Dear Earl:

I presume upon my friendship with you to write you regarding a matter over which I am much concerned. I am convinced that we must deal fairly with the loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry who have been evacuated from our state.

This is how Alfred J. Lundberg began his letter to his friend Earl Warren on July 13, 1943. Warren was the new governor of California, having taken office earlier that year after a term as state attorney general. Lundberg was the chief executive of the Key System, the East Bay’s major private rail, bus, and ferry mass transit company. He had twice served as president of the State Chamber of Commerce and four times as leader of the chamber’s Oakland branch. He was a trustee of Berkeley’s Pacific School of Religion and board member of the East Bay chapter of the Conference of Christians and Jews. In 1943, it would have been hard to find a more representative member of Oakland’s establishment than Al Lundberg.

Warren was also a member in good standing of that elite group. Before his election as governor in 1942, he had lived in Oakland, and prior to becoming state attorney general in 1938, he had served several years as Alameda County district attorney. He was tough on crime and corruption and willing to crack down on radical labor activists. Like Lundberg, he was a Mason and a Republican. The two men served together in civic organizations and one of Warren’s former assistants was an important Key System executive. Both Warren and Lundberg had strong connections with Joseph Knowland, Republican Party power broker and influential publisher of the Oakland Tribune. Yet for all their past ties, they disagreed fundamentally about what Lundberg called “the loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry.”
DEMOCRACY DEMANDS

Fair Play For

AMERICA'S JAPANESE
Warren was California's most prominent advocate of Japanese American wartime internment, while Lundberg was a leading member of the Fair Play Committee, a small but influential group of citizens who lobbied for the immediate release of people from internment camps and their eventual return to the West Coast. The committee's activities and its disagreements with Warren provide insight into a largely ignored part of the internment story—the vocal opposition of some members of the California establishment to the policy of dislocating and imprisoning people of Japanese descent. By actively speaking out, the Fair Play Committee signaled to power brokers in Washington that there were influential voices of reason on the West Coast countering the nation's dominant mood of hatred and fear. While it is difficult to measure the precise effect of the committee's activities on the evolution of federal policy, by early 1945 Washington had adopted a position similar to that advocated by the committee in 1941. Arguing on behalf of basic civil rights and civil liberties in the 1940s, the Fair Play Committee raised issues that are all too relevant to our contemporary debates over the Patriot Act, Guantánamo Bay, and policies of indefinite detention.

"AN INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS"

The Fair Play Committee was established in the fall of 1941, three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In May of that year, David Prescott Barrows, chairman of the University of California's Political Science Department and former university president, became concerned about rising anti-Japanese sentiment in California. He discussed the matter with Galen Fisher, a faculty member at the Pacific School of Religion and a political science research associate at the university. A liberal Protestant, Fisher had served twenty-one years in Japan as secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA. Subsequently, he had carried out a survey of race relations on the Pacific Coast for the Rockefeller Institute of Social and Religious Research. Although Fisher was in his late sixties in 1941, he agreed to take on the task of organizing what he and Barrows envisioned as "an independent committee of influential individuals" to advocate for the protection of the civil rights and liberties of Californians of Japanese descent. In September 1941, he announced the establishment of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese Ancestry.

Fisher created the new organization in part to counter the considerable influence of the Joint Committee on Immigration. Valentine Stuart McClatchy, former publisher of the Bee newspapers in Sacramento, Fresno, and Modesto, had organized the Joint Committee in 1921 to oppose Japanese immigration and warn of the specter of a "Yellow Peril" threatening white Christian culture in the Pacific Basin. By 1941, the group included official representatives of the Native Sons of the Golden West, the American Legion, the California Grange, the State Federation of Labor, and the Associated Farmers. Ulysses S. Webb, Warren's predecessor as state attorney general, was a prominent member. He had been the principal author of the state's 1913 Alien Land Law, which prohibited "aliens ineligible for citizenship" from owning land in California. Since federal law banned Asian immigrants from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens, the Alien Land Law was designed to reduce the substantial role of Japanese in California agriculture. However, the law applied only to the Issei, the first-generation immigrants. By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Nisei, the American-born second generation, were U.S. citizens and thus not covered by the Alien Land Law. (Collectively, all people of Japanese descent in California, first or second generation, were Nikkei.)
The Joint Committee became particularly active in 1941 as international tensions between the United States and Japan escalated. The organization argued that there were strong ties between Japanese Americans and the Japanese government and that the presence of people of Japanese descent represented a clear and present danger.

The committee's efforts to fan the flames of Yellow Peril feeling were supported by much of the state's media, including the McClatchy and Hearst newspaper chains and the Los Angeles Times.⁶

Galen Fisher envisioned the Fair Play Committee as an elite group of citizens whose prominence at least matched that of the Joint Committee members. In addition to Lundberg, Fisher recruited a number of important business leaders, including the president of the steamship company American President Lines and the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank. He also won the support of a number of Protestant leaders, including the Episcopal Bishop of California and the president of the Pacific School of Religion. However, the committee attracted few Catholic or Jewish clergy, with the prominent exception of Irving Reichert, rabbi of Temple Emanuel, San Francisco's largest synagogue. Fisher also recruited several prominent politicians, including Culbert Olson, the liberal Democratic governor of California, who initially served as honorary chairman.⁷

Given its academic roots, it was inevitable that committee membership would have a significant university connection. The presidents of Stanford and Mills College served on the board. Probably, the committee's most prominent member was Robert Gordon Sproul, the powerful and popular president of the University of California. Sproul's second in command, Provost Monroe Deutsch, was also particularly active, as were a number of UC Berkeley professors, including economist Paul Taylor. During the thirties, Taylor and his wife, photographer Dorothea Lange, had documented America's rural poor, but now they were attracted by the plight of Japanese Americans.⁸

Fisher and Barrows did not conceive of the Fair Play Committee as a traditional civil rights or social service organization. Its purpose was to influence public opinion and public policy rather than provide direct assistance to individuals.

The committee's first publication, an open letter released on September 11, 1941, urged Californians to distinguish between the Japanese government and the loyal people of Japanese descent living in the United States. If there was any espionage or sabotage, government agencies like the FBI would handle the problem. What the situation demanded of ordinary citizens was “fair play” for their Japanese American neighbors.

That, the committee argued, was true patriotism and the American way.⁹

Anti-Japanese propaganda saturated California's landscape. On April 13, Dorothea Lange, working for the War Relocation Authority (WRA), photographed this Sutro Baths poster depicting the era's racial stereotypes. Lange used her camera to expose the personal suffering and pain caused by the exclusion. The U.S. Army refused to release her pictures to the public for more than a decade. "Although the Army wanted a record," Lange observed, "it did not want a public record."

The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; photograph by Dorothea Lange
What the situation demanded of ordinary citizens was “fair play” for their Japanese American neighbors. That, the committee argued, was true patriotism and the American way.

The Fair Play Committee had barely gotten off the ground when the December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor dramatically changed the political and social landscape. Although public officials, including Warren, initially called for respect for Japanese American rights and property, in the first weeks of 1942, the idea of forced evacuation quickly gained popular support. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told the press (erroneously, as it turned out) that “the most effective fifth column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway.” The Hearst papers, along with other media and groups like the Joint Immigration Committee, warned of similar action by West Coast Japanese. On January 12, Congressman Leland Ford of Santa Monica proposed that “all Japanese, whether citizen or not, be placed in inland concentration camps.” By the beginning of February, Governor Olson had effectively dissociated himself from the Fair Play Committee and joined the growing chorus of elected officials calling for Japanese removal. Los Angeles mayor Fletcher Bowron not only supported exclusion, but also called for the immediate dismissal of all Japanese Americans on the city payroll. In early February, the West Coast congressional delegation unanimously called for the evacuation of people of Japanese descent from Washington, Oregon, and California.10

"CALIFORNIA’S MOST PROMINENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL"

Earl Warren became the de facto leader of this growing political movement. As Alameda County district attorney, he had battled against the Ku Klux Klan, and as state attorney general, he made a point of not serving on the anti-Japanese Joint Immigration Committee (in contrast to his predecessor, Ulysses S. Webb). In 1940, Warren had strongly condemned racial prejudice in a speech before the Associated Farmers. After Pearl Harbor, he opposed a proposal to fire state workers of Japanese descent as unconstitutional. His reputation as an opponent of bigotry gave his support of Japanese forced removal particular credibility. As the leading Republican office holder in Sacramento, his performance often was compared favorably to that of Democratic Governor Olson. Warren’s biographer Ed Cray observed that in response to Pearl Harbor, Warren “appeared to be firm and self-assured. . . . He was the voice of reason in a time of fear.” While Olson “vacillated, Warren was decisive; the attorney general had become California’s most prominent public official.”11

Although Olson tried to centralize control of California’s civil defense activities, the legislature established a structure that put Warren, the state’s chief law enforcement officer, effectively in charge. On January 29, Warren called a meeting of state officials, informing them that a Japanese attack on the mainland was possible. He argued that every Japanese immigrant should be considered “a potential fifth column,” and called for the
As governor of California during the war years, Earl Warren (1891-1974) promoted the compulsory exile of West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry. Formerly state attorney general (1939-1943), Warren served after the war as the fourteenth Chief Justice of the United States (1953-1969). Though celebrated for many landmark decisions, his position on internment during the war has left a dishonorable mark on his record as a protector of individual rights and equality.

DeWitt’s recommendation to proceed with the evacuation received a mixed reception in the nation’s capital. Members of the Justice Department, including FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General Francis Biddle, resisted mass removal. Hoover argued that his agency had the matter well in hand, having already arrested several hundred leaders of the Japanese immigrant community. Biddle condemned expulsion on constitutional grounds, particularly if it applied to U.S. citizens. But DeWitt, with strong support from Warren and other West Coast officials, won over Secretary of War Henry Stimson and his chief deputy, Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy. At a key Washington meeting with Justice Department officials, McCloy said that when it came to “a question of safety of the country,” the Constitution was “just a scrap of paper to me.” On February 11, the White House approved the evacuation and on February 19, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the army to forcibly relocate both citizens and non-citizens of Japanese descent from the West Coast.

Opponents of the evacuation policy hoped to make their case at sympathetic hearings conducted by the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, chaired by Democratic congressman John Toland. A pro-labor liberal, Toland previously had led hearings on California farm labor problems that had exposed the plight of migrant workers. But by the time the Toland Committee began its public hearings in San Francisco on February 21, 1942, Roosevelt already had issued Executive Order 9066, and the sessions served primarily to reinforce support for the forced relocation policy. Most of the people who testified at the hearings favored mass evacuation.

Warren was probably the most influential witness. He showed the committee a map of Japanese land holdings in California and noted that “virtually every important strategic location and installation has one or more Japanese in its immediate vicinity.” The fact that no sabotage had yet occurred, Warren surmised, only meant that Californians were “being lulled into a false
security." In his memoirs, written more than thirty years after the fact, he denied that his support of relocation was based on racism, but at the hearing he claimed that when dealing with the "Caucasian race we have methods that will test the loyalty of them." "With the Japanese," however, "we are in an entirely different field." Thus mass evacuation was appropriate for Japanese but unnecessary for Germans and Italians. Although Warren also recalled that he had advocated the evacuation only of Japanese-born residents, in fact he testified that it was "the consensus of opinion among law enforcement officers of this state that there is more potential danger among the group of Japanese born in this country than from alien Japanese who were born in Japan." Clearly, the attorney general was arguing for the involuntary removal of all people of Japanese descent, whether citizen or noncitizen.14

Representatives of the Japanese American Citizens League took strong exception to Warren's testimony. JACL membership was composed primarily of assimilated, well-educated young American citizens of Japanese descent. Mike Masaoka, the group's national secretary, strongly denied charges of widespread disloyalty among Japanese Americans and asked for "the right to share the common lot of all Americans." "We think, feel, act like Americans." Yet the organization said that if the government believed that "evacuation of Japanese residents from the West Coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying."15

Louis Goldblatt, longshoreman union activist and secretary of the California State Industrial Union Council, was probably the most outspoken defender of Japanese American rights at the hearings. The American Federation of Labor had long been identified with anti-Asian sentiment on the West Coast, and its state affiliate was a member of the Joint Immigration Committee. But the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the relatively new labor federation of which Goldblatt's industrial union council was an affiliate, included some unions with multiethnic memberships and strong records of civil rights advocacy. Goldblatt accused officials like Warren of joining the "wolf pack when the cry came out 'let's get the Yellow menace.'" They had turned the "war against Axis Powers into a war against the 'Yellow Peril.'" But even Goldblatt accepted the possibility of evacuation for the protection of the Japanese population—"to avoid vigilantism, mob rule, and hysterical beatings and riots."16

Galen Fisher, representing the Fair Play Committee, also defended the West Coast Nikkei. He argued that much of the anti-Japanese feeling was "whipped up by interested parties," including agricultural interests that stood to gain by evicting Japanese American farmers and processors. Fisher said there was no evidence of significant disloyalty among Japanese Americans. Indeed, some Nisei already were serving in the armed forces and evacuation would dramatically affect their morale. Mass evacuation also would be a propaganda boost for the Japanese war effort and cause significant problems for the United States after the war. But bowing to political reality, Fisher said the Fair Play Committee would support a "selective evacuation." He urged the government to establish fair processes for determining individual loyalty so that only disloyal and potentially dangerous people would be subject to removal.17

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy also had hoped that the evacuation could be "selective," perhaps excluding the elderly, people in mixed marriages, and those with special hardships. But General DeWitt told him, "Out here Mr. Secretary, a Jap is a Jap." In the end, the War Department supported DeWitt's plan for total expulsion.18 All people of Japanese descent living in a security zone that eventually included all of California, Oregon, Washington, and a portion of western Arizona were forcibly evacuated. The
order applied to about 120,000 people, close to 90 percent of all people of Japanese descent living in the continental United States. (Hawaii was not included, although Nikkei made up about 37 percent of the population.) The majority of those evacuated were American citizens and more than 70,000 were California residents. The exclusion applied to people of mixed heritage and even to unattached children who were taken from orphanages and placed in internment camps. Its criteria were not nationality or evidence of disloyalty, but race and ethnicity.

As evacuation got under way in the spring of 1942, several Fair Play Committee members became concerned about the future of West Coast Nisei college students. While the government planned elementary and secondary schools for the internment camps, there was no provision for post-secondary education. Robert O'Brien of the University of Washington estimated that there were more than three thousand Japanese American students enrolled in West Coast colleges, the largest—nearly five hundred—at UC Berkeley. Although the University of Washington was a close second, the great majority of Japanese American students were in various California institutions. Fair Play Committee members Monroe Deutsch and Paul Taylor joined with O'Brien to develop a program to allow the students to finish their studies at eastern and Midwestern
institutions outside of the security zone. Along with the presidents of Stanford and the University of Washington, UC president Sproul became actively involved, using his considerable prestige to influence federal officials. In spite of strong opposition from groups like the Joint Immigration Committee, federal authorities gave their blessing to a formal student resettlement program, initially headquartered in Berkeley but eventually administered by the American Friends Services Committee in Philadelphia. It served more than four thousand Japanese American students during the war.20

"THE HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVACUATIONS"

The Fair Play Committee seemed to face almost insurmountable odds during the spring and early summer of 1942. In February, a Japanese submarine shelled an oil facility near Santa Barbara and a blue ribbon committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack concluded (wrongly) that Japanese residents in Hawaii had engaged in sabotage. American forces sustained a series of military defeats in the Pacific. Fear and wartime hysteria strengthened the already intense public feeling against Japanese Americans. But the committee soldiered on, with Galen Fisher serving as unpaid executive secretary. In response to the post-Pearl Harbor environment, the organization changed its official name to the Committee on National Security and Fair Play. Its mission was now "to support the Government and armed forces in preserving national security and winning the war," while simultaneously fostering "fair play, especially toward law-abiding and innocent aliens and citizens of alien parentage."21

By the end of the summer, Fisher had identified influential allies in a surprising place—within the leadership of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the agency President Roosevelt established to administer the resettlement process. While the military provided security and carried out the actual roundup of residents, the president placed the administration of the relocation under the civilian WRA. The new agency was housed in the War Department, answering to Assistant Secretary McCloy. Roosevelt accepted McCloy's recommendation of Milton Eisenhower, an experienced Department of Agriculture administrator and brother of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as the first WRA director.

Milton Eisenhower became "deeply troubled" by the WRA's mission. He found that General DeWitt "had somehow blocked out the human implications of the evacuations." The Nikkei were temporarily housed in makeshift camps on the West Coast, including the racetracks Tanforan in the Bay Area and Santa Anita in southern California. Eisenhower proposed that many of the evacuees be allowed to resettle voluntarily in the Rocky Mountain and southwestern states. He also envisioned a series of centers spread throughout the West, based on the model of the Civilian Conservation Corps. From these facilities, the evacuees could work in western agriculture and industry, helping to fill labor shortages caused by the war. In April, Eisenhower had discussed these ideas with western governors at a meeting in Salt Lake City. The results were hardly encouraging. Only the governor of Colorado responded positively. Eisenhower said the other governors "were literally shouting at me." The governor of Idaho said "the Japs live like rats, breed like rats, and act like rats." Another governor told Eisenhower, "If you bring the Japanese to my state, I promise they will be hanging from every tree." Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to plan a series of large militarily secured camps, eventually ten in number, scattered in fairly isolated locations from eastern California to Arkansas. Evacuation and relocation now also had become involuntary internment.22
After just ninety days on the job, Eisenhower gladly accepted another federal assignment. He recommended his friend and former colleague in the Department of Agriculture, Dillon S. Myer, as his replacement. He told Myer to take the position only "if you can do the job and sleep at night." On June 17, 1942, Myer decided, "I was sure I could sleep, and so I accepted the position." During the next few months, Myer put Eisenhower's revised plans into effect, transferring more than 100,000 evacuees to the new internment camps. He came to share many of Eisenhower's reservations. He concluded that the mass evacuation was not justified and as early as March 1943 was privately arguing for a gradual phasing out of the exclusion order. In the meantime, he sought McCloy's approval for allowing qualified internees to leave the camps and voluntarily resettle in states outside the West Coast security zone. Myer argued that the camps bred a culture of dependence that was "bad for the evacuated people" and "bad for the future health of American democracy." His aim, he said, was "getting these people out of the relocation centers and reestablished in normal communities." Gradually, the War Department came around to Myer's position, at first supporting an individual furlough process and then approving procedures for more extensive voluntary resettlement. Still, the great majority of evacuees remained in internment camps for most of the war.

Myer also advocated allowing young internees to serve in the armed forces, initially as volunteers and eventually as draftees. When the war began, there were already a few Nisei in the military, and others were recruited for special intelligence units. But initially, Japanese Americans were prohibited from leaving the camps for military service. That policy changed in early 1943, when Secretary Stimson approved the creation of what was to become the army's all-Japanese American 442nd Combat Team.

Leaders of the Fair Play Committee supported most of Myer's policies and initiatives. More broadly, they agreed with his assimilationist convictions. Like Myer, their goal was to help Japanese Americans integrate into the mainstream of...
The grandstand dominated the entire complex. It was the center of activities and housed the camp administration, visitors’ hall, canteen, scrip book office, and one huge bachelors’ dormitory.

California Historical Society; CHS.Saito.003.tif

Tanforan Assembly Center: Siberius Y. Saito

Eighteen assembly centers, most of them in California, served as rustic quarters for Japanese Americans when they first were forcibly removed from their homes. The centers were hastily constructed at racetracks, fairgrounds, migrant workers’ camps, and warehouses. These detention camps—with barbed-wire fences, searchlights, and guard towers—provided temporary housing until the WRA permanent camps—with barbed-wire fences, searchlights, and guard towers—provided temporary housing until the WRA permanent camps—scattered in desolate inland areas throughout seven states—were completed.

Among those deported to the Tanforan Assembly Center in San Bruno was the architect Siberius Y. Saito (1908–1980), who composed twenty-four drawings illustrating Tanforan’s barracks, mess halls, medical facilities, public areas, and general views. In June 1942, Architect & Engineer magazine listed him in the “Architects Migrate” column as leaving from San Francisco “to Barracks 8, apartment 3, Tanforan Assembly, San Bruno.” Saito is one of many Japanese American internees who used their talents to document life during expulsion. He taught pencil drawing and architectural drafting in Tanforan’s art school, as did many other artists, photographers, and craftsmen who shared their expertise with others in the camps’ makeshift schools and studios.

In a June 22, 1942, letter, Saito described the living conditions of those internees assigned to the stall apartments: “Poor ventilation, dirty and grimy, smell of manure from underfloor area, dampness; these are some of the conditions that occur out in our ‘skid row.’”

After the war, in 1948, Saito cofounded an architecture firm in Waterloo, Iowa, and in 1979, a year before he died, donated annotated photographic copy prints of his Tanforan drawings to CHS; the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University; and Rod Library, University of Northern Iowa. His notes comprise the captions on these pages.

Editors
(Above) View from the top area of the grandstand looking north on El Camino Real, at that time the main highway between San Francisco and San Jose. Some barracks appear on the right.

California Historical Society;
CHS.Saito.004.tif

(Left) The guard tower.

California Historical Society;
CHS.Saito.008.tif
There were many skilled landscape gardeners. They converted a dried-up pond in the infield into a beauty spot complete with Japanese garden, bridges, trees, walks, etc.

California Historical Society; CHS.Saito.010.tif

Barrack apartments at the race track curve. . . . The camp was divided into blocks of barracks housing about 300. Each block had its own mess hall, toilets and showers. . . . There were neither plumbing nor heating and one single light bulb on a pull chain per compartment. Size of a typical apartment was 16 x 20 ft. with an average occupancy of 6.

California Historical Society; CHS.Saito.020.tif

"Well, it's been almost two months since coming here," Saito began his June 22, 1942, letter. "Gotten used to camp life now." His detailed description of the Tanforan Assembly Center ends with uncertainty about the future: "Don't know how long I'll be here—no word yet. . . ."

California Historical Society, Augusta Bixler Farms Records, MS 2028.001.tif
From the box seats of the grandstand looking down on people waiting in line to get into the canteen. Scrip coupons were exchanged there for sundries. There was only one canteen and choices of items were limited.

California Historical Society; CHS.Saito.007.tif
American society. Politically moderate to liberal, they criticized the Yellow Peril formulation of America as a “white man’s country.” But along with WRA leadership, the Fair Play Committee promoted the idea that Japanese Americans, like other minorities, should achieve integration by adopting white, middle-class values, standards, and lifestyles. By the end of 1942, a remarkable political alliance had emerged between the Fair Play Committee, a major opponent of Japanese American internment, and the WRA, the government agency administering the internment policy. Myer said the Fair Play Committee “helped provide support on the side of the angels.”

“PURELY AND SIMPLY A PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT”

The committee restructured itself in late 1942 and early 1943, changing its name for the third time in two years to the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. Robert Gordon Sproul was honorary chairman, Arthur McGiffert, president of the Pacific School of Religion, chaired the executive committee, and Professor Paul Taylor and Rabbi Irving Reichert served as vice chairs. Alfred Lundberg and Monroe Deutsch also served on the executive committee. The organization established an advisory board led by Maurice Harrison, a prominent San Francisco attorney. Galen Fisher was vice treasurer, a title that did not fully reflect his ongoing interest and activity, which included writing highly effective articles and flyers opposing the internment. The committee tried to spawn a number of local chapters in various California cities, as well as Seattle and Portland, but only the Pasadena chapter remained active and viable throughout the war. Never a mass-membership organization, by the end of 1943, the committee had only 600 members and an annual budget of about $7,300, most of which was supplied by foundation grants.

The most important changes produced by the committee’s restructuring were the establishment of modest offices in Berkeley and San Francisco and the hiring of a paid executive secretary, Ruth W. Kingman. Kingman’s husband, Harry, was director of Stiles Hall, the UC Berkeley YMCA. A former major league baseball player, he had worked for the YMCA in China and Japan. Ruth had accompanied him to Asia and used her music education at the College of the Pacific to organize performances and pageants for holidays and YMCA events. In Berkeley she served as Stiles Hall’s “unpaid hostess” and played an important role in the institution’s activities. Both children of Protestant clergymen, the Kingmans were political liberals and community activists. During the thirties, they fought against racial discrimination and established a free-speech policy at Stiles Hall that provided a forum for controversial speakers, including political radicals. In early 1943, President Roosevelt appointed Harry West Coast director of the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the agency enforcing the nondiscrimination provisions in federal defense contracts.

The Kingmans were early opponents of internment. Many Nisei were active in the YMCA, and Stiles Hall sponsored the initial efforts to resettle Japanese American students at eastern and midwestern colleges. After Executive Order 9066, Ruth asked Stiles Hall staff member Bob Okamoto what church groups were doing to help. He answered, “Ruth, I think they’ve got to put up or shut up.” Kingman took that as a challenge and worked with other Berkeley women to persuade the local Congregational Church to support internees through the difficult evacuation process. The church offered its social hall as Berkeley’s point of embarkation for the camps, serving coffee and cake to adults and providing toys for children. Later Kingman and her colleagues visited the temporary assembly camp at Tanforan, providing household supplies and moral support.
As executive secretary of the Fair Play Committee, Ruth Kingman (1900–1994) waged an unrelenting campaign for justice for "loyal" Japanese Americans. After the war, she served in leadership positions in numerous Bay Area civic organizations and was associate director of the Washington-based Citizens’ Lobby for Freedom and Fair Play. During an oral history interview in the early 1970s (right), Kingman described the Fair Play Committee’s relationship with Governor Earl Warren, affirming: “As far as I know, Earl Warren has never regretted the position he took during the war, and as far as I know, none of us has found reason to regret ours.”

The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley

for the internees. In December 1942, she traveled to Utah to organize a bilingual Christmas pageant for internees at the Topaz camp. It wasn’t a white Christmas, she reported, because “it was too cold to snow.” The high school chorus sang carols for an audience that included camp guards and administrators, as well as internees. Kingman said, “The soldiers loved it. They wouldn’t let the kids go.”

Assuming the office of executive secretary in early 1943, Kingman immediately became the focal point of Fair Play Committee activity. She argued that “the economic and racist interests” had mobilized long before people of good will who “hadn’t believed ‘it could happen here.’” Now the committee was playing catch up, and the organization’s role needed to be “purely and simply a public relations effort.” She believed the committee had to project a moderate image, instead of openly criticizing the internment or publicly calling for an immediate return of the internees. The committee also needed to be perceived as supporting the war. “None of us were antiwar,” Kingman said. The committee was “fighting for democracy, for American principles.” “This,” she explained, “was our war effort.” Kingman also strengthened the committee’s alliance with the WRA and its personal ties with Dillon Myer. She publicly defended Myer’s policies and decisions, while Myer used the committee’s existence to prove to his Washington superiors that not all Californians were anti-Japanese racists. The wife of a WRA official even served as a paid committee staff member in 1945.

Kingman established powerful connections in Washington, where she traveled in the fall of 1943 for the first of two highly successful lobbying trips. She met with Assistant Secretary McCloy and had a particularly gratifying session
“None of us were antiwar,” Kingman said. The committee was “fighting for democracy, for American principles.” “This,” she explained, “was our war effort.”

By mid-1943, the efforts of Kingman and her allies were having some effect. The War Department was increasingly comfortable with the idea of voluntary resettlement out of the camps. In June, the department replaced General John DeWitt as army commander on the West Coast. He was the military’s strongest supporter of internment and was deeply suspicious of Nisei loyalty. His successor, General Delos C. Emmons, previously served as military commander in Hawaii and in that capacity had opposed mass evacuation. Along with the FBI and the Honolulu police chief, Emmons had contradicted the erroneous charges of Nisei sabotage and espionage. California newspapers reported that the change in command was directly related to the War Department’s displeasure with DeWitt’s extreme views.

The relative liberalization of federal policy produced a furious counterattack from anti-Japanese American forces. New groups like the No Japs Inc. joined the traditional Yellow Peril establishment in criticizing federal authorities. The Home Front Commandos sponsored a “Slap the Jap” campaign, urging supporters to “keep the Jap rats out of your hair.” The California County Supervisors Association unanimously passed a resolution opposing the voluntary resettlement policy, and the San Francisco Board of Supervisors expressed its collective belief that 80 percent of the internees would fight for Japan if given the chance. The California congressional delegation voted unanimously to oppose any return of Nikkei to the West Coast.

Various federal and state legislative committees held hearings that gave the opponents of WRA policies well-publicized forums. A State Assembly committee chaired by Lester Gannon of Sacramento made the Fair Play Committee’s Pasadena chapter a particular target. The Pasadena group was the Fair Play Committee’s most...
active and unruly local chapter. Some of its members objected to the committee strategy of close cooperation with government agencies and its refusal to call for an immediate return of internees to the West Coast. Testifying before the legislative committee in December 1943, however, chapter leader Mrs. Maynard Thayer adhered to the Fair Play Committee's moderate stance. Gannon thought her defense of the Bill of Rights sounded like "Communist doctrine" and asked, "Are you a Communist?" Thayer answered that she was a Republican and member of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Gannon then asked whether "you want to champion the rights of people where different sexes do nude bathing together?" He argued, "You don't know anything about the habits and morals of Japs in California. Mrs. Thayer, have you ever smelled the odor of a Jap home?" Gannon may have overplayed his hand; even the pro-interment Los Angeles Times criticized his performance.4

Earl Warren remained the most credible spokesman for the anti-Japanese American cause. As governor, his views now attracted national attention. His defeat of incumbent governor Culbert Olson was due, in part, to his calm, decisive demeanor and moderate reputation. Warren criticized what he called "social experimenters" within the WRA leadership. He specifically opposed allowing internees to leave the camps and settle in the Midwest and East Coast, a policy he called "dumping the Japs on other states." In an address at a national governors' conference in Columbus, Ohio, he claimed that his views were not "an appeal to race hatred" but were based on rational security concerns. If the Japanese left the camps, he said, "No one will be able to tell a saboteur from any other Jap. We don't want to have another Pearl Harbor in California." At a later press conference, he reiterated his belief that the internment "saved our state from terrible disorders and sabotage."35

A "Slap the Jap" pamphlet produced by Sacramento's Home Front Commandos—"organized for the express purpose of Deporting and Excluding the Japs"—helped to foment hostile feelings in the state's major farming areas. "Do you want them back in your back yard . . . to poison your water, kill your cattle, destroy your orchards?" the brochure asked. "Slap the Jap" and other anti-Japanese slogans were used to sell war bonds and stamps and were featured on highway signs, posters, greeting cards, buttons, and ashtrays, and in magazines, leaflets, punchboards, and marble games.

California Historical Society, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California records, 1900-2000, MS 3580.001.tif
It was statements such as these that led to Alfred Lundberg’s “Dear Earl” letter of July 13, 1943. Although it was phrased as a personal letter, the correspondence appeared on Fair Play Committee stationery and was, in fact, the committee’s response to Warren’s position. The committee was particularly concerned that the governor’s pronouncements, covered by Life magazine, had extensive national distribution and publicity. Lundberg wrote that despite Warren’s claim that he was not appealing to race hatred, “your words are being exploited by vigilante-minded individuals.” Lundberg argued that although the great majority of people of Japanese descent were loyal, the Fair Play Committee did not favor their return to the West Coast “at the present time.” The committee did support the voluntary resettlement of loyal people out of the camps so that they could find jobs “in industry and agriculture outside the military areas.” Finally, giving the governor an opportunity for graceful retreat, Lundberg said that if Warren was misquoted, he should “take steps to set the matter right.”

Warren had no intention of accepting Lundberg’s olive branch. But he did take the letter seriously and replied just three days later. His “Dear Al” letter of July 16, 1943—nearly four single-spaced typed pages—was probably his most expansive statement on the internment policy, essentially an extended summary of his former positions. (A quarter-century later, Warren regretted having written the document and persuaded his biographer John Weaver not to publish it.) In 1943, Warren attributed Lundberg’s opinions to his laudable “humanitarian instincts.” But the governor refused to apologize for his own views because “I believe them to be true and in the interest of the safety of our State and Nation.” He defended the original relocation and argued that nothing had occurred to justify an end to internment. Indeed, he warned that “the same smugness that brought about . . . the disaster at Pearl Harbor is beginning to permeate our country again.” Warren denied that his views were affected by “race hatred” or “wartime emotions,” but he argued, “We know how Japanese, wherever born, are indoctrinated with the ambitions of the Japanese Empire and of their efforts to achieve them.” Ultimately, Warren relied on the military judgment of General DeWitt, who continued to back the internment. If the Japanese were released from the camps, he asked, “who, I ask you, could tell the difference between a loyal Japanese . . . and a saboteur?”

Lundberg did not reply until September, apologizing for the “multiplicity of demands upon my time” responsible for the delay. But the delay was also caused by the substantial participation of Fair Play Committee members and staff in drafting the response. Even Dillon Myer weighed in. The letter was designed to be a point-by-point refutation of each of the governor’s arguments. For example, Lundberg denied that his and the committee’s concerns were “primarily humanitarian.” Instead, he said, they were based on “the most important of all American principles, the protection of minority rights.” The son of Danish immigrants, Lundberg pointed out that he was in the minority in a number of ways, including, “for the present only, I hope,” as a member of the Republican Party (along with Warren). “Attacks upon the rights of any minority tend to undermine the rights of the majority.” Although the letter didn’t explicitly accuse Warren of racism, Lundberg pointed out that discrimination against minorities based on their ancestry “was the basis of Hitler’s rise to power.” While Warren had relied on General DeWitt for support, Lundberg cited a number of distinguished Americans, including General Emmons, FBI director Hoover, and even Secretary of War Stimson, who had defended the loyalty of the great majority of Nikkei. In contrast to DeWitt, who believed “a Jap is a Jap,” Lundberg proclaimed that a person is “either loyal to our country or not, as the case may be, entirely regardless of the blood or the mixture of bloods that flow in his veins.”
By May 1943, the WRA encouraged increasing numbers of internees—"the great majority of them . . . completely loyal to the United States"—to leave the camps and settle outside the West Coast restricted zone. The WRA urged "all able-bodied residents with good records of behavior to reenter private employment."

Internees were encouraged to apply for positions throughout the East and Midwest in a variety of fields—including, ironically, the vital arms-producing industry. The Fair Play Committee was particularly vociferous in its support of voluntary resettlement.

(Left) In its 1943 brochure, Relocating a People, the WRA described its resettlement policy and outlined "How to Employ Evacuees."

 JOSEPH R. GOODMAN PAPERS ON JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT, MS 840.002.TIF, CALIFORNIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(Above) Young internees inspect job notices on a work-offer board at the Manzanar Relocation Center in Owens Valley, California.

LOS ANGELES PUBLIC LIBRARY PHOTO COLLECTION
“TROUBLEMAKERS”

By 1943, the committee’s case for voluntary resettlement was weakened by significant disorder in the camps. Dillon Myer had continued Milton Eisenhower’s policy of working closely with the JACL, which cooperated with the WRA in the administration of the camps. The JACL supported Myer’s assimilationist beliefs and policies, but its prominence often was resented by traditional Issei community leaders and by Kibei, American-born Nisei raised and educated in Japan. Some American-educated Nisei also took exception to the JACL’s cooperation with a government that had deprived Japanese Americans of their basic rights as U.S. citizens. When, in December 1942, a dispute over wages and working conditions for internee kitchen workers at the Manzanar camp in California’s Owens Valley turned violent, demonstrators physically attacked JACL members and clashed with army guards. Troops killed two internees before order was restored.39 Demonstrations and protests broke out at other camps, including antidraft activities at Heart Mountain, Wyoming, where the rebels formed their own Fair Play Committee, perhaps in an effort to identify with the Bay Area group.

Kingman and her Fair Play Committee supported Myer’s actions. The committee believed that the WRA needed to assure the public that only “loyal” Japanese Americans would be released in the voluntary resettlement program. The committee also supported a loyalty questionnaire distributed by the WRA to internees in early 1943. But the questionnaire provoked even more protest and unrest in the camps. The WRA sent many of the alleged troublemakers to Tule Lake in northeastern California. For several months in late 1943 and early 1944, the Tule Lake camp itself was rocked by protests. At one point, the military took temporary control of the facility. Camp authorities put several protest leaders in a stockade, where they engaged in an extended hunger strike.

Ernest Besig, executive secretary of the Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, traveled to Tule Lake and publicly criticized the WRA for serious violations of the prisoners’ legal rights. He recruited San Francisco lawyer Wayne Collins to represent the men, who eventually were released.41 The ACLU’s national office in New York had supported the internment policy as a necessary evil. But in 1942, in direct defiance of national policy, Besig and his northern California branch backed the legal challenge to internment brought by Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American citizen arrested for disobeying the expulsion order. By 1944, so little love was lost between Besig and national ACLU director Roger Baldwin that Baldwin approved the WRA’s decision to forcibly eject Besig from the Tule Lake camp.42

Although Kingman, like many other committee leaders, belonged to the ACLU’s northern California branch, she feared that the Fair Play Committee’s moderate image would be compromised if she became identified with the hunger strikers and Besig’s militant defense of civil liberties. She even turned down an offer to serve on the branch’s executive committee. Instead, she and the Fair Play Committee rallied to support Dillon Myer and the WRA, whose position on the Tule Lake upheavals had induced an avalanche of criticism. In November 1943, the Hearst newspapers blamed the disorders on Myer’s “coddling” of camp residents and disclosed that conscientious objectors were working as teachers at Tule Lake. Many western members of Congress called for Myer’s immediate dismissal, and Governor Warren demanded the reestablishment of direct military control over the entire internment program.43
Under attack from both civil libertarians and Yellow Peril activists, Myer looked to the Fair Play Committee for support. The committee expressed its confidence in the WRA leadership but asked the agency to clearly answer the public criticisms, urging Myer to inform the public of the difference between the residents of Tule Lake and the “loyal populations” of the other camps. Kingman made the same point in telegrams to Attorney General Biddle, Assistant Secretary McCloy, and General Emmons. On November 26, she publicly released the text of a telegram to President Roosevelt, again distinguishing between the “troublemakers” at Tule Lake and the “law abiding residents” of other camps. In the end, Myer informed Kingman that he and the WRA still had the president’s support. The War, Justice, and State Departments all favored maintaining civilian administration of the camps.44

Myer admitted “that our public relations reached a new low following the Tule Lake incident.” Kingman agreed, complaining about Myer’s poor communication skills in letters to Congressman George Outland of Santa Barbara and Anna Roosevelt Boettiger. She encouraged Myer to speak before influential audiences in California, but the results were not always positive. Even Myer conceded that he “flubbed” a speech in Berkeley. Sproul, who introduced him at the event, complained that Myer’s “greatest weakness seems to be an utter lack of any dramatic sense.”45 Myer’s public speaking abilities apparently improved, and with committee support he continued to make appearances in West Coast communities.

“BEGINNING OF THE CHANGE OF THE WHOLE PUBLIC ATTITUDE”

Kingman believed that presentations by Nisei soldiers were the most effective means of changing public opinion. Eventually, the committee used the 442nd’s successful record to win converts, but even before that unit was trained and deployed, the testimony of Japanese American soldiers had a major impact. While the great majority of Nisei servicemen were in segregated units, a few who had volunteered before Pearl Harbor served in regular forces, including Yori Wada, a Berkeley graduate and former editor of the student newspaper, The Daily Californian. Wada had been active at Stiles Hall where he became friendly with the Kingmans. Unable to get a job because of his ethnicity, he joined the army and was on active duty at the time of Pearl Harbor. The committee arranged for Wada to write an article on his military service for the university’s alumni magazine, The California Monthly. The piece was published in December 1943 and was well received. Mary Jeffards, the committee’s office secretary, informed Wada that “everyone thinks the article superior.” The committee distributed copies to key constituencies.46

Even more effective were appearances by Sergeant Ben Kuroki, a decorated turret gunner for the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force who had served in the skies over Europe. Kingman persuaded McCloy to allow Kuroki to speak to the prestigious Commonwealth Club at San Francisco’s Palace Hotel. Kuroki talked about his combat experience and about the prejudice he had faced in the military. He said he was fighting “two battles instead of one—against the Axis and against intolerance among my fellow Americans.” During basic training, Kuroki explained, he and his brother faced so much hostility that they were “the loneliest two soldiers in the army.” The speech received a five-minute ovation. Industrialist Henry J. Kaiser was in tears after the event. Kingman arranged for Kuroki to follow up his speech with joint appearances on local radio stations with a white marine who had served on Guadacanal. She also hoped Kuroki would get national exposure on the NBC network. When the network canceled the broadcast, she fired off an angry telegram to NBC executives. But it turned out that the program had been banned by the War Department. Although McCloy claimed...
he had acted to protect Kuroki, it’s likely that the department’s primary motive was to avoid a national airing of army racism.47

Kingman was convinced that Kuroki’s appearances had a major impact. They received substantial media coverage, and even the Hearst and McClatchy newspapers ran sympathetic stories. According to Kingman, Kuroki’s presentations were “the beginning of the change of the whole public attitude in California.”48 American military successes in the Pacific also contributed, greatly reducing the levels of fear and hysteria that had been prevalent in the months immediately after Pearl Harbor. Galen Fisher wrote four articles in Christian Century magazine, attacking the internment and defending the loyalty of the Nikkei population. The articles were highly effective and in reprinted form became the committee’s most important public handout. Eventually more than twenty thousand copies were distributed.49

In spite of numerous attempts to develop a presence in California communities, at least until 1944 the Fair Play Committee was primarily a Bay Area institution. The only successful local branch in southern California was the sometimes rebellious Pasadena chapter. In the spring of 1944, the executive committee decided to hire a staff member based in Los Angeles to promote an active chapter in that city. One of the southerners Kingman contacted was Carey McWilliams, a Los Angeles lawyer, writer, and activist who had served as a controversial state Commissioner of Housing and Immigration under Governor Olson. In 1944, he wrote a book strongly condemning the internment. Although McWilliams sometimes criticized the Fair Play Committee’s moderate tactics, he supported the organization’s goals and maintained generally good relations with Kingman. McWilliams recommended Katherine Kaplan for the new staff position, and it proved to be an inspired choice.50 Her husband was a UCLA physics professor, and the couple had important connections in academic and political circles. She also developed good working relationships with prominent southern California community and business leaders.

Kaplan pushed for a Los Angeles appearance by Sproul to promote the new Los Angeles chapter. In early 1943, Sproul had agreed to serve as honorary chairman of the Fair Play Committee, but as UC president he seldom had time to attend committee meetings and was less than fully engaged in the organization’s activities. He had, however, allowed the committee to make good use of his name and prestige, which sometimes got him into political trouble.51 Due to either time constraints or political caution, Sproul delayed committing to a specific date for the Los Angeles appearance. But he finally agreed to address a selected audience at the city’s exclusive California Club on June 29, 1944. In his speech, Sproul strongly defended the committee, saying it was not “pro-Japanese” but “pro-American democracy.” He criticized Los Angeles as a center of “race-baiting opposition” to the committee’s efforts. “The opposition,” Sproul argued, “is still vehement and unscrupulous,” and the committee needed the active support of influential people of good will.52

The speech was a rousing success. It received favorable press coverage, and forty of the sixty VIPs in attendance agreed to participate in the new Los Angeles branch, including two bank presidents, the Catholic archbishop of Los Angeles, and the presidents of the University of Southern California and California Institute of Technology. Businessman Homer D. Crotty chaired the new Los Angeles executive committee, which also included Nobel Prize physicist Robert Millikan. Kingman expressed the organization’s “deep appreciation” for Sproul’s “magnificent statement” and complimented him for his “courage in attacking that highly controversial subject.” Sproul replied, “I liked the saying of it . . . I was getting tired of being quiet in
that difficult area." The committee reprinted and widely distributed the speech, accompanied by a cover letter signed by President Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford and UC Provost Monroe Deutsch and Professor David Prescott Barrows. More than 2,300 copies were sent to public school principals and teachers throughout the state.

Sproul told his Los Angeles audience that the Fair Play Committee favored return of the internees to the West Coast after the army lifted the security ban. But this point of view was hardly universal. A 1944 flyer published by the Southern California Produce Association called on farmers to mobilize to prevent any return of Japanese residents, otherwise “the Japanese will come back after the war and monopolize the produce business just as they were doing before Pearl Harbor.” The flyer was cosponsored by the Los Angeles County Chamber of Commerce, both the Los Angeles County and California State Farm Bureaus, and the University of California Agricultural Extension Service. The American Educational League of Los Angeles, whose board included state Senator Jack Tenny and the presidents of the California Federation of Labor and Pepperdine University, also opposed the return of the Japanese. The Los Angeles Times reported that a poll of Los Angeles County residents found 74 percent supported deporting all Japanese citizens in the United States after the war. Forty percent were in favor of including American-born Nisei in the deportation order. An editorial in the Los Angeles Herald argued, “California does not want any Japs ever returned. . . . Let us keep the Japs out forever.”

**“NO LONGER A MATTER OF MILITARY NECESSITY”**

Nevertheless, federal officials assured Fair Play Committee representatives that the internees eventually would return to the West Coast. In
1943, the War Department quietly began permitting Nisei service members to take military leaves in California. The Kingmans invited Yori Wada to dinner at their Berkeley home, but snuck him in after dark so he could come and go without being seen.

The possibility of a wholesale return of internees increased in February 1944, when President Roosevelt transferred control of the WRA from the War Department to the Department of the Interior. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who had opposed internment from the very beginning, called the policy “stupid and cruel,” referring to relocation centers as “fancy-named concentration camps.” Blunt and uncompromising, Ickes had made his opinions clear to the president. When Roosevelt transferred control of the camps into Ickes’s hands, the Fair Play Committee leadership took it as a sign that White House policy was changing for the better.

In April 1944, Ickes met with Kingman and other committee leaders in San Francisco. The meeting was cordial and encouraging. Kingman established good working relations with Assistant Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas. In June, Ickes wrote to Roosevelt, arguing that since the War Department no longer believed the exclusion zone was militarily justified, the time had come for the president to lift the executive order and allow Nikkei residents to return to the West Coast. Secretary of War Stimson agreed, but to the dismay of Fair Play Committee leaders who were kept abreast of events, the president did not. Roosevelt was preparing to run for reelection in November 1944 and did not want to face any political flack generated by ending the exclusion policy. The internees were going to have to wait until after the November election for full restoration of their rights and liberties.

The WRA, however, did allow a few people “of special merit” to return on an individual basis. One such person was Ester Takei, who in September was allowed to enroll in Pasadena Junior College. Her return was sponsored by the Friends of the American Way, a group of present and former Fair Play Committee members who had disagreed with the committee’s policy of not providing direct assistance to individual internees. Takei’s presence was opposed by the Ban the Japs Committee, which demanded that the school board expel her. The group held a mass meeting protesting Takei’s presence in Pasadena, but her supporters responded with an even larger demonstration of their own. The school board held firm, and Takei attended classes without incident.

By the fall of 1944, Dillon Myer feared that the internment would be overturned by the Supreme Court before the president acted. The 1942 California case of Fred Korematsu challenging the constitutionality of internment and similar challenges from Oregon and Washington led knowledgeable observers to expect a final court ruling before the end of the year. On December 17, 1944, apparently tipped off to the fact that the decision was imminent, the War Department finally revoked the exclusion order, explaining that “it was no longer a matter of military necessity.” Internees now were free to leave the camps and live anywhere in the United States, including the West Coast.

The following day, the Supreme Court ruled against Korematsu and his co-plaintiffs, affirming the legality of the exclusion order and the initial roundup and evacuation of people of Japanese descent, including American citizens. But in a companion decision in the case of ex parte Endo, the court ruled the enforced internment unconstitutional—the evacuees could not be held against their will outside of the exclusion zone. Although the War Department’s action of the previous day technically rendered the court’s actions moot, the Korematsu and Endo decisions never have been specifically overturned and thus remain legal precedent.
After the U.S. Army lifted its security ban in December 1944, Japanese American internees began returning to their home towns and cities on the West Coast. Despite efforts by the Fair Play Committee and other organizations, anti-Japanese sentiment prevailed. Many southern California returnees—forced to leave the camps before securing housing on the Pacific Coast—were housed in barracks and trailers at former army camps in Burbank. As late as May 1946, some still lived in the trailer camps of Burbank’s Winona Housing Project and ate at outdoor kitchens.

Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection; photograph by Howard Ballew

Washington informed Governor Earl Warren of the revocation order the day before the official announcement. Warren remembered that he was on the phone “nine-tenths” of the time that day, calling public officials, telling them “the worst thing that could happen . . . would be for us to maintain a feeling of antagonism toward the Japanese who had lived in our state and hadn’t done anything wrong”—a statement consistent with the Fair Play Committee’s position since 1941. Warren said that of those he called, only Los Angeles mayor Fletcher Bowron disagreed. Publicly, Warren asked Californians to “comply with the decision” and “join in protecting the constitutional rights of the individuals involved.”

At the end of December, Warren convened a statewide conference of law enforcement officials to discuss ways to assure an orderly return of the internees. The gathering was similar to the one he had organized in 1942 as attorney general, only the 1942 meeting promoted the expulsion of Japanese from the state, while the 1944 session advocated their return. State Coordinator of Law Enforcement Robert Piver proposed a resolution condemning the original exclusion, but Warren successfully argued against it, pointing out that “we agree on that now, but none of us raised a voice against it when it happened.” In fact, many of those in attendance, including Warren, had “raised a voice” in favor of exclusion back in 1942. Still, the Fair Play Committee publicly congratulated the governor for his 1944 statements, though some committee leaders privately questioned his sincerity. In June 1945, Warren assured the committee that he had worked with the army and the WRA to “create a tolerant public opinion. . . . I will continue to do everything I can to see that Japanese Americans have their constitutional rights protected.”
Paul S. Taylor (1895–1984), UC professor and vice chairman of the Fair Play Committee, opened the second-day session of the committee's Conference on Interracial Coordination on January 11, 1945. Attended by representatives of many government agencies and nonprofit organizations, the conference focused on the grave problems encountered by returning internees, including racism and the lack of jobs and housing.

The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; photograph by Charles E. Mace

On January 10 and 11, 1945, the Fair Play Committee sponsored its own conference in San Francisco, attended by more than two hundred representatives of various public and private agencies, to promote a positive and coordinated response to the problems created by the return process. The conference addressed not only public opposition and racism, but also practical issues like housing and employment. These concerns led to the only serious conflict between the Fair Play Committee and Dillon Myer. Consistent with his assimilationist views, Myer favored closing the camps and integrating the Nikkei into larger society as quickly as possible, even if it meant forcibly evicting them from the camps. The committee proposed keeping at least some of the camps open as interim settlements until the internees could be guaranteed housing, jobs, and personal security. Kingman went over Myer's head, asking Secretary Ickes to overrule his WRA director. It was a tough decision for Ickes, who described the choice as either "pushing many of the Japanese out or maintaining them in what were really concentration camps for months or years to come." In the end, Ickes backed Myer, and all the camps but Tule Lake closed before the end of 1945. The last resident left Tule Lake in March 1946, effectively ending four years of internment.

The practical problems faced by the returning evacuees persuaded some committee members to propose that the organization begin helping individuals cope with the return process. But Kingman adhered to the committee's original vision, explaining, "We are not working for the evacuees as they come back, but rather to establish public acceptance of their right to come back." Nevertheless, Kingman provided personal assistance to several individuals. Throughout the war, she corresponded with victims of the exclusion and
often used her influence on their behalf. That included Chiura Obata, a distinguished artist and Berkeley art professor. He and his family were interned first at Tanforan and then at Topaz. Obata taught art classes at the camps, and Kingman brought supplies for his students. She also arranged for some of Obata’s pictures of the camp experience to be presented as gifts to Eleanor Roosevelt. Kingman urged Myer to allow the family to leave Topaz, and after Obata was attacked by other internees, apparently for cooperating with camp authorities, the family was furloughed. They settled in the St. Louis area, where an Obata son was attending college. In the summer of 1945, UC President Sproul invited the professor to return to the university. Obata soon returned and took up his old faculty post.70

Earl Warren recalled that during the return period, there were “maybe a half dozen or so instances of hoodlums going by and throwing rocks into windows and so forth.”71 In fact, there were many more “instances,” some more serious than “throwing rocks into windows.” The American Council on Race Relations reported 124 cases of harassment and violence involving “persons of Japanese ancestry” on the West Coast between December 1944 and October 1945.72 Opposition to the return was particularly intense in some California rural areas. In Auburn and surrounding Placer County, for example, it included the establishment of a Placer County Citizens Anti-Japanese League. The leader of the county’s Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association said, “If we must do something for (the Japanese), let us sterilize them.” In mid-January 1945, a group of young people tried to dynamite and burn buildings on a Japanese-owned ranch near Auburn. The owner’s Nisei sons were on active military duty, while two of the white youths arrested for the incident were AWOL from their army units. In the subsequent trial, the jury acquitted the defendants, apparently swayed by the defense attorney’s argument that “this is white man’s country.”73

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The Fair Play Committee furiously condemned such verdicts and continued to call on Governor Warren and local law enforcement authorities to protect the returnees’ lives and property. Kingman didn’t let the federal government off the hook, communicating the committee’s concerns to President Harry Truman and strongly criticizing the War Department. In a letter to Assistant Secretary McCloy, Kingman argued that in instituting the internment, the department had been responsible for “crystallizing civilian attitudes which now present a potentially explosive situation on the West Coast.” She called on the government to wage a public relations campaign to challenge and change those attitudes.74

The army did, in fact, publicize the record of the 442nd and sent uniformed white officers to local communities to argue on behalf of returning Nisei soldiers. Even the American Legion modified its traditional anti-Asian policies to
defend the rights of Japanese American veterans. Much of the press, including the McClatchy newspapers, condemned the anti-Japanese agitation. Kingman was particularly grateful for the support of CIO unions, including the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. The ILWU prevented members of a Stockton local from discriminating against Japanese American workers, and San Francisco CIO Council President George Wilson, a Fair Play Committee member, issued a strong statement condemning organizations that “use war-caused prejudices to discriminate against all Japanese.”

During the last half of 1945, the number of anti-Japanese incidents declined, and Kingman reported that the return to the West Coast went more smoothly than she and other committee leaders had anticipated.

Dillon Myer said that one of his primary objectives was “to secure a rapid and widespread dispersal of the evacuees.” He hoped that most of the former camp residents remained “east of the Sierras,” allowing them to integrate more fully into the American mainstream. And some of the Nikkei did, indeed, stay in the Midwest and on the East Coast. Gyo Obata, Professor Chiura Obata’s son, settled in St. Louis, where he became a distinguished architect. Former sergeant Ben Kuroki became a newspaper editor in Nebraska and, much to Kingman’s dismay, a conservative Republican. But the great majority of evacuees eventually returned to the West Coast.

Kingman worked on the returnees’ behalf. She welcomed home Nori Ikeda, a former Stiles Hall member and office manager of the Communist Party’s San Francisco newspaper, The People’s World. Consistent with their wartime “popular front” strategy, the Communists had not objected to the internment and had suspended people of Japanese descent from party membership. The party also supported the JACL’s policy of cooperation with the WRA. Nevertheless, in 1945 the party newspaper sponsored a public celebration of the Nikkei’s return, including the paper’s own office manager.
“NOT IN KEEPING WITH OUR AMERICAN CONCEPT”

By the summer of 1945, the Fair Play Committee was involved in an internal discussion about its future. In July, Ruth Kingman and Galen Fisher represented the committee at a Sacramento conference of various civil rights organizations, planning for the postwar era. Kingman was named chair of a Temporary Organizing Committee that drafted proposed bylaws for a statewide federation. In November, the member organizations approved the establishment of what became the California Federation of Civic Unity. Unlike the Fair Play Committee, the new group was concerned with the civil rights of many ethnic, national, and immigrant minorities. Several active Fair Play Committee members now devoted their efforts to the new organization. With the war over, the internment ended, and the return to the West Coast proceeding fairly smoothly, they saw no need to continue operations. On December 12, 1945, the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play formally dissolved.80

When Congress shut down the Federal Fair Employment Practices Commission at about the same time, Harry Kingman returned to his job as director of Stiles Hall. He and Ruth again became deeply involved in YMCA matters and community affairs. In 1957, Harry retired and the couple moved to Washington, D.C., to establish the Citizens’ Lobby, using their considerable political connections and experience to advocate for civil rights and other liberal causes, including opposition to the Vietnam War in the late sixties. In the seventies, the Kingmans returned to Berkeley, where they lived out their final years. Ruth received an award from the JACL for her service during the internment era. She gave full credit to actions of the JACL and like-minded Japanese Americans for what she saw as a gradual change in public opinion during the war. The public finally “got it,” she said, but “without the Nisei we could have never done it.”81

Dillon Myer was proud of his accomplishments as director of the WRA. Though he argued that the relocation centers were not concentration camps but “way stations,” and claimed that some
The Fair Play Committee cosponsored an Americans All booth at the Pan-Pacific Industrial Exposition on September 6, 1945, in Los Angeles. The exhibit expressed the democratic themes espoused by the committee since its 1941 founding. Among the events was the continuous showing of films such as The World We Want to Live In, sponsored by the National Conference of Christians and Jews, which preached tolerance through national unity and defense and was shown to schools and civic groups across the country.

The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; photograph by Hikaru Iwasaki

of the residents “had never had it so good,” he continued to believe that the camps had bred an unhealthy atmosphere of dependence. This conviction influenced his subsequent career as director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Just as he had tried to promote the assimilation of the Nikkei into the American mainstream through resettlement, as BIA director he encouraged Indians to terminate their tribal status and move from reservations to urban centers. The results were often disastrous. In 1987, historian Richard Drinnon published a highly critical biography of Myer, calling him Keeper of the Concentration Camps.82

Earl Warren was reelected governor in 1946. The Republican candidate was so popular that he even defeated Attorney General Robert Kenny, the regular Democratic Party candidate, in the Democratic primary. During his second term, Warren became something of a champion of civil rights. After the federal courts held segregation of Mexican children in California schools unconstitutional in the case of Mendez v. Westminster, he worked with legislative leaders to remove the last segregation statutes from the state’s education code. He proposed the establishment of a state Fair Employment Practices Commission, but neither his proposal nor an initiative measure containing a more comprehensive version was passed into law.83 Warren also eventually supported postwar court decisions that overturned California’s Alien Land Law.

President Dwight Eisenhower appointed Warren Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1953. In 1954, Warren wrote the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, which struck down the doctrine of “separate but equal” and knocked the constitutional props out of the Jim Crow system. That began a fifteen-year period during which the Warren Court dramatically strengthened constitutional protections of civil rights and civil liberties. Yet Warren continued to defend his wartime advocacy of evacuation and internment.

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At an informal dinner with his law clerks, he joked about a clerk’s Southern background. The young man replied, “Wait a minute. What was the name of that guy in California who put all the Japanese in concentration camps?” There were a few seconds of uncomfortable silence—the clerk, after all, was addressing the chief justice of the United States. But Warren laughed and said, “I get your point. But that was a clear and present danger. We really thought their fleets were going to land in California.” As late as 1972, three years after his retirement from the Court, Warren was still publicly defending the internment’s constitutionality.84
"BIRTHPLACE OF THE AMERICAN FAIR PLAY MOVEMENT"

But privately, Warren was having doubts. Justice Arthur Goldberg said the chief justice told him, “You know in retrospect, that is one of the worst things I ever did.” During a 1971 oral history interview, Warren talked about the effect of internment on Japanese American children so emotionally that he had to stop the interview for a few minutes. In the last years of his life, some family members and friends urged him to make a public apology. In memoirs published after his death, Warren came as close as he ever did to such an apology: “I have since deeply regretted that removal order and my own testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.” He said he was "conscience stricken" when he thought of “the innocent little children who were torn from home, school friends, and congenial surroundings. It was wrong to react so impulsively without positive evidence of disloyalty, even though we felt we had a good motive in the security of our state.”

Warren again denied that racial prejudice played any part in his position. But even his most sympathetic biographers believed that race was a major factor for Warren, as it was for most Californians. Leo Katcher concluded that Warren was "motivated by personal beliefs and fears,” while Edward G. White said the governor “was a prisoner of racial stereotypes.” Warren’s contemporaries recognized the important role he played in the internment decision. Personal friend and sometime political rival Robert Kenny joined Carey McWilliams and Mike Masaoka in condemning Warren’s conduct, but Kenny wasn’t willing to excuse his own shortcomings. A liberal Democratic state senator at the time of the internment decision, Kenny admitted he had remained silent: “Some of us, like me, big brave me, I just wasn’t found. I should have spoken up for the Nisei.”

The Fair Play Committee did speak up. It did so even though as prominent members of economic, academic, and religious establishments, committee leaders had much to lose in terms of influence and reputation. In the name of political expediency, committee members sometimes compromised their principles, cooperated with their antagonists, and distanced themselves from militant Nikkei protesters and determined defenders of civil liberties. Many committee leaders agreed with Dillon Myer’s simplistic assimilationist ideology. Rather than running the committee as a broad membership group, they established a relatively small, top-down organization that emphasized public relations and insider lobbying rather than grassroots organizing. But the committee consistently argued on behalf of the Nikkei’s basic civil rights and, in the end, helped bring decision makers, including Earl Warren, around to that point of view.

And the committee let people in the camps know that they had supporters among their fellow citizens. Minejiro Hayashida, chairman of the community council at Heart Mountain, was one of many internees who wrote letters of appreciation to the committee in the days following the 1944 decision to end the internment. He thanked committee members “for your untiring efforts in establishing the real principles of democracy.” In September 1945, Professor Chiura Obata wrote Ruth Kingman that he was glad to return to Berkeley, not only because “it has such an atmosphere of universal goodwill” but because “it is also the birthplace of the American Fair Play Movement.”

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The complete text of their report is in Lyman and Rich to Young, July 23, 1850. Young Collection, LDS Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as Young Collection), in Bagley, *Scoundrel’s Tale*, 292–96.

Lyman and Rich to Young, July 23, 1850. Young Collection, in Bagley, *Scoundrel’s Tale*, 295. For the full history of this colonizing project, see Edward Leo Lyman, *San Bernardino: The Rise and Fall of a California Community* (Salt Lake City, UT: Signature Books, 1996).


George D. Watt’s transcript of President Young’s speech, delivered in the summer of 1857, is in the Brigham Young Papers, LDS Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as Young Papers). Lyman, *San Bernardino*, 377–78, refers to a version that appeared in the *Deseret News*, the LDS newspaper published in Salt Lake City, which is not entirely consistent with the Watt transcript.


“DEAR EARL”: THE FAIR PLAY COMMITTEE, EARL WARREN, AND JAPANESE INTERNMENT, BY CHARLES WOLLENBERG, PP 24–55


3. The government called its policy "relocation," a benign term that does not begin to convey the pain and suffering that resulted. Some recent scholars have used "incarceration," but to many Americans, this implies a judicial proceeding including due process. I use "internment" to refer to an executive branch policy of involuntary removal and imprisonment without due process. For current thinking on the use of language to describe the wartime experiences of Japanese Americans, see Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, *Words Can Lie or Clarify: Mako Nakagawa, The Power of Words*; JACL National Resolution on Terminology; and other works on the National Parks Service website, http://www.nps.gov/j Sed gravitational reading.htm.


7 Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 29–30; Kingman, Brief Historical Report, 1.


11 Bird, Chairman John J. McCloy, 149–50.


16 Ruth Kingman oral history, 38–39; Myer, Uprooted, xix.

17 Los Angeles Times, May 27, 1943; Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 81.

18 Flyer, carton 2:3; Records; Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 91–94.


21 Life, July 5, 1943; Lundberg to Warren, July 13, 1943, box 7:9, Records.

22 Warren to Lundberg, July 16, 1943, box 7:9, Records; Cray, Chief Justice, 158.


42 Kutulas, American Civil Liberties Union, 90–128; Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest, 49–58.


46 Jeffer to Wada, Sept. 20, 1943, and Jan. 26, 1944, boxes 1:12, 2:9, Records.


48 Ruth Kingman oral history, 49–52.


52 Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 145–47; Ruth Kingman oral history, 45.

53 Kingman to Sproul, July 10, 1944, Sproul to Kingman, July 14, 1944, Kaplan to Kingman, July 24, 1944, box 6:17, Records.

54 Harrison to Crotty, July 17, 1944, box 3:6, Records; Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 173.


56 Los Angeles Times, Oct. 2, 1944; Los Angeles Herald Express, Nov. 15, 1944.

57 Ruth Kingman oral history, 55.


59 Department of the Interior to Harrison, Apr. 1, 1944, box 2:15, Myer to Kingman, May 5, 1944, box 2:16, Kingman to Fortas, Apr. 20, 1945, box 4:14, Records.


62 Fisher to Baldwin, Dec. 10, 1944, box 4:3, Myer to Harrison, Dec. 18, 1944, box 4:3, Records; Shidler, “Fair Play Committee,” 183–85; Myer, Uprooted, 184, 191; Robinson, By Order of the President, 251; Los Angeles Times, Dec. 18, 1944.


65 John D. Weaver, Warren, the Man, the Court, the Era, (New York, Little Brown, 1967) 114; Schwartz, Super Chief, 16.


69 Kingman to Booth, June 15, 1945, box 6:28, Records.


71 Warren oral history, 261.


75 Kingman to Chronicle, May 25, 1945, box 5:2, Records.

76 Ruth Kingman oral history, 61; Kingman to Ickes, Sept. 28, 1945, box 5:9, Kingman to Reichert, Nov. 26, 1945, box 5:11, Records.

77 Myer, Uprooted, 286; Drinnon, Keeper of the Concentration Camps, 57, 58.


79 Orr to Kingman, Sept. 20, 1945, and Kingman to Orr, Sept. 25, 1945, box 5:9, Records.


81 Harry Kingman oral history, 110, 136, 166, 175, 190; Ruth Kingman oral history, 74.

82 Myer, Uprooted, 291, 293; Drinnon, Keeper of the Concentration Camps.
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85 Schwartz, Super Chief, 17; Cray, Chief Justice, 520.
86 Warren, Memoirs, 148–49.
87 Katcher, Earl Warren, 141; White, Earl Warren, 71.

SIDEBAR: TANFORAN ASSEMBLY CENTER: SIBERIUS Y. SAITO, PP 34–37
1 “Architects Migrate,” Architect & Engineer 149, no. 3 (June 1942), 52; Flinn Saito Andersen Architects website, http://www.ahtsarchitects.com/who_we_are.htm.
3 Ibid.
4 Drawings of the Tanforan Assembly Center, BANC PIC 1979.071—PIC, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.