and review of pending cases.

A further simplification of the counter-subversive system was effected in January 1944 as a result of the War Department's decision to shift the responsibility of determining whether or not a soldier was subversive from the service commands to the tactical commander.²⁴

This added responsibility was welcomed by Fourth Army as an opportunity to simplify procedure by a further delegation of authority, and as a chance to clarify the entire counter-subversive situation by eliminating a large number of cases in which no real subversive activity or opinions could be proved.²⁵

First, Army established the policy that the decision to open or close cases was properly a command function and delegated to corps and special troops commanders

responsibility for the proper execution of War Department directives on counter-subversive activity. They were also given authority to further decentralize this activity if they saw fit.

Secondly, a study of the files showed that a large number of cases had been held open when there was no evidence of actual subversive activity. This was especially true in cases involving soldiers of German birth (where no question of disloyalty was concerned), and in cases in which political ideologies were involved. As a result of the delegation of authority to lower echelon commanders, a majority of these cases were closed out through lack of factual evidence and by 1 May 1944 the total number of cases in Fourth Army had been reduced to 100.²⁶ By 19 August 1944 the total active investigations amounted to only 68.²⁷

Since this small number of cases represented only a few in each subordinate unit, action was initiated by Army to have the investigations completed and disposition of disaffected personnel expedited.²⁸

Thus the counterintelligence sub-section was now able to accomplish its primary mission of keeping the Army Commander informed of the subversive situation within his command and to insure that subordinate units were properly complying with pertinent instructions governing the disposition of subversive or disaffected personnel.

In his remarks before the Conference of 24 June 1944, Colonel Reinburg, Army G-2, again emphasized that it was not necessary for commanders to maintain a counter-subversive information system within their units and stated that, "it is the opinion of this Headquarters that information concerning disloyal and disaffected personnel will be reported to commanders by loyal American soldiers."²⁹

A counter-intelligence corps detachment of 3 officers and 10 enlisted men was attached to Fourth Army Headquarters by the War Department in February 1944.³⁰ Active training was begun on 25 February 1944. Training in the school of the soldier, in the employment of weapons, and in the tactical mission of the detachment was emphasized. Later, one half of the detachment was sent to the Louisiana Maneuver area to give the detachment field experience and further training in performance of their tactical mission.³¹

In addition to training his own detachment, the commanding officer was responsible for the proper administration and operation of the CIC detachments in the corps and divisions under Fourth Army.³²

In order to insure that each detachment operated as a separate and distinct organization, a policy was established and disseminated to corps headquarters whereby the Commanding Officer of a CIC detachment would not be designated as A.C. of S., G-2, or given any other designation other than Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment. The corps were advised further that this detachment was an organization having a separate and distinct mission and was under G-2 only for general staff supervision.

When the old Fourth Army went overseas as the Ninth Army, this CIC detachment accompanied it. On 1 July 1944 the 304th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment was activated and assigned to the new Fourth Army. It was authorized 5 officers and 15 enlisted men.³³

PUBLIC RELATION ACTIVITIES

Inasmuch as a special section for the handling of Public Relation activities was not authorized Fourth Army, the responsibility for such matters was delegated to the Special Service Officer. He worked through and in cooperation with the Army G-2, with satisfactory results.³⁴

At San Jose and the Presidio of Monterey, Special Service work and Public Relations were handled by a staff of four officers and seven enlisted men. No augmentation was allotted for the special duties incurred in performing public relations functions.³⁵ Later, when Fourth Army moved to Fort Sam Houston, an increase of five officers was authorized in order that competent Public Relations personnel could be maintained in the Louisiana Maneuver area without robbing the parent section at Fort Sam Houston. The section was further augmented with eight enlisted men transferred from the Third Army.³⁶

In general, all relations with the press and the public were conducted in accordance with Army Regulations and WD Circulars, amplified by Liaison Bulletins and instructions of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

By the time Fourth Army became responsible for the Louisiana Maneuver area, interest of the press had shifted from maneuvers to combat operations, reports of which were now coming from overseas in great volume. Furthermore, the War Department had ruled that "the less said about maneuvers the better."³⁷

Relations between the press and Fourth Army were very friendly both on the West Coast and in San Antonio. The policy of the Army headquarters was to give the press live material. This policy resulted in whole-hearted cooperation of the press when the Army had a story to tell.

After moving to Texas the Army Commander held a press conference with key men on the local newspapers and radio stations of San Antonio, announcing the transfer of the Fourth Army to Fort Sam Houston. Little information was given at this conference other than the bare announcement but it had the salutary effect of getting Fourth Army off on the right foot with the news-dispensing agencies of San Antonio.

Besides routine releases, the work of the section for the remainder of the stay at Fort Sam Houston consisted in supplying information to the press, on request, and acting as counsel for the Army Commander, the Fourth Army staff, and subordinate units on matters of relations with the public and the press.³⁸

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER VII

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

Two basic and distinct problems faced the Fourth Army G-4 section at all times. One involved the supply of units under Army jurisdiction but not alerted for overseas movement. The other was the task of facilitating the supplying and equipping of units within the Army that were preparing for movement into combat theaters. During the early period of the national emergency, the supply of non-alerted units that were substantially under their tables of equipment occupied the section. As time went on and an ever-increasing number of units became qualified for overseas movement, the stress was placed more and more on preparing, insofar as supplies and equipment were concerned, units for effective operation in an overseas theater.

The system of supply within the continental United States was devised so that units made application to the service command agencies at their respective posts for equipment and supplies authorized them. G-4 of Army had the task of supervising and coordinating supply problems between tactical units and Army Service Forces and of following up requests to see that they were met. In instances where the supply of a particular item was scarce or critical, due to insufficient production or overseas requirements, it was necessary for Fourth Army G-4 to effect transfers between units or to obtain the assistance of higher headquarters to equalize distribution of equipment and make possible the proper training of all units. It was the definite responsibility of Army Headquarters to assure the receipt of supplies from Army Service Forces in sufficient quantity to train adequately all units within the Army.

At the first staff meeting of the Fourth Army called at the Presidio of Monterey, Colonel Rickard, chief of the G-4 section, outlined some of the problems facing the section. "The basic problem is the supply of all troops coming under Fourth Army," Colonel Rickard said. "The other problem is to prepare the G-4 section and the Services and get them coordinated, especially with G-3, so these agencies can be prepared for effective and efficient operation in an active theater. There is no analogy between the systems in use in the western part of the United States and what we would have to use if we were in an active theater.

"G-4 is an operating agency. It is a planning and coordinating agency. We must not issue orders that are not sound, and we must operate so as to produce results. We must follow through and follow up until the job is completed."¹

In its organization within the Fourth Army, G-4 was divided into five subsections (hereinafter called "Sections"): Alerted Unit Section; Operation Section; Supply Section; Transportation Section; and a Miscellaneous Section which was a catch-all for Ordnance Field Depot problems and later for those pertaining to Louisiana Maneuver road problems.²

G-4 found, upon the movement of Army Headquarters to Fort Sam Houston, that the increased number of troops and units under POM made it necessary to create a subsection to handle POM units only. It was the responsibility of the Alerted Unit Section to handle all G-4 matters in the alerted units with the exception of the disposition of excess equipment. This required close coordination and cooperation with the Troop Movement Section of G-3 and with the G-4 Task Force Section of the Army Ground Forces.

The average number of units in the Fourth Army during this period was approximately 580 with a low of 472 and a high of 650. The average number of units under POM was 225

with a low of 200 and a high of 248. Of the units under POM training, from 18 to 44 percent were under movement order, and from 7 to 16 percent of all Fourth Army units were under movement order during this time.³

During the summer of 1944, the percentage of POM units placed under movement orders increased steadily. The fighting in France developed quickly and successfully, necessitating more troops to cover the expanding front and to exploit the sensational breakthroughs. To show how rapidly troops began to move out in the summer of 1944, Fourth Army had only 17 percent of its units under movement orders on 3 June. On 19 August 1944, this figure had risen to 49 percent. During the period from 31 April to 19 August 1944, 52 percent of all Fourth Army units were under POM procedure.

Following is a table showing how the task of preparing troops for overseas movement skyrocketed during the summer of 1944:

	May	June	July	Aug 1-19
Number of Units under Army	614	601	753	592
Number of Units under POM (A-4-c or higher priority)	249	326	397	314
Number of Units under M.O.	66	77	137	154
Number of Units to P.O.E.	40	22	39	28

4

Before establishment of the Alerted Unit Section, Colonel Rickard pointed out at a Staff meeting held at the Presidio of Monterey the difficult task of supplying the large number of alerted units, especially Ordnance, as well as the maintenance of armament and small guns. Colonel Rickard stated, "It is a tremendous task of adjustment and it requires a great deal of thought on the part of Services and officers to meet this continually changing problem.

"The supply and preparation of units leaving for overseas is one of the biggest tasks confronting G-4 at this time. Each time a Service unit leaves for overseas it affects the remaining units, for they have the problem of reconditioning the vehicles left behind. This problem is then doubled by the fact that automotive parts are scarce and hard to get."⁵

G-4's POM Supply Section was initially called the Alerted Unit Section, but in June 1944 the name was changed to the Task Force Section at the request of AGF so that all G-4 POM sections would have the same title.⁶ Preparation of units for effective operation in an overseas theater was the responsibility of the Task Force Section. Through the maintenance of up-to-the-minute records and by close checking to insure compliance with established procedure, proper action was taken to see that all alerted units determined the serviceability of their equipment, the extent of their shortages and submitted appropriate requisitions. It was the Army's responsibility to see that every alerted unit received all of its authorized equipment in combat serviceable condition and that the equipment was supplied in sufficient time to enable troops to familiarize themselves with it before moving to the Port of Embarkation. All alerted units received all of their equipment at their home station with the exception of special purpose vehicles.⁷ Delivery of this equipment to the home station was predicated on the understandable desire of unit commanders personally to check deliveries and be visually assured that their equipment shortages were being eliminated. It was found that "home delivery" did much to relieve the minds of commanders.

His indorsement read as follows:

"1. The comments reflect a condition which has been more or less characteristic of units participating in maneuvers in the past.

"2. After personal observations recently, and in past maneuvers, I feel that there are certain basic weaknesses which are reflected by the poor performance in the maneuver area. These may be summarized as follows:

a. Lack of thoroughness and exactness in training during the basic unit and combined periods of training at the home station.

b. A general failure on the part of officers to correct errors and deficiencies on the spot.

c. A lack of control exercised by commanders of units from platoon to division.

d. The tendency to look upon the maneuver period as a contest between opposing commanders as distinguished from a final period of instruction in which the units should be perfected in field operations.

e. Failure to conform to established tactical doctrines.

"3. It is believed that the training program as now set up for the divisions at their home stations will produce the desired results if all commanders are impressed with the necessity of establishing and demanding a higher standard of discipline, training and leadership. Steps are being taken to bring this about by requiring more rigid control; vigorous personal leadership on the part of all commanders from the highest to the lowest; and the correction of deficiencies on the spot.

"4. Steps are being taken to impress commanders of participating units with the fact that it is of no great consequence which side 'wins' the maneuver provided the units properly perform their prescribed roles. This should go far toward eliminating the effort of commanders to outmaneuver and overcome their opponents by fantastic and unorthodox methods which violate sound tactical doctrines, and which would have disastrous results if undertaken in active combat.

"5. Many of the deficiencies noted may be attributed to improper tactical handling of troops by battalion, regimental, and division commanders. In spite of the fact that the majority of our commanders are adequately educated and trained, the maneuvers have been characterized by a failure to apply approved principles with which our army has been indoctrinated for years and which have been proved by battle experience to be sound. These violations include the following:

a. Improper use of reconnaissance agencies.

b. Failure to provide adequate security.

c. When contact is imminent, failure to adopt suitable approach march formations.

d. Failure to definitely locate, develop, and fix the enemy before disposing the troops for attack.

e. Failure to bring the mass to the critical point in the attack.

The Operation Section was engaged with the preparation of operating procedure for the G-4 section. This procedure included recommendations concerning the policy as regards (a) funds; (b) construction; (c) assignment of Service Units; (d) evacuation and hospitalization; and (e) motor maintenance.⁸

Over and above the adherence to the fundamental operating policies as outlined in the Staff Officers' Field Manual (FM 101-5), Colonel Rickard felt that it was G-4's function to approve, check, and control, through the Finance Officer, the funds that are allocated to the headquarters for various usages.

He also pointed out that without Services it would not be possible for G-4 to function, so that it was of utmost importance that the Services and G-4 work together on all planning.⁹

Once these policies were established, the Operation Section carried out its work by personal visits to subordinate units and by contact with the Commanding General and the Special Staff sections.

During the Army's stay at the Presidio of Monterey representatives of the Operation Section were sent to Fort Lewis, Washington, for supervision of training of Fourth Army troops at that station. Officer representatives were also sent to Camp Cooke, California, for duty in connection with G-3 tests that were conducted there, and to Camp Elliot and the Marine Base at San Diego for conference with Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel regarding amphibious training programs to be conducted by the 81st Division.¹⁰

Immediately following the movement of Army Headquarters to Fort Sam Houston the Operation Section was faced with the new problem of planning for the Louisiana Maneuver area.

The job of supplying service units to support combat elements in the maneuver area during this period became extremely difficult since the demand for service units overseas was heavy. This scarcity of service units contributed greatly to the closing of the maneuver area in April 1944, at the end of the Sixth Period.¹¹

As of 19 August 1944, a critical shortage of certain type of service units still remained.¹² By organization of certain provisional units and of substituting units to perform functions for which they had not been trained, enough units of the proper or substitute type were available to permit reopening of the Louisiana Maneuver Area in the fall. As an example, Quartermaster Truck Companies were alerted to operate as Gas Supply Companies. It was also contemplated in August 1944, that co-belligerent Italian service units would be utilized to assist during the maneuver period.¹³ "The formation of provisional units and requiring a unit to function in a manner for which it is not intended will be inefficient and detrimental to the training of those units," G-4 reported. "However, without sufficient substitutions and provisions, the present shortage of service-type units would prevent the reopening of the Louisiana Maneuver Area."¹⁴

In order to prepare the Operation Section for its primary mission overseas, a constant study was made during the entire time the section was within the continental limits of the United States of reports emanating from the different active theaters of operation.¹⁵

At all times, the G-4 section kept in mind the day when it would operate in a combat theater.¹⁶ Since the duties of an Army Headquarters in the continental United States and in an active theater of operations differ materially, plans were made for

the reorganization of sections and the shifting of personnel against the day when the Fourth Army would go overseas. Distribution of duties and responsibilities under the revised combat theater set-up was determined and Standing Operating Procedures were prepared. In mid-summer of 1944, the G-4 section established a series of weekly classes to orient and further train G-4 section personnel in combat operations.¹⁷

The Supply Section of G-4 was charged with the supervision of all supply problems for troops assigned to the Fourth Army. In addition, this section was delegated the responsibility of supervising the preparation of units for overseas movement.¹⁸ As stated previously, when the Fourth Army moved to Fort Sam Houston, POM functions were assigned to the newly-created "Alerted Unit Section," later designated as the "Task Force Section."

When the Fourth Army assumed command of all former IV and XVIII Corps units an additional burden was placed on the Supply Section, consisting of only three officers, and at all times understaffed.¹⁹

A serious operating handicap developed at this time because of the long distances between Fourth Army units and inadequate telephone communications, but the delegation of certain responsibility and authority in the preparation of units for overseas movement to Special Troop commanders rapidly improved the situation.²⁰

Another problem confronting the Supply Section during this period was the disposal of excess equipment, aggravated by shipment of units with Minimum Essential Equipment.

By careful check of Status of Equipment Reports, this excess equipment was transferred to other Fourth Army units in order to bring them up to T/E allowance.

Thirty-five days prior to the Readiness Date or 35 days prior to the Completion of Training Date, if an "R" date had not been received, commanders of alerted units prepared and forwarded direct to Fourth Army a report on all excess controlled items of equipment.²¹ When this report was received, the G-4 Section, through appropriate Special Staff Sections, made disposition by transfers to other Fourth Army units or turned the excesses in to Army Service Forces after obtaining approval from the Army Ground Forces. Units were checked to see that action was expedited, relieving rush and confusion in the unit and giving Fourth Army G-4 a complete picture of the situation at all times. Noncontrolled equipment, except for a few items, were turned in to Post supply agencies and a few non-controlled critical items were disposed of by Fourth Army by transfer to other units in need of them.²²

Another function of the Supply Section was the checking of all shortages of equipment that were interfering with training and, if available, directing equipment transfers from other Fourth Army units. If equipment was not available within Fourth Army sources, requests were then made to the Service Command or to the Army Ground Forces to fill the deficiencies.²³

According to G-4 "equipment shortages have not seriously impeded training" since the Fourth Army moved to Fort Sam Houston. Certain Ordnance and Engineer items have been critical but the situation was partially alleviated by transferring items from one unit to another. A shortage of wool socks occurred in June and July 1944, caused by heavy demands from troops fighting overseas. By transfers from one continental depot to another and by issuing only to those units whose needs were most pressing, this shortage was gradually overcome.²⁴

Prior to the Fourth Army's departure from the Presidio of Monterey Memorandum No. 4 was published as a supply procedure guide for all units under Fourth Army. The

memorandum covered such problems as supply of newly-activated units; controlled equipment; non-controlled equipment; supply of units in A-2, A-3, or A-4 equipment priorities; training equipment and post, camp and station property; excess equipment; communications; property accountability; responsibility of Special Troop headquarters; procedure for supply and maintenance by services, and funds. This memorandum rescinded all previous supply instructions of IV and XVIII Corps.²⁵

During the Fourth Army's Monterey period approximately 50 percent of all units were under POM procedure, necessitating a check by the Supply Section to see that showdown inspections were held promptly; that showdown shortage lists were submitted to the Post, and that initial lists were prepared and submitted by Post to Chief of Technical Services.²⁶

The Fourth Army G-4 Section found the Forty Day Report of value in giving a unit opportunity to place a formal complaint against Service Forces if their shortages were not met.²⁷ This report was submitted to the Army Ground Forces through channels forty days after the unit had its original showdown. The report included a listing of only those items that were short or concerning which there had been no delivery date information.

One of the biggest problems in supplying units going overseas was the securing of Third Echelon spare parts for armored divisions. Certain items were sometimes difficult to obtain owing to different interpretations of combat serviceability. This has since been remedied by a clarification of combat serviceability.²⁸

The principal duties and functions of the Supply Section as visualized by G-4 included (a) the supervision of procurement and distribution of all classes of equipment; (b) supervision of disposal of all excess equipment by transfer to Army units so that the general level of authorized equipment in all units was greatly increased; (c) checking supply paragraphs of activation, reorganization and domestic movement orders; (d) maintaining close liaison with the Alerted Units (Task Force) Section in publication of priority lists for distribution of controlled items of equipment; and (e) distribution of all Army Air Force equipment as no Air Section was assigned to Army Headquarters.²⁹

Publication of the Supply Procedure Guide designated as Memorandum No. 51, which rescinded all previous supply instructions of the Third Army and placed all required information in one publication, was a far step forward in solving many of the problems confronting the Supply Section.³⁰

It was found that during the period in which the Fourth Army Headquarters was assigned a training mission, the need for a separate Transportation Section in G-4 was negligible. Any matters pertaining to transportation in the Army, which required G-4 coordination or supervision, were generally handled by the Operation Section.³¹

Studies were constantly made however on the use and control of transportation of all types for combat operations. Information was gathered from reports of operations and from observer reports covering the various theaters of combat. From these it was determined that G-4's in combat operation must supplement their sections with an operating Transportation Section to make possible and expedite both tactical and logistical movements.³²

This section was organized on 24 April 1944 for the purpose of operating in a map maneuver conducted by the Army Commander. Initially the section consisted of two officers and two enlisted men, but following two weeks of operation it was recommended that the strength be increased to five officers and seven enlisted men.

The G-4 assigned to the Transportation Section the general duties of making (a) recommendations for traffic circulation and control; (b) recommendations for transportation of supplies by land, sea and air; (c) recommendations for construction, improvement and maintenance of transportation facilities; (d) recommendations for protection of lines of communication; (e) supervision of operation, care and maintenance of automotive transport; and (f) recommendations for transportation of combat troops and service troops in the Army area and to the Corps area.³³

Creation of the maintenance and transportation subsection was predicated primarily on having a nucleus organization ready when the Fourth Army would go overseas. The number of officers and enlisted men available to this section and the extent of duties at Fort Sam Houston prohibited complete organization as of 19 August 1944.³⁴ A skeleton organization was available and it could be expanded and augmented prior to movement to an active theater.

With increased consumption of maintenance supplies overseas and the consequent cutting of such stocks in the continental United States, the G-4 section placed increasing emphasis on the need for superior maintenance procedure within the Fourth Army and checked closely to see that this policy was followed.

The "Miscellaneous Section," as it was termed when the Army was activated, later was redesignated as the "Operations Section" when the Army moved to Fort Sam Houston.³⁵

When originally organized the Miscellaneous Section was assigned the job of supervising the closing of the maneuver area at Bend, Oregon. This included the final policing of the area, disposition of supplies, and arrangement for the settlement of claims.

As mentioned heretofore the Miscellaneous Section was the catch-all for G-4 problems which, because of their unique character, could not be adequately handled in any one of the other four sections of G-4.³⁶ It was this section that was called on to solve the problems of the Louisiana Maneuver area and those which pertained to the Ordnance Field Depots.

In January 1944, when control of the Maneuver area passed to the Fourth Army, three years of continuous operation of heavy military traffic in all types of weather had caused serious failures on nearly every road in the area. Most of them were just usable by military traffic and many were entirely impassable to civilian vehicles.

So that relief could be afforded civilian residents Fourth Army Director Headquarters assigned one engineer group, four engineer combat battalions, two engineer light equipment battalions, one engineer maintenance company, and one engineer dump truck company to road work exclusively.

Certain primary roads were designated access roads, the Public Roads Administration allotting approximately \$400,000 to the State of Louisiana for their reconstruction. Assistance in the form of labor and equipment was furnished to the State Highway Department by the Fourth Army and the Eighth Service Command, respectively, enabling the State to use most of this fund for the purchase of gravel.³⁷

Every effort was then made to keep military traffic off roads during wet weather. This materially decreased the damage but slowed up action during the maneuver periods.

With the passing of the rainy season, the roads dried out and maintenance operations were sufficient to open all roads to civilian traffic. Following the close of the Sixth Maneuver period, when maneuvers were suspended, arrangements were made to turn over all highway maintenance to the State Highway Department.

Funds were to be made available through the Public Roads Administration and from Congressional appropriation for the rehabilitation of roads in the maneuver areas. Some assistance was furnished by prisoners of war under control of the Eighth Service Command.³⁸

In order to centralize control of spare parts issue to Ordnance units using arms, a system of field sub-depots and depots was established by the Ordnance Officer.³⁹ These installations acted as clearing houses for requisitions of Fourth Army units at each post, camp and station. The available Ordnance units at each post provided the personnel for such Ordnance establishments. As an adjunct to these depots, replacement vehicle pools were established to further Ordnance service replacements while repairs were being made by maintenance units.

During one phase, the Fourth Army Ordnance officers made personnel available to the commanding officer of the Red River Ordnance Depot to assist in processing requisitions for motor parts for units under Army.⁴⁰ This arrangement also provided additional training for the personnel involved.

REVISION OF ORDNANCE SUPPLY

One of the major changes in supply concerned a complete overhaul of Ordnance supply procedure. This was effected on 12 June 1944, when the old system of an involved Ordnance supply hierarchy was abolished and a system of Ordnance operating battalions was established.⁴¹

In the spring of 1944, the following Ordnance supply system was in effect within the Army. Three master depots, located so as to best serve the Army area, were responsible for supply of all Fourth Army units. Each master depot had two or more satellite stations assigned to it for supply and the master depot commander assigned two or three of his men to each satellite station to operate a sub-depot. The master depots maintained stocks upon the basis of the equipment density of all stations it served. The sub-depots did not maintain any stocks. At the top of this hierarchy was a Fourth Army detachment at the Red River Ordnance Depot at Texarkana, Texas.

The supply procedure, based on this physical set-up, was as follows: The unit commander submitted a requisition to the Ordnance unit serving his outfit. The requisition was sent to the sub-depot which then called on the service command for supply. Available items were issued to the lower echelon. Unavailable items were not placed on back order with the service command. After exploiting all possible local sources, the sub-depot requested the unavailable items from the master depot. After supplying the items it had on hand, the master depot checked with service command for those unavailable in the depot. The service command supplied what it could but no back orders were set up by the service command. Finally, all unavailable items were extracted from the Red River Ordnance Depot.

This complicated and burdensome system resulted in the breakdown of Ordnance Supply and, therefore, increased disability of vehicles and weapons.⁴² The sub-depots were valueless since they carried no stocks and processing requisitions through them only brought unnecessary delay, and sometimes, loss of requisitions. Movement of Ordnance Depot Companies left master depots under-manned with resultant inefficiency and lack of proper supervision. In some cases, duplicate issues were made, resulting in shortages of critical items in some units and overages in others. The entire system did not conform with existing policies governing supply in both the Zone of Interior and the Combat Zone.

To remedy this, the Fourth Army placed Ordnance Operating Battalions at each station and directed that there would be one stock of parts with each battalion. These battalions were responsible for supply of all Army units at their station and the battalions were directed to call upon service command for all supply. Using units submitted their requisitions to the operating battalion which consolidated all requisitions and established stock levels. Two thirds of stock level was prescribed as the re-order point for all supply units.⁴³

The only change made in this streamlined Ordnance supply system was an amendment whereby armored division Ordnance maintenance battalions could requisition directly upon the service command. This action was designed to reduce the load on Fourth Army Ordnance units and speed up supply to all echelons.

Vehicle shortages had also been a problem within the Fourth Army but this situation was alleviated during the summer of 1944. The "tendency of the previous regime was to hoard vehicles."⁴⁴ This practice was discontinued and Fourth Army vehicle pools were reduced from approximately 12,000 to 3,000 vehicles. A further reduction, in process during August, was designed to stabilize the vehicle pool total at 1,500. Vehicle replacement pools were established and the Fourth Army authorized immediate replacement of deadlined vehicles that were interfering with training. The Eighth Service Command was unable to supply vehicles "due to hoarding," but with reduction of all vehicle pools to the number required for actual replacement, the service command was able again to supply initial issues to newly activated units.⁴⁵ Direct exchange of unserviceable parts was also authorized, thus eliminating time consuming and unnecessary paper work.

The maintenance situation in the Fourth Army was "very critical" during the spring and summer of 1944, as a result of a shortage of maintenance units and the status of their training. A drive was made to improve first and second echelon maintenance by organic Ordnance units and thus stabilize the situation. Drastic action was required to reduce the percentage of motor vehicles deadlined. This was accomplished by applying constant pressure to Ordnance units and by thorough and frequent inspections by Fourth Army Ordnance inspection teams. How well it was accomplished is shown by the following statistics. In May 1944, the percentage of Fourth Army vehicles deadlined was 9.1. In June, this was reduced to 7.7%; to 6.4% in July, and to 5.9% in August.⁴⁷

A similar drive was made to improve maintenance on all Ordnance equipment, particularly artillery, instruments and small arms. Improvement in the situation was proportionate to that for motor vehicles. Fourth Army also issued a memorandum to control the condition of vehicles being transferred from one unit to another.⁴⁸ This memorandum required Special Troop commanders to spot check the vehicles to be transferred and determine if they were up to the high standard required by the Army.

The Fourth Army policy concerning ammunition supply was revised on 1 July 1944.⁴⁹ The policy existing up to that time required the submission of two monthly reports, one showing anticipated requirements for the second succeeding month and the other showing expenditures for the past month and balances on hand. The result was an abnormal level of stocks in post magazines. The new policy was designed to force lower units to edit their requirements. It eliminated the separate report on requirements and, by use of a separate column, showed the balance on hand, and, in adjoining columns, the requirements for the next succeeding months. Use of this form resulted in better control over ammunition supply and reduction of stock levels to the normal level of the two-month supply for troops at each station. The only serious shortage in training ammunition was for the 81mm mortar.⁵⁰

Despite the many problems which arose from time to time, members of the G-4 Section, and special sections under it, never forgot that their prime job was the studying of

problems, and the perfecting of techniques, so they would be ready to meet the demands of combat zone operations. No one in the Section was ever permitted to forget that many of the G-4 details, which in this country are handled directly by the service command, post, camp or station, are in combat the responsibility of the tactical G-4.⁵¹

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER VIII

PREPARATION FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

A major problem confronting Fourth Army from the time it relieved the IV and XVIII Corps was the preparation of troops for overseas movement.

In a memorandum outlining the procedure for the handling of alerted units, the Deputy Chief of Staff was charged with the coordination of "alerted unit" matters in the Army headquarters. The Inspector General was held responsible for making necessary inspections to determine whether unit commanders were taking the proper action regarding POM requirements.¹

At one of the early staff conferences (27 November 1943) Colonel DeWitt Ginder, G-1, stressed the necessity of accomplishing personnel requirements for POM. Immediate action on the part of unit commanding officers and Special Troops commanding officers was demanded. Enlisted replacements were to be correlated by the interested Special Staff sections.

As time passed, General Simpson became more and more impressed by the fact that many commanders and their staffs had failed to consider and make preparations for the day when their units would go on an "alerted" basis.

On assuming command of troops formerly under Third Army, General Simpson issued a personally signed letter to all unit commanders which hammered home the point that too often final inspections of units, prior to departure from a staging area, revealed unwarranted numbers of men lacking complete immunization, blood type records, proper eyeglasses, physical examinations, and other POM requirements.

After citing the directives and instructions regarding POM the letter stated, "These regulations specifically place upon all commanders the responsibility for preparing personnel of their command for duty overseas. All commanders must realize that this responsibility commences upon activation of a unit and does not end upon departure from the home station, but continues while at the staging area and on board ship."²

At an Army staff meeting on 5 February 1944 Colonel Mead, Army G-3, called attention to the fact that on the previous Sunday status reports for twenty-three alerted units were cleared just in time to get to Washington on the last possible plane in order to meet the due date.

This situation Colonel Mead stated was brought about in part by the unfamiliarity of various staff sections with the basic report and it proved necessary to rewrite many of the reports.

It was then suggested that when certain units in the field could not meet the readiness date they should state the reason for such failure and recommend a new date.

The issuance of pre-alert lists by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, had two specific advantages. It gave the Army G-1 an indication of the forthcoming demands for personnel of the various arms and services, and it brought home to unit commanders the need of early inauguration of plans so as to fulfill POM requirements well in advance of alert instructions.

The issuance of pre-alert lists did not solve the problem of obtaining adequately trained specialists for the units thus notified, as it was merely a warning and as such did not raise the priority rating of the warned unit.

Officers of the Inspector General Section, Fourth Army, were constantly plagued with the discovery that in too many instances men were arbitrarily given an MOS to fill T/O spots, although they were neither fitted by military training or civilian experience to handle the responsibilities of the job.

In Army Memorandum No. 53 of 17 April 1944, which amplified the AGF letter "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas," dated 3 April 1944, certain responsibilities for units under alert instructions, alert for movement, movement orders, or equipment priority (A-2, A-3, or A-4) were assigned to the senior tactical commander.³

These responsibilities included POM, ISI (Initial Special Inspection), and the prompt submission to Fourth Army headquarters of a statement containing (a) date showdown completed; (b) date showdown shortage reports furnished station commanding officer; (c) date initial or supplemental reports forwarded by station commanding officer to Chief of Service, and (d) follow-up inspections.

Commanding officers of Special Troops detachments were, in addition, charged with maintaining inspection teams and performing POM administrative duties for brigades, divisions, and corps units at their stations in cooperation with senior tactical commanding officers. Alert instructions prescribed the "date for completion of training."

Memorandum No. 53 further demanded that immediate physical examinations be held to determine that all men accompanying alerted units were in qualified physical condition. It went on to prescribe that Fourth Army units move to ports of embarkation at movement order strength, all units be required to complete training and personnel requirements, and that clothing and equipment shortages and overages be reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, for adjustment. This responsibility rested exclusively with the senior tactical commander.

A final inspection was to be made by the Inspector General, Fourth Army, five to seven days prior to the readiness date. The commanding officer, estimating the readiness date for the unit, was held responsible for completion of all requirements.

Although constant stress was placed by Army headquarters on the need for full compliance with Army's announced POE policy, there were some instances of units failing fully to conform to the directives. This problem was not completely solved at the time General Lucas and his staff assumed command over Fourth Army functions.

The changes in Fourth Army procedure, as outlined in Memorandum No. 53, from that pursued by the Third Army, were fundamentally two: (a) a prescribed system of checks for the inspection of units known as "Initial Special Inspection" (ISI) was instituted, and (b) a directive to Special Troops commanders stating they would cooperate with the corps commanders in the administration of POM of corps units of which the corps commander was the senior tactical commander. This cooperative effort was to include the furnishing of qualified and experienced inspection teams. It was the objective of the Army Commander that the Special Troops commanders would relieve the corps of as much administrative detail as possible.

On occasion the Army Ground Forces placed units participating in maneuvers on an "alert" status. The POM-ing of these units was a responsibility of the 14th Headquarters, Special Troops, Camp Polk, La.

By general agreement of the staff sections concerned with the concurrence of the Commanding General, Fourth Army, maneuver participation for a period of at least three weeks fulfilled the POM requirements of three weeks field training.

Check-ups for dental defects and their remedy was a major problem in the POM-ing of maneuver-based troops. The normally heavy demand on dental facilities at Camp Claiborne and Camp Polk by other maneuver troops further complicated this perplexing issue.

Another problem with all alerted units was the final physical check-up. A few men invariably would report to the Inspector General during his final inspection that they were not physically capable of performing overseas duty. By agreement with the service command the Post Surgeon was made the final authority in the determination of overseas physical fitness, his decision forming the basis for any action initiated by the Inspector General's Section.

The procedure outlined in Memorandum No. 53 of April 1944 proved to be fundamentally sound, but a constant study was being made to determine in what ways the procedure might be improved. After two months of experience with these procedures and shortly after General Lucas assumed command of Fourth Army, it was decided to issue a new memorandum clarifying and making more explicit certain POM requirements thus enabling Fourth Army headquarters to have a more accurate picture of the status of each alerted unit.

This new POM procedure guide issued in June 1944 provided for a detailed report on the status of training of alerted units with a complete breakdown into the various training phases.⁵ It was also required that all inspection schedules be submitted to the G-3 Section of Fourth Army. A more definite control over the equipment and supply situation was established by requiring the automatic submission of a supply report thirty-five days prior to the readiness date or the completion of training date.⁶

Just prior to the issuance of this POM Memorandum, all sections of Fourth Army headquarters were furnished an outline of the exact procedure to be followed within the headquarters in the handling of alerted units. This made each section aware of the responsibilities and duties of all other sections with resultant increase in coordination and efficient operation.⁷

Simultaneously with the revision of the guide for POM procedure, the directive relating to Initial Special Inspections (ISI) was rewritten and new check sheets were prepared. The revised directive continued to emphasize the responsibility resting on the shoulders of the senior tactical commander, and gave greater importance to the ISI inspection teams by requiring that the Senior Inspector be a senior field officer. The Senior Inspector was required to actually participate in and coordinate the work of the inspecting team and to prepare the ISI reports.⁸

At a general conference of Special Troops commanders and corps chiefs of staff held at Fort Sam Houston on 24 June 1944, the new POM procedure was explained in detail by the Chief of Staff and the Fourth Army G-3.⁹ At the same conference, the Inspector General discussed and explained the new ISI requirements and urged all officers to telephone his office in the event of any problems or questions.¹⁰

Colonel Moore, Fourth Army Chief of Staff, warned all officers of Army headquarters on 13 November 1944 that they should prepare themselves for overseas assignment. Proper identification tags and the required vaccinations and inoculations were the first steps required. A series of classes were inaugurated the following week consisting of familiarization training in the various weapons of the Army Ground Forces and physical training.

A complete course of instruction for officers of Fourth Army headquarters was outlined in a memorandum issued on 23 February 1944. The officers were divided into four groups and one group was transported each day to Camp Bullis for POM training.¹¹

Shortly thereafter a program of training was inaugurated for the enlisted men of Fourth Army headquarters. The program was so arranged that each man received eight hours of training a week without being absent from his section for more than two mornings a week.

Those passing the comprehensive tests were excused from further instruction in that particular subject. As many members of the headquarters had completed vigorous field training before joining the Fourth Army headquarters staff, the number of men absent from duty at any one time was minimized.

1.-Personal ltr of Lt. Col. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief, Historical Section, to Capt. Jack B. Beardwood, Historical Officer, Hq Fourth Army, 13 Dec 44.

CHAPTER I

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22. Fourth Army Training Memo (TM) 1, 15 Dec 43.
23. Notes Fourth Army Staff Meeting, 13 Nov 43. 337.
24. Fourth Army TWX to TAG, 18 Sep 43. 320.2/1.
25. Record of telephone conversation between CG Fourth Army and CofS AGF, 20 Oct 43. Vol I, Telephone Conversations, in office of CofS Fourth Army.
26. Fourth Army SO 1, Presidio of San Francisco, 15 Sep 43.
27. Record of telephone conversation between CG Fourth Army and CofS AGF, 21 Oct 43.
28. Interview of AGF Hist Off with Mr. Muscic, AGF Records Sec, 21 Apr 44. 314.7.
29. Record of telephone conversation between CofS AGF and Gen Simpson, 20 Oct 43. Vol I, Telephone Conversations, in office of CofS, Fourth Army.
30. Record of telephone conversation between Col Gavin, AGF Troop Movements, and CofS Fourth Army, 23 Oct 43.
31. Ibid.
32. Interview of Hist Off with Col John A. Klein, AG, 10 Feb 44. 314.7.
33. Appendix III.
34. Fourth Army GO 7, 1 Nov 43. In GO Master File.
35. Ibid., 6 Nov 43. In GO Master File.
36. Interview of Hist Off with Col John A. Klein, AG Fourth Army, 10 Feb 44. 314.7.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Strength Report, 23 Nov 43. AG files.

43. Statement of Col John A. Klein, AG Fourth Army to Hist Off, 1 Apr 44. 314.7.
44. Ibid.
45. Record of telephone conversation, Col Gavin, AGF to Fourth Army G-3, 4 Jan 44. 320.2/1.
46. Ibid.
47. Interview of Hist Off with Col Millener, DCof S, 23 Mar 44. 314.7.
48. Fourth Army TWX to CG Third Army, 7 Jan 44. 320.2/1.
49. Fourth Army TWX to TAG, 11 Jan 44. 320.2/1.
50. AGF ltr (C), 320.2 to Third & Fourth Armies, 21 Jan 44, w/amendment ltr, 26 Jan 44, sub: List of Units. 314.7 (C).
51. Notes on Staff Meeting, 5 Feb 44. 337 (Special).
52. Ibid.
53. Appendix III.
54. Eighth Army SO 3, 4 May 44. 300.4/2.
55. Notes on Conference of Corps and Sp Tr Hq, Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44. 314.7.
56. "Certain Lessons Learned from Recent Operations," Fourth Army, 16 Jun 44.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Notes on Conference of Corps and Sp Tr Hq, Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44. 314.7.
61. Remarks of CofS Fourth Army, Conference, 24 Jun 44. 314.7.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Remarks by ACoS G-3, Conference, 24 Jun 44. 314.7.
65. Ibid.
66. AGF ltr, 354.2/8 GNGCT, 30 Jun 44, sub: Maneuvers 1944.
67. AGF ltr, 354.2/8 GNGCT, 24 Aug 44, sub: Maneuvers 1944.
68. Fourth Army Maneuver Memo 1, 20 Mar 44, amended 15 Jul 44.
69. Fourth Army ltr, 5 Aug 44, sub: Opening of Director Headquarters, Louisiana Maneuver Area. 354.2/1.
70. Fourth Army SO 188, 24 Aug 44.
71. Fourth Army GO 119, 6 Aug 44.
72. Fourth Army SO 193, 30 Aug 44 (Assignment of augmentation offs and warrant offs to Fourth Army).
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3. Relationship with Sp Trs Hq is covered in the section: "Operation without Corps."
4. Cir 36, WD, 28 Jan 44.
5. Notes on Staff Meeting of AGF Hist Off with Fourth Army Staff, 28 Dec 43. 314.7.
6. Fourth Army GO 11, 6 Nov 43. GO file.
7. Statement of Col John A. Klein, AG to Hist Off, 10 Feb 44.
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9. Statement of Col George A. Millener, DCofS to Hist Off, 9 Feb 44. 314.7.
10. Fourth Army Memo 3, 12 Nov 43.
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12. Statement of Col Millener, DCofS to Hist Off, 9 Feb 44.
13. Statement of Col Millener, DCofS to Hist Off, 9 Feb 44.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.
17. Statement of Col Chas. Bixwell, G-2 to Hist Off, 21 Feb 44. 314.7.
18. Talk Gen Simpson to Fourth Army Staff, 13 Nov 43. AG file of "Notes on Staff Meetings."
19. Ibid.
20. Statement of Col Millener, DCofS to Hist Off, 9 Feb 44. 314.7.
21. Ibid.
22. Talk Gen Simpson to Fourth Army Staff, 13 Nov 43. AG file, "Notes on Staff Meetings."
23. Talk Gen Moore to Fourth Army Staff, 13 Nov 43. AG file, "Notes on Staff Meetings."

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1. Par 2, Sec I, Fourth Army Tng Memo 1, 1 Feb 44.
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5. Col Mead remarks Fourth Army Staff Meeting, 28 Dec 43.
6. Par 1 (d), Tng Memo 1.
7. Par 16, Procedure Guide, 3 Nov 43.
8. Par 1 (d), Tng Memo 1.
9. Sec 16, Procedure Guide, Fourth Army, 3 Nov 43.
10. Statement of Col Millener, DCofS to Hist Off, 27 May 44. 314.7.
11. Gen Simpson remarks to Fourth Army Staff, 14 Nov 43. 337 (Special).
12. Ibid.
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14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Staff Fourth Army Memo 33, 27 Dec 43. See Appendix.
17. Fourth Army Inspection Rpt, BF-233.
18. Statement of Col Millener, DCofS, 27 May 44. 314.7.
19. Ibid.
20. Statement of Col Flaherty, G-3 to Hist Off, 22 May 44. 314.7.
21. Ibid.
22. Par 6, Sec 1, Fourth TM 1, 1 Feb 44.
23. Ibid.
24. Remarks by ACofS G-3, Conference Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44.
25. Interview of Hist Off with G-3 sec staff members.
26. Remarks of Col Flaherty, G-3, Fourth Army Staff Meeting, 27 Nov 43, 3 Dec 43.
27. Statement of Col Flaherty, G-3 to Hist Off, 22 May 44. 314.7.
28. Fourth Army ltr to CGs of Corps, sub: Preparation and Conduct of D-Series Field Exercises. 353.
29. Rpt of G-3 to Army Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

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2. Ibid., III Corps 1st ind, 25 Jul 44.
3. Ibid.



Paratroopers of the 507th Para. Inf., of the Red Army, stage an attack at dusk in La. maneuvers near Burr Ferry, La.

4. Memo of Maj Cragholm, Fourth Army Liaison Off, 27 Nov 43, sub: Liaison with Tr Tng Unit in 81st Div. 314.7.
5. Hq Fourth Army ltr, 14 Jul 44, III Corps 1st ind, 25 Jul 44, sub: History Fourth Army Amphibious Tng. 314.7.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Memo of Maj Cragholm, Fourth Army Liaison Off, 27 Nov 43, sub: Liaison with Tr Tng Units in 81st Div. 314.7.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Fourth Army ltr, 14 Jul 44, III Corps 1st ind, 25 Jul 44, sub: History Fourth Army Amphibious Tng. 314.7.
12. Record of telephone conversation between Col Harding, AGF and Col Flaherty, Asst G-3, 4 Feb 44. 354.2.
13. Fourth Army ltr 354.2, 22 Feb 44, sub: Maneuvers 1944.
14. Gen Simpson Critique, 1st Phase, 6th Maneuver Period, 6-7 Feb 44.
15. The 11th Airborne Div had just been transferred to Cp Polk, La in order to prepare for overseas movement.
16. Gen Simpson Critique, 2nd Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
17. Cf 92nd Div Umpire Rpt.
18. Comments Air Dir, 3rd Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
19. Comments Dep Dir, 3rd Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
20. Ibid.
21. Comments Gen Simpson, 4th Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
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24. Ibid.
25. Comment Gen Simpson at XVIII Corps Critique, 6th Phase, 6th Period. 354.2.
26. Ibid.
27. Narrative, 7th Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
28. Critique Gen Simpson, 7th Phase, 6th Maneuver Period. 354.2.
29. AGF ltr 720/6, 2 Dec 43, sub: Malaria Control and Malaria Discipline.
30. DHQ Rpt on Malaria Control, Surg to G-3, 3 Apr 44. 314.7.
31. AGF ltr to CG Fourth Army, 29 Dec 43, sub: Mtzn of an Inf Div. 354.2/93.
32. DHQ Rpt to CG Fourth Army, 1 Apr 44, sub: Mtzn of an Inf Div.
33. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Moore, CofS Fourth Army and Col Pesek, AGF, 24 Mar 44.
34. Rpt Gen Simpson to AGF, 14 Apr 44. 354.2 GNMDC.
35. Ibid.
36. Record of telephone conversation between Lt Col Lewis, Asst A-3 Air Corps, Tampa, Fla, and Col Mead, G-3 Fourth Army.
37. Rpt Gen Simpson to AGF, 14 Apr 44.
38. Rpt Gen Simpson to AGF, 14 Apr 44. 354.2 GNMDC.
39. Critique Gen Simpson, 6th Phase, 6th Period. 354.2/1.
40. Ibid.
41. Critique Lt Col Powell, 6th Phase, 6th Period. 354.2/1.
42. Ibid. Also, see 15.
43. Critique Lt Col Powell, 7th Phase, 6th Period. 354.2/1.
44. Grd Ln Off Tng, 18 Mar 44. 353 (#2).
45. Demonstration Flight, 3 Feb 44. 353 (#2).
46. Ibid.
47. Grd Ln Off Tng, 18 Mar 44. 353 (#2).
48. Ibid.
49. Rpt of G-3 Sec to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
50. Ibid.
51. Gen Memo, G-3 to all sections, Hq Fourth Army, 4 Sep 44.

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2. Rpt of G-1 Sec to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
3. Rpt Maj Heisler, G-1 to Hist Off, 2 May 44. 314.7.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. AGF ltr, 7 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Enl Pers. 341/1202.
7. Rpt of G-1 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
8. Notes Staff Meeting, Presidio of Monterey, 3 Dec 44. 337.
9. Ibid.
10. Notes Staff Meeting, Presidio of Monterey, 1 Jan 44. 337.
11. AGF ltr 220.3/100 GNGAP, 9 Mar 44, sub: Retention of Ind in Div Affected by Receipt of ASTP Pers.
12. AGF ltr 220.3/1 GNGCT, 26 Feb 44, sub: Distribution of ASTP Pers.
13. AGF ltr, 6 Apr 44, sub: Distribution of Aviation Cadet Tng Pers. 220.3/115 GNGAP-M.
14. Rpt of G-1 Sec to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
15. Ibid.
16. Fourth Army Station & Assignment List 12, 11 Apr 44.
17. Statement of Col Shepard, G-1 to Hist Off. 314.7.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. From records of 97th MRU.
21. See Chart on page opposite.
22. WD ltr, AG 210.6, 4 Jan 44.
23. Ibid.
24. Statement of Reclassification Center Off to Hist Off.
25. Fourth Army Staff Memo 28, 24 Nov 43.
26. Ibid.
27. AGF ltr, 20 Nov 43, sub: ASF Schs. 352/669 GNGOT.
28. Memo of Maj M. J. Bartosik, AG Sec. 314.7.
29. Fourth Army ltr 319.1 GNMSU, 4 Feb 44, sub: Annual Rpt Med Sec.
30. Talk Col Grinder at Staff Meeting, 13 Nov 43. 337.
31. AGF ltr, 16 Nov 43, sub: Overseas Shipment of NCO's. 220.3/20.
32. Fourth Army Memo, G-1 to C/S, 5 Apr 44. 314.7.
33. Talk Lt Col Beishline, G-1, Staff Meeting, 4 Mar 44. 337.

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4. Statement of Maj Thorn, Asst G-2 to Hist Off, 12 May 44.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Incl 12U to Fourth Army TM 1, 1 Feb 44.
8. Ltr of Col Boxel, G-2 Fourth Army to Col Rogers, G-2 AGF, 19 Feb 44.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Statement of Col Reinburg, G-2 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
13. AGF ltr (R), 15 Jun 44, sub: Combat Int Tng Tests. 350.09/171 GNGBI (R).

14. Sec VIII, FM 30-5.
15. Statement of Maj Thorn, Asst G-2 to Hist Off, 12 May 44.
16. Fourth Army Memo 23, 10 Feb 43.
17. Statement of Maj Thorn, Asst G-2 to Hist Off, 12 May 44.
18. Ibid.
19. Conference, 24 Jun 44, Hq Fourth Army.
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24. WD ltr OB-S-B-M, 14 Jan 44, sub: Disposition of Subversive and Potentially Subversive Mil Pers, and AGF 1st ind. Cf ibid., 5 Feb 44.
25. Statement of Lt Sivertsen, Asst G-2 to Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.
26. Memo of Maj Clement, G-2 Sec for Hist Off, 12 May 44.
27. Statement of Col Reinburg, G-2 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44. 314.7.
28. Ibid.
29. Remarks of ACofS, G-2 at Conference Hq Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44.
30. AGF ltr (R), 14 Dec 43. 322.999/21 (CIC)(R).
31. Memo of Maj Clement, G-2 Sec to Hist Off, 12 May 44.
32. Ibid.
33. Statement of Col Reinburg, G-2 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
34. Statement of Col Crandall, PRO to Hist Off, 9 May 44. 314.7.
35. Ibid.
36. Fourth Army Memo 9, 29 Feb 44. In numbered memoranda file.
37. AGF ltr to PRO, LAMA, 24 Mar 44. 314.7.
38. Interview of Hist Off with Maj Shellenberg, PRO Fourth Army, 10 May 44. 314.7.

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2. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
3. Ibid.
4. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
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6. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
7. Ibid.
8. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
16. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
17. Ibid.
18. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
19. Ibid.
20. Memo 24, 10 Feb 44, sub: Designation of Representatives of the CG Fourth Army, and their Functions.
21. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
22. Ibid.
23. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
24. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
25. Memo 4, 4 Jan 44, sub: Supply Procedure for Fourth Army Units.
26. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.

27. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
28. Change 9, AR 615-40.
29. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
30. Memo 51, 11 May 44, sub: Supply Procedure for Fourth Army Units.
31. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Rpt of G-4 to Hist Off, 19 Aug 44.
35. Interview of Hist Off with Maj Dickey, Asst G-4, 11 May 44.
36. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
37. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Moore, CofS Fourth Army and Gen Rucker, CofS 8th Serv Comd, 4 Mar 44.
38. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
39. Sec 1, Memo 35, 29 Feb 44, sub: Fourth Army Ord Field Deps.
40. Rpt of Lt Col Johnson, G-4 to Hist Off, 11 May 44.
41. Fourth Army Memo 63, 12 Jun 44.
42. Rpt Fourth Army Ord Sec to Hist Off, 1 Sep 44.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Sec XVI, Fourth Army Memo 64, 16 Jun 44.
49. Fourth Army Memo 70, 1 Jul 44.
50. Rpt Fourth Army Ord Sec to Hist Off, 1 Sep 44.
51. Statement of Maj Dickie, Asst G-4 to Hist Off, 24 May 44.

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2. Tng ltr of Gen Simpson, 8 Jan 44, sub: Readiness to Perform Primary Mission.
3. Fourth Army Memo 53, 17 Apr 44, sub: POM.
4. Ibid.
5. Fourth Army Memo 66, 23 Jun 44, sub: POM. See also Incl 2 thereto.
6. Ibid.
7. Fourth Army Staff Memo 22, 21 Jun 44, sub: Procedure for the Handling of Alerted Units by this Hq.
8. Fourth Army ltr AG 333 GNMIG, 23 Jun 44, sub: Initial Special Inspections (Short Title "ISI").
9. Notes on Conference of Corps and Sp Trs Hq, Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44.
10. Remarks by IG, Fourth Army, 24 Jun 44.
11. Fourth Army Staff Memo 5, 23 Feb 44.

VOLUME II

PREFATORY NOTE

"History of the Fourth Army," Volume I, related how the Army was formed in 1932 as one of the four field armies within the continental limits of the United States. Originally the Fourth Field Army comprised the Seventh and Ninth Corps Areas and its mission dealt with the Pacific Coast.

In early 1941 Fourth Army was assigned the mission of constituting the Western Defense Command, preparing plans for the defense of the Pacific Coast and setting up the defense of Alaska.

From the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to the time of the expulsion of the Japanese from Attu (May, 1943), the efforts of the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Command were directed largely toward the defense of Alaska and the liberation of the Aleutian Islands.


In September, 1943, Fourth Army was separated from the Western Defense Command, with which it had been merged, and was reorganized at San Jose, California, under Lieutenant General William H. Simpson. Army headquarters was moved to the Presidio of Monterey the following month and, in January, 1944, was moved to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where the Army assumed the duties of the departing Third Army.

In April, 1944, an augmentation staff of chiefs of section and key officer and enlisted personnel, headed by Major General John P. Lucas, moved in to learn the work of the headquarters offices. When the first-mentioned Fourth Army staff moved out in June, as the Ninth Army, the augmentation group took over, under General Lucas, as the Fourth Army staff.

The process was repeated in August, 1944, when the second Fourth Army staff was alerted for overseas movement as the Fifteenth Army and a new augmentation group took over. General Lucas remained as commanding general of the Fourth Army and retained his Chief of Staff, deputy Chief of Staff and Secretary of the General Staff, but all other key positions were filled by new men.

Thus, while Fourth Army Headquarters remained in the historic Quadrangle at Fort Sam Houston, it fathered two Army staffs which saw extensive combat in the European Theater. Policies and practices developed at the headquarters had more than a merely theoretical bearing on the outcome of the war.

While the headquarters staff was changed almost in its entirety three times during 1944, the Army continued without interruption its task of preparing hundreds of thousands of troops for overseas combat.



HISTORY OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE COMMAND

Departure of the old Fourth Army staff--now the staff of the new Fifteenth Army-- and assumption of command of the Fourth Army by the augmentation group was announced by Brigadier General Laurence B. Keiser, Chief of Staff, at a meeting of the old and new staff groups on 26 August 1944.¹

General Keiser explained that, while the old staff members would move to a new location on Fort Sam Houston within a week, they would remain available for a time to acquaint the augmentation staff with all phases of operations and Army Ground Forces policy. He directed the submission of recommendations to rid the augmentation of any undesirable officers or enlisted men.

He outlined General Lucas's policies as follows:

1. Discipline is the foundation of all military success and organization.
2. Every effort must be made, in planning training, to profit by the lessons learned in combat operations.
3. All sections must work through their respective G Sections with no officer giving any order in the Commanding General's name except through the General Staff Section concerned.
4. All training should be conducted with normal combat support units. In division tests, divisions should have attached tank battalions, TD battalions, AA automatic weapons battalions and chemical mortar battalions.
5. In combat problems each unit must fire all weapons with which it is equipped.
6. Training schedules must be adhered to.
7. Fourth Army staff must "check, supervise and then check and supervise again and again and follow up to see that deficiencies have been corrected".
8. Inspection reports should be confined largely to deficiencies noted, with only outstanding good points included.
9. Greatest importance must be attached to the maintenance of all classes of equipment.
10. Every effort must be made to pare down excess documents and files in Army Headquarters.

* * *

The new Fourth Army staff took over at a time when the Allied armies were driving the Germans back to the borders of the Reich. The demand for more combat troops was increased greatly and it was up to the new staff to see that the many units being alerted for shipment were properly prepared and equipped for combat. Fourth Army inspection teams were on the road constantly, going from camp to camp checking alerted units.

At the time, Fourth Army was supplying at least half the combat units shipping from this country.

In the midst of this busy period word was received from Army Ground Forces headquarters, 12 September, that the area and units under Fourth Army control were to be expanded immediately.²

While the XXIII Corps, which had been stationed at Camp Bowie, Texas, was moved to Fort McPherson, Georgia, where it came under control of the Second Army, the XXXVI Corps and Second Army units at Fort Riley, Kansas, Camp Carson, Colorado; Camp McCoy,

Wisconsin, Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, were assigned to Fourth Army.

This change, effective 18 September, brought four new divisions under Fourth Army control -- the 16th Armored at Chaffee, the 42nd Infantry at Gruber, the 70th Infantry at Wood, and the 76th Infantry at McCoy.

Fourth Army took under its direct control the following units which had been under the XXIII Corps: 10th Light and 13th Armored Divisions; remaining elements of the 92nd, 99th and 103rd Infantry Divisions, and Corps-type troops at Camps Barksley, Bowie, Hood and Swift. Corps-type troops at Camps Maxey, Howze and Robinson were assigned to the XXXVI Corps.

On 5 October the 8th Armored Division and the 63rd Infantry Division and Corps-type troops at Camps Polk, Livingston and Van Dorn came directly under Fourth Army. On 6 October Corps-type units at Camp Robinson were relieved from assignment to the XXI Corps and assigned to the XXXVI Corps.³

Because of previous experience in operating without Corps, it was not difficult to readjust administrative problems resulting from withdrawal of the XXIII Corps. As in the past Fourth Army worked through its Special Troops headquarters at the various camps. Special Troops commanders obtained necessary files and data on units attached to them from XXIII Corps and Second Army supplied Fourth Army with similar data.

When Second Army turned over its Status of Training reports on units being transferred, it was decided that new Status of Training reports would not be required until a scheduled training inspection was held or until changes in movement status made a new report necessary.⁴ In this way the transfer was made with a minimum of disruption.

General Lucas and members of his staff immediately left on a flying tour of the new camps which had extended the Fourth Army area north to Wisconsin and west to Colorado.

Second Army notified Fourth Army on 18th September that four of the six Second Army camps coming under Fourth Army jurisdiction were scheduled to close during the next four months.⁵ Only Fort Riley and Camp Gruber were to remain open indefinitely.

As events were to prove, Fourth Army was on the verge of a great decline in troop strength. From a total of 265,636 officers and men under its jurisdiction on 1 October, 1944, troop strength was to fall to only 32,659 by 1 June, 1945, eight months later.⁶

This resulted, of course, from the departure, on overseas movements, of a total of 14 divisions and many separate units during the space of five months.⁷

The division departure dates were as follows:

9th Armored Division, 15 Aug 44.
84th Infantry Division, 13 Sep 44.
99th Infantry Division, 19 Sep 44.
12th Armored Division, 13 Sep 44.
92nd Infantry Division, 23 Sep 44.
103rd Infantry Division, 30 Sep 44.
8th Armored Division, 1 Nov 44.
76th Infantry Division, 30 Nov 44.
70th Infantry Division, 23 Dec 44.
42nd Infantry Division, 24 Dec 44.
10th Mountain Division, 28 Dec 44.

63rd Infantry Division, 30 Dec 44.
13th Armored Division, 18 Jan 45.
16th Armored Division, 28 Jan 45.

In an eight months period 11 Fourth Army camps were closed, as follows:⁸

Camp Claiborne, 15 Jun 44.
Camp McCain, 21 Aug 44.
Camp Carson, 30 Sep 44.
Camp Howze, 31 Oct 44.
Camp Livingston, 30 Nov 44.
Camp McCoy, 1 Dec 44.
Camp Robinson, 20 Dec 44.
Fort Leonard Wood, 31 Dec 44.
Camp Maxey, 6 Jan 45.
Camp Van Dorn, 8 Jan 45.
Camp Chaffee, 20 Feb 45.
Fort Huachuca, 22 Apr 45.
Fort Riley, 31 May 45.

* * *

In a memorandum of 5 Oct 44, the Special Troops commanders at the 13 posts where the Army then had troops in training were designated as direct representatives of General Lucas, functioning as staff officers of the Fourth Army.⁹ The purpose of the memorandum was "that Commanders may receive immediately information necessary to the accomplishment of efficient training of troops, to expedite the processing of routine administrative matters requiring action by a general officer, and to offset the resultant delay caused by the great distances and inadequate communication facilities between units and Fourth Army headquarters."

The change not only gave Special Troops headquarters the maximum amount of jurisdiction over the troops they were training for final Army Ground Forces and War Department inspections, but also cut down time-consuming paper work.

To assure greater efficiency in preparing alerted units for their final inspections by War Department teams, Fourth Army during November made an extensive revision of its inspection procedures.¹⁰

First, a special directive designed to remedy errors immediately was issued. It delineated particular responsibilities of inspection teams and called attention to deficiencies which experience had shown needed minute and thorough checking. Second, a carefully drafted, long-range program for permanently strengthening inspection team technique was published. This extensively overhauled old methods and provided, basically, for more carefully organized and better controlled inspection teams. It required each team to go minutely over its plans and to study beforehand individual problems facing the units to be inspected.

* * *

A conference of all Special Troops commanders with Fourth Army staff officers was called by General Lucas for 29 December, 1944. At the day-long conference, held at Fort Sam Houston, better utilization of manpower and conservation of equipment were the subjects stressed most frequently in a series of addresses by chiefs of staff sections.¹¹

"The stream of replacements has now been diverted from our units to fill more urgent overseas requirements," Col. L. M. Skerry, Army G-1, said.¹² "Hence we are faced with

problem of utilizing every man who can render service.

"Discharges and transfers of personnel to the Army Air Forces must be carefully watched to insure that we let no man escape who can be used in one of our units. We have too many able-bodied men performing administrative duties which could be filled by men with lower physical capacities.

"There have been too many instances recently in which unqualified personnel have been transferred from low to high priority units within the Fourth Army."

Col. Skerry said some Special Troops commanders had not been using the authority given them in October to make transfers to equalize strength between units and had failed to train enough specialists to meet their requirements.

Col. Paul Steele, Army G-4, said it had become apparent, from information received from theaters of operations, "that our men have not been indoctrinated sufficiently with the supply and maintenance training received in the Zone of the Interior".¹³

"Officers returning from overseas report wastage of food on a large scale, lack of emphasis on the necessity for conservation, illegal sale of Government property by sale or barter with civilians, disregarding of instructions relative to equipment of all types, etc.," he said.

"The importance of carrying out instructions about care, conservation and maintenance of their own clothing and equipment, and the materiel they use, must be brought home emphatically to every individual."

Col. Steele said Fourth Army vehicle deadline had improved during the previous six months and that stock vehicle pools in every camp had been reduced to minimum requirements. He said operational support by Ordnance units had to be discontinued as of 1 December 1944, except where such operation would could be considered as training of the unit.

He said there had been several cases of troops abandoning Post, Camp and Station property upon moving out of a camp.

"It is the duty of the Senior Tactical headquarters to see that all units dispose of this class of property properly and that buildings are left in a clean, sanitary condition," he said. "Where personal attention by the commander has developed a high state of supply and maintenance discipline, the problem of changes in key supply personnel will be greatly reduced."

In the closing address of the conference, General Lucas urged the importance of giving tactical explanations for all phases of training.¹⁴

"Let us always try to thoroughly orient our men," he said. "It's rather silly to bring a man out and give him a battle problem and not brief him on the background. Men don't fight without knowing something about the situation. Tell him everything you can about the Germans or Japs. Please try to have a sound tactical reason for every problem and for everything he is forced to do.

"I hope that in instruction on the Close Combat Course you will try to make it as realistic as possible. Don't make your training too fast. Don't rush them through a program in 20 minutes when that program should take five hours.

"I think too many men in our units are barracks-bound. I go to see them in the field and things are muddy and dirty. They haven't cleaned the machine guns and the

105 mm guns. There is mud all over the place. I ask them what they are going to do about it and they say: 'Sir, we're going back in tomorrow morning and we're going to clean it up when we get back to the barracks.'

"What the hell are we going to do in battle if we don't change that attitude? We must make them live like soldiers, not like dirty, filthy animals. They will get dirty and filthy enough without trying to do it. So I want you to watch those things closely.

"If the soldier is not taught now and under present conditions to maintain his equipment in the very best possible shape in which it can be maintained, the damn stuff won't be worth three hoots in hell after it has been in battle for five minutes.

"We have talked a lot about equipment discipline today. The men have got to be taught to take care of their personal equipment, their rifles and machine guns, no matter what exertion it takes on their part.

"Also this hoarding of equipment, then throwing it away rather than turning it in, is a serious matter. Some of the things we have found are remarkable. One unit was ahead one medium tank so they hid it out in the woods. That is an indication of a fundamental lack of disciplinary training in a unit. You wouldn't throw it away if it belonged to you, personally, yet it does belong to them personally. They have got to be made to see it.

"I know you think I am paying too much attention to housekeeping and not enough, perhaps, to training. Housekeeping, however, indicates the discipline of an organization and the training of disciplined soldiers is a comparatively simple problem. The training of an undisciplined mob is an impossibility for anyone.

"If I find a dirty kitchen I know the company commander hasn't been in to look at it for some time. Or that if he was there, he was too damned scared of the mess sergeant to make him straighten the place up and that he has lost control of the men in this unit.

"That is more important to me than the kitchen being dirty.

"I want you to have a conference periodically with your unit commanders. You may learn something from them. They should learn something from you. In any case you get to know each other. I think all the troubles we have had in our training of units can be traced back to lack of command supervision. Responsibility for that rests almost entirely upon your shoulders.

"We have young captains and lieutenance who don't know what it is all about. It is not their fault. Most of them are too young. It is up to us, the older officers, to keep on the job 24 hours a day and see that the younger officers learn these things.

"I want you to remember that the Reclassification Board is not a court. Things that officers do for which they should be court martialed should not be put up before a reclassification board. Don't punish a man because he is dumb. Punish him because he deliberately does something wrong.

"Also I want to stop this white-washing of officers who have done the same thing that an enlisted man has done. Why should some private do one thing and get five years and an officer doing virtually the same thing get merely a \$50 fine?

"I want pressure brought to bear to see that justice is done. It is worse for an officer to commit a crime than it is of an enlisted man. The officer has more responsibility and is supposed to set an example for the men.

"I want you to know that I appreciate the difficulties of your jobs. We take a division commander and give him a perfectly organized unit--one with which we are familiar and for which he has a well-organized and large staff. Then we organize a different unit, maybe twice as large, composed of all colors and every type of company and gadget that we thought we ought to have. We give him a small staff, a staff that is not well organized, then we expect him to run it, and do it perfectly.

"It has been a great pleasure to have you here, gentlemen. I am very fond of you personally and very proud of you officially."

As of 1 January 1945, the Southern Defense Command became the Southwestern Sector, Eastern Defense Command. Liaison between the Fourth Army and the defense command remained unaffected by the change.¹⁵ The same was true when the defense command was once more reconstituted, 15 May 1945, as the Southern Land Frontier, Eastern Defense Command.

Notified that XXXVI Corps would be relieved, about 10 January, of all corps units at Camps Chaffee, Gruber, Robinson and Fort Riley, and would move from Fort Riley to Camp Cooke, California, Fourth Army headquarters and Special Troops headquarters at Camp Chaffee, Camp Gruber and Fort Riley prepared to take over responsibility for inspection, training and administration of corps units as of 5 January.¹⁶

Charged instructions, however, moved the Corps, not to California but to Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. The advance detachment, already in California, was recalled. Army and Special Troop headquarters, which had taken over administration and certain tests, as of 5 January, returned records and administrative responsibility to Corps headquarters, in its new location, as of 16 January.¹⁷

By February 1945, redeployment training was looming as Fourth Army's principal future job. At this time the Army's strength had fallen to only about 70,000 officers and men, compared with a strength of more than 400,000 the preceding May, and the downward trend was continuing.¹⁸ The last complete divisions trained under Army supervision had shipped overseas and the principal remaining units, in six Special Troops headquarters, were field artillery and engineers.

"The fact that the infantry training regiments we have been using are now being moved into replacement and school commands indicates that only individual replacements will not be trained and Fourth Army no longer will prepare new or re-designated units for overseas service," Colonel Donald U. Galloway, Deputy Chief of Staff, said in an interview.¹⁹

"Although we have received no specific directive, it appears our job in the future will be the re-training and re-equipping of troops coming home from the European Theater.

"We expect that when a unit returning from Europe hits the port of debarkation, every man in the company save one or two, will be given an immediate 30 day furlough to his home. The remaining men will take the company's records to the outfit's new station in the Fourth Army area.

"When the records arrive our Inspector General will take them over for checking and the remaining company men will proceed on furlough. At the end of their furloughs the companies will proceed to their new stations and then we will begin the re-training and re-equipping of these units for further service in the Pacific area."

The temporary lull in Fourth Army activities was emphasized by an Army Ground Forces order directing a reduction in the officer personnel of Army headquarters to 153 officers by 1 March and to 111 officers by 1 May.²⁰

"In view of the reduced activities in your command and the urgent need for certain categories of officers, it is desired that a reduction of officer personnel be instituted to bring the actual overall strength of your headquarters to 153 officers by 1 March 1945 and to 111 Officers by 1 May 1945," the letter said.

"This reduction is temporary and in the event the redeployment program is placed in effect, or unforeseen circumstances arise, reduction of officer strength will be discontinued and assignments will be made to bring your headquarters to authorized strength."

The letter asked that priority, in release, be given company grade officers, especially infantry and armored. It directed that released officers be used, as far as practicable, in Fourth Army units and that those not so assigned be reported to Army Ground Forces headquarters for assignment.

Fourth Army's constant campaign to improve its inspection procedures showed results in April when tabulations of units inspected by War Department Inspector General for overseas movement, during the first quarter of the year, showed that only three of the 77 Fourth Army units inspected during the period had failed to pass.²¹ This was the best record for the period of any of Army Ground Forces subordinate commands.

May brought the end of the European phase of the war and a speeding up of plans for redeployment training. Fourth Army headquarters personnel assembled in the Quadrangle the afternoon of 8 May, V-E Day, to hear a brief address by General Lucas.²²

"This is a day for rejoicing but not for celebration," General Lucas, whose command of the Fourth Army had not been publicly announced until the previous month,²³ said. "There is still a hard fight ahead. Our task is but half done. We cannot relax our efforts until Japan has been utterly defeated."

A comprehensive new training memorandum, revising training to fit the new one-front war situation, was issued 1 June.²⁴ "All training will be planned and conducted with the objective of preparing specifically for operations against Japan," the memorandum said.

Fourth Army Special Troops commanders were called to Army headquarters for another conference, 18 June, on the complex arrangements for redeployment.²⁵

"We must have the greatest efficiency in handling these units coming back and it is not going to be easy," General Lucas told the group. "It means that you commanders and every member of your staff must display the greatest energy and personal effort in this job."

At the conference General Kaiser recommended a reorganization of the staff of Special Troops headquarters to improve efficiency and meet the anticipated loss of key personnel at the critical redeployment period.

Colonel H. O. Cushman, Army G-3, presented the forecast of units expected to sail from the European and Mediterranean Theaters during June and July for Fourth Army camps.

The complicated procedures for the reception and initial processing of redeployed units of various types were covered exhaustively in Fourth Army memoranda issued during June.²⁶ As of 24 June, Fourth Army lost its last subordinate Corps headquarters when XXXVI Corps headquarters moved from Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, to Camp Callan, California.²⁷ The 86th Infantry Division, returning from the European Theater for redeployment training, and all units assigned to the Corps at Camp Gruber were released as of midnight 23 June. All were assigned to the Fourth Army and all except the 86th Division were attached to 25th Headquarters, Special Troops, at Camp Gruber.



Taking advantage of cover along highway 611, 3.2 miles north of Mt. Carmel. (This was typical of entire battalion in this situation. Troops are on both sides of road).

As plans progressed for redeployment of large numbers of troops through Fourth Army camps, Special Troops headquarters which had closed were reactivated at several camps as follows:²⁸

- 16th Special Troops Headquarters at Camp Chaffee, 10 June 45.
- 17th Special Troops Headquarters at Fort Leonard Wood, 25 June.
- 31st Special Troops Headquarters at Camp Van Dorn, 25 June.
- 33rd Special Troops Headquarters at Camp Carson, 1 August.
- 34th Special Troops Headquarters at Camp Howze, 10 August.

Again, for the second quarter of 1945, Fourth Army had the best record of any AGF training organization.²⁹ Only two of the 45 Fourth Army units inspected during the quarter were found "not ready" by War Department inspectors.

With its duties increasing rapidly, following the comparatively slack spring period, Fourth Army headquarters at this time was authorized again to fill up to its T/O allowance of officers.³⁰ By 1 September, 1945, the officer strength of Army headquarters had again become 230 assigned officers.³¹

On 24 July, Lieutenant-General Alexander M. Patch, who had commanded the Seventh Army in its drive through France and Germany, assumed command of the Fourth Army.³² General Lucas became deputy commanding general.³³

On 25 July General Patch addressed all officers of Fourth Army headquarters on the Quadrangle lawn.³⁴ General Patch said he did not believe in making staff changes "merely for the sake of making changes" and that no changes would be made until he had had a chance thoroughly to familiarize himself with his new command.

"I have discussed with General Lucas his theories of staff procedure and find we are in complete accord," he said. "Therefore you will carry on as in the past."

General Patch, one of the outstanding troop commanders of the war, received his second Oak Leaf Cluster, in lieu of a third Distinguished Service Medal, three days before assuming his new command.

General Patch commanded American forces in New Caledonia in early 1942 and then commanded the composite forces -- Army, Navy and Marine Corps -- operating in the Solomon Islands.³⁵

After the liberation of Guadalcanal he was transferred to the European Theater where he commanded the Seventh Army from the invasion of Southern France until the end of the war.

* * *

The first division to begin redeployment training in this country was the 86th (Blackhawk) Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Harris M. Melasky, which began training at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, 1 August 1945, under Fourth Army supervision.

The division, which had been under command of the Seventh Army for a brief period in Germany, was visited 2 August by General Patch. Addressing officers and non-commissioned officers of the division, General Patch said:³⁶

"I want to impress upon you the unusual importance, in your particular case, of everyone doing a good job -- a superior job.

"In the first place your redeployment training period here will symbolize, for the civilian public, the Army's entire redeployment training program. In the second place it is possible your division will be among the first of the redeployed divisions to reach the Pacific Theater. Your performance -- all the way through -- will be a measuring stick and a guide for all the divisions that will follow you.

"Our job here, during the next few weeks, is, first, to bring these troops back to peak fighting condition and, second, to give them special training to meet combat conditions in the Pacific which are different from those in Europe.

"I am not so concerned about the second part of the job. In many respects -- amphibious operations, jungle terrain, closer quarter fighting -- conditions in the Pacific will be quite different than those in Europe. But you will have well qualified instructors to give you excellent training in how to meet those new conditions.

"The essentials for defeating Japan will be exactly the same as those for beating Germany. The Pacific War, whatever the terrain or enemy tactics, will be won, as the European War was won, by, 1, the technical skill, 2, the stamina and 3, the fighting heart of the individual soldier. None of these three things is new or strange to you men from the European Theater.

"The first of these three vital factors -- skill in the use of weapons -- and the second -- stamina -- will be rebuilt in the division as a matter of course, during the present training program. The third and most important factor -- the fighting heart -- is something that does not follow so naturally -- something we have to work constantly to create and maintain.

"Responsibility for this third factor falls, perhaps more than on anyone else, the non-commissioned officers and the company grade officers -- the officers who from day to day and hour to hour set the personal example for their men.

"It boils down to the same old question of leadership. The soldier is far more inspired by the example set him by his officers than by any argument out of a book.

"If the officers and non-commissioned officers of a unit are willing to work for their men to the limit of their strength. If they constantly set an example of high morale and determination and cheerfulness. Then I am not going to worry about that unit not having the fighting heart."

Four days after General Patch's visit word was received that the 86th Division's elaborately planned redeployment training program would be suspended immediately and the division would leave, 11 and 12 August, for a West Coast port of embarkation.³⁷

Plans that had been made for an elaborate ceremony on 10 August, welcoming the division to Oklahoma, to be attended by Undersecretary of War Robert L. Patterson, General Jacob L. Devers, Army Ground Forces commander, and General Patch, were cancelled.

This was a historic week which saw Japanese resistance collapse suddenly. On 6 August the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan was announced. On 8 August the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics enter the war. On 10 August the first hints of imminent Japanese surrender were heard from Tokyo and on 14 August Japan announced acceptance of the Potsdam surrender terms.

Advance detachments of other divisions, corps and separate units were arriving at various Fourth Army camps for redeployment. By early September three divisions had assembled: the 8th Infantry Division at Fort Leonard Wood; the 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Swift, and the 44th Infantry Division at Camp Chaffee.³⁸ The first detachments,

with records, of the 10th Mountain Division and the 45th Infantry Division had arrived at Camps Carson and Bowie respectively.

Total strength of the Army, as of 1 September, 1945, was 110,013 officers and men compared with only 30,388 on 1 June, 1945.³⁹

The 91st and 35th Infantry Division, originally scheduled to go to Camps Howze and Van Dorn, respectively, for redeployment training, were reassigned to Second Army camps prior to arrival.⁴⁰ The 34th Special Troops headquarters at Camp Howze, consequently, was discontinued 27 August and the 31st Special Troops Headquarters at Camp Van Dorn on 15 September.

The III Corps assembled at Camp Polk 21 August and took over supervision of the 2nd and 45th Infantry Divisions.⁴¹ The VIII Corps assembled at Camp Bowie 24 September.

Of all the divisions redeployed through Fourth Army Camps only the 86th Infantry Divisions had moved on to the Pacific Theater. What the future of the remaining redeployed units would be remained in doubt pending the working out of demobilization plans.

CHAPTER II

TRAINING

The new Fourth Army staff took over at a time when all-out offensive operations in Europe were causing ever-increasing demands for the shipment of more combat troops from training areas.

The training problem thus created in Fourth Army camps was described in a message, 9 Sep 44, from the Fourth Army G-3 to all subordinate Corps and Special Troops headquarters.¹

"It is apparent," the memorandum said in part, "that the next two months will require extraordinary effort by your headquarters in the preparation of units for overseas shipment. Reports of senior inspecting officers continue to indicate that the Commanding General's standard is not being reached.

"It is vital that you insure that your subordinate unit commanders know how to plan their training, that they study the POM requirements so that they may have their records properly prepared at all times, that they are taught how to direct and organize their administrative work.

"Units undergoing field training must be inspected not only during the day but late at night, during the night and in the early morning. Training schedules must be prepared and rigidly adhered to. You must permit units to keep only the minimum overhead from active participation in training. There must be no clock-punching either in your headquarters or in your subordinate units. Demand increasingly high standards."

Because of the increasing number of units being alerted for shipment overseas, Fourth Army was ordered, in mid-September, to cancel plans for maneuvers in the Louisiana maneuver area.² LAMA was closed following completion of the XXI Corps CPX maneuvers on 22 September. Fourth Army personnel serving at LAMA were returned to Fort Sam Houston, many of them being re-assigned to subordinate units and to Army Ground Forces.

Thus the Louisiana Maneuver Area, the great simulated battleground where almost every unit in combat had gone through the closest approximation to real battle, closed and began reverting to the quiet Louisiana hill and swampland that it was before the national emergency approached.

Upon word that the Louisiana maneuvers were cancelled, the Fourth Army, in accordance with ACF instructions, immediately laid down plans for divisional maneuvers that would give the various divisions smaller scale problems.³ Seven Fourth Army divisions were scheduled to stage comprehensive division maneuvers between 15 October and 8 December. All divisions were to spend four weeks continuously in the field in the vicinity of their permanent stations.

Officers of the old Fourth Army (re-designated the Fifteenth Army) and experts from the LAMA staff assisted division commanders in planning the maneuvers. Each division was to be provided with proper supporting units such as tank battalions, chemical mortar companies and tactical air units. Each maneuver problem was to be two-sided with the division, reinforced but minus one combat team or combat command, opposed by one combat team or combat command. Tactical air play was to be brought into the problem during the third or fourth week.

As it turned out, few of the seven planned maneuvers were held.

Because of the urgent need for infantry units overseas Army Ground Forces informed Fourth Army on 13 October that the infantry regiments of four divisions under the Army would be moved overseas as soon as possible, with other infantry division components, such as artillery, signal, medical, etc., to follow later.⁴

Four of the proposed division maneuvers were cancelled immediately. Successful maneuvers were held by the 13th and 16th Armored Divisions but the 76th Infantry Division maneuvers were suspended after two weeks as the division's shipping date was advanced.⁵

Increased emphasis was placed on orientation programs throughout the Army during October.⁶ Working on the time-proved theory that a well-informed soldier is a better fighter, Fourth Army ordered intensification of the Orientation program. In its training memorandum on the subject, the Army declared that Orientation was "an integral part of training" and "a command responsibility".

Short daily orientation meetings and a one-hour conference each Saturday were ordered to prepare Fourth Army soldiers mentally as well as physically for battle. Stress was placed on the significance of world and domestic events to enable the soldier better to realize what he was fighting for. Inspection teams were ordered to watch the program closely. Orientation was under the Information & Education subsection of G-3, having been moved there in the early fall from the Special Service Section.

The Close Combat Course program was revised during October to incorporate the "buddy system."⁷ Heretofore men had gone through the combat course as individuals, shooting at targets as they appeared and paying only cautionary attention to other soldiers going through the course. Under the buddy system the men worked in two teams of two men each, one man of each team moving forward while the other covered him. Purpose of the system was to teach the men "mutual combat support in working together as a team and to develop confidence in each other and in the capabilities of the team."

A change was made in the Army Ordnance set-up to promote unit training and reduce stockages of parts.⁸ The former system under which third and fourth echelon parts were consolidated and held by each operating battalion or separate Ordnance company was revised so that each operating company held its own third and fourth echelon parts. The same memorandum limited vehicular replacement pools to 100 vehicles of all types. The previous lack of limitation on the size of the pools had made some of them of almost uncontrollable size.

On 17 October Fourth Army added a new section to its headquarters--the Air-Ground Liaison Section.⁹ The need for the closest kind of cooperation between ground and air troops, particularly in the employment of close-in tactical air support, had been demonstrated overseas and the War Department ordered an Air-Ground liaison group as an organic part of army, corps and division staffs.

The mission of this special Staff Section was to "advise the commanders upon the technique of air-ground teamwork and maintain liaison between ground units and the various cooperation air units".

The new section, composed of eight officers and 20 enlisted men, became an operating part of Fourth Army 21 November, under Major Edgar S. Sanders. The section was composed of officers who had had special training in ground-air cooperation, not Air Corps officers.

The Tenth Light Division, newest division in the Fourth Army, was redesignated the 10th Mountain Division on 29 October.¹⁰ The division, at Camp Swift, Texas, immediately began reorganizing under its new T/O and T/E.

The training directive on Anti-Aircraft artillery training was changed in November.¹¹ The change was necessitated by the increased use of AA gun battalions as supporting artillery fire. Gun battalions were given an additional two to four weeks training in order to permit firing on ground targets under Field Artillery supervision.

A new policy also was inaugurated in training AA machine gunners of units other than Anti-Aircraft Artillery--such as men assigned to AA machine guns in such combat units as quartermaster truck companies which had the weapons as part of their organic equipment.¹²

Prior to Fourth Army taking over troops at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Fort Riley, Kansas, all machine gunners, other than those in AA units, had been sent to Fort Bliss or Camp Hulen, both in Southern Texas, for AA training.

On 30 October troops at the three Northern camps were authorized to conduct their machine gun firing at home stations because of their isolation from the Texas school.

The machine gun school at Camp Hulen was closed 15 November and, as of that date, all Special Troops headquarters were authorized to conduct their AA machine gun training at home stations. However, they were encouraged to send their gunners to Fort Bliss whenever possible. The Fort Bliss School was closed 3 February 1945, and thereafter all machine gun training and firing was conducted at home stations.

To improve intelligence functions in units without an S-2, Fourth Army issued a memorandum setting forth the training and duties of Intelligence officers in that type unit.¹³ The memorandum set forth the combat and non-combat duties of such officers and established an SOP for them.

As a result of reports from the combat zones, Fourth Army ordered more emphasis on night training.¹⁴ A training memorandum required at least six hours a week of night work during individual training and eight hours a week during unit training. The memorandum ordered that "every opportunity will be taken to improve technique of night operations."

Another training memorandum set up an SOP for passive measures against the German S mine.¹⁵

Bridge and ferry experiments which helped the Allied crossing of the Rhine River in Germany a few months later, were begun by Fourth Army Engineer Corps units on the Sabine River in Louisiana in October. To continue the work on a river more closely resembling the Rhine in width and velocity, the experiments were transferred in December, to the Lower John Day Rapids in the Columbia River, two miles east of Rufus, Oregon.¹⁶

A Provisional Engineer Combat Group, commanded by Lt. Col. Rufus C. Carhart, was activated by Fourth Army 23 December.¹⁷ It consisted of the 1687th Engineer Combat Battalion, the 558th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, the 590th Engineer Light Ponton Company and the 1490th Engineer Maintenance Company.

Experiments were with the new Bridge, Floating, M-4, a ponton-type with air-pocketed aluminum beams for the deck. The experiments culminated on 12 February when an 847 foot span was constructed in 10 hours in a water velocity of up to 10.4 feet per second.¹⁸ Lt. Col. George S. Witters, AGF representative who supervised the tests, said the 54 tons concentrated load carried was more than twice the weight carried by more cumbersome bridges used during the First World War.

Engineer School representatives visited the scene to obtain data for a technical bulletin and film bulletin on the M-4 bridge. Five officers and 20 enlisted men from the provisional combat group accompanied the first of the new bridges shipped to Europe.

During March the group tested an adaptation of a deck balk to the pneumatic float, made the first service test of a medium cableway, and experimented with ferrying the T26E1 tank in swift water. The camp was closed 11 April 1945.

In a January memorandum, increased emphasis on Special Service activities in all Fourth Army camps was ordered.¹⁹ All units down to company level were directed to designate qualified personnel as Special Service officers and to train personnel with talents as entertainers to "insure Special Service self-sufficiency overseas."

Maintenance of equipment standards were improved at all Fourth Army camps by a series of Maintenance Demonstrations held at each Special Troops Headquarters during January, 1945, under the direction of the Army G-4.^{19a}

All types of Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Corps materiel were displayed to demonstrate the maintenance standards required by Army headquarters. Duplicate items were displayed, one to show the major deficiencies observed in Fourth Army units and the other to show proper maintenance.

Also displayed were proper methods of storing spare parts as well as proper lubricants, cleaning and preserving materials. All officers, motor sergeants, supply sergeants, mechanics and drivers attended. The best displays were photographed and the photographs used as permanent illustrations of proper maintenance.

The demonstrations, together with the work of Army Ordnance maintenance teams, resulted in a considerable improvement in maintenance conditions throughout Fourth Army units during 1945.

Between the last quarter of 1944 and the second quarter of 1945, the average number of deficiencies per vehicle was reduced from 7.4 to 4.5 and the number per artillery piece from 2.48 to 2.4. During both quarters the average numbers of deficiencies per small arms and instruments was considerably less than one.

Whereas in August, 1944, vehicle disability within the Fourth Army was 5.9 per cent, by the end of the war, a year later, it had been reduced to zero.

This was accomplished by the establishment of a vehicle working stock. All vehicles out of use for more than three days were transferred to the vehicle working stock from which other vehicles were issued. Thus vehicles in the hands of Fourth Army units were always in serviceable condition. Vehicles transferred to working stock were processed and reissued.

Beginning in February, Fourth Army's major training job became planning for redeployment training, which is treated in a separate chapter of this history.

This did not mean, however, that the problems of undeployed troops still in training were slighted.

Better to coordinate training, Fourth Army, during February, made the Air-ground Liaison Section a division of the G-3 Section.²⁰ The newly designated division became responsible for obtaining high performance aircraft for air-ground tests, long range artillery adjustment firing and similar exercises.

Individual returnees, as distinguished from troops redeployed by units, already had become numerous at all Fourth Army Camps. Receiving complaints from Army Ground Forces that in many cases, returned battle-experienced soldiers had been required to go through the infiltration course and otherwise been trained alongside inexperienced replacements in basic training, Fourth Army made clear to Special Troops commanders that returned veterans were to be given special advanced training, not more time-killing basic training.²¹

"Commanders will insure that returned overseas personnel are given POM or POR credit based on combat experience comparable to training requirements of POM, POR and other instructions," the message said. "In the event that the service record, etc, of an individual does not bear out his statement as to his battle experience, he is to be given the advantage of the doubt within his apparent credibility."

Fourth Army passed on to its subordinate commands a "list of procedures found effective in promoting effective orientation of returnees," compiled by Army Ground Forces headquarters.²²

The letter recommended a personal conference between the returnee and his new commanding officer and a welcoming program, to include orientation as to what was expected of returnees and specific reasons why returnees must likely remain in service until final victory.

Recommended also were: liberal pass policy, comfortable quarters (and housing for families if possible), and press releases regarding veterans' experiences and decorations.

Recognition of returnees' combat experiences in training, utilization of veterans' battle experience at critiques, assignment of veterans according to their skills--if possible to units commanded by officers with battle experience--also were recommended.

Unit commanders were advised to instill in returnees the feeling that they set the pace for trainee performance and must participate in basic training to prepare those who would carry on overseas.

Encouraging the wearing of decorations and awarding combat decorations at appropriate ceremonies also were recommended.

A comprehensive new training memorandum, based on an extensive redeployment training program prepared by Hq ACF was issued 1 June.²⁶

"All training will be planned and conducted with the objective of preparing specifically for operations against Japan," the memorandum said. "Combat realism will be stressed during all tactical training. Technique only may be taught on the parade ground without a tactical situation; tactics or tactical formations always will be conducted on terrain under properly assumed tactical conditions.

"All men will be thoroughly worked into the situation, both friendly and enemy. Always fight the Jap. Everything that is done tactically must be done in the presence of the enemy, taking full account of his potentialities, his malicious cunning and deadliness. All positions occupied will be tactical and will be improved as time permits.

"Overhead will be reduced to an absolute minimum and rotated so that all personnel may receive necessary training. Garrison prisoners will be trained with their units daily.

"Tanks, tank destroyers, antiaircraft artillery, automatic weapons and mortar battalions will be attached to divisions so that combined combat firing and tactical exercises may be held. Communication and cooperation between the combined arms will be stressed.

"Training will be conducted generally under simulated battlefield conditions. Training will not be restricted by unnecessary safety precautions. Initiative will be encouraged to accomplish this objective."

Regarding the importance of redeployment training, the memorandum stated:

"It is essential that personnel of all ranks be impressed with the seriousness of the task in the Pacific and the vital importance to the war effort of the redeployment of combat experienced personnel. Such personnel will include many who may believe they have fulfilled their obligation to their country by their previous service, or who through justifiable pride in their achievements will be prone to view further training as unnecessary and harassing.

"It is incumbent, therefore, upon commanders of all echelons to present redeployment training with such enthusiasm, soleness of purpose and seriousness of intent that all personnel will realize its necessity.

"The training must be intensive, hard and thoroughly instructive. High standards of physical fitness must be reached and maintained. The highest degree of discipline and precision must be demanded.

"It is equally important, and conducive to good training, that all personnel returning for redeployment training be afforded adequate time for recreation, mental relaxation and renewal of contacts with normal American life."

The memorandum contained separate, detailed instructions covering the training of undeployed, redeployed and converted units and casual detachments.

It also contained instructions covering special battle and camouflage training, infiltration course, combat-in-cities course and camouflage demonstration practice area.

In July organization was announced of replacement battalions at Fort Leonard Wood and Camps Bowie, Chaffee and Polk, to house service type replacements for both undeployed and redeployed units and for certain arms replacements subject to AGF call.²⁷ In May Army Ground Forces had notified Fourth Army of a plan to accumulate pools of trained or potential specialists with MOS qualifications expected to be critical in service type units and to attach about 600 to each Special Troops headquarters.²⁸ Under the revised plan replacement battalions were organized at only four camps, but camps without replacement battalions were authorized if necessary to organize provisional storage battalions or companies.

Fourth Army suggested separating the various types of replacements by platoons, according to branch of service and ordered stress during the first two weeks on the POR qualifications of all storage personnel. MOS training was to be given to the greatest possible extent. Not more than 10 percent of the replacement personnel was to be used for overhead.

A memorandum consolidating "policies and procedures pertaining to the maintenance and supply of Fourth Army units" stressed the importance of training in tactical supply procedure.²⁹

This memorandum stated: "In order to obtain maximum benefits in training field forces in realistic theater of operations supply procedures, tactical channels of supply are emphasized."

"Every opportunity will be utilized to practice theater supply procedures to the maximum whenever tactical supply channels can be made available.

"It is realized that use of tactical supply units may be less efficient or less convenient. However the training value, both to using and service units, outweighs such inconveniences. Adequate, competent and constant supervision is essential to prevent loss of efficiency."

CHAPTER III

INSPECTIONS

"The only manner in which this headquarters can be thoroughly familiar with the status of units; exercise adequate supervision of their administration, supply and training; and institute the corrective action required to bring the units to the desired standards of efficiency is by command and staff visits of inspection".

The above quotation, from a Fourth Army Staff Memorandum, indicates the importance placed, in this training army, on staff inspections.¹

No other phase of staff work received more attention and, during busy periods of heavy overseas movement, half or more of the entire officer personnel of Fourth Army headquarters was on the road constantly, inspecting and testing.

Frequent revisions were made in inspection policies and practices to correct deficiencies and achieve the highest possible standard of accuracy and thoroughness.

All this work brought visible results during the year.

Briefly, the story was this:

During the last six months of 1944 the results of War Department inspections to determine the readiness of units for overseas movement were--in the words of General Lucas--"unsatisfactory."

However, during the first six months of 1945, Fourth Army had the best record in this respect of any Army Ground Forces command.

Specifically the results were as follows:

During the third quarter of 1944, 11 of the 73 Fourth Army units inspected were found "not ready."

During the last quarter of the year, 13 of 97 units inspected were "not ready," making a 14 percent failure for the last six months of the year.⁴

For the first three months of 1945, however, only three of the 77 units inspected failed to pass⁵ and, during the second quarter of the year, only 2 of 45 units inspected,⁶ bringing the percentage of failures for the six months down to only 4 percent.

At one of the first conferences of the new team of Staff Section Chiefs, in October 1944, General L. B. Keiser, Chief of Staff, spoke critically of Fourth Army inspection procedures.⁷ He said that many inspectors concentrated too heavily on housekeeping and not enough on training. He said inspectors should avoid a "Skinning" attitude and consider themselves more as advisors and helpers.

"The sole purpose for the existence of any headquarters within the Fourth Army is to train and prepare units for overseas movement," he said. "This means that every phase of POM must be carefully observed and that no unit must fail to meet the assigned readiness date."

When results of War Department inspections during the third quarter of 1944 were received--showing a failure by 11 of the 73 units inspected--a staff conference was called immediately.

General Keiser pointed out at the conference that Fourth Army's record for the quarter was the poorest of any Army Ground Forces command.⁸

"The present staff of the Fourth Army cannot be held responsible for these figures but the present Fourth Army staff can and will be held responsible for the units inspected since 1 October," he said. "Thus far during the present quarter six units have been reported as not ready. At this rate we will exceed our bad record of last quarter. Such a condition will not be tolerated.

"We can explain this very readily by indicating that some of these units were supposed to be taken in current status of training; inaptitude or inexperience on the part of the War Department inspectors, and other similar alibis, but the fact remains that the Second Army, which had more units inspected, had practically no kickbacks.

"Neither can we hold the commanding officers of Special Troops or other Senior Tactical commanders entirely responsible. The greater part of the responsibility for supervision of training lies with the technical staff sections of this headquarters. These sections are not doing the job, and this statement is based on the fact that a number of letters, giving the results of inspection by Special Staff Officers, deal primarily with housekeeping and military courtesy.

"On several occasions such letter reports have been returned to Section Chiefs as unsatisfactory and for a statement of training or technical deficiencies or for constructive suggestions to improve training. In many instances the Section Chief has replied there were no training or technical deficiencies in the unit. Such a condition is not believed possible, even in a superior unit. Either your subordinates are not technically qualified or else they are lazy and find it more convenient to walk casually through the barracks and kitchens than to go out in the field and closely observe training and check on the qualifications of technical specialists."

General Keiser then directed the section chiefs to check on the qualifications of their staffs, holding night classes if necessary, and weed out incompetent men. He said that inspectors, in the future, should spend at least one or two days with each unit--if necessary several weeks at a camp or station--and make a complete report dealing primarily with training and technical proficiency.

He said at least 75 percent of the inspection time should be spent on training and correlated matters and not more than 25 percent on housekeeping. The inspecting officer must know exactly what he wished to check before leaving San Antonio, he said, and should write back a report of his day's work each night.

He said some key specialists should be given practical tests whenever possible and that inspectors should always check on the number of men excused from training for any reason.

General Keiser advised the section chiefs to cut their personnel work to a minimum and get up to 75 percent of their sections on the road at all times.

"Do not ask units for reports that are not required by Army Regulations, AGF or this General Staff," he said. "Obtain your information by and during your training inspections.

"We must get more thoroughness and detailed information and give assistance in preparing our units for their readiness dates. To do this we must be in the field. When units are poor or unsatisfactory we must stay with them for such time as may be necessary to assist them in correcting their deficiencies. Never leave a unit without correcting things that can be done on the spot."

A second staff conference concerning inspections was held on 18 November.⁹ Colonel D. H. Galloway, deputy Chief of Staff, announced a new plan for coordinating inspections more closely, with the Inspector General responsible for setting up the inspection schedule and integrating the membership of the teams. Separate inspections by the Inspector General and the various sections were to be replaced by minutely planned, closely coordinated and completely thorough inspections.

Colonel H. O. Cushman, assistant chief of staff G-3, explained to the conference the new plan for Alert for Movement inspections that had been issued in a memorandum 14 November, to go into effect 27 November.¹⁰

The memorandum made Corps responsible for the inspection of their attached and assigned units and Army responsible for all other inspections not delegated to Special Troops headquarters. The Inspector General was made responsible for checking administration, records, morale, housekeeping, etc., and the Staff Section for training matters and sufficiency of technical personnel.

Each Staff Section was directed to prepare comprehensive check lists on matters pertaining to their specialties and inspection teams were directed to meet each Saturday to determine team compositions and tasks for inspections two weeks thence.

"It is planned," the memorandum said, "that these inspections will be made in the same manner and with the same scope and thoroughness as those by the War Department Inspector General."

Colonel Cushman explained the inspections were to be made within the second week after a unit was alerted for movement overseas. The team would determine whether the unit would be ready by its "R" date. It would report on POM matters still uncompleted and whether the unit's deficiencies could be corrected in time.

"This is going to be strictly a team proposition," Colonel Cushman explained. "The entire inspection will be planned ahead of time--place and date, composition of team, and particular special items to be checked. At least one half day will be spent on each company or similar type unit. Each company will have a prepared status report and the team will check minutely to see if that status report is correct. Spot checks will be made of the correctness of MOS numbers. Tests will be as practical as possible. The plan will work and it is going to work."

Three days later, 21 November, in a first indorsement to an AGF publication giving detailed instructions on Inspector General reports on Preparation of Overseas Movement, Fourth Army required that its inspectors follow the same general inspection plans and use the same definitions on the readiness status of a unit.¹¹

The indorsement also required the Senior Tactical Commander of a unit undergoing inspection, or his representative, to be present when the AGF inspector made his oral report. If the inspector indicated a "not ready" report, the commander would report the deficiencies noted to Army headquarters immediately and state his reasons why the unit was "not ready." He would also take immediate steps to correct the deficiencies and report whether they would be made up by the "R" date.

Four more staff memoranda pertaining to inspections were issued by Fourth Army on 24 November. These memoranda completed the extensive overhauling of Army inspection procedures and the same day General Lucas called another staff conference to go over the new system.¹² The conference was attended by every section chief and every available officer and warrant officer.

"The number of unsatisfactory units in Fourth Army has reached serious proportions," General Lucas said. "Immediate action will be taken by everyone to remedy the situation. This is a relatively new staff but it has to begin functioning properly immediately. Time is desperate and short on some of these units.

"I'm tired of inefficient reports coming in. Staff sections have not been on the job. I can't see everything although I am out most of the time looking over Fourth Army troops. Disciplined organizations are functioning well. Discipline gives control. I want schools set up so the younger officers in this headquarters will know their duties when they go on inspection trips."

General Lucas then ordered that efficiency reports be submitted immediately on every officer and warrant officer in Fourth Army headquarters. "We are going to weed out the incompetents regardless of their rank or their previous records," he said.

The first of the four memoranda issued that day was a comprehensive document titled "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas Service."¹³

"Commanders of all echelons," it said, "must be impressed with the fact that preparation of a unit for overseas service is initiated with the activation of the unit and is a continuous operation during all phases of training. The importance of fully preparing the unit to completely meet all requirements for overseas service cannot be overemphasized."

The memorandum designated senior tactical commanders, outlined methods of notification when a unit was alerted, instructed Special Troops commanders to assist alerted units, set forth the procedure for procurement of clothing and equipment for alerted units, ordered that alert for movement inspections be held as soon as possible after receipt of the alert, and set forth detailed instructions concerning the conduct of such inspections. Attached to the memorandum were new model inspection forms.

In the second memorandum issued that day, Fourth Army detailed the procedure to be followed by the Headquarters staff in handling alert matters.¹⁴ The Deputy Chief of Staff was charged with coordinating the staff.

"A combined Training and Inspector General Inspection will be made of each unit not assigned or attached to a Corps as soon as possible after the unit has received Alert for Movement instructions," the memorandum said. The object of the inspection would be "to insure that deficiencies that might exist are corrected prior to the readiness date." This team was to be made up primarily of officers from Fourth Army headquarters, augmented by individual officers from Special Troops if needed. Special Staff Sections were made responsible for the training phases of the inspection and the Inspector General for administrative and records phases.

The Inspector General was required to furnish each staff section, each Thursday afternoon, a list of units to be inspected during the second following week, with an estimate of the number of officers required for the inspection at each station. Each Saturday morning a conference of Special staff sections was held to determine the composition of teams for the second following week.

At this meeting the Inspector General outlined plans for the inspections and a round table discussion was held. Names of officers who would participate in the inspection were submitted to the Inspector General by the following Wednesday. The team officer from the Inspector General's section held a meeting of the team prior to leaving Fort Sam Houston and again at the station prior to beginning the inspection.

In its broader aspects, these maneuvers had been valuable to separate arms. TD units had their first opportunity to apply their principles of Training Circular No. 88, published 24 June, just before the maneuvers opened. General Earnest, Commanding General, 1st TD Brigade, reported that the maneuvers had proved those principles "sound."²⁹⁷ Though there had been violations - especially in "digging in," thus nullifying mobility, one of TD's first necessities -- all commanders to which TD units had been attached had learned successfully the precepts of its primary and secondary missions.

Corps staffs, operating with from one to three divisions under their control, had reaped experience obtainable nowhere else.

Especially gratifying was the first large-scale participation of AA units - one brigade, four groups, nine battalions, and the 101st Barrage Balloon Battery (VLA). Six of the nine battalions were semi-mobile, and though this placed "an undesirable burden" on the mobile units to which they were attached,²⁹⁸ they performed creditably in most cases. The barrage balloon battery, participating in Louisiana maneuvers for the first time, served with the III Armored Corps, the X Corps, and with Army, and was used to supplement protection of supply installations, bridges, defiles, and river crossings. Pilots were so wary of its 2,000-foot high "sausages" that they gave installations it protected a wide berth. It was rated excellent in its performance of duties.

Air support, however, despite good performance in some phases, was still unsatisfactory.²⁹⁹ As for the second maneuver,³⁰⁰ there were insufficient planes and tactical personnel. The use of panels was found generally ineffective because of wooded terrain; smoke pots and colored smoke grenades, however, were used with some success.

At the close of the maneuvers, General Hodges rated the major unit as follows:

X Corps	-	Satisfactory
III Armored Corps	-	Excellent
31st Division	-	Excellent
88th Division	-	Excellent
95th Division	-	Satisfactory

AGF apparently concurred in these ratings. Before the maneuvers were over, it issued orders sending the 31st Division to Camp Pickett, Va., a customary last stop before overseas destination.³⁰¹ It sent the 88th Division, likewise outstanding, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for post-maneuver training, but on 13 October, the 88th likewise made ready for overseas destination.³⁰²

TRAINING IN THE THIRD ARMY

The high standards of discipline and performance which General Hodges had insisted upon in the maneuver area were only attainable, or at any rate were readily attainable, if the training of all units was rigidly controlled from its inception, or through ITP, UTP, Combined training, and for Divisions, the "D" exercises. Early measures were taken by the Army to bring about the desired uniformity of standards and the required control.

Sub-Headquarters:

At the time General Hodges assumed command, eleven sub-headquarters (Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Third Army) were in operation with average strength as follows:

Thus the composition, leadership and general policies concerning Fourth Army team inspections were tightened up, and better-planned and better-conducted inspections resulted.

The third memorandum of 24 November was a staff memorandum establishing an SOP for Alert For Movement Inspections and listing inspection responsibilities for all Headquarters personnel.¹⁵

Greatest responsibility was delegated to the Inspector General. An inclosure to the memorandum listed in detail the scope of inspections for each type of organization under Fourth Army and included a model inspection report form. All tests were to be conducted by questionnaire checksheets which experience had shown to be practical and thorough. The memorandum gave a complete breakdown of inspection duties.

The fourth and final memorandum published was on "Coordination of Testing Teams."¹⁶ This made the Army G-3 coordinator of all details connected with tests. It set up a Fourth Army Test and Inspection Liaison Officer with each Special Troops headquarters to facilitate inspections and tests at each camp. Chiefs of Staff Sections were ordered to submit to G-3 each Monday a report of training tests to be conducted during the second following week. On the basis of these reports direct arrangements were made with the liaison officers at the stations concerned.

Better to qualify Fourth Army Headquarters officers as inspectors, a school was set up at headquarters during December and January.¹⁷ All officers of the G-4 were required to attend and officers from all other sections were invited. Instructors were technical experts furnished by the various Special Staff Sections. Most of the instruction was practical demonstration. Classes covered the inspection of everything from water cans and gasoline lanterns to bulldozers and water purification sets.

In December section chiefs were directed to avoid sending individual officers on special inspection visits because "too frequent inspections interfere seriously with the training of units and with orderly and planned supervision." All visits and inspections, except those made by section chiefs or the Inspector General, were made subject to the approval of the Army G-3. It was provided that Army inspecting officers should visit units under Fourth Army headquarters and units attached to Special Troops headquarters monthly and units assigned or attached to a corps every two months.

A headquarters memorandum of 19 March implementing the new POM, Third Edition, stressed the importance of early preparation for POM requirements. It designated the Senior Tactical Commanders and their responsibilities, from the period prior to receipt of warning orders through the port call.¹⁹

A comprehensive consolidation and revision of inspection policies and procedures also was issued during March.²⁰

The memorandum included complete instructions regarding the scope of the inspection of records and the manner of making reports of inspections, and summarized other principal inspection policies as follows:

All units transferred to Fourth Army control would be inspected, upon transfer, regardless of their size.

The Army G-3 would conduct scheduled inspections at stations which the Army commander had not visited during the previous four weeks and did not expect to visit during the coming four weeks.

Section chiefs would determine the need of inspections of training tests and the conduct of special training inspections.

"All inspections will be considered follow-up inspections," the memorandum said. "Prior to making an inspection of any kind the officer making the inspection will examine the file of the unit. He will make necessary notes of the deficiencies disclosed in preceding inspections and, in his inspection, will determine whether or not those deficiencies have been corrected."

In April and again in July, when the reports of War Department final inspections were published, showing the marked improvement resulting from the new inspection systems, General Lucas expressed gratification but added that every effort should be made in the future to insure that "every unit" would be ready for overseas movement on its commitment date.²¹

"The results obtained in most instances indicate considerable improvement," he wrote. "However all subordinate commanders and staff officers must insure that every unit of their command is ready for overseas movement on the date for which it is committed."

CHAPTER IV

PERSONNEL

Among the most pressing and complicated problems that faced Fourth Army during the last year of the War were those pertaining to personnel matters. With large numbers of units moving overseas, the task of maintaining alerted units at full strength in qualified personnel was tremendous.¹ Fundamentally, the difficulty was caused by the diversion of the replacement stream from domestic units to fill more urgent overseas requirements just at the time that large numbers of men were being removed from domestic units because of physical disqualifications for overseas service.

War Department Circular No. 370, 1944, provided discharge of enlisted personnel who could not meet the minimum standards for limited service as set forth in Mobilization Regulations 1-9. Advance notice of the provisions of this circular was received early in September, 1944. Immediate provisions were made for the establishment by each senior tactical commander (corps, division and special troops commanders) of physical profile screening boards, consisting of a medical officer, a line officer and a personnel officer.² These boards were organized to function on a 24-hour per day basis to complete the enormous task of passing on the physical qualifications of every enlisted man. Eventually, over 20,000 men were discharged or transferred to other commands because of physical disabilities.

It soon became apparent that service type units, many of them of a highly technical nature such as ordnance and engineer maintenance units, were losing the highest percentage of personnel, as these units had been filled up with enlisted men who could not complete replacement training of the ground arms because of physical limitations. At the same time, this headquarters was informed by telephone from Headquarters Army Ground Forces that Army Service Forces was having difficulty filling requisitions for service type personnel due to overseas demands for replacements. A few days later, all requisitions for service type personnel were cancelled and Headquarters Army Ground Forces advised this headquarters that no more trained personnel would be available from outside sources.³

Previous to this time special troops commanders had very little authority to transfer enlisted personnel. It was now obvious that decentralization of authority was necessary so that local action could be taken to maintain units at full strength wherever possible. Senior tactical commanders were therefore granted authority, on 7 October 1944, to make local adjustments between units where necessary, without prior approval of Army headquarters in each case, unless the transfers would affect requisitions already forwarded to higher headquarters.⁴

The Army G-1 Section had been maintaining personnel statistics and performing many of the actual operations on transfer and reassignment of personnel in lower echelons. The increased tempo of these activities resulted in complete overhauling of the relationship between the G-1 and AG Sections. It was decided that the G-1 must be freed of operational details so that more effort could be devoted to formulations of policies and supervision of personnel activities in the field in accordance with paragraph 14c, FM 101-5; concurrently the AG was delegated the responsibility for actual operations regarding personnel and keeping of necessary statistics for the benefit of the general and special staff sections. This resulted in a streamlined reorganization of both sections, the details of which were finally crystallized and announced to the staff on 14 December 1944.⁵ Without this clear delineation of functions and the close cooperation maintained between the two sections, it is not believed the army could have completed its mission of preparing so many units for overseas service.

It was then determined that many of the service type units which were having difficulties because of loss of skilled personnel had been alerted for movement without full consideration of the personnel problems then arising. Immediate steps were taken to restudy personnel conditions in these units and necessary action was taken to advise AGF.

After the senior tactical commanders had made all possible local readjustments of personnel, many units alerted for dates in November, December and January, particularly Ordnance, were still short of highly skilled specialists. A survey of every enlisted man in the army was made to determine if hidden skills could be discovered.⁶ By shifting trained personnel from units with later dates to units with earlier dates and by putting the potentially qualified men in the later units and giving them intensive special training, the problem was finally solved in January of 1945 and all of the service type units went overseas with fully qualified personnel.

The War Department had ordered Army Service Forces to transfer enlisted men physically qualified for overseas service to Army Ground Forces units. A large percentage of these men had received NCO rating and the morale problem of excess NCO's immediately arose. Unit commanders naturally resented this situation and it was suggested to unit commanders that they spend less time in trying to get rid of these individuals and more time in finding how they could be used.⁷ It was directed that no NCO would be reduced merely to effect a readjustment of grades to conform to the T/O and that excess NCO must be treated as an individual who deserved special consideration in retraining and assignment. These newly acquired NCO's were not allowed to be reduced until they had been given an opportunity to perform in a position commensurate with their grade for at least 12 weeks.

Another constant problem was the marked increase in applications for dependency discharge whenever a unit was alerted, in many cases obviously as a means of avoiding overseas service. Senior tactical commanders were directed to give every consideration to dependency discharge requests but it was pointed out that every man owed an obligation to the Army as well as to his dependents and that applications should normally be initiated prior to a unit's attaining an alerted status.⁸ It was therefore directed that extreme hardship or privation must exist to justify a dependency discharge and that reduced living standards must be differentiated from extreme hardship.

Another difficulty arose from numerous complaints from alerted units that filler replacements sent them from other units were often physically disqualified for overseas service. This resulted in an order that "no man will be transferred as a filler for a high priority unit who does not meet at least minimum physical requirements for his MOS."⁹ Attention was invited to the fact that many men exaggerate their physical difficulties as an expression of dissatisfaction at their being transferred. It was pointed out that the sending unit had been able to observe the man in actual performance of his duties and was therefore best qualified to judge his physical capacity; in the absence of marked deterioration, the receiving unit was not allowed to change a man's physical classification for 60 days.

In March, 1945, the majority of units prepared for overseas had been shipped. Administration, however, and particularly personnel records, continued to be a difficult problem. Representatives of the War Department Inspector General's office found "an excessive number of units with unsatisfactory administration and records during the first quarter of 1945."¹⁰ An Army staff memorandum inclosed a list of records to be checked, during the course of every inspection, by representatives of the various staff sections. A sharp warning was issued that "any future reports of unsatisfactory administrative records, irrespective of whether deficiencies are correctable by personnel readiness dates, will require a personal explanation by the senior tactical commander."¹¹ Although particular reference is made herein to personnel records, it is desired that similar

consideration be given to the perfection of all types of records". The memorandum inclosed a list of procedures to be included in the SOP's of corps and special troops headquarters to improve the situation.

Establishment of schools for all company clerks at special troops installations was directed a few days later.¹² As specified in this memorandum, officers and enlisted men from each special troops headquarters attended a school at Fort Sam Houston, conducted by the Fourth Army Adjutant General, and then returned to conduct schools for all company clerks at their own stations. The memorandum specified that clerks unable to pass the course be reassigned and that, in the future, no personnel be assigned as company clerks without having passed the course.

A conference was held on 18 June 1945 of all special troops commanders to consider the reorganization of their headquarters staffs. Colonel Skerry, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, said that there had been a lack of coordination of staff functions regarding personnel at most of the headquarters in the past.¹³ Colonel Skerry emphasized that the S-1 must be free to formulate policy and supervise personnel matters and that the AG must be delegated the responsibility of a free hand in operations regarding personnel within the policies as laid down by the S-1. He said "Use your AG branches as the operating agencies for your Personnel and Administratives Divisions and give your AG officers duties commensurate with their grades and qualifications. In the event there is any doubt in your minds as to the effectiveness of utilizing your AG Sections as operating agencies, I would suggest that you request permission to send your present S-1's and AG's to this headquarters with a view to observing our procedures."

During the last year of the war the Adjutant General's section revised the system for strength accounting in order to furnish general and special staff sections with more complete and accurate statistical information.

This system was based largely upon informational rosters furnished by machine records unit which were supplemented by special orders, telephone conversations, reports of inspections, and verbal instructions. Authorized and actual strengths were maintained by unit. Control strength for each arm or service furnished the total army command status. In addition, separate status cards for each officer within the command contained a summary of information available in military 201 files, together with information from other sources.. These individual, unit and control cards were correlated entry against entry.

Informational rosters for special and general staff sections by arm or service were all furnished by the machine records unit. This headquarters instigated the policy whereby subordinate units would not be required to submit reports to this headquarters for consolidation or for any other purpose when such information was available from official files or from machine records unit.

Machine records unit then assumed responsibility for all personnel reports and compiled them on morning report entries, corrected rosters, and statistics supplied by the Adjutant Generals Section. Extremely close liaison was maintained. Such procedure of consolidating statistics by a central control agency eliminated individual interpretation and had farreaching effects on accuracy. Machine records unit further supplied vital statistical reports for planning purposes in connection with officer and enlisted strength accountability which became of utmost importance with Army wide redeployment and demobilization programs.

Constant stress and positive and definite action was demanded from all subordinate units to properly utilize limited service officer personnel, to rotate officer personnel without overseas service, and to remove officer personnel who were unfit or poorly trained.

Fourth Army was largely independent in supplying officer personnel from its own sources during this last year of the war. Additional requirements not available were furnished from Army Ground Force sources.

ANALYSIS OF TYPES AND STRENGTHS OF UNITS TRAINED
 UNDER FOURTH ARMY CONTROL AND SHIPPED OVERSEAS
 1 SEPTEMBER 1944 TO 2 SEPTEMBER 1945

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER OF UNIT	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
AAA			
Gp Hq and Hq Btry	6	78	360
Gun Bn	1	32	695
AW Bn	3	114	2,232
AW Bn - Mob	1	38	744
Total AAA	11	262	4,031
Divisions			
Infantry	9	7,263	119,070
Armored	4	2,656	40,344
Mountain	1	779	13,329
Regiments	2	316	6,098
Total Divisions	16	11,014	178,841
Armored			
Gp Hq and Hq Co	1	18	80
Total Armored	1	18	80
Bands			
AGF Bands	4	4	112
Total Bands	4	4	112
Cavalry			
Rcn Sqd	1	41	702
Total Cavalry	1	41	702

TYPE OF UNITS	NUMBER OF UNIT	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Chemical			
Chemical Bn	5	195	3,165
Chemical Bn Mtz	1	40	556
Chemical Dep Co	1	5	150
Chemical Maint Co	1	3	90
Total Chemical	8	243	3,961
Engineer			
Engr L Pon Co	8	48	1,640
Engr C Bn	52	1,716	31,460
Engr Dep Co	9	63	1,818
Engr Maint Co	23	138	4,462
Engr Topo Co Corps	3	15	339
Engr Heavy Pon Bn	2	8	260
Engr LE Co	11	44	1,254
Engr Topo Bn	2	44	808
Engr Topo Co	1	5	135
Engr Tdwy Br Co	7	28	938
Engr C Gp Hq and Hq Co	16	256	1,056
Engr C Gp	4	384	7,260
Engr WS Co	2	12	260
Total Engineer	140	2,761	51,690
Field Artillery			
FA Brigade	1	16	91
FA Bn	54	1,620	27,000
FA Gp Hq and Hq Btry	12	216	972
FA Gp	5	90	405
FA Obsn Bn	3	84	1,263
FA Armd Bn	4	136	1,944
FA Gp Hq and Hq Btry, Mtz	2	36	162
Total Field Arty	81	2,198	31,837

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER OF UNIT	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Medical			
Med Gp Hq and Hq Det	3	33	78
Med Dep Co	5	60	775
Med Vet Co, Sep	1	5	59
Med Bn Hq and Hq Det	8	72	256
Med Vet Co	2	18	234
Med Bn	1	37	407
Med Evac Hosp	3	306	909
Med Evac Hosp, Semi	13	1,027	2,691
Med Coll Co	14	70	1,122
Med Amb Co, Mtr	10	40	850
Med Amb Co	1	11	207
Med Clearing Co	10	120	960
Med Ptbl Surg Hosp	5	20	165
Total Medical	76	1,819	8,983
Military Police			
MP Co	1	5	158
MP Bn, Army	1	24	519
MP Bn	1	30	619
Total MP	3	59	1,296
Ordnance			
Ord Hq & Hq Det, Gp	2	24	74
Ord Hq & Det, Bn	13	78	234
Ord HM Co	1	12	295
Ord Amm Co	9	54	1,557
Ord Hv Maint Co, Army	1	12	295
Ord HM Co, Trk	5	45	965
Ord MM Co	12	144	3,384
Ord HM Co, FA	4	48	928
Ord Bn	2	12	368
Ord MAM Co	10	40	1,160
Ord Evac Co	9	54	1,530
Ord HAM Co	23	161	4,692
Ord Dep Co	3	18	522
Total Ordnance	94	702	16,004



... withdrew by foot ...

Co. E, 357th Inf., retires from ridge East of Caney.

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER OF UNIT	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Quartermaster			
QM Bn	1	5	105
QM Bn, Mbl, Hq & Hq Det	5	30	70
QM Bakery Co	2	10	310
QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	2	10	210
QM Gas Sup Co	22	66	2,684
QM Bn Mbl	1	5	105
QM Rhd Co	9	36	1,557
QM Trk Co	71	213	8,449
QM Gp Hq and Hq Det	2	20	50
QM Laundry Co	1	5	262
QM Dep Co	5	40	890
Total Quartermaster	121	440	14,692
Signal			
Sig Rep Co	5	35	760
Sig Rad Inst Co	1	6	96
Sig Bn	6	216	4,542
Sig Photo	1	18	130
Sig Dep Co	5	40	675
Sig Opr Bn	2	52	1,052
Sig SIAM Co	2	28	30
Total Signal	22	395	7,285
Tank Destroyer			
Gp Hq and Hq Co	3	45	183
Bn (SP)	2	74	1,210
Bn, Towed	2	66	1,454
Total Tank Destroyers	7	185	2,847
Tank			
Light Bn	1	37	549
Bn	1	42	682
Total Tank	2	79	1,231
TOTAL ALL BRANCHES	587	20,220	323,612

CONSOLIDATED STRENGTH
FOURTH ARMY ORGANIZATION
1 OCT 44 -- 1 SEP 45

Oct 44	-----	288715
Nov	-----	257729
Dec	-----	182527
Jan 45	-----	127190
Feb	-----	87555
Mar	-----	59673
Apr	-----	44767
May	-----	36073
Jun	-----	32669
Jul	-----	39358
Aug	-----	101217
Sep	-----	110013

CHAPTER V

REDEPLOYMENT

By February, 1945, it had become evident that redeployment training--the training of veteran units from the European Theater for further service in the Pacific Theater--soon would be Fourth Army's major task.

Preliminary planning for the task was begun even before receipt of the first directives from Army Ground Forces.

Colonel Donald H. Galloway, Deputy Chief of Staff, pointed out in an interview 14 February, that Fourth Army seemed destined no longer to prepare new or re-designated units for initial overseas service--only individual replacements.¹

Colonel Galloway said that the size of the Fourth Army, during the preceding nine months, had been reduced from about 400,000 to about 70,000 officers and men; that the number of Special Troops headquarters had been reduced from 14 to 6; that the last complete division trained by Army had sailed for Europe, and that the infantry training regiments used to train combat troops were being transferred to Replacement and School Command.

"It looks as though our first big training job was ending and, although we have received no specific directive, it appears our next big job will be the re-training and re-equipping of troops coming home from Europe." he said.

It soon became apparent that Fourth Army camps would carry a large share of the redeployment training program and a February memorandum requested each Staff Section to prepare training plans--stressing athletics--for all type units of its arm and service.²

"The return of units of all types to the United States from overseas stations is, to a small degree, now in progress," the memorandum said. "Although no definite plans have been received from Army Ground Forces as to what training programs will be followed by these units--or what their future mission may be--it is essential that Fourth Army formulate some plans as to their initial reception and formulate training objectives pending receipt of AGF directives."

The memorandum stressed the importance of meeting and checking units immediately upon their arrival. Returning units must be given a complete file of directives, training programs and schedules and otherwise instructed as to Fourth Army policies and objectives. Personnel and equipment must be brought up to T/O and T/E requirements. Irregularities in administrative and supply records and unit funds must be corrected and full complements of athletic supplies and Orientation materials issued.

"The reaction that overseas units will take upon their return to training duties here must be carefully considered," the memorandum continued. "A firm but understanding attitude must be taken. It is known that it is best to keep troops occupied to the fullest extent and all programs should be designed accordingly. Advanced training of specialists in specially selected schools should be considered. In addition thereto: disciplinary training, re-training in basic military subjects, qualification in weapons, competition in training subjects such as rifle matches, squad and platoon problems, etc., should be entertained. A full program of athletic and physical conditioning has exceptional value. The planning of intramural sports as well as team competition between units is essential."

Staff Sections were directed to prepare training plans--based upon a 60 day period of eight hour days, reserving two full afternoons a week for athletic training--and submit them to G-3 for approval. Special Staff Sections not having any units under their control also were directed to submit plans or recommendations.

Before the end of February more complete instructions were dispatched to Corps and Special Troops Headquarters commanders.³

"During redeployment training it is essential that all personnel of all ranks be impressed with the seriousness of the task awaiting them and of the vital importance of the redeployment training program," the directive said.

"It is necessary that the highest standard of physical fitness be reached and maintained for all personnel. Training must be conducted with enthusiasm, and the highest degree of discipline and proficiency must be demanded for all personnel.

"A full program of athletics and physical conditioning will be instituted. Competition in training subjects will be encouraged. Instructors assigned for redeployment training--except technical experts--should be selected from personnel having had service in active combat theaters. The importance of Orientation must be stressed."

"Local commanders were directed to institute requisitions to bring units up to T/O strength; to request funds, if necessary, from the Central Welfare Fund, and to inquire what Special Service activities should be planned. Also they were to conduct physical examinations and dental surveys immediately upon the unit's arrival and complete the profiling and processing of all personnel determined to be potential Class "D".

Concerning supply, commanders were directed to send shortage lists to the Post directors of supply for immediate action; arrange for proper storage and safeguarding of all equipment shipped from port to station; make spot inspections to see if property was properly prepared for storage prior to shipment; arrange for vehicles needed for administration and training; hold showdown inspections of all equipment within a week after the unit was reassembled, and check maintenance of supply records.

Training programs were to be initiated upon the return from furlough of 80 percent of the T/O strength and the arrival of 50 percent of equipment. Necessary SFE funds for training purposes were to be applied for. Either requisitions for school quotas were to be submitted or local facilities for specialist training provided.

Commanders were directed to submit, at the earliest practicable date, status of training reports with recommendations as to the number of weeks required for ITP, UTP and combined training.

A memorandum issued in March arranged for Staff Sections to get information, on which to base redeployment training plans, at the earliest possible date.⁴ The Chief of Staff directed that officers of advance detachments of redeployed units to be interviewed on arrival by representatives of Special Staff Sections to get an early picture of planning needs.

Interested Staff Sections would then submit appropriate recommendations to G-1, G-3 and G-4 concerning each unit's personnel, training and supply.

The problem of equipping units returned to this country for redeployment training was considered at a series of conferences, beginning 3 May 1945, between Fourth Army Supply personnel and the Director of Supply, Eighth Service Command.^{4a}

The problem was complex because units were being returned from Europe with only housekeeping equipment. The task of fully equipping them for the training period was, from the supply standpoint, comparable to the sudden activation of a great number of units.

The plan set up at the conference called for the obtaining and laying down at the respective stations 100 percent of the authorized allowance of equipment for each unit scheduled to train at that station.

To enable Army headquarters to know at all times the amount of supplies received, the Director of Supply, Eighth Service Command, reported at 10 day intervals the percentage of equipment, by service, on hand and available for issue at each post.

"Supply personnel of the Eighth and Seventh Service Commands did an exceptionally fine job." Col. W. V. McCreight, Army G-4, said. "Through their efforts the equipment was available at assembly stations at or before the time the unit reassembled--and in some cases was located right in the unit area."

On V-E day Fourth Army dispatched a secret letter showing the tentative station assignments for the first units to be redeployed through Fourth Army camps.⁵ This first, tentative, word was sent so that Special Troops commanders could begin preliminary planning for housing and organizational equipment.

Plans to stress athletics during redeployment training were outlined in another letter.⁶ The letter advised that the training program for units not actually in the field probably would include two hours a week of physical training--including swimming--and four hours a week of organized athletics. The latter would be planned and supervised program consisting of physical contact games designed to instill confidence, develop team play and leadership, and increase the fighting spirit and will to win.

Announcing the formation of an Athletics Branch in the training division of the G-3 Section, the letter directed the establishment of similar branches in the training sections of subordinate headquarters. It advised that Army was surveying the adequacy and condition of athletic facilities at all Fourth Army camps.

"To achieve the maximum benefit from athletics, men must be properly instructed in how to play," the letter said. "The time allocated during training periods will be used, therefore, to progressively teach the rudiments of selected sports. Services of the Special Service Officer will be used to the fullest extent to supervise and conduct the athletic program."

In June, as the time for the arrival of the first redeployed division approached, all Special Troops commanders were called in to Army headquarters for a conference on the complex arrangements for redeployment.

"We must have the greatest efficiency in handling these units coming back and it is not going to be easy." General Lucas told the group.⁷ "It means that you commanders and every member of your staff must display the greatest energy and personal effort in this job."

"The War Department thinks we're going to have difficulty with these men who have been overseas for some time. Some of these men think the war for them should be over and 'let somebody else go and fight the Japs'."

"If our leadership is such that we can make these men see what the situation actually is, I don't believe we're going to have any trouble. Upon the example you set may depend the lives of many young men."

"With the troops coming back we're going to have more trouble with the housekeeping part. I know a dirty motor will run as well as a clean one but in the long run the clean ones will run longer. An organization that does not take care of its equipment and housekeeping is not a disciplined outfit."

General L. B. Keiser, Chief of Staff, suggested to the commanders that, because they would be faced with losses of key personnel at the critical redeployment period, they should improve the organization of their headquarters as much as possible.

He recommended consolidating the work of the Adjutant General, Judge Advocate, Chaplain, Special Service and Sanitation and Veneal Control sections under a Personnel and Administrative Division, headed by a lieutenant-colonel and a major.

He recommended consolidating the Training, Troop Movement, Athletics, I & E and Intelligence branches under a Training Division; and the supply and maintenance branches under a Supply and Maintenance Division.

General Keiser said Fourth Army would do its utmost to keep Special Troops headquarters supplied with at least potentially qualified replacements but that rotation policies, requirements for cadre personnel for new Special Troops headquarters, and loss of personnel through RR 1-1 and RR 1-5 threatened a serious situation.

"The sole purpose for the existence of any headquarters within the Fourth Army is to train and prepare units for overseas movement," he said. "This means that every phase of PCM must be carefully observed and that no unit must fail to meet the assigned readiness date. This will be more important in the case of redeployed units than ever before and it cannot be emphasized enough."

General Keiser said the staffs of Special Troops headquarters and of group and battalion headquarters were not "getting away from their desks" and checking training properly. He said some Fourth Army testing teams never saw a Special Troops headquarters training officer for days at a time. He said the frequent, last-minute discovery that certain officers or key personnel were unqualified or that entire organizations were not qualified in some type of unit training, proved the inadequacy of checking procedures.

Colonel Galloway suggested classes in PCM for key staff personnel because most Special Troops headquarters soon would be staffed with overseas returnees, unfamiliar with PCM procedures.⁹

Colonel H. O. Cushman, Army G-3, presented the forecast of units expected to sail from the European and Mediterranean Theaters during June and July for Fourth Army camps and explained that main bodies of units could be expected about 45 or 50 days after the sailing date, with complete assembly of the main body taking six to nine days.¹⁰ He explained that divisions would be under the direct control of Fourth Army and all non-divisional units would be attached to Special Troops headquarters.

Colonel Cushman discussed the proposed training and athletics programs and the plans for building oriental villages, multiple lane combat courses and camouflage demonstration practice areas.

He said a Fourth Army instruction team in flame throwing would visit each station.

Colonel W. V. McCreight, Army G-4, suggested using service type troops in support of tactical troops during maneuvers, for the training benefit they would derive, instead of using them only on overhead and labor details.¹¹

Colonel J. J. Honan, Army Judge Advocate General, said the time element, in the administration of military justice in the Fourth Army, had been reduced more than 50 percent during the preceding five months and urged the importance of speedy administration of justice during the redeployment period.¹²

Colonel Honas said he did not expect redeployed troops would create any unusual disciplinary problems. He said some, but not too much, consideration should be given the battle records of soldiers accused of offenses. He suggested that sentences involving fines and hard labor, without confinement, were preferable to confinement because they interfered less with the training program.

Detailed instructions for the reception and initial processing of redeployed units of different types were covered exhaustively in a Fourth Army numbered memorandum and a staff memorandum issued during June.¹³

Senior tactical commanders were made responsible for the reception, initial processing and preparation for further overseas service of all redeployed units.¹³ Senior tactical commanders were defined as: Special Troops commanders for units assigned to their headquarters; the Corps commanding general for units assigned to corps; and the commanding officers of separate units when so directed by special instruction from Fourth Army.

In advance of the arrival of the first detachments, bringing records, the Senior Tactical Commanders were directed to arrange for appropriate housing and utilities service, recreational and medical facilities and distribution of required publications.

They were directed to meet the first detachment, bringing records, get training, equipment and personnel requisition data and help store the records. They were to send shortage lists to the Post director of supply and morning reports, since leaving the port of debarkation, to the Fourth Army, and to administer the unit during the reception period.

Similarly they were directed to meet and provide facilities for the Advance Detachment upon arrival, to prepare reports on commitment and training program and to insure that buildings would be ready to receive the main body.

Upon arrival of the main body, senior tactical commanders were to require the unit commander to conduct physical and mental examinations, complete physical profiles, correct records and process potential losses.

After assembly of the unit the senior tactical commander was to conduct an appropriate welcoming ceremony and impress upon the commanding officer the need of completing PCM requirements. By Assembly Date plus three the training program or training recommendations were to be mailed to Fourth Army. By Assembly Date plus five personnel status reports and personnel requisitions were to be mailed. By Assembly Date plus seven a report as to whether readiness and warning dates could be met was to be mailed. By Assembly Date plus ten a complete administrative inspection was to be held.

Other specific directions to the senior tactical commander were that he expedite discharges and reclassifications, initiate VD and AWOL controls, submit 66-4 forms and begin the training programs.

For units remaining directly under control of Fourth Army the memorandum provided that some of the aforementioned duties would be performed by the Special Troops Commander, some by Fourth Army and some by the commanding officer of the unit.

Each new unit would be assigned upon the arrival of the first detachment and the Assembly Date would be the date upon which at least 80 percent of the strength of each component unit was present.

Senior Tactical Commanders were to determine, in the case of units unable to meet their readiness and warning dates, the training needed to correct deficiencies and to recommend training schedules. For units which could meet their dates or which had been given no dates, the commanders were to determine what period of training the units should be in and recommend completion dates for the initial eight weeks period and the three supplemental periods.

Training was to begin the day after Assembly, i.e. upon arrival of 80 percent of the units strength. Issuance and maintenance of equipment, processing of personnel and individual training was to be conducted during the interval between arrival of early personnel and Assembly date.

A Fourth Army staff memorandum, establishing the responsibilities of Army staff officers for the redeployment reception period and facilitating coordination, was issued a few days later.¹⁴

For units directly under Fourth Army control, the following procedures were set up:

Upon word of the arrival of the Advance Detachment, the G-3 would coordinate a visit by representatives of interested staff sections to orient the unit commander in Fourth Army policies; obtain training, personnel and supply data; and acquaint training personnel with permanent training aids available.

Upon arrival of the unit commander, the Chief of Staff would arrange a welcoming ceremony for the unit and the G-3 would coordinate a visit by staff section representatives to discuss compliance with POM, determine a training program and the commitment of the unit.

For units attached to Special Troops headquarters the following was provided:

Upon arrival of the unit commander, section representatives would obtain full data to enable the Chief of Section to comment on the Senior Tactical commander's training programs and personnel requisitions.

No special visits by staff representatives to the advance detachments were provided for units assigned to corps.

Upon receipt of information as to the Assembly Date, Inspector General representatives would visit the station to give instruction in conducting the Initial Special Inspection--or actually conduct the inspection for units other than divisions.

Visiting representatives were directed to obtain information through direct conference with the commanding officers and members of his staff rather than through questionnaire forms.

The sudden ending of the Japanese War in August found Fourth Army still deep in plans for redeployment training.

Arrangements were completed for the first Japanese Mobile Intelligence Training Units to begin instructing redeployed troops in Japanese tactics at Fort Leonard Wood and Camps Gruber and Swift.¹⁵

Provision was made that, if an Alert for Movement Inspection were scheduled within the first 20 days after the unit's assembly, the Initial Special Inspection would not be held.¹⁶ In any event the ISI was to be conducted without any interference with the training program.

Another memorandum stressed the importance of Special Service activities during redeployment.¹⁷ Commanding officers were invited to request additional Special Service facilities.

"Training to assure Special Service self-sufficiency for overseas service will be conducted by all units," the memorandum said. "Immediate effort will be exerted to obtain equipment and materials needed for Special Service activities overseas."

Another Fourth Army directive implemented the War Department campaign to give a maximum of publicity to the combat records of redeployed units and individuals--as a morale builder.¹⁸

Each Special Troops headquarters was directed to designate a Public Relations Officer to work with the Post PRO in giving publicity to those separate units with no PR staffs of their own. The headquarters were directed also to cooperate with the AGF news teams working on public relations with each redeployed division's headquarters.

CHAPTER I

1. Remarks of C/S at Staff Conference, 26 Aug 44.
2. Ltr, Hq AGF, 320.2/456 (17 Sep 44) GNGCT, 17 Sep 44, Subject: "Assignment of Units of Second and Fourth Armies."
3. Ltr Hq AGF, 320.2/463 (3 Oct 44) GNGCT, 3 Oct 44, Subject: "Release of Units From Assignment to XXI Corps, Fourth Army."
4. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 18 Sep 44.
5. Ltr, Hq AGF, 602.1 (28 Sep 44) GNGCT-51, 28 Sep 44. Subject: "Evacuation of Camps."
6. Interview of Historical Officer, 8 Aug 45, with Maj. Drummond, G-1 Personnel.
7. Interview of Historical Officer, 7 Jun 45, with Capt. Osborne, Assistant Executive Officer, G-3.
8. Ibid.
9. Memorandum No. 89, Fourth Army, 5 Oct 44.
10. See Chapter III, this volume.
11. Report of Conference held 29 Dec 44.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 4 Jan 45, Subject: "Relations with Southwestern Sector, Eastern Defense Command."
16. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 4 Jan 45, Subject: "Relief of XXXVI Corps."
17. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 9 Jan 45, Subject: "Movement of XXXVI Corps."
18. Interview of Historical Officer, 14 Feb 45, with Col. Galloway D C/S.
19. Ibid.
20. Ltr Hq AGF, 210.31 (3 Feb 45) GNGAP-B, 13 Feb 45, Subject: "Reduction of Officer Personnel."
21. See Chapter III, this volume.
22. Notes by Historical Officer, 8 May 45. Subject: "V-E Day Talk by General Lucas."
23. Ltr Hq Fourth Army, AG 000.76, GNMOB, 30 Apr 45, Subject: "Publicity Concerning Fourth Army Commander."
24. See Chapter II, this volume.
25. See Chapter V, this volume.
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27. Report of Change of Status of Fourth Army Units, No. 151, 25 Jun 45.
28. Interview of Historical Officer, 1 Oct 44, with Capt. Dodge, Troop Movement Officer G-3.
29. See Chapter III, this volume.
30. Fourth Army G-1 Memo to all Staff Sections, 15 Jul 45, Subject: "T/O Allowance in Officers This Headquarters."
31. Fourth Army PRO Memo to G-1, 28 Sep 45.
32. Fourth Army General Orders No. 4, 24 Jul 45, Subject: "Assumption of Command."
33. Fourth Army General Orders No. 5, 6 Aug 45.
34. Notes by Historical Officer, 25 Jul 45, Subject: "Initial Talk to Officers by General Patch."
35. Publicity Release, Hq Fourth Army, 23 Jul 45, Subject: "Alexander McCarrell Patch, Jr."
36. Speech by General Patch to 86th Division, 2 Aug 45.
37. Interview of Historical Officer, 1 Oct 45, with Capt. Dodge, Troop Movement Officer, G-3.
38. Ibid.
39. Fourth Army Pro Memo to G-1, 28 Sep 45.
40. Interview of Historical Officer, 1 Oct 45, with Capt. Dodge, Troop Movement Officer, G-3.
41. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

1. Fourth Army Memo from G-3 to all Staff Sections, 9 Sep 44.
2. Fourth Army Memo from G-3 to all Staff Sections, 16 Sep 44.
3. Ltr, Hq Fourth Army, 353 GNMDC, 29 Sep 44, Subject: "Maneuvers for Divisions at Home Stations."
4. Transcript of telephone conversation, 13 Oct 44, between Col. Cushman, Fourth Army G-3, and Col. Barnes, AGF G-3 training section.
5. Interview of Historical Officer, 7 Jun 45, with Capt. Osborne, Assistant Executive Officer, G-3.
6. Letter, Hq Fourth Army, 353--GNMDC, 4 Oct 44, Subject: "Revision of Training Memorandum No. 1."
7. Letter, Hq Fourth Army, AG 353--GNMDC, 13 Oct 44, Subject: "Transmittal of Enclosure Number 3B, Training Memorandum No. 1."
8. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 98, 21 Oct 44, Subject: "Fourth Army Ordnance Service."
9. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 94, 17 Oct 44, Subject: "Air-Ground Liaison Sections."
10. WD Ltr AG 322 (25 Oct 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M, to C G Fourth Army, 1 Nov 44, Subject: "Reorganization and Redesignation of 10th Light Division."
11. Letter, Hq Fourth Army AG 353 GNMDC, 2 Nov 44, Subject: "Training Memorandum No. 1, Enclosure No. 14."
12. Letter, HQ Fourth Army, AG 353 GNMDC, 8 Nov 44, Subject: "Training Memorandum No. 1, Enclosure No. 23."
13. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 350.09 GNMDB, 11 Nov 44, Subject: "Training and Duties of Intelligence Officers."
14. Letter Hq Fourth Army, 353 GNMBC, 18 Nov 44, Subject: "Training Memorandum No. 1, Enclosure No. 10."
15. Letter Hq Fourth Army, 353 GNMBC, 10 Nov 44, Subject: "Training Memorandum No. 1, Enclosure No. 30, Annex No. 3."
16. Fourth Army Engineer Section "Historical Record."
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 6, 25 Jan 45, Subject: "Special Service Activities."
- 19a. Letter, Fourth Army Ordnance Officer to Fourth Army G-4, 30 Nov 45, Subject: "Activities of Maintenance Branch."
20. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 23 Feb 45, Subject: "Requests for High Performance Aircraft."
21. Fourth Army 1st Indorsement, 16 Mar 45, Letter Hq AGF 353/125 (10 Mar 45) GNGCT, 10 Mar 45, Subject: "Training of Overseas Returnees."
22. Fourth Army 1st Indorsement, 18 May 45, Letter Hq AGF 220.3/3 (Overseas Returnees) (12 May 45) GNGAP, 12 May 45, "Overseas Returnees."
23. Fourth Army 1st Indorsement, 26 May 45, on Letter Hq AGF, 341 (19 May 45) GNGCT-51, 19 May 45, Subject: "Emergency Storage of RTC Graduates."
24. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 220.3, GNMDE, 10 Mar 45, Subject: "Emergency Storage of RTC Graduates."
25. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353, GNMDC, 17 Apr 45, Subject: "Emergency Storage of RTC Graduates."
26. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353, GNMDC, 1 Jun 45, Subject: "Fourth Army Training Memorandum No. 1."
27. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353, GNMDC, 10 Jul 45, Subject: "Storage of Replacements."
28. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353, GNMDC, 24 May 45, Subject: "Storage of Service Type Replacements."
29. Fourth Army Publication, 9 Aug 45, Subject: "Policies and Procedure for Supply and Maintenance of Fourth Army Units."

CHAPTER III

1. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 20, 2 Mar 45, Subject: "Inspection Policies and Procedures."
2. Fourth Army Indorsement, 27 Jan 45, on Letter Hq AGF 353/1257, (Int Tng) (21 Jan 45) GNGCT, 21 Jan 45, Subject: "Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas."
3. Fourth Army Memorandum, 5 Nov 44, Subject: "Remarks of Chief of Staff at Staff Conferences, This Date."
4. Letter Hq AGF 353/1257 (Int Tng) (21 Jan 45) GNGCT, 21 Jan 45, Subject: "Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas."
5. Letter Hq AGF 353/1447 (Read) (9 Jul 45) GNGCT, 9 Jul 45, Subject: "Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas."
6. Letter Hq AGF 353/1541 (Read) (9 Jul 45) GNGCT, 9 Jul 45, Subject: "Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas."
7. Notes by Historical Officer, 14 Oct 44, Subject: "Meeting of Fourth Army Chief of Section."
8. Fourth Army Memorandum, 5 Nov 44, Subject: "Remarks of Chief of Staff at Staff Conference, This Date."
9. Notes by Historical Officer, 18 Nov 44, Subject: "Fourth Army Staff Conference."
10. Fourth Army Memorandum (unnumbered) 14 Nov 44, Subject: "IG Team Inspections."
11. Fourth Army 1st Indorsement, 21 Nov 44, on Letter Hq AGF 370.5/455 (R) 11 Nov 44, GNMTC, Subject: "Preparation for Overseas Movement."
12. Notes by Historical Officer, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "Fourth Army Staff Conference."
13. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 106, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas Service."
14. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 62, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "SOP for AFM Inspections."
15. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 66, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "Coordination of Testing Teams." Army Staff Memorandum No. 63, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "SOP for AFM Inspections."
16. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 66, 24 Nov 44, Subject: "Coordination of Testing Teams."
17. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 75, 12 Dec 44, Subject: "G-4 School for Inspectors."
18. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 71, 4 Dec 44, Subject: "Inspection Policies and Procedures."
19. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 19, 26 Mar 45, Subject: "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas Service."
20. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 20, 2 Mar 45, Subject: "Inspection Policies and Procedures."
21. Fourth Army 1st Indorsement, 14 Jul 45, on Letter Hq AGF 353/1541 (Read) (9 Jul 45) GNGCT, 9 Jul 45, Subject: "Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas."

CHAPTER IV

1. Appendix A: "Analysis of Types and Strength of Units, etc."
Appendix B: "Consolidated Strength-Fourth Army Organization."
2. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 327.3 GNMDA, 8 Sep 44, Subject: "Enlisted Men-Utilization of Manpower Based on Physical Capacity."
3. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353 GNMDC, 17 Dec 44, Subject: "Training Service Type Enlisted Personnel for AGF Units."
4. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 220.3 GNMDA, 7 Oct 44, Subject: "Transfer of Enlisted Personnel."
5. Hq Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 78, 14 Dec 44, Subject: "Staff Personnel Procedure."
6. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353 GNMDC, 17 Dec 44, Subject: "Training Service Type Enlisted Personnel for AGF Units."

7. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 220.3 GNMDA, 30 Jan 45, Subject: "Utilization of NCO's Excess in Grade."
8. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 220.804 GNMDA, 17 Jan 45, Subject: "Applications for Dependency Discharges."
9. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 220.31 GNMDA, 5 Jan 45, Subject: "Transfer of Class 'D' Personnel Between Fourth Army Units."
10. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 46, 7 June 45, Subject: "Responsibility for Administrative Records."
11. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 38, 2 Jun 45.
12. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 44, 16 Jun 45.
13. Remarks by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, at Conference, Hq Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 18 June 1945.

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1. Interview of Historical Officer, 14 Feb 45, with Col. Galloway D C/S.
2. Fourth Army Memorandum to all Staff Sections, 10 Feb 45, Subject: "Planning: Reference units returning from Overseas Stations."
3. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 353 GNMDC, 21 Feb 45, Subject: "Redeployed Units (Non-Divisional)."
4. Fourth Army G-3 Memo to all Staff Sections, 22 Mar 45, Subject: "Interview of Officers of Advanced Detachments."
- 4a. Interview of Historical Officer, 3 Dec 45, with Maj. J. F. Melcher, G-4 Section.
5. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 370.5, GNMDC, 8 May 45, Subject: "Station Assignments for Returned Units."
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14. Fourth Army Staff Memorandum No. 52, 26 Jun 45, Subject: "Processing of Redeployed Units."
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16. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 58, 6 Aug 45, Subject: "ISI--Redeployed Units."
17. Fourth Army Memorandum No. 57, 3 Aug 45, Subject: "Special Service Activities."
18. Letter Hq Fourth Army, AG 000.7 GNMSS, 10 Aug 45, Subject: "Redeployment Training Publicity."