



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MILITARY SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES



**A REPORT CONCERNING
THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL
GUARD'S PART IN SUPPRES-
SING THE LOS ANGELES
RIOT - - - - AUGUST 1965**



PREFACE

The National Guard is ever ready to aid civil government, either as a Federal force in the first line of National Defense or as a State force during natural disasters or other domestic emergencies, to include man-made disturbances. The California National Guard responded to a State need on 13 August 1965 and, for ten days, Guard troops assisted police authorities in restoring order to riot torn Los Angeles.

This report attempts to present an objective account of the California National Guard's role in the quelling of this disturbance. It does not deal with the causes of the riot. These have been explored in great detail by the press and have been documented in the report of the McCone Commission. This report does depict the conditions which Guardsmen encountered in the riot area. It describes specific incidents of violence and lawlessness and the counter measures employed by the California Army National Guard, so that readers may better understand the problems inherent in disturbances of this nature and how the military can best help law enforcement agencies to cope with them.

Chapter I explains the legal basis for the California National Guard's participation in civil disturbance operations and tells of the prior planning accomplished by the State Military Department and its field organizations for such contingencies. It describes the militia forces available to the Governor and pictures briefly that portion of Los Angeles which was to be the scene of operations. Chapters II, III, IV, V and VI narrate in detail the alert and preliminary mobilization phase, the initial operations phase, the troop build-up and occupation phase, the period of stabilization and withdrawal, and logistical problems and solutions. The concluding chapter summarizes lessons learned and implications for the future planning and training of the California National Guard.

The report deals with the overall situation and involvement of the State's military forces as observed, directed and controlled by The Adjutant General and staff and as experienced by those Army Guard units in direct contact with the rioting citizens.

The report has as its sources the official operations journal of the Office of The Adjutant General and the journals and after-action reports prepared by the 40th Armored Division, 49th Infantry Division, and major Air Guard organizations. It draws, too, on U.S. Army Advisor reports and a capsule summary of the riot operation compiled by the Los Angeles Police Department. In detailing accounts of mob actions and troop responses, the report relies heavily on tape recorded interviews with National Guard commanders whose units were most deeply involved in riot control duties.

Guardsmen and police officials at all levels have been very helpful in providing the facts needed to make this a complete and accurate report. It is hoped that all who contributed as well as other military and civil authorities concerned with civil disturbance problems will find this both an informative case study and a valuable reference manual.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Militia and Law Enforcement

In the State of California, the employment of the National Guard to help suppress civil disturbances is clearly defined by law.

One stated purpose of the *Constitution of the United States* is to "provide for the common defense," and the Second Amendment calls for a "well-regulated militia (as) being necessary to the security of a free state." Accordingly, the *Constitution of the State of California* stipulates that the Legislature shall provide by law for organizing and disciplining the militia and that the Governor, as Commander-in-Chief, shall have the power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State, to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasions.

The *State Military and Veterans Code* provides that the militia of the State shall consist of the National Guard, the State Military Reserve and the Naval Militia, which constitute the Active Militia, and the Unorganized Militia comprising all persons liable for service in the militia but who are not members of the Active Militia. The State Military Reserve is presently inactive, except for a small cadre which is assigned training missions in support of local civil defense agencies. The Naval Militia has not been activated.

The term "National Guard" is generally construed to apply to both Army National Guard and Air National Guard units or organizations and their assigned personnel, organized according to Tables of Organization specified by the United States Army or Air Force.

The organization of the California National Guard is shown in Annex A.

The broad powers of the Governor regarding the militia, and by inference the broad missions of the militia, are defined in the *California Military and Veterans Code*. Briefly, the Governor may order the Active Militia or any portion thereof to perform military duty of every description and may order into the service of the State such number and description of the Active Militia or the Unorganized Militia as he deems necessary:

- a. To suppress insurrection, tumult or riot.
- b. To insure due process of law or to enforce city or county laws where local law enforcement agencies are inadequate to do so.
- c. In case of war, insurrection, rebellion, invasion, tumult, riot, breach of peace, public calamity or catastrophe or other emergencies or imminent danger thereof or resistance to the laws of the State or the United States.
- d. Upon call or requisition of the President of the United States.
- e. Upon call of any U.S. Marshal in California or military commanders of certain Federal forces or installations within a geographical area including generally the State of California.
- f. Upon call of any chief executive of city or county government, Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of Superior Court, or any county sheriff, setting forth that there is an unlawful or riotous assembly with intent to commit a felony, or to offer violence to person or property, or to resist the laws of the State or the United States or that there has occurred a public calamity or catastrophe for which aid to the civil authorities is required.

There are two general cases or conditions under which the National Guard may be employed during natural disasters or

domestic disturbances; under conditions of "martial rule," or "in aid of civil authorities."

Where it appears to the Governor that the situation in a locality is so chaotic that the assurance of public safety and private rights are beyond the capacity of civil authorities to direct and control, he may proclaim that local civil authority is partially or wholly superseded by the military commander during the emergency. The situation established by such a proclamation, often described by legal writers as "martial rule," is an extreme measure which can be justified only by absolute necessity. While there is no provision in the *Military and Veterans Code* for the imposing of "martial rule" per se, the Code does provide for a proclamation by the Governor of a state of insurrection with the same general consequences as the establishment of martial rule.

On the other hand, the commander of troops ordered into service may be directed to report to a specific civil official, such as the mayor of a city or an official designated by the mayor, such as the chief of police, and to take direction from that official as to the mission to be accomplished. In this situation the military is said to be "acting in aid" of the civil authorities, who continue to be responsible for the general maintenance of law and order and continue to discharge the normal functions of their offices.

The foregoing distinctions made between acting "in aid" and under "martial rule" are of no practical importance to officers and men subordinate to a designated troop commander. In either event, their legal powers and limitations and, for the most part the tactics employed, are the same. It is primarily for this reason that The Adjutant General's *Emergency Plan for State Military Forces (CAL-EP-62)*, a directive to all California National Guard units, has for many years dealt with broad missions and general guidance, with only a passing reference to martial rule as one condition which might obtain. Specifically, the plan contains operational and administrative instructions for State military forces called to State Active Duty in various domestic emergencies. One specified mission calls for aiding civil authorities in combating civil disturbances.

The California National Guard's history of service during emergencies such as floods, earthquakes and forest fires is well known. Historical records of the Office of The Adjutant General also contain many accounts of the use of State troops in law enforcement missions, not incidental to combating natural disasters, but in direct response to man-made domestic disturbances. While such accounts have no direct bearing on the Los Angeles riot operation, they are of possible interest to readers of this report and are briefly summarized in Annex B.

Awareness of the Civil Disturbance Threat

For some time, both civil and military authorities of this State have been cognizant of the growing potential for civil disturbances in California's metropolitan centers. They have watched with great interest and mounting concern the outbreaks of violence or threats of violence requiring the commitment of military resources; particularly, at the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, where Guardsmen were Federalized and augmented by other Federal forces, and at Cambridge, Maryland, in June 1963, where Guardsmen were employed as State troops.

In 1964, during a 52-day period from 18 July through 7 September, there were riots of major proportions in seven northern cities and two seaside resort cities, from coast to coast.¹ The Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the direction of the President of the United States, inquired into and reported on these nine cases of violence.

The pattern of the disturbances, as found by the F.B.I., paralleled closely that which developed in Los Angeles this August. Except in New York City, each of the major city riots was an escalation from a minor incident such as has happened hundreds of times in most of the communities involved but resulted only in routine misdemeanor arrests. In these instances, however, people unexplainedly abandoned all normal respect for law and order and all concern for the rights of their fellow citizens.

Each incident triggered violent interference with the policeman on the scene and was quickly followed by the gathering of a crowd. Then, as the result of further disturbance or incitement by rabble-rousers, the crowd was swelled by youths seeking excitement or violence. As the crowd gave way to the mob spirit, individuals began to stone police officers and other citizens and a mass of violent people bent on destruction began to spread through the city streets.

The F.B.I. account of the Labor Day weekend resort area riots identified the participants as chiefly young Caucasians who, at the end of their vacations and egged on by young toughs, sought to create trouble and profit thereby.

The report noted that, in most of the riot-stricken communities, respected Negro and other civic leaders tried, often at considerable personal risk, to calm the rioters. In almost every case, however, vigorous action by local or State police or the National Guard was required to restore law and order.²

Given the report late in September, 1964, President Johnson responded to one of the F.B.I.'s recommendations by directing that agency to make riot control training available to all police departments nationwide. He urged that the National Guard of the several states cooperate in this program.

Meanwhile, although California had escaped the 1964 outbreak of riots, it had a taste of the well-publicized demonstrations, sit-ins and marches in connection with the civil rights movement, at first prevalent in the Southern States but now becoming widespread. It was clear to police officials of California's major cities, particularly communities having a high percentage of Negro residents, that the civil disobedience aspect of these events was imposing increasing and extraordinary requirements on law enforcement.

The first major event of this nature in California occurred in San Francisco on 13 May 1960, when a meeting of the House Committee on Un-American Activities was disrupted by a Students' Committee to Abolish HCUA and 70 arrests were made. The next occurrences took place in San Francisco during September and November, 1963, when 132 participants in two demonstrations were arrested. These were followed in San Francisco during March and April, 1964, by four demonstrations against alleged discriminatory hiring practices on the part of a large hotel and several automobile dealers. These demonstrations resulted in a total of 633 arrests.³

Concern in the top echelons of California State administration was expressed by the State Director of Public Safety and Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol, Bradford Crittenden, at whose request a manual entitled *Crowd Control and Riot Prevention* was prepared by the Office of the Attorney General of California.

Deputy Attorney General Raymond M. Momboisse, the author, began the assembly of materials for the manual in September 1963, in cooperation with law enforcement agencies throughout the State and with contributions by police officials of large cities throughout the United States.

The manual was published in July 1964 and furnished to all law enforcement agencies in the State. The State Military Department adopted it as a basic text for riot control training and provided copies to each unit of the California National Guard.

Pre-Planning for Civil Disturbances in California

In July 1963, Los Angeles Police Chief William H. Parker expressed to Governor Brown his concern for the growing civil disturbance threat. The Governor directed Lt Gen Roderic L. Hill, The Adjutant General, to contact Chief Parker. This initial contact was established in late July, through Deputy Chief of Police Roger E. Murdock.

Immediately following his conference with top LAPD officials, General Hill assigned the task of continuing liaison to Colonel Robert L. Quick, of his personal staff. Colonel Quick brought key officers of Headquarters, 40th Armored Division, and top members of Chief Parker's staff together on 21 August 1963, to begin joint contingency planning on a continuing basis. This pattern of liaison was repeated with respect to the police departments of the San Francisco Bay Area and Headquarters, 49th Infantry Division.

In November 1964, Governor Brown was requested by the United States Department of Justice to approve California National Guard cooperation with the F.B.I. in a series of training sessions on riot control for local law enforcement agencies. Approval was given and, at Governor Brown's direction, General Hill designated Colonel Quick to participate in training sessions held in eight communities from San Diego to Chico during the period January through June 1965.

The early conferences between members of the staffs of The Adjutant General, LAPD, and 40th Armored Division resulted in the following mutual understanding:

If a civil disturbance occurred in Los Angeles which appeared likely to be beyond the capability of LAPD to control, a police official would so inform one of several pre-selected members of the 40th Armored Division staff, who would pass this information on to the Office of The Adjutant General (OTAG), which would alert the Governor's Office.

If and when the appropriate city official decided to request National Guard assistance, this fact would be communicated to the 40th Armored Division representative, who would inform OTAG, dispatch standby liaison personnel to the Los Angeles Police Administration Building, and alert the headquarters of certain battalions of the division.

OTAG would alert the Governor's Office to the anticipated call from the city. At this time The Adjutant General, or in his absence a senior officer of his staff, would depart for Los Angeles.

The request for troops would be made directly to the Governor by the appropriate civic official. The Adjutant General would order the troops to duty through military command channels, in response to the Governor's direction, and would dispatch pre-selected members of his staff to LAPD to form a forward area support headquarters.

A troop commander selected in advance by the Commanding General, 40th Armored Division, would report to the Chief of Police to receive directions as to the general or specific objective to be accomplished.

Joint planning between the 40th Armored Division and LAPD included the designation of units by priority, the selection of routes, assembly areas and public buildings such as schools to be used for billets and command posts, the integration of mili-

¹ Harlem and Brooklyn areas, NYC, 18-23 Jul; Rochester, NY, 24-25 Jul; Jersey City, NJ, 2-4 Aug; Elizabeth, NJ, 11-13 Aug; Paterson, NJ, 11-14 Aug; Dixmoor, Ill, 15-17 Aug; Philadelphia, Pa, 28-31 Aug; Seaside, Ore, 4-7 Sept; Hampton Beach, NH, 6-7 Sept.

² U.S. Department of Justice, F.B.I. Report of September 18, 1964.

³ Information furnished by the San Francisco Police Department.

tary and police communications systems, the establishment of responsibility for and techniques to be used in making arrests, and provision for coordination and cooperation between all elements of the National Guard and LAPD involved in operations.

Similar understandings and agreements were reached as the result of joint planning conferences between 49th Infantry Division representatives and police officials of San Francisco Bay cities.

Preparation and Training of the National Guard

For several years, training requirements of the Federal Government have included as a subject: "Military Assistance and Recovery from Nuclear Attack."⁴ As a part of this requirement, all Guardsmen have received a minimum of three hours' training annually in riot and traffic control, to include the restoration of law and order and military-civil responsibilities under existing laws and directives.

In July 1964, the California Military Department directed that all members of the Army National Guard would receive two hours of additional training per year based on the previously-mentioned manual, *Crowd Control and Riot Prevention*, published by the State Attorney General's Office. (See Annex C.)

Concurrent with their liaison and planning activities with law enforcement officials in their respective areas, the two California Army National Guard Division Commanders ordered the following accomplished:

- a. The selection and notification of priority organizations to be employed in the event such requirement developed.
- b. The selection, in order of priority, of the major command headquarters to be employed as may be required.
- c. The orientation of selected staff personnel regarding possible troop employment in support of police activities.
- d. An inventory of available ammunition, gas masks, bayonets, radio batteries, vehicles, weapons, and similar supplies or equipment, with particular attention to selected organizations.
- e. That riot control training be emphasized in the selected organizations.

⁴ Appendix 12, Annex AA, CON REG 350-1 (USCONARC Training Directive).

The Riot Area, Los Angeles, California

Thus far, by way of introduction, we have discussed the legal basis for employing militia during civil disturbances, the growing concern of law enforcement officials in this State that such disturbances might occur on a large scale, and the joint planning and preparations for the California National Guard's employment in a law enforcement role. There remains only to describe briefly that portion of Los Angeles City and County which was to be the scene of operations.

The area involved comprises some 46 square miles, 34.4 miles of which lie within the boundaries of south-central Los Angeles. (See Figure 1.) This relatively small segment of California's largest metropolis houses over one-half million people, 55% of whom are Negro.

While the name "Watts" has been used to identify the entire riot area, the Watts District, located in the extreme southeastern corner of the city and centered on 103d Street and Maie Avenue, makes up less than one-twentieth of the total area. It has a population density of 25.7 persons per acre, compared with a City of Los Angeles average of 9.2, and 87% of its inhabitants are Negro.

Watts and its surrounding neighborhood can, by many yardsticks, be described as slums. Housing is badly overcrowded. Unemployment is widespread. The great majority of those employed work at menial tasks for meager pay. The area has an unusually high percentage of broken homes, an excessive number of school dropouts, and considerable illiteracy. The crime rate greatly exceeds that of the city as a whole.

But Watts and its surrounding communities are a far cry from the classic slum with its dilapidated tenements and squalor. The area consists mainly of one story, single family homes, with lawns, shrubs and trees. There is breathing space. While buildings generally date from the years just prior to World War I and many are badly run down, there are no infestations of rats and cockroaches such as plague slums of some Eastern cities. Interspersed with these homes are small apartment buildings, businesses, shops and churches.




Figure 1. The Riot Area.

CHAPTER II

ALERT AND PRELIMINARY MOBILIZATION PHASE

The Beginning

About 1900 hours Wednesday evening, 11 August 1965, a California Highway Patrol officer stopped a vehicle at 116th Street and Avalon Boulevard, near the Watts district of Los Angeles, and attempted to arrest the male Negro driver for drunk driving. The man's mother and brother interfered and were abusive in their language and attitude toward the officer. A crowd quickly gathered. LAPD officers who responded to the patrolman's "Officer needs help" call found some 300-500 hostile Negroes harassing the arresting officer, taunting him and shouting threats. After 45 minutes, police were able to remove the arrestees. The last police unit leaving the scene was stoned by the crowd, which continued to grow. Immediately thereafter, white citizens began to phone in complaints of vehicles damaged and persons injured by thrown missiles.

The LAPD, reinforced by Los Angeles County Sheriff's Officers, was able to disperse the original crowd, but not until it had swollen to approximately 1,000 persons. Throughout the night, conditions continued to deteriorate. There were numerous incidents as angry crowds gathered on street corners. Aggravated by the presence of news photographers, rioters attacked two newsmen and burned their automobile and equipment. An estimated 300 unruly citizens stoned the LAPD Field Command Post at Imperial Highway and Avalon Boulevard. The police lacked the necessary manpower to regain control of the situation and their efforts to scatter the mob split it into smaller groups which ranged over a wider area. A survey made at 0200 disclosed the first known large scale looting as a result of the breaking into and sacking of a large market at 116th Street and Avalon Boulevard. However, by this hour of the morning, the area had become quiet and control appeared to have been established.

Developments Thursday Afternoon and Evening

The tempo of disorder began to pick up again Thursday afternoon and police intelligence reports showed an increasing trend toward large scale lawlessness and violence. Consequently, Chief Parker of the LAPD telephoned The Adjutant General just prior to 1700 hours, advised him of the situation and indicated he might find it necessary to call for troop support.

The Adjutant General immediately alerted key members of his staff who were still on duty in the headquarters and caused OTAG's emergency operations machinery to be set in motion. He next called Brig Gen Robert G. Elder, Assistant Division Commander, at the headquarters of the 40th Armored Division in Los Angeles. He informed General Elder of Chief Parker's call, alerted him concerning the possible requirement for division troops and directed that liaison be established immediately with the LAPD. General Hill next called the Governor's Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Sherril Luke, advised him as to the situation and requested that information to this effect be relayed to the Acting Governor, Lt Governor Glenn M. Anderson, who was then in Santa Barbara. (Governor Edmund G. Brown was in Europe.) The Adjutant General's next action was to call the home of Colonel Robert L. Quick, OTAG Inspector General and special liaison officer in civil disturbance matters, and alert the latter for travel to Los Angeles at the earliest possible moment to act as the OTAG representative at LAPD headquarters. Finally, Gen-

eral Hill contacted Maj Gen Paul R. Teilh, Commanding General of the 49th Infantry Division of Northern California by phone and briefed him on the situation.

During the early hours of the evening, Colonel Quick returned to OTAG headquarters, received a personal briefing from General Hill and departed for Los Angeles by commercial air on the first available flight out of Sacramento. He was met at the Los Angeles International Airport by a representative of the 40th Armored Division and was in the headquarters of the LAPD by 2345 hours, at which time he reported his arrival to The Adjutant General. Meanwhile, General Hill had telephoned various members of the Governor's staff from time to time and had been apprised of the Acting Governor's itinerary for the evening, to include the projected time of the latter's arrival at his residence in Hawthorne, near Los Angeles.

In the interim, following Chief Parker's call to General Hill, the situation in Los Angeles had continued to deteriorate. By 1800 hours, the buildup of unruly crowds had forced Chief Parker to borrow manpower from four other divisions of the LAPD to reinforce the 77th Street Division. By 1900 hours, there were an estimated 2000 rioters in the area of 116th Street and Avalon Boulevard. The LAPD Emergency Control Center was activated at 1930 hours and assistance from the Sheriff's Reserve was requested. Shortly after 2000 hours, the number of rioters and the violence of their attacks on policemen and police vehicles caused a withdrawal of all police units from the area and the establishment of a perimeter while spokesmen for the community were given an opportunity to exercise what influence they could muster.

Meanwhile, the 146th Air Transport Wing of the California ANG, in Van Nuys, and the 129th Air Commando Group, in Hayward, had been alerted to the possibility that airlift of troops into the Los Angeles area might be required. At OTAG, in Sacramento, the Emergency Operations Center of the headquarters had gone into operation on a twenty-four hour basis. Radio broadcasts were continually monitored and periodic calls for information were made to the California Highway Patrol, the LAPD and cooperating radio stations in the Los Angeles area. As a precautionary measure to facilitate a timely move to Los Angeles of The Adjutant General and a portion of the OTAG staff, the 129th Air Commando Group of the California ANG at Hayward was requested to provide standby transportation at Sacramento in the form of a C-119 aircraft. This aircraft was in position at McClellan Air Force Base at 2300 hours.

Shortly after midnight Thursday, Colonel Quick was advised by Chief Parker's Adjutant that the LAPD visualized no foreseeable requirement for National Guardsmen at that time. This information was relayed to The Adjutant General, who immediately passed it on to Acting Governor Anderson, then at his residence in Hawthorne. The latter advised General Hill of his plans to fly to the San Francisco Bay area Friday morning for a meeting of the University of California Board of Regents, in Berkeley, unless the riot situation again became critical. It developed that the Governor's Los Angeles office was informed by the LAPD that the situation was under control, prior to the Acting Governor's planned time of take-off, so he proceeded with his trip to Berkeley.

Developments Friday Morning, 13 August

Colonel Quick telephoned General Hill at about 0830 with a detailed report as to the significant events of the previous night. A meeting of the key members of the OTAG staff was held, in order that they might be fully informed, and contingency plans for establishment and operation of a field command post were reviewed. Selected staff officers were advised of the possibility of their being airlifted to Los Angeles on short notice.

At approximately 1015 hours Friday, Colonel Quick telephoned General Hill that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and that he had just heard Chief Parker announce his intention to ask for 1000 National Guardsmen. General Hill passed this word to his staff, established 12 noon as a projected time for the OTAG field command post party to depart Sacramento, and advised Brig Gen Elder of the 40th Armored Division and Mr. Winslow Christian, Executive Secretary to the Governor, of the impending request. While The Adjutant General was talking to Mr. Christian, the latter indicated he was being called by Chief Parker.

At the request of Acting Governor Anderson, General Hill changed his previously announced plans for travel to Los Angeles. The Adjutant General and staff would now join the Governor's staff party on an ANG C-119 aircraft which was bringing Acting Governor Anderson from the Bay area to Sacramento, with an expected arrival time of 1300 hours at McClellan Air Force Base.

Meanwhile, at LAPD headquarters, Colonel Quick met with Colonel Irving B. Taylor, the officer designated by the Commanding General, 40th Armored Division, to act as senior commander of troops, if Chief Parker requested support. In this meeting, Colonel Quick briefed Colonel Taylor as to his knowledge of the situation, discussed the legal and other ramifications of Guardsmen being employed in a law enforcement support role, reviewed the established policy with respect to the issue of ammunition to the troops and cited the requirement that Guardsmen were not to resort to gunfire unless forced to do so by circumstances beyond their control.

As the result of OTAG's alert message on Thursday evening, Headquarters 40th Armored Division had designated those battalions which would probably be called first, if the ARNG were needed in Los Angeles. Until about 1300 hours on Friday, however, all units were concentrating on preparation for Annual Field Training.

California National Guard Posture on 13 August

On Friday the 13th, all units of the California Army National Guard were in inactive status. Armories were manned by Administrative/Supply Technicians, one per company sized unit, and by one or two officer staff technicians at battalion and brigade headquarters. Each division headquarters was manned by the full-time Chief of Staff, three general staff officers and a few clerical personnel. Units of the 40th Armored Division, with the exception of the 3d Brigade from San Diego, were scheduled to assemble at their armories some time on Friday evening, in drill status, in preparation for an early Saturday morning departure for fifteen days of Annual Field Training at Camp Roberts. The 3d Brigade was in Federal training status on the 13th, enroute to Camp Roberts. Most units of the 49th Infantry Division were planning a two-day training assembly for the weekend of 14-15 August.

The California Air National Guard was engaged in the normal activities of operating air bases on a full-time basis. In addition, efforts were being directed toward field training activities scheduled for the weekend. Portions of the support elements of the 146th Air Transport Wing were actually in a field training status at Van Nuys on Friday. Final arrangements were also being made for weekend flights scheduled in support of the

National Guard Bureau's "GUARDLIFT II" exercise. Among these weekend missions was the airlift of California's 162d Communications Group to its Annual Field Training sites in Northern California.

The 129th Air Commando Group was preparing for a unit training assembly scheduled for the coming weekend. This was to be the last drill prior to the deployment of the unit to the Panama Canal Zone during the following week. Most of the Hayward technician force was therefor engaged in packing equipment and finalizing movement plans. Because of all of this activity, over 1,000 Air Guardsmen were on duty at ANG bases during Friday 13 August.

Events of Friday Afternoon 13 August

When Acting Governor Anderson arrived at McClellan Air Force Base shortly before 1300, General Hill immediately briefed him as to OTAG's knowledge of the Los Angeles situation. Then, at the instigation of representatives of the press who were present, a press briefing was held while some 150 armored vests (which had been requested by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department through the Law Enforcement Division of the California Disaster Office) were being loaded. After the press briefing and while the aircraft loading was still in process, Acting Governor Anderson again gave his full attention to the situation in Los Angeles, consulting with his staff advisors, General Hill and staff. This discussion was concluded at 1320 with the Acting Governor authorizing The Adjutant General to assemble elements of the 40th Armored Division comprising an effective strength of at least 1000, in drill status, at their armories by 1700 hours. Orders to this effect were relayed to the division at 1330 by a series of telephone calls originating at the McClellan Air Force Base Operations Center.

Meanwhile, the OTAG staff in Sacramento continued to monitor the situation and to proceed with the administrative and logistical measures necessary to the call-up of Guardsmen to State Active Duty. Brig Gen Bernard J. Kitt, Deputy Adjutant General, Army, conferred with Mr. Ron Clark of the Governor's Office concerning provisions of the *State Military and Veterans Code* applicable to this situation. Army Guard staff members coordinated with Headquarters 40th Armored Division regarding equipment and supply requirements of the alerted units. Through Colonel Quick, the staff arranged with the LAPD for locating General Hill's command post adjacent to the police Emergency Control Center and sought to establish a policy for the ARNG's dealings with news media representatives, who were already pressing Headquarters 40th Armored Division for information of Guard activities.

OTAG's Air Guard staff, under the direction of Acting Chief Colonel Jack Motes, reviewed air support procedures and initiated plans for all possible airlift contingencies. Experience with previous emergencies had shown that airlift requirements could be effectively met and controlled only if requests for air support were submitted through the OTAG Emergency Operations Center to the Air Division staff. It was determined that this procedure would be followed from the outset. The Air staff would, in turn, assign missions directly to CAL ANG organizations. In effect, the OTAG Air staff served both as a command headquarters and air transport control center throughout the deployment phase of the operation.

A direct telephone line had been established between OTAG's advance command post in the LAPD and OTAG's EOC in Sacramento. Through Colonel Quick, the OTAG staff in Sacramento kept informed of the still expanding riot situation. By 1400 hours, two full blocks of 103d Street were in flames. Firemen were being driven off by thrown missiles and rioters were completely overrunning law enforcement officers. The number of fire alarms reached such proportions that fire control measures

were reduced to a visual control surveillance of the area. All possible fire fighting equipment from LA and its environs was brought into play and, at one time, the entire San Fernando Valley area was reportedly covered by only five pieces of equipment.

By 1500 hours, rioting, looting and burning raged out of hand. Streets in the Watts area were jammed with rioters numbering in the thousands, who had created a veritable waste-land of burning and pillage. Six snipers had fired on a police helicopter. Police communications were completely inadequate for processing the enormous volume of calls, which were both legitimate and of a decoy or false nature. Looters were acquiring large numbers of weapons. Fires and looting were expanded east, west and northward into the Newton Street area, where long stretches of business firms were being turned into "charcoal alleys," and disorders appeared to be spreading to Compton and elsewhere in the LA County area.

Some 600 Los Angeles Police, Sheriff's Officers and California Highway Patrolmen committed to riot control duties were concentrating on efforts to disperse the crowds. By 1600 hours, they had arrested more than 500 rioters and it was necessary to open the old Main Jail in order to handle the volume.

Immediately on his arrival in the Los Angeles area, Acting Governor Anderson conferred with Mr. Hale Champion, State

Director of Finance, and others. Concurrently, he instructed The Adjutant General to call to duty such units and numbers of Guardsmen as General Hill felt were required to meet the situation. Accordingly, at 1630 hours, The Adjutant General ordered Headquarters 40th Armored Division to complete the assembly of the 2d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, in State Active Duty status, prepared to support the LAPD on call.

Shortly after 1700 hours, General Hill and staff met with Mayor Yorty and Chief Parker at Chief Parker's headquarters, where they were soon joined by Acting Governor Anderson. Here they discussed the current situation, the role to be played by the California Army National Guard, and the Governor's proclamation which had been signed at 1650 hours (See Annex D). The proclamation stated that a condition of tumult and riot existed in a portion of the County of Los Angeles and that, under the applicable provisions of the *Military and Veterans Code*, the Governor was ordering into the service of the State those California Army National Guard forces which he deemed necessary.

Throughout the alert and preliminary mobilization phase, OTAG kept the Governor's Office, the Public Safety Agency, the National Guard Bureau and Headquarters Sixth U.S. Army continually informed regarding the situation in the riot area as it promised to involve the California National Guard.




Figure 2. Zone of Operations and Initial Mission Areas.

CHAPTER III

INITIAL OPERATIONS PHASE

General

As activated units of the 40th Armored Division assembled at their armories, The Adjutant General and staff conferred with police officials to develop suitable missions for Guard forces.

At this time, approximately 1800 hours on 13 August, the police were primarily concerned with two critical areas. The first was a portion of Watts. The other was a stretch of Avalon Boulevard from 120th Street north to Century Boulevard. The two areas had felt the brunt of the burning, looting and other mob violence during the preceding 48 hours and still required constant surveillance by several hundred police officers.

Initial missions given the CAL ARNG were to take control of these two areas, assisting the Los Angeles police with the apprehension of rioters, the prevention of looting, and the protection of life and property. The police were determined, with Guard assistance, not only to disperse rioters but to make mass arrests and to seal off and regain control over both of the problem areas. (See Fig. 2.)

At approximately 1830 hours, these missions were assigned to Colonel Irving B. Taylor, Commanding Officer of the 2d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, and in civilian life a veteran police officer, who was to command Guard troops during the initial phase of riot operations. Instructions given Colonel Taylor, in the presence of staff officers of Headquarters, 40th Armored Division, were to work directly with the police inspectors having operational control over the riot areas. By moves carefully coordinated with the police, Guard units would establish roadblocks, seal off assigned sectors, and clear streets of rioters while police made the necessary arrests. Guard commanders would respond to requests of police officials in charge of operational areas, but would be responsible only to their military superiors.

Colonel Taylor was to move in with his troops deployed in combat formations by 2400 hours, or sooner if possible, but allowing sufficient time for reconnaissance and the preparation of plans, the issuance of operations orders and the orientation of individual soldiers as to the nature and scope of their mission. The proper use of troops in fulfilling their support role was deemed more important than their speedy commitment. The ARNG would employ minimum force to do the job, but would use all necessary measures. If fired upon, they would fire back.

ARNG and ANG Forces Available

By 1700 hours, 539 officers and men of the two infantry battalions and armored cavalry squadron first alerted were assembled at their armories. Their number grew rapidly so that, by 2000 hours, the ready strength of these organizations was as follows:

Unit	Armory	Strength
1st Bn, 160th Inf	Glendale	496
4th Bn, 160th Inf	Long Beach	383
	Fullerton	
1st Recon Sqdn, 18th Armd Cav	Burbank	477
	Sylmar	
	Lancaster	
	San Fernando	

By this time, other 40th Armored Division elements alerted between 1400 and 1700 hours were standing by in their armories as follows:

Unit	Armory	Strength
3rd Bn, 160th Inf	Santa Ana	404
	Colton	
	Orange	
1st Sqdn, 111th Cav	Inglewood	406
	Long Beach	
Hq & Hq Co, 2d Bde, 40th Armd Div	Ontario	86
40th MP Co	Los Angeles	103

Also by 2000 hours, these forces were augmented by a medical company, a signal detachment, and an Army aviation element with two H-23 helicopters, and Colonel Taylor had at his disposal a brigade with a strength in excess of 2400.

Through Colonel Robert O. English, Senior Army Advisor to the California Army National Guard, The Adjutant General advised Commanding General, Sixth U. S. Army of the commitment of these units to riot operations and obtained permission for them to delay their departure for Annual Field Training.

The 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry, with units in San Bernardino, Banning and Redlands, and a strength of 396, was in the process of assembling and would be available for commitment in the Los Angeles area early on 14 August. Moreover, anticipating possible additional troop requirements, The Adjutant General had directed that the 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, consisting of a headquarters and three tank battalions, with a strength of 856 and enroute to Camp Roberts, remain at its Ventura bivouac site pending further orders.

Headquarters, 49th Infantry Division, in Alameda, was advised concerning the situation and warned of the possible early call-up of infantry elements of that command, the most likely possibility being an airlift of two San Joaquin Valley infantry battalions from Fresno to the Los Angeles area.

Although the exact role the California Air Guard was to play in the mounting emergency was not clear, OTAG directed both the 146th Air Transport Wing at the Van Nuys ANG Base and the 129th Air Commando Group at the Hayward ANG Base to maintain a standby alert status. The 146th Air Transport Wing airlift capability on August 13th consisted of ten out of a total of sixteen assigned C-97's. Of the six aircraft which were not available, four were engaged in training missions with the Regular Air Force, Military Air Transport System (MATS) and two were scheduled for maintenance. The 129th Air Commando Group capability at this time consisted of five C-119 aircraft.

Throughout the afternoon hours, efforts were made by OTAG's Air staff to prepare an air support plan. A firm airlift plan could not be developed, because of the uncertainty of Army Guard troop commitments. However, at the same time the 49th Infantry Division was warned of the possible airlift of two infantry battalions, the 146th Air Transport Wing was advised of this possibility. Contingency plans were prepared to provide six C-97 aircrews within two hours after the assignment of this possible mission.

Plans for ARNG Employment

Colonel Taylor had previously decided to establish the Brigade Command Post at the Field Command Post of the Los Angeles

Police Department, at the 97th Street School (Figueroa Street and Golden Avenue). Here the LAPD Field Commander would assume full responsibility, for the Chief of Police, of all riot control activities. Here, too, police intelligence affecting ARNG missions would be readily available, and here requests for Guard assistance would originate.

Upon receipt of his mission, Colonel Taylor directed Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade, to proceed to the 97th Street School. He ordered the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry to assemble at the Manchester Playground (on Hoover Street near Manchester Avenue), to be prepared for early commitment in the Watts area, and directed the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry to assemble at the John Muir Junior High School (on Vermont Avenue near Slauson Avenue). Colonel Taylor also approved a request of the Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry, to move his Fullerton units to the Long Beach National Guard Center.

Arriving at the 97th Street police headquarters, Colonel Taylor conferred with Deputy Police Chief Murdock concerning specific missions, while the 3d Brigade staff arranged for the use of various high schools as battalion bivouac areas.

Initially, police officials had no definite plan for the employment of the National Guard. There was no clear picture of conditions existing in the riot areas early Friday evening, because of a dearth of intelligence at this time. Rioters were still starting numerous fires; but no distinct pattern of riot activity had emerged. One primary concern of the police was to relieve most of the 300 police officers occupying the still critical sector of the Watts area. The second police requirement was for the Guard to sweep Avalon Boulevard and two to three blocks on either side of it, from Santa Barbara Avenue south to Slauson Avenue. (Figs. 3 and 4.) In these and all subsequent missions, police would be working with Guard units, so that police officers could make necessary arrests and would be available later to testify in court. Policemen accompanying Guard units could also quickly arrange for the evacuation of apprehended rioters and the disposition of confiscated arms, loot and other contraband.

Colonel Taylor assembled his battalion commanders at the 97th Street Command Post at 2030 hours and briefed them concerning the situation. He assigned the Watts area to the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, which by now was arriving at the Manchester Playground. He gave the Avalon sweep mission to the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry, assembled at the Long Beach National Guard Center, and directed the battalion to move to a forward assembly area at Wrigley Field (42d and San Pedro Streets). He ordered the 1st Squadron, 111th Armored Cavalry to assemble at Jacob Riis High School (Main and 67th Streets) and assume responsibility for a sector bounded by Florence Avenue on the north, Broadway on the east, Century Boulevard on the south, and Vermont Avenue on the west. (See Fig. 5.) There were no missions for the other two rifle battalions and reconnaissance squadron at this time.

Colonel Taylor instructed his commanders concerning the legal and moral ramifications of Guardsmen using live ammunition and directed them to stress this matter in briefing their units. He ordered that ammunition be issued to squad leaders and that one man in each squad be designated to return any fire directed at the unit. Other troops would be given ammunition and permitted to fire only when this was necessary to protect their own lives.

Situation as of 132300 August

As Colonel Taylor deployed his brigade in and around the assigned areas, the riot situation reflected in police intelligence reports was increasingly grim. Riot activities were threatening to spread north from the original hot spots in Watts and along Avalon Boulevard. It was estimated that, without drastic control

measures, disturbances would reach the center of the city in about four hours.

There were several critical areas. A flare-up at Manchester and Broadway was growing. Police officers were reported under fire at Washington Boulevard and Central Avenue. Looters were plundering the Sears store at Slauson and Vermont Avenues. There was a threat of looting in the Inglewood area, also a report that rioters planned to take over the 97th Street Police Station at midnight.

On Broadway, between 81st and 93rd Streets, on Avalon Boulevard between 48th and 51st Streets, and on Central Avenue between 29th and 41st Streets, there were major disturbances involving looting and shootings. Increasingly large crowds were gathering on Avalon Boulevard between 49th and 51st Streets, where stores were being pillaged and some shots were being fired.

103d Street between Compton and Wilmington Avenues was also the scene of heavy looting and sporadic shooting. Fires still burned out of control here and on Avalon between 106th Street and Century Boulevard. Rioters were employing Molotov cocktails and shots were being directed at fire fighting crews. The Fire Department had requested 50 police officers to provide protection.

One Deputy Sheriff and two looters had been killed.

There was considerable concern about what might happen should the looters turn their attention to the parking lot of the Coliseum, where thousands were attending a circus.

The pattern of disturbances was that, wherever an incident took place, a crowd would quickly gather. While stores were burning, looters made off with everything in reach. Rioters were shooting at police as well as firemen in some locations. By 2300 hours on 13 August, there were six to eight such areas where crowds ranging from 50 to 1,000 people were involved, most of them spectators. Riot fever seemed to be spreading from neighborhood to neighborhood, as police forces became over extended and incapable of coping with the situation.

Confronted with this picture The Adjutant General decided, shortly before midnight, to order to active duty two infantry battalions of the 49th Infantry Division, from the Modesto-Fresno area, and to airlift them to Los Angeles as soon as possible. This information was furnished the OTAG Emergency Operations Center in Sacramento, where the movement of the 49th Infantry Division elements was planned, directed and controlled.

Initial Operations in the Watts Area

The 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, had completed its move to the Manchester Playground by 2100 hours. There the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Thomas T. Haykin, immediately assembled his entire command for a briefing concerning conditions in the Watts area and what was expected of the ARNG. He emphasized considerations for the safety of civilians on the streets, as well as the safety of the Guard troops, and instructed all concerning the issue and use of ammunition.

The portion of Watts assigned to the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry was bounded by Success Avenue on the west, Century Boulevard on the north, Grape Street on the east, and 104th Street on the south. (See Fig. 3.) Lt Col Haykin split the area into two parts, assigning the west sector to Company A and the east sector to Company B, with other battalion elements held in reserve at the Manchester Playground.

As Companies A and B moved by truck to final assembly positions at Will Rogers Park (103d Street and Central Avenue), troops observed numerous stores being looted. Individuals laden with food, shoes, liquor and everything imaginable moved between Guard vehicles at times.

At the park, the two units formed in company columns and marched to the 65th Fire Station, at Success and 103d Streets,




Figure 3. Initial Mission Area, 1st Bn 160th Inf.




Figure 4. Initial Mission Area, 1st Recon Sqdn 18th Armd Cav, 3d Bn 160th Inf and 4th Bn 160th Inf 13 Aug and 3d Bde 40th Armd Div 14 Aug 65.




Figure 5. Initial Mission Area, 1st Sqdn 111th Cav.

where police assigned to the area had established a command post. These units were deployed in tactical formations. Company B moved to the east sector, with its far boundary at Grape Street and extending back to Beach Street, and including east-west streets between 102d Place and 105th Street. Company A followed, to establish its eastern boundary at Beach Street and occupy a similar area extending west to Success Avenue. Companies deployed in column formations and moved into assigned areas. Troops were positioned on each side of the street with about 15 yards between men. Troops on the south side of the street provided cover for those on the north, and vice versa. The area was secured by 2300 hours and 260 policemen were moved out of the Watts area for other duties. Lt Col Haykin established his battalion command post at the 65th Fire Station.

As Company B entered 103d Street from the east, troops beheld a spectacle such as most of them had never seen before. Store buildings on both sides of the street were in flames. Some fire hydrants were knocked over or tops were broken off, and water was shooting 75 feet into the air. The only people in sight were police stationed at street corners and firemen manning nine fire trucks. Police had managed to push rioters east as far as Grape Street and clear the area up to the alley line on both sides of 103d. As troops advanced, some rioters could be seen darting across the street in the distance. Beyond 102d Street on the left and 105th Street on the right was a "no man's land." Police in the area, many of whom had been on continuous duty for 36 hours, were delighted to see the National Guard.

By this time almost all of the business houses along a twelve-block portion of 103d Street had been plundered and burned nearly to the ground. Left standing were a few stores marked "Negro owned." Police advised that this burning and looting had taken place that afternoon. The few firemen on duty were simply trying to keep fires from spreading to remaining stores and nearby residences.

Police had warned that, if any civilian cars penetrated the area, Guardsmen could expect to draw some fire and that car occupants would probably throw incendiary bombs.

About 2315 hours, a Cadillac was driven down 103d Street from the west and its occupants fired four caliber .38 bullets into the door of the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry Command Post. At 2330 and again at 2345, troops stopped vehicles attempting to penetrate their blockades.

About midnight, Lt Col Haykin learned of a Guardsman having been run down in the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry area. Police had fired upon and wounded the car's driver. At this time, he directed that ammunition be issued to all 1st Battalion troops. Guardsmen were directed not to fire unless fired upon or there was a threat of a car overrunning their positions.

Company B patrols came under sniper fire from the upper windows of an apartment house near 102d Place and Grape Street. Troops returned the fire from several positions and a squad moved in to flush out the structure. Guardsmen apprehended two of seven persons suspected of doing the firing and seized some caliber .22 ammunition, but could find no trace of weapons. Police arrested the two suspects.

Company B established two roadblocks on 102d Place, at Beach Street and Grape Street, constructing barricades using abandoned civilian cars, garbage cans, signs, broken glass, and anything else they could lay hands on which could be counted on to stop or slow down a vehicle.

Very shortly after the Cadillac incident, the driver of a Mercury carrying four persons of Mexican descent tried to overrun Company A's roadblock at Compton Avenue and 102d Place. A squad of men manned this post, two of them stationed behind several pieces of debris collected as a barrier. The driver "floor-boarded" the Mercury and tried to run through the barricade.

Guardsmen fired into the vehicle, killing the driver and severely wounding the man sitting beside him. Two youths in the rear seat suffered numerous fragmentation-type wounds about the legs, arms and faces.

Guardsmen quickly summoned nearby police, who examined the car and its occupants and called a police ambulance to remove the seriously wounded man, who was being given emergency care by the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry Surgeon. Almost simultaneously, a police ambulance removed the vehicle driver.

About 0130 hours, three cars carrying several young Caucasians attempted to enter the area at Compton Avenue and 102d Place. Company A troops fired one warning shot, halted the cars, made the passengers dismount, and searched the vehicles. They found quantities of wine, whiskey, Molotov cocktails, and rocks. The troops removed these items and immediately turned them and the prisoners over to police stationed nearby. When questioned by the police, the youths disclosed that some of them (about ten who had Molotov cocktails in their possession) were from La Puente. One car contained a young white male and his bikini-clad girl friend. They possessed no obvious contraband but surrendered a nearly empty gallon wine jug.

Things quieted down for about ten minutes, then six shots were fired from the upper windows of a hotel two doors west of 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry Command Post. Fire from the hotel ricocheted off a building on 103d Street and bullets were bouncing inside the Battalion Command Post. Several Guardsmen had been positioned on rooftops to watch for this sort of thing and protect troops in the street. One of these was stationed on the roof of a building across the street. On hearing shots he ran to the front of the rooftop and saw several policemen flattened against the side of the Watts Police Substation pointing their weapons at the upper story of an adjacent hotel. Looking in the direction the police were pointing, the private saw the outline of a man standing in a doorway leading to a balcony. The sentry fired a warning shot and the figure withdrew. A few moments later the man suddenly reappeared. The Guardsman fired once more. Police went immediately to the upper floor of the hotel, found that the suspected sniper had been killed and sent the body to the morgue by civilian ambulance. Fearing more fire from the hotel, Lt Col Haykin sent a lieutenant and two enlisted men to flush out the place. They emerged after about fifteen minutes with a sawed-off caliber .22 rifle and a pistol, both loaded, which were released to the police.

The private came down off the roof with a bad case of "shakes". After a couple hours of rest, he requested permission to go back to his rooftop position and was allowed to do so. No further firing came from the hotel.

Throughout Friday night there was intermittent sniper fire in the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry sector of the riot area. Apparently, mostly caliber .22 weapons were involved.

Company B troops were not forced to stop any additional cars by gunfire. There were many feints by drivers who would send their vehicles charging toward the roadblocks, then decide that Guardsmen meant business and stop. Troops searched several cars and, during the early morning hours on Saturday, apprehended about fifteen looters. They confiscated 120 pints of whiskey from one car and 20 cases of wine from another, also 12 pairs of shoes, some wrist watches and transistor radios. Guardsmen destroyed the liquor and gave other items to the police.

Prior to the arrival of Guard troops, police had been unable to provide much protection for firemen, some of whom were so tired they were just sitting on their hoses and trying to keep enough water on the burning ruins to prevent flames from spreading. Rioters apprehended by Guardsmen stated that all "white hats and blue uniforms" were sniper targets, but that they were not especially interested in shooting at soldiers.

Towards daybreak, the area of the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry became relatively quiet. Lt Col Haykin ordered Company C, in battalion reserve at the Manchester Playground, to relieve Company B in the eastern sector of Watts. Headquarters and Headquarters Company was to relieve Company A in the west sector.

About 0310 hours, as Company C was relieving Company B, a 1959 white Oldsmobile sedan was driven through a roadblock at 103d Street and Wilmington and swerved as if it would run down a Company C squad. Guardsmen fired approximately 15 rounds and wounded both of the vehicle's male Negro occupants, one in the neck and one in the shoulder. The vehicle crashed through a service station and collided with a frame house behind it. Guardsmen searched the car and found no weapons or other contraband. As they held the two wounded men in a kneeling position, awaiting evacuation by police ambulance, one shouted: "Kill me, white man, kill me before I kill you!"

The relief of Company B proceeded rapidly enough, in the sense that Company C men quickly assumed their positions. It was some three hours, however, before all Company A troops reached their assembly area at Will Rogers Park, because of the sporadic and at times heavy sniper fire which made movement extremely hazardous. Officers who took part in the operation likened it to anti-guerrilla combat in cities, with troops silhouetted in the streets being fired upon from windows and rooftops of darkened buildings and from roving cars on the perimeter, whose occupants would open up with their weapons then quickly drive away. Guardsmen ducked behind walls, flattened out in gutters and used whatever cover they could find. Where sources of firing could be spotted, patrols went in pursuit. Much of the sniper fire, although of light caliber, was from automatic or semi-automatic weapons.

The Avalon Boulevard Sweep Operation

Almost simultaneously with the commitment of 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, in the Watts area, the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry, began its sweep of Avalon Boulevard.

As Lt Col Robert N. Ford, Battalion Commander, was receiving his instructions from Colonel Taylor at 2030 hours, the battalion began moving from Long Beach to the Manchester Playground. During the move, Lt Col Ford met with the Inspector in charge of police forces to be working with the battalion and discussed details of the sweep mission.

4th Battalion, 160th Infantry units arrived at the Manchester Playground and then proceeded on to a forward assembly area at Wrigley Field (42d Street and Avalon), completing the move by about 2130 hours. Here troops and participating police were briefed and given their orders. By 2345 hours, troops and police officers were deployed at Santa Barbara Avenue and ready to begin their move down Avalon Boulevard. (See Fig. 4.) Ammunition had been issued to squad leaders, who were designated as "marksman" for their squads and were instructed to return fire if troops were subjected to sniping.

Early Friday evening, Colonel Taylor had requested LAPD to furnish him portable public address systems. Just prior to the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry sweep, Colonel Taylor employed a hand transportable PA (bull horn) to read a proclamation directing the people of the neighborhood to leave the streets and return to their homes.

Company A formed a platoon skirmish line across Avalon Boulevard and was just starting to move out when a vehicle was observed some 300-400 yards away, heading north on Avalon. The car was moving at a high rate of speed, without lights, in the inside lane. Ahead of it was a slower moving vehicle. As the driver of the speeding car approached the rear of the slower vehicle, at an estimated speed of 50-60 miles per

hour, he swerved sharply to the outside lane, slammed on his brakes and went into a locked skid. Several police marshals working with the Guard unit opened fire. The vehicle smashed into the side of a marshal's car, swung around, and stopped heading south.

During its slide, the skidding vehicle struck and seriously injured a sergeant of Company A, knocking him under the wheels of a 2½ ton Army truck.

One of two male Negro occupants in the vehicle, the driver, was wounded by police gunfire.

Colonel Taylor, who witnessed the incident, along with The Adjutant General and members of his staff, compared the ramming attempt to a kamikaze attack. The vehicle was traveling without lights and at a high rate of speed. Advancing Guardsmen and police were clearly visible. The action of the driver could only be viewed as a deliberate attempt to run them down.

At this time, General Hill ordered Colonel Taylor to issue ammunition to all of his men, have them load their weapons, and fire as necessary to insure their safety and accomplish their missions.

There were no other significant incidents during this initial sweep operation, which lasted until 0600 hours Saturday morning. Rioters and looters were cleared from the streets. Troops recovered considerable loot, which they handed over to the police. They captured several individuals who were armed and assisted police officers in making numerous arrests.

Actually, the area was very quiet from about 0300 on. Since the sweep-through had taken longer than was anticipated, Lt Col Ford did not have his units turn around and sweep north upon reaching Slauson Avenue, but requested Colonel Taylor's permission to pull his troops off the street. This was granted and the battalion withdrew to its assigned bivouac area at Bret Harte Junior High School (92d and Figueroa Streets).

Other Operations During the Night of 13-14 August

By 2200 hours, the 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry had closed into its assembly and bivouac area at the Jacob Riis High School (67th and Main Streets). Here the Squadron Commander, Lt Col Russell W. Porteous, briefed his troops and gave them their orders. The squadron's initial mission was to take charge of a sector comprising about 14 blocks on each side of Manchester Avenue, between Vermont Avenue and Broadway. (See Fig. 5.) Guardsmen were to control looting and assist the LAPD in restoring order to the business area, which was pretty well burned out and plundered when troops took over about 2350 hours on Friday evening.

Lt Col Porteous established his command post at Jacob Riis High School, with a forward CP at the corner of Manchester and Broadway.

In occupying its sector, the 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry released 140 policemen for other duties. The police pulled out shortly after Guardsmen moved in, except for eleven officers who stayed to work the troops. Guard units established control over the area using roving motorized patrols, which consisted of ¼ ton trucks, each carrying three Guardsmen and a police officer, who rode in the right front seat. Foot patrols were also employed in the business section.

Lt Col Porteous had tight control over his squadron's activity from the outset. Unit officers were responsible for giving the command for any firing. Squadron staff officers were integrated in the patrol activity, giving them firsthand information of what was going on and enabling them to assist the commander in controlling operations.

As viewed by Troop A, action in the 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry area was pretty slow on Friday evening. There were some hit and run shootings, which patrols were not able to pin down.

The presence of motorized and foot patrols operating throughout the sector obviously had a restraining effect.

In the Troop C area on Friday night, two ¼ ton trucks carrying patrols were fired on by snipers. Guardsmen and police completely surrounded the building from which the firing originated and spotted and killed a sniper with their combined fires. There were several incidents where snipers fired a couple shots and then quickly disappeared.

Troop C men on dismounted patrol captured several looters. In one case, attracted by the sound of breaking glass, a sergeant patrol leader dashed in the direction of the noise and spotted a looter. The man took off and refused to halt until several rounds were fired at him. Fortunately, he was not killed. The patrol apprehended the man and turned him over to police officers who had come immediately to the scene when they heard shooting.

When one Troop C motorized patrol drew sniper fire, Guardsmen and police immediately placed the suspected building under surveillance. The building was locked. A Guardsman observed a muzzle flash from an upper story window and lobbed a tear gas grenade through the window. About the time that the effects of the gas would have worn off, the sniper fired another round. First police and then Guardsmen returned the fire and numerous rounds were expended. A Guardsman and several police then donned gas masks, forced the door and searched the building. They found no one. A woman living behind the building claimed that she saw three men leap over her fence and run away.

Troop B did not take part in any shooting incidents on Friday evening, but one patrol was indirectly involved when a sniper began firing at passing cars from a school building at Manchester and Vermont Avenues. Police had the building surrounded when the Guard patrol arrived. Cars were still being driven by, so Guardsmen immediately set up road blocks and routed traffic away from the scene.

Early Saturday morning there was an unusual incident involving 2nd Lt Raymond O. Wrenn, Troop A, who was subsequently awarded the State of California Military Cross for his actions.

As Lt Wrenn and members of his platoon participated in routine motorized patrol activity, firemen requested a Guard escort to help them move equipment to the scene of a fire. Lt Wrenn obtained permission from his troop commander and proceeded to provide the escort.

Some 300-400 people standing in the street around the burning building refused to make way for the fire truck. Guardsmen cleared a path in front of the equipment so that it could be moved within reach of the fire. The fire fighting crew consisted only of four men.

The fire involved a department store which had been ignited by a Molotov cocktail thrown in a back window. Police had tried to put out the original fire from the rear of the building, but the blaze had reached electrical circuits and spread everywhere at once.

The crowd was beginning to grow to huge proportions and Lt Wrenn had only six people with two ¼ ton trucks to help him control it. He radioed for reinforcements and then tried to hold back and re-route traffic. Before help could arrive some time later, there were four major fires burning in a three block area.

A vehicle passed about 50 feet from Lt Wrenn's parked jeep and the two occupants opened fire with automatic weapons. Lt Wrenn had carefully cautioned his men not to fire unless fired upon. However, in view of the danger to bystanders, he undertook the capture of these men without firing at them and endangering bystanders by pursuing them as they tried to escape by car down an alley. Lt Wrenn successfully halted the car and took the men into custody. They were carrying two automatic pistols, a German Luger type and a caliber .32 automatic.

By this time, additional Fire Department personnel had reported in plain clothes. Five other pieces of equipment had arrived and firemen were trying to control three large fires blazing in a three block area.

One of the fires was in a clothing store. The owner, contacted by phone, had warned that he had stored some five gallon drums filled with gasoline in the rear of the building. Lt Wrenn succeeded in forcing the crowd far enough back from the store so that there were no injuries when the inevitable explosion came. Two homes to the rear of the building caught fire but were quickly extinguished.

The general area where this incident was taking place showed the results of earlier far-ranging destruction. Most business buildings had burned to the ground, cars had been up-ended, and streets were strewn with broken glass.

Lt Wrenn's troops were receiving considerable abuse from the crowd, particularly Wrenn's driver, a Caucasian. (Note: Lt Wrenn is a Negro officer.) The driver was spat upon, kicked, and hit with stones. To make the situation more precarious, Lt Wrenn had to dispatch two Guardsmen to protect a fire station about three blocks away, leaving him only four men to control most of the hundreds of neighborhood residents, who were congregating in the three blocks between 110th Street and 111th Place.

Firemen finally regained some sort of control and Lt Wrenn's troops were reinforced by other Guardsmen and police. Some 30 or 35 looters were apprehended, most of them youths 13 to 14 years of age.

The 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry remained in its initial sector through Sunday evening and the units of the squadron were rotated for rest periods at Jacob Riis High School between patrol assignments.

Meanwhile, the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry was given its first mission, to sweep Broadway and vicinity from Washington Boulevard south to Slauson. (See Fig. 4.) The squadron had completed its move to John Muir Junior High School (59th Street and Vermont Avenue), its assembly and bivouac area, by about 2200 hours. Here the Squadron Commander, Lt Col Robert T. Dove, briefed his units and issued his orders. The squadron completed its deployment into the assigned area of operations by 2230 hours.

Lt Col Dove employed his troops in the shape of a boomerang, so as to sweep the area from two directions at the same time. His goal was to corral the rioters rather than to scatter them, enabling the police to make the maximum number of arrests. The sweep took place with only one or two noteworthy incidents and was completed about 0240 hours on Saturday morning.

In preparing his people for probable missions, Lt Col Dove had emphasized that troops were to treat civilians pretty much as they would like to be treated and would employ minimum force necessary to accomplish their mission. Initially, he handled control of ammunition much as other units of the brigade and had it distributed only to squad leaders.

Early Saturday morning, Troop B dispatched a patrol to provide protection for firemen who were receiving sniper fire while fighting a blaze on 49th Street. Some 20 Guardsmen, relieving weary firemen, manned hoses and contained fires until reinforced firefighting personnel got back on the job.

Some of Lt Col Dove's initial impressions of his squadron's operations were that civilians and police alike were very pleased to have Guardsmen in the area, but for different reasons. He noted that, particularly where crowds were gathered around fires, blue-suited police and firemen alike were objects of scorn and abuse, whereas Guardsmen were generally viewed in a quite different light.

Because of the attitude of the people, and despite the Guardsmen's limited training for this specialized function, troops proved

effective in directing and controlling traffic. Police officers in Lt Col Doye's area quickly turned this chore over to the Guard and devoted their attention to other pressing matters.

A Fire Captain in civilian life, Lt Col Dove was particularly interested in the firefighting aspect of the riots and how the Guard could effectively aid the Fire Department in bringing this situation under control. Techniques were later developed and policies established in the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry area of operations which contributed significantly to the solution of the firefighting problem.

The remaining Guard involvement in riot control activities on Friday evening 13-14 August, was a sweep of San Pedro Street and vicinity, from Jefferson Boulevard south to Slauson Avenue, conducted by the 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry, beginning about 2300 hours. (See Fig. 4.) This sweep was accomplished without any unusual incidents.

Completion of Initial Operations Phase

By 2400 hours on 13 August, Colonel Taylor's brigade attained peak strength. During the remainder of the initial period of operations he had at his disposal 3083 troops, as follows:

Unit	Station	Strength
Hq & Hq Co, 2d Bde	Ontario	87
1st Bn, 160th Inf	Glendale	496
2d Bn, 160th Inf	San Bernardino	396
3d Bn, 160th Inf	Santa Ana	404
4th Bn, 160th Inf	Long Beach	383
1st Sqdn, 111th Cav	Inglewood	406
1st Recon Sqdn, 18th Armd Cav	Burbank	711
40th Maint Bn	Long Beach	52
40th Med Bn	Bell	45
40th MP Co	Los Angeles	103
Total		3,083

All of these elements had actually been committed in support of the LAPD except for the 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry, still in the process of moving into the Los Angeles area from its armories to the east of the city. The 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, halted in Ventura while enroute to Camp Roberts, had been ordered to riot duty by The Adjutant General and was retracing its route to Los Angeles. Arrival of the Brigade would augment Colonel Taylor's forces by an additional 856 troops.

Shortly after midnight, OTAG had taken all possible steps to effect the early arrival in the Los Angeles area of infantry reinforcements from central and northern California. Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division, the 1st Battalion, 185th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry, were ordered to State Active Duty and directed to assemble at the Fresno Air Terminal as soon as possible. Unit locations and assigned strengths were:

Unit	Station	Strength
Hq & Hq Co, 3d Bde, 49th Inf Div	Fresno	83
1st Bn, 185th Inf	Fresno	168
	Hanford	102
	Visalia	96
	Reedley	139
2d Bn, 185th Inf	Modesto	174
	Merced	99

Unit	Station	Strength
	Madera	96
	Turlock	104
	Columbia	40
	Total	1,101

Units were to take with them rations purchased for their week-end drills and their field kitchen ranges, individual weapons and ammunition issued for emergency purposes, individual field equipment to include gas masks, and hand-carried radios. Vehicles were to be left behind; however, OTAG had arranged for necessary trucks and command vehicles to be provided from U. S. Army Reserve equipment pools in the Los Angeles area. It was subsequently decided to move some 50 personnel of the brigade to Los Angeles using assigned transportation.

OTAG also arranged through the LAPD for the use of school buses to haul troops from the "off-load" point, at Van Nuys Air National Guard Base, to the Los Angeles riot area. Otherwise, during the initial operations phase, most logistical support was provided from State sources under emergency provisions of CAL-EP-62 or by the U. S. Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) from his resources and active Army stocks at Fort MacArthur.

By 0100 hours on 14 August, 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division elements were assembling at armories and preparing to move to the Fresno Air Terminal. The initial turn-out of troops was not as rapid as would have been the case had the alert come earlier in the evening, as telephones were the only means of contacting individual Guardsmen until commercial radio stations came on the air beginning about 0300 hours.

Initial Airlift Operations


The Adjutant General's decision to fly in 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division units was quickly communicated to OTAG's Air staff in Sacramento. The Fresno Air National Guard Base at the Fresno Air Terminal was selected as the "on-load" point because of its central location. The Van Nuys ANG Base was chosen as the "off-load" site, because its facilities were directly controlled by the California ANG. It was estimated that the 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division elements would require about four hours to assemble in Fresno.

This first mission was assigned to the 146th Air Transport Wing at 0055 hours. The Wing's operational concept was to employ up to eight C-97's, to be "scrambled" as the alerted aircrews reported in. Base maintenance could make this number of operational aircraft immediately available. The Wing committed six aircraft to the initial phase of the mission. The first call for aircrews was made at 0100 hours and the first C-97 was airborne enroute to Fresno at 0240, less than two hours later. The last of the six aircraft was airborne by 0425 hours and all were at the appointed load-on point by the time ARNG troops arrived.


Concurrently with their alerting of the 146th Air Transport Wing, the Air staff advised Colonel Milton R. Graham, Commander of the Fresno ANG Base, concerning the situation and directed him to prepare the Fresno Base to receive Army Guard troops and the C-97's inbound from Van Nuys. Colonel Graham was to coordinate with the local ARNG commander to insure proper control of the loading operation. Within thirty minutes, fifteen Fresno Air Guardsmen had reported to base duty stations.

By 0600 hours on Saturday, 14 August, over 5,000 California Guardsmen, Army and Air, were either engaged in, committed to, or directly supporting riot operations.





Guardsmen of Company B, 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry arrive at Wrigley Field for the Avalon Boulevard sweep 13 August 1965.—Los Angeles Times



1800 Block E. 103d Street, Midnight 13 August 1965, Guardsmen of 1st Battalion,
160th Infantry.—Los Angeles Times

CHAPTER IV

TROOP BUILD-UP AND OCCUPATION PHASE

The Situation Early Saturday Morning

As infantry reinforcements and aircraft were converging for the airlift from Fresno to Van Nuys and the 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division was moving south from Ventura, police and Guardsmen were establishing some semblance of control over a portion of the Los Angeles riot area. Daybreak brought a general relaxation of violence and a chance for most of the troops to rest, while Guard leaders took stock of the situation and made plans for the following evening.

By mid-morning on Saturday, 14 August, the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry had relieved Companies A and B, with other battalion elements assuming the responsibility for roadblocks and patrols in the Watts sector. An initial attempt to open up the area and permit residents to move about was quickly terminated when the situation began to get out of hand, and tight control was reestablished.

There was no requirement on Saturday morning for the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry to resume its Avalon Boulevard operations. The situation here remained quiet, so the battalion rested at the Bret Harte Junior High School and prepared for future missions.

The 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry continued its motorized and foot patrols over a portion of Manchester Avenue and vicinity.

The 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry and 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry kept their assigned sectors under surveillance, while the bulk of their forces occupied bivouac areas at John Muir Junior High School and Washington High School.

Meanwhile, the airlift of 49th Infantry Division elements from Fresno was proceeding smoothly.

Aircraft loading operations were slowed initially because the Army Guard's need to retain unit integrity required that troops be formed into passenger loads by unit and assigned by written manifests to specific aircraft. For later loading operations unit rosters, prepared for the most part at home stations, were used as passenger manifests.

The first outbound aircraft departed Fresno at 0530 hours, carrying 77 passengers. By 0755 hours, 270 troops were airborne and 150 additional personnel were waiting to load aircraft. The 146th Air Transport Wing now committed two additional C-97's to the Fresno operation and, by 0915 hours, some 534 Army Guardsmen had been airlifted from the Fresno Air Terminal.

Aircraft arriving at the Van Nuys ANG Base were met by school buses arranged for by the LAPD. The off-loading was well organized and troops proceeded without delay to their designated assembly areas.

In Los Angeles, Colonel Taylor had conferred with the OTAG staff and recommended that a curfew be imposed throughout the disturbed area beginning Saturday evening. He also urged that OTAG and police firm up plans for the continued use of the Army National Guard, so that commanders could move into their assigned sectors and reconnoiter them during daylight hours. He felt that plans must be more specific as to what the Guard was expected to do; also, the troops would be more effective if deployed further out on the fringes of riot areas. For example, on Friday evening Guardsmen might have achieved tighter control over the Watts area by moving further south. Learning that two infantry battalions of the 49th Infantry Division were being airlifted to Los Angeles, Colonel Taylor recom-

mended that one of them be committed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, in the Watts sector. This would provide fresh troops for what had been a critical area on Friday evening and would facilitate the delineation of division areas as operations expanded.

Developments During the Day of 14 August

Three significant events on Saturday gave impetus to the troop buildup and set the stage for a second phase of operations.

By Saturday morning, it was apparent to Acting Governor Anderson that the riot was far from being under control and that disturbances involving up to 10,000 rioters could be expected to flare up again at any time. He felt that widespread conditions of extreme peril to persons and property existed and local authorities were incapable of coping with the worsening situation. He therefore proclaimed, at 1000 hours, that a State of Disaster existed in the County of Los Angeles and thereby set procedures in motion to bring the full resources of the State of California to bear on the problem.

Also by 1000 hours, General Hill had ordered the four remaining infantry battalions of the 49th Infantry Division to State Active Duty and was arranging for their airlift to Los Angeles by Saturday evening. Units would travel light and, upon arrival, would borrow vehicles and radios from 63d Infantry Division (U. S. Army Reserve) elements in the Los Angeles area. The Adjutant General also directed that all combat units of the 40th Armored Division at Camp Roberts return immediately to Los Angeles, and ordered the 3632d Ordnance Company (103d Ordnance Group) and 579th Engineer Battalion (49th Infantry Division) to proceed to Los Angeles using assigned truck transportation.

By 1100 hours, infantry elements of the 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Carl O. Nichols, had completed their airlift to Van Nuys and the brigade's "land tail" was moving south from Fresno by unit vehicles. A short time later, Major General Teilh, 49th Infantry Division Commander, with his G1 and Aide, departed for Los Angeles by Sixth U. S. Army aircraft. By this time more than 6,200 Army Guardsmen were involved in or committed to riot operations; 3,900 from the 40th Armored Division and 2,300 from the 49th Infantry Division.

At 1645 hours, Acting Governor Anderson proclaimed a State of Extreme Emergency in Los Angeles County. This would further enable him to issue and enforce rules, regulations and orders considered necessary to protect life and property. The first rules issued in this context were contained in a curfew proclamation signed at 1700 hours. This proclamation, issued as a necessary measure to enable police and Guardsmen to reestablish control over the riot situation, required all persons to keep clear of streets, alleys, parks and all public places from 2000 hours until sunrise the following day. The curfew rules were clearly explained by news media announcements. Only those persons having emergency business or who resided in the area, and who must travel to and from it for legitimate reasons, might do so after demonstrating this need to authorities enforcing the curfew. The curfew zone was bounded by Adams Boulevard and Washington Boulevard on the north, Alameda Street on the east, Imperial Highway and 120th Street on the south, and Van Ness Avenue and Crenshaw Boulevard on the west (see Fig. 6).




Figure 6. Initial Curfew Area (14 Aug) and Division Zones of Responsibility as of 151200 Aug 65.

The Adjutant General had decided early Saturday afternoon that the full resources of the 40th Armored Division and most of the 49th Infantry Division would be committed to riot control operations. To the extent practicable, 49th Infantry Division units would be airlifted from a number of concentration points throughout northern California. This would increase Saturday's total airlift requirement to move approximately 4,000 troops and would make more than 13,000 Army Guardsmen available for riot duties by late Sunday morning.

At approximately 1600 hours, General Teilh telephoned his headquarters from Los Angeles, directing that the two remaining brigade headquarters, the entire Division Artillery, the 1st Squadron, 170th Cavalry, the 1st, 3d and 4th Tank Battalions, 149th Armor, the 49th Military Police Company and a ration-breakdown section be airlifted to Los Angeles during the night. He further directed that certain personnel of his staff, including Assistant Division Commander, Brig Gen Robert F. Hassard, report as soon as possible.

Troop Operations During the Day of 14 August

While these events were occurring, activities in areas assigned to the 2d Brigade, 40th Armored Division were generally uneventful. Troops in the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry sector of Watts were subjected to constant harassment by the Negro citizens of the community. Several owners of businesses in the sealed-off area were allowed to go in and inspect their property, and one Watts area printer was permitted to remove the entire contents of his shop. At one time, the only persons on the streets, other than Guardsmen and police, were mail carriers operating out of the Watts Post Office.

A local funeral director was allowed to proceed with three funerals scheduled to be held in Watts on Saturday morning. Troops remained alert at roadblocks, but made themselves inconspicuous as the funeral processions passed. The funerals were conducted without incident, although police and Guard officers had been apprehensive as to what might happen if these crowds were permitted to assemble.

Also on Saturday, Guardsmen permitted a wedding to take place involving the daughter of a former Negro sergeant of the 40th Armored Division. Father and daughter drove up to a barricade in their formal wedding attire and troops convoyed them through the streets of Watts to a church near 103d Street and Compton Avenue. When the ceremony was finished, Guardsmen escorted the wedding party out of the area.

Except for the few events of this nature, there was little semblance of normalcy in the Watts area on Saturday. There was apparently no organized riot activity, but trouble makers were constantly sensing the situation and ready to spring into action. For example, about 1500 hours, Company B, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, was relieving one of its squads at a roadblock. All at once there were many more roving cars needing to be stopped. Soon both the relieving unit and unit being relieved had their hands full and the relief had to be delayed for some time. News of any development such as this was spread by word of mouth through the Negro community and traveled like wildfire.

About 1400 hours on Saturday, Lt Col Haykin, Commanding the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, learned that the 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division was arriving in the area and that its units were in the process of drawing military vehicles from the U. S. Army Reserve. Lt Col Haykin took Colonel Nichols, Commanding Officer of the 3d Brigade, and his two battalion commanders on a reconnaissance of the Watts area and then to a briefing conducted by Colonel Taylor and police officials at the 97th Street Command Post.

Elsewhere in the 2d Brigade area there was little significant activity during daylight hours on Saturday. Battalions took advantage of the opportunity to conduct additional riot control

training and found troops highly motivated and much interested, despite a lack of sleep.

Colonel Taylor assembled his battalion commanders at 1500 hours and gave their orders for Saturday evening. The 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry was to be relieved by the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry, as soon as Lt Col Jack W. Conway, Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, could feed his troops and coordinate details of the relief with Lt Col Haykin. The 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry would then regroup at the Manchester Playground and await further orders. The 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry was to conduct a sweep of Vermont Avenue from Adams Boulevard to Exposition Boulevard, clearing Vermont back to the alley line on each side of the street. The 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry would continue to patrol its originally assigned sector.

Missions assigned other battalions of the 2d Brigade, 40th Armored Division called for the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry to continue its mobile screening operations along Broadway, from Exposition Boulevard to Slauson Avenue, using minimum forces and keeping the remainder in reserve at Berendo Junior High School (12th and Berendo Streets). The 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry was to protect the Crenshaw Shopping Center at Crenshaw Boulevard and Santa Barbara Avenue, using motorized patrols to cover the surrounding area. The battalion Command Post would be located at Horace Mann High School (69th and St. Andrews Streets).

Effective 1500 hours on 14 August, the 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division assumed control of the area bounded by Washington Boulevard on the north, Hooper Street on the east, Slauson Avenue on the south, and San Pedro on the west. (See Fig. 4.) Commanded by Colonel Gordon M. Dawson, the Brigade consisted of a headquarters and three tank battalions. The 3d Battalion, 185th Armor and 5th Battalion, 185th Armor conducted sweeps of Central Avenue and Avalon Boulevard, respectively, from Slauson Avenue north to Washington Boulevard. The 6th Battalion, 185th Armor followed and supported both sweep operations. Sweeps were completed, patrols were in operation, and check points were established at key intersections by about 1830 hours.

By this time, with increasing numbers of 40th Armored Division troops being committed, Maj Gen Charles A. Ott, the Division Commander, had returned from Camp Roberts and was preparing to direct Division operations from his Command Post at the Hope Street Armory.

While the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry prepared to relieve the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, other 3d Brigade, 49th Infantry Division elements moved into the Manual Arts High School (42d Street and Vermont Avenue).

Second Phase Airlift Operations

The commitment of remaining infantry units of the 49th Infantry Division required the airlifting of approximately 300 troops from Oakland and a like number from San Francisco and San Jose. At 1000 hours on Saturday, OTAG's Air staff assigned the Oakland and San Francisco missions to the 146th Air Transport Wing and the San Jose mission to the 129th Air Commando Group. Assignments were based primarily on the airport facilities at these locations and the estimated assembly times of Army National Guard troops.

The 146th Air Transport Wing airlift capability now amounted to nine C-97 aircraft, all of which were committed to the new mission. Aircraft crews would operate on three shifts, with the original crews, on duty since 0100 hours on Saturday, being replaced Saturday evening. A third shift would take over at 0700 hours on Sunday. The first C-97 was in position at its assigned on-load point at 1205 hours Saturday afternoon.

Full use was obtained of the 146th Air Transport Wing's C-97's despite some conflicting requirements. As a part of the National

Guard Bureau's "GUARDLIFT II" program, the Wing had been scheduled to airlift southern California elements of the 162d Communications Group, CAL ANG, to their field training sites in northern California on Saturday morning. When the riot situation developed, OTAG warned the Commander of the 162d to anticipate a probable delay in the airlifting of his units and instructed the 146th Wing that riot operation airlift would have priority over any previously scheduled missions. However, by taking full advantage of time intervals required for the assembling of 49th Infantry Division's infantry units, the 146th was able to airlift most of the 162d Communications Group elements to McClellan Air Force Base as aircraft were being deployed from Van Nuys to on-load points at Oakland and San Francisco.

Also at 1000 hours, OTAG gave Colonel Charles W. Koenig's 129th Air Commando Group, in Hayward, its first troop airlift requirement. Since the unit was in drill status the weekend of 14-15 August, Group personnel were ready immediately for support missions. The first of five C-119 aircraft available was dispatched to San Jose and was in position at 1330 hours, thirty minutes prior to the scheduled on-load time.

While this second phase of the airlift was in progress, the OTAG Air staff learned of the requirement to transport remaining elements of 49th Infantry Division to the Los Angeles area. Troops were to be assembled at the Stockton Metropolitan Airport, Chico County Airport, McClellan Air Force Base, Oakland International Airport, and Moffett Field U. S. Naval Air Station (San Jose).

For the first time the full magnitude of the airlift was apparent. First and second phase requirements had developed quickly, as decisions were made to commit troops to meet the deteriorating riot situation. The OTAG Air staff had employed all available Air National Guard forces as if each airlift were a complete operation, while at the same time attempting to anticipate future air transport requirements. Now, with the third phase of the troop build-up, it was clear that the Air Guard would require outside help, in order to accomplish airlifts with the timeliness and dispatch required by the worsening riot situation.

Having committed the complete California ANG airlift capability to second phase requirements on Saturday morning, and anticipating probable additional airlift need, OTAG's Air staff had contacted the 349th Troop Carrier Wing (U. S. Air Force Reserve) at Hamilton Air Force Base, to determine if that organization could make its C-119's available. The Wing Commander replied that he had the capability, but lacked the authority to commit his aircraft in support of State military forces.

To clear the way for possible airlift support by either the U. S. Air Force or Air Force Reserve, the Governor's staff took steps on Saturday afternoon to insure that Presidential approval would be forthcoming.

At 1430 hours, Brig Gen George W. Edmonds (scheduled to become Deputy Adjutant General, Air Force, on 1 September 1965), who was at OTAG and taking part in the EOC operation, personally phoned Brig Gen William H. Brandon, Deputy Commander of Western Transport Air Force and requested WESTAF assistance. General Brandon advised that he could furnish two C-130 and two C-124 aircraft, provided approval was obtained from the Military Air Transport Service and the Pentagon. At this time the OTAG Air staff also contacted the Sacramento Air Materiel Area (McClellan Air Force Base) and Mather Air Force Base. Colonel Charles D. Birdsall, McClellan AFB Commander, immediately promised support in the form of one C-54 and one C-118 aircraft.

Colonel Birdsall's commitment was the first U. S. Air Force material assistance for the airlift mission. Approximately four more hours were to pass before the operational release of additional USAF aircraft could be obtained. Although the OTAG Air staff received direct word that the President had approved

the use of Federal airlift forces, confirmation through USAF channels could not be obtained. This situation necessitated repeated telephone calls between Colonel LaVerne J. Tobin of the OTAG Staff and Lt Col Frank Atchison, National Guard Bureau Staff Duty Officer, to obtain the proper USAF releases. Meanwhile, the WESTAF capability was increased to three C-130 and five C-124 aircraft.

By 1900 hours, OTAG had assigned third phase airlift missions to the 146th Air Transport Wing and 129th Air Commando Group. The C-97's were scheduled to airlift 600 troops from Moffett Naval Air Station and 600 from McClellan Air Force Base. The 129th Group's C-119's were to airlift 300 troops from the Stockton area. The 146th mission was later changed as USAF and Air Force Reserve aircraft became available.

Operations During the Night of 14-15 August

The 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry was in for another eventful evening before being relieved of its responsibility in the Watts area. Late Saturday afternoon, Lt Col Haykin learned of a build-up of "red arm band" Negroes in the vicinity of 103d and Grape Streets. Police intelligence reports indicated that the group would try to penetrate the battalion sector at 1900 hours. Company C, whose area included the 103d and Grape Streets intersection, was alerted. About 1930 hours, Company C reported some 40-50 people at a beer tavern 100 yards east of the intersection. Many of the individuals, several of whom wore red armbands, were yelling and inciting the crowd, which milled around in groups of from five to ten.

As elements of the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry arrived in the vicinity of 103d and Grape Streets shortly before 2000 hours and began to take over the roadblock, the driver of a pickup truck threatened to crash the barricaded intersection. The truck was coming from the east, approaching Grape Street. The NCO in charge of Company B, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry troops manning the roadblock positioned himself and one other man in the middle of the intersection, halted the vehicle, and pulled it to the side of the street for questioning. A couple of minutes later, the driver of a red 1957 Chevrolet proceeding west on 103d Street failed to slow down for the traffic control markers and tried to run the roadblock. The Sergeant turned and shouted "look out!" At this time, an NCO and other Guardsmen of the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry opened fire on the red vehicle.

1st Battalion, 160th Infantry personnel had observed this red Chevrolet in the area on numerous occasions during the afternoon, while operating jeep patrols. The driver was definitely aware of the traffic cones placed about 75 yards in front of the 103d and Grape Streets intersection. As the car slammed into the barricade and was fired upon, it stopped at 103d and Grape Streets. The driver was badly wounded by gunfire. A passenger in the car was cut by flying glass but did not appear seriously injured.

Heavy sniper fire on the roadblock from an apartment house at 103d and Hickory Streets, some of it involving automatic weapons, prevented immediate evacuation of the two wounded rioters.

Because of this apparently organized crash attempt, involving two vehicles and sniper fire, Lt Col Haykin felt his unit should not proceed with the relief at this time. He had also become aware of an exposed gap at 103d Street and Wilmington Avenue, near the Pacific Electric Railway tracks. He pulled a part of Company C back to plug this gap and advised Lt Col Conway, 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry concerning this situation.

Another incident involved a Company C, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry squad manning a roadblock at 102d and Beach Streets, a four way intersection partially barricaded by a trailer and

trash cans. About 2100 hours, a vehicle approached the roadblock from the east, on 102d Street. When it was 200 yards away, a Guardsman behind the barricade flipped a cigarette on the pavement. The driver halted his car, turned off the lights, backed up 40-50 yards, and sat there for about ten minutes. Then he turned on the car lights and proceeded slowly toward the intersection. The Sergeant in charge and another soldier stepped into the intersection, leaving two other men behind the barricade. The Sergeant shouted "Halt!" several times, but the vehicle continued on. The Sergeant fired two warning shots in the air and the man with him fired one shot. The vehicle sped up to an estimated 40-50 miles per hour, so the Sergeant ordered one shot fired at a tire. When the vehicle kept coming, he ordered all of his men to fire at the vehicle. It immediately went out of control, swerved around a corner and headed up Beach Street, where it careened off a brick building, wedged between the building and a telephone pole, and stopped. The vehicle was occupied by a male Negro in his twenties. Police arrived on the scene almost immediately. They removed the wounded driver, evacuated him by police ambulance, and searched the vehicle. Sniper fire was quite heavy throughout this incident.

There was later activity at this same roadblock. Company C men were in position and receiving considerable sniper fire when a 1955 or 1956 red and white Buick was spotted proceeding east on 102d Street. The Sergeant in charge and two of his men moved out into the street and fired two warning shots in the air. When the driver speeded up and tried to crash the roadblock, Guardsmen shot out one tire and the vehicle skidded to a halt some 25-30 yards away. Troops pulled the two Negro occupants from the vehicle and searched them. The male driver was uninjured, but his female companion suffered a leg wound.

Again police quickly arrived at the scene. As they were evacuating the two Negroes, the 1st Sergeant of Company C noticed that sniper fire was coming uncomfortably close to the police and his men manning the roadblock. As two Guardsmen went to aid the police, the Sergeant used a bull horn and ordered residents of the area to stay indoors and away from their windows. This order was given three times and ignored, so the Sergeant fired a shot in the air as a warning. Thereafter, the nearby residents stayed out of sight and police quickly removed the wounded female Negro by police ambulance.

While still in this area on the evening of 14 August, Company C personnel seized several caliber .22 and caliber .38 pistols from occupants of vehicles. Weapons were turned over to the police, who arrested the owners. Guardsmen also apprehended one driver who had 114 pints of liquor in his possession.

By approximately 2300 hours, the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry had the Watts sector pretty well under control and action was slowing down. Colonel Taylor directed Lt Col Haykin to move Company C, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry out of the area. This was done and the relief of the battalion by the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry was completed at 2320 hours.

By 2000 hours, 14 August, troops of the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry had moved up on line at Adams Boulevard to begin a sweep down Vermont Avenue. For this operation, police formed a skirmish line in front of the deployed Guardsmen. The chief concern of the approximately 40 police supported by the 4th Battalion was to prevent looting and keep citizens off the streets.

A roadblock was established at Vermont Avenue and Adams Boulevard, to keep south bound traffic off Vermont. As police and Guard units moved south, a squad of Guardsmen was dropped off at each intersection. A police officer was stationed at every second or third corner. Police were to make necessary arrests and arrange for the evacuation of prisoners from the area.

Guardsmen following police down Vermont moved by platoon echelons. As a squad was dropped off, another moved up from the reserve platoon, etc., until all intersections were manned. One company reinforced by two rifle squads was established as a roving reserve. Later, the battalion took over additional outposts on Vermont, south of Exposition Boulevard, relieving elements of the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry for duties elsewhere.

Guardsmen maintained roadblocks until about 0700 Sunday morning and then retained control over the area by motorized platoon patrols until relieved early Sunday afternoon.

There was no shooting in the 4th Battalion, 160th Infantry area on Saturday night. Lt Col Ford did investigate one report of automatic weapons firing but concluded that it was a case of troops being harassed by a string of firecrackers.

During this period, thorough security measures were employed at the 4th Battalion bivouac and motor pool area at the Bret Harte Junior High School. Sentries were posted on the roofs of school buildings where they could watch over vehicles pooled as far as possible from school ground outside boundaries. Sentries patrolling the front of the school grounds were stationed several yards in from the perimeter, to avoid any unnecessary incidents involving civilian passers-by.

There was considerable activity in the 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry sector on Saturday evening, including several incidents involving looters, broken windows, and suspicious cars operating in the area. Guardsmen confiscated a number of Molotov cocktails. One motorized patrol operating between Hoover and Figueroa Streets passed a row of apartment buildings at approximately 83d Street and saw two figures dart behind a parked car. Troops and accompanying police officers flushed out two Negro men. In the car behind which the two had taken cover, the patrol found a quart syrup bottle and a beer bottle converted to Molotov cocktails.

Two privates of Troop B, 1st Squadron, 111th Cavalry who were on a walking patrol in the Crenshaw shopping area (Crenshaw Boulevard and Santa Barbara Avenue) apprehended a wanted thief with a stolen car. The Guardsmen entered a tunnel used for deliveries to the shopping center, noticed a parked car, investigated, apprehended the Negro driver, and confiscated three weapons. They summoned police, using a nearby pay phone. The arresting officers then discovered that the driver was wanted for a previous theft.

In the area of the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry, along South Broadway, troops were engaged in protecting firemen who were being sniped at, particularly in the vicinity of 45th and 46th Streets. Most of the firing emanated from apartment buildings, although there were also instances of hit and run sniping by small caliber pistols fired from passing automobiles. Guardsmen and police captured several snipers and confiscated a variety of weapons, including shotguns, caliber .22 rifles, small caliber pistols and considerable ammunition. The Commander of Troop C was personally involved in the seizure of an Armalite AR 15 automatic rifle, of the type being used by U. S. forces against the Viet Cong, along with two boxes of ammunition. The weapon was set for semi-automatic fire.

About midnight, Troop A was confronted with a nasty situation at 49th Street and Broadway, where some 30 police and firemen and five or six fire trucks were immobilized by heavy sniper fire from all four corners of the intersection. Guardsmen had not been forewarned of the circumstances and were highly exposed in their 2½ ton and ¼ ton trucks. As they sought cover, sniper fire from a nearby theater roof missed one of the platoon leaders by inches. With the Troop Commander's permission, the Lieutenant fired some 35 rounds at the sniper from his jeep-mounted caliber .30 machine gun. This unprecedented use of an automatic weapon created temporary consternation among

troops and police forces, but all sniper fire immediately ceased and snipers retreated from the area.

1st Reconnaissance Squadron troops suffered no casualties, however, a shot from an assumed heavy caliber rifle creased the helmet of one NCO, knocking it off his head.

Nothing of special significance occurred on Saturday night in the area of the 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry.

In the 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division area there were minor incidents and sporadic sniper firing throughout the night. Shortly after midnight, at Slauson Avenue and Avalon Boulevard, a patrol of the 5th Battalion, 185th Armor observed an automobile approaching west on Slauson at a high rate of speed and being pursued by several LAPD sedans with flashing red lights. The Guard lieutenant in charge hastily moved his vehicles to set up a roadblock and fired several warning shots. When this action failed to slow the oncoming vehicle, troops fired directly at it and fatally wounded the driver.

Previous reference has been made to incidents in the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry area as the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry was in the process of taking over the Watts sector. The mission given the 2d Battalion, at this time under the operational control of Headquarters 2d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, was to secure its assigned area against looting, protect the 65th Street Fire House and Police Station, and assist the police as required. After his Saturday afternoon reconnaissance of the area, the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Conway, had decided to employ minimum patrols and to concentrate on blocking entrances to the area. His decision was prompted in part by his observation that numerous vehicles of suspicious appearance were cruising around the perimeter and apparently checking on the efficiency of the roadblocks. Lt Col Conway felt that these were the people who were most apt to cause trouble when darkness fell.

This was borne out during the battalion's initial attempt to relieve the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, when there were two attempts to run the roadblock at 103d and Grape Streets. About a half hour later (approximately 2000 hours), there was a third try at penetrating this barrier, now manned by personnel of Company C, 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry. Rifle fire was directed at the engine of the vehicle and it stopped immediately. The two male Negro occupants jumped out, threw up their hands and were taken into custody by Guardsmen and turned over to police. Thereafter, on Saturday evening, there were no more attempts to crash roadblocks in the battalion area.

There was some sniper firing early Saturday evening in the vicinity of the 103d and Grape Streets roadblock. Sheriff's officers working with the 2d Battalion flushed six persons from a nearby housing project. All were armed with weapons which had been recently fired.

Another significant development early Sunday morning was a requirement for the Army Guard to furnish security for the Van Nuys ANG Base, by now the scene of extensive troop off-loading activity. This mission was given to the 5th Battalion, 144th Artillery, 40th Armored Division, which had completed its return move from Camp Roberts. The advance party arrived at the Air Base at 0130 and the main body at 0230. Colonel Richard H. Denison, Van Nuys Base Commander, briefed the Battalion Commander, Lt Col Frank J. Smith, and staff concerning base security problems, provided them a copy of the Base Defense Plan and advised of arrangements for billeting and messing. Air Guard personnel continued to maintain security until Army Guardsmen, who had been on the road since 2000 hours the preceding evening, could be rested and fed.

The 5th Battalion accomplished its mission so effectively that there were no instances of thefts or pilferage while they were in charge of base security (both were a problem before the Army Guardsmen arrived). The show of force and the manner in which Guardsmen took charge was quite impressive to other

airport operators and neighbors of the Van Nuys Base, many of whom stated that they appreciated being situated close to an installation which could count on such adequate protection.

Throughout the riot area, Guard Commanders were agreed that the establishing of the curfew on Saturday evening contributed immeasurably to their success in controlling assigned areas. There was still much speculation as to what might yet happen.

At approximately 2300 hours on Saturday evening, Colonel Taylor had asked Inspector Davis of the LAPD to draw up a plan detailing the number of Army Guardsmen which the police felt would be necessary for regaining full control of the Los Angeles riot area. Inspector Davis used the services of 12 police officers having intimate knowledge of the Watts and Avalon areas. The plan, submitted to OTAG on Sunday morning, called for 17,000 Guardsmen or nearly the full available effective strength in the State. Colonel Taylor had previously advised OTAG of his estimate that at least 6,000 men would be required. Meanwhile, by late Saturday evening, in response to LAPD requests for assistance, Colonel Taylor had committed all troops of his brigade except for three trucks and 30 Guardsmen.

Of significance, too, beginning Saturday afternoon, Lt Col Dove, Commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry and a Fire Captain by profession, had many opportunities to consider the problems faced by Los Angeles firemen. He observed how their firefighting efforts were restricted by their being highly vulnerable to sniper fire, particularly those firemen silhouetted at pumper stations, hose batteries and on ladders. Many times firemen were being forced to abandon a fire. Lt Col Dove recommended to the Fire Department on Saturday evening that four Guardsmen be assigned to "ride shotgun" on every firefighting rig. The Fire Department quickly concurred and this practice was followed throughout the riot area. Troops remained at fire stations and from there accompanied fire crews as they responded to calls. By early Sunday morning, firemen were winning what had previously been a losing battle. They acknowledged that Guard assistance had been a big factor.

Completion of Troop Build-Up

With the escalation of the emergency and the commitment of both ARNG Divisions, The Adjutant General decided that command, control and coordination of operations could best be accomplished by establishing a fully-manned OTAG Emergency Operations Center in Los Angeles and leaving only the Air element and a small ARNG administrative and logistical staff in Sacramento. So, early on 15 August, Brig Gen Kitt and selected members of the OTAG staff were airlifted to Los Angeles by a C-119 of the 129th Air Commando Group. This was to be the last mission flown by the 129th in support of riot operations.

By 0430 hours on Sunday, all elements of the 40th Armored Division had reached assembly areas in Los Angeles or adjacent communities, so that the entire Division was available for riot control missions.

By mid-morning on Sunday, the airlift of the 49th Infantry Division combat elements to Los Angeles was accomplished, all motor elements were on their way and General Teilh had established his forward Command Post at Foshay Junior High School. Before the airlift was completed, the Air Guard troop carrying capability was augmented by ten U. S. Air Force aircraft (one C-54, one C-118, three C-130 and five C-124). The Air Force Reserve had committed nine C-119's and the Arizona ANG had committed three of its C-97's (arranged by the 146th Air Transport Wing). Some 4,025 troops and over 50,000 lbs of cargo were airlifted during 72 missions involving approximately 246 hours of flying time.

At approximately 1500 hours, 15 August, Brig Gen Robert J. Martell (Deputy Adjutant General, Air Force) returned to OTAG

headquarters in Sacramento. General Martell had been on temporary duty out of the State and was unable to arrange transport back to California until late on the evening of 14 August. General Martell was briefed by the Air staff concerning developments of 13-15 August. Since, by this time, the deployment airlift movements were essentially completed, General Martell directed his attention to plans for the redeployment phase, as yet only in the initial stages. After preliminary discussions with Colonel Motes, General Martell departed for the Los Angeles area to oversee personally the return air movement. At this point, the command and control of airlift operations were transferred to the Van Nuys ANG Base.

On Sunday morning Brig Gen Edwin A. Simpson, Assistant Division Commander, 49th Infantry Division, was placed in command of the division units remaining in the north, together with Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 103d Ordnance Group and its northern California units. These troops were placed in alert status in case there should be "sympathetic" flareups in the San Francisco Bay Area. Only the 1401st Engineer Battalion at the extreme northern end of the State, with a strength of 340, remained uncommitted.

With more than 13,400 troops available for riot operations, The Adjutant General could now employ Guardsmen in sufficient numbers to control the entire curfew area, while retaining adequate reserves for other possible developments. He therefore split the curfew area into two zones of responsibility, assigning everything west of the Harbor Freeway to the 40th Armored Division and all east of the Freeway to the 49th Infantry Division. This would make full use of the command, control and logistical support capabilities of the two division headquarters. Division commanders would conduct support operations under broad mission type orders, with OTAG now assuming more of a coordinating role.

The curfew area and zones of responsibility were defined so that there were comparable level Army Guard headquarters coordinating with and supporting police command elements. Division Commanders would respond directly to requests for assistance by the police field commanders responsible for division areas. Police would turn to OTAG with requests for assistance outside the curfew area and OTAG would in turn assign these missions to the appropriate Guard Division Commander. Fig. 6 shows areas of responsibility assigned the two divisions. Annex E is a complete list of all units committed during this phase of operations, giving their actual strengths and the locations of all battalion and higher headquarters.

Division Commanders were to occupy and control their assigned areas using the tactics and means required to assist police in enforcing the curfew and regaining full control. Activities would include patrolling, the prevention of looting and the wanton destruction of property, the apprehension of law breakers, guarding fire stations and post offices, and furnishing protection for Post Office employees, telephone repairmen and others trying to maintain or restore critical services in the riot-torn communities. While use of minimum force was desired, troops would take necessary actions to include the firing of individual weapons when needed to protect their own lives. Each Division was to maintain one highly-mobile battalion in reserve for employment on OTAG's orders.

Assignment of Division sectors was made effective 12 Noon on 15 August, with the deployed elements of the 40th Armored Division and the 49th Infantry Division reverting to Division control at that time. Relief of the 2d and 3d Brigades, 40th Armored Division was not actually completed until about 2000 hours, because of insufficient vehicles being available to the 49th Infantry Division.

The 40th Armored Division element first committed to riot operations, the 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, was designated

40th Armored Division reserve. By 1500 hours, the battalion had moved back to Glendale, where it established a bivouac in a park just north of the Glendale armory. The Glendale Police Department and other agencies made shower rooms and other facilities available to the Guardsmen. The local Salvation Army sent a station wagon loaded with refreshments to the bivouac area three times daily, a service greatly appreciated by the troops. The remainder of the 2d Brigade was given a new mission in the 40th Armored Division zone.

Meanwhile, at 1325 hours, Governor Brown (who had returned from his European trip) had extended the curfew area to the south, to include Rosecrans Avenue. Division sectors were changed accordingly and troop dispositions early Sunday evening were as shown in Fig. 7.

Operations During the Night of 15-16 August

As the critical hours of darkness approached on Sunday evening, some 732 LAPD officers, 70 California Highway Patrolmen, 500 members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office and over 13,400 Guardsmen were deployed in and around the curfew area. The results of this build-up were soon apparent.

In the north portion of the 40th Armored Division sector, the 2d Brigade encountered few difficulties establishing control. After observing the riot area from a helicopter, on Sunday morning, Colonel Taylor had decided to concentrate hereafter on controlling the front and rear of business streets, while lightly patrolling the adjacent residential neighborhoods. This was to become the pattern of employment for all brigades of the 40th Armored Division from Sunday evening on. Also, by Sunday evening, Colonel Taylor considered it no longer necessary for individual Guardsmen to carry loaded weapons, so he reverted to the earlier policy whereby ammunition was issued to squad leaders only. Each squad leader carried a loaded weapon, however, and was ready to deliver fire, if needed. This worked out very satisfactorily as, beginning Sunday evening, 2d Brigade troops experienced no problems requiring the firing of their weapons.

The situation was relatively stable throughout the 40th Armored Division area. At 2100 hours, OTAG directed the Division to send 100 Guardsmen to Long Beach, where a police officer had been killed while investigating a disturbance in the predominantly Negro section of that city. This threatening situation was quickly suppressed and a curfew was established by the Mayor of Long Beach. At 2115 hours, the City of Inglewood requested National Guard support to help prevent rioting in that city. The request indicated that three carloads of Negroes with Molotov cocktails had been stopped as they passed through the City. OTAG directed the 40th Armored Division to furnish necessary assistance. The threat did not materialize and Guard troops were soon withdrawn from this mission.

At 2145 hours, OTAG was asked to furnish 50 Guardsmen to close off the area surrounding the Lincoln Heights Jail and to disperse a crowd gathering near this facility, which housed most of the arrested rioters. This mission was also given to the 40th Armored Division which dispatched Troop F, 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry. The situation was quickly brought under control and there were no further incidents involving the jail.

There were few significant developments in the 49th Infantry Division sector on Sunday evening. About 2230 hours, troops of the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry shot and killed a Negro woman driver who attempted to crash a roadblock at 51st Street and Avalon Boulevard. Search of the vehicle disclosed a number of Molotov cocktails and looted articles.

Also on Sunday evening, an individual dressed as a Guardsman and professing to be a member of 40th Armored Division entered the OTAG Emergency Operations Center and requested 9mm ammunition. He was apprehended as he left the building

and was found to possess a 9mm Luger pistol. Unable to produce proper identification, he was turned over to the U. S. Department of Justice.

Throughout the night, there were hundreds of reports of shootings, fires, gathering crowds, explosions, etc., received by the LAPD Emergency Control Center. All reports were carefully checked and most were found to be untrue or greatly exaggerated. Many were the work of cranks, frightened citizens, or malicious individuals. Information received through police channels also indicated new riots might develop in Inglewood, San Diego, Van Nuys, Pasadena, Pacoima and San Bernardino.

By dawn on 16 August, the situation in the riot area had definitely changed for the better. Various groups, such as the Salvation Army, were given permission by Governor Brown to distribute bulk foods at designated locations within the disturb-

ance area. The food was to be distributed only during the hours of daylight, and the operation would be protected and controlled by National Guard troops. No hot meals were to be served, to avoid long waiting lines and the unnecessary gathering of crowds. Food distribution began early on the morning of 16 August and continued without incident.

At the same time, plans were prepared to provide security for trucks and personnel required to restock the many supermarkets located in the damaged area. Coordination of this activity was accomplished by the California Disaster Office.

Throughout the build-up and occupation phase of the Los Angeles riot emergency the National Guard Bureau, Headquarters, Sixth U. S. Army, and other interested agencies were kept continuously informed of the situation and the status of committed National Guard troops.

CHAPTER V

STABILIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL PHASES

Indications of Order Being Restored

The arrival of the National Guard in riot-stricken Los Angeles was welcomed by law enforcement agencies and all responsible citizens, for the presence of uniformed and armed soldiers presaged an early end to defiance of law and order. Acting Governor Anderson's curfew proclamation, coinciding with the troop build-up, was of tremendous assistance to Guardsmen and law enforcement officers. It gave them unequivocal authority to clear the streets of any citizens who did not respond to the Governor's edict and who lacked valid reasons for being abroad in the curfew area. Once streets were emptied, there was ample reason to doubt the motives of any persons observed moving about.

The effects were almost immediate. Would-be riot leaders were unsuccessful in their efforts to maintain the momentum of earlier lawlessness and, beginning Sunday, police records reflected definite indications that control was being restored. Demonstrations became more sporadic and scattered. There was reduced traffic over civilian-band radio frequencies (which were heavily used during the height of the riot). There was a return to a normal level of "crank" calls, which had also reached an unprecedented high.

With the tapering off of riot activities, inhibited by the curfew and by Guardsmen working hand in hand with the Los Angeles law enforcement agencies, the Governor announced on Tuesday morning, 17 August 1965, his belief that law and order had been restored to the area and that the riot was over. Confident that the current situation would stabilize and that there was little likelihood of serious flare-ups, the Governor decided to lift the curfew, effective immediately.

Reasoning behind this decision was that control over the rioting resulted chiefly from the establishment of the curfew and the presence of sufficient troops to enforce it. If the lifting of the curfew were deferred until after troops were withdrawn, any flare-up would encourage further disregard for law and order. It was concluded, therefore, that the curfew should be lifted while the troops were still present in force and available to prevent any recurrence of violence.

Police officials permitted an exhibition pro-football game to be played at the Los Angeles Coliseum on Tuesday evening. This annual charity affair sponsored by the Los Angeles Times had been originally scheduled for 14 August 1965. All agreed that, if this event took place without undue incidents, the riot was, in fact, over. However, to make certain that those attending the game could do so safely, an adequate protective force surrounding the Coliseum was provided by the Guard.

With the lifting of the curfew, the disposition and employment of National Guard units were altered drastically. Prior to this time, troops were conspicuously present throughout the area as they conducted foot and motorized patrols, directed traffic, manned roadblocks and provided escort services. All Guard units were now withdrawn into their bivouac areas, from where they were dispatched as the situation required an occasional display of force.

One notable exception was the use of the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 18th Armored Cavalry as a security force around the Los Angeles Coliseum during the football game. The Coliseum, being within the former curfew area, was considered the most critical location during the first evening of "freedom from

restraint." Representatives of the LAPD reported that there was an unprecedented lack of incidents at this football game; that spectators were somewhat subdued in their behavior, displaying a courteous manner both within the stadium and when leaving the parking lot afterward.

Factors Dictating Release of National Guard Units

As stated in Acting Governor Anderson's initial proclamation, the California Army National Guard was ordered into the riot-torn area because of conditions beyond the control of local law enforcement agencies. Significantly, troops were there to assist local authorities in restoring law and order. Guardsmen ordered to emergency duty would support but not supplant local law enforcement. No form of martial rule was declared. Troops would be withdrawn, according to plan, just as soon as control was reestablished and could be maintained without military assistance.

The Adjutant General was ever mindful, as the situation developed, of the necessity to withdraw the National Guard on a timely basis. As the runaway characteristics of the riot were stalled, the OTAG staff watched constantly for evidence of changes for the better. Any decision to reduce strength and eventually withdraw had to be weighed carefully, for premature troop reductions might well create a vacuum for still-aroused agitators to fill with greater and more vigorous disturbances. However, by the close of 17 August, it was clear that the turbulence was gradually subsiding to the point where civil authorities could resume full control. The National Guard had fulfilled its mission and could be relieved.

The decision to withdraw National Guard units was not made unilaterally by The Adjutant General. Liaison between OTAG and police officials was constant, comprehensive and effective. The withdrawal plan was announced only after careful joint determination had been made that control of the situation and area was within the capabilities of the local law enforcement agencies.

Plan for Withdrawal

For basically the same reasoning which guarded against a premature withdrawal of troops, the withdrawal plan avoided calling for all units to return to home stations at one time. It was considered psychologically advantageous to release troops on a phased basis, while continuing to demonstrate a show of strength sufficient to meet the needs of any expected situation.

A major factor which had permitted most units of the 40th Armored Division to respond almost immediately to the call-up of the Guard was their conduct of a unit training assembly on 13 August 1965, as a preliminary to departing for field training the next day. The conduct of Annual Field Training is a Federal requirement which is rarely, if ever, relaxed. This dictated that priority be given to the release of the 40th Armored Division elements from riot duties and that 49th Infantry Division units be retained in Los Angeles as long as troop support might be required.


In general, the combat capabilities of the units within each division established the priorities of their release. The supporting units, to include artillery, signal, transportation and Army aviation elements, were withdrawn first. Those forces possessing the



A Guardsman rides "shotgun" for fire fighters.—Los Angeles Times



During the early morning hours of 14 August a Guardsman stands ready to ward off snipers as Los Angeles County Firemen battle a blaze at a furniture store in the Watts Area.—Los Angeles Times



A typical "sweep" in the riot area by Los Angeles Police backed by Guardsmen.
—Los Angeles Times

greatest dismounted combat capability, such as infantry, cavalry and engineer units, were the last to leave.

The withdrawal plan called for the 49th Infantry Division to retain the responsibility for its current missions and to assume the missions of the 40th Armored Division. The importance of mobility was never more clearly demonstrated than by this expanded role given the 49th Division. It was clearly impossible for Division forces to occupy physically locations previously manned by the two organizations. Accordingly, battalion and company-sized mobile task forces were positioned where they could move quickly to any trouble spots likely to develop throughout the riot area.

The relief of the 40th Armored Division began with the departure of the support units at 1000 hours, 17 August 1965, and was completed when combat elements were released at 1000 hours, 18 August 1965. The withdrawal of the Division was accompanied by some overtones of anxiety and apprehension. This natural concern was to a degree stimulated by the several "threats" communicated by telephone and other means, such as: "We'll go again, Baby, when the Guard goes!" Fortunately, these threats were not fulfilled.

While the Guard's withdrawal was taking place on a phased basis, it was important that the rebellious segment of the population be convinced that sufficient strength remained to thwart any efforts designed to revive or renew the earlier chaos. It was also necessary to reassure responsible and law-abiding citizens that remaining troops were adequate to cope with any recurring disturbances. The withdrawal of the 49th Infantry Division, however, would put an entirely different light on the situation. When its units cleared the Los Angeles area, there would be no military help immediately at hand should a need arise. There was some comfort in thinking that the swiftness of the Guard's response to the Governor's call on 13 August would discourage anyone inclined to start rioting afresh.

Whereas the withdrawal of the 40th Armored Division was accomplished using its assigned equipment, the 49th Infantry Division returned to home stations by Air National Guard aircraft, commercial bus and unit vehicles which had been brought to the riot area following the period of initial occupancy.

The phasing out of the 49th Infantry Division followed the same pattern set by the 40th. The support units departed first, followed by the combat elements. The last major element leaving the area, on 22 August, consisted of approximately 1000 men of the 3d Brigade. The majority of these had been in the vanguard of the division and had remained in the area nine days.

In contrast to the emergency nature of the deployment phases of the airlift operation, the return air movements were accom-

plished on an orderly, scheduled basis. The deployment airlift of 13-15 August had been subject to many unknown and changing factors. The urgency of the situation required an immediate response to the phased commitment of Army troops and there was insufficient lead time for detailed advance scheduling of the available airlift forces.


For the return moves, the total requirements of the operation were firmly established well in advance of movement times. As a result, the return air movements were a classic example of the well planned airlift. The excellent cooperation between Army and Air Guard staffs at OTAG and subordinate levels insured successful execution of all phases of plan.

To develop and supervise return airlift plans, the command element of OTAG's Air staff was located at Van Nuys. This permitted close control of each facet of the operation. On 17 August, the 146th Air Transport Wing was notified to send a representative to the 49th Infantry Division to prepare a detailed flow plan for the return movement of the Northern California troops. The operation was split into two phases, given the code names NORTHSLIP I and LADYBUG. The NORTHSLIP I phase called for airlifting 1800 troops in 24 missions starting at 1800 hours on 18 August. The LADYBUG phase was similarly organized and provided for 1800 troops to be flown in 23 missions starting at 1800 hours on 19 August. The basic airlift plan was designed to obtain maximum use of aircraft and crew time. Schedules provided for minimum aircraft ground time and the least possible delay in passenger loading. Aircraft were programmed to depart the Van Nuys Base in three waves, with departures scheduled every fifteen minutes.

Operation NORTHSLIP I was executed exactly as planned. Ten aircraft were committed, troops arrived by buses on time, and flight departures were clocked out precisely on schedule. On 18 August, troops were transported to Oakland, Sacramento, Stockton, Chico and San Jose, with the last troops deplaning at Moffett Naval Air Station at 0700 hours.

Operation LADYBUG was revised due to troop commitments during the period 20-23 August. As a result, three missions were flown on 22 August, carrying 341 passengers. The final mission on 23 August carried 54 passengers to Moffett Naval Air Station. These men had comprised "Task Force Barrera" which had furnished security for the Los Angeles County Court House.


It should be emphasized that, unlike the deployment phases of the airlift, return air movements were accomplished entirely with California ANG resources. U. S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Military Air Transport Service and Arizona ANG aircraft were not available.




View from a helicopter over the east side of Central Avenue between 44th and 45th Streets on 14 August 1965.—Los Angeles Times



Governor Edmund G. Brown visits the riot area 15 August 1965.
—Los Angeles Herald-Examiner



guarded walk. Wilmington Avenue at 103d Street 15 August 1965.—Los Angeles Times



Guardsmen of Northern California's 49th Infantry Division loading for return movement to home stations by aircraft of the California Air National Guard. Top, C-97 aircraft assigned to the 146th Military Airlift Wing based at the Van Nuys ANG Base. Bottom, C-119 aircraft assigned to the 129th Air Commando Group based at the Hayward ANG Base.—CAL ANG Photos.

CHAPTER VI

LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS

General

Logistical aspects of the National Guard's Los Angeles riot operations have been discussed incidental to the preceding narrative. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the significant logistical operations.

Federal property is issued to a State solely for the purpose of arming, equipping, and training the National Guard of the State for field service and when called or ordered to active duty in State or Federal service (32 USC 702, National Guard Regulations 75-1).

Whenever there is a public disaster or an emergency within a State, the Governor may order troops of the Army National Guard into State service accompanied by their equipment (National Guard Regulations 75-1).

Under the provisions of Section 86 of the Act of 3 June 1916 (39 State 204; 32 USC 39) the Secretary of the Army is authorized to sell property to the various States, for use of the Army National Guard. Section IV, Army Regulation 130-470 provides that "During emergencies declared by the appropriate State authorities . . . subsistence may be purchased by a State on a cash basis for use by its Army National Guard when the types of rations requested are available without detriment to Active Army requirements."

Under the above authorities, and because of the existence of an emergency, the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) for California made his resources available to support the operation. Arrangements were made for the State of California to reimburse the Federal government for supplies obtained for the Los Angeles riot.

Significantly, although the status of the 40th Armored Division was clouded somewhat at the outset, due to its field training requirement, at no time did questions regarding the status of units delay action on requests for support. All agencies involved—city, county, State, Federal and military—offered total assistance within their capabilities on a "support now, ask questions later" basis.

Billeting

Shortly after General Hill arrived in Los Angeles, the LAPD assigned Inspector John Kinsling as its logistics coordinator to work with OTAG's logistics staff and provide liaison between the LAPD and other city agencies. Through Inspector Kinsling, arrangements were made with the Los Angeles Board of Education to open various city schools for use as troop billets. The schools selected were located in or adjacent to the Guard's assigned areas of operation.

Subsistence

Subsistence support did not appear to be critical initially; however, as the National Guard build-up increased, it became apparent that ration procurement could develop into a major problem. Fortunately, units of the 40th Armored Division had from one to four meals on hand, either in the form of operational combat rations or meal components, to be used as travel rations while enroute to field training at Camp Roberts. Most units of the 49th Infantry Division were anticipating a weekend training assembly and had rations on hand for this purpose. For these

reasons, the urgency of ration procurement for the initial preparation of meals was lessened.

Contact was established early with the Supply Officer, Fort MacArthur, and arrangements made for ration issues to the 40th Armored Division. This support was later expanded to include the 49th Infantry Division. Rations on hand at Fort MacArthur were limited and, as demands increased, it could be expected that stocks would shortly be depleted. Rations enroute to Camp Roberts for support of the 40th Armored Division field training were therefore diverted to Fort MacArthur. This took the pressure off until resupply of ration stocks at Fort MacArthur could be built up in sufficient quantities to support all National Guard units in the Los Angeles area. As additional Guard units were committed to riot duty, Fort MacArthur was advised of anticipated strength increases. Actual strength figures were confirmed as soon as possible. All ration demands placed on Fort MacArthur were satisfied.

Arrangements were made with the Los Angeles Board of Education to use cafeterias in schools designated as troop billets. The cafeterias were opened by school employees, who prepared and served hot meals to Guardsmen as they arrived. This most welcome service was continued until unit messes were in operation. Most units billeted in schools used the convenient cafeteria facilities in preference to their own mess equipment.

General Supplies

Shortly after the National Guard was committed, requirements emerged for additional supplies such as cots, radio batteries, repair parts, housekeeping supplies and ammunition. As the build-up continued, such requirements increased in intensity. These demands were relayed to the USPFO in Sacramento, who directed that required supplies in USPFO stocks at Camp San Luis Obispo be dispatched to Los Angeles. Items not in USPFO stocks were obtained on temporary loan from Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps installations and other governmental agencies in the area. For example, Fort Irwin, through Fort MacArthur, provided ammunition. The U. S. Public Health Service and the U. S. and State Forestry Services provided 8,000 canvas cots. The USPFO Supply Division at Camp San Luis Obispo and Fort MacArthur operated on a 24-hour basis, providing supplies on call as needed.

Repair Parts

Vehicle repair parts supply was provided from USPFO stocks in semi-trailer vans located at the Long Beach Field Maintenance Shop. These vans were enroute to Fort Irwin to support the 40th Armored Division Annual Field Training, but were diverted to the Los Angeles area.

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

Vehicle fuel tanks and gasoline tank trucks of the 40th Armored Division were full in preparation for the movement to Camp Roberts. Resupply to the 40th Armored Division and to the 49th Infantry Division was accomplished from commercial vendors under State contract. During the period 13-23 August 1965, some 121,400 gallons of gasoline were consumed.

Transportation

Arrangements were made with the U. S. Army Reserve Center for the loan of tactical vehicles from USAR units to the 49th Infantry Division elements airlifted into the Los Angeles area. The USAR vehicles that were ready for issue were issued and in the hands of the 49th Infantry Division soon after their arrival. Considerable delay was experienced, however, before all of the loaned vehicles were ready for use. Unfortunately, many vehicles had recently been used by USAR units conducting field training and required a great deal of maintenance before they could be issued. Through the combined efforts of maintenance personnel from the USAR, 49th Infantry Division, 3632d Ordnance Company, and Long Beach Maintenance Shop, this maintenance was eventually completed and the loan of the vehicles accomplished. A total of 137 tactical vehicles were borrowed from the USAR, including 95 trucks, 2½ ton; 14 trucks, ¾ ton; and 28 trucks, ¼ ton.

Units airlifted to Los Angeles required transportation from Van Nuys Air National Guard Base to Los Angeles. Arrangements were made with the Los Angeles Board of Education to borrow buses, with drivers, to accomplish this move. The movement of airlifted units from Los Angeles to Van Nuys Air National Guard Base during the withdrawal phase was accomplished in the same manner. This support greatly assisted operations in that no tac-

tical vehicles had to be withdrawn from National Guard units on riot duty for administrative troop movements.

Services

Military installations in the Los Angeles area could not handle laundry service in the quantities and within the time frame required. Local commanders made laundry arrangements with commercial vendors as provided for by the *State Emergency Plan for State Military Forces (CAL-EP-62)*.

Summary

From the logistical support viewpoint, conditions could not have been more favorable for the Army Guard's commitment to Los Angeles riot control duties. The 40th Armored Division was at maximum capability in anticipation of Annual Field Training and most of the 49th Infantry Division was scheduled for a weekend training assembly. The weather was warm, which reduced the need for warm clothing and troop comforts items. Schools were not in session and, as a result, were readily available for troop billets. There were no other State or Federal emergencies creating conflicting requirements for logistical services. There were some problems which, in the event of future operations of this nature, can be prevented or minimized by more detailed advance planning and preparation. These are discussed in the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In Summary

The report of the McCone Commission carefully records the grim statistics of the Los Angeles riot. Some six days of violence saw 34 persons killed and over 1,000 injured. More than 950 business and privately owned buildings were either looted, damaged or destroyed, with over 200 structures burned to the ground. One public building was destroyed and 14 others damaged and/or burned. Of the 8,000-10,000 citizens who actively participated in the riot, nearly 4,000 were arrested; most of them for burglary and theft but many for arson and other more serious charges.¹

To halt this "insensate rage of destruction" and begin the restoration of order required the commitment in the 46 square mile riot area of over 1300 police officers and more than 13,400 Guardsmen. Before Guard units were withdrawn, the State of California had expended more than \$187,600.00 for subsistence, services, and general supplies required by the troops and for fueling and maintaining the Guard's vehicles and other Federal equipment. More than 65,800 man-days of State Active Duty were logged, at a cost for military pay and allowances in excess of \$607,600.00.

The Los Angeles disturbance has been labeled the most destructive riot in our country's history. Without doubt, the California National Guard's part in suppressing this riot constitutes the nation's most costly employment of State military forces in connection with a civil disturbance. One might expect that, from such an operation, numerous important lessons would be learned and that there would be many implications for future emergency planning and training by Guard units. Many such lessons and indications have been acknowledged in the foregoing narrative.

Significant Lessons Learned

Perhaps the most important lesson for military and civil authorities alike is that troops can actually be committed in such numbers, during a disturbance of this nature, with local law enforcement agencies remaining in full control of the situation. In the past, some law enforcement officials have expressed fears that a military support operation of such magnitude would inevitably result in a "military take-over." What happened in Los Angeles dramatically illustrated the concept that during any domestic emergency where military resources are involved, the goal of the military is to complement rather than replace civil authority.

It cannot be overemphasized, however, that careful prior planning for all foreseeable emergencies, accomplished with complete coordination and liaison between National Guard, State Civil Defense agencies and local civil authorities, is indispensable for effective military support operations. In this instance, the prior planning done jointly by the LAPD and the California National Guard contributed immeasurably to the success of the Guard in accomplishing its riot control mission. Such planning must be continued. It must take into account the problems encountered during this disturbance and insure that their effects will be minimized in any future operations of this nature.

Equally important, there must be prompt and thorough coordination between OTAG and the U. S. Army Area Headquarters as soon as the possibility of a need for any specific logistical support is foreseen. Discussion should cover both the nature of logistical support which State military forces may require and the channels of communication to be used. In this way, the tremendous capability of the military logistics system to respond rapidly to diverse and large scale emergency demands can be fully utilized.

One item requiring further study is the need for Guard units to be aware of the equipment and material assets of civilian agencies that could be made available to troops engaged in support missions. A Guard unit airlifted to an emergency area cannot possibly carry all of its mission-type equipment, such as large radios and vehicles. Also, as was the case during the Los Angeles riot, troops may require equipment not normally available to the National Guard. For example, portable public address systems and floodlights were at times sorely needed.

Prior planning must include the pre-designation of possible troop assembly and quartering areas in each major metropolitan complex. Use of school facilities in this instance was an ideal solution. Had schools been in session, however, their use may not have been practicable.

During the riot, many governmental agencies were constantly seeking information concerning strengths, locations and movements of the company-size units making up battalions or brigades. To complicate the situation, local representatives of the same agencies continually made similar requests and then belatedly furnished the information to their higher echelons. This dual reporting resulted in many inaccuracies and erroneous assumptions and was a considerable duplication of effort. An accurate and timely reporting system must be developed to overcome this problem and keep interested agencies informed while avoiding unnecessary interference with operations.

National Guard units involved in actions of this nature should not depend entirely on civilian agencies as the primary source for support mission information and intelligence. During a civil disturbance operation, as in any other military type operation, G2-S2 (intelligence) sections must perform their normal staff functions. They must collect and evaluate information received from all sources, to include civilian agencies, and disseminate processed intelligence to higher, lower and adjacent headquarters.

The provision of ground transportation and vehicular mounted radios for the airlifted units proved a serious problem, despite the availability of equipment from U. S. Army Reserve sources. Future plans for the airlifting of troops to the scene of State emergencies must provide for the departure of a "land-tail" of unit vehicles, either prior to or simultaneously with the departure of airlifted elements. This will insure that sufficient command communications vehicles are on hand for effective operations.

Because of nation-wide interest in the Los Angeles riots, the OTAG Public Information staff was swamped with queries from the press, radio and TV. Besides countless local requests, calls came in from all over the country. The Adjutant General and other ranking officers of the Guard held numerous press conferences in an attempt to provide the news media with up-to-date information. Despite this, numerous news reporters were

¹ *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning*, a Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, December 2, 1965.

continuously in and out of the OTAG Emergency Operations Center and often interfered with the conduct of operations. This situation points up the need for clear policies and guidelines to permit full cooperation with the press, also the requirement for a press room, adequately equipped and staffed, during any large-scale operation of this nature.

The demonstrated rapidity with which a civil disturbance can build up and over-tax the capacity of even highly effective law enforcement agencies stresses the necessity for a quick reaction on the part of the National Guard. The soundness of prior planning by OTAG and subordinate commands to insure a fast reaction was proven as units were able to assemble rapidly, determine missions and formulate plans without undue delay, and commit forces where needed in the shortest practicable time.

The report of the McCone Commission stated that the 856 Guardsmen of the 3d Brigade, 40th Armored Division, should have been employed in the riot area by early or mid-afternoon on 13 August.

This force consisting of a brigade headquarters, three tank battalions, and an attached half-strength infantry platoon, was enroute from San Diego to Camp Roberts in field training status. The individual weapons in this column, with the exception of the infantry platoon, consisted for the most part of caliber .45 hand weapons, and the quantity of training ammunition present with these troops was negligible.

Troops employed initially consisted of infantry and cavalry units stationed within the Greater Los Angeles Area which had been pre-selected for this contingency. They were appropriately armed, equipped and trained for riot control duties and had not yet been committed to their annual field training duty.

Unit assembly and emergency plans must be highly flexible, to fit a variety of situations and varying degrees of military support. Troops must be required to assemble equipped with clothing and personal items as if for an extended period of operation. Where appropriate, plans should also include details on movement by air, with emphasis on required staff actions and the preparation of load lists of essential items of equipment. In this instance, the airlift of thousands of Northern California troops to Los Angeles was accomplished speedily and without any serious problems despite the Army Guard's lack of detailed prior planning or training for air movement.

Procedures for alerting unit personnel must be as complete and foolproof as possible. One problem was experienced in the 49th Infantry Division which had not been anticipated, based upon experience with previous practice assemblies. It developed as several elements were alerted during the early morning hours, when radio and TV stations were off the air. Sole reliance had to be placed on the use of commercial telephones. Fortunately, during the most recent practice emergency assembly of the 49th Infantry Division, units had been denied use of radio and TV stations in alerting their people and unit telephone systems had been thoroughly tested.

Once the National Guard has been authorized by the Governor to provide military support to civil authorities, it is essential that support operations be decentralized to the lowest National Guard command element involved. This will further reduce the Guard's reaction time by enabling unit commanders to respond quickly to mission requests from civil authorities being directly supported.

Another lesson learned, previously emphasized and perhaps obvious, is that in emergency situations where violence and lawlessness are rampant and threaten to carry over into the hours of darkness, the imposition of a curfew over the affected area is mandatory.

Except for those Guardsmen who are law enforcement officers by profession or who are members of military police units,

National Guard troops are not trained in arrest procedures and techniques. For this reason, law enforcement officers should make the actual arrests and arrange for the evacuation and booking of prisoners, as was done during the Los Angeles disturbance. National Guard troops should assist in the apprehension of rioters and serve as witnesses if the need arises.

The National Guard is not in competition with civilian enterprise. When Guardsmen are functioning in a military support role, civil authorities must consider carefully all missions assigned to them. If a mission is of an emergency nature and clearly beyond the capability of local civilian resources, then its assignment to the Guard may be justified. For example, it was appropriate for the National Guard to provide escort and security forces for food supplies brought into the curfew area. The loading, transporting and distribution of food was properly handled by local authorities employing commercial agencies.

The use of the California National Guard to help suppress the Los Angeles riot taught many lessons, resulted in a better understanding of Guard capabilities and limitations among civil authorities throughout the State, and provided experience that will be highly valuable in any future operations of this type. Participation in riot duties greatly enhanced each Guard unit's combat potential. Actual field operations under these circumstances, as opposed to simulated emergency exercises, furnished invaluable training in troop leading and staff procedures. Having to cope with the angry populace and to function under fire gave the Guard soldier a seasoning seldom obtained short of actual combat. Individuals came away with a strong feeling of self-confidence and pride at being able to accomplish so difficult and unpleasant a mission efficiently and effectively. This, together with each individual's realization that he is an important member of a military unit that can do its job, could be considered the most valuable of all lessons learned.

Implications for Future Training

Although formal training of the National Guard in riot control operations has been a requirement for many years, Guardsmen in Los Angeles were not confronted by the large, concentrated mobs depicted in the usual textbook situation. The success of the Guard in this action is a tribute to the sound basic training of the individual soldier, the effectiveness of team training within squads, platoons and companies, and the leadership qualities of the young officers and non-commissioned officers.

A decentralized and varied operation of this nature requires the use of mission type orders, in most cases oral and frequently sketchy. While this posed no great problem in Los Angeles and all troops concerned generally performed in an outstanding manner, it was evident that unit training must stress continued use of oral orders in preparing for domestic emergencies as well as combat situations.

Emergency plans must be exchanged between major headquarters. Commanders and staffs must make liaison visits to other headquarters, conduct briefings, and be briefed in turn regarding other area emergency requirements. This will insure effective operations if an organization is committed to an emergency task normally assigned to another command.

Additional training is needed in assembling and preparing for troop movements, particularly airlifts. Unit notification plans, with slight modifications, are considered adequate and workable; however, emphasis must be directed toward emergency assembly of personnel equipped for extended operations. Practice assemblies must be conducted with the requirement that personnel bring a 3 to 4-day supply of clothing, toilet articles, and other necessities. Practice assemblies should also provide for rehearsing the loading of vehicles and moving to an actual airlift point or to a simulated area of operations.

ANNEX A

ORGANIZATION OF THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

The California National Guard, Army and Air, presently consists of the following general groupings:

a. **Ground Forces, North.** This force comprises divisional and nondivisional units allotted to the State by Department of the Army, with the concurrence of the Governor, and located throughout Northern California as determined by The Adjutant General. The force structure provides units capable of rapid expansion to war strength, trained and equipped to defend areas of the United States and to cover the concentration of other forces and prepared to take part in all types of ground operations in the United States or overseas. Units are allotted to Northern California communities so as to insure a sound recruiting base and to provide a dispersed, balanced militia force trained and equipped to function effectively, at existing strength, in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety in support of civil authority. Ground Forces, North presently consists of the 49th Infantry Division (-) and the 49th Infantry Brigade comprising 97 combat (infantry, armor) and combat service support units spread from Red Bluff south to Tulare. This force is augmented as required from the 16 engineer, medical and ordnance units of the 103d Ordnance Group, located in Central and Northern California. The total strength of this force is approximately 11,000 officers and men. It is well designed to provide military support to civil defense in the event of a nuclear attack on the San Francisco-San Jose-Sacramento target complex.

b. **Ground Forces, South.** This force comprises divisional and nondivisional units situated in Southern California. The force structure is determined, units are allocated to the State, and in turn located in communities, so as to provide the same capabilities for Federal mobilization or State emergency missions described for Ground Forces, North. This force presently comprises the 40th Armored Division with 107 organic and attached combat and combat service support units situated from Porterville and San Luis Obispo south to San Diego and Calexico. This force is augmented as required from units of the 103d Ordnance Group situated in Central and Southern California. The total strength of Ground Forces, South is approximately 11,000 men. It is well suited to provide military support to civil defense in the event of nuclear attack on the Los Angeles-San Diego-San Bernardino target complex.

c. **Air Defense Forces.** This force comprises Army and Air National Guard organizations assigned primary missions of defending an air space indigenous to the State of California. The California Air National Guard units are charged with general area airspace defense while the California Army Guard units are responsible for the ground to air defense of key California metropolitan complexes. The Air Guard force is organized into units compatible with USAF Air Defense Command type organizations and presently consist of the 144th Air Defense Wing and the 163rd and 144th Air Defense Group. The Air Guard units are equipped with 50 manned, all weather, interceptor type aircraft based at the Ontario and Fresno California Air National Guard Bases. The Army Guard units presently assigned to the Air Defense Forces are the 1st Missile Battalion, 250th Artillery and the 4th Missile Battalion, 251st Artillery. These Army Guard units are equipped with Nike-Hercules missiles and occupy on-

site locations in the San Francisco-Oakland and Los Angeles-Long Beach areas. The Air Guard Forces conduct a 24 hour runway alert program at Air National Guard Bases and the Army Guard Nike sites are manned on a "around-the-clock" basis in the accomplishment of their basic mission. These Air Defense Forces provide the people of California a significant military capability to defend the airspace of their State at a moment's notice and are a vital link in the balanced militia concept. Air Defense Force elements are also available to aid civil authorities in the traditional militia role of protecting life and property, preserving peace and order, and coping with civil disturbances and natural caused disasters.

d. **Airlift Forces.** State Airlift Forces are organized into Air Force type units comparable with Military Airlift Command (MAC) organizations. The 146th Military Airlift Wing, 146th Military Airlift Group and its two Heavy Transport Squadrons comprise the Airlift Force. The mission assigned this force gives the State a significant personnel, cargo and aeromedical evacuation capability. This force is presently equipped with 16 four engine C-97 type aircraft, and is based at the Van Nuys California Air National Guard Base. The support mission capability of this militia force provides the State an immediate and effective fleet of transport aircraft, available to render material assistance to relieve victims of floods, earthquakes, forest fires, and other natural disasters, in locations where civil authority must obtain supplies and personnel assistance from outside the disaster area. This long-haul, airlift capability offers the State a service which cannot be duplicated by any other State agency. In addition to the State oriented support missions, the Airlift Force participates regularly in MATS directed missions in the global support of USAF military requirements.

e. **Tactical Air Forces.** The organization of the Tactical Air Force is aligned with that of USAF Tactical Air Command special air warfare type units. The 129th Air Commando Group, stationed at the Hayward California Air National Guard Base, comprises the State Tactical Air Force. Its primary mobilization mission is in the unconventional warfare area. This force is presently equipped with eight C-119 and six U-10 aircraft, which give it a respectable cargo and an air transport capability and represents a significant augmentation to the State's Airlift Forces for accomplishing State oriented support missions. The type aircraft assigned to the State Tactical Air Force complements the C-97's assigned to the State Airlift Force, so that the total air transport capability of the State covers a wide spectrum of support mission requirements. Elements of the Tactical Air Force are also available to function in the protection of life and property in the traditional militia concept.

f. **Communication Service.** The Communication Service is contained in the CAL ANG 162nd Communications Group and elements of the Army Guard. The 162nd Group headquarters and its seven assigned and attached Communication Squadrons are located at the Van Nuys, Hayward, North Highlands, Compton and Costa Mesa California Air National Guard Bases. This State military force is charged with a radio communication mission which is compatible with those assigned to the USAF Communication Service Forces and Army communication systems. The State Communication Service is responsible for pro-

viding an instantaneous, "in-place," communication system capable of supporting State military and emergency requirements. Thru this service, all ANG Bases are interconnected by means of a radio network. The ARNG ground and air defense forces also operate an extensive radio network that reaches into almost every community in the State in which there is a National Guard armory. The Communication Service has a mobile communication capability to provide emergency communication to disaster areas. In addition to the State's natural disaster emergency requirements, this Force has been assigned the mission of providing communication facilities to assist in a national recovery effort and to reconstitute or augment USAF communication and electronics forces in the event of National emergency or general war.

g. **Command/Support Grouping.** The Office of The Adjutant General (OTAG) within the State Military Department provides all measures necessary for the supervision and control

of the California National Guard, to include the development of long range plans and programs which project future State military requirements, the determination of current requirements and the analysis of current operational capabilities of ARNG and ANG organizations, the development and execution of plans for the employment of the State military forces, as well as the programming, obtaining and insuring proper utilization of resources to support mission requirements. It involves the formulation of policies and directives necessary to implement statutory requirements and assures effective program achievements. It insures that the organization, housing, recruitment and training of ARNG and ANG are properly planned, directed, administered and supported. These functions are carried out by the Army and Air Force Division staffs, with the direct support of the Administrative and Personnel Division and augmented, as appropriate and required, by State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, CAL ARNG, and Headquarters, CAL ANG.

ANNEX B

HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD EMPLOYMENT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Stockton Emergency, July 1876

Security of the San Joaquin County Jail was furnished by thirty members of the Stockton Guard. This assistance was provided in response to the request of the Sheriff of San Joaquin County on July 22, 1876, "he being informed that certain lawless persons were combining to take from the jail a certain prisoner held by him in lawful custody." The Guardsmen were furnished immediately and served until all apprehensions of danger had passed.

Chico Emergency, March 1877

Back up support was rendered by members of the Chico Guard during the month of March, 1877. The Guardsmen actually performed guard and patrol duty, although they had been mustered and armed to assist local authorities, if required, while a number of prisoners were being removed from Chico to Oroville for trial.

Sacramento Emergency, April 1882

Four companies of the First Artillery Regiment were called into service on April 11, 1882, in response to the requests of the Mayor and Chief of Police of the City of Sacramento for assistance in quelling a threatened riot. This community unrest resulted from the murder of a prominent Sacramento citizen and the desires of a mob, which surrounded the city prison, to forcibly remove the alleged murderer. The Guardsmen, under the leadership of Colonel T. W. Sheelien, Commander of the First Artillery Regiment, were successful in frustrating the efforts of the mob and thus assisted in the maintenance of law and order.

Redlands Emergency, August 1893

In and around Redlands, San Bernardino County, serious disturbances and threats of personal violence to the Chinese developed during the latter part of August, 1893. Companies E, F and G, Ninth Infantry, located in Riverside and San Bernardino, were ordered to their armories to prepare for possible riot control duty. This action discouraged the would be rioters and the unrest subsided without further incident.

Railroad Strike, July 1894

A railroad strike, nationwide in scope, was ordered on June 28th, 1894, the effects of which were drastically felt throughout California. In this situation, because the U. S. Mails were carried by the railroad, the Federal Government was involved immediately. Through prior arrangements, requests for National Guard assistance would be initiated by the U. S. Marshal.

Although the effects of the strike were felt throughout the State, the most militant group was located in the Sacramento area. The size of the group of strikers and sympathizers in the State's capital city frustrated the efforts of local agencies to control the situation. The Governor, on July 3, 1894, ordered troops of the National Guard to Sacramento to aid in the quelling of "disturbance." Many of these units were from the San Francisco area which is considerably cooler during the summer than is Sacramento. This change in weather conditions, combined with

initial shortages of food and equipment, reduced the effectiveness of these units. Concurrent deployment of other Guard units to other railroad communities throughout the State were significantly more effective. During one phase of this strike, which had many sympathizers, elements of the National Guard were on duty from Bakersfield in the south to Dunsmuir in the north.

No other community experienced the problems of control comparable to the situation which existed in Sacramento. Strikers from other areas commandeered trains and converged in Sacramento in an obvious attempt to exploit the uncertain conditions to their advantage.

Because the early efforts of the units in Sacramento were not effective, the subsequent assignments resulted in troops being deployed in positions around the areas occupied by the strikers. This resulted in a "waiting game" type of situation, where neither side gained any advantage over the other. The strikers, as the days passed, gradually became disenchanted and when, on the 10th of July, troops of the Regular Army arrived in Sacramento, the stage was set for the restoration of control to the hands of the local authorities.

The combined efforts of the Regular troops and the National Guard soon permitted the trains to resume operations. Although the first train to leave Sacramento to the south was wrecked, by July 14th the trains were operating approximately on schedule.

Guard units remained on duty in the Sacramento area until July 22nd, when it became apparent that conditions were near normal. The original mission having been fulfilled, the units were gradually released for return to home stations, the last being dismissed on July 30, 1894.

Strike at McCloud, June 1909

Toward the end of May 1909, in the town of McCloud, Siskiyou County, a controversy between the McCloud River Lumber Company and about 700 of its employees, nearly all of whom were foreign born, developed into a strike which threatened to become serious.

On May 31st, the Sheriff of Siskiyou County, at the request of the lumber company, entered the company plant with six special deputies. They were immediately surrounded by strikers who ordered them to leave the plant. The strikers told the sheriff that any persons who attempted to work there would be killed. The sheriff, believing that if he resisted and attempted to arrest the strike leaders the plant would be destroyed and bloodshed would ensue, withdrew.

In response to the sheriff's request for assistance, Governor J. N. Gillett directed his Adjutant General, J. B. Lauck, to inquire into the matter and advise him. The Adjutant General sent his assistant, Colonel A. W. Bradbury, to McCloud, where he arrived by train on June 1st.

As a result of information and recommendations provided by telegrams from Colonel Bradbury, three companies of the 2d Infantry Regiment and Troop B, Cavalry, National Guard of California, under the command of General Lauck, arrived at McCloud on June 3rd.

Under protection of the soldiers, the sheriff arrested the three principal strike leaders on June 5th. Although there was no

further resistance or threats of violence after the arrival of the National Guard, the troops remained until June 10th, at which time the sheriff was satisfied that he could control the situation.

One of the telegrams sent by Colonel Bradbury to General Lauck, as quoted in The Adjutant General's report to the Governor for 1910, and the title of the report on the McCloud incident as it appears in the report, will be of particular interest to students of civil rights movements, race relations and attitudes between groups of different national origins:

TELEGRAM

McCloud, California
June 2, 1909, 4 PM
General J. B. Lauck
Sacramento, California

Strikers had meeting about three o'clock. After considerable speaking went in body to machine shops, car shops and power plant and compelled all engineers and workmen to quit work. Broke in doors of power plant, ran wood cars out and stopped firing of furnace. McCloud now without fire protection and light. Two million dollars worth of property, white people, and their homes at mercy of strikers, who seem to be beyond control of former leaders. Sheriff cannot or will not give proper protection. I believe four or five companies should be rushed here to protect property and whites. I personally witnessed all that took place. Please advise action.

Signed: Bradbury

TITLE

Report of Brig Gen J. B. Lauck, The Adjutant General of California, relative to the service performed by a part of the National Guard of California in connection with the strike of Italians at McCloud, Siskiyou County, June 1 to 10, 1909.

Wheatland Riot, August 1913

On August 3, 1913, the Superior Judge of Yuba County wired the Governor that rioting had taken place that afternoon in the hop fields near the town of Wheatland. The judge stated that in a fight between Industrial Workers of the World hop pickers and peace officers of Yuba County, the district attorney, the undersheriff and two rioters had been killed and the sheriff, the constable of Wheatland Township and several others had been wounded; that the rioters retained the ground and bodies of the killed and wounded and that further bloodshed and rioting were imminent.

Immediately upon receipt of this information and orders from the Governor, The Adjutant General sent 200 National Guardsmen to Wheatland, where they arrived at daylight on August 4th.

The troops promptly surrounded the rioters' camp, estimated to contain 2,000 people, and assisted the peace officers in serving warrants on the leaders and those persons charged with crime.

Although most of the persons in what had been the rioters' camp were gone within 24 hours following the arrests, the troops were not completely withdrawn from the area until August 9th, when the fears of the frightened citizens of Wheatland had subsided.

Sacramento Emergency, March 1914

In March, 1914, a large band of Industrial Workers of the World, styling themselves as "Kelley's Army," and another band of I.W.W.'s traveling with them, invaded Sacramento and established a camp near the Southern Pacific Depot.

This group of about 2,000, trained into companies in military order, refused to obey orders of the police, refused to leave town and threatened to scatter over the town and commit vari-

ous crimes unless fed by the citizens and given transportation to Ogden, Utah.

The city authorities appealed to the Governor for help. The Governor directed the city authorities to try their forces first. In the meantime he ordered The Adjutant General to get enough of the militia together to suppress this lawless assemblage, which was continually making threatening speeches, in case trouble should occur and the city authorities should prove inadequate to preserve order. The Adjutant General ordered Companies A, E, F, G and I, 2d Infantry, Troop B, 1st Squadron of Cavalry, and Battery C, 1st Battalion, Field Artillery, to assemble at the State armory in Sacramento. These organizations fell in under arms, ready to take action at a moment's notice. The Adjutant General went to the camp of the I.W.W.'s and watched the fight between the police and deputies, the sheriff and deputies and the firemen upon one side and the I.W.W.'s on the other side, to determine whether it would be necessary to intervene with the militia. The Governor was adverse to shedding blood by the troops unless it was absolutely necessary, his instructions being not to bring the troops into the fight unless to prevent bloodshed or great destruction of property. Fortunately the troops did not have to intervene, as the civil authorities, by the free use of pick handles and other clubs, and the hose from the city's fire department, routed the invaders and made it unnecessary for the militia to take part. The troops were retained at the armory from six to ten days, until the civil authorities were satisfied that there was no cause to fear further trouble.

Folsom Prison Riot, November 24-25, 1927

Taking advantage of the Thanksgiving Holiday schedule, a small group of prisoners, frustrated in their attempts to break out of prison, incited a riot among the 1200 prisoners attending a motion picture being shown in the school building. The convicts took control over the interior of all but a small portion of the prison and also held five guards as hostages.

Warden Court Smith telephoned Governor C. C. Young requesting aid to subdue the rioters and prevent an outbreak. The Governor contacted Colonel Wallace A. Mason, Commanding Officer, 184th Infantry, and ordered all Sacramento units of his regiment to proceed immediately to Folsom Prison to assist the civil authorities in quelling the riot.

General R. E. Mittelstaedt, The Adjutant General, spending Thanksgiving with his family in San Francisco, was notified by the Governor of this uprising and that Colonel Mason was already at the prison with his local units. General Mittelstaedt immediately ordered units from Yuba City, Marysville, Stockton, Woodland and Lodi to assemble at their respective armories, and then proceed without delay to Folsom. Two tanks were shipped by train from Salinas to bolster the security around the prison and for possible employment to break into the convict controlled portions of the prison.

Although some Guard units arrived during daylight hours on the 24th of November, most reported after dark. All units were positioned around the prison and were equipped with machine guns, some of which were mounted on trucks, and automatic rifles. At daybreak on the 25th, the prisoners were given an ultimatum to give up peaceably or suffer the consequences. To lend weight to this ultimatum, Co E, 184th Infantry, entered the prison inclosure in a line of skirmishers, with bayonets fixed, and were in full view of the rioters. Shortly after this show of force, the convicts capitulated, released all hostages and, when they returned to their cells, control of the entire facility was restored to the prison authorities.

This attempted prison break was one of the most desperate situations in penal history of the United States at that time. Prison, local and State authorities were unanimous in their praise

of the Guard's significant contribution to the rapid restoration of control to the proper authorities.

San Francisco Emergency, 1934

On May 9, 1934, maritime workers of San Francisco went on strike against the shipping industry in protest against what were described as poor working conditions, unfair hiring practices and the refusal of the ship owners to recognize other than company unions. The effect of this strike was to effectively block the movement of all commodities to and from the Embarcadero, with its 5½ miles of piers and warehouses. The positioning of pickets was designed to physically impede the goings and comings of the strikebreakers. As time passed, the situation deteriorated with more and more violence building to a level that the Acting Governor, Frank C. Merriam, ordered a partial mobilization of the California National Guard.

This call to duty, to preserve order and to protect State property along the waterfront in San Francisco, was issued at 1:00 p.m., July 5, 1934. By daybreak on July 6th, 700 Guardsmen, under the provisional command of Col R. E. Mittelstaedt, had established full military control of the area. The Chief of Police, W. J. Quinn, had agreed to the relief of his officers from this area by the Guard for duty elsewhere in the strike worn city. In effect, martial rule was established along the Embarcadero within the area controlled by the National Guard. Although violence and bloodshed had become routine previously, with control of the area passing to the military, order was restored and maintained. No standing groups were permitted; pickets on duty were ordered to "keep walking," and those who refused were placed under arrest.

Despite the fact that order had been restored along the waterfront, the strike built up in its intensity until the climax

was reached on July 16, 1934, when a general strike was declared. As the tempo of the strike increased, The Adjutant General, Seth Howard, realized that more troops would be needed so he ordered to duty additional troops of the 40th Division. Major General David P. Barrows, Commanding General of the 40th Division, was placed in command of the augmented Port Command which now included the First Provisional Brigade, commanded by Col Mittelstaedt, consisting of the 159th Infantry Regiment and the 250th Coast Artillery Regiment, the 79th Brigade comprised of the 185th Infantry Regiment and elements of the 184th Infantry Regiment and commanded by Brigadier General William A. Mason; and the Reserve commanded by Colonel Harcourt Hervey, 160th Infantry Regiment, which consisted of the 160th Infantry Regiment less one battalion, and the 40th Tank Company. Colonel Otto E. Sandman commanded the East Bay Command which included elements of the 143d Field Artillery Regiment, 160th and 184th Infantry Regiments.

The general strike began to disintegrate with the return to work by the Teamsters on July 20th and, on the 21st, the strike collapsed completely. During the entire period of the strike, martial law, although never invoked, was provided for with detailed plans covering the military occupation of the city, developed for implementation upon receipt of the Governor's order. Fortunately, the situation never became so severe that civil authority had to be superseded by the military.

The vital role played by the Guard in this monumental labor dispute was to protect life and property which, in turn, permitted a more stable atmosphere in which the negotiators could meet. In truth, a retrospective evaluation of the Guard's call to duty during this emergency would be that it was welcomed by both labor and employers alike.

ANNEX C

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Adjutant General
2520 Marconi Avenue - P. O. Box 214334
Sacramento, California

ARMY MEMORANDUM
NUMBER 40

29 July 1964

CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINING


1. References:

- a. CAL-EP-62.
- b. Tab A, Appendix XII, Annex AA, USCONARC Training Directive.
- c. Manual, subject: Crowd Control and Riot Prevention, Department of Justice, State of California, 1964.

2. The maintenance of law and order and protection of life and property are primarily responsibilities of local authorities. The Emergency Plan for the State Military Forces (CAL-EP-62) recognizes this but directs that State military forces be prepared to act in aid of law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances or other domestic emergencies. Annex AA, USCONARC Training Directive (Tab A, Appendix XII), also directs that officers and EM of all ARNG units except medical units receive instruction annually in riot and traffic control as a part of their preparation for civil defense emergencies.

3. A new publication prepared by the State Attorney General's office (reference 1c) which relates directly to this phase of emergency training, is being distributed to all ARNG units and headquarters. While written as a basic guide for civilian law enforcement officers, the manual contains invaluable information for military personnel who might be called upon to assist in the law enforcement effort. Specifically, military personnel confronted with a civil disturbance situation must recognize the necessity for maintaining an impartial attitude. They must be aware of the constitutional rights of individual citizens. They must know the fundamentals of mob psychology and basic riot control techniques. Of particular importance, since the military would act in aid of law enforcement agencies, they must understand the police position and, subject to specific mission requirements, must be able to adopt the police officer's attitude.
(CAROT)

BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR:



RODERIC L. HILL
Lieutenant General
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: X

Executive Department

State of California

I, Glenn M. Anderson, Acting Governor of the State of California am satisfied that a condition of tumult and riot exists in a portion of the county of Los Angeles, and under the applicable provisions of the Military and Veterans Code I therefore order into the service of the State of California, the California Army National Guard in such number as I shall subsequently determined necessary.

I direct that this proclamation shall take effect immediately, effective August 13, 1965 and that as soon hereafter as possible this proclamation be filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of California; and that widespread publicity and notice be given to this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the great seal of the State of California to be fixed.


Done at the City of Los Angeles this 13th Day of August, 1965.


ACTING GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA

ATTEST:



SECRETARY OF STATE


Assistant Secretary of State



FILED

In the Office of the Secretary of State
of the State of California

AUG 17 1965

FRANCIS W. JORDAN, Secretary of State


Assistant Secretary of State

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
State Hq CAL NG Sacramento	Lt Gen Roderic L. Hill		150 N. Los Angeles St Los Angeles
State Hq Det CAL ARNG Sacramento	Capt Rolfe A. Glashan	36	
HQ 40th Armd Div Los Angeles	Maj Gen Charles A. Ott, Jr		3440 S. Hope St Los Angeles
Hq Co 40th Armd Div Los Angeles	Capt William F. Bryant	106	
HQ 1st Bde 40th Armd Div Long Beach	Col Thomas O. Lawson		97th Street School, 97th and Figueroa St Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bde 40th Army Div Long Beach	Capt Francis M. Latchford, Jr	98	
HQ 2d Bde 40th Armd Div Ontario	Col Irving J. Taylor		36th and Hoover St Los Angeles
Hq Co 2d Bde 40th Armd Div Ontario	Capt John A. Armendarez	96	
HQ 3d Bde 40th Armd Div San Diego	Col Gordon M. Dawson		Muir Jr High School, 5929 S. Vermont Los Angeles
Hq Co 3d Bde 40th Armd Div San Diego	Capt Robert S. Paul	81	
40th Armd Div Arty Los Angeles	Col Charles M. Taylor, Jr		Federal Ave Armory, 1300 Federal Avenue Los Angeles
Hq Btry 40th Div Arty Los Angeles	Capt Arthur E. Allen	102	
DISCOM 40th Div Bell	Col Alvin E. Howell		Bell National Guard Center Bell
Hq Co & Band Bell	1st Lt Fred W. Darley, Jr	50	
HQ 1st Bn 160th Inf Glendale	Lt Col Thomas T. Haykin	496	Armory, 220 E. Colorado Glendale
Hq Co 1st Bn 160th Inf Glendale	Capt John R. Freeman		
Co A Glendale	Capt Robert P. Nelson		
Co B Glendale	Capt Henry A. Compton		
Co C Glendale	Capt Randall L. Woods		
HQ 2d Bn 160th Inf San Bernardino	Lt Col Robert E. Lytle	353	Horace Mann Jr High School, 69th and St Andrews Los Angeles
Hq Co 2d Bn 160th Inf San Bernardino	Capt James A. Troxel		
Co A Banning	1st Lt George C. Mullenix		
Co B San Bernardino	Capt Arthur F. Ballin		
Co C Redlands	Capt Leopoldo Rojo, Jr		

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
HQ 3d Bn 160th Inf Santa Ana	Lt Col Bruce W. Paul	404	Mt Vernon Jr High School, 18th and Bronson Los Angeles
Hq Co 3d Bn 160th Inf Santa Ana	Capt Marvin L. Van Horne		
Co A Santa Ana	Capt James P. Mc Lain		
Co B Colton	1st Lt Raymond F. Troutwein, Jr		
Co C Orange	1st Lt Charles R. Messer	383	Bret Harte Jr High School, 92d and Hoover Los Angeles
HQ 4th Bn 160th Inf Long Beach	Lt Col Robert S. Ford		
Hq Co 4th Bn 160th Inf Long Beach	Capt Charles L. Cain		
Co A Long Beach	Capt John W. Toomy		
Co B Fullerton	Capt Gerald F. Daley		
Co C Fullerton	Capt Robert J. Norgren		
HQ 1st Bn 185th Armor Riverside	Lt Col Eugene G. Rudd, Jr	301	74th Street School, 74th and Cimarron Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bn 185th Armor Riverside	Capt Julian W. Amador III		
Co A Apple Valley	Capt Robert T. Wages		
Co B Indio	Capt Billy D. Loman		
Co C Hemet	Capt Andrew W. Lewis	249	97th Street School, 97th and Figueroa Los Angeles
HQ 2d Bn 185th Armor Bakersfield	Maj David L. Marlin		
Hq Co 2d Bn 185th Armor Bakersfield	Capt Arthur H. Dalzell		
Co A Barstow	Capt William D. Smith		
Co B Porterville	Capt John Gray		
Co C Tulare	Capt David E. Tomlinson		
HQ 3d Bn 185th Armor San Diego	Lt Col Charles E. Thomas	256	Hollywood Park, Century Blvd and Prairie Inglewood
Hq Co 3d Bn 185th Armor San Diego	Capt William H. Holt		
Co A San Diego	1st Lt Gary B. Hill		
Co B San Diego	Capt Carl M. Dillree		
Co C Vista	Capt Earle E. Brown		
HQ 4th Bn 185th Armor Pasadena	Lt Col James F. Battin II	272	Hollywood Park, Century Blvd and Prairie Inglewood

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Hq Co 4th Bn 185th Armor Pasadena	Capt Frank F. Benites	272	Hollywood Park, Century Blvd and Prairie Inglewood
Co A Pomona	Capt William B. Sheffer, Jr		
Co B Corona	Capt Dennis V. Allen		
Co C Monrovia	Capt Richard E. Lewis		
HQ 5th Bn 185th Armor San Diego	Lt Col George R. Smith		
Hq Co 5th Bn 185th Armor San Diego	Capt John A. Bowley		
Co A Calexico	Capt James L. Speer		
Co B Brawley	Capt John L. Steincamp		
Co C Escondido	Capt Joseph L. Markley		
HQ 6th Bn 185th Armor National City	Lt Col Robert W. Sanders	247	Hollywood Park, Century Blvd and Prairie Inglewood
Hq Co 6th Bn 185th Armor National City	Capt Roger L. Bergevin		
Co A El Cajon	Capt Edward Rein		
Co B Coronado	Capt Franklin Kral, Jr		
Co C El Cajon	Capt Paul C. Wylie		
HQ 1st Sqdn 111th Cav Inglewood	Lt Col Russell W. Porteous		
Hq Trp 1st Sqdn 111th Cav Inglewood	1st Lt Julio Guevara, Jr		
Trp A Inglewood	Capt William D. Ward		
Trp B Inglewood	Capt Jesse V. Hardy, Jr		
Trp C Gardena	Capt Eugene Kirshner	406	Mt Vernon Jr High School, 18th and Bronson Los Angeles
Trp D Long Beach	Capt Donald R. Dee		
HQ 1st Recon Sqdn 18th Armd Cav Burbank	Lt Col Robert T. Dove		
Hq Trp 1st Recon Sqdn 18th Armd Cav Burbank	Capt Eduardo Lopez		
Trp A Burbank	Capt George A. Paulson		
Trp B Sylmar	Capt Donald L. Stehsel		
Trp C Burbank	Capt Howard E. Carr, Jr		
		711	Berendo Jr High School, 12th and Berendo Los Angeles

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Trp D Lancaster	Capt Donald R. Carter	278	Inglewood Armory, 111 Grosevenor St Inglewood
Trp E San Fernando	Capt William G. Woodard		
Trp F Los Angeles	Capt Richard Rowland		
How Btry Burbank	Capt Floyd M. Hess		
HQ 1st Bn 144th Arty Santa Barbara	Lt Col Thomas R. Hidalgo		
H&S Btry 1st Bn 144th Arty Santa Barbara	Capt Billy C. Spradlin		
Btry A Ventura	Capt Raul A. Ramos		
Btry B Santa Maria	Capt Edward Collins		
Btry C San Luis Obispo	Capt Robert F. Bright		
Btry D Atascadero	Capt Bobby R. Drennan		
HQ 2d Bn 144th Arty Arcadia	Lt Col James R. Griffith	262	Arcadia Armory, 260 W. Huntington Dr Arcadia
H&S Btry 2d Bn 144th Arty Arcadia	1st Lt Edward R. O'Connor		
Btry A Arcadia	1st Lt Charles Garcia, Jr		
Btry B Azusa	1st Lt Anthony C. Manilla		
Btry C Montebello	Capt Edgar B. Shockley, Jr		
HQ 3d Bn 144th Arty San Pedro	Lt Col Elwood Nixon	224	San Pedro Armory, 891 W. 13th Street San Pedro
H&S Btry 3d Bn 144th Arty San Pedro	Capt Melvin H. Marquardt, Jr		
Btry A Culver City	Capt Jack G. Magnus		
Btry B Culver City	Capt Richard P. Fox		
Btry C Inglewood	1st Lt David G. Brown		
HQ 4th Bn 144th Arty Van Nuys	Lt Col Robert J. Madsen	253	Van Nuys Armory, 17330 Victory Blvd Van Nuys
H&S Btry 4th Bn 144th Arty Van Nuys	1st Lt Thomas H. Chasin		
Btry A Los Angeles	Capt Rob R. Schuyler		
Btry B Los Angeles	2d Lt Arthur R. Tantardino		
Btry C Glendale	1st Lt Norbert F. Smith		
HQ 5th Bn 144th Arty Pasadena	Lt Col Frank J. Smith	113	Van Nuys ANG Base Van Nuys

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Hq Btry 5th Bn 144th Arty Pasadena	Capt Victor H. Barber	473	Henry Clay Jr High School, 124th and Western Los Angeles
Btry A Inglewood	1st Lt Douglas S. Myers		
Btry B Arcadia	Capt William P. Hennelly, Jr		
HQ 132d Engr Bn Manhattan Beach	Lt Col William L. Geissert		
Hq Co, 132d Engr Bn Manhattan Beach	Capt Thomas M. Mc Nicholas		
Co A Manhattan Beach	Capt Richard G. Deleissegues		
Co B Lynwood	Capt Richard W. Kramer		
Co C Ontario	Capt Ralph E. Crawford		
Co D Burbank	Capt Walter L. Schoenwald		
Co E Torrance	Capt Earl W. Hurley, Jr		
40th Maint Bn Long Beach	Lt Col Martin P. Wade	423	Long Beach Field Maint Shop Long Beach
Hq & Co A Long Beach	Capt Jack L. Winkler		
Co B San Diego	1st Lt David L. Schoolcraft		
Co C San Diego	Capt Roger B. Patrick		
Co D Burbank	Capt Curtis F. Des Forges		
Co E Long Beach	1st Lt Donald E. S. Merritt		
40th Medical Bn Bell	Lt Col Robert E. Tranquada	191	Bell NG Center Bell
Hq & Co A Bell	Capt Armin M. Sadoff		
Co B Ontario	Capt Gerald H. Bradley		
Co C Pasadena	Capt Morton L. Futterman		
Co D Pasadena	Capt David A. Swan		
HQ 40th S & T Bn Bell	Lt Col George W. Hartman	198	Bell NG Center Bell
Hq Co 40th S & T Bn Bell	2d Lt Harry E. Douglas III		
Co A Compton	1st Lt William P. Orien		
Co B Bell	1st Lt Solomon Henderson		
540th Admin Co Los Angeles	Capt Daniel J. Hernandez	125	3440 S. Hope Street Los Angeles

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
HQ 240th Sig Bn Long Beach	Lt Col Clyde S. Harris	239	Armory—Long Beach, 854 E. 7th Street Long Beach
Hq Det 240th Sig Bn Long Beach	Capt Robert M. Prentice		
Co A Los Angeles	Capt Seisuke Tamanaha		
Co B San Diego	Capt Alfred J. Allen, Jr		
Co C Long Beach	Capt William D. Paige		
40th MP Co Los Angeles	Capt Harry S. Hansen, Jr	105	3440 S. Hope Street Los Angeles
HQ 140th Avn Bn Oxnard	Maj David R. Pierson	163	Oxnard Base, 351 South Street Oxnard
Hq Det 140th Avn Bn Oxnard	Capt Curtis H. Bryan, Jr		
Co A Long Beach	Maj William W. Netolicky		
Co B Oxnard	Maj Donald L. Riordan		
HQ 49th Inf Div Alameda	Maj Gen Paul R. Teilh		Foshay Jr High School, Western and Exposition Los Angeles
Hq Co 49th Inf Div Alameda	Capt Francis R. McLane	104	
HQ 1st Bde 49th Inf Div Sacramento	Col Wilber S. Green		Manual Arts High School Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bde 49th Inf Div Sacramento	Capt Gilbert A. Albiani	64	
HQ 2d Bde 49th Inf Div San Jose	Col George S. Nixon		Audubon High School Los Angeles
Hq Co 2d Bde 49th Inf Div San Jose	Capt Earle R. Rice	65	
HQ 3d Bde 49th Inf Div Fresno	Col Carl O. Nichols		Manual Arts High School Los Angeles
Hq Co 3d Bde 49th Inf Div Fresno	Capt James F. Holmes	74	
HQ 49th Div Arty Stockton	Col Edward G. Schleiger		Suzan B. Dorsey High School Los Angeles
Hq Btry 49th Div Arty Stockton	Capt Alex W. Franklin	95	
HQ 1st Bn 185th Inf Fresno	Lt Col Billie Asher	372	Manual Arts High School Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bn 185th Inf Fresno	Capt Salvador Rodriguez, Jr		
Co A Hanford	Capt Stephan A. Douglas		
Co B Visalia	Capt Clifford W. Rolland		
Co C Reedley	Capt Arthur J. Lopez		
HQ 2d Bn 185th Inf Modesto	Lt Col Vernon L. Conway	364	65th Fire Station, 103d and Compton Los Angeles

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Hq Co 2d Bn 185th Inf Modesto	Capt Earl L. Lucas		
Co A Merced	Capt Joseph O. Silva		
Co B Madera	Capt Harold E. Anderson		
Co C Turlock	Capt George G. Stough		
HQ 1st Bn 159th Inf San Francisco	Lt Col Albert T. Olivier	306	64th Street Fire Station, 108th and Main Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bn 159th Inf San Francisco	Capt Robert E. Denison		
Co A San Francisco	1st Lt Donald R. Trauthen		
Co B San Bruno	Capt Ralph C. Marinaro		
Co C San Francisco	Capt Dixon Arnett		
HQ 2d Bn 159th Inf San Jose	Lt Col Harland H. Smith	264	Green Meadows Playground, San Pedro and 88th Los Angeles
Hq Co 2d Bn 159th Inf San Jose	Capt William L. Diangson		
Co A Sunnyvale	Capt Alonzo Torres		
Co B San Jose	Capt Lynn E. Payne		
Co C San Jose	Capt Robert L. Darby		
HQ 1st Bn 184th Inf Sacramento	Lt Col Arthur I. Dublirer	318	7th Fire Station, 29th and Main Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bn 184th Inf Sacramento	Capt Donald G. Swain		
Co A Chico	Capt John T. Rummel		
Co B Oroville	Capt Richard P. Walsh		
Co C Yuba City	Capt Robert A. Tiff		
HQ 2d Bn 184th Inf Pittsburg	Lt Col Frank E. Podesta	326	22d Fire Station, Vernon and 8th Los Angeles
Hq Co 2d Bn 184th Inf Pittsburg	Capt John R. Henry		
Co A Richmond	Capt Louis P. Barry		
Co B Walnut Creek	1st Lt Calvin E. Moore		
Co C Walnut Creek	Capt Willard A. Laux		
HQ 1st Bn 149th Armor Salinas	Lt Col James Rodriguez	291	118th Street School, 118th and Main Los Angeles
Hq Co 1st Bn 149th Armor Salinas	Capt Alex D. Coy, Jr		

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Co A Monterey	Capt Leslie I. Vierra	220	14th Fire Station, Jefferson and Central Los Angeles
Co B Freedom	Capt Andrew E. Ausonio		
Co C Hollister	Capt Ronald H. Tyler		
HQ 3d Bn 149th Armor Roseville	Maj Ernest N. Rude, Jr		
Hq Co 3d Bn 149th Armor Roseville	Capt Karl V. Muehlberg		
Co A Auburn	1st Lt Frederick E. Angell	342	Lincoln School, 118th and Compton Los Angeles
Co B Willows	Capt Wendall W. Lowery		
Co C Red Bluff	Capt John H. Sharrah		
HQ 4th Bn 149th Armor Newark	Lt Col Albert E. Crane		
Hq Co 4th Bn 149th Armor Newark	Capt Gene H. Campbell		
Co A Santa Cruz	Capt William D. Collette	252	Adams Jr High School, Hill and 30th Streets Los Angeles
Co B Santa Cruz	Capt Robert L. Allen		
Co C Gilroy	Capt Donald L. Ziegenfuss		
HQ 1st Sqdn 170th Cav Sacramento	Maj Wilbert H. Derr		
Hq Trp 1st Sqdn 170th Cav Sacramento	Capt Kenneth C. Barnette		
Trp A Oakdale	1st Lt James A. Martin	216	Compton and Nadeau Los Angeles
Trp B Richmond	Capt Robert E. Hatch, Jr		
Trp C North Sacramento	Capt Robert C. Logan		
HQ 1st Bn 143d Arty Richmond	Lt Col George M. Lawton, Jr		
H&S Btry Richmond	Capt John B. Anderson		
Btry A Alameda	Capt David A. Stevenson	177	66th and Compton Los Angeles
Btry B Richmond	Capt Clayton R. Rossen		
Btry C Richmond	Capt Joseph A. Birilli		
HQ 2d Bn 143d Arty San Jose	Lt Col Don A. Rascon		
H&S Btry San Jose	Capt Joseph P. Hyde		
Btry A San Jose	Capt Silas L. Smith		

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Btry B San Jose	Capt John F. Bates	244	21st Fire Station, 52d and Hooper Los Angeles
Btry C San Jose	Capt Joseph D. Farias		
HQ 3d Bn 143d Arty San Mateo	Lt Col Henry M. Threefoot		
H&S Btry San Mateo	Capt Gilliam R. Middleton		
Btry A Redwood City	Capt James J. Desonie, Jr		
Btry B San Mateo	Capt Robert A. Armstrong	287	33d Fire Station, Broadway and Florence Los Angeles
Btry C Fremont	Capt Gerald T. Olsen		
HQ 4th Bn 143d Arty Stockton	Lt Col Edward H. Pickering		
H&S Btry Stockton	Capt James D. Bond		
Btry A Tracy	Capt Edward C. Callahan, Jr		
Btry B Stockton	Capt Walter E. Plumb, II	146	69th Street School, 69th and Compton Los Angeles
Btry C Stockton	Capt Marshall L. Wattel		
Btry D Lodi	Capt James E. Fontanilla		
HQ 5th Bn 143d Arty North Sacramento	Lt Col Howard R. Smith		
H&S Btry North Sacramento	Capt Richard C. Carli		
Btry A Lodi	Capt Lawrence W. Stallings	387	Adams Jr High School, Hill and 30th Streets Los Angeles
Btry B Woodland	Capt Michael T. Daugherty		
HQ 579th Engr Bn Santa Rosa	Lt Col Kenneth E. Robin		
Hq Co 579th Engr Bn Santa Rosa	Capt Harold W. Thompson		
Co A Santa Rosa	Capt James W. Lerner		
Co B Petaluma	1st Lt Joseph G. Kimes	91	Foshay Jr High School, Western and Exposition Los Angeles
Co C Healdsburg	1st Lt Michael M. Freeborn		
Co D Napa	Capt Robert L. Vance		
49th MP Co Sunnyvale	Capt James A. McCuiston		
HQ 49th Sig Bn San Francisco	Lt Col Arthur H. Hammett	248	Foshay Jr High School, Western and Exposition Los Angeles

ANNEX E

CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS COMMITTED TO RIOT CONTROL DUTY IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA—Continued

Unit/Home Station	Commander	Strength	C P Location
Hq Det, 49th Sig Bn San Francisco	Capt Peter W. Lismer		
Co A Alameda	1st Lt Paul D. Monroe, Jr		
Co B Redwood City	Capt Donald W. Smiley		
HQ 49th S & T Bn Alameda	Lt Col Hans Eichenwald	221	Foshay Jr High School, Western and Exposition Los Angeles
Hq Co 49th S & T Bn Alameda	Capt Jerald A. Combs		
Co A Concord	Capt James E. Terrell		
Co B Alameda	Capt Raymond L. Brousseau		
49th Admin Co Alameda	Capt James B. Lucas	50	Foshay Jr High School, Western and Exposition Los Angeles
Co B 749th Ord Bn San Lorenzo	Capt Stephen F. Bosma	42	
3632d Ord Co Benicia	Capt William A. Bayliss	97	Long Beach Field Maintenance Shop

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