# The California National Guard at the Mexican Border
# 1916

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# THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

# AND

# THE MEXICAN BORDER SERVICE

# 1916

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ASSISTANCE IN PREPARATION OF THESE MATERIALS
WAS FURNISHED BY THE PERSONNEL OF WORK PROJECTS
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL PROJECT NO. 665-08-3-128.

# OUTLINE HISTORY

OF THE

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD
MILITIA AND VOLUNTEER FORCES

1849 - 1941

Prepared in
THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
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The Adjutant General

## STATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DURING THE MEXICAN BORDER SERVICE 1916

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# THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

# AND THE

# MEXICAN BORDER SERVICE, 1916

## INTRODUCTION

In order to properly understand the Mexican situation as it existed in June 1916, a brief resume of events since Mexico established her independence and began her career as a self governing nation in 1821 under a form of democracy, is desirable.

In the ninety-five years that elapsed from 1821 to 1916, there was hardly a year except during the period under the rule of the ruthless Perfirio Diaz, that was not marked by at least one attempt at revolution. That most of those attempts were successful is proven by the fact that during that period Mexico experimented with some thirty-eight different forms of government under eighty-five rulers.

During the fifty-five years which elapsed between the date of her independence and the accession of Diaz to power, she had tried thirty-six of these several forms of government under seventy-five rulers.* This excessive mutability in government which probably no other people on earth ever passed through, can only be accounted for by the existence among her leaders of a contempt for law and order, a spirit of selfish amibition, and an absence of the restraints of patriotism and devotion to the public welfare without a parallel in history. This apparent contempt for law and order affected the nation not alone through its influence on intermal affairs, but also brought about several grave international complications.

In 1837, the Congress of the United States passed an act authoorizing President Andrew Jackson to make final demand upon the Mexican Government for redress for numerous outrages that had been committed upon the persons and property of American citizens. President Jackson was further authorized to use the Naval forces of the United States to enforce his demands. After years of negotiation, signalized by numerous violations of diplomatic agreements on the part of Mexico, the differences between that country and the United States were only partly adjusted; and later, in 1846, became one of the contributing causes of the Mexican war.**

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, pages 194, 195.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 196.

In 1838, Mexico became involved in serious difficulty with France, arising from outrages against the persons and property of French citizens. Wearied with ineffectual demands for reparation, the French Government sent a fleet of warships to bombard the fortifications of Vera Cruz.

In 1861, Spain, France and England entered into an agreement to take joint action to enforce certain rights which they claimed in Mexico and this afterward led to French intervention and the short lived empire of Maximilian.

When the Maximilian epoch was ended by his capture and execution in 1867, the republic was again restored with Jacarez as President. Jacarez was succeeded by Ledro de Tejada and the latter was unseated by Porfirio Diaz who took his place at the head of the government as President in 1876.

Diaz was in actual control of Mexico's affairs for thirty-four years and during that period, with the exception of four years when his creature, Gonzales was President, he was the official head of the Mexican Government.*

A number of revolutions were attempted during Diaz's incumbency; but his great ability and the stern use of force enabled him to suppress the turbulent element which had been responsible for a condition of turmoil for more than half a century. During this period Diaz retained control of Mexico's affairs, and for the first time in the experience of that country as a democracy, there was order, tranquility and a fair amount of honesty in the administration of its governmental affairs. Diaz applied himself earnestly to the material development of his country, and whatever may be thought of the character of the structure he reared, he showed during his term of power, that he was a statesman of great constructive ability. The materical progress of Mexico during Diaz's incumbency was remarkable, but the beneficent results of that progress were so unevenly distributed among the people of the country that there existed a smoldering discontent. The discontent resulted in revolt in November 1910 when Francisco Madero headed a revolution against the man who had for so many years been President in name, and dictator in fact. Age had weakened Diaz and his control of Mexican affairs had also weakened.

After some months of activity on the part of the revolutionists, D iaz in 1911, resigned from the Presidency of the republic and abandoned his country. Diaz remained in exile until his death in Paris, France, July 2, 1915.

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 197.

During the period from 1868 to 1877 conditions on the border and especially along the Rio Grande, were probably more unsettled and irritating than ever before or afterward. Texas was suffering greviously from the disorders of reconstruction and was establishing an appalling record for crime. Law and order had not been effectively established into New Mexico and Arizona. The Mexican states south of the border were being disturbed by revolutions and counter-revolutions. Smugglers, robbers, cattle-thieves and all kinds of desperate characters had collected along the lower Rio Grande. Indians and bandits infested the region above Loredo and westward to the California line.

Formerly, Mexico had born the brunt of frontier lawlessness. For years, Indians, smugglers, filibusters and border ruffians had defied Mexican laws but following the Mexican War the movement seemed to have been reversed and the frontier of the United States soon felt the force of the change. Cattle-thieves from the Mexican side of the Bravo River stole Texas cattle in large numbers. Smugglers were attracted by the Mexican Free zone--a strip of country some six or eight miles wide and extending for more than five hundred miles along the meanderings of the Rio Grande. The existence of this zone presented an opportunity for introducing large quantities of goods into the United States without the payment of duties. These smuggled goods, designed for the markets of the southern states of the Union, defrauded the United States treasury to the extent of several millions of dollars annually. Savage Indians who had their lodges in the mountains of Coahuila and Chihuahua laid waste northwestern Texas and southeastern New Mexico. North of the Sonora border, frontier settlers were terrified, robbed and killed by Indians who had their hiding places in that state.

The first of the irregularities to cause trouble was the smuggling along the Rio Grande. The Treasury department of the United States was much concerned over the loss of revenue in the region, and Edward L. Plumb, American representative in Mexico was instructed to confer with the Mexican government regarding the matter. A Mexican Tariff commission reported against the continuance of the Free Zone which was undoubtedly causing much of the difficulty. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, however, was quite reserved and evinced uneasiness lest any action toward abolishing the Zone might turn the frontier against his government. The Mexican Congress refused to revoke the decree establishing the Free Zone and even debated the advisability of extending that district. The Congree of the United States then felt called upon to investigate the irregularities and on May 16, 1870 a joint committee made a report to the Congress of the protection of the revenue of the United States. The report was based upon the testimony of a few witnesses from the border country who were not kindly disposed toward Mexico. The committee reported that the hope of successful negotiations

seemed to have been exhausted, and characterized the Mexican attitude as unfriendly. The committee suggested that a due consideration for the protection of the interests of the United States might render other measures necessary to induce Mexico to observe toward the United States, a course of conduct essential to the maintenance of friendly relations.* Another effort was then made in the Mexican Congress to abolish the Free Zone, but that also failed. In fact the Z one was extended to cover the frontiers of Coahuila, Chihuahua and part of Nuevo Leon. During 1870 and 1871 the revenue question continued to attract considerable attention in both countries. Soon afterwards, however, tariff frauds were overshadowed by other occurrences on the Mexican frontier.

On May 7, 1872, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to appoint a commission to inquire into the extent and character of the crimes committed along the Rio Grande frontier and upon learning of this action, the Mexican government appointed a similar committee with a view of being prepared to present its side of the case. The border had definitely taken the center of the stage in American-Mexication relations, but more was heard of cattled stealing and Indian raids than of smuggling. In the summer of 1872 the United States commissioners proceeded to the Rio Grande and examined witnesses for more than two months. The fact that Texas cattle were being stolen by Indians and Mexican residing south of the Rio Grande River was established to the satisfaction of the committee members. Thet also submitted the opinion that Mexican frontier officials, State and National, had either shared in the plunder, or actuated by hostility toward the United States, winked at the crimes perpetrated on the Texas border. In view of such an appalling situation the committee recommended an increase of the United States Cavalry force along the Southwestern frontier.

The members of the Mexican commission went much more fully into the frontier problem. They declared that the injuries inflicted upon the United States were insignificant when compared with the atrocities committed against Mexico by the Indians. They found that some few Mexicans who had been guilty of cattle stealing had been trained in the practice by Americans; that most of the Texas cattle had been stolen by Texans themselves and finally, the committee declared that American complaints against alleged outrages by Mexicans on the Texas border were raised with a view of finding a plausible excuse for annexing a portion of northern Mexico to the United States. Thus, the commissions were far from being in agreement. Both were unfair and both were inaccurate. Such reports

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, page 285. 1931 Ed.

did not tend to cultivate a spirit likely to take the matter seriously in hand, nor to promote friendly relations between the two countries. As might have been expected, neither government made any serious attempt to apply a remedy, and meantime the robbers, the cattle and horse thieves, and the Indians plied their trade.

It was not long, however, until impetuous army officers of the United States, stationed on the border began to act of their own accord. During the next few years expeditions of American troops into Mexico were numerous. Perhaps the first of the expeditions of that character was in May, 1873, when Colonel R.S. MacKenzie who was stationed at Fort Clark, Texas, received word that a band of Kickapoo Indians from across the border had made a raid into United States territory and escaped with a drove of horses. Colonel MacKenzie and Lietuenant Bullis took up the trail and leading their troops into Coahuila, fell upon an Indian village. Nineteen Indians were killed, about forty were taken prisoners, and sixty or seventy head of horses were recovered. Although it is possible that Colonel MacKenzie undertook the expedition on his own responsibility, there is some evidence that he may not have acted contrary to the wishes of the Washington government.* Colonel MacKenzie does not appear to have been censured for his act, and later, when the governor of Texas referred to the raid as a precedent, the United States government seems to have acquiesced.

The year 1874 witnessed unusual excitement along the Rio Grande and according to Governor Coke of Texas, the murders and robberies were more numerous and destructive than they had been previously. The year 1875, however, was destined to be the most perilous and harrassing the Texas frontiersmen had experienced. Hardly a week passed without tis raid and hardly a raid without loss of stock and other property, nor without murders and outrages. In fact a reign of terror held sway in a vast section extending from the banks of the lower Rio Grande to Corpus Christi.

The next important invasion of Mexican soil occurred in November, 1875, when a company of Texas Rangers under command of Captain McNally crossed the Rio Grande near Las Cuevas, Mexico in pursuit of a band of Mexicans. A sharp skirmish was taking place when about two hundred Mexican soldiers put in an appearance. McNally lost several of his men and was forced to return to United States soil without the cattle or the theives.

The civil government of Texas did not bear these outrages with meekness and passivity. A joint committee of the State Legislature appointed to investigate conditions, recommended the increase of State forces on the southwestern frontier and expressed the hope that the Federal Government would furnish the border with

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F Rippey, page 289. 1931 Ed.

adequate protection. The Governor forwarded the report to Washington and sent other protests and pleas for federal assistance, but little was done to remedy conditions. A small number of additional troops were sent to the region and a few war vessels were dispatched to the Rio Grande. In 1876 a committee of the House of Representatives undertook another investigation of the Rio Grande frontier, and although the findings of this committee were the result of a more thorough investigation than that of its precessor in 1872, still its researches were far from exhaustive and its conclusions were by no means unprejudiced. The report declared that conditions along the lower Rio Grande were becoming gradually worse; that the problem of the frontiersman was being rapidly transformed from one of pecuniary losses to one of personal security against outrage and loss of life. The committee also declared that Mexican officials of the frontier, both local and national, continued to aid and abet the crimes and to grow rich off the plunder. While declaring that it was anxious to avoid all cause of dispute with the Mexican government; and disclaiming any design for a collision with Mexico or the acquisition of territory south of the boundary, the committee recommended that the President increase the Army on the frontier. It was further recommended, that the President be permitted at his discretion, to order United States troops, when in close pursuit of robbers with their booty, to cross the Rio Grande and use such means as they found necessary for recovering stolen property. The action of the committee in recommending such a course in spite of the admitted conviction that the Mexican people would never allow their government to grant the United States permission to send troops into Mexican territory, was remarkable.*

The report of the commission called forth inflammatory articles in Mexican newspapers and there was much clamor and excitement. A resolution was offered in the United States Congress to accept the report of the committee and to approve the recommendations made therein; but it failed to pass and the situation remained unchanged.

In 1877 the raids along the border continued, but the scene was shifted from the Rio Grande to the rough and mountainous country above Eagle Pass. Punitive expeditions crossed the Mexican border on several occasions but met with only partial success and failed to put a stop to the Indian incursions into the United States. Moreover, the Mexicans evinced less and less dispostion to cooperate in the efforts to suppress the raids. On March 9, 1877, Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Shafter wrote that not the slightest attempt was being made by the Mexicans to prevent the Indians from making raids into the United States, but on the contrary the raiders were finding refuge when pursued and a market for their stolen plunder at all times.**

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, Page 293. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 295. 1931 Ed.

About this time the exigencies of domestic politics rendered it imprudent for thw Washington government to continue longer in an attitude of semi-indifference towards the southwestern frontier or any other phase of Mexican relations. A bitter contest over the election of a president had brought the United States to the verge of another civil war. The successful candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was in need of an issue to draw the public attention away from the contest. Certain political geniuses conceived the idea that it would divert attention from certain pending issues, and tend to consolidate the new administration if a war with Mexico could be brought on and another slice of Mexican territory be added to the Union.

The recent advent of Porfirio Diaz to power in Mexico and his desire for recognition by the United States, furnished an excellent opportunity to exert pressure in behalf of Americans interested in Mexican trade and investments. It was thought that the new Mexican executive might be forced to grant favorable consideration to American interests in return for recognition, of his government, and for moral or even maternal backing.

United States minister to Mexico, John W. Foster, submitted to the Mexican government, a memorandum of subjects for negotiation which included almost every conceivable phase of the United States-Mexican relations. Among the subjects enumerated in Mr. Foster's memorandum was the matter of frontier affairs. This delicate question was to be adjusted by an agreement providing for reciprocal crossing of the border by the modification of the existing extradition treaty, and by more specific agreements with reference to property rights of citizens of one country residing in the frontier region of the other.*

Before negotiations with reference to the subjects mentioned in Minister Foster's memorandum could be entered upon, news of the policy adopted by President Hayes with reference to the disorders on the frontier had aroused a strom of protest which rendered such negotiations temporarily out of the question.

On June 1, 1877, the Secretary of War had issued instructions to General William T. Sherman with regard to the border raids. The utmost vigilance on the part of the military forces in Texas for the suppression of these raids was requested. Efforts to that end, to be made with the co-operation of the Mexican authorities, was desirable. General E. O. C. Ord, commanding in Texas was to invite co-operation by the Mexican authorities, and was to inform them that while the President of the United States was anxious to avoid giving offense to Mexico, the invasion of our territory by armed and organized bodies of thieves and robbers to prey upon American citizens could no longer be endured. General Ord

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, pages 298, 299. 1931 Edition.

was to notify the Mexican authorities along the border of the desire of the President to unite with them in efforts to suppress the long continued lawlessness. The Mexican authorities were to be informed that if the Mexican Government should continue to neglect the duty of suppressing the outrages, that duty would devolve upon the Government of the United States, and would be performed, even if the performance should render necessary the occasional crossing of the international border by the United States troops. General Ord was directed that in case the lawless incursions continued, he would be at liberty when in pursuit of a band of marauders, and when his troops were sight of them, or upon a fresh trail, to follow them across the Rio Grande river and to overtake and punish them, and to sieze stolen property which had been taken from American citizens and found in possession of the marauders on the Mexican side of the line.*

Porfirio Diaz could hardly assume an attitude of passive indifference with respect to these activities on the frontier or to allow himself to appear coerced or intimidated into active co-operation with the United States. If he did, he would bring down upon his head the condemnation of the Mexican people at a time when he was in great need of their support. Diaz accordingly instructed General Geronimo Trevino to advance to the border with a division of the Mexican army. This was purportedly for the purpose of co-operating with the American forces in the suppression of the turbulent eleements along the frontier, but Trevino was ordered that in case the United States troops invaded Mexico, to repel force with force. The publication of that order rallied all parties in Mexico to the support of Diaz. The Mexican newspapers called upon every loyal son of Mexico to support the new President against the Yankees who were merely using the frontier as "a pretext for despoiling a friendly nation."**

The general impression created in Mexico, was that the order to General Ord was without cause or provocation; that it was inspired by the President of the United States and his Cabinet for political purposes, with the hope of driving Mexico into a war. The object of such a war, the Mexicans contended, was the annexation to the United States of the northern Mexican States and the possible establishment of a protectorate over the whole country.

While the relations of the two countries were strained almost to the breaking point, Generasl Trevino and Ord exercised prudent moderation on the frontier. Friendly interviews were had and

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, page 299. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, page 300. 1931 Ed.

both commanders were careful to avoid occasion for a rupture. General Ord did send troops across the Rio Grande im pursuit of raiders, but was careful to do so only when there were no Mexican troops near.

The greater part of the Mexican journals kept a critical and even a hostile watch over the situation. General Trevino was denounced by these newspapers as a traitor because of his cautious procedure on the frontier and President Diaz was accused of a disposition to truckel to the Yankees.

In the face of the overwhelming sentiment in Mexico against submitting to the demands of the United States, the Diaz administration dared not make any concessions and United States Minister, Foster reported that the attitude of the Mexican Government amounted virtually to a rejection of all the terms submitted to it by the United States.*

There was in Mexico a growing feeling of bitterness toward the United States. The conviction seemed to be unanimous that it was the settled policy of the United States to provoke a conflict and that the attitude of this Government with reference to the Rio Grande frontier and other questions, was only a pretext to humiliate Mexico and force that country to perform some act which would be construed as a declaration or cause for war.**

The wily Diaz played to his constituents. He sent reenforcements to the frontier and then sent agents to the United States to carry on propoganda in favor of his recognition.

There was in the United States, a growing conviction that the attitude of the Hayes administration was not serving the interests of American merchants and investors. President Hayes was criticised for overstepping the bounds of his authority, violating treaty rights and virtually making war upon an impotent friendly power. It was charged by the opposing party that the administration was actuated by a purpose to provoke war with Mexico in order to divert attention from domestic problems and to bring about the annexation of several norther Mexican states. Only the gestures of Diaz were needed to set in motion an organized attempt to force President Hayes to abandon his Mexican policy.

The special session of Congress which met in October 1877, had scarcely opened before there was manifested a dispostion to go into the entire Mexican question. Committees were appointed by the Senate and House of Representatives to make a thorough investigation and these committees did not hesitate to ask embarrassing questions.***

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, page 303. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey, page 304. 1931 Ed.

*** The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippey,page 305. 1931 Ed.

The result of these activities in the Congress of the United States, was an order dated April 9, 1878, to extend recognition to the Diaz government in Mexico. On April 25 of the same year, the Congressional Committee on foreign affairs recommended the passage of a joint resolution that the President be authorized to keep on the border, from the mouth of the Rio Grande to El Paso, a military force of not less than 5000 men, of which at least 3000 should be cavalry. Also that the order previously issued to General Ord should not be withdrawn or modified until Mexico should agree to treaty stipulations insuring adequate protection for the lives and property of American citizens along the border, as well as a satisfactory settlement of all Other outstanding issues.*

The Mexican Congress and press, however, were determined that no agreements should be entered into until the Ord order had been revoked and President Diaz was not inclined to defy public opinion on the question. Diaz recognized that the easiest way out of the difficulty lay through the successful manipulation of public opinion in the United States. His propagandists were at work and reports were continually coming to him of increasing impatience and growing opposition among American business men to President Hayes' Mexican policy. The agents of the Mexican government, perceiving that the financiers of New York and the large merchants and manufacturers of the Middle West were most likely to be concerned with the President's Mexican policy, were making their most vigorous appeals to these centers. In the late summer of 1878, Senor Zamacona, Mexican Minister at Washington, made several addresses in Chicago in which he set forth in glowing terms, the prospects for a rapid increase of trade with Mexico and the opportunities for American investors south of the RioGrande. Zamacona also made at least one appearance before the Manufacturers' Association of the North West.

Minister Foster, aware of the damaging influence of the Mexican propoganda to the Hayes policy, addressed a lengthy communication to the President of the Manufactueres' Association, which contained a refutation of Zamacon's address. The letter also dexcribed the impediments to the development of commercial relations between the two countries, the lack of protection to American citizens and capital and of the prejudices displayed against American enterprises in Mexico in general. Fosters' argument was immediately refuted by Matias Romero, who under direction of the Mexican government contended that the Diaz administration was eager to attract American capital and enterprise and to develope American trade.

At any rate, New York financiers and Western merchants and manufacturers demonstrated their interest by organizing excursions to Mexico, while the United States Congress considered the appointment of a commission to negotiate a commercial treaty with that

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 307. 1931 Ed.

country and also to investigate other matters designed to stimulate Mexican trade. The Hayes administration did not dare to further oppose public sentiment or to persist in what proved to be useless negotiations.

A gradual improvement in conditions along the lower Rio Grande rendered it unnecessary for troops to cross into the Mexican territory and rendered it possible in 1880 to revoke the instructions to General Ord without giving offense to Texas. Diaz then evinced a willingness to enter into an agreement for reciprocal crossing of the boundary in pursuit of marauders.*

The crisis had passed and in reailty Presiden Hayes had been defeated in his contest with the shrewd Mexican President. Hayes had been forced to grant unconditional recognition of the Diaz government and had gained no coneessions on the issues of the Free Zone, indemnity for alleged insults and injuries to American citizens or the protection of American life and property.

President Hayes' immediate successors in office accomplished no more satisfactory results than did he. At no time did Diaz prove himself more entitled to the sobriquet of "Iron Man" than when withstanding attempts of the United States to induce, persuade or coerce him into signing formal, official agreements, or granting protection, guaranties or exemptions to its citizens.**

There followed a period of comparative quiet and prosperity in Mexico. American pioneers were crossing the Rio Grande in ever increasing numbers and when they reached Mexico they usually found the officials of the central government cordial and obliging. If they sought railway concessions they soon procured them. If they desired exemption from import duties during the initial stages of a new enterprise, the favor was not long denied. The mining laws appeared to be satisfactory to those engaged in the mining of metals as well as to the coal miners and the oil men. Citizens of the United States soon found it possible to evade the Mexican law which forbade them to purchase real estate on the frontier. If any complained of unjust treatment by the Mexican courts, Diaz is said to have eventually interfered in their behalf. It may be that they were granted other favors either by Diaz or by counsellors of the dictator, who according to rumors, were not averse

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 310. 1931 Ed

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 310. 1931. Ed.

to lining their pockets with gold. What Diaz refused to grant by open and formal proclamation, he gradually yeilded in secret.*

Diaz and his group did not show any marked favoritism to Americans. Certain privileges may have been granted, but it is probable that virtually the same advantages were offered by the Mexican government to all capitalists regardless of nationality. Nor were the concessions generally such as would yield returns without expense or effort. Some of the grants were no better than had been secured from the United States or could have been secured from various State governments of the American Union. Mexico was more undeveloped however, and its central government had at its disposal more extensive, more numerous, more varied and more valuable concessions than could have been easily found elsewhere.

The railway builders of the United States were the first to enter Mexico on a large scale. Close upon the heels of the railway promoters and builders came the American mining interests. They did not often find bananzas, but they brought into the country large quantities of capital, improved machinery, and superior skill. Much of themining in Mexico was carried on by large interests. With the railroad men and the miners came ranchmen, planters, land-speculators and small farmers. The large holding was the rule. Into lower California went the representatives of great land and cattle companies and speculators in real estate to purchase properties varying from fifty thousand to three million acres. Soon after the opening of the twenthieth century, Amerian land speculators and oil prospectors began to purchase large estates, varying from 6,000 to 300,000 acres, in Tamaulipas on the Gulf of Mexico. The large investments were not confined to the northern frontier of Mexico. Large American holdings could be found in almost every Mexican state. The years 1900 to 1906 saw a large increase in the number of tropical properties held by Americans.

Along with the big landlords there were small farmers in ever increasing numbers. Thanks in part to the efforts of the land companies many Americans from the west and southwest crossed the border and set up agricultural establishments in almost every Mexican state.

It is impossible to state with accuracy, the amount of money invested by Americans in Mexican lands during the Diaz regime. It is probably that by 1912, the actual investments of Americans in Mexico exceeded one hundred million dollars, and the value of these investments was estimated at $1,057,000,000.**

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 311, 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 317,318. 1931 E

The most marvelous of all transformations occurred in connection with the development of the oil industry. Fuel oil had been known to exist in Mexico for centuries. It had been mentioned in pamphlets as an industry of Mexico as early as 1857. Several attempts to develop the petroleum industry and market the product had been made in the seventies and eighties of the ninteenth century, but all of these efforts ended in failure. It remained for Edward L. Doheny and his associates to develop and market the "liquid gold" on a huge and immensely profitable scale. They brought in their first well in 1901. Other American capitalists were attracted to the Mexican oil fields until about 290 companies owned by citizens of the United States had organized for the purpose of developing Mexican oil.*

Somewhere between forty and seventy-five thousand Americans had established their homes in Mexico before General Diaz was sent into exile in 1911.** In a little more than three decades since the advent of Diaz to power, the Americans had become a tremendous force in Mexican lifeand progress.

Commerce between the United States and Mexico had grown from about fifteen million dollars in 1880, to one hundred seventeen million in 1910. By 1900 the United States had acquired a large portion of Mexican trade than all of the European nations combined. In 1912 about 51% of Mexico's imports were from the United States and more than 77% of her exports went to the same country.*** Surely, the process of pacific penetration had gone a long way.

The American movement into Mexico resulted in many advantages to the Mexican people. It brought prosperity, raised the standards of living, sometimes stimulated the ambitions of the Mexicans, and, in a word, contributed largely toward placing Mexico temporarily among the great nations of the modern world. But few Mexicans appreciated the contribution which Yankee finance, enterprise and ingenuity had made to Mexican progress. Most of them were thinking, not so much of what the Yankees had done for Mexico, as of the price which Mexico had paid for that service. They were thinking of the unequal distribution of wealth and of the possibility of Saxon domination.

There had never been a time when Mexico received foreigners more than half-heartedly or looked upon them without suspicion, and

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 317. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 318. 1931 Ed.

***The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 319. 1931 Ed.

Americans were least likely to be an exception to the rule. Nationals from the United States had entered Mexico either of their own accord or at the urgent invitation of the Mexican Chief Executives. They had entered the country rather against the wishes of the Mexican people than at their solicitation. Successive Mexican presidents had been willing to make grants to American railway-builders and American masters of finance and industry for years before the popular branch of the Mexican Congress showed a disposition to ratify them. The fact that in the early eighties Diaz and Gonzalales had been able to force through the Mexican Congress numerous concessions to American railway companies, did not by any means indicate that the opposition had subsided. Several Mexican newspapers continued to declare that after having lostTexas, California, New Mexico and part of Indian territory, Mexico ought to be more prudent in her dealings with the United States; that Mexico could not afford to ignore the spirit of absorption natural to the northern races. Other journals continued to maintain that the American companies would surely involve the Mexican government in disputes which would furnish the United States a pretext for aggression and absorption.

Sentiments such as these received more than occasional expression during the Diaz regime and such opposition could not be completely ignored even by the Chief Executive. Censorship of the Mexican press was established, but in spite of that, the opposition to the Yankees was sometimes expressed. When the despotism of Diaz at last began to reveal unmistakable evidences of weakness, the pent up forces of hostility assumed a violence which could not be controlled. With respect to the denunciation by the newspapers, it is of interest to point out the fact that the American Embassador, Henry Lane Wilson, felt called upon to urge Diaz to curb the most vehement journals.

Causes of Mexican antipathy to the government and people of the United States were evident on every hand. They were to be found in diversities of religion, race and temperament; in the lively memory of former injuries suffered at the hands of Americans; and in the propaganda carried on by Europeans from motives of political jealousy or economic rivalry.

President Diaz clamped the shackles of press censorship on the journals because their distribes frequently tended to assume an anit-Diaz tone, and because their discoveries, alleged or genuine, endangered his power. There are indications that Diaz as well as his ministers, likewise shared these apprehensions of American domination. The Dictator complied with the earnest solicitations of American financiers, and in the early days even urged them to make investments because he believed that Mexico was in great need of their enterprise and ingenuity. It was surmised, however, that he came more and more to resent the power and influence of the Americans

in Mexico and also that of the government of the United States. It may be that such resentment furnished one motive for his desire during the last twenty years of his rule to stimulate the influx of European capital into Mexico, and to begotiate European loans. Diaz was embittered by what appeared to be the too persistent attempts of the United States government to serve as mediator in the various disputes between Mexico and Guatemala. The suggestions of Diaz in 1896 with reference to the advisability of the Pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine, furnished further evidence concerning Diaz's attitude. His joint mediation with the United States in Central American in 1907 probably had a similar significance; but nothing apparently, could stem the rising tide of Mexican nationalism which was destined ere long to drive out both the foreigners and the ruler of the country.

Nearly all the charges preferred against the Diaz regime were connected directly or indirectly with his policy toward the United States or toward immigrant capital, and particularly that from the United States. A prominent authority remarked, concerning the charges against the Diaz administration, that "some were false, others, simply absurd, others grossly exaggerated, others indicated a lack of understanding and a wrong interpretation; and some were true. It is probable that most Mexicans believed that the counts against Diaz were true.

Diaz, convinced of Mexico's great need of foreign capital, began his long rule by encouraging foreign enterprise and investments in partial defiance of the will of the Mexicans themselves. Perhaps he had done this in the hope that the enriching and civilizing influence of the foreigners would eventually demonstrate the wisdom of his policy, but the Mexican people were hard to convince. They persistently maintained that the foreign element in Mexico was oppressive and denationalizing. Meanwhile, the foreigners, especially the Americans were accumulating wealth and power with a rapidity beyond the wildest dreams either of themselves or of Diaz, so that in his declining years the aged chief found himself trying to serve two unfriendly masters. Then occurred what always occurs under such conditions. Diaz was forced to hold to one and despise the other. He surrendered to foreign capital and attempted to suppress the Mexican people. But the Mexicans proved more powerful than Diaz and the foreigners. The grey-haired dictator died in exile and the outlanders were either killed or fled before the destructive rage of the Mexican populace, crying for the protection of their native land.

The Mexican revolution which began in November, 1910, was an armed protest of Indians and mixed breeds against the exploitation of foreigners, native landlords and industrialists and the church.

hierarchy. It was heralded by violent denunciations of the United States and its people in the newspapers of Mexico City and by anti-American riots in various parts of the republic.*

After President Taft's inauguration, his first step with reference to the uprising in Mexico, was to telegraph President Diaz, expressing confidence in the ability of the latter to maintain order and protect American property and citizens. Henry Lane Wilson, United States Ambassador in Mexico City, held numerous interviews with Diaz and the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs at which Wilson urged that the Mexican press be brought under control and the rioters suppressed. The Diaz government assembled its waning strength and began to act. The anti-American sentiment soon became latent.

Meantime, the agents of the Diaz government were complaining of the failure of the United States to maintain neutrality. They alleged that the revolution against Diaz was being planned and equipped on American soil, and there was truth in the allegation. Owing to the amount of personal liberty permitted under the American form of government, to antiquated neutrality laws and to the character of the frontier region, it was easy for the Mexican revolutionists to carry on propaganda, collect munitions and supplies and even to organize their forces on United States soil. Their operations were facilitated by the widespread sympathy with the revolutionary movement among the Mexicans along the border and the possible indifference of some of the frontier officials of the United States. This was not unusual as many Mexican revolutions had been organized in part within the United States. The one which brought Diaz himself to power had been one of them.**

A unique feature of the affair now under consideration was the slowness with which the United States came to the realization that it was failing to meet its international obligations. In November 1910, the Diaz government urged the United States to guard its fro frontier, but it was not until the following March, that troops were sent to the border and then only for maneuvers. This dilatory policy led the critics of President Taft's administration to state that perhaps the President, or at least some of his advisors would be pleased to see Diaz overthrown. The statement was made that certain powerful American interests had determined to unseat Diaz and were glad to take advantage of the general discontent in Mexico to effect their purpose.

This explanation of the delay of the Taft administration in adopting measures which would fulfill its neutrality obligations can

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 332. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 332. 1931 Ed.

neither be proved nor disproved. There is good evidence that De la Bara was the choice of President Taft and Secretary of State Knox, for president of Mexico and it seemed significant that United States troops were not sent to the border until it appeared certain that Diaz would be driven from power. The Department of Justice, at Washington, had during the Taft administration co-operated with the Diaz government for some time prior to the revolutionary outbreak in Mexico, giving it assistance in the suppression of propaganda and of treasonable acts and utterances of Mexicans on American soil and the Department had been severely criticised for its pains. In fact a congressional investigation of the conduct of the Department had been demanded.

International obligations of the United States were not totally neglected during the early stages of the Mexican revolution and it was apparent that Mexico expected too much from this country. The Diaz government would probably have been overthrown even if the United States had guarded every foot of the frontier. Whatever the true explanation of the conduct of the Taft administration, the fact remains that the neutrality of the United States was enforced during the spring and summer of 1911, to a degree far beyond that of the previous months.

It might appear significant that most of the United States troops were withdran from the border in August 1911, after Henry Lane Wilson, the United States Ambassador to Mexico had reported the general belief in the Mexican Capitol, that Madero was sure to succeed in the November elections. Although conditions were comparatively quiet in Mexico at the time, Ambassador Wilson earnestly recommended on November 15, after Madero was already in power, that energetic measures be taken on the border and that every possible assistance be given to the Mexican government.

By the beginning of the year 1912, Madero found himself more embarrassed by the zeal of the United States in guarding its frontier than by its indifference to matters of neutrality. Early in January several newspapers of the Mexican Capitol published articles charging that Madero had received assistance from the government of the United States in overthrowing General Diaz and establishing himself in power, and for that reason he found himself obligated to the United States. Shortly afterward Ambassador Wilson reported revolutionary movements in five or six Mexican states and mistreatment of Americans in half a dozen other states.

Madero soon had reason to question the sincerity of the friendship of the Washington government. On February 4, 1912, President Taft order 100,000 troops to concentrate on the Mexican border. Twenty days later telegrams discussing the advisability of intervention were exchanged between the Acting Secretary of State at Washington and Ambassador Wilson. Americans were warned to remove from certain sections of Mexico. These steps were interpreted as indicative

of lack of faith in, or even hostility toward Madero. Opponents of the Madero regime in Mexico were greatly stimulated. Then came two proclamations of President Taft which partially stopped any move of the Madero government to capitalize on the situation.

The first proclamation, dated March 2, 1912, warned Americans not to participate in the revolutionary disorders i n Mexico. The second, dated March 14, assumed more rigid executive control over the shipment of arms and ammunition to Mexico and hinted at the possibility that the authority of the President of the United States might be exercised to the advantage of Madero. In view of this showing of favoritism it would appear futile for the Madero administration to seek new strength by posing as the victim of American persecution. A month later, however, Madero found himself in a more favorable position, President Taft had not only prevented the insurrecters of northern Mexico from importing arms while that privilege was granted to Madero's followers, but he had permitted Madero to transport troops across United States territory for the purpose of attacking the insurgents. That act aroused the ire of Pascual Orozco andother Mexican chiefs and they immediately assumed a truculent attitude, seized American mails, committed depredationsupon American property, killed American Nationals, and refused to take cognizance of the protests of the American consuls. This led to vigorous remonstrance by the United States and on April 15, Henry Lane Wilson handed the Mexican government a drastic note of protest against the enormous and constantly increasing destruction of valuable American properties, the taking of American lives, the increasing dangers to which all American citizens in Mexico were subjected and the seemingly indefinite continuance of the situation.

The government of the United States gave notice that it expected and demanded that American lives and property be adequatily protected and that it would hold Mexico and the Mexican people responsible for all wanton and illegal acts endangering American life and property. The remonstrance concluded with a quotation from a recent warning to Orozco in which a portest was made against the practical murder of an American, and served notice that mistreatment of any American citizen would be deeply resented by the United States and must be fully answered for by the Mexican people. The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately proceeded to capitalize the situation and on the seventeen th of April, he replied to Ambassador Wilson's note and handed the text of the reply to the Mexican press.

The Mexican government, the reply of the Mexican Minister stated, was fully cognizant of its duties and found itself under the painful necessity of not recognizing the right of the United States to give the warning contained in the note since it was not based upon any action which could be imputed to the Mexican government

signifying that it had departed from the observance of the principles and practices of international law. The reply stated, that since a part of Mexico was in a state of revolution, the Mexican government held as its principal duty the suppression of the rebel movement. But if in the districts which had disobeyed the legal authorities, attempts were made against the lives and property of foreigners, the government would not be liable except under the same conditions as the government of the United States or that of any other country would be if a rebellion occurred in its own country.

The Mexican Minister then proceeded to pledge Mexico to abide by international law and the laws of the Mexican nation in the treatment of American and other foreigners who might be among the prisoners captured from the rebel forces. He declared finally, that it was the policy of the Mexican government to punish the Mexican purpetrators of outrages against foreigners, but he denied that the Mexican government and peole could be held responsible for the acts of the rebel leader Orozco in the sense implied by the American Secretary of State. Following this diplomatic encounter, Madero seems to have developed new and unusual strength. By midsummer in 1912 his troops had arrested Villa and sent him to Mexico City for trial and had also virtually annihilated the insurgents under Orozco.

The main purpose of the Department of State in the spring and summer of 1912 appears to have been to furnish protection to American citizens and to mend its political fences in view of the coming election. Its exertions did not end with the note of April fifteenth. War vessels were sent to various parts on the Atlantic and Pacific coast of Mexico to furnish transportation to American citizens who desired to leave the country and to serve as a warning to the Mexican government. The effectiveness of the procedure followed in shielding American life and property was very doubtful.

The rebels of northern Mexico were irritated at the favoritism shown by the Washington government toward Madero in the matter of importing arms andmunitions. In other sections of Mexico, the attitude of the United States appeared to add fuel to the flames of anti-Americanism. Something had to be done by the administration at Washington, as the temporary defeat and dispersal of the Mexican insurgents in July and August, 1912, failed to bring peace to Mexico or to add greatly to the security of American life and interests in the country. The defeated rebels of northern Mexico split up into numerous small bands ranging in size from one hundred to one thousand men and resorted to robbery, Murder and pillage. In the south of Mexico the country was being terrorized and laid waste by Zapata and his followers. Elsewhere, while there were no large revolutionary.

organizations, the Mexican government had broken down and chaos seemed imminent.

According to the statement of the American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, American life and property in Mexico were in greater peril in August 1912, than ever before. There were, according to Mr. Wilson, increasing frequency of murders, arrests, imprisonment on frivolous charges, and the illegal and unjust seizure of American property. Conditions were becoming intolerable. The situation was arousing indignation among American residents of Mexico. There were letters of protest and criticism by the American press. Apparently the usual diplomatic methods had failed. The Ambassador even went so far as to accuse the Madero family and the personal and political adherents thereof, the beneficiaries.* Such a charge was exceedingly grave and aroused a strong suspicion of personal grudge or ulterior motives.

The mild patience of President Taft in dealing with Mexico had long been criticised by the press of the United States and certain elements in Congress. The criticism had been called fourth mainly by the injury of American citizens during battles between Regular Mexican troops and insurgents in the vicinity of El Paso, Texas and Douglas, Arizona. President Taft's policy was upheld, however, and a kindly, mild sympathy for Mexico was advocated.

By the summer of 1913, however, conditions had considerable changed. As hundreds and even thousands of American refugees, pursuant to the advice of the Taft administration, made their way to the United States, a wave of sympathy passed over the country and that sentiment was deepened by the reports in American newspapers. Again the press demanded intervention and Congressnot only made appropriations for transporting, sheltering and feeding the refugees, but also directed the Secretary of War to investigate the territory and growing out of the Mexican insurrection. In July 1912, Senator Albert Fall demanded protection for the persons and property of citizensof the United States, south of the Rio Grande, and Senator Smith of Arizona also revealed a growing impatience with the manner in which the Mexican situation was being handled. Another important feature of the situation was the fact that the National campaign of 1912, had begun and the Democratic platform had pledged the party to protect its nationals abroad.

The Taft administration accordingly took steps which indicated a resolution to bring Mexico to terms. On September 2, 1912, the American Ambassador to Mexico was instructed to demand

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 338. 1931 Ed.

that the Mexican government establish adequate garrisons along its northern frontier and to designate the number of troops which the United States deemed necessary to prevent uprisings in the region, for the protection of American inhabitants across the border in the United States.

Two days later President Taft had a serious interview with the Mexican Ambassador at Washington who was about to depart for Mexico City. The Ambassador appeared greatly worried when President Taft remarked that Mexico must not assume that his patience was perennial and urged that the Ambassador use his influence to bring about an improvement in the situation. The Ambassador, somewhat cowed and out of sympathy with the Madero movement, could only apologize for the conditions in Mexico.

On September 17, the United States through Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, presented to the Mexican Government a note which virtually amounted to an ultimatum wherein the Mexican government was scored for its indifference and inefficency. It was at the same time announced that the United States was no longer disposed to permit its nationals to be constantly made the objects of the tyranny of petty local authorities. It demanded that the predatory persucution which had been practiced, and which amounted practically to confiscation must cease forthwith.

The note stated flatly that the time had come when the administration at Mexico City must either demonstrate its determination and ability to handle the situation by the early establishment of law and order or confess itself powerless to do so. In the latter case it would become necessary for the Government of the United States to consider what measures to adopt to meet the requirements of the situation.*

The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs did not formally reply to the ultimatum until November 22. It was a masterpiece however, and sought to assure the United States authorities that Mexico had been and still was doing all that could be done for the protection of Americans in Mexico.

The situation grew more tense and on October 25, the Secretary of the Navy of the United States was requested to hold in readiness eight vessels; four for the Pacific and four for the Atlantic coast of Mexico. The unfortunate Madero was being harrassed from all sides. Pressure was brought to bear to force him to resign but that he declined to do.

Finally, on February 18, 1913, Madero was arrested through the treachery of Generals Blanquette and Huerta, officers of his own

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 341. 1931 Ed.

army and two days later a provisional government with Huerta as President was installed in Mexico. On February 23, Madero and Vice President Pino Suarez were shot while being taken under escort from the National Palace to the penitentiary.*

United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, strongly urged that the United States recognize the Huerta government but the State Department at Washington did not decide upon immediate recognition, nor did the administration officially announce its acceptance of the Huerta version of the murders of Madero and Suarez.

When President Taft left the White House in March, 1913, he had made little contribution toward the solution of the Mexican problem. American interests were still suffering and no indemnities had been obtained. Thanks in part to the machinations of the Ambassador who served him in Mexico City, a dictator was in charge of the Mexican government and ready to make terms with Washington, but the dictator was a toper with bloody hands and there was little assurance either of his continued tractability or of his power to bring permanent order to Mexico.**

In one respect the Mexican policy of Woodrow Wilson was similar to that of his immediate predecessor. President Taft intervened in Mexican affairs while disavowing intervention and President Wilson did likewise. In most other respects thepolicies of the two Presidents differed widely and were carried out under very different circumstances.

President Wilson took up the Mexican problem with the vision of a world reformer. He had the zeal of a Democratic crusader, but he lacked patience. His course was rendered more arduous by the novelty of his policy, increasing disorders in Mexico and the growing impatience both of his constituents and of the world about him.

Immediately upon turning his attention to foreign affairs. President Wilson clearly saw several facts. First the little Latin American states were indignant. They denounced the United States for officious meddling, accused us of cold calculatin materialism

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 347. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy,page 348. 1931 Ed.

and viewed the course we were pursuing with trembling apprehensiveness. Second, the powers of Europe were impatient with the continued disorders in Mexico and third, Mexico's problems whether external or internal were similar to those of many other Latin American states.

On March 11, 1913, President Wilson announced that he would throw the moral weight of his administration into the balance in favor of the responsible governments of Latin America. "We hold," he declared, "that there can be no freedom in government without order based upon law and upon thepublic conscience and approval. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal ambitions." This was a plain announcement of determination not to recognize the despotism of Huerta in Mexico.*

Such a policy was clearly one of intervention; strictly moral, but far-reaching in its consequences. Wilson had clearly set out to unseat a distator and help the Mexicans toward an era of democracy. In doing this he ran great risk of prolonging an era of disorder. The effectiveness of his course depended not only upon the attitude of the Mexican people and of the governments of Spanish America, but upon the leading nations of Europe who were showing more and more concern regarding the Mexican situation. If all agreed to co-operate with the American President, Huerta would be doomed.

The Latin-American states soon relieved Wilson's anxiety and accepted his leadership, but the diplomats of Europe saw otherwise. By the middle of the summer of 1913, all the European powers and Japan had recognized Huerta.

Wilson's optomism, however, was equal to almost any obstacle. Even as the European and Japanese diplomats, one by one extended recognition to the de facto ruler of Mexico, President Wilson sent John Lind of Minnesota to the Mexican government with instructions designed to eliminate Huerta and pacify Mexico by means

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 350. 1931 Ed.

of a fair election and the loyal acceptance of its results by all parties.* Lind's mission was a complete failure. European statesmen continued recalcitrant, but Presidnet Wilson's purpose remained unshaken. In the latter part of October, 1913, he addressed a Pan-American assembly at Mobile, Alabama and announced himself as the champion of American democracy against official economic imperialism. The address amounted to a defiance of those European powers who placed the secutity of the investments of their nationals above democratic progress in Mexico.

President Wilson probably designed his remarks mainly for the government of Great Britain. At any rate, American diplomats had been busy for some time in an effort to bring SirEdward Grey around to the Wilson view of the Mexican problem, and before the close of the year 1913 Wilson had his way. In November or December of that year, Sir Lionel Corden, British Ambassador at Mexico City led a procession of European diplomats to General Huerta and formally advised that warrior to accede to the American.

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*De facto--From the "Americano" volumn 8 , page 585. De facto means "actual in fact, based on fact" in contradistinction of de jour which means "based on law, by right, by lawful title."

A de facto government is always a usurpation and may be said to exist when the usurping government has expelled the regularly constituted authorities from their customary seats and functions and has established itself in their place, so becoming the actual government of a country. The authority claimed for a de facto government must be effective and actually in operation before it may assume the de facto character.

The mere usurpation of an office does not constitute the urusrper a de facto officer unless he acturally exercises the functions of the office.

The continental congress exercised de facto authority which became de jour when Great Britain recognized the independence of the colonies.

demands and withdraw from the presidency of Mexico. The delegation informed the dictator that their governments were supporting the American policy and Sir Lionel brought him the unwelcome news that he could not depend upon British support. The great powers had acquiesced in the Wilson policy with reference to Huerta. Soon afterwards however, their energies were absorbed by the World War and the Mexican embroglio became an American affair.

Thus freed from European pressure, President Wilson could announce on December 2, 1913, that he saw no reason to depart from his policy of watchful waiting for the overthrow of Huerta and the achievement of order south of the Rio Grande. In reality Wilson's attitude was not strictly that of watchful waiting

His pressure upon the European diplomats had shattered Huertas prospects of a loan and now he took an even more important step. The law of March 14, 1912, had conferred authority upon the president of the United States to prevent each of the contesting groups in Mexico from receiving aid from above the border. This was in fact a law to enforce neutrality, but the removal of the embargo from arms andmunitionson February 4, 1914, so, as was claimed, that the conclusion of the fight might be hastened, hardly accorded with the attitude implied by the term, watchful waiting.* What it really amounted to was favoritism toward Corranza, Villa and Obregon, who were leading the anti-Huerta forces in the north of Mexico. Of similar import was the occupation of Vera Cruz by United States forces in April, 1914. That occupation, avowedly provoked by Huerta's studied abuse of the American flag and his systematic persecution of American nationals, was designed to administer a humiliating rebuke to and intercept Huerta's supply of arms and ammunitions. It was an effective blow, and soon Victoriana Huerta embarked for Europe. Never again to set foot on Mexican soil** All this, President Wilson said, was for the good of the Mexican people.

Scarcely anything was known of the thoughts of the pathetic eighty percent of exploited Indians and Mestizos to whom President Wilson's sympathy was generously extended, but the articulate Mexicans showed little appreciation for the American President's benovolence. They resented his occupation of Vera Cruz. As some of the Mexican insurgent leaders scolded and the friendly occupation of Vera Cruz, which was intended neither as a foraml intervention nor as an act of war against the Mexican people, was about to degenerate into an ugly affair, the Latin-American countries

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Ri ppy, page 352. 1931 Ed.

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 352. 1931 Ed.

extended a timely offer of mediation. President Wilson delighted to find a way of escape from the embarrassing situation in which he found himself, eagerly accepted the offer. Mediation meant little in the pacification of Mexico, but it did promote Pan-American friendship; and it also enabled President Wilson to maintain a status quo at Vera Cruz until the armed forces could be withdrawn without humiliation or alienation of popular support in the United States. At least Mexico had been given ridance of a tyrant and left free to move along the pathyway of order and democracy.

During the latter half of the year 1914 and the early part of 1915, the American administration pursued its previous policy of watching and hopefully waiiting. Now that Huerta had been removed, the Mexican leaders who held the field were very slow in the arrangement of their difficulties. To one familiar with Mexican history, this was to be expected. A people who had been used to having their presidential elections decided for them by terrorism and bullets could hardly be e pected speedily to reach a decision to confine themselves to the use of ballots. But Mr. Wilson had either forgotten his Mexican history or was under the impression that the Mexicans were ready to adopt the peaceful policy he so much desired them to take. Early in 1915, the President contended that Mexico ought to be allowed to consume all the time she pleased in settling her internal troubles, but by the middle of that year be began to lose patience. In the very hour of their success, the leaders of the revolution agreed to disagree and turned their arms against each other. President Wilson admonished them and threatened drastic action. When the revolutionary leaders failed to follow the admonition, President Wilson invited diplomatic respresentatives of Latin America to again discuss the Mexican situation with him. The insurgent leaders were requested to lay their cases before the assembled diplomats.

Some of the Military leaders of Mexico sent representatives and others refused. The result of the conferences of the assembled diplomats was the decision reached October 19, 1915, to recognize Venustiano Carranza as the de facto head of the National Government of Mexico.* This was done in spite of the fact that Carranza had for two years shown himself to be least amenable to American advice. President Wilson did not allow himself to be provoked by Carranza's stubborness as the movement in Mexico which Carranza championed appeared to promise most for the submerged eight percent of the Mexican population to whom Wilson's sympathies were

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F.Rippy, page 353. 1931 Ed.

extended. Those associated with Carranza seemed to be loyal to their chief and to his ideals. President Wilson was convinced that the triumph of the Carranzistos and their much heralded reforms was essential to the permanent pacification of Mexico.

Mr. Wilson had hoped that the authority of Huerta would pass directly to Carranza in the summer of 1914, but he had been disappointed. Now at last, his point of view had been made to prevail. The governments of Europe soon followed in the path which had been marked out by the American states under the leadership of President Wilson. Carranza's cause was immensely strengthened and for the second time President Wilson had intervened in Mexican affairs.*

This was not the extent of the somewhat hasty intervention. Mr. Wilson proceeded forthwith to manipulate the export of arms and munitions from the United States to Mexico in favor of Carranza. These supplies were permitted to enter freely into the areas dominated by that leader, but an embargo was placed upon their shipment into Mexican territory where followers of Villa were threatening to gain the ascendency. Arms and ammunition were even allowed to proceed even into so called Villista territory provided assurance was given that the supplies would be received by Carranza and his followers.

Except for such interposition as was represented by these acts, the Wilson administration adhered to its policy of non-intervention. Having exalted Carranza's international status by securing for him the recognition of the leading powers of Europe and America, and having instructed his subordinates to enforce the arms embargo so as to favor the Carranzistas, theWilson administration settled down once more to watch and wait. Mr. Wilson is credited with the following statement in his armeral message of 1915: "We will now hopefully await the rebirth of the troubled Republic. We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not coerce her."** At any rate the United States had not sent an army into Mexico for the purpose of protecting American life and property and restoring order. To have remained completely passive in the face of the tragedy which was dragging into its sixth year south of the Rio Grande, would have been a dangerous provocation of American interests and the American people.

As early as April, 1914, there were those who appeared to hope that the seizure of Vera Cruz might result in general intervention in behalf of American interests in Mexico. These people

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, pages 353,354. 1931 E

**The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, pages 354. 1931 Ed.

seemed to favor one of the lines of action suggested by Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador to Mexico under the Taft administration. The Lines suggested by Ambassador Wilson were three in number and were read into the Congressional Record. They were substantially as follows:*

> First: The recognition of Huerta on condition that he satisfy pending American demands, dismiss his Foreign Secretary and permit United States troops to assist in establishing order north of the twenty-sixth parallel.
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> Second: A more general invasion of Mexico by United States forces, preceded by a denial of any desire for permanent occupation and the recall of United States nationals. There would be a commission composed of the American Ambassador, the Commander in Chief of the United States army, the ranking officer of the United States navy and a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which should follow in the wake of the invading force, reconciling Mexican factions.
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> Third: The establishment of a permanent buffer state north of the twenty-sixth parallel and incidentally including the most important mining area of Mexico.

Such were the suggestions which some of the aggressive members of the United States Congress favored in the spring of 1914, but the hold which President Wilson's party had on public opinion easily held them in check. As the year 1916 opened, however, Mexico appeared to be approaching the crisis. This crisis was occasioned mainly by the raids of Francisco Villa and his followers upon the American frontier and by political stage-play on the eve of another national election in the United States. The natural marauding proclivities of the Villistas, stimulated by the hostility aroused by the partiality for Carranza shown by the Wilson administration, caused the perpetration of outrages upon American life and property in northern Mexico, and too, began a series of incursions into the United States.

The opposition to the Wilson party in the United States eagerly seized upon the Mexican problem as one of the major issues of the campaign. Whatever the complaints and criticisms against the administration of Woodrow Wilson, it must be conceded that he gave to Mexico and its people the consideration due to an independent sovereign state, with an absolute right to adopt a constitution

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*The United States and Mexico, by James F. Rippy, page 354. 1931 Ed.

constitution in its own way. Prior to President Wilson's time, because of the misconduct or misfortune of Mexico's rulers and people, the country was looked upon generally as a region inhabited by an altogether backward folk in sore need of correction. This was the attitude of the United States government when Wilson succeeded to the presidency in March, 1913.

President Wilson was an idealist who looked forward to the good that might be accomplished in Mexico, not by force, but by a process of education and instruction intended to reach that pathetic eighty percent of Mexico's population which consisted principally of exploited Indians and Mestizos. The President believed, and rightly so, that these people had been during the past half century, and were still being exploited and robbed by certain vested interests, both American and European, through the connivance and with the assistance of dishonest and even traitorous Mexican officials. Wilson's sympathies were with these people; ignorant, possibly, but an ignorance which was the result of centuries of tyrannical oppression. Since independence was achieved, the condition of this so called eighty percent had improved scarcely at all. Not lacking in intelligence, perhaps, but still ignorant of the enormous wealth of their country and of the cowardly manner in which they were being exploited by the traitorous one fifth of their own countrymen.

President Wilson believed in the human right of these people to self government, and without a doubt he was honest in the belief that the best interests of a majority of the people of Mexico would be served by having Venustiano Carranza as the de facto head of the Mexican government.

In every country there exists a predatory element whose chief ambition it is to secure control of the machinery of government of the property they have accumulated, and then dividing it among themselves.* Such an element was represented in Mexico by the Carranza party. The destruction of productive industry by the greed of this party deprived hundreds of thousands of Mexican citizens of the chance to make a living and brought indescribable miseries upon the country.

The character of the Carranza revolutionary party in Mexico may be judged by the record of negotiations between the representatives of the Carranza Government and the Department of State in Washington and by acts in conducting the recognized government of Mexico.

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 40.

The relations established by the Carranza regime with the United States Government and with other nations are shown in the State document. Still more illuminating was the record made by the Carranza government by its treatment of foreigners and especially of Americans.

The correspondence carried on during the latter part of 1915, between Mr. E. Arredondo, the agent of the Carranza revolutionists at Washington and the Secretary of State of the United States showed two things:

> First: That the Government of the United States trusted in the pledges contained in the communications of Mr. Arredondo and in the various declarations of General Carranza.
>
> Second: That these pledges and declarations guaranteed to nationals and foreigners in Mexico, that their lives and property would be respected in accordance with the practices established by civilized nations and the treaties in force between Mexico and other countries. That besides, Carranza would recognize and satisfy indemnities for damages caused by the revolution, which would be settled in due time and in terms of justice.

There was also submitted by the Carranza government to the State Department the so called "plan of Guadalupe," a sort of declaration of principles upon which the Carranza revolution was founded. The declaration was dated March 26, 1913, and purported to have been signed by sixty-four officers of the troops with which Carranza began his revoltuion against the Huerta government. In the so called "plan ofGuadalupe" appeared the following:

> "The undersigned chiefs and officers commanding the constitutional forces, have agreed upon and shall sustain with arms as follows:
>
> "That General Victoriano Huerta is hereby repudiated as president of Mexico;
>
> "That for the purpose of organizing the army to carry out the aims of the consitutionalist party Venustiano Carranza was named as first chief of the Constitutionalist army;*

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 46.

"That upon the occupation of the City of Mexico by the Consitutionalist army, the executive power was to be vested in Venustiano Carranza or in the person who should substitute for him in command;

"That the provisional trustee or the executive power of the Republic should convene general elections as soon as peace should be restored and should surrender power to the citizen who should be elected."

Again, under date of June 11, 1915, Carranza issued what was entitled: " Declaration to the Nation" setting forth in a general way what had transpired. The statement was reiterated that the Constitutionalist government would afford to foreigners residing in Mexico all the guaranties to which they were entitled according to the laws of the country. That the government would amply protect their lives, their freedom, the enjoyment of property rights, allowing them indemnity for any damages which the revolution may have caused them, so far as the same were just. Any such indemnities to be determined by a procedure to be established later. There was to be no confiscation in connection with the settlement of the agrarian question.*

The two documents entitled respectively "Decree of General Carranza" dated December 12, 1914 and "Declaration to the Nation," signed by V. Carranza, dated June 11, 1915, were, when they were issued, given the widest possible circulation in the United States as well as abroad. The object of the wide circulation given the documents was undoubtedly to appeal to the sympathies and support of the world for the declared effort of the Carranza revolutionists to restore the consitution of Mexico to its full force; and thereby give Mexico a government which would safeguard the rights of her own people as well as those of foreigners. The documents no doubt had the desired effect among people who knew the Mexican constitution of 1857, referred to in them, as being an admirable organic law for the foundation of a democratic government.**

The Carranza regime was recognized by the United States October 19, 1915, asthe de facto government of Mexico. That is to say, this nation on that date gave notice to all the world that, waiving consideration of its legal status, the government set up by Carranza wasin face the government of Mexico, having power to perform all the functions of a government and to fulfil all international obligations.

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 50

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 51.

Recognition as the de jour government, which did not occur until nearly three years later, was an official notification to the nations of the world that Carranza's administration was legall constituted; and possessed the lawful power and the inclination to discharge its obligations toward its own people and the rest of the world.*

As had been observed, General Carranza, as the head of what he and his followers had denominated the "Constitutional Party of Mexico," had repeatedly made the pledge that as soon as he was established in the City of Mexico he would issue a call for the election of Congressmen. The record shows that Carranza did nothing of the kind, but on the contrary, as soon as he found himself in control in the City of Mexico in 1914, he declared a "preconstitutional period," ignoring the constitution he claimed he had fought to restore. In the fall of 1915 he issued a call for a constitutional convention whose function it should be to enact for Mexico a constitution de novo**in entire disregard of the consitution of 1857 to which he and his adherents had pledged fealty in communications addressed to the United States and to the World.

To show how completely the action of the Carranza party violated the rights of the Mexican people, it should be observed that the consitution of 1857 was adopted by a vote of the representatives of all the Mexican people, whereas, when General Carranza's call for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention was issued, several states of the Republic were not under his control and his writ calling the election did not run in those states. That fact was well known to everyong acquainted with the conditions obtaining in Mexico at that time. If any additional proof were needed it could be found in the fact that soon after the new constitution was adopted, Mr. C abrara, the Secretary of Finance under Carranza, stated on the floor of the Mexican Congress that the five states of Flaxeala, Puebla, Morelos, Oaxaca, andChiapas were absolutely not under the control of the Carranza government. Furthermore, in his call for the election, First Chief Carranza expressly provided that the elective franchise should be exercised only by those citizens who were known to have been the supporters of the constitutionalist party.

Thus, there was the spectacle of the leader of a movement which that leader had denominated the Constitutionalist Party, pledged to the restoration of the consitution of 1857, deliberately

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 3.

**De novo: Anew, over again. (Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, volumn 4, page 1535.)

ignoring that instrument and assuming the authority to enact a new constitution for the whole Mexican nation by a convention, the membership of which did not represent several states of the Mexican Union and were in no sense representative of all the citizens even of the states in which the election was held, because by the terms of the writ calling the election, a large number of those citizens were disfranchised. It has been stated that the votes cast for delegates to the convention represented less that two percent of the population.

Some of the provisions of the new constitution show how completely it violated in every possible way, the pledges that had been made to the government of the United States and the rest of the world, by the Carranza party.

Nearly all large holdings of real estate by foreigners in Mexico, in the form of ranches, coffee and rubber plantations and projects for irrigation of arid lands were held by corporations regularly organized in compliance with the laws as they existed under the constitution of 1857. Under these national laws of Mexico formerly in force, solid mineral fuels, petroleum and all hydro carbons were the property of the owners of the lands in which they existed.

About the end of Diaz's long administration, there was filed in the State Department at Washington, a statement showing the total wealth of Mexico to be $2,434,241,422; of which Americans owned $1,057,770,000; English, $321,302,800; French, $143,446,000; all other foreigners, $118,535,380; Mexicans, $792,187,242.* These figures are not exact, but will at least serve to give an idea of the relative importance of foreign captial in developing the resources of Mexico. The fact was evident that foreigners developed Mexico; built its railroads, opened its mines, constructed and operated its factories, opened its oil wells, introduced modern machinery and gave employment to practically all the native labor in the country except that engaged on farms, plantations and ranches.

These foreign investments and their influence in developing national resources and affording a livelihood to all willing workers, were advertised as one of the fundamental grievances of the Carranzistas, to redress which they proceeded to confiscate all the property that could be converted into cash without too much effort, and greatly damaged or destroyed all the rest. Conscious that such proceedings were not considered good form in the countries

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 93.

from which the investments came, the Carranzistas expended a good deal of ingenuity in endeavoring to justify or excuse their ideas regarding property rights.

The Carranzistas were zealous in their efforts to win American sympathy and to that end maintained two centers of propoganda in the United States. One was located in the City of Washington and issued a monthly journal and press sheets at frequent intervals describinb in rosy terms the alledged conditions in Mexico and setting forth the beneficent effects of Carranza's sway. The material so issued was circulated among membersof the United States Congress, Government officials and others who were presumed to be influental to a greater or less extent.*

Every number of thepublications contained manifestations of one of the most prominent vices of the Carranza regime; mendacity. A sufficient example of that characteristic was found in a statement in one of the publications to the effect that a school census taken in Mexico City showed that a larger percentage of children of school age attended the public schools in that city than were attending the public schools of New York City. To any person acquainted with actual conditions, the statement was palpably false. Its falseness was soon demonstrated by the news from Mexico City a short time after the item appeared, to the effect that many of the city schools there had been closed because the government found itself unable to pay the salaries of the teachers.

Another center of Carranza activity was centered in New York City shortly after the beginning of the Carranza administration, by what was called the "Latin-American News Association." In one of the pamphlets distributed by the latter organization appears the following statement:

> "Mexico has been the happy hunting ground of adventurer since the days of the Spanish Conquest. Government has always meant merely an organized system of robbery and exploitation. It took whatever the people had but gave them nothing. It taxed them in the most ruthless way and spent their money for private purposes and profit."**

Another pamphlet stated as follows:

> "Diaz reduced the process to a scientific system. He termed it developing the country. Concession seekers flocked to Mexico with the coming of Diaz to power. He owed them everything, for they made him master of Mexico. They enjoyed

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 95.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 96.

thirty-four yearsof almost uninterrupted freedom until the flight of Diaz in 1910. Diaz paid his first debts by concessions for the building of two railroad lines to Mexico City. Land was given for the right of way, together with a subsidy of $14,000 per mile on level country and $35,000 per mile in rough country."

"During these years, the United States was unhappily the bulwark of the exploiting interests. The Mexican people feared American intervention and that fear kept them from revolution. The colossal grants and subsides for railroads, mines, oil and land, judiciously destributed, identified the United States State Department, the Senate, the press and the people of the United States with Diaz, no matter what his outrages might be."

"The Mexicans want to get back their lands which were taken from them by bribery or guns and they are doing it. They want to get back their oil wells, gold and silver mines and the rich copper deposits of the nornt, and they are doing it."*

The author of the paragraphs quoted did not hesitate to allege that the grants and subsideies given by the Diaz government were used as bribes to influence the State Department, the Senate, the press and the whole people of the United States. That may be accepted as a fair sample of the mendacity of the Carranza propagandists. What the writer really meant, although he did not say it, was that the Mexicans had taken and proposed to continue to take, the property acquired and developed in Mexico by citizens of the United States and other foreigners. As a matter of fact it can be shown that during the Diaz regime no citizen of the United States acquired by grant or subsidy, any oil territory, gold, silver or copper mines, or land; and that the subsidies to the railroads were probably the most moderate ever given for such vaule as was received by Mexico in the building of her railroads, and were much less than subsidies granted by the United States for a like purpose.**

As an illustration of the reckless falsehoods which were uttered about the dealings of the people of the United States with Mexico and which found credence to which they were not entitled among men in responsible Governmental positions in the United States, the history of oil developement in that country may be cited.

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 97.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas E. Gibbon, page 98.

The inhabitants of Mexico knew of the existence of oil in Mexico from the time they first occupied the country. Notwithstanding that fact, no citizen of Mexico displayed sufficient energy and initiative to attempt the development of these oil fields. It remained for two Americans, citizens of Los Angeles to undertake the development which added enormously to the economic welfare of Mexico. These men, visited the section now known as the oil territory of Mexico; and convinced themselves of the existence of subterranean oil measures. These measures were located upon lands held in private ownership, and in their oil developments the Americans were forced to deal with the private owners. The promoters went to the Mexican government, called attention to the fact that Mexico had no oil wells, announced that they proposed to invest a large sum in developing the petroleum deposits, and asked to be granted a concession which would enable them to conduct their business for a term of years free from import and export duties.

The law providing for the granting of such a concession in Mexico required that the enterprise should represent a new business of a character not developed, and before they could secure the concession for which they asked, they were compelled to obtain a certificate from every state in the Mexican Union, certifying that no oil development had been made in any such state. This was to establish the fact that the business which they proposed to conduct would really add a new business to the industrial life of Mexico. Having obtained these certificates, they secured a concession which granted to their enterprise of developing petroleum, immunity from all national import and export taxes on any material which they might bring in for use in their business or any product which they might ship out of the country for a period of ten years.* That was the sole advantage given to Mr. Doheny and his associates by the Mexican Government.**

It is probable that, owing to the habit of speaking of the work done by Americans in the development of petroleum and other enterprises of that character as "concessions", there is a general impression that the lands were obtained as a gift from the government. Such an erroneous impression may be traced to the translation of the Spanish word "concession" which means merely a franchise or a right to do business and means something quite

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 99 to 102.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 101, 102.

different from the English word "concession".*

After the discovery of oil in paying quantities, several other large oil interests as well as other less important organizations secured territory in the oil fields by purchase or lease, and commenced the the production of petroleum. Not in any instance, however, did an American company secure any part of its oil territory as a grant, gift or concession from the Mexican Government. The contrary, however, was asserted in numerous false-propoganda pamphlets and articles which were distributed by Mexican revolutionists in the United States.

The oil industries in Mexico furnished employment for thousands of Mexican workmen at wages several hundred percent greater than any they had ever received from their own countrymen.

As to the encouragement of railroad construction in Mexico by subsidy, the practice was inaugurated years before Diaz came into power in 1876. The practice played an important part in the efforts made by the great patriot Juarez, to improve and elevate the condition of his countryment. While it would be difficult to determine the exact date upon which the first subsidy or concession was granted by the Mexican government, it is certain that by a decree of the Mexican Congress in 1874, a concession was granted for a railroad line northwardly from Mexico City. Although this concession was granted two years before Diaz came into power, the railroad referred to was one of the lines named in a Carranza propaganda pamphlet which alleged that Diaz paid his first debts by concessions for the building of railroad lines. The concession for that particular line was granted under the administration of President Lerdo de Tejada.**

The supporters of the Carranza regime in Mexico, in their efforts to win the sympathies of the world, dwelt with much insistence upon the allegation that foreigners and particularly Americans, exploited to their own benefit and to the injury of the country, its mineral resources, especially gold, silver and copper.

As in the case of mining and oil properties, what lands were acquired in Mexico by American citizens were bought at a price which represented the full value of the land to the owners. Undoubtedly, in most cases, under the management of the foreign owner, the lands became worth more than was paid for them and the increased value was attributable entirely to the energy and

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 102, 103.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 110.

Intelligence of the foreign owner. Yet, the American investor, who thus added to the prosperity of Mexico was denounced by the Carranza regime as a robber of the people.*

One of the first acts of Carranza after his revolution was announced in the "Plan of Guadalupe" on March 26, 1913, was to send his brother Jesus Carranza on May 26, to call the coal producers to account. The following extracts from a letter written by an American who was interested in the coal mines at Lampacitos, Mexico, will perhaps best describe what followed:**

> "When General Jesus Carranza visited the mines at Lampacitos, he demanded of the manager of the mines that he be paid 100,000 pesos, in default of which he treatened to burn and destroy the plant. As the manager was unable to comply with the demand, General Carranza proceeded to destroy the plant by dynamiting several hundred coke ovens, burned most of the buildings and destroyed the extensive structures of the company.
>
> After completing such work of destruction, Jesus Carranza announced that he intended to march immediately to Agujita, Mexico, where another plant of the company was located, about fifty miles from Lampacitos and that if, by the time he arrived there, the money previously demanded was not paid, he would destroy the plant at Agujita.
>
> Upon arriving at the latter place, the representative of the corporation being without money and unable to comply with the demand of General Carranza, the latter proceeded to destroy the plant at Agujita, but his troops were frightened away by the fumored approach of Huerta's forces before the destruction was completed. Declaration of forfeiture of various mining properties in Coahuila including the plant at Agujita was then issued. The Declaration of forfeiture was signed by one R. Muzquiz, Chief at Coahuila of the partisans of First Chief Carranza. It was believed by the owners of the properties that the object of the Declaration of Forfeiture was to provide means whereby some 30,000 tons of coke

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 143.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 148, 149.

on hand, worth about 2,000,000 pesos in Carranza currency could be disposed of.*

What happened to these coal mines was typical of most industrial enterprises owned by Americans in Mexico. After the mines stood idle for some time because the owners, having no assurance of protection, dared not attempt to operate the, the properties were purchased for a small part of their value by a corperation representing a group of German Capitalists whose headquarters were at Frankfort-on-the-Main. The new owners under the protection received from Carranza, reopened and operated the mines.

In 1915, the Carranza government installed General Calles as military Governor of the state of Sonora. Among the first acts of Governor Calles was the issuance of a decree dated December 22, 1915, levying high taxes, impossible of payment against certain lands owned by American interests. When a company objected to such taxation and referred to its contract with the state government of Sonora, dated 1909, it was told that Governor Calles had cancelled the contract and that taxes must be paid as provided in the new decree.**

These are only a few examples of the way many enterprises were destroyed by the Carranza government as a result of a shortsighted and unpatriotic greed which preferred a few dollars of loot in the present to a great national benefit in the future.

There were a number of American colonies located at Garcia, Pacheco, Juarex, Dublan, Diaz and other places in the states of Sonora and Chihuahua. A typical example of what these colonists were subjected to was shown in a statement concerning the colony at Diaz. In that colony, about 125 houses were destroyed, the occupants having been given three hours to get out, leaving the accumulation of years of hard work. Beautiful homes were destroyed and farm equipment burned. The vandals burned or wrecked everything they could lay their hands upon. One owner had 300 head of Polled Angus cattle of which he saved only 29 head. Of 80 horses only 8 escaped the hands of the banditis. The same owner had 6000 bushels of wheat on his ranch. The wheat quickly disappeared when the revolutionists showed up.***

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, pages 149, 150.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 155.

***Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 160.

The American farmers who composed these little centers of agricultural industry were in no sense exploiters of Mexico under concessions granted by the Diaz government. They had purchased the land upon which they built their homes and depended upon their efforts and enterprise for the prosperity which they had achieved and not upon any advantage secured by concessions or privileges of any kind granted by the Mexican government.

These examples are given as being illustrative of the character of the Carranzistas. The list of what they wrecked and ruined might be extended to include mines, smelters, public service corporations, railroads, banks and in fact every kind of financial and industrial enterprise which contributed to the well being of the country. The railways were almost entirely wrecked; the capital of the banks was used for purposes of the Carranza government and not one cent was repaid, nor was any effort made to repay, although for years the owners of these properties have enjoyed neither the use of the properties nor the income therefrom.*

No account of the treatment of foreigners by the Carranzistas would be complete without a reference to the number of American citizens who lost their lives at the hands of the revolutionists. A list of 285 American citizens, with their names and addresses, who were killed by Mexican revolutionists between December, 1910 and September, 1916, was carefully compiled by private parties for the information of the United States Government. The list did not pretend to be complete, for it did not include the two officers and thirteen men killed by the followers of Carranza at Carrizal, nor mnay other Americans known to have been killed, but whom it was impossible to identify.**

There appeared in both the Decree and Declaration of Carranza an unqualified promise that when his revolutionary movement succeeded, he would first call for an election of congressmen. He violated this promise by issuing a call for the election of members of a consitutional convention and did not call congress together until he had secured the enactment by that convention which as we have seen, did not represent the Mexican people, of a new consitution which would govern and control the action of the congress.

Both Mr. A redondo in his letter to our Secretary of State and General Carranza in both his Decree and Declaration, solemnly

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 168

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 170.

promised to afford to foreigners residing in Mexico all the guaranties to which they were entitled according to the laws of Mexico, and would protect their lives, their freedom and their enjoyment of their rights of property. Also to allow these foreigners indemnities for the damage which the revolution may have caused them.

Instead of redeeming these pledges, and keeping their promises inviolate, the Carranza government as we have seen, confiscated the capital of banks, the public service properties throughout the country and variousother properties of foreigners to the value of hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, although Carranza's administration was recognized as the de factor government of Mexico by the United States October 19, 1915, no step was taken to pay the indemnities due foreigners for damages done by revolutionists but instead, the destruction of properties continued without apparent abatement.

Instead of solving the agrarian question by an equitable distribution of the land still owned by the government as promised by Carranza in his declaration of June 11, 1915, the new constitution gave to each state and territory, the right to fix the maximum area of land which any one individual or corporation might own and to compel the owner to subdivide the remainder and offer it for sale at a price fixed by the government. In default of such action on the part of the landowner, the state was given authority to fix the price at which it would take over the land and compel the owner to accept bonds of the state in payment thereof, which meant absolute confiscation.

The Carranza government completely violated its pledge to observe strictly the laws of record guaranteeing individual freedom of worship.

One of the worst features of the Carranza constitution was that, not having been enacted by a constitutional convention representing all of the national territory or all the people of the nation, it was likely to prove to be a perpetual and just incitement of revolution on the ground that it did not represent the will of the people.

Soon after the departure of the expedition under General Pershing in March 1916, in pursuit of Villa and his band, it occurred to Carranza that the presence of United States troops upon Mexican soil was prejudicial to him as head of the Mexican government. This, because of the fact that he had sedulously cultivated hatred and distrust.

of the "gringos" in the minds of his supporters. Hoping to rehabilitate himself in the regard of his supporters, Carranza caused his Secretary of Foreign Relations to address an impudent letter to the State Department at Washington in which the claim was made that the presence of American troops in Mexico was an act of bad faith; that the move was for political purposes and that the presence of United States troops in Mexico constituted a grave wrong to that country. The letter ended with the treat that "in the face of the unwillingness of the American Government to withdraw its forces from Mexico, there would be left no other recourse than to defend its territory by means of arms.*

In reply to this letter Secretary Lansing on June 20, 1916, advised the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations that the execution of the threat contained in the letter from the representative of the de facto government would lead to the "gravest consequences."

Under date of June 16, 1916, General Trevino, in command of a force of Mexican troops located near the camp of the American forces in Mexico, sent a note to General Pershing reading as follows:

> "I am instructed by First Chief Carranza to inform you that any movement of American troops from their present lines to the south, east or west will be considered as an overt act and will be the signal for hostilities."**

To that message, General Pershing replied under date of June 18, 1916, General Pershing curtly informed the Mexican commander that he had not received any orders to remain stationary or to withdraw. That if he saw fit to send troops in pursuit of bandits either to the south, east or west in keeping with the object of the expedition, he would do so. And finally, that if an attack were made on any part of his forces while performing such duties, the entire military strength of the expedition would be used against the attacking forces.

A short time after these threats were exchanged, several hundred Mexican soldiers armed with machine guns attacked a small detachment of American cavalry, killing several of their number including two young officers. This killing of American soldiers,

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 74.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 75.

considered in the light of all the circumstances under which it occurred, and the overwhelming force that attacked the Americans was virtually an assassination.*

Even this was not succeeded by the "serious consequences" mentioned by the Secretary of State, nor was the entire military strength of the expedition used against the attacking forces, as threatened by the General commanding the punitive expedition.

Carranza, apparently appreciating the fact that the wave of indignation which swept the United States at this juncture, might force the hand of the Administration and compel the carrying out of threats of Secretary of State Lansing and General Pershing, suggested the appointment of a joint commission to be composed of three memebers representing each government. The commission so constituted to hold conferences and resolve at once the point regarding the withdrawal of the American forces from Mexico. An agreement regarding the ciprocal crossing of forces should be drafted. An investigation of the origin of the incursions up to date, so as to be able to place the responsibility; then to arrange definitely the pending difficulties or those that might arise in the future.**

This suggestion of Carranza for the appointment of a commission was accepted by the United States and three of the most able men in this country were appointed as members. The commission remained in session for several months during which time the American commissioners endeavored to secure some agreemtn regarding the recognition and protection of the rights of American citizens in Mexico. Their efforts resulted in exactly nothing. In fact, one of the American membersof the commission allegedly admitted that he believed, that before the Mexican members left Mexico City to attend the conference they were instructed by Carranza to make no commitments whatever regarding the protection of American-owned property in Mexico, because Carranza had in mind at that time the confiscatary constitution which was subsequently enacted at Queretero.***

In the meantime, the appointment of the commission and its prolonged sessions had given time for the indignation of theAmerican people over the murder of our soldiers to cool. This was undoubtedly the result desired by Carranza when he suggested its

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*Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 75.

**Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 76.

***Mexico under Carranza, by Thomas Edward Gibbon, page 79.

formation. It also marked another instance of the betrayal of the American government in its efforts to adjust our differences with Mexico by peaceful means.

In all the diplomatic negotiations in which this country had been engaged, there was nothing which compared with the experience the United States had with the Carranza administration, for infamous violation of pledges after it was recognized as the de facto government of Mexico. In view of the shameful violations by the Carranza regime of its promises and agreemtns, one can hardly understand its recognition as the de jure government of Mexico which followed.

Following the raid on Coluubus, New Mexico by Villa and his followers and the sending of the expedition into Mexico in pursuit of the bandits, several raids by Mexican bandits into United States territory occurred. The most notable of these raids were as follows:

> At Glen Springs, Texas, May 5, 1916, three American soldiers and one civilian were killed and three American soldiers wounded. It was believed that two Mexican bandits were killed and several wounded, although it wasimpossible to secure definite information.
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> On June 15, 1916, San Ygnacio, Texas was raided and four American soldiers were killed and five were wounded. Six Mexican bandits were killed at San Ygnacio.*

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*Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1916, page 8.

# ACTIVITIES OF
# THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD
# DURING
# THE MEXICAN BORDER SERVICE 1916

DURING
THE MEXICAN BORDER SERVICE 1916

The International border between the United States and Mexico is long irregular, passing in places through cities and towns, but, for great distances running through sparsely settled regions and through wild difficult country. Along this border there were frequent disturbances occasioned in most cases by raids of irresponsible Mexican bands of outlaws seeking plunder, and not hesitating to commit the most heinous crimes to staisfy their greed.

These frequent raids held the peaceful citizens on both sides of the border in a constant state of fear. Numerous appeals for California State troops to protect the residents of the border district were sent to California State officials, and the same was probably true in regard to the other border states. As a result of these border raids and the appeals of American citizens along the border, during the spring of 1912, practically the entire California National Guard was for some time held in readiness for active service and for a time it was feared that international complications would arise. Again in April, 1914, there were fervent pleas for protection from the American side of the border, between California and lower California and also from the Imperial Valley district.

The forces at the disposal of the Commander of the Southern Department of the United States for the protection of the border, had, from time to time been strengthened by the transfer to that department of a large part of the Regular Army. The forces transferred included detachments of Coast Artillery forces withdrawn from their coast defense stations. It was clear however, that even thus strengthened, the forces under General Funston's command were inadequate to patrol the long border line and assure safety to the life and property of American citizens against raids and depredations.

After the United States had recognized the Carranza regime as the de facto government of Mexico, the latter applied for permission to transport by rail, through United States territory, a military force to attack Villa for the asserted reason that the bandit leader could not be reached in any other way.

A reciprocal agreement was entered into between the de facto government and the United States, whereby troops of either country could be transported through the territory of the other, for the purpose of pursuing outlaws. Following this reciprocal agreement, Carranza soldiers were carried by American railroads through United States territory. They then invaded that portion of Mexico controlled by Villa's forces and defeated them. This, naturally, inspired Villa with the most bitter hatred toward the United States, and as an act of revenge, on the night of March

eight and nine, 1916, he led a force variously estimated at from 500 to 1000 men across the international border from Mexico to the United States at a point about three miles west of the border line gate and concentrated his force for an attack on Columbus, New Mexico.*

The attack, made during the hours of extreme darkness, was, according to information subsequently obtained by the military authorities, for the purpose of looting the town after disposing of the garrison. During the skirmish which ensued, seven American soldiers were killed and two officers and five soldiers were wounded. Eight civilians were killed and two wounded. Mexican bandits killed in the town, the camp, and on the border line during the raid numbered sixty-seven, while the wounded and captured numbered seven.** Villa and his band fled to Mexico after the skirmish.

On March 10, 1916, the Commanding General of the Southern Department was directed to organize an adequate military force under the command of Brigadier-General John J. Pershing, with instructions to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican outlaws who had attacked Columbus.

The known presence of large numbers of bandit forces of irregular military organizations, hostile alike to the de facto Government of Mexico and to the Government and people of the United States, made it apparent that further aggression upon the territory of the United States was to be expected. The President of the United States therefore, deemed it proper to exercise the authority vested in him to call out the Organized Militia of the several states. The first call on May 9, 1916, directed the concentration of the militia of the states of Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, at places to be designated by the Commanding General of the Southern Department. Even thus strengthened, the forces along the border were inadequate to patrol the long and difficult border line between the United States and Mexico. Consequently, to assure safety to the lives and property of American citizens against raids and depredations, the President on June 18, 1916, called into the service of the United States a large part of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the other states of the Union and the District of Columbia. The

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*Report of the Secretary of War, 1916, page 5.

**Report of the Secretary of War, 1916, page 5.

Organized Militia of the State of California was included in the call.

The expedition under General Pershing which had been ordered into Mexico was in no sense punitive, but rather defensive. Its objective, of course, was the capture of Villa if that could be accomplished, but its real purpose was the extension of the power of the United States into a country disturbed beyond the control of the constituted authorities of the Republic of Mexico.

General Pershing's force had been on Mexican soil since March fifteenth, 1916. During part of that time they were engaged in active and vigorous pursuit of bandits, but during the greater part of the time they were encamped generally in the neighborhood of Colonia Dublan, Mexico. The orders of the expedition enjoined the maintenance of cordial relations with the Mexican Government and its military commanders and forces. These orders were obeyed with fidelity and the relations of General Pershing's forces with the native population in Mexico were characterized by seeming cordiality and friendliness.

On the twelfth of April, 1916, an unprovoked attack was made upon a detachment of American troops at Parral, Mexico, during which two American soldiers were killed and two officers and four soldiers were wounded. On May fifth, there was a raid on Glen Springs, Texas, wherein three United States soldiers and one civilian were killed and three United States soldiers wounded.

The National-Defense Act had been approved June 3, 1916. Among other things, the act provided for the transition of the Organized Militia of the several states and the District of Columbia into the National Guard, by taking the oath prescribed by that act, and the transition was in progress in the several states when the call of June 18, was made. There had been no time for perfecting the National Guard, so that the mass of detail which under ordinary circumstances is involved in the concentration of the milita at various mobilization points, was increased. This was further due to the fact that some of the organizations then existed wholly under their earlier status; some had completed their organization under the National-Defense Act, and some were in the course of changing their relation to the Federal Government in compliance with the new laws and regulations.

The National Guard of the United States, composing a force of approximately 135,000 officers and enlisted men of various branches of the service was rapidly mobilized in their respective

State Mobilization Camps. There they were to be subjected to a rigid physical examination conforming to that in the regular service. They were inspected, mustered and equipped under the direct supervision of officers of the United States Army, officially detailed for that duty. As rapidly as possible these soldiers, taken from civil life, were transferred to the large concentration and training camps in the Southern Department and stationed in close proximity to the troops of the Regular Army, some 40,000 of whom had been occupying the border district adjacent to the Rio Grande for several years. This sudden and rapid movement of a large body of partially trained or quite inexperienced troops, threw an enormous amount of work and responsibility on those charged with its execution, and particularly upon the staff and supply departments of the army.*

To the officers of the Medical Corps of the Army was given the task of making the physical examinations and administering the vaccination against typhoid fever and small pox, immediately compulsory on entering the Federal service. Their assignment to the different camps as sanitary inspectors and instructors added further to their important duties.

Prior to the passage by Congress of the act generally known as the "Dick Militia Law" early in 1903, the State Militia was to the average American, more or less of a joke. It appeared publicly on Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day and the like, paraded in more or less disorder, and to a military audience resembled an "awkward squad". It drilled at uncertain periods in the armories and became entangled in the intricacies of maneuvers. Upon emergence into public view, its members were greeted with snickers. Its task was a thankless one and its lot apparently hopeless.

All this had been changed. The National Guard of 1916, although ridiculed by some, was no longer a joke. It did not represent a group who drilled occasionally and uselessly. It was the accepted reserve army of the United States. At times the process of improvement seemed slow, but it was steady and the ultimate results were gratifying.

In California, the call by the President of the United States for troops for Mexican border service was received by Governor Hiram W. Johnson, the day it was issued, June 18, 1916. Upon the Governor's orders, officers and men of the California National Guard were directed to assemble at their armories immediately

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*War Department Annual Report 1916, Volumn 1, page 474.

Within twelve hours from the receipt of orders, all commanding officers in the State reported their organizations ready to entrain.

Immediately upon the receipt of orders to mobilize the National Guard of the State, all officers of the staff corps and departments were directed to report at Sacramento and detailed to the work of preparing the mobilization camp at the State Fair Grounds, Sacramento. The fair grounds immediately became the scene of intense activity. Sewer pipe and water mains were laid. Water was piped over the entire inner field of the race track. Shower baths were installed. The work was completed on Thursday June 22, and on that date the first troops arrived and immediately pitched camp. Due to the efficiency of the officers in charge, the mobilization of the California National Guard at Sacramento for border duty was speedily and splendidly executed.

The entrainment of some 4,600 men and moving them by train over the great distances of California to the mobilization camp without a mishap, and with the exception of one or two trains, on time, speaks volumes for the efficiency and discipline of the National Guard and for the earnest cooperation of the railroads of California. The only difficulty experienced during the mobilization was caused by the late arrival of Federal equipment.

To have worked out the details and completed the transition of the National Guard in accordance with the provisions of the National-Defense Act and recruited it to its full strength before transferring the forces to the border, would have taken more time than the exigencies of the occasion permitted. Therefore on June twenty-third, instructions were given to the Commanding Generals of the various Departments to transfer each unit to the border as soon as it was reasonably equipped for fiedl service.

As fast as the physical examinations were concluded, the troops of the California National Guard were mustered into the service of the United States. The firsttroops were mustered in June twenty-six and the last on June thirty, 1916. The mustering in ceremony was impressive. The captain of each company read the oath, while the men raised their right hands. Then the papers were signed, and the California Guardsmen were in the service of the United States.

Strict censorship was placed by the Army officers on the movement of the troops, orders having been issued not to disclose

any advance information concerning the place of entrainment, the time of departure, the route to be traveled or the destination of the troops. The first troops to leave the mobilization camp at Sacramento were those of the First Battalion of Field Artillery and the Second Regiment of Infantry. These troops entrained at Sacramento June 30, 1916, and arrived at their destination, Nogales, Arizona, July 3, 1916. The next to depart was the 5th Infantry which entrained at Sacramento July three and arrived at Nogales July fifth. The 7th Infantry also entrained at Sacramento on July third and arrived at Nogales July sixth. The remainder of the troops including Brigade Headquarters entrained at Sacramento July fourth and arrived at Nogales, July sixth. The distance traveled by these troops from the mobilization camp to their destination was one thousand one hundred and seventy- one miles.

When the California troops arrived at Nogales, Arizona, they proceeded about one mile north from the town and established Camp "Stephen Little" where all the California troops were finally encamped.* Then began a period of time during which the soldiers were to learn and appreciate the full meaning of of the phrase, "watching and waiting on the border."

The duty on the Mexican border was of the most trying kind which soldiers can be called upon to perform. The movement and enthusiasm of active military operations supplies a spirit of its own, but the soldier who is required to wait inactive, finds it difficult to reconcile himself to the privations of camp life, to the separation from family and friends, from normal occupation and home. Yet, such trying service is exactly what was required of the National Guard on the border. The time of the officers and men was of course used profitably in military training and an enormous advantage accured to the country as a result.

Soon after the arrival of the troops at the border, a spirit of restlessness was evident and complaints were heard both from members of the guard forces and from their friends at home who failed to appreciate the necessity for the sacrffice in view of the absence of active operations. However, the spirit of the Guardsmen was high, their services were cheerful and their appreciation of the value of the training they were receiving was evidenced from all quarters.

It can be fairly stated that the mobilization of the National

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*Returns of First Brigade, California National Guard. On file.

Guard was accomplished with promptness and with a minimum of disease and discomfort. In view of the general situation and the suddenness of the call, there was little ground for complaint, particularly from the standpoint of hygiene and sanitation. A comparison with somewhat similar mobilization of citizen soldiers in 1898 showed clearly the advance that had been made in the knowledge of preventive medicines and camp sanitation in the army since the days of the Spanish-American War.

There, however, the words of praise must end. Without any sufficient reason, there seems to have been on many of the troop trains on the way to the border, a scarcity of food and what there was, was not the proper kind. It seems reasonable to believe that this deficiency could easily have been remedied. Every school boy is taught that it is hot along the Rio Grande River in summer. Yet, for weeks after the arrival of the troops at the border, thousands of them sweltered in heavy winter clothing. It was evident that the supply department was not functioning properly and weeks elapsed before the condition was remedied.*

Whenever the troop train stopped in a city or town for any length of time on the way south, there was a general clamor to be permitted to purchase food. Fresh or even canned fruit and vegetables were most in demand. Once or twice during the journey the men were allowed to leave the train and eat at a hotel or restaurant. Needless to say the opportunity was eagerly grasped. During part of the journey there was a marked scarcity of water which added greatly to the general discomfort. Water could be obtained at infrequent tanks along the road and severe restrictions were placed upon its use. One pail of water must suffice for for cleaning fifty mess kits.

Having established themselves at Camp Stephen Little, the California troops were, a good part of the time, at a loss for something to do. Work was supplied in plenty at times, but it was seldom of a character to appeal to the men. Almost invariably the duties so imposed came under one of the three classifications "details," "police" and "regulations." From the soldier's point of view, those are the three most important words in his vocabulary and also from the same viewpoint, the first mentioned word is probably the most distasteful one ever invented. Its

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*Watching and Waiting on the Border, by Roger Batchelder, Introduction, page 22.

mere mention would cause a soldier to disappear temporarily or to simulate sleep. The word detail signifies work outside the ordinary camp routine. It might mean that a new drain must be dug, that ice must be carried to the kitchen or that a load of cinders must be spread. If any mental or physical labor is to be performed, a "detail" is called for. The non-commissioned officer on whom the demand is made by the "top" sergeant calls the required number of men from the company at once. If he is on good terms with his own squad, he wins their sincere approval by going to the next squad. The victims thus selected perform the necessary labor under the watchful eye of the non-commissioned officer.

Some details require but a few minutes, others half a day. Sometimes a non-commissioned officer would call for volunteers to perform a certain piece of work. That was voluntary "detail" and conscription was unnecessary. Ordinary details were formed in the usual manner according to the likes or dislikes of the man in charge. Extra detail or extra duty was a punishment for a petty military misdemeanor. If the culprit speaks unkindly or disrespectfully to his corporal, if he is late at reveille, is unsatisfactory at inspection, or commits any of the numerous misdemeanors, he is reported to the first "top" sergeant who records his name in a little book. The next time a detail is necessary, the culprit is called, and with others in the same predicament as himself, ordered to report for duty. Ordinarily, voluntary details are practically unknown.

In the army the word "police" has an entirely different meaning from that conveyed by its use in civil life. Taken as a verb, its signifies the cleaning up of the camp, the tent or the kitchen as the case may be. Policing the company streets consists of forming the privates of the company in line a few feet apart, and at a given signal a thorough search is made for waste paper, burnt matches or any other refuse. Such refuse when found is deposited in the incinerator and burned. The same rule applies to the tent, the policing of which usually falls to the most unruly member of the squad. As applied to individuals the term police is restricted to the tent police just described and to kitchen-police. The latter is called the worst and also the best of camp duties.

There are usually two kitchen-police from each company. They arise with the cooks an hour in advance of the other members of the company. They bring water, build fires in the stove and incinerator and help prepare the morning mess. When the men appear for mess the police serve the food. Mess over, he washes the kitchen utensils, peels the vegetables for dinner

and performs any other work which the cook may dictate. The afternoon is spent in like manner and his work is usually finished by eight o'clock. In addition to performing the duties described, he is the object of whatever particular variety of abuse and profanity in the use of which the cook feels most proficient.

Yet, the boys of the kitchen-police are not to be underrated. He is in a position to assure himself of plenty of "seconds". He has free access to the fruit, the eggs and the meat. If he is on good terms with the cook, these and many other delicacies are his for the taking. He is also exempt from further duty that day. He cannot be summoned for details, nor need he stand inspection or drill. The position of kitchen-police is never sought, but is always accepted with peaceful complacency.

The word "Regulation" signifies that the object to which it is applied, has received the approval of the United States Government. Every article the soldier uses or wars must be "regulation". The stoves in the cook-shacks bear that stamp. The gun must be carried at the regulation angle; incinerators and drains must be constructed according to regulation. Freom reveille to taps every move of the soldier is governed by rules set forth in the United States Army Regulations.

During the first part of July the food served in camp wasof extremely poor quality. Evidently there was some trouble about drawing rations and there was certainly plenty of trouble in cooking them. Beans, which constituted the chief article of diet, were sometimes nearly raw; at other times they were burned. Like the cooking, many other important matters were exceedingly unsatisfactory. Not through fault of the officers or men of the militia and not caused by lack of honest endeavor, but at almost every turn, obstacles were encountered which were the result of the lack of foresight and experience.

The greater part of the State troops, unused to the intense heat of the Mexican border district, found conditions there almost unbearable at first. The requisitions of light weight clothing to replace the heavy woolen uniforms with which the men were equipped, did not arrive for some time, and a great many men were prostrated by the terrific heat. From eleven A.M. to three P.M. each day the termometer registered around 120 degrees inside the tents. Outside, in the sun it was hotter. Throughout the day there was a steady procession of stretchers conveying the victims of the heat to the hospital.

As soon as the camp near Nogales was settled, the regular army routine began. Reveille was sounded at six in the morning, followed by mess. At seven-thirty the companies were marched to the field and drilled for four hours. This may sound simple and easy, but it was far from easy for men unused to the intense heat of the border country in July. Mess came again at twelve o'clock. Theoretically, the afternoons were at the disposal of the men, but they were usually spent on detail work. Retreat was at five-thirty and was followed by mess again at six o'clock. No work was done during the evenings. Taps was sounded at ten o'clock.

The Machine-Gun Company was exempt from guard duty. One infantry company in each regiment performed interior guard duty every night. One company from each regiment was also sent out alternately as a border patrol. As at that time international affairs along the border were in a more or less unsettled condition, it was considered necessary to keep a platoon of machine gun men in readiness for action throughout the night. Two squads of these men were required to sleep under arms--fully dressed, outside the tents with loaded side arms and a machine gun with twelve hundred rounds of ammunition. At first the men were forced to sleep on the ground, but the early arrival of bunks relieved that discomfort.

The calling out of the militia and the presence of the enlarged force on the border, seemingly had the effect of completely changing the attitude of the Mexicans. The presence of the additional force enabled a sufficient number of troops to be so stationed as to provide adequate protection for American homes near the border. Disturbances by outlaws and bandits in Northern Mexico continued and roving bands moved through the territory harrassing Mexican forces and raiding Mexican communities. However the bandits did not venture to attack people of the United States.* In the meantime, the militia on the border was being drilled, their organizations perfected and their personnel was becoming accustomed to camp life in the performance of defensive duty.

Contrary to general belief, the danger along the border states, was not wholly from foreign raids, but partly from the Mexican population within the states of the Southwest. The population of these states, especially in the districts on or near the border, was largely Mexican. These aliens were closely united in every way, but chiefly through mutual hatred for the "gringo." In an attack or uprising they would prove a serious menace. These Mexicans of the Southwest were chiefly of the peon type and because

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*Annual Report of the War Department, volumn 1, page 13.

of higher wages and better conditions in general in the United States, they had flocked across the border. They were, almost without exception, illiterate, and according to Southwestern opinion, absolutely unscrupulous and untrustworthy. Ordinarily, the men were cowardly, but when inflamed with liquor, became reckless and dangerous.

A soldier might hesitate to go alone at night through the streets of the Mexican district, but a group of six would be as safe as if they were in camp. Mexicans living at isolated points or in the rural districts are more peaceable and quiet than those in the towns, and were very obliging. At any place, however, a soldier who addresses a Mexican receives more civil treatment than he would from one of his own countrymen. Possibly this respect is due to a certain fear of the man in uniform, for the unruly Mexican fares ill with the soldier. Strict orders, however, were issued to the Guardsmen as to their conduct and they were directed to use every precaution to prevent friction at the border.

The citizens of Nogales treated the militiamen with the utmost friendliness. They called the latter "The Boys" while the regulars were termed "soldiers" or troopers". Perhaps the application of the term "the boys" was due to the fact that the Guardsmen, rushed from such widely scattered points, supplied the protection these Arizonians had so long sought.

There were about 10,000 soldiers in and near Nogales. These consisted of United States Regulars and National Guardsmen from California, Utah, Idaho and Connecticut. The little town was constantly filled with soldiers, and stores sprung up over night to meet the demands of the military population. Prices advanced, especially on souvenirs and Mexican knick-knacks. An article which formerly cost a dollar was advanced to ten or fifteen dollars. In every line of business the merchants made the most of their opportunity and on pay-day the camp was thronged with peddlers selling souvenirs of every kind at exorbitant prices.

Pay day is the great event in the life of the soldier. It means the assurance of a month's supply of tobacco and a few days of luxurious extravagance. No pay had been received from the Federal Government until July fifteenth, and the finances of a majority of the Guardsmen were extremely low. Consequently, when one morning the pay call was blown before reveille, the air was at once filled with cheers and other evidences of delight. Needless to say that on this morning, there were no laggards.

begging to be allowed to remain in bed a few minutes longer. The National Guardsmen received the same amount of pay as men of like rank in the Regular Army.

A short drill of perhaps an hour took the place of the usual four hour maneuvers on that day. At nine o'clockthe companies were formed, with the men in the order of rank. First, the top sergeant, then the sergeants, corporals, cooks, farriers, first-class privates and privates. The paymaster, an officer from the Regular Army, sat at a bench, called the name of each individual and announced the amount due. The recipricant took his money and passed on. It was done very quickly, an entire company usually being paid in fifteen minutes or less. The companyies were thenformed in the streets and the amount due for canteen checks were paid to the first sergeant, credit amounting to not more than one third of the monthly pay having been extended. After the canteen checks were taken care of, individual debts were cancelled.* The mathematical intricacies in which some of the men became entangled required the services of an expert accountant before they could strike a balance. As taps blew and the men returned from town, many of them were penniless, all debts had been paid and every one was happy.

The canteen was to the army what the general store is to the country village. There the soldier could obtain, at moderate prices, all the necessities and luxuries of his life. Tobacco, candy, crackers, canned goods, ice cream and two per cent beer were the most popular. Many other indispensables could also be obtained. The canteens of the army were operated by members of the companies and whatever profits were obtained reverted to company funds.

Formerly, soldiers were permitted to purchase light wines and beer at their canteens. The sale of these beverages could be easily restricted and excesses prevented. It was decided, however, thatliquor should be prohibited in the army and the sale of one and two per cent beer only was allowed. As a result, the territory adjacent to the army posts became infested with saloons, or where the sale of liquor was prohibited by civil status, dives and rum-holes of the lowest order were to be found.

Where the soldier was formerly content with drinking real beer in his own canteen, under the new regulation he takes a walk

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*Watching and Waiting on the Border, by Roger Batchelder, pages 71, 72, 73.

and procures whiskey or something worse, often with unfortunate results. Prohibition or no prohibition, soldiers could purchase liquor anywhere. The soldier is no more vicious in temperment than the average civilian. The narrow minded type of reformer hailed as a great victory, the abolition of liquor in the army, while instead of remedying the situation he added to the perniciousness of the evil.*

The soldiers were greatly benefited by the work of the Y.M.C.A. in military circles. The recreation hall which was maintained at camp was a delight to all. The room was filled with benches and tables and was well supplied with writing materials which were furnished free of charge by the organization. There was a piano and equipmentfor playing checkers and dominos. Notices, baseball scores, telegrams and papers of general interest were posted on abulletin board. Leading newspapers from the home states of the troops were kept in files.

By a mild and almost imperceptible persuasiveness, the Y.M.C.A attendants exerted a beneficial influence over the men. As an example, to curb profanity they did not forbid swearing, but simply posted a small notice reading as follows: "If you must swear, put it in writing". This appealed to ones sense of humor and brought about the desired result. The Y.M.C.A. shack was crowded each night.

Toward the latter part of July a number of Guardsmen, among whom were several non-commissioned officers were discharged and sent home. Those relieved from further duty were for the most part, men with families dependent upon them, although there were many discharges on account of physical disability.

Orders were received August first for the establishment of schools in which privates were trained in the duties of non-commissioned officers. Many of the non-commissioned officers were relieved under the dependent provision, and the schools were established for the purpose of training men to fill the vacancies thus created.**

About 1:30 o'clock on the morning of August fourth, Sentry Claude Howard of the Twelfth United States Infantry was wounded by a shot fired by a Mexican sniper who was hidden on the opposite

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*Watching and Waiting on the Border, by Roger Batchelder, pages 94, 95.

**Oakland Tribune July 26, 1916, page 2, column 5.

side of the river. The sentry returned the fire but missed. The attack occurred near the end of the International Bridge near the town of Nogales. The bridge was being guarded at the time by ten men from Company C, Fifth Infantry, California National Guard. Howard was with the guards and was performing sentry duty when he was shot. The sound of the shots aroused the troops on both sides of the river. Howard was carried to a place of safety and the other members of Company C, under command of Captain Andrews were at once rushed to the scene of the disturbance.

About the same time, Mexican troops were observed approaching the bridge from the Mexican side and to all appearances a battle was imminent. Mexican soldiers and civilians assembled on the south bank of the river, shouting threats and insults at the Americans on the north bank. The Mexican officers appeared to have difficulty in restraining their men from rushing the bridge.

Additional American troops were summoned and held in readiness for instant action, but there was no further demonstration by the Mexicans. Instructions were issued by the officers of the United States troops for the utmost restraint. Later on, a formal request was made on General Calles, Mexican Commandant of the State of Sonora for a full explanation of the act of the sniper and a demand for the summary punishment of the guilty man.*

Gradually the hardships on the border began to lessen. The soldiers became accustomed to the hot days, and heat prostrations became rare occurrences. As the probability ofintervention in Mexican affairs lessened, and the possibility of returning home became less visionary, the men's spirits rose.

About this time, the men were ordered to spend their drill period in accustoming the mules to their packs and loads so that they might be used in army maneuvers. The mules had become slothful and indifferent to all save their rations of oats and trips to the river for water. The army mule, is undoubtedly endowed with more obstinacy and plain "cussedness" than any animal on earth. His mild innocent eyes are merely a screen for the villiany in his soul. Walk on the mule's

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*Oakland Tribune August 4, 1916, page 1, column 7.

right side and he will stop. Face him directly and he will walk steadily backwards. Bring him his oats and you will be rewarded with a well placed kick. If, as is said, to handle a mule perfectly you must know him, it is quite evident that few of the Guardsmen could boast of more than a passing acquaintance with the animals used on the border.

To pack a mule, he must first be caught, and to inveigle him from the corral was a process which consumed many minutes. Then the blinder must be placed over his eyes; clothe him with a blanket, set the aparejo* on his back; adjust the cinch and the mule is to all appearances, harnessed. But, let the blinder slip and the mule gives a jump, scatters the packers to the four points of the compass, discards all superfluous weight and disappears in a cloud of dust. Woe be unto him who attempts to block the animal's rush for freedom. Many minutes later the truant is led back with fire and happinessin his eye. He has gained a great moral victory. Having exacted a heavy toll of bruises and cuts, the mules became gradually accustomed to their burdens and resigned themselves to their labors.

About the fourteenth of July came a welcome relief from the blistering heat of the past two weeks in the form of a heavy downpour of rain accompanied by strongwind and lightning. Although there had been one or two storms with violent electrical disturbances, high winds and some rain, the rainy season was not actually ushered in on the border until about August fifteenth. As the first storm of the rainy season approached, there were the usual warnings. Portentous black clouds appeared in the west, then flashes of lightning and peals of thunder. These were in turn followed by a high wind which raised havoc with the tents, many of which collapsed or blew away entirely, leaving the clothing and paraphrenalia of the occupants at the mercy of the storm.

Then came the rain, sheets of it and it was real water. Pools formed in the streets, joined other pools and formed streams which flowed underneath the tents, invaded the cook shacks and extinguished the fires. The camp of the California troops was located in a depression and it was soon apparent that it would be impossible to remain there for any great length of time. The first storm passed quickly, but more were to follow. It

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*Aparejo: A sort of Mexican saddle used on pack trains in the Army.

was necessary therefore, to move the camp to higher ground and a suitable location was found about three miles north of Nogales on the Tucson road.* Moving operations commenced August seventeenth and continued until the twenty-third. The new camp was high and dry and as comfortable as it was possible to make it. Trenches were dug around the tents and outlets for the water were made.

By the twentieth of August all idea of entering Mexico had been abandoned and the thoughts of the Militiamen very naturally turned toward the prospect of home. The newspapers, and to some extent, certain Government officials, were responsible for the perplexity of the State troops as to when their term of service would end. The headlines of the papers read "Guardsmen will return to their homes soon." Then followed vague and unedifying columns of incoherence. Wild reports would spread through the camp. Rumors fixing the day the troops were to depart for their homes were heralded and when that day passed uneventfully, a new date was set for the Militiamen to leave the border.

Finally, the State troops became so disgusted with the unfounded rumors that the mere mention of the words "return home" was taboo and any unfortunate who revived the subject was likely to be sorry for his recklessness.

September brought fine weather. The days were still warm, but the heat was not excessive. The nights became really cold and about four o'clock in the morning, became uncomfortably so. Then there was a clamor for extra blankets and sweaters. A requisition was made and after the usual delay of several weeks, the quartermaster's depot forwarded an extra blanket for each man. As the supply of sweaters was limited, the issue of those garments was sufficient for only about half the men. Instead of retiring scantily clad, the Guardsman removed leggings and shoes only, donned a sweater if he were fortunate enough to haveone, put on several extra pairs of socks, wrapped himself in two blankets with pancho and overcoat on top. Even then he slept with some discomfort.**

With the cool weather, came new discomforts for the troopers. Flies and mosquitos appeared in swarms. Up to that time the number of these pests had been small, but now the mosquitos made

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*Monthly Return First Brigade, August, 1916, on file.

**Watching and Waiting on the Border, by Roger Batchelder, page 122.

the nights miserable. A few mosquito-nets were issued by the quartermaster, but there were not enough even for the non-commissioned officers. The flies, attracted to the tents, made sleeping in the afternoon impossible. The kitchens were beclouded with the insects; they could not be kept from the food. Conditions became so intolerable that wooden mess shacks of the "regulation" type were ordered built. These buildings were entirely enclosed in wire netting to exclude flies and vermin.

On the twenty-seventh of August word was received that the War Department had ordered the title "National Guard" to be dropped, and that the State troops be referred to as the "Organized Militia". It was declared that pursuant to the provisions of the Dick Militia Law, under which the California troops were mustered into the Federal service, they could not legally be termed "National Guard." The new title "Organized Milita" was carried in all official orders.*

On September first came the first order directing the return of an organized body of California troops to their home state. In compliance with Special Order Number 64, Headquarters, Nogales District, dated September 1, 1916, the Fifth California Infantry, fifty officers and six hundred and fifty-one enlisted men, left Nogales for the State Mobilization camp at Sacramento, California. One officer and thirty-nine men, (a Supply Company), were left at Nogales to care for horses and other property. On September third the Supply Company of the Fifth California Infantry left for Sacramento with horses, mules and wagons.**

Leaving the border service at about the same time that the Fifth California departed, were three regiments from New York, two from New Jersey, one from Maryland, two from Illinois, two from Missouri, one from Oregon, one from Washington and one from Louisiana, making in all about 15,000 of the National Guard or Organized Militia as it was termed by the Federal authorities. In view of the fact that substantially that number of troops had not been required for patrol duty on the border, it was decided by the High Command to return these regiments to their home states for muster out at an early date. The Fifth California Infantry reached Sacramento September 4, 1916 and wentinto camp, where routine

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*Los Angeles Tribune, August 27, 1916, page 4, column 1.

**Returns of the First Brigade, National Guard ofCalifornia, September 3, 1916, on file. Adjutant General's Office.

camp duties were performed until the regiment was mustered out of the Federal service, October 7, 1916.*

From September one until September nine, 1916, that portion of the California contingent remaining at Nogales, performed routine camp duties. On the tenth of September, 1916, the monotony of camp routine was broken when pursuant to instructions of the Commanding General of the Nogales, Arizona District, dated August 21, 1916, the First Brigade of Infantry, California National Guard, proceeded by marching to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for target and field practice. The regiments broke camp at Nogales at 7:10 A.M. September tenth and marched to Nogales Pumping Plant a distance of seven and one half miles. On September eleven, they marched to Patagonia, Arizona, a distance of fourteen miles. On September twelve, the Brigade reached Old Fort Crittenden, Arizona, having marched ten miles that day. September thirteen, they marched twelve miles to Elgin, Arizona. On September fourteen, they marched a distance of fourteen miles to Clark's Ranch and on September fifteen, marched through Fort Huachuca to Garden Canyon, Arizona, a distance of eleven miles. The Brigade made camp at Garden Canyon, four miles from Fort Huachuca and remained in camp there until October seventh engaging, during that time in field exercises and rifle practice.

The Seventh Regiment, California Infantry remained in camp at Garden Canyon September fifteen to September twenty-four, performing various battalion and regimental problems. On September twenty-five the Seventh Infantry marched to Fort Huachuca Rifle Range for target practice. California Ambulance Company No. 1, three officers and forty-nine men, were attached to the First Brigade for the period from September then to September thirty, 1916, inclusive, performing routine camp and other duties pertaining to their branch of the service. On October one, these two Companies were ordered to return to their station at Nogales and accordingly left Garden Canyon on that date.

The Second Regiment, California Infantry engaged in target practice at Fort Huachuca Rifle Range September sixteen to September twenty-four and on September twenty-five, marched four miles to Camp GardenCanyon.

Brigade Headquarters and the Second Regiment California Infantry

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*Oakland Tribune, September 4, 1916, page 1, column 5.
Adjutant General Report 1914-1920, page 18.

remained in camp at Garden Canyon, and the Seventh Infantry remained on the Rifle Range at Fort Huachuca until October seventh, on which date orders were received to proceed immediately to Nogales.*

Pursuant to instructions, the Brigade, consisting of the Second and Seventh Regiments of California Infantry, broke camp at Garden Canyon on October seventh and marched twelve miles through a driving rain to Pyatt's Ranch. On October eight, the Brigade marched 14.7 miles to Parker's Ranch. On October ninth they marched sixteen miles to Patagonia and on the tenth of October covered the remaining distance of 21 1/2 miles to the permanent camp at Nogales.**

The hardest and most trying days of the border service for the infantry, were those from September 10 to October 10, 1916. The troops had been inspected repeatedly and had maneuvered so consistently that there was no necessity for continuing. The harrassed authorities of the Southern Department asked dubiously, "what can we do with the Guardsmen"? for the authorties at Washington had not decided as yet, to send all of the State troops home. Finally, the idea to send the troops on a long march for maneuvers and rifle practice presented itself and orders were issued accordingly.

On the evening preceding the start all personal belongings and surplus equipment were packed and stored. The tents were not struck as they would not be needed during the trip. The Second and Seventh Regiments, California Militia, left camp Stephen Little at 7:10 on the morning of September ten. The weather was fine and the much dreaded sun had not commenced its daily career of frightfulness. As the march was begun, the band and the drum corps played spirited pieces or shrilled old marching songs. Every one sang, or tried to sing and everyone was in good spirits. As the morning progressed, the sun grew hotter until finally it became the usual ball of fire. Heavy clouds of dust arose from beneath the feet of the marchers, riny alkaline particles penetrated the throat, irritated the membranes and dried the tongue and mouth. The canteens became quite hot and the lukewarm water which they then contained

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*Returns of the First Brigade, California Infantry, September and October, 1916, on file.

**Report of First Brigade, California Infantry, 1916, on file.

afforded only momentary relief.

Finally, shortly afternoon camp was pitched. Then came the search for water, and in accordance with the inviolable rule of the army the animals must be cared for before the men themselves. The site of the camp was a typical stretch of Arizona desert, dry and dusty, the surface dotted with clumps of cacti and mesquite. The pitching of the pup tents was somewhat difficult. The tent pins were driven but they soon loosened and came out.

The pup tents were small shelters consisting of two halves and were intended for two men, one half of the tent carried by each man. There were also the tent pins and two tent poles. When tents are pitched, each man selects a bunk-mate from his squad. The paid then undo their blanket rolls, button the halvesof the shelter together, place the poles and drive the pins. Blanket and pancho are spread on the grond inside the tent and side arms are hung on the tent-poles. These tents are by no means satisfactory to thier occupants. The tent pins are small and are easily uprooted. The slightest movement of the sleeper, causes the structure to collapse. A heavy rain, as the men discovered later to their sorrow, penetrates the thin canvas and causes great discomfort to the occupatns of the tents.

Pracitcally the same routine was followed day after day until the troopers reached Garden Canyon, Arizona. The heat, during the middle of thedays was almost unbearable and there were many prostrations. The water in the canteens of the soldiers became hot and the alkaline dust was no mere cloud hovering over the army, but a thick cloak which enveloped then completely. At frequent intervals an infantryman would drop, overcome by the heat, and lie exhausted on his pack. Some few were bleeding at the mouth.

During the return march from Garden Canyon to Nogales conditions were practically the same, with the exception that a heavy driving rain was encountered and added to the general discomfort. The average day's march was much longer on the return trip than on the outgoing one, the last day of which on October tenth was especially long, a distance of twenty-one and one half miles having been covered. On the outgoing march, two days were consumed in traveling the same distance.

During the month that elapsed from September 10, to October 10, 1916, while the Second and Seventh Regiments of Infantry, California National Guard were engaged in marching and in target and

field practice; the First Battalion, Field Artillery, Company B, Signal Corps and the First Squadron of Cavalry, National Guard of California remained in camp near Nogales performing border patrol and routine duties. The dreary monotony of camp routine endured by these organizations was perhaps even more trying than the hardships endured by the Infantry.

Upon the return to Nogales of the two Infantry regiments, on October 10, they remained in camp, performing only routine duties until October 18, when orders were received from the Commanding General of the Nogales District that Brigade Headquarters, the Second and Seventh Regiments of California Infantry, Company B, Signal Corps, and the First Squadron, California Cavalry proceed to Mobilization Camp at Los Angeles, California muster out. Accordingly, Brigade Headquarters and the Seventh Infantry broke camp and entrained at Nogales October 18, for Los Angeles, and arrived at the latter city October 20. Camp was established at Exposition Park, Los Angeles where the regiment remained until mustered out of the Federal service, November 11, 1916.

The next organization to leave the border district was Company B, Signal Corps, National Guard of California. This company entrained at Nogales, Arizona for Los Angeles October 19 and arrived at the California city October 21. The Second California Infantry entrained for Los Angeles at Nogales, October 23 and arrived at Los Angeles October 25.

The First Squadron of California Cavalry entrained at Nogales October 26 for Los Angeles, and arrived at the latter city October 28. All of these organizations established camp at Exposition Park, Los Angeles where they remained, performing routine camp duties and duties pertaining to the mustering out of the Federal service of the various organizations of the California National Guard.

Company B, Signal Corps was mustered out of the Federal service on November 6, 1916. The Seventh Infantry Regiment was mustered out on November 11. The SecondRegiment of California Infantry was mustered out November 15, and the First Squadron of Cavalry was mustered out November 17, 1916. California Field Hospital No. 1 was mustered out of Federal service October 31 and Ambulance Company No. 1 was mustered out on the same date. The above organizations were all mustered out of Federal service at the mobilization camp in Exposition Park, Los Angeles.

First Battalion Field Artillery consisting of the Staff, Batteries A, B and C, and the Sanitary Detachment; also Company A, Engineers, did not receive orders to return to their home state for muster out with the other California troops. Affairs on the border were still in an unsettled state and the Artillery and Engineers were held there as a precautionary measure until relations between the United States and Mexico became less disquieting.

Battery B of the First Battalion of Field Artillery, returned to Los Angeles from Nogales, Arizona December 15 and was mustered out of the Federal service at Mobilization Camp, Exposition Park, Los Angeles, December 21, 1916.* Battery A of the First Battalion, Field Artillery arrived at Los Angeles December 22 and was mustered out ofFederal service at Mobilization Camp, Exposition Park, Los Angeles on December 30, 1916.** Battery C of the First Battalion Fidled Artillery left Nogales December 21, 1916 and was mustered out of Federal service at Stockton, California, its home station,on January 6, 1917.***

Company A, Engineers remained on duty at the border about two months after the departure of Battery C, and was mustered out of Federal service March 6,1917.

Thus ended the mobilization of State troops on the Mexican border. Villa had fled from one hiding place to another in the mountains of northern Mexico and the wounded fugitive cut too poor a figure to attract support among his countrymen. His activities and those of the other lawless bands in northern Mexico gradually ceased to menace the safety of Americans along the border. The rule of order extended more and more widely throughout Mexico as the Mexican people proceeded to establish a constitutional government. The expeditionary force under Brigadier-General John J. Pershing which maintained itself on Mexican soil from March, 1916 until February 5, 1917, engaged in no serious conflicts. It would seem that General Pershing's force, exercised, by its mere presence in Mexico, a stabilizing effect in the territory. The outlaw forces which had been disturbing

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*Los Angeles Herald, December 15, 1916, page 9, column 2.

**Los Angeles Herald, December 22, 1916, page 13, column 6.

***Los Angeles Herald, January 6, 1917, page 6, column 3.

northern Mexico, rapidly disintegrated and the purpose of the expedition was satisfactorily accomplished.* However, after the withdrawal of the Organized Militia forces from the border, the situation still required the presence there of the major part of all the American troops stationed in the United States.

As a result of the mobilization of the Organized Militia, many valuable lessons were learned. After the period of intensive training, the men returned to their homes in the best of physical condition. The four months of outdoor life gave the men a foundation for health which, in the yearsthat followed, proved of great benefit to them. Yet, to effect that great blessing, there was the lamentable fact that many men were ruined or at least financially crippled as a direct result of their period of service on the border.** Positions were lost, mortgages were foreclosed, bills went unpaid. In spite of the fact that they were urgently needed at home, some of the men found it impossible to obtain either a furlough or a discharge.

One group that deserved the most sympathy was that composed of men who were buying homes on the installment plan. When their earning capacity was curtailed, the installment payments necessarily stopped, leaving their families subject to ejection. Countless positions were lost for good. Many small business ventures collapsed entirely during the absence of the owners. It was not a time of war and it did not seem just or right that oneman in a thousand should abandon his calling for that of a soldier, when he was financially unable to do so, while the other nine hundred and ninety-nine, many of whom were untroubled by financial worries, remained at home untroubled by business calamities or financial disaster.

The mobilization of the National Guard provided an excellent opportunity for training, both to the men in the Guard and to the supply departments of the Government. This afforded a most serviceable foundation upon which to proceed with the larger expansion of the Military Establishment which the country was soon called upon to undertake.

The Guardsmen were sent to the border in wretched condition.

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*Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1917, pages 3 and 4.

**Watching and Waitingon the Border, by Roger Batcherlder, pages 207 and 208.

Proper accountrements were lacking. The guns were imperfect and almost without ammunition. Most important of all, the men had had practically no experience in service conditions. The number of prostrations during the first few weeks showed that the troops were physically unable to endure the hardships of a campaign, to say nothingof maneuvers. If the raw troops had been required to enter Mexico immediately after their arrival at the border, a few day's,marching on the deserts with the usual equipment would have exterminated most of their number, regardless of the condition of the fighting equipment.

Upon their return from border duty, the troops of the National Guard were confronted with a set of new regulations providing that before the National Guard of California could be recognized under the Congressional Act of June 3, 1916, all officers must subscribe to a new oath of office and all enlistedmen must sign a new oath of enlistment.* The new oath of enlistment provided as follows:

> "I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted this -- day of ----- 19 -- as a soldier in the National Guard of the United States and of the state of ------- the United States and of the state of ------ for the period of three years and three years in the reserve, under the conditions prescribed by law, unless sooner discharged by proper authority. And I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of American and to the State of -----, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever, and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the Governor of the State of ----- and of the officers appointed over me according to law and the rules and articles of war. This oath is subscribed to with the understanding that credit will be given in the execution of this contract for the period that I have already served under my currect enlistment in the Organized Militia of the State of -----. So help me God."**

When the California Guardsmen were mustered into the service of the United States at the Mobilization Camp in Sacramento,

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*Adjutant General Report 1914-1920, page 20.

**~~Special Order No.~~ 6. Adjutant General's Office, dated March 7, 1917.

just prior to the date they left there for duty on the border, not all of them had subscribed to the new form of oath. Details concerning the new law had not been worked out or thoroughly understood by the mustering officers or even by the high command before the troops entrained. It was not understood that it would be necessary for those who had previously subscribed to an oath of enlistment, to subscribe to a new form of oath under the new National Defense act.

Such, however, was the situation. Under the Federal law of June 3, 1916, all officers and men who subscribed to the oath prescribed in that statute, retained their membership in the National Guard, while those who did not subscribe to that oath were automatically severed from the National Guard, but still remained members of the California Organized Militia. Thus, when the California troops were mustered out of the Federal service upon their return from duty on the Mexican border, those who subscribed to the new Federal oath thereby became members of the new National Guard, while those who did not subscribe to that oath continued to be members of the Organized Militia of California under the law in force at the time of their enlistment. A large number refused to sign the oath, thus leaving the National Guard of California in a position where, with the exception of the Coast Artillery, it was represented by a force averaging approximately eleven men per company.*

Yet, the large number of officers and men who refused to subscribe to the new form of oath under the National Defense act, still retained membership in the old Organized Militia and were members of the same organizations as their comrades who had subscribed to the new oath and had become members of the National Guard. Thus, there existed for the time being, the old Organized Militia and the reorganized National Guard.

General Order No. 34, State of California, dated December 29, 1916, provided that in order to prevent organization commanders of the new National Guard from carrying officers or enlisted men under the National Defense Act and the old Organized Militia in the same company, all organization and detachment commanders should forward to their superior officers a list of the members of their organizations who had not and did not intend to take the new Federal oath. The officers and men so listed were placed on an unassigned list, so that they might be dropped from the rolls of the organization.

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*Adjutant General Report, 1914-1920, page 20.

Then followed General Order No. 15, dated June 1, 1917, which provided that all enlisted men of the Organized Militia of California who had not taken the Federal contract oath of enlistment, as prescribed in the National Defense Act and not previously discharged, were thereby ordered discharged from the military service of the State of California.

As soon as the extremely low membership in the National Guard of California became definitely established, an intensive recruiting campaign was inaugurated and by the first of March, 1917, the organizations, outside of the Coast Artillery, had an average strength of thirty-five enlisted men.*

The order of June 1, 1917, definitely disposed of the old California National Guard or Organized Militia, and a reorganized State force conforming with the requirements of the National Defense Act, and composed mainly of new recruits, was rapidly taking form.

After the withdrawal from the Mexican border of the various units of the National Guard, an adequate force of Regulars was maintained in Texas, Arizona and New Mexico to prevent further trouble from scattered bands of outlaws. The Mexican incident, which had at times seemed to be fraught with possibilities of grave embarrassment in the relations of the two Republics, was happily closed. That such an outcome was possible was in no small degree due to the sacrifices made and to the self restraint and consideration shown by the officers and soldiers of the American Army and of the National Guard.

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*Adjutant General Report 1914-1920, page 20.